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OPERATIONAL REPORT


LESSONS LEARNED

4TH

LESSONS LEARNED

4TH

Infantry



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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1 - SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES	PARA	PAGE
GENERAL	1	1
INTELLIGENCE	2	2
OPERATION AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES	3	11
LOGISTICS	4	19
CIVIC ACTION	5	23
PERSONNEL	6	29
ENGINEER	7	33
ARMY AVIATION	8	35
INSPECTOR GENERAL	9	35
SIGNAL	10	35
INFORMATION ACTIVITIES	11	37
SECTION 2 - COMMANDERS OBSERVATION, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS	PARA	PAGE
PERSONNEL	1	39
OPERATIONS		39
TRAINING	3	44
INTELLIGENCE		45
LOGISTICS	5	46
ORGANIZATION	6	48
TACTICAL COVER AND DECEPTION	7	48
OTHER	8	48

By 4th Infantry Div.
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED ON DEC. 31/1974.

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INCLOSURES

TITLE

1. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
2. KEY PERSONNEL
3. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY
4. CHEMICAL OPERATIONS
5. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
6. COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT - TASK FORCE MATHEWS

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

SECTION 1 (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES *Ag 4th Inf Div*

1. (C) General.

a. During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation MAC ARTHUR. On 15 July the operation was renamed BINH TAY-MAC ARTHUR in keeping with the practice of conducting combined operations with ARVN and territorial units wherever possible.

b. Organizational Structure. Task organization for Operation BINH TAY-MAC ARTHUR for the period is contained at inclosure 1.

c. Key personnel. Commanders as of the end of the reporting period are listed at inclosure 2.

d. Mission.

(1) The general mission of the division at the end of the reporting period was to conduct surveillance and offensive operations and to provide maximum support to the Government of VIETNAM's Refugee Resettlement Program and the Revolutionary Development Program.

(2) The specific missions of the 4th Infantry Division are to:

(a) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN Border and destroy enemy (NVA/VC) units within the assigned area of operations.

(b) Block enemy infiltration routes from CAMBODIA/LAOS across the highlands into the coastal provinces.

(c) Conduct spoiling attacks and ambush operations.

(d) Destroy enemy base areas and supply installations.

(e) Detect and eliminate VIET CONG infrastructure.

(f) Clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility.

(g) Support the Government of VIETNAM's EDAP ENANG Resettlement Program.

(h) Open, secure and maintain land lines of communication.

(i) Be prepared to deploy forces for the relief/reinforcement of Camp

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18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

Strike Forces, Regional and Popular Forces, critical signal sites and sector/
subsector headquarters within II Corps Tactical Zone.

(j) Provide to I Field Force, VIETNAM, a battalion size reserve on order.

2. (C) Intelligence

a. General: At the beginning of the reporting period, the enemy posed a three divisional threat to friendly installations and units in KONTUM Province. The 1st NVA Division was deployed west of POLEI KLENG, where their drive toward POLEI KLENG and KONTUM City in late March had been stopped by the ring of 4th Infantry Division fire support bases established on the mountains dominating the approaches to the enemy objective. The 325C NVA Division had moved into the Tri-border (LAOS-CAMBODIA-VIETNAM) area in late April from KHE SANH, and was preparing to launch an offensive to take BEN HET and DAK TO. The 2nd NVA Division had moved from DANANG into LAOS border area north of DAK PEK in late April, and was preparing for attacks on Special Forces Camps.

During May and early June 1st NVA Division conducted heavy attacks by fire and small ground probes against the fire support bases west of POLEI KLENG with little success, while at the same time sustaining severe casualties from B-52 strikes and artillery. With casualties and supply shortages mounting, the 1st NVA Division withdrew into Base Area 702 in CAMBODIA in late June. In May and early June the 325C Division conducted several futile attacks on 4th Infantry Division fire support bases deployed around BEN HET. After suffering very heavy casualties from friendly fire power, which included numerous B-52 strikes, the 325C Division withdrew in mid-June to Base Area 609 in LAOS and CAMBODIA. In late May, the 2nd NVA Division overran two Special Forces Camps in I Corps, and moved into position to take DAK PEK. Rapid deployment of two US battalions into fire support bases between DAK PEK and the enemy forces, combined with concentrated B-52 strikes, forced the 2nd NVA Division to withdraw to the north.

After remaining in Base Area 702 until early July, the 1st NVA Division deployed south to DARLAC Province and began preparation for an attack on BAN ME THUOT to take place in early or mid-August.

Additional intelligence indicated that the 18B and 95th NVA Regiments would move from the coast across DARLAC to B-3 Front base areas in CAMBODIA during the latter part of July and remain there for three months to train and resupply. One battalion of each regiment was to remain on the coast for deception purposes. This movement was conducted, and at the end of the reporting period these units were in CAMBODIAN base areas west of DUC CO.

At the end of the reporting period, the 1st NVA Division was in position north and south of BAN ME THUOT, and constituted the major enemy threat in the Central Highlands. The 325C NVA Division remained in Base Area 609. The 2nd NVA Division which has moved away from the 4th Inf Div Area of Operations, is no longer considered an immediate threat.

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

(1) KONTUM: A massive build-up of enemy forces characterized activity in KONTUM Province during early May. After the infiltration of enemy forces was completed by mid-May, friendly forces were opposed by the largest concentration of enemy units ever assembled in the Central Highlands.

After overrunning KHAM DUC Special Forces Camp, QUANG RIN Province, on 11 May, control elements of the 2nd NVA Division along with the 21st Regt moved south into the DAK PEK area of northern KONTUM. The enemy units arrived in the area west of DAK PEK SF Camp in late May and prepared positions from which they could launch offensive operations against the camp. The apparent mission of the unit was to overrun DAK PEK.

The 325C NVA Div, with two well-equipped regiments, moved into the area west of BEN HET, and on 9 May overran a Camp Strike Force Co on Hill 990 just west of the BEN HET SF Camp. The ultimate objective of the division was to overrun the 1st Bde, 4th Infantry Division to seize DAK TO. PW's and HOI CHANHS indicated that the 325C NVA Div would employ tanks and artillery during the forthcoming offensive

To oppose the threat the 1st Bde, 4th Infantry Division established fire bases on the high ground surrounding the objectives and massed their fire-power against the known enemy positions. The 1st Bde was initially joined by the 3 Bde, 101st Abn on 26 May, however, because of the continued build-up in the DAK PEK area, the 3d Bde (-) was moved to the high ground west and north of DAK PEK on 28 May.

West of POLEI KLENG, the 1st NVA Div, with three regiments, the 174th 320th, and 66th, were completing preparations for their attempted breakthrough of 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div bases located on critical terrain surrounding the POLEI KLENG SF Camp. Once they had seized POLEI KLENG, the division would attempt to wrest KONTUM City from allied control.

The enemy offensive in the Highlands was in full swing by late May and continued to mid-June. In late May, the major contacts were enemy initiated.

The enemy's thrust in the DAK PEK and POLEI KLENG areas was characterized by intense attacks by fire. In late May fire base BRILLO PAD, west of POLEI KLENG, received 1100 rounds of incoming RR, mortar, and rocket fire in a 4 day period. Eighty-two recoilless guns and 140mm rockets were employed for the first time in the Highlands during the attacks by fire against installations in the DAK PEK area in late May and early June. These attacks were followed by assaults against the fire bases which resulted in moderate enemy casualties and light friendly losses.

The fiercest fighting took place west of BEN HET. On 26 May, Fire Support Base 29, just southwest of BEN HET, received an intense attack by fire and ground assault by an NVA Bn. This attack resulted in 150 confirmed enemy killed. US forces suffered light casualties. On 30 May, just northwest

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18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

of BEN HET, a fire base on Hill 990 was hit by a battalion-sized unit resulting in 50 enemy killed and only light friendly losses. For the first time, the enemy employed 100mm guns and 105mm howitzers in the Central Highlands; however, the projected armor threat never materialized. By early June the enemy's drive had been blunted by superior allied firepower and airpower.

Two tactics, the control of the high ground and the extensive use of B-52 strikes, assured the US forces of the ultimate victory. Fire support bases were established along the key terrain surrounding the enemy's objectives. These fire bases were then covered by mutually supporting artillery. The NVA were thus forced to mass their forces in an attempt to break through the wall of fire bases. However, when they massed for the attack, an unprecedented number of B-52 strikes were unleashed on their positions. By the time the enemy's defeat was completed in mid-June, 178 B-52 strikes had been launched against them.

The withdrawal of enemy forces began in early June in the BEN HET area and ended by late June in the DAK PEK and POLEI KLENG area. The 325C Div, which had been hit the hardest, withdrew west into base area 609 in the tri-border area in early June. Since that period, enemy activity has been at low level in the BEN HET area. Small recon units from the 325C Div have conducted only minor harassing attacks, but a threat continues in the area as long as the 325C Div remains located in Base Area 609.

After failing in the DAK PEK area, the 21st Regt, 2nd NVA Div withdrew northwest into LAOS in mid-June and left behind platoon-size heavy weapons units to cover their withdrawal and conduct harassing attacks in the area. By late July indications were that the 21st Regt and 2nd NVA Div HQs had completely exfiltrated the area.


The pattern established in the DAK PEK and BEN HET areas was followed by the 1st NVA Div west of POLEI KLENG in late June. After being repulsed in their attacks on POLEI KLENG, the division began its movement southwest into base area 702 in CAMBODIA, leaving friendly forces in control of southwestern KONTUM Province. Since that time, there have been no indications of enemy movement back into the area. The major elements of the 1st NVA Div ultimately infiltrated into DARLAC Province.

The 24th NVA Regt had been operating north of KONTUM City. On 15 May almost an entire battalion of the 24th NVA Regt was annihilated during an assault on a Regional Force/Popular Force hamlet northeast of KONTUM City. In late June it withdrew to CAMBODIA, and probably then moved to DARLAC Province with the 1st NVA Div. During July, the KONTUM City area was extremely quiet with only 304 LF Bn and 406 Sapper Bn conducting mining operations and resupply missions in the area.

(2) PLEIKU: In late April, elements of the 6th Bn, 32nd, NVA Regt moved from the west, along the PLEIKU-KONTUM boundary, toward Highway 14N. The unit's

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HOHTUM PROVINCE
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
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ENEMY ATTEMPTS TO DESTROY FIRE SUPPORT BASES

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KONTUM PROVINCE

ENEMY WITHDRAWAL AFTER BEING DEFEATED



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~~TOP SECRET~~

DAK PHU

14

KHUM PROVINCE

DAK SEANG

LAO

PSB 25


BIEN HIEI

PSB 29

21

DAK TO

PSB 3



CAMBODIA

14

FOLKI ELENG

~~TOP SECRET~~

KONTOM

SITUATION AS OF 31 JULY 68

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AVDDH-GC-MH

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

mission was to interdict traffic, both supply convoys and security forces, moving from PLEIKU to KONTUM. During May, in attempting to accomplish this mission, the unit conducted harassment activities, mining, and two major ambushes. The 6th Bn lost 122 men killed in a 5 May attempted ambush about 28 km north of PLEIKU City, and another 15 killed on 26 May about 19 km north of the City. In both cases, north bound convoys were attacked. PW's from these contacts indicated that their unit, 6th Bn, 32nd Regt, has been guided, while moving into the province, by elements of the 95B Regt. One of the PW's stated the unit was moving to join the 95B Regt when it conducted the 5 May attack.

Documents captured in these contacts indicated that the unit's moral was very low. The commander's personal notes revealed that many of his cadre and men were new, lacking in experience, and that some of his equipment was inadequate for the mission. The 6th Bn, 32nd Regt failed in its mission of interdicting the highway. Armor and gunships proved too much of a challenge for the unit, which, no longer combat effective, dispersed into the high ground east of Highway 14. There were no identifications of any elements of the 6th Bn, 32nd Regt from late May through July.

In northwestern PLEIKU Province, an increase of river traffic and trail activity, from early to mid-May, revealed that enemy forces, probably elements of the 1st NVA Div, were moving into the area from southwestern KONTUM Province. Long Range Patrol contacts confirmed the presence of unidentified squad and company size enemy units. A subsequent decrease of activity in this region was followed in late June by an increased amount of low level reports and significant visual reconnaissance, revealing that unidentified enemy elements were entering the province from CAMBODIAN base areas west of PLEI DJERENG and northwest of DUC CO. LRP contacts with squad and company size NVA units, and concurrent minor incidents along Highway 14B, continued in the area until late July. The activity then decreased, having produced no major contacts or enemy unit identifications.

The enemy fired 122mm rockets into allied installations in the PLEIKU City area in early May and June, including 4th Infantry Division Base Camp, CAMP ENARI. In one of these attacks, which damaged two C-47's at PLEIKU Air Force Base, the enemy fired his rockets at about 1800 hours. All other attacks occurred between 2400 and 0200 hours. The enemy units involved were elements of the 31st Bn, 40th Artillery Regt. The 1st Co, 31st Bn, 40th Arty Regt was identified in a contact 18 km southwest of CAMP ENARI on 22 May. A PW stated that the 1st Co, equipped with four 122mm rocket launchers, was targeted against CAMP ENARI, while the 2nd Co had two 122mm launchers and was targeted against PLEIKU City. Documents captured on 30 May, 15 km northeast of PLEIKU City, identified the 31st Bn, 40th Arty Regt.

From May to July, harassing attacks and attacks by fire were conducted against the PLEIKU City area by elements of the 408th Sapper Bn. This unit, operating from the DE MANG area, 20 to 24 km northeast of PLEIKU

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

City, had the mission of destroying personnel and equipment at installations around the city. Throughout the period, the effectiveness of the attacks decreased since the 408th had not successfully rebuilt its ranks following the TET Offensive. Locally trained replacements led by inexperienced officers, combined with food shortages, produced low morale. The 408th Sapper Bn was last identified in an attack against bridge security elements 15 km east of PLEIKU City on 4 June. A PW captured in the attack identified himself as XO, 70th Co, 408th Sapper Bn.

Segments of a major enemy resupply route across southern PLEIKU Province were revealed by a contact with an NVA transportation company 9 km south of PLEI ME and by the discovery of three large ammunition caches 12 km north-east of PLEI ME in early June, as well as the discovery of five large rice caches, in late June, to 15 km southeast of PLEI DO LIM, along the DAK AYUNH River. Also, the discovery of a large cache of 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds 16 km east of PLEI DO LIM shows that the route was used for resupply, probably to elements of the 95B Regt in the DAK PAYAU Valley. Documents captured in a 1 June contact south of PLEI ME revealed that the transportation company was coordinating with the 95B Regt.

Elements of the 95B Regt occupied base areas in the southern DAK PAYAU Valley, south of Highway 19E. The 5th Bn, 95B Regt continued its mission of ambushing vehicular traffic along this highway. There was a total of 17 squad size ambushes during this period, from LE TRUNG District HQ to the Province boundary, in which the enemy employed small arms and RPG-2 fire.

The 5th Bn, 95B Regt was identified by a prisoner captured in a squad size ambush 38 km east of PLEIKU City in late June. The enemy also directed 75mm recoilless rifle and 60mm mortar fire against installations along the highway.

Friendly elements were deployed in the DAK PAYAU Valley in mid-June. Squad to platoon size mixed VMC and NVA units were met in sporadic contacts which continued through early July. As a result of these contacts, the 5th Bn, as well as the Engineer, Anti-Aircraft, and Medical Support Companies of the 95B Regt were identified. From mid to late July these elements remained in the lower DAK PAYAU Valley, reorganizing and reestablishing their base areas.

(3) DARIAC: At the beginning of the reporting period, the 32nd and 33d NVA Regiments were located in Base Area 740 in CAMBODIA, where they had retreated in mid-April to conduct training and to resupply. The training consisted of hit and run tactics for use in attacking friendly outposts. The first action of the period took place on 6 May 68, when DUC IAP was attacked by the 5th Bn, 32nd Regt. The objective was to divert attention from the withdrawal of the 32nd and 33rd Regiments to III Corps and probably to test the effectiveness of their recent training. The attack consisted of mortar and rocket bombardment of the DUC IAP Special Forces Camp and MACV sub-sector

AVDDH-GC-MH

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

headquarters, with ground forces attacking the latter. The enemy suffered moderate casualties in the two days of battle in and around DUC IAP. The 5th Bn, 32nd Regt returned to Base Area 740 after the attack.

Enemy activity from mid-May to mid-July was at a low level in DARLAC Province. Enemy units known to be operating in the province were the E-301 and 401 Local Force Battalions with a combined strength of approximately 400 men. Activity was characterized by attacks by fire on friendly installations. The weapons employed in these attacks were 60mm and 82mm mortars, 75mm RR, and 122mm rockets. Minor contacts with VC/VMC units were also noted.

Enemy activity increased in mid-July when NVA company-size units were contacted during operations conducted by Special Forces. Elements of the 1st NVA Div were detected in mid-July moving forces into DARLAC. The 1st NVA Div and the 66th NVA Regt were identified north of BAN ME THUOT by a HOI CHANH who returned on 21 July, by documents captured on 22 July, and by contacts during the last two weeks of July. Documents were captured on 15 and 27 July that identified the 2nd Co, K-39 Bn, which had been left behind by the 33rd Regt to provide infantry support for the rocket attacks on BAN ME THUOT. The E-301 LF Bn was again identified by documents captured on 26 July.

In late June documents captured by ROK forces on the coast revealed that the 18B and 95th NVA Regiments, 5th NVA Division, would move across DARLAC to E-3 Front base areas in CAMBODIA, where they would train and resupply for approximately three months. Each regiment was to cache their weapons before moving out, and a battalion from each regiment was to be left behind for deception purposes. In July these units moved across DARLAC, and at the end of the reporting period were training and resupplying in CAMBODIAN base areas west of DUC CO.

At the end of the reporting period, it became obvious, based on reports, sighting, and contacts with 1st NVA Div reconnaissance elements, that BAN ME THUOT was the objective of the 1st NVA Div. The first indication of the planned attack came from a VMC agent who penetrated a 4th Infantry Division LRP team and was captured on 17 July. This agent revealed that an attack on BAN ME THUOT was planned for 9 August. Further indication of this attack was provided by a PW from a local VC force, who was captured on 26 July. He stated that BAN ME THUOT would be attacked on 10 August. Units to participate in the attack are expected to be the 66th, 320th, and 24th Regiments. The attacks will reportedly come from the south, southeast and north. All indications are that the attacks will take place in early or mid-August.

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

b. Estimated Enemy Composition, Disposition and strength on 31 July 1968.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CURRENT EST STR</u>	<u>LAST KNOWN LOCATION</u>
B-3 Front Hq	500	Tri-border area
325C NVA Inf Div (HQ & SPT)	2200	Tri-border area
101D NVA Inf Regt	1600	Tri-border area
95C NVA Inf Regt	1800	Tri-border area
1st NVA Inf Div (HQ & SPT)	1415	CAMBODIA/DARLAC border
66th NVA Inf Regt	1800	North of BAN ME THUOT
320TH NVA Inf Regt	1800	CAMBODIA/DARLAC border
24th NVA Inf Regt	1800	South of BAN ME THUOT
95B NVA Inf Regt	900	E. PLEIKU Province
*40th NVA Arty Regt	1200	Tri-border area
18B NVA Inf Regt	1200	West of DUC CO
95th NVA Inf Regt	1000	West of DUC CO
H-15 LF VC Bn	200	E. PLEIKU Province
301st LF VC Bn	300	North of BAN ME THUOT
304th LF VC Bn	300	NW of KONTUM City
401st LF VC Bn	100	North of BAN ME THUOT
406th Sapper Bn	200	North of KONTUM City
407th Sapper Bn	250	PLEIKU/BINH DINH border
408th Sapper Bn	250	North of PLEIKU City
K-39 NVA Inf Bn	300	South of BAN ME THUOT

*HQs in tri-border area, 2 battalions in KONTUM Province, 1 battalion in PLEIKU Province, and 1 battalion in DARLAC Province.

c. Counterintelligence

During the reporting period, there was a significant increase in the identification of VIET CONG Infrastructure Personalities. Sector Teams of Special Operations Branch, Counterintelligence Section, 4th Military Intelligence Detachment, detected 201 VIET CONG Infrastructure Personalities, of whom 109 were detained. Seventy-eight of the detainees were declared Prisoners of War and 31 were declared Civil Defendants; none were declared Innocent Civilians.

This increase in figures from the last reporting period came as a result of splitting the Division Tactical area of Operations into five sectors with one Special Agent assigned to each sector, rather than having two Special Agents cover the entire area. Each Special Agent has been able to gain an intimate knowledge of his area of operations. By conducting single operations against specific VC individuals, as opposed to the larger cordon and search operations, a greater number of VC have been apprehended.

d. Interrogation of Prisoners of War

During the reporting period, there was a significant increase in the num-

8

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18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

ber of detainees who were classified as PW's. The 4th Infantry Division Compound processed 319 detainees, who were interrogated by personnel of the IPW Section, 4th MI Detachment. Of these detainees, 92 were classified Prisoners of War (75 VC/VMC; 17 NVA); 30 were classified Civil Defendants; 58 were classified Innocent Civilians; and 139 were classified Returnees.

This increase in detainees classified as PW's is a direct result of the improved system used to identify and apprehend these individuals (Ref para 2c).

e. Significant Enemy Tactics, Techniques and Capabilities

(1) General: The enemy continues to show that he can employ any of several tactics in his operations. Although he made no large-scale attacks on any city during the reporting period, his re-deployment around BAN ME THUOT in late July indicated that he still plans to conduct major offensive operations when conditions are favorable. Although he has never succeeded in seizing and holding a US fire support base, and experience has proven that he normally loses the equivalent of at least one battalion when he makes an all-out ground attack on a FSB, he made several disastrous attempts around BEN HET and DAK PEK in May and June. Throughout the reporting period, local forces have attempted to strangle the economy of the provinces by mining and by conducting ambushes on the highways, encirclement and harassment of the cities, and taxation and raids on outlying villages. His success in these operations has been minimal. The enemy continues to lack the staying power to conduct sustained offensives.

(2) Significant Changes in Tactics:

(a) The enemy attempted to eliminate the obstacle posed by US FSB's by massing artillery fire on them. He attempted this in late May - early June near POLEI KLENG and BEN HET. The enemy employed 105mm howitzers against a fire support base southwest of BEN HET, the first known employment of this weapon in II CTZ. The enemy also introduced the 82mm recoilless gun, the 140mm rocket, and the 100mm gun into the Highlands during this period. Although this tactic of massing fire on US fire support bases caused minimal damage, it did demonstrate an increased enemy artillery capability, and the enemy can be expected to attempt it again in the future.

(b) During the reporting period the enemy began utilizing larger numbers of plastic mines, which, being undetectable, with metallic mine detectors presented a new threat to friendly vehicular traffic. From May to mid-June the enemy initiated an increased campaign of ambushes and minings in the AO in conjunction with the offensives at POLEI KLENG, BEN HET and DAK PEK. The 4th Infantry Division's counter-ambush program kept the enemy's campaign from succeeding, and enemy units attempting ambushes suffered heavy casualties. In mid-June ambush and mining activity decreased greatly, and at the end of the reporting period this activity was at a low level.

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

(3) Recapitulation of Enemy Battle Losses:

(a) Personnel:	KIA (BC)	907
	NVAC	17
	VCC/VMCC	<u>75</u>
	Total	999
(b) Weapons:	S/A	278
	C/S	<u>15</u>
	Total	293
(c) Ammunition:	S/A rds	549,560
	C/S rds	1,424
	Grenades	525
	Mines	137

(d) Miscellaneous captured item:

Explosives	968 lbs
Documents	156 inches
Rice	6.2 tons
Salt	185 lbs

(e) Enemy facilities destroyed:	Structures	136
	Fortifications	749

f. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

(1) Enemy Capabilities:

(a) The 325C NVA Div is capable of conducting attacks by fire and ground attacks on fire support bases in the BEN HET-DAK TO area.

(b) The 1st NVA Div is capable of conducting a multi-regimental attack on BAN ME THUOT.

(c) The 304 LF Bn and the 406 Sapper Bn can conduct ambush and mining operations on Highway 14 north of KONTUM City. Additionally, these units are capable of attacking friendly installations in the vicinity of KONTUM City.

(d) Elements of the 31st Bn, 40th NVA Arty Regt are capable of conducting attacks by fire on PLEIKU and CAMP ENARI.

(e) The 95th and 18B NVA Regiments are capable of entering country from CAMBODIA and conducting attacks on friendly installations west of PLEIKU.

(f) Conduct ambushes, particularly in the MANG YANG Pass area on Route 19E.

(g) The 301 and 401 LF Bns have the capability of conducting ambush and

18 August 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

mining operations on Highway 21 and 14S. The K-39, which was part of the 33rd NVA Regt but did not move south with the regiment, can attack friendly installations in the BAN ME THUOT area. The units are also capable of supporting the 1st NVA Div in an attack on BAN ME THUOT.

(h) The enemy is capable of introducing new forces without warning into the AO from adjacent CAMBODIA and LAOS.

(2) Enemy Vulnerabilities: The enemy is vulnerable to artillery and air strikes when he bivouacs or masses for a large attack.

(3) Enemy Probable Courses of Action:

(a) Attack in the BAN ME THUOT area in the early part of August with the 1st NVA Div, supported by the K-39 Bn and the 401 and 301 LF Bns.

(b) Maintain pressure in the BEN HET-DAK TO area by utilizing the 325C Div and elements of the 40th Arty Regt in small ground attacks and attacks by fire against friendly fire support bases.

(c) Conduct mining operations on LOC's with particular emphasis on Highways 19E and W and north of KONTUM City.

(d) Conduct attacks by fire in the KONTUM City and PLEIKU City areas.

(e) Conduct ambushes, particularly in the MANG YANG Pass area on route 19E.

3. (C) OPERATIONS AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES

a. The following OPLANS/OPORDS were published:

(1) OPLAN 10-68 (DUCKBLIND) dated 14 May 68, classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(2) OPORD 11-68 (MATHEWS) dated 24 May 68 (with 2 changes) classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report. OPORD 11-68 terminated 12 June 1968.

(3) OPLAN 12-68 (RED BALL) dated 27 May 68 directs that rescue, security and recovery of personnel, documents, sensitive equipment, and downed aircraft will be the responsibility of the unit in whose AO the downed aircraft is located.

(4) OPORD 13-68 (SCOUT) dated 31 May 68, outlines the selection, orientation, training, and employment of HOI CHANHS as Kit Carson Scouts to augment the 4th Infantry Division's reconnaissance efforts in AO BINH TAY-MAC ARTHUR.

(5) OPORD 14-68 (ROADRUNNER) dated 23 June 68. 4th Inf Div elements will conduct ROADRUNNER operations within assigned AO. ROADRUNNER Operations will use specifically tailored forces traversing main and secondary roads throughout the AO at irregular intervals and in random patterns.

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS GSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

Operations will be integrated, when feasible, with tactical operations.
Quick reaction forces will be employed to exploit contacts.

(6) OPLAN 15-68 (SPEEDBALL) dated 9 July 68. 4th Infantry Division elements and ARVN 24th STZ will conduct combined security operations to clear, secure and react to enemy activities along Highway 14N between PLEIKU and KONTUM City.

(7) OPLAN 16-68 (REMACEN) dated 15 July 68, classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(8) OPLAN 17-68 (BASTOGNE) dated 16 Jul 68, classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

(9) OPLAN 18-68 (JAY-SILVER) dated 28 Jul 68, classified SECRET, will not be discussed in this report.

b. Operations. The 4th Infantry Division continued Operation BINH TAY-MAC ARTHUR which began 12 October 1967. A chronological summary of significant activities for this quarter is at Inclosure 3. The action of TF MATHEWS in the vicinity of DAK TO covering the period 24 May - 12 June is at Inclosure 6.

c. Training:

(1) During this period, the first class in an ARVN IRLP training program began on 23 April and was completed 21 June 1968. ARVN IRLP training scheduled for 29 July - 19 Aug was modified into a reconnaissance operations course when the scheduled ARVN students failed to arrive and Regional Force personnel appeared in their place.

(b) A Kit Carson Scout (KCS) program was established at the 4th Division to exploit former VC personnel. Training for the first group of 25 was conducted 5-18 June on basic US weapons, tactics, physical training and miscellaneous political indoctrination subjects. Students were deployed to units in the field on 19 June to assist with their special knowledge of enemy techniques and methods of operation. A second group of 24 underwent training from 14 thru 27 July.

(c) A USARV training team visited the 4th Division from 29 June through 1 July and conducted training on the AN/PPS-5 radar for men from the 3/506 Inf, 2/1 Cav, 1/10 Cav, 1/8 Inf and the 1/14th Inf,

A USARV Team visited the 4th Division from 5 through 9 July and conducted training in KY38 Secure Voice Device operations for divisional units.

~~CLASSIFIED~~

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

(d) On 29 July, the Division Materiel Office conducted classes for divisional units on TAER's and dispatching procedures.

(2) 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment.

(a) The detachment trained 4,760 enlisted and 95 officer replacements.

(b) The Combat NCO Leadership School provided instruction to 235 students, all of whom successfully completed the course.

(c) The Recondo Preparatory course provided instruction to 47 students. Of these, 23 successfully completed the course. Twenty-nine personnel attended the MACV Recondo School. Twenty-four successfully completed the course.

(3) RF/PF Training.

(a) During the quarter, CMIT/CMTT activities were conducted from 1 May through 1 July. On 1 July the seven remaining teams were reassigned to MACV and converted to Mobile Advisory Teams (MATS). The MATS, which will number 96 prior to CY 69, should provide considerable assistance to RF/PF units throughout the II Corps area. The 4th Infantry Division personnel have been used to fill those MATS located in KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC, QUANG ~~TRU~~ ^{TRU}, TRU-EN-DAC, and LAM DANG Provinces. MACV replacements will be directed on a one-for-one basis to 4th Infantry Division. This procedure will insure that MATS located in the Highland provinces of II Corps receive experienced personnel. Fourth Division units have been directed to identify with MATS operating in the division AO and to render assistance within their capability.

(b) Problem areas. Problem areas have been identified in almost every province. Those that are of a recurring nature and must constantly be corrected include:

1. Leadership. The major problem area facing the upgrading of RF/PF units is lack of leadership. This area must be given special attention.

2. Logistical Support. Resupply and maintenance for RF/PF units is at best poor. Many improvements have been made, but extensive work in this area is necessary.

3. There is a reluctance on the part of Province and District Chief to make units available for training. The reason given is usually attributed to alleged enemy activities. Detailed planning must be accomplished at all levels to insure that training momentum is continuous.

(c) Observations.

1. The CMIT/CMTT Program conducted from 15 October 1967 to July 1968 decidedly improved RF/PF units which received training in the Highland provinces of II Corps.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFIED

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

2. Over one-third of the RF/PF units in II Corps were trained by the CMIT/CMTTs'. Sixty-one (61) RF companies and one hundred twenty-six (126) PF platoons received training.

3. It is expected that emphasis being placed on RF/PF training will result in significant improvement during the next quarter.

(4) (C) R&D: Several new items of equipment were evaluated by division during this quarter. Evaluations included:

(a) Light Weight Entrenching Tool: 120 tools were evaluated in the 1st and 2d Bdes. In general the tool was found to be too light for extensive digging, although the reduced size and weight did make it easier to carry.

(b) Patrol Seismic Intrusion Devices: 12 sets, consisting of 4 transmitters and 1 receiver, were evaluated. Although the sets were rugged, light-weight and easy to emplace, the large number of false sensings was definitely a problem. Operators have been instructed to reduce the sensitivity setting on the transmitter in order to reduce the number of false sensings.

(c) Mine Roller: An expendable bogey wheel mine roller was delivered for evaluation in March. The shipment was short six critical parts which have been reordered. The system will be evaluated by the 4th Engr Bn when all the necessary parts have been obtained.

(d) Tunnel Exploration Kits: The kits were evaluated in the Fall of 1967 and modifications were recommended and adopted. The new kits are now being received in operational quantities; 2 kits per maneuver battalion.

(e) Discreet Hamlet Signaling Device: The signaling device scheduled for delivery in April is now expected in Sep 68.

(f) Communications Balloon: 2d Bde LRP's have been selected to receive and evaluate the communications balloon. The system consists of a 17 foot dirigible type helium-filled balloon to which is attached a remoted PRC-25 radio. The balloon is then tethered at 500 feet altitude by a nylon rope and winch assembly. The increased altitude is expected to increase the LRP communications range significantly.

(g) Elevated Site Markers: 20 ESM's were received for evaluation in late April. The system consists of a standard meteorology balloon, a supply of helium and a nylon tether line. When a unit operating below a jungle canopy wants to mark its position for an airborne observer, a balloon is filled and allowed to ascend through the canopy on the tether line. The advantage of the system is that the balloon can penetrate the canopy when smoke might not, and the marker can remain in place as long as the aerial observer is in the area so the position of the unit is always identifiable. The system is designed to be used once and then discarded.

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18 August 1968

SUB. T: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
ACCESSION NO: Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)
PO REGISTR 126 af

(h) M113 APC Belly Armor: Five modification kits are being installed on 2/1 Gav APC's for evaluation. The kits consist of 3/4 inch steel plate which is affixed to the underside of the APC. The armor is designed to increase troop protection against mines. The kit also includes an emergency quick release to the loading ramp and a safety harness for the driver.

(i) Improved Munitions: COPRAM hand grenades and 40mm grenades were released for use in late June after units had conducted specialized training on these munitions. The grenades represent a significant increase in lethality over standard munitions.

(j) XM174 Automatic Grenade Launchers: Eight 40mm launchers were received during the month of July for a one month evaluation. To date, the launchers have not been used in a contact mission. Ten weapons, which fire the same rounds as the M-79, permit the individual soldier to put a high volume of 40mm grenades on a target within a short period of time.

(k) V-100 Commando Cars: The division obtained a 180 loan of 30 V-100 Commando Cars from ARVN forces. The cars were assigned to the 4th MP Company for use in convoy escort and protection. The vehicles offer complete protection against small arms fire and mount twin M-60 machineguns as armament. The vehicles have significantly reduced the tracked vehicle mileage previously experienced within the division.

(5) Training Regulations:

(a) A regulation was published requiring a training POI for each LRP unit. LRP units are to train a minimum of 300 hours annually on the team level.

(b) A revision of the replacement training regulation was published expanding the original and adding a section on M-16 firing tables and requirements.

(c) A revision of the M-16 regulation was published which consolidated the policies of a series of command letters.

(d) A revision of the unit training regulation was published establishing mandatory and recurring training subjects required and creating a new training record form.

(e) 4th Inf Div Reg 350-12 (ARVN, RF/PF CIDG Training), 350-13 (War Dog Opns) and 350-19 (Combined Operations Training) are in the process of being revised.

e. Air Support.

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Inclosure 2

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

(1) The following close air support missions were flown in support of
Operation BINH TAY-MAC ARTHUR, 1 May 1968 - 31 July 1968.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MSNS</u>	<u>REQUESTED</u>	<u>FLOWN</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>A1</u>	<u>B57</u>	<u>F4</u>	<u>F100</u>	<u>F105</u>	<u>A37</u>	<u>A47</u>
FAC, PP		1499	874	1826	276	9	569	782	191	0	00
FAC/IMM		0236	217	0435	143	1	088	194	012	2	00
CSS/PP		0524	341	0512	004	9	133	312	054	0	00
CSS/IMM		0021	017	0021	000	0	008	013	000	0	00
SPOOKY		0047	045	0045	000	0	000	000	000	0	45
MOONSHINE		0012	011	0011	000	0	000	000	000	0	11
Total		<u>2339</u>	<u>1505</u>	<u>2830</u>	<u>423</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>797</u>	<u>1301</u>	<u>257</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>56</u>

(2) Bomb Damage Assessment:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>EST</u>	<u>SEC</u>	<u>SEC</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>MRTR</u>	<u>FOX</u>	<u>RKT</u>	<u>ROAD</u>				
<u>MSNS</u>	<u>KBS</u>	<u>BUNKERS</u>	<u>FIRES</u>	<u>EXP</u>	<u>AW</u>	<u>PSN</u>	<u>HUTS</u>	<u>TRUCKS</u>	<u>HOLES</u>	<u>BRIDGE</u>	<u>PSN</u>	<u>CUTS</u>
FAC/PP	087	407	47	60	24	11	02	0	64	14	5	83
FAC/IMM	109	191	18	35	08	12	26	1	18	01	3	09
CSS/PP	000	000	00	01	00	00	00	0	00	00	0	01
CSS/IMM	000	000	00	00	00	00	00	0	00	00	0	00
SPOOKY	001	000	00	00	00	00	00	0	00	00	0	00
Total	<u>197</u>	<u>598</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>93</u>

(3) B-52 Strikes.

B-52 struck known base areas, infiltration routes, strong points and major NVA headquarters. Both primary and secondary strikes were delivered in the 4th Division AO in support of Operation BINH TAY-MAC ARTHUR. The following figures show the number of B-52 strikes carried out during the period 1 May 1968 - 31 July 1968:

PRIMARY MISSIONS		TOTAL SORTIES
4th Div	174	987
II Corps	<u>4</u>	<u>24</u>
Total	<u>178</u>	<u>1011</u>
SECONDARY MISSIONS		TOTAL SORTIES
4th Div	59	194
II Corps	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	<u>59</u>	<u>194</u>
TOTAL MISSIONS		TOTAL SORTIES
4th Div	<u>233</u>	1181
II Corps	<u>4</u>	<u>24</u>
Total	<u>227</u>	<u>1205</u>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

(4) Gravel Mines:

XM41 Gravel Mines (Air dropable, self-arming, self-sterilizing, anti-personnel mines) were employed on the following targets along the PLEI TRAP road as an obstacle to NVA infiltration and road reconstruction efforts. Because friendly ground forces did not conduct operations in the vicinity of the Gravel target boxes, conclusive data on the effectiveness of the munition as an obstacle is not available. A total of 17 AIE missions/68 AIE sorties was used to seed the target areas:

- Target #1 - YB 741036 - YB 741043 - YB 751036 - YB 751043
- Target #2 - YB 730054 - YB 734056 - YB 734044 - YB 739046
- Target #3 - YB 746012 - YB 751012 - YB 746022 - YB 751022
- Target #4 - YB 760035 - YB 764039 - YB 769029 - YB 771034
- Target #7 - YB 760212 - YB 764212 - YB 764219 - YB 760219
- Target #8 - YB 76219 - YB 767219 - YB 774219 - YB 772223

(5) Weather:

Frequent inclement weather throughout the reporting period caused cancellation of a significant number of pre-planned FAC-controlled airstrikes. If a fighter mission carried low-drag, general purpose bombs, it was possible to deliver the ordnance by Combat Sky Spot Direction. However, when the ordnance consisted of retarded-fall (high drag) bombs, napalm, or cluster bomb units, Combat Sky Spots could not be used, and the mission was cancelled by the Direct Air Support Center.

f. Chemical

(1) (U) The Division Chemical Section and 43d Chemical Detachment continued to support combat operations within the division during the reporting period by employing riot control agents (RCA), supervising the defoliation program, operating and maintaining the division's Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD), rendering technical advice on use of flame munitions, operating a chemical ASP, and inspecting unit CBR readiness, equipment, and supply.

(2) (C) Defoliation operations were seriously curtailed by weather, especially during the last half of the reporting period. Only three Traildust missions were flown during the months of June and July compared to an average of nine monthly for previous quarters. With the coming of the growing season the chemical section once again became engaged in crop destruction operations. Approximately 391 acres of enemy crops including rice, beans, corn and bananas were destroyed. Perimeter defoliation was also increased due to excessive growth of grass and brush around friendly installations. See Inclosure #4 for complete summary of defoliation operations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

(3) (U) RCA Employment. The use of riot control agents generally decreased during the reporting period due to decreased enemy activity and lack of lucrative targets.

(a) Bulk Agent. The Division Chemical Section employed very little bulk CS as compared to previous quarters. On 30 July, 2080 pounds were employed from a CH-47 helicopter on the NVA road at YB772222. On 28 May the Air Force employed 20,480 pounds of CS-1 at YB905854 on the NVA road entering VIETNAM from LAOS. The 80 pound drums were dropped from C-123 aircraft. This was the first use of C-123's in this manner in VIETNAM. Another drop of 17,920 pounds was made at YB9385 on 1 June. A total of 6480 pounds of CS in eight pound plastic jugs was issued to ground units for use in contaminating enemy bunkers and tunnels.

(b) XM-15 CS Cannister Clusters. The XM-15, formerly known as the E-158, were employed on only one occasion in the division AO. On 18 May, eight XM-15's were dropped from a UH-1 helicopter at YA955859 (IZ BRILLO-PAD) in support of the 1/12th Infantry Battalion.

(c) E-8 Tactical CS Launchers. Use of E-8's increased during the quarter with 741 being issued to subordinate units as compared to 226 for the previous period. This increase was due primarily to successful use of the E-8 in defense of firebase in the DAK TO area. In early May, the 1/8th and 3/8th Infantry Battalions had occasion to fire several E-8's in defense of their firebases against estimated enemy battalion-size forces. The E-8's were credited with playing an important role in repulsing the attack, and in the case of the attack on the 3/8th, were the deciding factor in the capture of six NVA.

(d) XM651 40mm Cartridge. Availability of the XM651 round for the M-79 grenade launcher ceased on 2 June when USARV ordered the turn in of the entire division's assets for redistribution to USARV units. The round has proved its worth in combat and will be a tremendous asset when made available in operational quantities.

(e) The Division Chemical Section developed a new munition called the BFOG (Box Full of Grenades) consisting of a plywood box filled with 25 M7A3 CS grenades and rigged so as to release the grenades above the ground after dropping the 25 pound munition from a helicopter. The munition is cheap, easily constructed, reliable and extremely effective. Since 4 May when the first BFOG was constructed, 262 have been issued to subordinate units, most of which were employed by battalion commanders from their command and control ships. See Inclosure #4 for a picture of the BFOG.

(4) Airborne Personnel Detector Operations. A total of 83 APD missions were flown with the two APD's available to the division. Monthly summary follows:

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
MAY	26	34.0
JUNE	15	19.8
JULY	42	98.3

g. Psychological Operations:

(a) A total of 22,885,000 leaflets were dropped during the period, compared with 35 million during the preceding period. Air and ground loudspeaker time amounted to 932 hours, compared with 520 hours during the previous period. Themes used were primarily in support of the CHIEU HOI Program, with emphasis on the exploitation of HOI CHANH.

(b) The Division had a total of nine HOI CHANHs during the period. Of these, six were NVA and three were VMC. Significant observations concerning the six NVA HOI CHANHs are that two were Non-Commissioned Officers. The six rallied in groups of three, and two, and one by himself. All NVA HOI CHANHs were exploited through the use of quick reaction leaflets and taped loudspeaker appeals, and several group appeals by leaflet.

(c) The Volunteer Informant Program, stressing both the Reward for Information and the Public Safety Themes began to show positive results during the reporting period. On 12 May, 500 pounds of cal. 50, 7.62mm, and 5.56 ammunition were turned over to a Civic Action team by the villagers of KON MONAY KOTU (AR80293), KONTUM Province. On 25 May, 12 machinegun barrels, three machinegun operating rods, and a 106mm recoilless rifle sight were turned over to a Civic Action team by the villager of PLEI BONG GOLAR (AR824425), PLEIKU Province.

(d) The bi-monthly NVA newspaper, BINH MINH (First Light) continues to draw favorable comments from HOI CHANH. This paper prints news stories which are extracted from all sources on a variety of subjects. Photographs are also included. The newspaper was started since intelligence indicates that there has been a complete news blackout among the NVA units in our area of operations.

4. (C) Logistics

a. General

(1) Extensive airdrop operations were conducted during the period 2-18 June. Airdrops were in support of 4th Division units operating north of KONTUM in the vicinity of DAK PEK and DAK SEANG. Five airdrops consisting of 605.6 short tons of Class I, III & V were made during this period.

(2) Action was completed on 122 Reports of Survey. Thirty-two Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were approved and 336 Combat Loss Report were

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

processed.

b. Supply and Services

The following figures represent cumulative support data for support activities of the 4th Supply and Transportation Battalion at all locations in the division area of operations.

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|
| (1) Division Supply Office | |
| Requisitions received | 19,556 |
| Requisitions passed | 4,200 |
| Requisitions filled | 11,379 |
| Total due out releases | 7,390 |
|
(2) Class I | |
| Average headcount issues | 9,400 |
| Average number of units | 41 |
|
(3) Class III | |
| JP-4 | 888,000 gal |
| MOGAS | 896,000 gal |
| DIESEL | 1,049,000 gal |
| AVGAS | 52,900 gal |
|
(4) Baths | |
| Individuals processed | 25,873 |
|
(5) Graves Registration | |
| Human remains processed | 6 |
| Personal Property shipments processed | 270 |

c. Transportation Services

(1) During this period convoy operations consisted of 835 convoys with a total of 43,194 vehicles. Seventy-nine special missions by fixed wing aircraft were flown in support of the division, lifting 836.5 short tons of cargo equipment. Additionally, the C7A division courier lifted 11,669 passengers and 236.6 short tons of cargo.

(2) The hold baggage section of CAMP ENARI processed 2,613 pieces consisting of 91.7 short tons.

d. Materiel Readiness.

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

(1) The Division Command Maintenance Management Inspection cycle was completed with five initial inspections and three re-inspections.

(2) Assistance was rendered to the II Corp MACV advisor in the formation of a CMMI Team inspection program in support of ARVN units.

(3) Roadside inspections continued on a daily basis.

(4) The Project Counter instructional team from QUI NHON Support Command instructed all divisional units on the establishment and maintenance of prescribed load list (PLL) during the first two weeks of June.

(5) Classes were conducted by the Division Materiel Section for all divisional units on the TAERS forms system.

(6) An M16 Rifle Inspection Team, consisting of personnel from ACoFS, G3 and G4 offices, was formed on 2 Jun 68 to conduct unannounced inspections of divisional units in both the forward and rear areas. These inspections have been incorporated in the Command Maintenance support and supply of spare parts for all divisional and attached elements continued to be accomplished through three forward support companies, the maintenance support company and the aircraft maintenance company of the 704th Maintenance Battalion. Provisional emergency support was provided the 3d Bde, 101st Airborne Div and Special Forces Units within the AO. Contact teams were provided on a special mission basis.

e. Medical Service. Medical support was provided by the Division Medical Battalion.

	<u>HQ & Co A</u>	<u>Co B</u>	<u>Co C</u>	<u>Co D</u>
Patients seen	14,039	9,646	2,429	3,269
Patients admitted	1,033	2,139	412	1,263
Patients returned	468	209	412	185

f. Operation BINH TAY-MAC ARTHUR logistics.

(1) Logistical support was provided forward elements of the division by Forward Support Activity (FSA) facilities from PLEIKU Sub-Area Command and 1st Logistical Command units located at CAM RAHN BAY.

(2) During the period 24 May through 12 June 1968, TASK FORCE MATHEWS operating in northern KONTUM Province was supported by FSA, 1st Log Command. FSA provided Class I, III, V, barrier materiel, graves registration, bath and laundry services. FSA DAK TO is established on a permanent basis primarily providing the above supply and services to 3d Brigade operating in Northern KONTUM Province. A JP-4/Refuel point was operated by 4th Aviation Battalion in DAK PEK to reduce helicopter flying time.

(3) FSE KONTUM is operated by the Division Support Command primarily

AVDDH-GC-MH

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

in support of 3d Brigade units operating in that area. FSE provides Class I, III, II & IV fast moving items and barrier materiel. Class III, bulk and packaged products, is provided by PLEIKU Sub-Area Command (PKSAC). The Class III point is operated jointly by PKSAC and the 57th Aviation Company for JP-4 at the KONTUM Air Field. Additional Class III items, MOGAS and DIESEL, are provided by FSE KONTUM located at the 3d Brigade CP area near KONTUM. Class V is provided by the 1st Log Command from the 1st Log Command ASP located in KONTUM. A forward JP-4/Refuel point was operated at POLEI KLENG by the 4th Aviation Battalion, to decrease helicopter flying time.

(4) On 12 June 1968, a forward supply point was established adjacent to Special Forces Camp, DAK SEANG to reduce helicopter flying time and turn around time for resupply operations in support of units operating north of KONTUM. Forward supply point provided Class I, III & IV and was operated by the Division Support Command depending solely on paradrop for resupply. The 4th Aviation Battalion established and operated a JP-4/Refuel point to support air operations in the area.

(5) The FSE in operation at the OASIS continued to provide support for 2d Brigade operations in the western PLEIKU area. This FSE provided Class I, bulk and packaged Class III, V, barrier materiel, graves registration, bath and laundry services. The bath and laundry units were attached from the 1st Log Command. 3d Brigade assumed area responsibility on 19 July 1968 and FSE continues to support 3d Brigade units from OASIS.

(6) On 18 July 1968 the 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was deployed to BAN ME THUOT for operations in that area. An expediting team from the 1st Log Command at CAM RAHN BAY, augmented by Class I, V, and graves registration personnel from Division Support Command, provided logistical support direct from 1st Log Command CAM RAHN BAY. This facility was increased to full FSA operated by 1st Log Command effective 19 July 1968 with deployment of 2d Brigade Task Force to BAN ME THUOT. An FSA, augmented with Division Support Command personnel, continues to support 2d Brigade Task Force with Class I, bulk and packaged III, IV, barrier materiel, V, graves registration, bath and laundry services. FSA BAN ME THUOT is supported directly from the 1st Log Command, CAM RAHN BAY, by LLOC with back up ALOC.

g. In addition to the logistical support provided by US Army elements, the US Air Force expended the following quantities of Class III and V in support of operations:

<u>Class III</u>	<u>QTY (GALLONS)</u>
Fighters	27,519,000
B-52's	334,390,000

DECLASSIFIED 22

AVDDH-GC-MH

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
BOMBS	11,764	3,641.7
CBU	740	110.8
NAPALM	1,541	574.5
ROCKETS	650	130

Delivered by fighters and AC47 (Spooky)

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
20mm	57,400	14.3
7.62mm	840,000	21.7

Delivered by B-52

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
Bombs	Unk	21,424.2

5. (U) Military Civic Action Program.

a. TAOR: The Good Neighbor Program continued within the Division TAOR. Consolidation of hamlets resulted in further reduction in the number of separate hamlets from 66 in the past quarter to 60. The relocation of six hamlets in respect to last quarter's total of 19 shows continuing progress in the consolidation program, but is not indicative of the outstanding receptiveness of other hamlets to either join existing consolidated villages or to form new ones. There have been five instances where consolidated villages have been probed by VC during the period and in all instances the villages have given a commendable account of themselves. A further decrease in the number of kidnappings within the TAOR was noted, with a total of four chiefs and 19 villagers reported kidnapped, in comparison to the 18 chiefs and 88 villagers of last quarter. A noticeable distinction is recognized by TAOR Civic Action Teams in the manner in which friendly villages treat VC influenced villages. The complete disassociation from VC influenced villages by GVN orientation of consolidated villages is in itself encouraging and is understood as signifying a closer alignment with the VIETNAMESE Government and a commitment to the principles of democratic government. There were no significant population changes or shifts within the TAOR during the reporting period. The overall civic action effort remained constant with 26 teams visiting approximately 20,000 civilians within area.

b. PLEIKU Province:

(1) The 2d Brigade continued civic action responsibility along Route 19W and in the PLEI MRONG area until the 19th of July when this AO came under the control of the 3d Brigade.

DECLASSIFIED

18 July 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

(2) The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, continued civic action along Highway 19W from PLEIKU City to the MANG YANG Pass.

(3) Civil Affairs Team 9, 41st Civil Affairs Company, continued civic action activities at the EDAP ENANG Refugee Center. Beginning the quarterly period with approximately 4,600 inhabitants, EDAP ENANG continued to increase in population to its present population of approximately 6,000. The program has all indications of being a success at this time. There is a distinct change in that people are now being placed on a waiting list for EDAP ENANG. Quarterly comparisons indicate that the improvements made at EDAP ENANG have changed the project from a potential failure to a potential success.

(4) Plans are now being formulated for a new refugee center on the eastern periphery of CATECKA Tea Plantation. The planning for this new village was initiated during the period with the actual construction being delayed pending the allocation of funds and final decision by the Province Chief.

c. KONTUM Province: The 1st Brigade continued civic action activities in DAK TO and DAK SUT Districts with intensified civic action programs coinciding with the increased tactical activity in the areas. Adding a combined ARVN/US Civic Action team to its established CA resources, the 1st Bde is expanding and improving an already excellent civic action program. The 3d Brigade began civic action activity in the vicinity of KONTUM City during the last reporting period and has developed a regular CA program in the area during the present period.

d. DARLAC Province: Civic action activity was curtailed in the BAN ME THUOT area during the last reporting period due to the movement of US tactical units away from the area. The return of 4th Infantry Division elements from the 2d Bde on 18 July has necessitated a new civic action program which was just beginning to operate on 31 July.

e. Nation Building Program:

(1) Psychological Development.

(a) Government:

1. The Division "Good Neighbor Council House" was utilized for a TAOR hamlet meeting during the month of May and bi-monthly sector meetings during the months of June and July. The bi-monthly meetings are intended to provide an informal assembly of the various chiefs and sub-chiefs within a specific sector in order to express opinions and develop a better working relationship between the villages. It has become standard practice to include division dignitaries, CORDS representative, and district officials at these meetings. By combining a festive atmosphere with appropriate topics of discussion, the meetings have become a popular, worthwhile accomplishment.

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

2. A weekly council meeting is being held in the village of PLEI NHGO YUT by the 704th Maintenance Battalion Civic Action Team and an elected council of villages. This project was initiated with CORDS assistance as a self-help program to encourage a better understanding of the VIETNAMESE Government. The meeting has developed into an efficient decision-making apparatus and a ready means of providing agricultural and hygienic self-improvement information.

3. The VIETNAMESE supply/logistics system: Improved coordination with VIETNAMESE supply and logistics agencies is best exemplified by the outstanding success in requesting and receiving fish for stocking purposes in the many fish ponds constructed throughout the area. The initial benefit derived from the accelerated fish pond projects within the TAOR is the experience derived by village and hamlet leaders in dealing directly with province and district officials in order to obtain the fish for stocking. This is expected to be as valuable as the protein supplement derived from the fish.

(b) Education:

1. The construction and establishment of a village school in the predominantly VIETNAMESE village of PLEI MY has provided a significant improvement in local GVN/MONTAGNARD relations due to the excellent working relationship of the MONTAGNARD/VIETNAMESE students. It has been a common observation of unit civic action teams that villagers throughout the TAOR have an extremely intense desire to obtain an education for their children. The combining of MONTAGNARD and VIETNAMESE students within the same classroom not only satisfies their desire to learn, but is expected to develop an understanding between the people as they mature.

2. There were four women attending sewing classes at the PLEIKU City Training Center at the close of the reporting period, and it is expected they will finish the course in good standing. At the completion of the course of instruction, diplomas are given to qualified students and CORDS provides a sewing machine to each village in which there are four qualified seamstresses. Nine women graduated from the course during the reporting period. Two villages have received sewing machines at this time.

(2) Development of the Standard of Living:

(a) Water Supplies: Nine wells were completed within the TAOR during the reporting period; in addition, six spillways were constructed at various village sites. There have been ten fish ponds constructed within the TAOR since 1 May 1968. These ponds provide a potential irrigation source as well as a food producing area. In all but one of these ponds, a constant supply of water is guaranteed to provide an emergency water supply throughout the year.

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

(b) Animal Husbandry:

1. An extensive pig raising facility has been developed within the DISCOM Sector of the TAOR which shows increasing indications of success. Yorkshire hogs were procured and selective breeding has taken place. Classification, separation, and castration phases have been completed and further US assistance is planned in the development of an artificial insemination program. The initial litters resulting from the cross breeding program have impressed various villages so much that the boars are in demand by the LE TRUNG District Chief to spread the program throughout the District.

2. Early in May, Major Fergusson of the Walter Reed Medical Research Team visited several villages within the 4th Division TAOR and confirmed a previously suspected outbreak of rinderpest disease among the cattle in the vicinity of PLEI WAU (AR843447), LE TRUNG District, PLEIKU Province. As result of his findings, vaccine was procured from the Pasteur Laboratories at SANANG and a selective inoculation program was initiated. Suitable pens and holding chutes were constructed to allow diagnosis and treatment. The program became so well accepted that six villages have build corrals and holding chutes within the TAOR to facilitate veterinary assistance. The efforts of the personnel involved with the control of this rinderpest outbreak have been rewarded by a very low animal mortality rate from this disease during the period, while the usual mortality rate is 90%.

(c) Crop Production: Experimental gardens have been planted in three separate villages within the TAOR during the reporting period. Using seed obtained through the 5th Special Forces Group, the villagers were encouraged to plant gardens. Advice is given by CORDS agricultural experts. Benefiting from the weekly visits of these agricultural experts, and by the daily care given by the MONTAGNARDS, the gardens are growing better than expected and are a source of pride to the villages taking part in the program.

(d) Health Program:

1. In the hamlet of PLEI DO (AR813436), the CA team has encouraged the building of new fences around the homes of the residents. Replacing the traditional bamboo branch fences normally used, the fences use either barbed wire or woven, trimmed bamboo. The motivating factor behind this suggested change to MONTAGNARD tradition was the great number of eye injuries caused by the protruding branches of the old styled fence. A significant decrease in the number of eye injuries has been noted since the new style fencing has been built.

2. During the reporting period, a new dental program was initiated for the villages assisted by the CA team of the 2/1 Cav. On Wednesday and Friday of each week, the CA team takes a large number of villagers into PLEIKU Province Hospital to receive free dental care and instruction from the

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
 Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

clinic. The CA team will continue this program until all of the personnel having dental problems within the unit's villages are treated. The program is continuing as of the end of this reporting period, with approximately 300 people having been treated.

3. Due to the trust established between the CA team and villages of the consolidated village located at AR840377, a CA team suggestion concerning the separation of family living quarters and livestock holding areas was readily accepted. The elimination of waste and vermin, which was formerly accepted with the ownership of livestock, has done a great deal to improve the sanitation of the village.

4. The dispensary construction program has continued within the Division TAOR during the quarterly period. Five new dispensaries were built and 16 repaired. The supplies obtained for dispensary construction have been obtained through district logistics channels. The constant use of the dispensaries indicates an outstanding value for the low cost materials and labor required.

(3) Development of Security: Four PF platoons have been trained as village security forces within the TAOR, while one additional platoon began training on the 30th of July for the newly consolidated village in DIVARTY Sector. Civic action teams have been permanently assigned to the several consolidated villages throughout the TAOR in order to coordinate US assistance in case of enemy activity and to provide a communications capability to coordinate supporting weapons and relief forces.

(4) Statistical Summary of Civic Action:

(a) Construction:

Dwellings	16
Roads	9.5 km
Churches	2
Hospitals	3
Dispensaries	21
Market Places	1
Schools	11
Latrines	4
Bridges	11
Fish Ponds	6
Spillways	12
Cattle pens and chutes	9
Fences	20
Wells	9
Pig Pens	16
Bulletin Boards	6
Chicken Coops	6
Playgrounds	12
Showers	3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

Flagpoles 2

(b) Health:

Medcaps 67,779
Youth Health Program 144,946
Vetcap 247

(c) Services:

Food Distribution 29,927 lbs
Clothing 4,552 lbs
Lumber 102,276 bd ft
Soap 18,150 lbs

(d) Recovered goods returned to GVN control:

Rice 11,650 lbs

(e) Results-Intelligence: Villages served by division civic action teams have provided the following assistance:

1. 11 May 1968 - 500 lbs of cal. 50, 7.62mm and 5.56mm ammunition were turned in by the villagers of PLEI KON MONAY KOTU (AR802903).

2. 25 May 1968 - 12 M-60 machine gun barrels, 3 M-60 machine gun operating rods, and 1 106mm recoilless rifle sight were turned in by the residents of PLEI BONG GOLAR (AR824425).

3. 13 July 1968 - 300 rounds of 7.62 ammunition, 50 rounds of 40mm ammunition, and one 40 pound shaped charge were turned in by the village of THAN PHU (ZA234825).

4. 19 July 1968 - one 60mm mortar round was turned in by the village of THAN PHU (AR234925).

5. 20 July 1968 - Three 60mm mortar rounds and one 82mm mortar round were turned in by the village of THAN PHU (AR234825).

(5) Summary: The continuation of the 4th Infantry Division "Good Neighbor Program" has evolved into a more concentrated effort to initiate and support consolidated villages within the Division TAOR. The formation and training of PF defense forces within the consolidated villages has been encouraged and implemented with outstanding results. Civic action programs within the forward areas have progressed during the period with the main emphasis on high impact-short duration projects, and in the case of the 1st Bde, the incorporation of ARVN CA teams into their S5 structure. Coordination and mutual assistance with province and district officials improved noticeably

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

within the Division Area of Operations during the reporting period, allowing greater facility in the initiation of more advanced civic action programs.

6. (C) Personnel

a. Strength: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows:

(1) Beginning of Reporting Period (1 May 1968)

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
(a) Authorized - organic units	1,076	185	16,241	17,272
Authorized - attached units	<u>44</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1,016</u>	<u>1,063</u>
Total	1,147	188	17,257	18,335
(b) Assigned - organic units	1,147	165	16,488	17,800
Assigned - attached units	<u>41</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>984</u>	<u>1,028</u>
Total	1,188	168	17,472	18,828

(2) End of Reporting Period (31 July 1968)

(a) Authorized - organic units	1,108	185	16,373	17,656
Authorized - attached units	<u>44</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1,016</u>	<u>1,063</u>
Total	1,152	188	17,389	18,719
(b) Assigned - organic units	994	154	16,497	17,645
Assigned - attached units	<u>39</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1,182</u>	<u>1,224</u>
Total	1,033	157	17,679	18,869

b. Replacements: A total of 357 officer and 5988 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period, division losses were 512 officers and 5781 enlisted personnel. Emergency leaves processed during the reporting period totaled 398.

c. Promotions: A total of 5016 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

d. Casualties:

AVDDH-GC-MH

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

UNIT	DEAD	HOSTILE		WOUNDED	NON-HOSTILE		
		MISSING	DEAD		MISSING	INJURED	
1st Bde	39	0		223	9	0	25
2nd Bde	43	1		258	0	0	19
3rd Bde	22	0		152	2	0	47
DIVARTY	17	0		69	0	0	12
DISCOM	3	0		0	2	0	6
2/1 Cav	11	0		58	0	0	9
1/10 Cav	2	0		49	0	0	32
1/69 Armor	2	0		41	0	0	3
4th Engr	3	0		4	3	0	9
4th Avn	0	0		6	0	0	6
124th Sig Bn	1	0		6	0	0	1
HHC, 4th Inf Div	0	0		0	0	0	0
4th MP Co	3	0		4	0	0	0
4th Admin Co	0	0		2	0	0	3
Scout Dog	0	0		7	0	0	0
E, 20th Inf	2	0		8	0	0	0
E, 58th Inf	1	0		4	0	0	0
4th MI	0	0		2	0	0	0
Total	149	1		893	16	0	172

e. Morale and Personnel Services

(1) Decorations Awarded.

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>
Distinguished Service Cross	1	2	3
Silver Star	29	38	23
Legion of Merit	5	14	20
Distinguished Flying Cross	1	4	0
Soldier's Medal	3	0	1
Bronze Star (Valor)	182	204	103
Air Medal (Valor)	3	11	0
Army Commendation (Valor)	73	137	136
Bronze Star (Service)	132	377	187
Army Commendation (Service)	812	1514	655
Air Medal (Service)	343	328	204
Purple Heart	600	362	127
Total	2184	2991	1459

(2) Badges

Combat Infantryman Badge	815	793	868
Combat Medical Badge	108	59	46

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>
Aircraft Crewman Badge	34	0	0
Miscellaneous Badge	<u>95</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	1052	890	918

f. Reenlistments: 171 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was as follows: first term RA reenlistments-37, AUS enlistments-21, RA extensions-13, AUS extension-3.

g. Postal

(1) Money Order Sales: \$4,467,045.49.

(2) Parcel Post and Postal Fees: \$84,872.95.

(3) Incoming Mail: Sacks-14,110, Pouches-2539, Daily Average-156 Sacks and 28 Pouches.

(4) Outgoing Mail: Sacks-5588, Pouches-1131, Daily Average-62 Sacks and 12 Pouches.

(5) Number of mail days: 92.

h. Special Services

(1) The 4th Infantry Division was visited by five USO Shows: Joe Flynn and Bob Hastings hand-shake tour, a Country and Western Variety Show, the Claude Stroud Show, the James Brown Show, and another hand-shake tour with Pat Morrow and Joyce Jillson. Jan Moorehead from the USO office also visited and distributed cigarettes and candy to our infantrymen.

(2) R&R quotas received were 4120 out-of-country and 995 in-country.

(3) A total of 114 movies circulated within the division.

i. Chaplain Activities

<u>DENOMINATION</u>	<u>NO. OF SERVICES</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Roman Catholic	1022	25,814
Protestant	1555	43,316
Jewish	17	265
Memorial Services	41	

j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(a) A total of 632 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
 Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

Office during the period.

(b) Combined police patrols continue in effect. The composition of the patrols varies:

1. One 4th Div MP, one 504th MP, one ARVN policeman (QC), one National policeman (NP), and an ARVN interpreter.
2. Two 4th Div MP, one QC, one NP, and an ARVN interpreter.
3. One 4th Div MP, one 504th MP and three NP.

These patrols operate in the vicinity of CAMP ENARI and PLEIKU City, and provide for handling of all military and civil police problems involving US Forces personnel. Additionally, the 1st Platoon, 4th Military Police Company, serving in support of the 1st Brigade, operates two similar patrols in the DAK TO area, and the 2nd Platoon, supporting the 2nd Brigade initiated two combined patrols in the BAN ME THUOT area.

(c) Checkpoint #31, located at the base of Dragon Mountain, is now operated by two 4th Div MP, one NP, and one QC. This checkpoint searches VIETNAMESE civilian, ARVN, and AMERICAN vehicles passing through on a selected basis. Its primary mission is the control of traffic on Hwys 14S and 19W, with a secondary mission of searching for enemy war materials, contraband, and false identification papers being carried by VIETNAMESE using the road.

(d) A VIETNAMESE National Policeman continues to serve as liaison between the division and LE TRUNG District for police matters. He maintains his office in the Provost Marshal's Office.

(e) A total of seven combined cordon and search operations, consisting of 4th Div MP, National Police, 4th MI Det, G-5, and infantry or cavalry troops resulted in the search of sixteen villages with many detainees captured, some of whom were eventually classified as VMC.

(2) Military Justice

(a) General Court-Martial	11
(b) Special Court-Martial	52
(c) Summary Court-Martial	28

k. Health.

(1) The general health of the division during the quarter remained at a satisfactory level.

(2) Malaria again was the most important medical problem in the division.

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

The increased command emphasis on malaria discipline caused the rates for June to fall to the lowest level since the division arrived in VIETNAM. In June, the vivax rate was 2.1 cases/1000 men/month; the falciparum rate for the same period was 3.5 cases/1000 men/month. The fact that the southwest monsoon brought less rainfall than expected during the quarter undoubtedly assisted command efforts to control malaria. As has been demonstrated in the past, strict emphasis of malaria discipline should render vivax malaria an insignificant problem and minimize the incidence of falciparum malaria.

(3) During the quarter 47 animal bites were reported, resulting in 35 persons taking the rabies immunization series. In an effort to eliminate this problem, an intensified program to vaccinate pets was initiated in June. Military police began collecting animals on post that were not vaccinated and registered. They were then euthanized by the Division Veterinarian. A number of rat bites, inflicted while men were sleeping on the bunker line, could have been prevented by the proper use of mosquito nets. With the arrival of monsoon rains, rats will be driven from their burrows. Maintenance of high standards of area sanitation and use of rat poisons and traps will reduce rodent problems in the area.

7. (C) Engineer

a. Intelligence:

(1) Aerial reconnaissance of LLOC's were conducted within the AO. Ground reconnaissance of bridge and culvert inspection was conducted from convoy bound vehicles.

(2) Mining Incidents:

<u>Anti-tank</u>		<u>Other</u>	
Plastic	33	Command detonated	1
Homemade	25	Anti-personnel	6
Unknown	88	Total	7
Total	136		

b. Operations and Training:

(1) Operations. During this quarter the 4th Engineer Battalion (Combat) directed engineer effort from the battalion CP located at CAMP ENARI. Companies A, B and C worked in direct support of the 1st, 2d and 3d Brigades respectively. Company D was committed to general support until the later part of the reporting period when it exchanged missions with Company C. Company E (Bridge) supported the division with tactical bridging, transportation, and assistance in base camp projects. Headquarters and Headquarters Company continued in a general support role.

DECLASSIFIED

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

(2) Training:

(a) Unit leaders were required to review bridge classification, engineer reconnaissance, and techniques of safe bunker construction.

(b) The Engineering Rappelling Platoon (ERP) conducted training at periodic intervals to maintain its capability to enter an area and clear an LZ quickly.

c. Logistics:

(1) Chainsaw problems have become less acute with the receipt of 40 additional chainsaw and certain repair parts.

(2) Six 65 gpm pumps were received for the 600 pgh water purification units.

(3) Difficulty has been experienced in keeping the M60A1 AVLB operational. Few support maintenance personnel are knowledgeable in M60A1 repair. This is due to the high density of M48 model tanks in RVN.

d. Engineer:

(1) The AN/PRS-4 mine detector was tested during the reporting period. It was found to be effective in locating both metallic and non-metallic mines. Disadvantages include greater weight and less rugged construction than the Polar 153.

(2) There has been a lack of proper maintenance support for a dozer on forward firebases. Well qualified operators need to be provided to insure good operating techniques and maintenance procedures. Every two weeks the dozers should be lifted to a base area for thorough organizational maintenance.

(3) Periodic bunker inspections throughout the division indicated several areas which need to be improved:

(a) Stringers need to be braced on timber supports, not sandbags.

(b) The spans on roof beams should use a center support if the distance is over four feet.

(c) PSP should be used to supplement basic timber structure, not as a roof stringer.

(d) Timber supports should be notched to secure roof stringers.

(e) Interceptor ditches, drainage pits or sumps and waterproofing on the roof will lengthen bunker life.

AVDDH-GC-MH

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

8. (C) Army Aviation Operations

Operational Totals for the Quarter

	<u>Co A</u>	<u>Co B</u>	<u>Bn Total</u>
a. Sorties	14,778	11,893	26,671
b. Hours Flown	4,614	2,015	6,629
c. Troops Lifted	26,985	2,261	29,246
d. Tons of Cargo	553	N/A	553
e. Aircraft Flares	447	N/A	447
f. Ammo Expended (7.62, 2.75, 40mm)	61,700	358,500	420,200

9. (U) Inspector General.

a. The FY 68 Annual General Inspection Program was completed during the period.

b. Beginning on 24 June a program of Courtesy AGI's initiated to prepare those units scheduled to be inspected by the USARV IG in September. This program will continue until 20 August.

c. No complaints were received by this office during the reporting period. Numerous personnel visited the office to request assistance.

10. (U) Signal

a. Operations.

(1) There were two major changes in the Division Area Communication System.

(a) The first major alteration occurred 24 May to 10 June on Operation TF MATHEWS. A 4th Division TOC was located with 1st Bde Hq at DAK TO and the 3rd Bde, 101st Airborne Division was attached to the 4th Infantry Division and located at the old DAK TO Air Field. To support the 4th Div forward TOC, the 124th Sig Bn furnished the following.

1. One (1) AN/MTC-3 switchboard to DAK TO. One-half of the switchboard was used to provide the TOC with common user trunking service while the remainder was used as a TOC switchboard to provide direct hot line service for the TOC.

2. one (1) AN/VRC-49 (FM Retransmission) at DAK TO, MACV for Division Command Net #1.

3. Two (2) RT-524 and two (2) RC-292 were employed in the TAC Hqs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-MH

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

4. One (1) AN/MS-31 to DAK TO. The Assistant Division Signal Officer established a 4th Inf Div SYSCON (System Control) and controlled all communications for the TF.

5. Long distance trunking circuits were provided over the existing UHF systems.

6. To support the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div the 124th Sig Bn furnished the following:

a. Two (2) AN/MRC-69 to 3/101 CP to terminate two (2) VHF systems. One to connect them with 4th Div TOC and the other to connect them with 4th Div Main via a relay located at Dragon Mountain.

b. One (1) AN/MRC-69 at DAK TO and one (1) AN/MRC-69 at CAMP ENARI to terminate the systems described above.

c. To provide the 3/101 Abn a complete Forward Area Support Center, they were provided at their CP location: One 5B-611 Patch Panel, one AN/MTC-7 switchboard, one AN/MGC-17 Message Center.

d. When the 3/101 Abn deployed a forward CP into the DAK PEK area, a UHF system was established from DAK TO to DAK PEK via a relay located at BEN HET. Upon departure of 3/101 Abn from DAK PEK area the 3/8 Inf move onto Hill 1270. A four channel VHF system was installed and operated from DAK TO to Hill 1270.

(b) The second major alteration occurred on 15 July with the relocation of 2d Bde to BAN ME THUOT and 3d Bde to OASIS. Another element equivalent to a FASC platoon was provided for the 2d Bde. The platoon which had supported the 2d Bde prior to the move remained in position to support the 3d Bde. Circuits to provide 2d Bde access to Div Main were established over a TROPO system from Dragon Mountain (D6M) to BAN ME THUOT. The circuits were extended to 2d Bde CP via a 12 channel VHF system. The circuits were extended from Dragon Mountain to Div Main and KONTUM, where the 3d Bde was previously located, one was deactivated. The FASC platoon has remained in KONTUM in anticipation of the arrival of another Bde into that area.

(2) A change occurred in the division's tactical trunking circuits when an AN/MTC-1 operated by the 124th Sig Bn was placed in operation on VHF Hill. A tactical trunk service was discontinued from the CAMP ENARI switchboard and is now routed through FAMOUS. This was accomplished in anticipation of the establishment of the Dial Central Office. Also affected under this plan is the removal of the FAVOR switchboard to be completed by mid-August.

(a) The 124th Sig Bn was relieved of the responsibility for rebroadcasting of Armed Forces Radio Service with the establishment of the 50,000 watt station at CAMP ENARI.

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

(b) After an extensive training program the AN/GRC-142's were placed in operation and are currently being utilized for Net #3 (Div Comd Opns Net). Current locations of AN/GRC-142 as operational stations are as follows:

1. 1st and 3d Bde Hq, (provided and operated by Bde Communication Platoon Personnel).
2. 2d Bde Hq, CAMP ENARI (NCS), and 2/1 Cav Hq (Provided and operated by 124th Sig Bn).

b. Logistics

(1) The Division Distribution Authority (DISTRA) has received 135 TSEC/KY-38 which is the secure voice for the AN/PRC-77. Proposals for distribution and issue are currently in progress and it is expected that operational nets will be established in late August.

(2) Eight (8) of a scheduled twelve (12) AN/GRC-142 Radio Teletype Sets, replacements for the AN/GRC-46, were received.

(3) Shortage of TOE power units is the most pressing logistical problem of the 124th Sig Battalion.

11. (U) Information Activities.

a. Because of the division's combat action in May against the 1st NVA Division west of KONTUM and the 325C Division in the DAK TO-Tri-border area there was more interest shown by the news media toward the 4th Division than had been experienced since the Battle for DAK TO. During May, 56 civilian news media representatives visited the division, the majority coming the last week in May to cover TASK FORCE MATHEWS operations. All major wire services and three TV networks were on hand. During the remainder of the quarter 34 more newsmen visited the Division. BG S.L.A. Marshal (ret) also visited the division in May where he was briefed by the Commanding General and visited forward battalion areas.

b. The world-wide quarterly report for the U.S. Army Home Town News Center for the last quarter of FY 68, revealed that the Ivy Division had more DS Forms 1526, Information for Home Town News Release, processed than any other reporting unit in the Army. The first two months of this reporting period, May and June, were included in this total. For the month of July still another new high was reached when 3989 hometowners were processed and sent to the Center.

c. The Division Chapter of the National 4th Infantry (Ivy) Division Association was very active during this period with 2321 new members added, bringing the chapter total to 5056. Two major projects were taken on during

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AVDDH-GC-MH

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

the period, the kick-off of the 4th Division Scholarship Fund drive, and the selection of a chapter representative to attend the annual reunion at Boston, Mass., the first weekend in August. The mechanics of the Scholarship Fund were established and published in Div Reg 230-4. In June the first payroll drive was held and the chapter transferred \$10,000 to the fund accounting. By the end of the period \$29,900.89 toward the goal of \$150,000 had been collected. The Board of Governors of the Chapter selected from six candidates from the major commands, SGM Guy Sullivan, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, to represent the Chapter at the Annual Reunion being held this year in Boston on 2-4 August. The SGM will return to the division and give a report to the CG on the reunion. He will also present a report of the division's operations during the past 12 months in the form of a slide presentation to the assembled members.

d. The Assistant Information Officer travelled to Tokyo, Japan, on 17 July in order to procure \$3,000 in photographic and sound-recording equipment from Central Post Welfare Funds. He is also supervising the printing of a historical booklet on the 4th Division. The \$2000, cost of this booklet came from Central Post Welfare Funds. The book is expected to be delivered by mid-August.

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

Section 2(c) - Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

1. (U) Personnel - None

2. (C) Operations.

a. Night LZ Extractions

Observation: Artificial illumination assists in final extractions conducted during the hours of darkness.

Evaluation: Even during daylight hours, final extraction from an LZ is an extremely sensitive task that requires detailed planning and coordination. This problem is even greater during periods of darkness. The employment of flare ships inhibits enemy action, minimizes unfavorable flying conditions, and allows the use of daylight techniques for final extraction.

Recommendation: That when a night extraction is planned, consideration should be given to the employment of flare ships to permit daylight extraction techniques.

b. Use of "Natural" LZ's

Observation: In extremely difficult terrain, natural LZ's should be located and recorded for future use.

Evaluation: During combat operations the preparation of LZ's in difficult terrain is time consuming. If natural LZ's are recorded, units can be directed to these locations for resupply and evacuation, often with a considerable saving of time, materiel, and effort.

Recommendation: That LZ's requiring little or no preparation should be recorded and maintained on file to facilitate planning for future operations.

c. LP Bunkers

Observation: LP bunkers should not be connected to the perimeter by a communication trench.

Evaluation: It has been discovered that the enemy will utilize a communication trench connecting an LP bunker to the main perimeter for an approach into the perimeter. In one instance, as an LP withdrew after detecting heavy movement around his position, the enemy followed him along the trench; an enemy ground attack was subsequently launched and succeeded in penetrating the perimeter through the same trench.

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

Recommendation: That units do not construct communication trenches leading from the main perimeter.

d. Integration of CSF Elements into US Unit

Observation: Integration of CSF elements with US units during combat operations can be beneficial to the success of the operation.

Evaluation: Because of their knowledge of the land, native CSF elements make excellent guides, scouts and security elements when integrated with US line elements. Unit commanders report great success in integrating these elements; the CSF unit was reinforced with firepower, and the US unit became more effective in its reconnaissance operations. Finally, integration of these elements fostered a mutual respect and sense of cooperation between both elements.

Recommendation: That US units capitalize on the indigenous knowledge of CSF elements by making maximum use of integration with US units.

e. Use of Trip Flares

Observation: Because of restrictions placed on long range employment of booby-traps, another early warning device has been devised.

Evaluation: Trip flares placed in four concentric belts around a fixed installation provide satisfactory long range early warning when coupled with a hand flare. The device called a "Bauer Flare" operates when the trip flare activates the hand flare. It has been successfully observed at distances up to six kilometers and is ideally suited to trigger an artillery concentration.


Recommendation: That units operating from fixed bases establish trip-flare and Bauer Flare early warning devices to improve their defensive posture.

f. Mine Detection

Observation: Standard mine detection devices alone are not adequate to locate all mines, especially the plastic anti-tank mines.

Evaluation: A continued use of plastic mines by the NVA has resulted in an increased road hazard. Plastic mines are undetectable by the metallic mine detector. Consequently the only successful detection continues to be the eye and the bayonet. This technique coupled with the use of metallic

DECLASSIFIED



REPLACED
BAUER FLARE

REPLACED

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

detectors can decrease a likely hazard. Foot prints along the shoulders of the road, fresh piles of dirt in nearby shrubs or an overly symmetrical depression in the road are all indicators. Another technique is in the formation and composition of the sweep team as shown on the following page.

Recommendation: That the above formation be employed by units conducting road sweep operations.

g. Integration of Kit Carson Scout and Scout Dogs

Observation: The combined use of Kit Carson Scouts with Scout Dogs for small unit patrols improves the ability of the patrol to perform its mission. The advantage of the Kit Carson's knowledge of the terrain coupled with the Scout Dogs capability to provide sufficient warning of enemy approach is an effective combination.

Evaluation: It has been found that employing the Kit Carson Scouts with Scout Dogs for small unit patrols, enhances the ability of the patrol to perform its mission. The advantage of the Kit Carson's knowledge of the terrain coupled with the Scout Dogs capability to provide sufficient warning of enemy approach is an effective combination.

Recommendation: That Kit Carson Scouts and Scout Dogs be employed with small unit patrols as often as possible,


h. Use of Saturation OP's and LP's

Observation: It has frequently been found that enemy build-up for an attack cannot be detected through the use of conventional air and ground reconnaissance techniques. This is especially true when the enemy is intimately familiar with the terrain and when he chooses to confine his movements to the hours of darkness.

Evaluation: In operations in the BAN ME THUOT area involving three infantry battalions with the mission of preempting an anticipated attack on the city, extensive use is being made of four to five man groups equipped with a radio located on high ground and astride likely infiltration routes. The mission of these groups which remain stationary, is to detect and give warning of all enemy movement. This technique was also used successfully in the POLEI KLENG area, where an entire battalion was employed in this role, utilizing radios drawn from other units.

Recommendation: That where intelligence indicates an enemy build-up for an impending attack on a defensive position or area which must be protected, extensive use be made of four to five man groups equipped with a radio to cover all likely routes into the area. To provide complete saturation of an area, an entire battalion should be employed to provide the reconnaissance screen.

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1. Pointman: Surveys road surface for signs of tampering, soil discoloration or footprints.
2. Dismounted shoulder sweepmen: Look for wires (command detonated) fresh dirt under shrubs or in grass.
3. Visual sweepmen: Visually check outside portion of road for physical indicators while operating metallic detector.
4. Center Sweepmen : Sweeps center portion of road visually and with mine detector.
5. Probers: Assist sweepmen by probing any unusual areas.
6. Security: AGAV's provide flank security while lead tank or vehicle remains sufficiently far enough to the rear to preclude injury to the sweepmen in case it hits a missed mine.

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

i. NVA Tactics

Observation: Enemy tactics during a recent engagement suggests that the NVA forces select targets by orienting on the shout of "Medic".

Evaluation: During an engagement with a large NVA force a US platoon received four WIA. Following the initial exchange of fire, the enemy patiently waited until the WIA shouted "Medic" and then took the area under intense fire. The correlation between shouts for medic and incoming fire over a period of time suggests the validity of the observation.

Recommendation: Shouts for aid on the battlefield should be no louder than necessary, and covering fire must be provided for personnel moving to the aid of wounded.

j. Fabricated Spray Bar for AGAVENCO System

Observation: An aircraft must fly at speeds in excess of 50 knots to provide enough pressure to open the valves in the AGAVENCO spray system. In the small cultivated fields encountered in the highlands, 50 knots is too fast to provide adequate and effective coverage for crop destruction.

Evaluation: A locally fabricated spray bar can be used effectively in crop destruction missions. By replacing the standard spray bar with a 20 foot piece of one inch water pipe drilled with $\frac{1}{4}$ " holes, less pressure is required to operate the system, and the aircraft can fly at 20 - 30 knots, an acceptable airspeed for crop destruction.

Recommendation: That the AGAVENCO system with locally fabricated spray bar be used as the primary crop destruction spray system.

k. The E-8 Tactical CS Launcher on Armored Vehicles

Observation: The E-8 Tactical CS Launcher can be mounted on armored vehicles and used effectively in convoy operations.

Evaluation: Mounts can be locally fabricated from angle iron and scrap metal on which E-8 Launcher can be easily attached on any armored vehicle. The Launchers can be employed in recon by fire and for counter ambush.

Recommendation: That armored vehicles engaged in convoy security or

AVDDH-GC

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

road security have E-8 Launchers mounted and ready for use at all times.

1. Circuit Breakers for Airborne Personnel Detectors

Observation: Fuse wells in Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD's) are a source of trouble due to lack of replacement fuses.

Evaluation: N/A

Recommendation: That APD's issued to the division be modified by replacing the fuse wells with circuit breakers.

m. S-5's and Tactical Operations

Observation: Sector S-5's could be more advantageously employed to assist in the conduct of Tactical Operations within their sectors.

Evaluation: Operations conducted within the Division TAOR would cause less unnecessary property damage to friendly indigenous personnel if proper coordination were made with S-5 teams responsible for the areas concerned prior to the initiation of tactical operations. The familiarity of Sector S-5 personnel would allow for the determination of friendly agricultural projects, temporarily abandoned hamlets, and population habits and customs. The participation of S-5 personnel in the conduct of tactical operations would provide a verifying element to determine the status of otherwise suspicious and questionable cultivated or occupied areas.

Recommendation: That tactical units make coordination with appropriate Sector S-5 personnel prior to the initiation of tactical operations with the TAOR.

3. (C) Training

a. Determining Direction and Distance to Key Terrain Features

Observation: Because of the difficult terrain in the Central Highlands, the individual soldier requires intensive training in determining the direction and distances to key terrain features to his front while occupying a defensive position.

Evaluation: With proper training the individual soldier can render accurate and timely reports on the location of enemy fire. This training is easily accomplished while the unit is occupying a fire base. The training involves the use of target detection techniques and a compass. An individual

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

so trained can provide information to bring rapid suppressive fires on the enemy.

Recommendation: That all units conduct training in firebases in the determination of accurate direction and distance to key terrain features.

4. (C) Intelligence

a. Use of AN/PPS-5 Radar for Convoy Security

Observation: It has been demonstrated that the AN/PPS-5 radar is an effective addition to convoy security.

Evaluation: On several occasions during the reporting period the AN/PPS-5 proved effective for increasing convoy protection. When situated on observation posts overlooking the LLOC, it can detect the enemy planting mines or his movement with a high degree of accuracy, enabling direct or indirect fire to be brought on the enemy without visual contact.

Recommendation: That AN/PPS-5 radar sets be used where feasible in a convoy protection role.

b. Patrolling

Observation: Immediately upon occupation of a new area a rifle company should conduct aggressive saturation patrols out to a distance of four kilometers.

Evaluation: Patrolling at company level is common practice; however, often these patrols are few in number and traverse distances of only 500 - 1000 meters. In at least one instance in the area of DAK PEK SF Camp, a unit occupied a defensive position and did not discover an enemy force located 3000 meters away until the US unit was attacked the second night. Indications subsequent to the attack revealed that the enemy force had occupied the same position the previous night; however, because of the 1500 meter limit of the US patrols the enemy location was not discovered.

Recommendation: That aggressive patrolling to a distance of 4,000 meters be done immediately upon occupation of a new area.

c. NVA Diversionary Tactics

Observation: Enemy forces utilize small elements to draw fires of a FSB as a diversion to bypass the FSB.

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AVDDH-GC

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

Evaluation: Activities around LZ BRILLO PAD during the first part of July revealed that significant enemy elements infiltrated the valley system east of that location. During the same period sporadic attacks by fire during evening hours were launched on BRILLO PAD from CU PU Mountain 2 kilometers west of BRILLO PAD. Also, attacks by fire were received by LZ BUNKER HILL during this time. The intensity of the attacks indicated that a small force was involved. Concentration of artillery fires, a normal procedure, probably increased the enemy's ability to bypass both BRILLO PAD and BUNKER HILL.

Recommendation: That before massing artillery fires during a series of sporadic attacks, consideration should first be given to the possibility of an enemy attempt to create a diversion in order to bypass.

d. Searching POW's

Observation: On a recent mission, a POW was said to have been thoroughly searched by the capturing unit. On closer inspection two double edge razor blades were concealed in the PW's shirt pocket.

Evaluation: The razor blades lay flat against the individual's chest and should have been easily spotted. The insertion of the hand into the pocket while searching could have resulted in severe cuts.

Recommendation: That capturing units tear the pockets from the shirts of POW's and make a visual search for similar small weapons.

5. (C) Logistics

a. Plastic and Cloth Sandbags

Observation: Experience has proven that the cloth sandbag is more versatile than the plastic sandbag.

Evaluation: Vertical construction almost always demands the use of cloth bags since they are less prone to slip and fall. The plastic bag is satisfactory for horizontal construction. The plastic bag is more durable than the cloth bag, but is very susceptible to slipping. The plastic bag is acceptable for use in revetment walls, blast shields, and in open topped fighting positions for crew served weapons.

Recommendation: That only cloth bags be used for side-wall construction of bunkers and all vertical construction over four feet in height. Neither bag should be used as a weight bearing surface or for support.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 August 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RSS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

b. Vitamin Supplements

Observation: The incidence of rashes and infections is related to vitamin deficiency.

Evaluation: Vitamin tablets were issued to the forward elements of one battalion for one month. With no change in operations or requirements during this period, the incidence of infectious rashes, heat rashes, and minor infections was reduced considerably.

Recommendation: That multi-vitamin tablets be made available in sufficient quantity to allow regular use.

c. UH-1H Rotational Maintenance Humps

Observation: The 4th Aviation Battalion received all of its UH-1H aircraft during a short time span. This has caused the majority of the aircraft to enter scheduled maintenance at the same time.

Evaluation: Every 100 hours each army aircraft must undergo an extensive inspection termed the Periodic Inspection. A rotational maintenance problem occurs when it is time for a Periodic Inspection since most of the helicopters reach the 100 hour mark within the same general time frame. The length of time required to perform the Periodic Inspection varies according to the number of parts that need replacement and the availability of those parts.

Recommendation: That spacing in aircraft maintenance be accomplished similar to the DEROS on individuals. Aviation units arriving in an overseas theater should infuse aircraft with other aviation units to avoid the maintenance hump.

d. Resupply by Helicopter

Observation: Turbulance in mountainous terrain causes hazardous flying conditions, often making resupply of friendly units difficult, or impossible.

Evaluation: In extremely mountainous terrain where only DZ's are available and unsafe flying conditions due to turbulance preclude hovering a sling employed under a UH-1 Helicopter for a "quick drop" facilitates the operation.

Recommendation: That UH-1 aircraft sling load resupply items when terrain or weather prohibits normal resupply techniques.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
AVDDH-GC

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

6. (U) Organization - None.
7. (C) Tactical Cover and Deception

Enemy Evasive Patterns

Observation: After daylight operations, US units are often required to leave their AO before nightfall to establish security of a populated area. Over a period of several days the enemy soon recognizes this pattern and can easily evade friendly forces when they return to their area of operations the following day.

Evaluation: In one instance, friendly forces realized the enemy's evasive pattern, and moved infantry forces into ambush positions along enemy withdrawal routes within the friendly AO. At first light an armored force entered the AO in accordance with their previously established pattern. Two of the ambushes intercepted enemy withdrawing hastily from the mechanized force.

Recommendation: That ambushes be used to capitalize on a pattern of enemy reaction to friendly operations.

8. (C) Other

A. Civil Affairs

(1) Control of Rice Sales

Observation: Intelligence sources have substantiated that VC/NVA elements have forced excessive rice purchases from local villagers as a means of resupply.

Evaluation: Indigenous families often require purchased rice to supplement their regular crop production. VC/NVA forces attempt to collect a variable portion of each family's rice supply regardless of US Civic Action assistance. To discontinue making purchased rice available would create extreme hardship among the villagers. The formation of consolidated, fortified villages also requires a commitment to provide assistance in economic functions while the newly introduced civic improvements are being accomplished. Documenting rice purchases made by the villages will preclude excessive amounts of rice purchased, insure an adequate supply for the villages, and require enemy forces to alienate themselves from the civilian population when attempts are made to tax this amount. An inventory of rice available within a village, and a record of rice consumed within a given period will provide some basis for the control of rice.

AVDDH-GC

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

Recommendation: That a proposed rice purchase be cleared through a control authority a minimum of 24 hours prior to the desired date of purchase. After determining the minimum rice needs of a village, a comprehensive file should be kept to provide a record of all unusually large purchases.

(2) CA Teams and Local Customs

Observation: It is a mistake to assume that a civil affairs project should not be attempted because it apparently violates customs and taboos.

Evaluation: Undesirable traditions can be changed if the alternatives are properly presented. In the consolidated village of PLEI KONG BRECH the MONTAGNARD practice of keeping their livestock under their homes was creating a serious sanitation problem. A CA team recommended to the village chief that all livestock be penned outside the village. The village chief decided to take the advice of the CA Team and build cattle pens outside the village.

Recommendation: That CA Teams demonstrate to the people that the change will be to the advantage of the village. Often the traditional taboos and customs of the MONTAGNARDS will be readily changed if an alternative is properly presented.

(3) MONTAGNARD Injuries on US Vehicles

Observation: Several vehicle accidents within a short period of time have involved MONTAGNARD passengers who fell from the rear of moving US Army vehicles.

Evaluation: MONTAGNARD passengers in US military vehicles require greater supervision than US personnel. The unfamiliarity with basic safety practices and the great excitement experienced by MONTAGNARDS riding in a moving vehicle necessitates a safety lecture and positive supervision during the conduct of any vehicle movement.

Recommendation: That all units involved in the transportation of indigenous civilians require a safety lecture prior to boarding the vehicle, and the presence of a responsible US individual in the same passenger compartment as the indigenous personnel. The supervisor should insure that all indigenous personnel sit, and remain seated, during the duration of the ride.

B. Engineer

(1) Over-reliance on Airmobile Engineer Equipment

18 August 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

Observation: Units have tendency to over-rely on airmobile engineer equipment.

Evaluation: Airmobile engineer equipment is a "nice to have" item. However, this equipment is subject to numerous maintenance problems when located at a fire base for more than one week. The 3414 Tractor, D-5A, D-6B, and Case 450 dozers have all experienced maintenance difficulties away from good maintenance facilities.

Recommendation: That airmobile engineer equipment be committed for a limited period of one to two weeks to firebases, and then returned to brigade base areas for thorough maintenance.

(2) Shortage of Airmobile Rigging Equipment.

Observation: Difficulty has been experienced in securing airmobile rigging equipment for rapid response to operations.

Evaluation: It has been difficult at time to secure sufficient slings and clevises to move a piece of heavy equipment. Rigging equipment rapidly becomes lost or unserviceable over a period of several sorties.

Recommendation: That direct support engineer companies have available to them a basic issue of twenty (20) feet, 20,000 pound slings, 30 clevises, and five donut rolls.

(3) AVLB and Rough Terrain

Observation: The Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) is not suited for rough terrain.

Evaluation: The AVLB has proven too top heavy for operations in exceptionally rough terrain. Insufficient maintenance support add to the complications of a long distance mission. Air lifted dry gap spans (M4T6) can often be emplaced more quickly and with greater assurance, when a long distance mission is involved.

Recommendation: That AVLB's be used on a very limited basis and primarily on short distance missions on roads or good trails.

(4) Removal of M4T6 Float Bridge

Observation: Too much time is wasted removing the M4T6 float bridge.

Evaluation: Much of the time in removing a float bridge is taken up by washing the mud off the bridge, removing the end ramps, and unpinning the bridge. Since this takes only a squad of men, these details can be accomplished one day prior to the actual removal of the bridge while the rest of the unit is convoying to the site.

AVDDH-GC

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

Recommendation: That one squal equipped with a 250 cfm compressor for cleaning of the bridge be dispatched one day prior to the removal of the bridge.

(C) Signal

Use of Secure Mode

Observation: Use of the secure mode on the command net blocks traffic on that frequency between radios not on secure mode.

Evaluation: A "secure-only" radio frequency has been established apart from the Command A frequency. The operation of this net requires one additional radio at each monitoring station. This method prevents the back log of clear, routine traffic from completely monopolizing the net following extended secure messages.

Recommendation: That units experiencing message back log on their Command A frequency consider the establishment of a secure-only net.

6 Inclosures
as

Charles P. Stone

CHARLES P. STONE
Major General, USA
Commanding

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. (C) Task Organization as of 30 April 1968 was:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

3-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
1-8 Inf
C/2-1 Cav
6-29 Arty
A/5-16 Arty
B/6-14 Arty
A/6-14 Arty
Co A(-), 4th Engr Bn
TACP

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-8 Inf (Mech) (-)
1-10 Cav (-)
4-42 Arty
A/6-14 Arty
B/3-6 Arty
C/3-6 Arty
B/5-16 Arty
Co B(-), 4th Engr Bn
TACP

DISCOM

DIVARTY

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-14 Inf
1-35 Inf
2-35 Inf
1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
B/1-10 Cav (-)
A/2-8 Inf (Mech) (-)
2-9 Arty
B/1-92 Arty
C/1-92 Arty
C/6-14 Arty
C/5-16 Arty
D/5-16 Arty
C/5-22 Arty
C/4-42 Arty
Co C(-), 4th Engr Bn
TACP

Div Troops

2-1 Cav (-)
7-17 Air Cav (-) GS
A/5-22 Arty
4th Engr Bn

2. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 63-37-67

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

ADD: 1-22 Inf (-)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: B-1-10 Cav

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: 1-22 Inf (-)
ADD: B/1-10 Cav

3. (C) Task Organization as changed by OPORD 11-68

TASK FORCE MATHEWS

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

3-8 Inf
3-12 Inf

3d Bde, 101st Abn Div

1-506 Inf (Abn)
2-506 Inf (Abn)

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1-35 Inf
Co. A, 4th Engr Bn
6-29 Arty
C/4-42 Arty (DS)
TACP

3-187 Inf (Abn)
1-8 Inf
1-22 Inf
C/2-1 Cav (+)
2-319 Arty (DS)

HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-12 Inf
1-14 Inf
2-35 Inf
B/2-8 Inf (Mech)
C/1-10 Cav
Co C, 4th Engr Bn
2-9 Arty (DS)
B/4-42 Arty (DS)
TACP

DIVARTY

5-16 Arty

DISCOM

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-8 Inf (Mech) (-)
1-10 Cav (-)
Co B, 4th Engr Bn
4-42 Arty (-) (DS)
B/3-6 Arty (DS)
TACP

Div Troops

2-1 Cav (-)
7-17 Air Cav (GS)
A/5-22 Arty
4th Engr Bn

4. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 65-37-67:

TASK FORCE MATHEWS

DELETE: 1-35 Inf

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

ADD: 1-35 Inf

5. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 65-37-67:

TASK FORCE MATHEWS

DELETE: 3d Bde, 101st (Abn) Div (-)
2-506 Inf (Abn)
3-187 Inf (Abn)

6. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 67-37-67

TASK FORCE MATHEWS dissolved effective 121500 June. The 1st Bde, 4th Infantry Division returns to division control effective 121500 June.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

ADD: 1-506 Inf (Abn) (eff 121500 Jun)

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-12 Inf
1-14 Inf

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3-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
1-506 Inf (Abn)
B/2-1 Cav
B/6-14 Arty
C/4-42 Arty
A/1-92 Arty
C/1-92 Arty
A/2-319 Arty
Co A, 4th Engr Bn. (-)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-8 Inf (Mech) (-)
1-10 Cav (-)
A/6-14 Arty
B/3-6 Arty
C/3-6 Arty
4-42 Arty (-)
Co B, 4th Engr (-)

DIVARTY

1-35 Inf
2-35 Inf
B/2-8 Inf (Mech)
A/1-10 Cav
C/1-10 Cav
2-9 Arty
B/4-42 Arty
B/1-92 Arty
B/5-16 Arty
B/7-15 Arty
6-84 Arty
C/6-14 Arty
C/5-22 Arty
Co C, 4th Engr Bn. (-)

Division Troops

2-1 Cav (-)
7-17 Air Cav (GS)
A/5-22 Arty
4th Engr Bn (-)

DISCOM

7. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 68-37-67:

The 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (Abn) depart MAC ARTHUR and 4th Infantry Division control, effective 17 June.

8. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 69-37-67:

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: C/1-10 Cav (-)
ADD: A/1-10 Cav

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: 1-22 Inf

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: A/1-10 Cav
ADD: 1-22 Inf
C/1-10 Cav (-)

9. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 70-37-67:

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

DELETE: 2 Co's/2-35 Inf
2-35 Inf (-)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

ADD: 2 Co's/2-35 Inf

Div Troops

ADD: 2-35 Inf (-)

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10. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 72-37-67:

<u>Division Troops</u>	<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
DELETE: 2-35 Inf (-)	ADD: 2-35 Inf (-)
<u>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
ADD: 1-35 Inf	DELETE: 1-35 Inf

11. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 73-37-67:

<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>Division Troops</u>
DELETE: 2-35 Inf	ADD: 2-35 Inf

12. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 74-37-67:

<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
DELETE: 2-8 Inf	ADD: 2-8 Inf
1-12 Inf	1-12 Inf
1-10 Cav	1-10 Cav
ADD: 2-35 Inf	
A/7-17 Air Cav	<u>Division Troops</u>
	DELETE: 2-35 Inf
	A/7-17 Air Cav

13. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 75-37-67:

<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
DELETE: 1-12 Inf	ADD: 1-12 Inf
1-10 Cav	1-10 Cav

14. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 76-37-67:

<u>Division Troops</u>	<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
DELETE: D/7-17 Air Cav	ADD: D/7-17 Air Cav

15. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 77-37-67:

<u>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
DELETE: 1-35 Inf	ADD: 1-35 Inf

16. (C) Task Organization as changed by FRAGO 78-37-67:

<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>Division Troops</u>
DELETE: 1-35 Inf	ADD: 1-35 Inf

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17. (C) Task Organization as of 31 July with supporting artillery units:

<u>1st Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>2d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>	<u>3d Bde, 4th Inf Div</u>
3-8 Inf	2-35 Inf	1-14 Inf
3-12 Inf	1-22 Inf	2-8 Inf
1-8 Inf	1-12 Inf	1-10 Cav (-)
B/2-1 Cav	B/1-10	1-35 Inf (-)
6-29 Arty	A/7-17 Air Cav	A/2-9 Arty
A/1-92 Arty	D/7-17 Air Cav	A/3-6 Arty
C/5-16 Arty	B/1-35 Inf	B/3-6 Arty
D/5-16 Arty	D/1-35 Inf	B/1-92 Arty
B/6-14 Arty	B/4-42 Arty	A/5-16 Arty
Co A, 4th Engr Bn	C/4-42 Arty	A/6-14 Arty
TACP	B/2-9 Arty	C/6-14 Arty
	C/1-92 Arty	C/2-9 Arty
<u>Division Troops</u>	B/5-22 Arty	Prov Btry
2-1 Cav (-)	Co B, 4th Engr Bn	Co E, 4th Engr Bn
7-17 Air Cav (-)	TACP	TACP
A/5-22 Arty		
4th Engr Bn		
<u>DISCOM</u>	<u>DIVARTY</u>	

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Key personnel by position as of the end of the reporting period.

Division Headquarters

Stone, Charles P.	MG	CG, 4th Inf Div
Brownfield, Albert R. Jr.	EG	ADC-4
Hodges, Warren D.	COL	Chief of Staff
Sulenski, Joseph S.	LTC	ACofS, G1
Smith, John A. Jr.	LTC	ACofS, G2
Kirwan, Robert L.	LTC	ACofS, G3
Brandt, Leo M.	LTC	ACofS, G4
Renick, Roderick D.	LTC	ACofS, G5
Daniels, John L.	LTC	DPC
Krug, Robert W.	LTC	AG
Zone, Robert W.	LTC	Div Durg.
Seaman, Robert	LTC	IG
Russel, Donald N.	LTC	PMO
Childers, John C. Jr.	LTC	Fin Off
Cotton, James H.	LTC	Chap
Gillespie, John W.	LTC	Cml Off
Peck, Darrell L.	LTC	SJA
Kington, Donald M.	MAJ	IO

1st Bde, 4th Infantry Division

Fix, Joseph E.	COL	CO
Hickey, Pennel J.	LTC	XO
Howitt, Robert A.	MAJ	S3

2d Bde, 4th Infantry Division

McChrystal, Herbert J.	COL	CO
Story, Robert P.	LTC	XO
Stanilli, Joseph	MAJ	S3

3d Bde, 4th Infantry Division

Forrester, Eugene P.	COL	CO
Buckner, Garrett D.	LTC	XO
Estep, Ronald C.	MAJ	S3

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Division Artillery

McAlister, Robert C.	COL	CO
Dewhirst, Sam T.	LTC	XO
Maurer, William W.	LTC	S3

Division Support Command

Abernathy, William C.	COL	CO
		XO
Whedbee, John S. Sr.	MAJ	S3

Battalions

Tombaugh, William W.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 8th Inf
Edgerton, John P.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf
Yarbrough, John D.	LTC	CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
Palastra, Joseph T.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf
Hendrix, Jamie R.	LTC	CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
Monclova, Irving	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 14th Inf
McBride, Thomas E. Jr.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf
Mundie, William L.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 35th Inf
Moore, William C.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 35th Inf
Noce, Robert W.	LTC	CO, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav
Moreau, Donald W.	LTC	CO, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav
Riggs, Theodore S.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor
Akers, Albert B.	LTC	CO, 6th Bn, 29th Arty
Fronczak, Edward L.	LTC	CO, 4th Bn, 29th Arty
Wiles, Richard I.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 9th Arty
Hayward, Barton M.	LTC	CO, 5th Bn, 16th Arty
Williams, Donald L.	LTC	CO, 4th Avn Bn
Heiberg, Elvin R.	LTC	CO, 4th Engr Bn
Rolya, William I.	LTC	CO, 124th Sig Bn
Stracener, Carl E.	LTC	CO, 4th Med Bn
Porter, Vernon R.	LTC	CO, 4th S&T Bn
Ball, Duard D.	LTC	CO, 704th Maint Bn

Separate Companies and Detachments

Kelly, Peter A.	CPT	CO, HHC, 4th Inf Div
Long, George M.	CPT	CO, 4th Admin Co
Damon, Donald	CPT	CO, 4th MP Co
Magee, Michael C.	MAJ	CO, 4th MI Det
Holtry, Preston W.	CPT	CO, 29th Mil Hist Det

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

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1 May. At YA890935 Company C, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry engaged two-three NVA resulting in one NVA KIA. At YA898819 a fire team from Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry exchanged fire with one NVA. The enemy soldier fled the area after one US was killed. Company B later found one US MIA unharmed at YA973838. Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry discovered 50 rounds of 60mm mortar ammo and 15 B-40 rockets at YA844886. Troop B also recovered two US MIA, confirmed KIA from the April 27 contact of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry.

2 May. At YA924942 Long Range Patrol 3B made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Artillery was employed as the patrol broke contact and linked up with Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry. Enemy casualties could not be determined. At Camp Enari, one individual on patrol at ZA214269 was wounded when he stepped on an anti-personnel mine.

3 May. At YA207957, four ARVN's were wounded when their five ton truck hit a mine. At AR994327, Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry observed one individual in the area of suspected cache sites. A helicopter from Troop D landed in the area and two crew members and one indigenous interpreter attempted to apprehend the individual. The dismounted ground element received one B-40 rocket resulting in one US KIA, one US WIA, and one indigenous WIA. The casualties were evacuated and gunships expended in the area, resulting in eight NVA KIA. At YA945927, Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found five NVA killed by artillery. At YA942892 a patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry consisting of two US and two CSF from POLEI KIENG received small arms fire and grenades from two NVA. One CSF was captured by the NVA and released, as the patrol withdrew and became separated. Two US and one CSF were wounded in the contact. At YA919801, Long Range Patrol 4C made contact with an unknown size enemy force, resulting in one US KIA. The patrol was extracted and gunships expended in the area with unknown results. The Aero Rifle Platoon of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received sporadic small arms fire on insertion at AR995327. Gunships supported and contact was broken. The platoon found an ammo cache containing 20 122mm rockets and three 75mm recoilless rifle rounds. The results of the contact were four NVA killed.

4 May. At ZA057457 Long Range Patrol 2F engaged four NVA with small arms fire killing two. Gunships were employed and the patrol was extracted. Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found two NVA bodies, estimated to be three weeks old at YA937926. At YA940891 a four man observation post from Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, received small arms fire from five NVA at close range, resulting in three US KIA and one US WIA. Artillery was employed. A platoon reaction force from Company A swept the contact area with negative findings.

5 May. At 0105H-0123H Camp Enari received 25 rounds of 122mm rockets, only one impacted within the perimeter with negative casualties or damage.

Inclosure 3

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At ZB167025, an armored personnel carrier from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment struck mine, wounding three US. At ZA104508 a platoon from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, received small arms and a B-40 rocket, resulting in one US KIA. A relief force from Troop A was dispatched to the contact site. An armored personnel carrier in the relief force received a B-40 rocket resulting in four US WIA. At AR755894 the 3d Brigade Command Post received 40-45 82mm mortars, 60mm mortars, and 122mm rockets, wounding 27 US. At BR088552 a convoy on highway 19E was ambushed. Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment reacted, killing eight NVA, with two US wounded. Troop B conducted a sweep north of a village at BR187519, an armored personnel carrier from Troop B struck a mine resulting in one US wounded. Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed four NVA killed by Artillery at YB782292 and YB786290.

6 May. At AB166025 Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment received small arms and B-40 rocket fire from unknown size force, wounding one US.

7 May. At YA752982 a Head Hunter aircraft observed one individual. Artillery was employed killing one NVA. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry received sniper fire wounding one US at YA940911. At YA890928 Company C, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry received one B-40 rocket resulting in three US WIA. At YA952882 Companies A and D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received small arms fire from a small enemy force. The companies reacted seizing the high ground, killing one NVA. At AR928492 Troop A, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment engaged an enemy force resulting in one VMC KIA. At YB800293 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed one NVA. At AS888005 Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged one individual resulting in one NVA KIA. Troop A later observed an estimated NVA Company in the open at YB800276. Gunships were employed killing six NVA. Troop A reported six NVA killed by a B-52 strike.

8 May. An ambush patrol from Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry observed two individuals in camouflage suits at YB862142, small arms fire was exchanged, with one US WIA. At YB815272 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed a platoon of NVA in the open, and took them under fire killing one NVA. Troop B fired on nine individuals in a trench at YB838302 killing two NVA. A light observation helicopter from Troop B went down due to mechanical failure, injuring two US at YB836297. At YB968169 the Reconnaissance Platoon from 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with estimated NVA squad. The point man from the Reconnaissance Platoon was missing in action, but returned on 9 May 68. The Commanding Officer of 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry observed six 122mm rockets on wooden platforms oriented towards DAK TO at YB962170. The position was destroyed by artillery. Gunships from the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed a second rocket position upon arriving to support the contact. Fifteen rockets were fired at DAK TO with negative results before artillery destroyed the position. Gunships from the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry confirmed four NVA KIA. Company D, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact as it moved to reinforce the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry who had been in contact earlier. One NVA was captured. As Company D began to withdraw, an erratic round from a gunship caused one US KIA and five US WIA. Long Range Patrol H4 made contact at ZA112809 resulting in one

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NVA KIA. At YA947884 the Reconnaissance Platoon from Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received fire from one NVA, the platoon returned fire killing one NVA. Company C, 1st Battalion 14th Infantry made contact with 15 NVA, killing all 15.

9 May. At ZBO94455 Long Range Patrol 1A made contact with 15 man force killing one NVA. Artillery was fired in support. At YB818247 a CSF Company was attacked from three sides by an estimated NVA Battalion at 0455H. The position was overrun, with the contact lasting ten minutes. At 0700 the enemy force returned and again swept over the hill, final results were: 16 NVA KIA, one US KIA. one US MIA, nine CSF KIA, 29 CSF WIA, and 28 CSF MIA. At ZA135564 Troop A and Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry killed two VMC. A 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment bridge security team was informed by local children that mines were located at AR933482. Three 82mm rounds planted as mines were destroyed in place. At 0123H, Camp Enari received a total of 14 rounds of 122mm rockets from seven different positions bounded by ZA1824, ZA1827, ZA2314 and ZA2327. At YA948874 Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received two rounds of 60mm mortar wounding one US. The Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with a squad size unit at YA937853, killing four NVA. The platoon later engaged one NVA, resulting in one NVA KIA. At ZA055921 a 3/4 ton truck from 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery hit a pressure mine, killing one US, and wounding another.

10 May. At YB870315 a F-105 was downed by ground fire. The pilot ejected and was extracted by the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry. At YB831210 a listening post from Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry engaged two NVA with small arms and grenades. Two US were wounded and two 2 NVA KIA. One NVA body was found after artillery was employed. Four NVA KIA were also observed in the area of contact by a command and control ship. At YB831210 a listening post from Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received a ground attack by an estimated NVA Battalion. The enemy occupied two bunkers on the perimeter, but a counter-attack regained the positions. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, recoilless rifles, mortars, and B-40 rockets. Artillery and SP00KY were employed in support of the contact. Results were: three US KIA, 12 US WIA, 48 NVA KIA, and six NVAC. At YB877321 a forward air controller observed a suspected enemy assembly area. Air Strikes were employed resulting in an estimated 20 NVA killed by air.

11 May. At YA952882 a patrol from Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry exchanged small arms fire and employed artillery on five NVA. At YA954854 a patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry killed one NVA. An aircraft in support of the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment received ground fire from four NVA, resulting in one US WIA at BR258483. At YB793311 Troop B, 7th Squadron 17th Air Cavalry killed one NVA. At YB825282 Troop B observed 50 individuals in a Battalion size bunker complex. Gunships, airstrikes, and artillery were employed, killing three NVA. At YB882300, a light observation helicopter from Troop B received small arms ground fire, wounding one US.

12 May. At ZA199795 Long Range Patrol H4E had one man wounded by

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sniper fire. At YA969392 Long Range Patrol 2A employed artillery on 22 individuals, killing an estimated 15. At AS852202 B Troop, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed one NVA.

13 May. At AR796715 Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received ground fire and returned fire with gunships killing three NVA. At YA963855 a man on observation post from Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was wounded when small arms fire was exchanged with two NVA. At YB893066 Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged eight individuals killing one NVA. Artillery and airstrikes were employed. At YB937060 Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed an NVA platoon in the open, resulting in six NVA KIA.

14 May. An armored personnel carrier from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment struck a mine at ZB170017. At this location, Troop C also received B-40 rockets and small arms fire, wounding one US. At YB936906 a Head Hunter aircraft observed an NVA company performing repairs on a bridge. An airstrike was employed resulting an estimated 20 NVA killed by air. Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found three NVA killed by artillery at YA952882. At YA951879, an observation post from Company D observed one NVA, artillery was employed and the individual moved towards the observation post and was engaged with claymore mines, resulting in one NVA KIA. A patrol was dispatched to check the area, and received small arms fire wounding two US. At YB888301 a light observation helicopter from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry took two hits from an automatic weapon wounding one US. Artillery was employed killing an additional 7 NVA. Troop A and Troop B each killed one NVA at that location. Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed 28 NVA in 14 two-man foxholes. Gunships were employed killing four NVA at YB831210.

15 May. A CSF killed two NVA at YB827294. The US advisor was wounded in the contact. The PLEI DJERENG Special Forces Camp received an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds wounding one US. Long Range Patrol 2A engaged five enemy, killing one at YA961368. Fire Support Base #14 (YA939913) received two rounds of 82mm mortar fire wounding one US. At YA552862 a patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, engaged an unknown size NVA force which resulted in three NVA KIA, and two US WIA. At BR152553 a west bound convoy received six 75mm recoilless rifle rounds and small arms fire from an estimated eight to ten individuals located on the south side of Highway 19. Two US were wounded in the contact. Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed two NVA at ZA012807. Camp Enari received ten rounds of 82mm mortar in conjunction with an attempted sapper attack. An estimated three VC penetrated the perimeter. One VC was killed by small arms fire while the others fled. The enemy then employed two B-40 rockets which wounded one US.

16 May. Fire Support Base #25 (YB887291) received three rounds 60mm mortar fire wounding one US. A Helicopter from the 52d Aviation Battalion crashed and burned at YB988153 as it attempted to land at Fire Support Base #5. One US was slightly injured. At YB909168 a patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an estimated ten NVA killing one NVA. Fire Support Base #14 (YA939913) received 12 rounds of 75mm recoilless

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rifle fire and 17 82mm mortar rounds, wounding three US. An observation post from Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry at YA996825, received small arms fire, automatic weapons, grenades and flamethrowers as an unknown force initiated an attack at 0252H. The enemy occupied three bunkers while friendly forces occupied one. Company C moved from Fire Support Base #18 and effected link up with the observation post element at 0945H and then withdrew to the company position. Air strikes were employed on the vacated observation post. The fire support base continued to receive mortar, recoilless rifle, and rocket fire until 1755H. The results of the contact were: five US KIA and 29 US WIA, while 17 NVA KIA were counted. Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry engaged three NVA with gunships, killing two at YA956859. An air strike was employed in the same location killing one NVA.

17 May. At YB893270 a mine sweep team consisting of engineers, Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, and CSF from BEN HET was ambushed by an estimated NVA Company. Artillery and gunships supported Troop C in the contact. Losses were one US KIA, three US WIA, and four CSF WIA. In response to the contact, Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made a combat assault to YB890273 and found one NVA KIA. Company C later exchanged fire with an unknown size force which resulted in two US wounded. A platoon from Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found two NVA bodies at YB887291. The Reconnaissance Platoon from 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry reported being pursued by an estimated ten NVA. Artillery was employed on the patrol's withdrawal route, and they were extracted without incident. Fire Support Base #25 (YB887291) received three rounds 82mm mortar fire, killing one US and wounding nine others. At ZAO55217 Long Range Patrol H-2C engaged three individuals resulting in one VMC KIA. At YA987819 a United States Air Force Forward Air Controller was downed for unknown reasons. An Air Force rescue crew was inserted and confirmed the pilot to be KIA. The 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry at Fire Support Base #18 (YA963855) received a 75mm recoilless rifle round which impacted inside of the perimeter resulting in two US WIA. Later, three more rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle round wounded two US. At YA961859 an observation post from the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, killed one NVA. At ZA005867 Long Range Patrol 3B engaged three individuals with small arms resulting in two NVA KIA. An armored personnel carrier from Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment was hit by a B-40 rocket wounding one US. Another armored personnel carrier from Troop A, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment hit a mine at BRO90576 resulting in five US WIA. A gunship from Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry was downed by ground fire at ZA009798. Two US crewmen were wounded when the aircraft crashed. The crew was extracted and the aircraft destroyed.

18 May. At YB943666 a 20-30 man CSF patrol element engaged an estimated NVA Company, resulting in two CSF WIA. Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry conducted a cordon and search of a village located at ZA155515. At ZA-113515 the cordon element of Troop A received small arms fire from the south, and engaged three individuals resulting in two VMC KIA. At ZAO68773 Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received sniper fire, resulting in one US WIA. At ZA026443 Long Range Patrol 4C made contact with an estimated ten NVA, killing one NVA before being extracted. Long Range Patrol 4C exchanged fire

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with three individuals at YA922806 resulting in one US WIA and one NVA KIA. Troop A, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment received three B-40 rockets at BR028512 resulting in one US wounded. A light observation helicopter from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry was downed by ground fire at YB820280. A medical evacuation ship extracted one crew member of the downed helicopter. The pilot was pinned inside the wreckage and believed to be KIA. As the evacuation ship lifted off, another light observation helicopter was downed by ground fire. The two crew members were extracted, one slightly wounded.

19 May. At YB842215 a patrol from Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received automatic weapons fire from six to seven NVA, resulting in one US WIA. Four hours later, the patrol engaged ten NVA in the same location, killing two NVA while two US were wounded. At YB910649 a Head Hunter Aircraft observed ten NVA and employed artillery, killing two NVA. At 1630H, a NVA HOI CHANH walked into BEN HET Special Forces Camp, indicating his unit to be 101st Regiment, 325C Division. Landing Zone MILE HIGH (YZ939913) received sniper fire wounding one US. At ZB037011 the Aero Rifle Platoon, Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry found one NVA body estimated to be two months old.

20 May. At YB840216 at 0955H a patrol from Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry moving south from Fire Support Base #29 exchanged fire with ten NVA who were in prepared positions. The patrol withdrew to an observation post at YB840219 and employed artillery. The observation post, manned at this time by 12 US, received a ground attack by an estimated NVA platoon. A platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry moved overland to reinforce the observation post and extract the element. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, and rifle grenades. Artillery and air strikes were employed in support of the contact while recoilless rifles were employed from Fire Support Base #29 to suppress the enemy fire. At 1200H, the observation post and the platoon from Company C closed at Fire Support Base #29. Results were 13 US WIA, with enemy casualties unknown. At YB840216 Company C received fire from an unknown force resulting in two US WIA. In the same area, Company C found two NVA KIA. A patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry moving west from Fire Support Base #15 (YB853188) received fire from an estimated ten NVA. The patrol returned fire, withdrew to the fire support base and employed artillery. One US was listed as missing in action. A Head Hunter aircraft killed one NVA with rockets at ZB084784. At ZA035386 a platoon from Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry received automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire resulting in one US WIA. Long Range Patrol 2H made contact at ZA158192. Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry deployed to the area and received heavy ground fire from ten to fifteen individuals. The gunships expended killing three VC. At ZA158192 Long Range Patrol 2H engaged five VC, killing one. At YA955859 a patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received small arms fire and withdrew back to Landing Zone BRILLO PAD with 1 US wounded. A patrol from Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA body estimated to be ten to twelve days old.

21 May. A light observation helicopter received heavy small arms fire at ZB092446, resulting in one US wounded. At YA963306 an ambush patrol from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry killed two VMC.

22 May. At ZA145165 a CSF Company from PLEI ME made contact with an unknown size NVA force. Artillery was employed killing one NVA. The CSF captured one NVA. Long Range Patrol 2B killed two VC at YA987228. At YA959857 a platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged a reinforced NVA platoon

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while moving NW from Landing Zone BRILLO PAD. Six US were wounded, while ten NVA were killed. A Patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry killed one NVA at ZA043987. A light observation helicopter from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry received ground fire, wounding one US at ZB078368. At ZB095451 a helicopter from Troop A was downed by ground fire. The crew was extracted with minor injuries, while one NVA was killed.

23 May. At YB864814 a Head Hunter aircraft observed an estimated enemy Company moving south. The Head Hunter employed rockets resulting in one NVA KIA, followed by an airstrike which killed another NVA. A HOI CHANH walked into Fire Support Base #25 (YB887291). The individual identified his unit as 3d Battalion, 101st Regiment, 325C Division. A CSF Company from PLEI ME killed one NVA at ZA139150. A US advisor with a CSF Company was swept downstream crossing the YA KRONG BOLAH River at YA991729, and is missing in action. At ZA070770 Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry found two VMC killed by artillery. Long Range Patrol 4D killed three VC at ZA004768.

24 May. The 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry (Abn), the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry (Abn), and the advance party for the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division closed DAK TO. Task Force MATHEWS became operational at 2000H. At YA936915 Company D, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry found five NVA bodies. Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed one NVA at YB842342. At YB828192 a helicopter was downed by ground fire. The aircraft was burning in flight prior to crashing and was destroyed by fire. The crew apparently could not exit the aircraft and are missing in action.

25 May. The 2d Battalion, 506th Airborne closed at DAK TO. At YB895272 a mine sweep element secured by one platoon from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment moving east from BEN HET, was ambushed by an estimated company size force. Gunships from Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry supported the contact, in addition to another platoon from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment which linked up with the friendly forces. A sweep of the contact area by Troop C produced 39 NVA KIA, while US losses were two US killed and 11 US wounded. One US was wounded when a Head Hunter aircraft received ground fire at YB828308. Fire Support Base #29 (YB839223) manned by companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received an enemy ground attack at 2240H. The enemy penetrated the perimeter on the south side, and occupied six bunkers. Fourteen US were killed in the contact, 56 US wounded, and one missing in action. 129 NVA were killed in the contact. At 2155H, three rounds of 120mm mortar impacted inside the perimeter of Fire Support Base #15 (YB885188) wounding five US. A patrol from the Reconnaissance Platoon observed 20 NVA walk into the killing zone of an ambush. Claymores, small arms, and automatic weapons were employed, followed by artillery and gunships from the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry. An unconfirmed body count of 20 NVA killed was estimated by the patrol leader. One CSF was wounded at YA992718 when his company received fire from an unknown size force. Company A, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry made contact with fourteen to fifteen NVA in prepared positions at ZA037997. Air strikes and artillery were employed in support of the contact, which resulted in one US KIA, nine US WIA, and nine NVA KIA. At ZA03999 Company A received an unknown number of mortar rounds, killing two US, and wounding one. The Reconnaissance Platoon from the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry found two NVA bodies, estimated to be five weeks old at ZA037999. At YA957857 a four man patrol from Company

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C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged four NVA, killing two NVA.

26 May. From 0028H-1900H, Landing Zone BRILLO PAD received in excess of 250 rounds of 120mm, 82mm and 60mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire, killing one US and wounding 24 US. At YA964854 a platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received ten rounds of 60mm mortar fire, wounding two US. A platoon from Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA body in grave, estimated to be four days old. At YB839223 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry received ground fire, they returned the fire with gunships, killing eight NVA.

27 May. At YB876306 a command and control helicopter in support of 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was downed by ground fire. Individuals were extracted from the area without injury, while the helicopter was destroyed by fire. A patrol from Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry killed one NVA at YB874294. At 1235H, the four Companies of the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry completed a combat assault to YB817247. Company A received sniper fire upon insertion. Company B moved into contact area and engaged an unknown size enemy force in bunkers. Artillery and air strikes were employed. Eleven NVA were killed in the contact, while US losses were one killed and 11 wounded. Fire Support Base #15 received four rounds of 82mm mortar fire, wounding six US. At YB855268 a CSF Company from BEN HET reported being in contact with an unknown size enemy force. Artillery and air strikes were employed. One US was killed, one US was wounded, and one CSF was wounded. Landing Zone INCOMING (YA939913) received 25 suspected 122mm rockets or 120mm mortars, resulting in one US wounded. At ZAO37994, a platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry found one NVA body in a body-trapped spider hole. Landing Zone BRILLO PAD received a total of 96 rounds of 120mm, 82mm, 60mm and 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, killing four US, wounding 15 US.

28 May. Fire Support Base #29 (YB838223) received 25 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire killing one US and wounding two US. At YA998382 Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry received sniper fire resulting in one US KIA and two US WIA.

29 May. A squad from Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with an estimated 10-20 NVA, resulting in one US KIA at YB928268. At YB830209 and YB836204. Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry received heavy ground fire, identifying one weapon as a 12.7mm anti-aircraft. One NVA was observed in the area. Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry found a large bunker complex and a grave containing one VC at ZAO25442. Landing Zone BRILLO PAD (YA963855) received a total of 30 120mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, killing three US and wounding 2 US.

30 May. At YB909273 an individual from Company D, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was killed when he stepped on a mine. At 0230H Company D, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry securing a patrol base on Hill 990 (YB817247) received a hand grenade at a listening post, wounding two US. At 0500H, the patrol base received a heavy ground attack. Artillery was employed in support of the contact. Heavy contact was broken at 0530H, but the patrol base continued to receive sporadic small arms fire. Seven US were killed in the contact, with 56 US wounded. There were 43 NVA killed and one NVA captured

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The patrol received over 100 rounds of 120mm mortar fire and 75mm recoilless rifle fire, wounding five US. Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact while moving overland to reinforce Company D on Hill 990. Negative casualties were reported. At YB801254, Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received a probe on their perimeter. Fire was returned and artillery was employed, killing one NVA. In response to company B's contact, Company C began moving back to their night location. At YB808251 Company C engaged an unknown size force killing three NVA. Long Range Patrol 4C engaged an unknown size enemy force at ZB008259 killing 4 NVA. At YB968714 a CSF company from DAK PEK engaged an estimated 30 VNC, killing two. The Aero Rifle Platoon from Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was inserted at ZAO28458 to check a bunker complex. The platoon engaged an estimated NVA squad resulting in two US WIA and one NVA KIA. Gunships from Troop D in support of the action killed an additional three NVA.

31 May. The 2d Battalion, 506th Airborne returned to DAK TO. At YB865178 an OH-23 aircraft was downed for unknown reasons. The crew was extracted unharmed, but the aircraft was total loss. At YB855287 Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found three NVA bodies. The patrol base on Hill 990, occupied by Company D, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry, and Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, received an estimated 42 rounds of 82mm fire resulting in 11 US wounded. At YB834214 Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found two NVA bodies.

1 Jun. During the first lift of Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry's combat assault to YB791219, a UH-1H helicopter crashed for unknown reasons. The crew was extracted with one individual injured. At YB855268 Company D, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry found two NVA bodies estimated to be two-three months old. At YB886296 Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body estimated to be one month old. At YB87293 Companies B and D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry captured one NVA who identified his unit to be the 18th Transportation Battalion, 101D Regiment, 325C Division. Two HOI CHANHs walked into Fire Support Base 25 at YB887291. One US from Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry was wounded when Fire Support Base 29, YB839223, received 60 rounds of suspected 100mm artillery fire. At YB828206 a patrol from Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry exchanged small arms fire with seven NVA. The patrol withdrew and artillery was employed. One US was wounded in the contact. At YB841212 the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA KIA estimated to be three days old. At 1421H, a HOI CHANH walked into Fire Support Base #29, identifying his unit as the 4th Battalion, 102D Regiment, 325C Division. A CSF Platoon from PLEI ME made contact with an estimated NVA platoon at ZV165973. Gunships and air strikes were employed in the contact area killing one NVA. An additional CSF platoon from PLEI ME conducted a combat assault to the contact area, where one Special Forces advisor was wounded. Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry was deployed to the contact area while air strikes were employed. A bomb landed in the proximity of the friendly location resulting in one US Special Forces KIA, five CSF KIA, and 18 wounded. The CSF remained in contact and the Aero Rifle Platoon from Troop D was inserted. Troop D received small arms, auto-

matic weapons, and B-40 rocket fire wounding 12 US. Thirteen NVA were killed by artillery, and eight NVA were killed by gunships during the contact. FSB BRILLO PAD, YA963855, received in excess of 100 rounds of 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire. One NVA was killed on the perimeter. Three US were killed and one US wounded in the attack. At YA995860 a platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found 19 NVA bodies. Thirteen bodies were in large bags which had been dragged from Hill 1124. At YB830193 the Aero Rifle Platoon from Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry recovered two US MIA from a light observation helicopter downed on 24 May. Individuals were confirmed KIA. At the same location, the Aero Rifle Platoon observed ten NVA KIA estimated to be two-three days old.

2 Jun. At YB808278 Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry received 25-30 pounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in two US wounded. At YB884303 Company B, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry (Airborne) made contact with an NVA platoon in bunkers. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, unknown type mortars and 75mm recoilless rifle fire, wounding 11 US while ten NVA were killed. At YB846221 the Reconnaissance Platoon from the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA KIA, two B-40 rocket launchers, and seven B-40 rockets. Later the Reconnaissance Platoon found one NVA killed by artillery at YB847223. A patrol from Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found two NVA bodies at YB839223. At ZV165965 Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed two NVA with gunship fire. A Mobile Strike Force Company killed one NVA at ZV166796 while conducting a police of the contact area of 1 June by the CSF Company from PLEI ME. The lead armored personnel carrier from Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry was struck by a B-40 rocket, killing one US and wounding 11 US. A patrol from Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry found three NVA killed by artillery at YA961851. At YA955860 a platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found three NVA bodies and four small arms. Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry killed one NVA at YA938854. Long Range Patrol 3D reported two HOI CHANHS with weapons and documents had been secured at YA898933.

3 Jun. At YB818299 the point element from Company D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received small arms fire from an estimated 12 individuals resulting in two US wounded. In the same area, Company D found one NVA body in a grave. Long Range Patrol 1C found two NVA bodies killed by air or artillery at YB917613. A CSF Company from PLEI ME reported being in contact with an estimated NVA Company, killing two NVA while one CSF was wounded. At ZV180984 a Mobile Strike Force Company found one NVA KIA. A platoon from Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry killed one NVA at YA969833. Long Range Patrol 3D received small arms fire and grenades from one individual at YA898933. The individual fled north after wounding one US. Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed two NVA at ZA073999. A civil affairs team in a village at AR865420 received satchel charges and grenades resulting in one US wounded.

4 Jun. A truck from the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry struck a mine wounding one US at YB866270. At ZA208948 a north bound convoy was ambushed by an estimated NVA Company from the east and west side of Highway 14N.

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Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment; Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry; and ten gunships from the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, 4th Aviation Battalion, and the 52d Aviation Battalion provided the support. Air strikes were employed. One US was killed in the contact, eight US wounded, and 41 NVA were KIA. Companies A, B, and C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry received a probe on their perimeter at YB794274 by an estimated two NVA Companies, killing three US, while 23 US were wounded. A sweep around the perimeter found a total of two NVA bodies. At YB883303 Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body. At YB786271 Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an estimated two Company NVA force wounding four US. Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged five NVA, killing two at YB886303. The 57th Aviation Battalion area in KONTUM City received 13 rounds of 122mm rocket fire, wounding one US. At ZB042014 Company A, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry found two NVA bodies in graves estimated to be seven-ten days old. One US was wounded when a four man patrol from Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged two NVA at YA938863. The bridge at AR923479, occupied by elements of Troop A, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment and Regional Forces received a ground probe. The supply point received automatic weapons fire from a church 100 meters north of the bridge. Spooky supported and tank fire destroyed the church. One US and one Regional Force individual was wounded in the contact, with one VC KIA. At YA943957, a light observation helicopter from Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed two NVA.

5 Jun. At YB801178 Companies B and D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received sporadic small arms fire resulting in one NVA KIA. The Reconnaissance Platoon from the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found two NVA bodies at YB881292. Companies B and C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry swept through an abandoned enemy bunker complex at YB786271, the site of the 4 June contact. One NVA body, weapons, and supplies were found. Long Range Patrol H2A found one VC at ZA088720 believed killed by Spooky. At YA956859 Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA body and documents. At YA953859 Company C found one NVA killed by artillery.

6 Jun. Company D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body at YB808308, and another at YB808305. At YB823222, the Reconnaissance Platoon from 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry captured one wounded NVA. Individual indicated his unit to be 23d Transportation Company, 2d Regiment, 325C Division. At YB785227 Companies B and C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found a total of 18 NVA bodies in graves. In the same area a hospital complex with four operating rooms was located. At YB964786 Company A, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry (Airborne) found three damaged bulldozers. In the same area, two US were wounded when an individual from Company A stepped on a mine. Two individuals from Long Range Patrol 4B were injured by punji stakes at ZA019157. Four 155mm artillery rounds impacted near Landing Zone ALAMO, YA951881, killing one US and wounding another.

7 Jun. Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed three NVA at YB782296. At YB957243 two ARVN Rangers were killed when they detonated a booby trap which they were emplacing. At YA962288 a 5-ton tractor trailer

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from the 20th Engineer Battalion, received a B-40 rocket while traveling east on Highway 19, wounding one US. At ZQ001875 a platoon from Company D, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry received 82mm mortar fire from an estimated enemy platoon. The platoon from Company D withdrew as gunships were employed in the area. One US was killed, and 15 US wounded in the contact. A platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry reported to be surrounded at YA993924. The platoon was extracted as six gunships from the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry supported the contact. Thirteen US were wounded, two US KIA, and five NVA were killed. One US from Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was wounded by sporadic small arms fire at LZ MILE HIGH, YA936931.

8 Jun. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry relieved the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry (Airborne) at DAK PEK. At ZB170028 a northbound resupply convoy was ambushed by an estimated platoon size force. Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment reacted to the contact with two platoons, while four gunships supported the friendly forces. One wounded NVA was captured and one NVA was killed, while friendly losses were three US KIA, and four US wounded. At YB797296 Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA killed by artillery or airstrikes. At ZA095266 a pol tanker from 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry struck an unknown type mine, wounding one US. One VMC was killed by Long Range Patrol 2E at ZA088518. An ambush patrol from Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry killed one NVA at YA948865.

9 Jun. At YA987896 Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry dispatched three patrols to the east, west, and north. All patrols make sporadic contact, withdrawing to the company perimeter, and continuing on their missions. One US was killed in the patrolling, with four US wounded, and two NVA KIA. At ZA003873 Company D, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force killing five NVA. Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry found one NVA body two days old at YA998918. At YA942920 Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found one NVA killed by artillery, estimated to be one month old. A westbound resupply convoy on Highway 19E was ambushed at BR082555 with negative casualties. One NVA was killed at ZA020988 by the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry.

10 Jun. The 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry began moving to reinforce the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry at DAK PEK. A reinforced NVA company employing small arms, automatic weapons, hand grenades and flame throwers initiated a ground attack on Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, located at YB910677. The enemy breached the perimeter and occupied three bunkers. Company B remained in heavy contact until 0300H, with artillery and Spooky supporting. One US was killed, 22 US wounded, and four NVA KIA in the contact. DAK PEK Special Forces Camp at YB956686 received an estimated 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, coupled with a ground probe by an estimated enemy squad size force. Three CSF were wounded and one CSF killed in the action. One NVA was killed and two US wounded at YA948869 when a patrol from Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact returning to their night location. At ZA004875 Company D, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry received 75-100 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire killing two US, and wounding two US.

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11 Jun. Three CSF were wounded at DAK PEK when the Special Forces Camp received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At YB816247, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA body. Gunships from Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry killed seven NVA in a bunker complex at BRO64282. In the vicinity of YA9793 a Head Hunter aircraft was downed for unknown reasons, killing one US and injuring the observer. At YA932965 an 81mm mortar round impacted in the proximity of Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry killing four US and wounding four US.

12 Jun. At 1500H TF MATHEWS relinquished operational control of AO SPAATZ and AO CHEROKEE to 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. At YB893675 an airstrike was employed by a Forward Air Controller and Head Hunter aircraft, resulting in two NVA killed by air. Three US were wounded when a UH-1D helicopter received .50 caliber ground fire at YB905714. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received 32 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at YB913713, killing two US and wounding three US. One NVA was killed by air strikes requested by Long Range Patrol H2A at ZA008449. At YA919892 Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received three rounds of 4.2" mortar fire wounding three US. Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found one NVA body at YA899933. Two US were killed at YA897740 when an aircraft from the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry crashed and burned.

13 Jun. At YB898600, Head Hunter 60 observed two individuals pushing an anti-aircraft weapon. The weapon was destroyed, and two NVA KIA by an airstrike. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received a ground attack at YB909677. The perimeter was not penetrated. Twelve US were wounded in the contact, and 13 NVA were killed. Gunships from 20-25 fortified bunkers at BR114310. An airstrike was employed, with 17 NVA estimated killed by air. At ZA182609 a civilian Lambretta hit a pressure mine killing four civilians and one Regional Force soldier. A patrol from Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry found one NVA KIA at YA961842.

14 Jun. The Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found two NVA KIA estimated to be a month old at YB815251. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found two NVA KIA at YB909681. A water trailer being pulled by an armored personnel carrier hit a mine at BRO68440, killing one US and wounding three US. At ZU222970 an estimated enemy squad ambushed a wood cutting detail from the 739th Regional Force Company, resulting in 10 RF KIA, six RF WIA, and four RF MIA. Troop C, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry killed one NVA at ZA042920.

15 Jun. Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA KIA badly decomposed at YB838223. The 23d ARVN Rangers engaged a VC squad at AS807120, resulting in one ARVN KIA, three ARVN WIA, and two VC KIA. At YA898933 the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry tripped a booby trap wounding two US. Four other US were wounded by a claymore booby trap when they went to aid the first two victims. Company D, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry found three NVA in graves at YA997875.

16 Jun. A patrol from Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry killed one NVA at YB882671. A CSF Company from DAK SEANG made contact with four-five NVA at YB933478. One NVA was killed, one CSF KIA, and four CSF were

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wounded in the contact. The 145th Regional Force Company killed two VC at ZA130527.

17 Jun. At YB809259 Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA KIA approximately one month old. The 442d Regional Force Company made contact with an estimated reinforced VC platoon at AP950810. The results were five RF KIA (including the CO and XO), seven RF wounded by fire from an unknown size force.

18 Jun. One US was wounded when a listening post from Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry engaged seven individuals at YA939913.

19 Jun. The PLEI ME CSF Company made contact with an estimated NVA Company at ZV186979, killing four NVA. Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry killed five NVA in support of the contact. One CSF was wounded.

20 Jun. Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry heard a bugle blowing at YA933903.

21 Jun. Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed three NVA at YA762382. The 203d Mobile Strike Force engaged an estimated enemy company at BR143285. Two MSF were wounded.

22 Jun. An ARVN armored personnel carrier hit a mine at BQ193135, wounding two ARVN. Mobile Strike Force Company 207 killed two VC at BR185313. Mobile Strike Force Company 206 killed one VMC at BR154268.

23 Jun. The 203d Mobile Strike Force Company engaged ten VC/NVA, killing one at BR156269. The Company later killed one NVA at BR157298, where a NVA squad was setting up a RPD light machine gun.

24 Jun. Two US from the 4th Engineer Battalion were wounded by a booby trap grenade at YB867262. Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA badly decomposed at ZB006264. Troop C, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry found the grave of one VC KIA at ZA018386. At ZA190630 a civilian vehicle hit a mine, killing one civilian and wounding three. A road clearing team from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment received B-40 rocket fire from the south at BR150524. Gunships and artillery were employed, killing three NVA. One wounded NVA was captured. US losses were one KIA, and five US wounded. Eleven civilians were killed when their Lambretta hit a plastic mine at ZA203966. Three ARVN's were wounded when the 2½ ton truck they were riding in received sniper fire and overturned.

25 Jun. The point element from Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated two snipers. Two US were killed and two US wounded with no enemy casualties confirmed. The 477th Regional Force Company, under operational control of 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, killed one VMC at YA966360. Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry found a grave with four NVA, estimated two weeks old. The 203d Mobile Strike Force Company, under operational control of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, killed one NVA at BR176300. One civilian was killed and two wounded when a 2½ ton truck hit a mine at BR080548.

1 July. One US from Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was wounded by a sniper at BR165390. Fire was returned and artillery was employed killing one NVA. Later Company A received five rounds of small arms fire and one B-40 rocket wounding two US at BR168399. Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received sniper fire from three-four NVA at BR101332 resulting in three US KIA, and one US WIA. Artillery and gunships were employed in the contact leaving three NVA KIA. Company C, (-), 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an unknown enemy size force at ZA145412 resulting in one US wounded.

2 July. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry killed one VMC at BR128336. One US was wounded by small arms fire at BR103329. A westbound convoy on Highway 19E received small arms fire at BR132542 wounding one US. Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment reacted to the contact killing one NVA at BR138531. Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed one NVA at BR203330.

3 July. A CSF Company from DAK SEANG killed one NVA at YB923487. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry intercepted a NVA litter team carrying one patient at BR108338. The team fled, leaving behind the litter patient. The Reconnaissance Platoon from 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received small arms fire from four-five individuals resulting in one US wounded at BRO96257.

4 July. Hawkeye 1A had one team member wounded by enemy small arms fire at YB819366. One US from Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was wounded when he stepped on a mine at ZA122287. Company B, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry killed two NVA at AS816194. Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed one VC at BR254200. At YA619827 Omega Team #58 made contact with an estimated NVA Company. Gunships and airstrikes were employed resulting in an estimated 40 NVA KBA.

5 July. The 201st MSF Company captured one VMC at BR164394. LRP 3G found one NVA killed by artillery at ZB040011.

6 July. Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with five NVA, killing one at BR162334. Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed two NVA at YB788330, and killed seven NVA at YB815298.

7 July. At YA905328 a 2½ ton truck struck a pressure type mine wounding one US. An armored personnel carrier from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry struck a mine at YA905328, wounding two US.

8 July. No significant activities.

9 July. At ZA171138 an armored personnel carrier from Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry hit a mine resulting in one US KIA and six US WIA. At ZA196199 an armored personnel carrier from Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry hit a mine wounding eight US.

10 July. At YA966452 LRP 2F found an estimated 80 rifle grenades. Five VMC approached the position and exchanged small arms fire with the LRP's, wounding three US.

11 July. One US from Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry was wounded by

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mortar fire at YB855188 (FSB #15).

12 July. A patrol from Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA KIA at YB823188. Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry killed two NVA at YB791191.

13 July. LRP 4HD killed three NVA at YZ747363.

14 July. No significant activities.

15 July. At BR089577 an armored personnel carrier from Troop A, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment struck a mine resulting in one US KIA and four US WIA. Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry employed gunships and air-strikes on an unknown enemy size force, killing six NVA at ZA062683.

16 July. An armored personnel carrier from Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment struck a plastic type mine resulting in one US WIA at ZB175011. The 2d Battalion, 42d ARVN made contact with an unknown size NVA force at YB980479. One ARVN was killed, one ARVN wounded, and two NVA killed in the contact.

17 July. An aircraft from Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry went down for unknown reasons at ZA125418. Two crewmen were injured.

18 July. No significant activities.

19 July. A patrol from Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force at YB813192. One US was killed in the contact.

20 July. An armored personnel carrier from Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment struck a mine at ZB153124 wounding one US. Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed three NVA at ZA256184. Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry had movement at YA798233. The listening post threw grenades in the direction of the movement. One grenade hit a tree and bounced back on the position, wounding one US.

21 July. Troop A, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment made contact with an estimated enemy squad at BR003507. One US was wounded in the contact.

22 July. At YB802197 a patrol from Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry killed one NVA. Company B later found 16 NVA KBA in graves at YA800190. Bodies estimated to be three-four weeks old. Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed five NVA at ZV191104.

23 July. At YB800183 Company D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received small arms fire from two individuals resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. IRP 1C killed two NVA at YB804313.

24 July. An armored personnel carrier from 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Scout Section struck a mine at YA977425 wounding two US.

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25 July. A C7A aircraft crashed at AR773369 killing two US. A patrol from Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found two NVA KIA at YB814249.

26 July. The Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated 50 man force resulting in three US wounded. Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found five NVA KIA at ZV233176. The Scout Platoon, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry moved to the contact area of their battalion's maintenance platoon at ZA174332. Results were two US KIA and six US WIA.

27 July. LRP 4F made contact with 10-15 NVA at ZA003404, killing one NVA. The Reconnaissance element from the 2d Battalion, 45th ARVN made contact at AP284909 resulting in one ARVN KIA, two ARVN WIA, and seven NVA KIA. Later the same unit made contact at AP765920 killing 17 NVA/VC, while suffering five ARVN KIA, and 13 ARVN WIA.

28 July. An Omega patrol killed five NVA at ZA006697.

29 July. At ZU247895 Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry made contact with an estimated NVA Company. One US was wounded and 17 NVA were killed in the contact. The Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found two NVA KIA at AQ770183. Gunships from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed two NVA at ZU246875.

30 July. No significant activities.

31 July. In the vicinity of ZA2057 a U6 Beaver aircraft received ground fire wounding one US. At AQ858122 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry received small arms fire wounding one US.

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CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

1. (C) Traildust Missions:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>SCORTIES</u>
2 May	YB7504-YA7588	6
3 May	YA7127-7722-8114	6
5 May	YB7504-YA7588	6
7 May	YA8901-YV8984	6
9 May	YA7284-YA6571	6
24 May	YB7504-YA7508	6
28 May	YA7144-7127	6
14 Jun	YA8802-YV8885	6
16 Jul	YB7804-YB8506-YB9506	2
18 Jul	YA9101-8605-8115	2

2. (C) Crop Destruction:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>TYPE CROPS</u>	<u>ACRES</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>
29 Jun	ZB7871-8232	Corn	34.5	White	150
2 Jul	BR1125	Corn, Rice	53	Blue	240
3 Jul	BR1325-1326	Corn, Rice	59	Blue	250
3 Jul	BR1216	Rice, Beans	74	Blue	350
4 Jul	BR1213	Rice	22	Blue	75
9 Jul	BR1323	Rice, Beans	37	Blue	110
10 Jul	BR1523	Rice	25	Blue	110
11 Jul	BR1423-0924	Rice, Bananas	25	Blue	110
13 Jul	YA8977	Rice, Corn	21	Blue	110
14 Jul	YA8977	Beans, Rice Corn	21	Blue	110

3. (U) Perimeter Defoliation:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>
28 May	Div	AR7833	Truck	Blue	165
31 May	Div	AR7833	Truck	Blue	550
1 Jun	Div	AR7833	Truck	Blue	495
11 Jun	Div	AR7835	Truck	Blue	605
12 Jun	Div	AR7834	Truck	Blue	660
13 Jun	Div	AR7834	Truck	Blue	550
14 Jun	Div	AR7834	Truck	Blue	495
19 Jun	Div	AR8036	Truck	Blue	550
29 Jun	Sp Forces	ZB0393	UH-1	White	225
4 Jul	Div	AR8033	UH-1	Blue	75
14 Jul	Div	AR8035	UH-1	Blue	150
18 Jul	Sp Forces	ZA2387	Truck	Blue	330

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>AGENT</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>
19 Jul	2/1 Cav	BR1453	Truck	Orange	270
31 Jul	Div	AR7833	CH-47	Blue	1500
		AR7834			
		AR7835			

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Box Full Of Grenades




FIGURE 1

20 CS GRENADES
WITH PINS PULLED




FIGURE 2




FIGURE 3




FIGURE 4

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ABBREVIATIONS

List of abbreviations used in text (local, common usage, standard Army).

AA	Anti-Aircraft
AFB	Air Force Base
AFRS	Armed Forces Radio Service
AGI	Annual General Inspection
ALOC	Air Line of Communication
AO	Area of Operations
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APD	Airborne Personnel Detector
ARP	Aero Rifle Platoon
ARVN	Army Republic of VIETNAM
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASR	Available Supply Rate
A/V	Audio/Visual
AVLB	Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
AW	Automatic Weapon
BC	Body Count
CA	Civic Action: Combat Assault
CAS	Close Air Support
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
C&C	Command and Control (Aircraft)
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CI	Counterintelligence
CMIT	Combined Mobile Mobile Instruction Team
CMTT	Combined Mobile Training Team
CORD	Council on Revolutionary Development
CP	Command Post
CS	Tear Gas
CSF	Camp Strike Force
CSS	Combat Sky Spot
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DS	Direct Support
DTOC	Division Tactical Operations Center
EDP	Equipment Deadlined for Parts
ERP	Engineer Rappelling Platoon
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FDC	Fire Direction Center
FO	Forward Observer
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
FSA	Forward Support Area
FSB	Fire Support Base
FSE	Forward Supply Element
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GRREG	Graves Registration
GS	General Support
GSR	General Support Reinforcing
Gunship	Armed UH-1 Helicopter
GVN	Government of VIETNAM
Hawkeye Team	Four Man Hunter-Killer Team

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HE	High Explosive
H&I	Harassment and Interdiction
Headhunter	O-1E Aircraft Used for Visual Reconnaissance
Hook	CH-47 "Chinook" Helicopter
ICC	Installation Coordination Center
I FFORCEV; IFFV	I Field Force, VIETNAM
JUSPAO	Joint US Public Affairs Office
KBA	Killed by Air
KIA	Killed in Action
LF	Local Force
LOH	Light Observation Helicopter
LP	Listening Post
LRP (formerly LRRP)	Long Range Patrol
LLOC	Land Line of Communication
LZ	Landing Zone
MACV	Military Assistance Command, VIETNAM
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program
MF	Main Force
MI	Military Intelligence
MIA	Missing in Action
MSF	Mobile Strike Force
MSR	Main Supply Route
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NCS	Net Control Station
NVA	North VIETNAMESE Army
NVAC	North VIETNAMESE Army Captive
OB	Order of Battle
OP	Observation Post
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
PF	Popular Force
PKSAC	PLEIKU Sub-Area Command
POLWAR	Political Warfare (ARVN)
POW, PW	Prisoner of War
PP	Preplanned
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PZ	Pick-up Zone
RATT	Radio Teletype
RCA	Riot Control Agent
RD	Revolutionary Development
Red Ball	Requisition for Part to Remove Major Item from Deadline
RF	Regional Force
RIF	Reconnaissance in Force
RL	Rocket Launcher
RRC	Radio Research Company
RVN	Republic of VIETNAM
SA	Small Arms
Slick	UH-1 Helicopter Used Primarily for Air Lift
SLAR	Side Looking Airborne Radar
Snatch	Sudden Apprehension of Suspect Person

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SP	Self Propelled
Spooky	Air Force Minigun Armed AC-47 Flaeship
SSB	Single Side Band
STZ	Special Tactical Zone
TAC	Tactical
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TCE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOT	Time on Target
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARV	United States Army, VIETNAM
USSF	United States Special Forces
VC	Viet Cong
VCC	Viet Cong Captive
VETCAP	Veterinary Civic Action Program
VMC	Viet MONTAGNARD Cong
VMCC	Viet MONTAGNARD Cong Captive
VR	Visual Reconnaissance
VT	Variable Time
VTR	Vehicle, Tank Recovery
WIA	Wounded in Action
WP	White Phosphorous

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT - OPERATION MATHEWS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE	PARA	PAGE
NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION	1	1
DATES OF OPERATION	2	1
LOCATION	3	1
CONTROL HEADQUARTERS	4	1
REPORTING OFFICERS	5	1
TASK ORGANIZATION	6	1
INTELLIGENCE	7	1
MISSION	8	9
CONCEPT OF OPERATION	9	9
EXECUTION	10	10
SUPPORTING FORCES	11	13
RESULTS	12	20
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS	13	21
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES	14	23
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS	15	24

INCLOSURES

TITLE

1	AREA OF OPERATION
2	TASK ORGANIZATION
3	LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO CG TF MATHEWS
4	CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATION
	<u>FRAG'S TF MATHEWS</u>
5	A - FRAGO 1-68
6	B - FRAGO 2-68
7	C - FRAGO 3-68
8	D - FRAGO 4-68

Inclosure 6

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC-P

13 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

Commanding General
4th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96262

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation MATHEWS. Offensive Operations.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 242000 May 68 to 121500 June 68.
3. (U) LOCATION: Kontum Province, RVN. Maps, Vietnam, scale: 1/250,000, sheets No 48-4, 48-8, 49-1, 49-5. See Incl 1, Operations Overlay.
4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, TF MATHEWS.
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICERS:
 - a. BG Don R. Hickman, Commanding General, TF MATHEWS.
 - b. COL Joseph Fix III, Commanding Officer, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div.
 - c. COL Lawrence L. Mowery, Commanding Officer, 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div.
6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION: Incl 2.
7. (C) INTELLIGENCE:
 - a. Enemy Situation Prior to Operation MATHEWS.

(1) In late April, Headquarters, NVA 325C Division, with at least two subordinate regiments, moved into the Tri-border area west of BEN HET. It began conducting operations in early May, the most significant being the 10 May attack on C and D/3/8 Inf at FSB #25. Intelligence gained from PW's, ralliers and documents during the first three weeks in May identified the 325C Division and its subordinate regiments, 10LD and 95C, with a total strength of at least 6000. In addition, it was learned that the 325C Division probably possessed armaments not previously employed by the NVA in the 4th

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SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

Division AO; i.e., tanks, 100 and 105mm artillery. It was also determined that the enemy's immediate objective was BDN HET. This situation existed at the time TASK FORCE MATHEWS began operations on May 24th.

(2) Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength Prior to Operation MATHEWS:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
325C NVA		
HQ and Support	2200	YB 750300
101D Regt	2150	YB 842286
95C Regt	1800	YB 795195
120th Sapper Bn	250	YB 750300
40th Artillery Regt		
HQ and Support	200	Tri-Border Area
K-33 Bn	300	YB 896179

b. Enemy Activity During Operation MATHEWS

(1) On 25 May 2/C/2/1 Cav made contact on Hwy 512 (YB 903274) with an unidentified enemy unit which attacked from the northwest, resulting in 47 NVA KIA. On 25 May at FSB 29 (YB 939223), A and C/1/8 Inf were attacked from the south, south-southwest and west by elements of the K-4 Bn, 95C Regt, resulting in 149 NVA KIA.

On 27 May reliable intelligence reports indicated the movement of an unidentified NVA division headquarters element into the vicinity of DAK PEK Special Forces Camp. This division was believed to be the 2nd NVA Div, which had overrun two Special Forces Camps just north of the 4th Division AO during the period 9-11 May. It was not known what elements on the division accompanied the headquarters element. TASK FORCE MATHEWS instituted a sustained air strike effort in the area, in conjunction with reconnaissance in force by two battalions of the 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div. Subsequent reconnaissance and other intelligence indicated that the enemy force had apparently withdrawn temporarily into Laos.

On 30 May on Hill 990 (YB 817248) D/3/12 Inf was attacked from the north, northwest and west by a large enemy force, believed to consist of elements of the K-1 Bn, 101D Regt, resulting in 43 NVA KIA (BC). It was believed that the enemy's casualties were at least three times as high as the body count, but he was able to remove most of them before they could be counted. On 3 June, at YB 794274, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry was attacked from the north, west and south by an estimated enemy battalion. Sweep of the area around the perimeter found 4 NVA KIA (BC) and many parts of bodies and drag marks. Subsequent search of a bunker complex which included a medical facility at YB 7827 revealed 18 additional NVA bodies in shallow graves. This attack was the last offensive action by the 325C

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13 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

Div; following it the enemy began a gradual withdrawal toward the border. The 101D Regt is believed to have withdrawn northwest of Hwy 512 into Laos, while the 95C Regt moved southwest of Hwy 512 into Cambodia. On 4 June on Hwy 14N (ZA 209950) a convoy was ambushed by elements of the 4th Bn, 24th Regt. The convoy was relieved by elements of 2/1 Cav, resulting in 39 NVA KIA. Identification of the 4th Bn, 24th Regt in the ambush area by captured documents confirmed the movement of this unit into the area north of KONTUM City near Hwy 14N. The 24th Regt continued to constitute a significant threat to friendly lines of communication in AO MATHEWS between KONTUM City and TAN CANH.

On 10 June DAK PEK Special Forces Camp and B and D/1/22 Inf received intense attacks by fire, in which the enemy employed 60 and 82mm mortar fire, 75mm RR fire, and 122mm rockets. In addition, E/1/22 Inf at YB 910677 received a ground assault with small arms, grenades, and flamethrowers. The attacking force was probably a reinforced company. The size of the unit making the attack, as well as the weapons employed in the ground attack and attacks by fire, indicate that major elements of the 2d NVA Division have probably returned to the DAK PEK area to renew offensive.

(2) Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength Encountered During Operation MATHEWS:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
325C NVA Div		
101D Regt	1430	YB 8124
95C Regt	1425	YB 8322
120th Sapper Bn	125	Both of the above locations
2d NVA Div		
U/I Regt	2000	YB 9167
24th Regt		
4th Bn	350	ZA 2095
5th Bn	375	ZA 1899
40th Arty Regt		
K-33 Bn	300	YB 9216

c. Characteristics of the Area of Operations:

(1) Weather: Almost every day of Operation MATHEWS saw heavy rainfall; normally a light drizzle occurred in the morning, giving way to numerous afternoon rainshowers. Scattered low clouds, bases of 300 to 500 feet, and scattered-to-broken clouds above 1000 feet were experienced during early morning hours. Broken cumulus and scattered cumulonimbus

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3

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13 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After - Action Report

and ceilings of 1000 feet (obscuring some peaks) occurred during late afternoons and evenings. Several foggy mornings limited visibility to 3 foggy mornings.

(2) Terrain: The western portion of KONTUM Province from the border to the eastern end of AO MATH NS is characterized by rugged mountains surrounding a small central basin area. The highest peaks reach over 1400 meters while ranges in the west and south average 1035 meters. Vegetation in the mountainous areas consists of very heavy double to triple canopy forest. The undergrowth in most areas is very thick brush mixed with bamboo. Some of the higher elevations have very light undergrowth. In the mountainous areas, there are scattered out-croppings of mixed large stones and stone cliffs. There are natural stone caves in such areas. Suitable natural landing zones do not exist in the mountainous areas. The central basin area has moderate relief averaging from 650 to 660 meters. Vegetation varies from single canopy heavy forest with very thick undergrowth to scattered low trees with thick grass and mixed brush undergrowth. Lower areas near streams have heavy brush grass. Large stands of bamboo are scattered throughout the basin area. Suitable natural landing zones can be found in some areas. Principal drainage is provided by the DAK POKO River, which flows south through the area. Many smaller tributaries dissect the entire area. Deep ravines are found throughout the mountainous area while rice paddy choked streams meander and criss-cross through the basin area.

(a) Observation and fields of fire: Observation and fields of fire are extremely limited in the mountainous areas due to the very heavy vegetation. Some vantage points, however, do exist which permit observed direct and indirect fire into the low areas. Observation improves in the lower areas and along the DAK POKO Valley where scattered open areas and lighter vegetation offer less restricted fields of fire.

(b) Cover: Good cover is available throughout the mountainous area where many deep ravines, large rocks, heavy forest, and natural caves provide protection from both airstrikes and artillery fire. In the central basin area, cover from indirect fire and airstrikes can only be obtained from bunkers and tunnels.

(c) Concealment: Concealment is excellent in the heavily forested mountainous areas; air observation of ground activity is impossible except in areas where heavy bombing has removed the vegetation. The central basin area provides much less concealment; air observation varies from good in the lightly forested areas to excellent in the open areas.

(d) Obstacles: The majority of the AO, except for the basin area east and south of BEN HET, is characterized by steep (30%) slopes, rain forests, and dense vegetation. In the eastern section of the area, the DAK POKO River presents a formidable barrier to vehicular and foot traffic. The bamboo in

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13 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After - Action Report

the area east and south of BEN HET is thick and difficult to traverse. Conditions greatly restrict foot movement to existing roads and/or trail networks and for all practical purposes channelizes vehicular movement to Highway 512.

(e) Key Terrain: In addition to friendly fire bases the following areas are critical:

1. Bridges vic YB 943238 and ZB 156053.
2. High ground vic ZB 0126 and YB 9969.
3. Ridge-high ground vic YB 9222, ZB 0416 and ZB 0011.

(f) Avenues of Approach: The main avenues of approach into the area are provided by Highway 14N, Route 14N, Route 512 from the west, a newly constructed enemy road toward BEN HET from the west, and the DAK SIR and DAK HO'DRAI Valleys from the south. A major trail enters the area from the west vicinity YB 730368. (See Appendix 3).

1. Highway 14N as far north as TANH CANH is an improved, hard-surfaced, two lane dirt road trafficable to wheeled and heavy armored vehicles except from mid-June to late September when the low areas become impassable. North of TANH CANH it is unimproved dirt road, impassable to vehicular traffic.

2. Route 512 enters the AO from the west vicinity YB 7527 and continues to the east through BEN HET and DAK TO to TANH CANH where it meets Highway 14N vicinity YB 063225. This route has generally the same characteristics as 14N, but it is impassable from YB 750270 to YB 802238 due to heavy bombing.

3. A newly constructed enemy road enters the AO from the west vic YB 740219 and connects with Route 512 vicinity YB 803238. The road, constructed by hand labor, is hard-packed dirt and averages four to five meters in width. The road follows terrain contours and has no drainage ditches. Due to heavy bombing the road is impassable from YB 784227 to YB 803238. If repairs are made, this route could provide a high speed armor approach to BEN HET.

4. The river valleys from the south provide excellent avenues of approach for infantry movement. Concealment from aerial observation, however, is lacking in many areas.

(g) Effects of Weather on Terrain: Soil conditions vary from moist and fairly firm in the high mountains to saturated and extremely muddy in the central basin area. Thick vegetation and very slick, steep slopes present a definite impediment to foot and vehicular traffic. Many waterways, especially

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13 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After - Action Report

the DAK POKO River due to the swelling caused by the rains and drainage, become unfordable during this period.

d. Attacks by Fire on Friendly Positions by Type.

60mm mortar	10
82mm mortar	42
75mm RR	4
100mm Gun	0
105mm Howitzer	4
122mm Rocket	3
120mm mortar	3

e. Mining Incidents.

Vehicles hit mines	3
Mines discovered	2

f. Captured Enemy Weapons.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Small Arms</u>	<u>Crew Served Weapons</u>
1-8 Inf	41	15
1-22 Inf	3	
3-8 Inf		1
3-12 Inf	65	3
2-1 Cav	22	
1-35 Inf	6	
1-506 Inf (Abn)		
2-506 Inf (Abn)	4	
3-187 Inf (Abn)		
7-17 Air Cav	III	19

Total Weapons Captured 160

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AVDDH-GC-P

13 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

g. Enemy Casualties:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>KIA (Body Count</u>	<u>CIA</u>
1-8 Inf	149	
1-22 Inf	5	
3-8 Inf	9	3 (2-Returnee)
3-12 Inf	72	3 (1-Returnee)
2-1 Cav	90	1
7-17 Air Cav	5	
1-35 Inf	5	
1-506 Inf (Abn)	0	
2-506 Inf (Abn)	11	
3-187 Inf (Abn)	0	
LRPs	6	
	<u>352</u>	<u>7</u>

8. (C) MISSION:

a. TF MATHEWS was activated to:

(1) Conduct reconnaissance in force operations and locate and destroy enemy forces in AO MATHEWS.

(2) Destroy the 325C NVA Division in accordance with OPORD 11-68, HQs 4th Infantry Division, dtd 24 May 1968.

(3) Protect DAK PEK and BEN HET USSF Camps.

(4) Protect DAK TO Base Camp.

(5) Secure ILOC within AO MATHEWS.

(6) Be prepared to relieve/reinforce 42D ARVN Regiment.

b. Letter of Instruction to CG, TF MATHEWS is at Inclosure 3.

9. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a. Task Force MATHEWS was formed with 2 brigades in response to the movement of major units of the 325C NVA Division toward BEN HET USSF Camp from the west. To destroy the 325C Division, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division attacked on D-Day (27 May 68) with simultaneous combat assaults by two battalions to secure objective DIGGS (YB 8731) and objective BAVON (YB 8124). 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division followed at H + 3 hours with a one battalion combat assault to secure objective CARDINAL (YB 8218) southwest of

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13 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

BEN HET. One CSF company began reconnaissance in force at H+2 hours from BEN HET west northwest toward Hill 705 (YB 8526) to find and destroy NVA weapons positions and assembly areas. 1st Bde continued the offensive on D+1 with a battalion-size combat assault to secure objective COBBS CREEK (YB 8327).

b. In order to block the TU MRONG Valley approach to DAK TO and TAN CANH from the north, 42d ARVN Regiment deployed one battalion by air assault northeast of DAK TO on D-1 (26 May 68). The 23d ARVN Ranger Battalion was deployed beginning D-1 (26 May 68) to secure FSB's along Rte 512 and the high ground north of DAK TO. Convoy routes were secured by armored cavalry units supported by armed helicopters and air cavalry.

c. CSF operations at BEN HET and DAK PEK were coordinated with Task Force operations and were integrated into the overall offensive plan.

d. One battalion, as Task Force reserve, was initially prepared to exploit contacts in either brigade area and/or to secure objective FOSTER (YB 7829) on D+3. 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne was prepared to reinforce DAK SEANG and/or DAK PEK USSF Camps should the enemy threat require.

e. All offensive operations were supported by B-52 airstrikes and massive artillery preparations prior to assaults by infantry. Immediate tactical air support, B-52 strikes, and artillery were employed throughout Operation MATHEWS to neutralize enemy weapons and destroy enemy forces by fire and as close support.

f. Inclosure 1, Operations Overlay.

10. (C) EXECUTION:

a. General.

(1) Operation MATHEWS was initiated by Task Force MATHEWS at 242000 May 68 with 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division under the Command of the Assistant Division Commander, 4th Infantry Division. The area of operations encompassed AO SPAATZ (DAK TO) and AO CHARCKIE (DAK PEK) and included BEN HET, DAK SEANG, and DAK PEK USSF Camps. 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division closed using C-130 aircraft on 26 May with 3 battalions.

(2) On 27 May (D-Day) 3d Brigade relieved 1st Brigade of responsibility for the AO east of BEN HET. 1st Brigade air assaulted with 2 companies, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry at 1003 hours to secure Objective DIGGS (Hill 900) and with 4 companies, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry at 1005 hours to secure Objective BAVON (Hill 990). Both objectives were secured with no enemy contact. The command and control aircraft, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received enemy fire and made a forced landing south of Objective DIGGS. The command group and crew were extracted uninjured and continued control of the assault. At 1200 hrs (H+2), a BEN HET CSF company began a ground assault to secure Hill 705 northwest of BEN HET. At 1340

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

hrs, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry under OPCON 3d Brigade, assaulted and secured Obj CARDINAL (Hill 889) with 2 companies without incident. Upon securing initial objectives, 1st Brigade units began conducting reconnaissance in force toward the Cambodian border with a mission to engage and destroy enemy forces. From Objective CARDINAL, 3d Brigade controlled the southwest approach toward BEN HET by conducting extensive reconnaissance and screening operations around Hill 889 and along the approach toward the northeast.

(3) On 28 May 68 (D+1), 1st Brigade continued to attack with a combat assault by 3 companies, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry to secure Objective COBBS CREEK and search possible NVA staging or storage areas in the draws west of BEN HET.

(4) Based on the major threat to DAK PEK which developed on D-Day from units of the 2d NVA Div, 3d Brigade deployed on 28 May 68 (D+1) with a Brigade CP, 2d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry. 3d Brigade assumed OPCON of AO CHEROKEE with the mission to protect DAK PEK and to destroy 2d NVA Division forces threatening DAK PEK. With the deployment of the remainder of 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry on 29 May, 3d Brigade established control of the high ground controlling DAK PEK to the west and north and began a series of airmobile combat assaults to exploit B-52 airstrikes and engage 2d NVA Division forces. Airstrikes, artillery, and positioning of infantry on key terrain resulted in the enemy forces withdrawing into LAOS. Upon withdrawal of the major enemy forces, 2d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry was deployed back to DAK TO on 2 June.

(5) After the enemy attack on the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry mortar base at Hill 990 on 30 May, A Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry reinforced Hill 990 and began extensive sweep operations around the base. 1st Brigade continued to push toward the west with 3 battalions searching the ridges and draws along approaches leading from the west.

(6) 23d ARVN Ranger Battalion and 2d Battalion, 42d ARVN (-), under OPCON 42d ARVN Regiment, assumed responsibility for the area north of Rte 512 and east of FSB 25 (YB 8829) beginning 28 May. 42d ARVN Regiment retained responsibility for securing FSB 13 (YB 9125), FSB 3 (YB 9523), FSB 30 (YB 9726), and maintaining one company on the ridge north of DAK TO.

(7) On 1 June 68, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry assaulted with three companies to secure Hill 905 (YB 7921) and block the southwestern escape route from BEN HET, FSB 29, and FSB 15. The battalion conducted reconnaissance in force northwest to Hill 947 (YB 7724) and operated astride a well used NVL route from Cambodia. No enemy contact was made.

(8) On 3 June 68, 2d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry, under 1st Brigade control, secured Hill 1043 (YB 3332) with an air assault and began reconnaissance operations northwest to Hill 1191 then southwest to FSB 18 (YB 8531) and west to search the DAK SU Valley approach toward BEN HET. No contact was made with the enemy.

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13 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

(9) As the 1st Brigade maneuvered to search the routes and suspected assembly areas between BEN HET and the Cambodian border, it was apparent that the 325C Division had withdrawn from the battle area toward the west. Light contacts with small NVA covering forces were made and several battalion sized bases were secured and contaminated with CS chemical.

(10) The 4th Infantry Division offensive west of POLMI KLING required that TF MATHEWS release 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry to 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division on 5 June.

(11) On 8 June 1st Brigade assumed responsibility for AO CHEROKEE and deployed the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry to DAK PEK to relieve the 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry. 3d Brigade began deployment out of AO MATHEWS by airlifting the advance party with five C-130 sorties. 3d Battalion, 187th Airborne Infantry departed on 9 June with the brigade CP followed on 10 June by 2d Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry. 1st Brigade resumed responsibility for all of AO SPAATZ and completed pursuit operations to within 3 Kms of the border.

(12) Based on intelligence that a battalion of the 325C Division had moved to vic (YB 8513), 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry assaulted 2 companies to YB 8213 and 2 companies, 1st Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry to FSB 28 on 9 June. All companies, under control of 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, conducted a detailed bomb damage assessment of six B-52 strikes that preceded the combat assault. Although recently used enemy bunkers and positions were located and searched, no contact was made nor were bodies or weapons found.

(13) Early morning on 10 June an attack on DAK PEK by NVA forces began with a battalion sized ground assault supported by mortars and rockets against the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry FSB'S. The 1st Battalion, 506th Airborne Infantry remained under Task Force control as 3d Brigade (-) departed the AO. 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry reinforced AO CHEROKEE on 10 June and established positions both inside and northwest of DAK PEK Camp. Over the 48 hour period that followed, intense indirect fire attacks were received by friendly installations in AO CHEROKEE. B-52 strikes were employed on enemy positions and again the enemy withdrew to LAOS. Combat assaults followed by reconnaissance and pursuit operations were conducted throughout AO CHEROKEE to discover and defeat any remaining enemy forces.

(14) The threat of DAK PEK, BEN HET, and DAK TO diminished and at 121500 June 68, TF MATHEWS was deactivated and control of tactical operations in the DAK TO and DAK PEK areas reverted to 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

b. Following are the significant contacts during Operation MATHEWS:

DATE	US UNIT(S)	EN UNIT	LOCATION	US LOSSES	EN LOSSES
25 May	B/2-1 Cav	UNIDENT EST Co (+)	YB892270	3KIA 6WIA	47 NVA KIA
25 May	A,C/1-8 Inf	K-4 Bn 95C Regt	YB839222	14KIA 55WIA	149 NVA KIA

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AVDDH-GC-P

13 June 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

<u>DATE</u>	<u>US UNIT(S)</u>	<u>BN UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>US LOSSES</u>	<u>BN LOSSES</u>
30 May	D/3-12 Inf	K-1 Bn (+) 101D Regt	YB817247	7KIA 56WIA	43 NVA KIA
4 June	C/2-1 Cav	4th Bn 24th Regt	ZA208948	1KIA 8WIA	41 NVA KIA
10 June	B/1-22 Inf	UNIDENT EST BN (*)	YB910677	1KIA 22WIA	43 NVA KIA

c. Implementing FRAG Orders published by HQ, TF MATHEWS, are at Inclosure 3.

d. Chronological summary of operation is at Inclosure 4.

11. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Non-organic and non-attached supporting forces.

- (1) 7th US Air Force
- (2) 52d Artillery Group
- (3) 52d Combat Aviation Battalion
- (4) 299th Engineer Battalion (C) (-)
- (5) Det, 9th Air Commando Squadron
- (6) Co B, 8th Psyops Battalion

b. Artillery Support

(1) General.

(a) The concept of artillery employment was to provide direct artillery support to each maneuver element and to employ the relatively large amount of medium and heavy artillery in reinforcing and general support roles to weight maneuver efforts and to provide artillery support for ARVN operations.

(b) Initially, the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery was in direct support of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105mm T), Battery C, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm T), Battery A, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155mm SP), and Batteries A and C, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155mm T) reinforced its fires while Battery D, 5th Battalion, 15th Artillery and Battery B, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery were in general support. 3d Brigade of the 101st Abn Div deployed to 4th Div control with its direct support artillery, the 2d Battalion, 39th Artillery (105mm T), which arrived on 24 and 25 May. Additional artillery (155mm SP) closed on 26 May and Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery (175mm SP) arrived on 28 May.

71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-P
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

13 June 1968

(2) DIVARTY established a Division Artillery Tactical Command Post at DAK TO Base on 25 May to coordinate artillery activities in the battle area and to insure maximum effectiveness in the allocation of general support artillery fires.

(3) Artillery units conducted 24 displacements to support tactical operations initially west of DAK TO and then north to DAK PEK.

(4) Extensive use was made of radar. Three (3) AN/MPQ-4A counter-mortar radars were employed in the DAK TO, DAK PEK and BEN HET areas. This aggressive use of Q-4A radars resulted in detection of 48 mortar locations and one 122mm rocket location. One AN/MPQ-10A counterbattery radar was flown into the AO from TUY HOA and transported to a forward fire base by CH-54 on 2 June to counter the threat of enemy artillery detected on 30 May west of DAK TO. The AN/TPS-25 ground surveillance radar organic to Division Artillery was displaced by air to a forward fire base in the DAK TO area. The TPS-25A radar located seven groups of personnel identified as enemy ranging in size from 3-21 personnel. These targets were engaged with artillery.

(5) Meteorological support was furnished continuously throughout the operation.

(6) Maximum use was made of air observation. Division Artillery was augmented daily by aircraft from 52d Artillery Group.

(7) Assigned, attached and operational control units during Operation MATHEWS are as follows:

(a)	6-29 Arty	(105 T)	DS	1st Bde, 4th Div
(b)	2-319 Arty	(105 T)	DS	3d Bde, 101st Abn
(c)	C/4-42 Arty	(105 T)	DS	1st Bn, 22d Inf
(d)	C/2-9 Arty	(105 T)	DS	1st Bn, 35th Inf
(e)	A/5-16 Arty	(155 SP)	GSR	6-29 Arty
(f)	C/5-16 Arty	(155 SP)	GSR	6-29 Arty
(g)	D/5-16 Arty	(8" SP)	GSR	6-29 Arty
(h)	A/1-92 Arty	(155 T)	GSR	6-29 Arty
(i)	C/1-92 Arty	(155 T)	GSR	6-29 Arty
(j)	B/6-14 Arty	(175 SP)	GS	TF MATHEWS
(k)	D/6-14 Arty	(175 SP)	GS	TF MATHEWS

AVDDH-GC-P

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

13 June 1968

(8) Summary of ammunition expenditures by caliber.

(a) 105mm	27,037
(b) 155mm	12,966
(c) 8"	1,560
(d) 175mm	<u>4,076</u>
GRAND TOTAL	45,639

(c) Air Support.

(1) Task Force MATHEWS TACP controlled tactical fighter-bombers and long-range heavy bombers for ground elements of the Task Force.

(2) The existing TACP of 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was augmented by three Forward Air Controllers, three O-1G aircraft, a radio control 1/4 ton vehicle, and four enlisted men. This composite TACP was the coordinating agency for USAF assets in AO MATHEWS.

(3) Initial organization of the Air Request Net was that all 1st Brigade, 4th Division G3 immediate and preplanned strikes went through normal channels to Division G3 Air at Camp Enari. 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne request immediate strikes from TF TACP at DAK TO who then relayed the request to IFFV and was monitored by Div G3 Air by telephone. Sorties assigned to fill these request were controlled by Forward Air Controllers from 1st and 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division because of the performance limitations of the O-1 aircraft assigned to 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne. ALO, 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division provided liaison between the brigade and HQ, TF MATHEWS.

(4) The Air Request Net was modified on 28 May when 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne deployed to DAK PEK. The mobile TACP of 3d Brigade, 101st was air-lifted to DAK PEK and processed immediate requests for tactical operations within AO CHLROKKE. Preplanned missions continued to go directly to Div G3 Air. In addition, radar-guided Combat Sky Spots (CSS) were used to deliver Tac Air Support during inclement weather and for night missions.

(5) All preplanned strikes were backed up with CSS strikes because weather changed rapidly during the operation. These backup missions were often flown instead of cancelling a flight of fighters.

(6) Weather conditions adversely affected Tactical Air Support during Operation MATHEWS. Low cloud ceilings and morning fog associated with the Southwest Monsoon combined to limit FAC missions to the late morning and early afternoon hours on approximately 16 days during the period. A total of 40 preplanned FAC missions were diverted to CSS status because of unfavorable weather conditions in the target area.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDDH-GC-F
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

13 June 1968

(7) Summary of air support flown is as follows:

(a) Fighter missions-309

(b) Fighter sorties-661

(c) Spooky/Moonshine-8/1

(d) Summary of Damage Assessments-33 bunkers destroyed, 2 foxholes destroyed, 4 active AAA positions destroyed, 1 recoilless rifle position destroyed, 35 NVA KIA (9 BC), 21 secondary explosions, 2 landing zones constructed.

(8) ARCLIGHT STRIKES: Arclight strikes contributed more significantly to the success of Operation MATHEWS than to any previous 4th Infantry Division operation. Employed in mass for the first time in this area of operations and closely coordinated with the scheme of maneuver and other supporting fires, they were a major factor in the attrition of enemy forces. Since employment varied between the DAK TO, BEN HET and DAK PEK areas, they will be described separately.

(a) DAK TO - BEN HET; The concept of operation in this area called for the numerically inferior allied forces to occupy the critical terrain in the area in strength, concentrating the Division Reconnaissance Package in the area to find targets for exploitation of the friendly preponderance of fire power. Once located, targets were attacked by massed fires of all appropriate types, including Arclights. This phase of operations employed 39 Arclight strikes. After massive attrition of the enemy forces, and the arrival of additional maneuver forces in the area, simultaneous air assaults were to be made in the enemy's rear to complete his destruction. These assaults were preceded by a massive five day Arclight, tactical air, and artillery preparation in the area known to be occupied by major elements of 325C NVA Division. During this five day period there were 29 strikes, culminating in five on D-Day on the immediate objectives of the combat assaults. These assaults were made as scheduled, even though on D-Day events in the DAK PEK area required diversion of significant maneuver forces to that area. Although large and determined enemy elements were known to have been present in the objective area prior to the preparation phase, US Forces were able to complete three battalion air assaults into cold landing zones on D-Day without loss of a single US soldier. In operations following the US attack, Arclights continued to be used in mass to complete the exploitation and to neutralize enemy fires. A total of 20 targets were attacked during this period, bringing the total for Operation MATHEWS in this area to 88.

(b) DAK PEK: Arclight strikes were employed in the DAK PEK area to blunt a major enemy thrust at the isolated CSF camp and to provide reaction time for reinforcement of the defense. There were two separate phases of this operation, 23 to 31 May and 11 to 14 June. Task Force MATHEWS reacted to indications from a reliable intelligence source that major enemy forces were threatening the DAK PEK CSF camp. During the earlier period, a total of 11 Arclights were employed, and despite reliable indications of the enemy's presence in the area, no attacks were made on friendly positions, and the enemy apparently withdrew. From 11 to 14 June, after withdrawal of the bulk of the US Forces, the enemy again threatened the camp this time in strength. During this period, 20 Arclight targets were

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Reports

struck. Despite indications of a major enemy effort to overrun the camp, he was able to make only one ground attack on friendly positions and ineffective attacks by fire. In this operation, because of comparative lack of artillery support and poor weather conditions for tactical air support, Arclight support was especially significant.

(c) In summary, it is apparent that the mass employment of Arclight strikes played a major role in the decisive defeat of elements of two NVA Divisions in Operation MATHENS. Although extensive efforts were made to assess bomb damage, no single target strike could be proved to have produced dramatic results. Taken in sum, however, the evidence of their effect is conclusive. The enemy made a major effort during this operation, moving large forces for long distances to mass them against numerically inferior US forces, he introduced more sophisticated weapons systems than had been previously used in the Central Highlands, including artillery, and probably armor. Despite this major effort the enemy achieved not one minor objective, but paid a staggering price in casualties and damage. Friendly casualties were comparatively very light considering the results achieved. The large number of Arclights were massed in a relatively small area where the enemy forces had to assemble to attack their objectives, and they were never able to organize a sustained attack.

d. Army Aviation Support.

(1) Aviation support for Operation MATHENS was provided by the organic 4th Avn Battalion and the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion. Missions were assigned by the Task Force Aviation Officer to support combat operations.

(2) Task Force MATHENS employed an average of 24 UH-1hs, 6 UHLCs, 6 CH-47s, and 1 CH-54 per day. This represents the normal commitment of two (2) Assault Helicopter Companies and one (1) Assault Support Helicopter company. These aviation resources conducted an average of two (2) combat assaults, one (1) extraction and one (1) secure lift daily.

(3) The following is a summary of operational data and support furnished to TF MATHENS by the combined assets of the 4th Avn Battalion and the 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

	<u>UH-1D/H</u>	<u>UH-1C</u>	<u>CH-47</u>	<u>CH-54</u>
(a) Total Hours	2990	599	627	66
(b) Total Sories	13499	6101	2003	102
(c) Type Missions:				
CA	6128	6101		
Log	5889		2003	102
C&C	1482			

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After-Action Report

(d) Cargo (Tons)	2300	3747	444
(e) PAX	23343	4017	

e. Engineer Support

(1) Direct support was furnished to the Task Force by Company A, 4th Engineer Battalion and Company B, 326th Engineer Battalion who supported 1st Bde, 4th Infantry Division and 3d Bde, 101st Abn respectively.

(2) Company D, 299th Engineer Battalion, augmented by Headquarters and Headquarters Company 299th Engineer Battalion, provided general support to the Task Force.

(3) Company A 4th Engineer Battalion provided direct support for the infantry and artillery battalions of 1st Brigade, 4th Division performing LZ clearing missions, cleared fields of fire, and provided technical assistance for barrier installation. Also, Company A operated a 1500 gallon-per-hour water purification point at 1st Brigade base camp, and installed and operated a 600 gallon-per-hour unit and BEN HET Special Forces Camp. Daily minesweeps on Hwy 512 were also conducted by Company A. Heavy equipment was airlifted to provide support missions for the TF and a large TOC was built for HQ, TF MATHEWS at DAK TO Base. An emergency ASP/POL storage facility was constructed at DAK SEANG Special Forces Camp to support tactical operations in the DAK PEK area.

(4) Company B, 326th Engineer Battalion provided direct support to the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne, Infantry Battalions and DS Arty Battalion. Major elements of Company B deployed with the brigade to DAK PEK, where the company constructed fire support bases, as well as berms for three POL storage areas and three ammunition points. In addition, a 1500 gallon-per-hour water purification unit was installed and operated at 3d Brigade Base Camp and a 600 gallon-per-hour unit at DAK PEK

(5) Company D and Headquarters Company, 299th Engineer Battalion (Combat) provided general support to both brigades and to the Task Force. Priority was given initially to construction of a base camp for the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne, consisting of a brigade TOC and Artillery TOC, four helipads using M8A1 matting, two helicopter revetments, establishing drainage control, dozing out offensive positions, clearing fields of fire and providing technical assistance for the establishment of a tactical wire barrier system. Also, elements of Company D assisted 4th Engineers to conduct minesweeps on Hwy 512. A 1500 gallon-per-hour water point was operated at DAK TO Base in support of the Task Force.

f. Signal Support

(1) The 124th Signal Battalion provided communications support for Operation MATHEWS, and established communications with the following major units:

(a) 4th Inf Div Main

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- (b) 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
 - (c) 3d Bde, 101st Abn Div (modified area signal center)
 - (d) 4th Inf Div DIVARTY (TAC)

(2) Multichannel VHF systems were activated on 25 May from 4th Infantry Division Base Camp to the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division at DAK TO I airstrip, and from Task Force MATHEWS CP at DAK TO Base to 3d Bde, 101st Airborne Division at Dak To I.

(3) Upon deployment of HQ, 3d Bde, 101st Abn and 2 battalions to DAK PEK, a VHF relay and FM relay station were planned for. This was necessary because both the DAK TO Base and DAK PEK Special Forces Camps are virtually inaccessible to VHF and direct FM communications. On 29 May, FM relay was established with DAK PEK. The multi-channel systems, however, encountered many difficulties which included airlift of equipment, frequency problems, equipment problems, and non-line-of-sight-path.

g. Psyop Support

(1) Psychological operations were conducted in conjunction with tactical operations to create dissatisfaction and desertion among NVA units.

(2) A total of 108 PSYOPS missions were flown in support of Task Force MATHEWS. These missions dropped 2,200,000 leaflets and made 140 hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcast. In addition, a total of 82 hours of live broadcast were made. Target areas were known and suspected enemy locations and infiltration - exfiltration routes.

(3) During the operation, three NVA soldiers rallied to US units. These individuals provided unit identifications, personalities and locations that were promptly exploited by PSYOPS teams. The CHIEU HOI wrote leaflets and made tapes urging their comrades to rally.

(4) All of the ralliers told that their reasons for rallying were B-52 strikes, suffering, and life in the jungle.

h. Civic Action Support

(1) The civic action program already underway in AO SPATZ was continued with efforts aimed at improvement of health, sanitation and living conditions.

(2) Eighteen villages in AO MATHEWS were selected for the Civic Action Program. A total of 154 visits were made, in addition to 1450 MEDCAP visits. A total of 5293 children participated in the Youth Health Program. Diagnostic examinations by the surgeons of both brigades were provided to approximately 182 people in villages in the AO.

i. Chemical Support

(a) CS Operations:

(1) During the period Operation MATHEWS chemical operations consisted mainly of contamination of bunker complex using persistent CS-1.

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Assuming normal weather conditions for this time of year it is felt that this contamination should last for at least 6 months. It is estimated that more than 200 bunkers were contaminated using this method during the operation.

(2) The E-8 Tactical CS Launcher was used extensively on firebase perimeters during the operation. The E-8 was used on several occasions to assist in repelling NVA attacks on such installations. The 4th Division Chemical Section provided the 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division with 60 E-8s. These items were used on defensive perimeters throughout their AO.

(3) A bulk CS drop was conducted north of CHEROKEE by USAF using C-130 aircraft and 500-800 found drums of CS. The purpose of this drop was to contaminate the NVA road which enters SVN vicinity of YB 893858.

(4) E-158 (XM-15) munitions and the newly developed BFOG (Box Full of Grenades) were used to prep LZs prior to combat assaults. In addition, the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry used the BFOG extensively throughout the operation.

(5) During the period of Operation MATHEWS the following munitions were issued by the Division Chemical Section to units participating in the operation:

- 122 E-8 Tactical CS Launcher
- 50 Boxes of JEEP CS (2000 pounds)
- 12 E-158 (XM-15) Tactical CS Clusters

12. (C) RESULTS

a. Summary of enemy personnel and equipment losses.

(1) Personnel:

- (a) NVA KIA - 352 (PC)
- (b) NVA CIA - 7

(2) Weapons:

- (a) Small Arms - 141
- (b) Crew Served - 19

b. Summary of Friendly personnel losses.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WL</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>(NBI) (Non Battle)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HHG1st Bde		1			1
1-8 Inf	8	57		3	68
3-8		23	1	3	27
3-12 Inf	13	88			101
1-35 Inf	4	18			22
1-22 Inf	4	37			41
2-1 Cav	3	9			12
7-17 Cav					
DIVARTY	3	10			13
DISCOR					

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>(NBI) (Non Battle)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Div Troops	2	3		1	6
4th Div Recap	37	246	1	7	291

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>(NBI) (Non Battle)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
3-101 Abn					
1-506 Inf				1	1
2-506 Inf	1	13		7	21
3-187 Inf	1	15		3	19
2-319 Arty					
326 Engr				1	1
3-101 Recap	2	28		12	42

TOTAL 39 274 1 19 333

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

a. General.

(1) The concept of logistical support of Task Force MATHEWS followed the previously established concept of logistical support of operation MACARTHUR. The battalions logistical bases were co-located with the brigade's trains at DAK TO. The 1st logistical Command Forward Support Activity (FSA) at DAK TO continued providing Class I, III, IIIA, V, barrier materials, bath, laundry, and graves registration to the units. Class II & IV materials, less barrier, were provided from CAMP ENARI through established supply channels. Organic elements from the Division Support Command (DISCOM) provided medical support, maintenance support, and a direct exchange for personal clothing.

(2) Resupply of forward company and battalion fire bases was by UH-1D, CH-47 and CH-54 helicopters from the battalion logistical bases at DAK TO. Resupply of the FSA at DAK TO was primarily by overland convoy from PLEIKU Sub Area Command utilizing some of the Divisions organic vehicles as augmentation.

(3) To continue the previous concept of providing supply point distribution as far forward as possible and also to provide an emergency resupply logistical base, a small resupply point consisting of Class I (C-Rations), III, and V was established at DAK PEK. Resupply of this area was CH-47, CH-54, C7A Caribou, and C-130 air drop. Due to restrictions placed on the use of CH-47 for resupply during the latter stages of the operation, another emergency resupply logistical base was established at DAK SEANG. Resupply of this area was by C-130 air drop.

b. Material and Services: The majority of the supplies consumed during Operation MATHEWS were issued through the FSA at DAK TO. In order to provide the required logistical support, the previously established supply levels and objectives at the FSA had to be increased.

(1) Supply summary for Operation MATHEWS.

(a) Class I: Meals issued:

<u>ARATIONS</u>	<u>C RATIONS</u>	<u>SUNDRY</u>
151,826	81,192	1,395

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(b) Class III: Gallons issued:

<u>JPL4</u>	<u>AVGAS</u>	<u>MOGAS</u>	<u>DIESEL</u>
595,826	48,500	120,500	148,800

(c) Class V: Tons issued: 3,343.89.

(e) Services.

(a) Laundry and Bath Services rendered during the period:

LAUNDRY - 24,200 lbs
 BATHS - 5,825 individuals

(b) Direct Exchange Point services for the operation were 1,000 sets of fatigues and 25 pairs of boots.

(c) Graves Registration service was provided by 1st Logistical Command through the FSA at DAK TO.

c. Maintenance.

(1) Forward support of Task Force MATHEWS was provided by Company C, 704th Maintenance Battalion operating from the brigade trains at DAK TO.

(2) Headquarters and Company A, 704th Maintenance Battalion provided back-up support for all units and a technical supply base for all units at CAMP ENARI. In addition, contact teams were augmented with personnel and equipment as required.

(3) During the operation, 330 work orders were processed for maintenance requests.

d. Medical Support.

(1) Company B, 4th Medical Battalion provided a forward clearing station at DAK TO in support of Task Force MATHEWS. The station consisted of approximately 40 personnel and provided an admission and disposition facility, a medical ward, one medical laboratory and communication ground evacuation, treatment and dental sections.

(2) The 4th Medical Battalion (-) provided medical service and manned the rear clearing station at CAMP ENARI. The 39th KJTeam provided necessary dental support.

(3) Army level supporting facilities consisted of the 18th Surgical and 71st Evacuation Hospitals located at PLEIKU.

(4) The 2d Platoon, 32d Medical Depot, located in QHI NHON, furnished medical supplies and maintenance support.

(5) Summary of medical services provided by the clearing section at DAK TO

(a) Patients seen: 1652

IRHA	217
INRHA	35
Disease	187

- (b) Patients evacuated: 424
- (c) Returned to Duty: 33
- (c) Patients seen but not admitted: 1213

e. Headquarters, Task Force MATHEWS was composed of the following personnel and supporting equipment:

- (1) Personnel: Officers 21
Enlisted men 38
TOTAL 59
- (2) Equipment:
- (a) Tents: 3 GP medium and 6 GP small
- (b) Light Sets: 3
- (c) Generators: 3 (5 KW)
1 (3 KW - DC)
- (d) Vehicles: 9 (1/4 T)
2 (2 1/2 T)
3 (2 1/2 T VANS)
- (e) Cots: 70
- (f) Air mattresses 70
- (g) Sleeping bags: 70
- (h) Chair, folding: 25
- (i) Tables, folding: 15

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT & TECHNIQUES.

a. A flash and radar Information Coordination Center was established by Division Artillery survey personnel which combined the information from visual observation posts and radar locations for target data.

b. Selected munitions were employed extensively on suitable targets during the period. Examples are:

(1) On 30 May, Hill 990 (YB 8124) received a ground attack. Firecracker was employed in and around the perimeter with nine (9) artillery batteries firing in support. A sweep on 31 May revealed 43 NVA KIA, 25 by artillery. Numerous blood trails and drag marks were also found in the area.

(2) On 1 June, an aerial observer sighted four 100mm field pieces in dug-in positions. Fire was adjusted resulting in 2 guns destroyed and a large secondary explosion. VR on 2 June revealed 4 NVA bodies still in the open. Fire tracks in the area indicated that the weapon and bodies had been recovered during the night.

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(3) Firecracker expenditure:

<u>Caliber</u>	<u>Firecracker</u>
105	472 rds
155	126 rds
8"	5 rds

15. (c) LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Operations

Item: Control of Army Aviation

Discussion: Operation MATHEWS utilized almost an entire CAB (Combat Aviation Battalion) on a daily basis and these assets were employed in an extremely large area of operations. The Task Force Aviation section had two (2) FM radios to control the Aviation elements during the day. The majority of aviation resources were provided by the 52d CAB and the 52d retained command of the aviation elements. This arrangement resulted in unacceptable response time to requirements that arose during the day. In addition the TF Aviation section was unable to function as a staff planner/coordinator because they were involved in minute-to-minute control of aircraft assets.

OBSERVATION: At a minimum, a forward CP of an aviation battalion is required to control aviation assets and effectively coordinate with the supported brigades. Additionally, this control element should be equipped with a MRC-119 ($\frac{1}{2}$ Ton) which would provide UF, VHF, ssb, and FM communications. This would permit the TF Aviation Section to function in a planning/coordination role and provide immediately responsive command and control of the aviation units supporting the TF.

Item: Massing Arc Lights

Discussion: Arc Lights were employed in mass for the first time in the Division Area of Operations and were closely coordinated with the scheme of maneuver and other fire support means. These strikes proved to be a major factor in the attrition of enemy forces and caused him to abandon his mission of overrunning friendly positions at DAK PEK and in the D.K TO-BEN HET area. Although single Arc Lights had been planned on enemy targets previously, the grouping of several Arc Lights in one area and over short time spans created a devastating effect on the enemy.

Observation: When the enemy gives indications of massing for an attack, Arc Lights should be massed in order to gain maximum advantage of the strikes.

b. Logistics

Item: Need for Airmobile Bulldozers

Discussion: Tactical operations in the Central Highlands require frequent use of key terrain features for Fire Support Bases. The need to move heavy engineer construction equipment to isolated areas is apparent. High altitudes coupled with the monsoon season, reduces the lift capability of the CH-54 and restricts air transport of the D5A and D6B to the forward fire bases. The D6B with adapter kit is acceptable and would allow a payload reduction; however, the D6B with kit is not organic to the Division.

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Requests for this equipment are submitted to IFFV and further to the 18th Engineer Brigade.

Observation: Two D6B with adapter kit should be made an MTOE addition to 4th Engineer Battalion to increase responsiveness to tactical requirements.

HICKMAN
BG


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Preston W. Holtry
PRESTON W. HOLTRY
CPT, Infantry
Division Historian

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AO MATHEWS

MAPS: VIETNAM, NOT TO SCALE

SHEETS: NO 48-4, 48-8, 49-1, 49-5

Inclosure 1

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TASK ORGANIZATION:

1st Bde

HHC, 1st Bde
3-8 Inf
3-12 Inf
1-35 Inf
A/4 Engr
6-29 Arty (DS)
C/4-42 Arty (DS)
TACP

3d Bde, 101st

HHC, 3-101st
1-506 Inf
2-506 Inf
3-187 Inf
1-8 Inf (-)
1-22 Inf
C/2-1 Cav (+)
2-319 Arty (DS)
TACP

TASK FORCE CONTROL

HQ, TF MATHEWS
B/6-14 Arty (GS)
D/6-14 Arty (GS)

Inclosure 2

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC

24 May 1968

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction

Brig Gen Don R. Hickman
Assistant Division Commander-A
4th Infantry Division

1. You are designated Commander of Task Force Mathews effective 241800 May 1968.
2. Task Force Mathews will consist of your Task Force Headquarters and the following major units:
 - a. 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division.
 - b. 3d Brigade 101st Airborne Division.
 - c. Attached artillery and other supporting units.
3. You will be the Tactical Commander of the designated forces and directly responsive to the undersigned. You are charged with the responsibility of conducting operations within your assigned area of operations as directed by this headquarters.
4. Your initial mission is to destroy the 325C NVA Division in accordance with OPORD 11-68 Hq 4th Inf Div, dated 24 May. A collateral mission is to protect the Special Forces Camp at Ben Het and the 4th Division Base at Dak To. Additionally, you are charged with the logistical support of the DS 155 arty elements at Dak Pek.
5. Direct liaison and coordination with ARVN and other US agencies and forces not assigned to your OPCON is authorized and directed.

Incl 3

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AVDDH-GC
SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction

24 May 1968

6. Requirement for additional resources will be submitted to this headquarters in sufficient time to permit timely allocation.
7. Existing rules of engagement and existing command relationships with USASF apply.

CHARLES P. STONE
Major General, USA
Commanding

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Preston W. Holtry
PRESTON W. HOLTRY
CPT, Infantry
Division Historian

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

OPERATION MATHEWS

- 24 May HQ, TF Mathews moved to Dak To and became operational at 242000H May 68. 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB moved from YB 971267 (FSB #30) to YB 883291 (FSB #25) and 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry moved from Dak To Base (ZB 004217) to replace 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry at YB 971267 (FSB #30). 1-506 Infantry and 3d Brigade; 101st Abn Tac CP closed Dak To at 1525H. Upon arrival, HQ, 1st Battalion, 506 Infantry moved to YB 988153 (FSB #6) and assumed control of Rocket Ridge.
- 25 May At 1015 vic YB 892270, C/2-1 Cav made contact on Hwy 512, receiving SA and Bl40 fire. Gunships were on station. At 1820 contact was broken. Results: 3 US KIA, 6 US WIA, 47 NVA KIA. At 1630, Ben Het received 13 rds 82mm mortar from the west, landing outside their perimeter. At 1915 hrs, vic YB 839222, FSB #29 of 1st Battalion 8th Infantry began receiving 75 Recoilless and 82mm fire and at 2000 they were assaulted by an estimated NVA Battalion from the south and west. Fighting continued throughout the night. Spocky was employed and drew ground fire. The NVA attack penetrated the perimeter and the enemy still held 2 bunkers at 0445. Results: 14 US KIA, 55 WIA, 47 NVA KIA. PWs confirmed the 101D NVA Regiment of the 325C NVA Division conducted the attack. During the attack on FSB #29, two nearby FSBs were mortared, one of them with CS.
- 26 May At 0550, Dak To Base was attacked with 122mm rockets, however no casualties were inflicted. At 1335, FSB #29 (YB 839223) was still receiving 75mm Recoilless Rifle fire. 7-17 Air Cav observed the position and directed an airstrike on it. 3d Bde, 101st Abn Division closed Dak To at 1402 hrs, with a total of 122 sorties of C-130.
- 27 May At 0020, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB #15 (YB 854187) received 6 rds of 82mm mortar fire. B&D Companies, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry and A, B, C and D Companies, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted heliborn assaults to begin the attack northwest of Ben Het (YB 873257). At 1255 A Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry exchanged fire with 4-5 NVA at YB 872294 with negative results. At 1035 hrs at YB 814248, A Company, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force. Results: 2 US WIA, 10 NVA KIA. At 1604, CSF Ben Het contacted an estimated NVA Company in bunkers. Tac Air and artillery were employed. 3d Brigade, 101st Abn was alerted at 2230 to move 2d Battalion 506th Infantry to Dak Pek (YB 953680).

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- 28 May At 0237, FSB #29 (YB 839223) received 20-22 rounds of mixed 60-82mm mortar fire that resulted in one US KIA and 2 WIA. At 0645, the advance party of 3d Bde, 101st Abn departed Dak To enroute to Dak Pek. B Company, 2d Battalion 506th Infantry began moving to Dak Pek at 0820 by CH-37 and C-7A. One section of 155mm Arty (A/1-92) and one 105mm (B/2-319) battery moved to Dak Pek and closed at 1120 hrs. At 1010 hrs, a FAC aircraft crashed at Dak Pek Airstrip due to power failure. The pilot was evacuated to Dak To. A, B, & C Companies 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry combat assaulted to YB 835280 to continue the attack northwest of Ben Het. Light contact was made near the LZ with an unknown size enemy force.
- 29 May At 0900, 1st Battalion 8th Infantry FSB #29 (YB 839223), received 6 rounds of 60mm mortar, all outside the perimeter. Airstrikes on the suspected mortar location produced a large secondary explosion. 3d Battalion, 187th Abn Infantry completed airlift to Dak Pek at 1215 hrs. At 1410, a squad from C Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry exchanged fire with an estimated NVA squad vic YB 928268. C Company reinforced the squad and employed Tac Air and artillery. HQ, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry moved from FSB #30 (YB 971267) to Dak To Base. They were replaced by one company, 23D ARVN Ranger Battalion. The move was complete at 1020 hrs.
- 30 May D Company, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry in their night defensive position on Hill 990 (YB 818247) began to be probed at 0230. By 0300 the company was receiving small arms and mortar fire in increasing intensity. At 0330 Spooky arrived to support the contact. At 0500, an estimated NVA battalion launched a ground assault from the north, south and west. Contact tapered off by 0530 but snipers continued to harass the position. Results: 7 US KIA, 56 WIA, 43 NVA KIA. Throughout the day, Hill 990 and 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry FSB #29 (YB 839223) received a total of 100 plus rounds mixed 120mm mortar, 105mm howitzer and 75mm Recoilless Rifle fire. A Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was airlifted to Hill 990 to reinforce, however the NVA attempted to interdict the lift with 105mm and 75mm Recoilless Rifles. Reinforcement was completed at 311430 May. At 1240 hrs, B Company, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry outpost observed 4 NVA approaching their position. Results: 1 NVA KIA, 3 fled to the north.
- 31 May At 0012 - 0451 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB #25 (YB 887291) received total of 17 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, all outside the perimeter. At 0247 A Company, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry located at FSB #5 (YB 935188) received 35 rounds 82mm mortar fire from the southwest, all of which landed outside the perimeter. From 0655-1043, Company D, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry on Hill 990 received approximately 12-15 rounds 82mm mortar fire, one round of which set off mortar ammunition that was stored in a bunker. Results: 11 US WIA. At 1800 vic YB 865178, an H-23 helicopter crash landed for unknown reasons. The crew was extracted at 1830 hours.

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1 June

During the first lift of Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry's combat assault to YB 791219, a UH-1H crashed into the LZ requiring elements be inserted into the alternate LZ. The crew was extracted with 1 individual injured. At YB 855268, Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found two NVA bodies estimated to be two-three months old. At YB 886296, Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body estimated to be one month old. At YB 876293, Companies B and D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry captured one NVA who identified his unit to be the 18th Transportation Battalion, 101D Regiment, 325C NVA Division. Two Hoi Chanh walked into FSB #25 at YB 887291. One US was wounded from Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry when FSB #29 (YB 839223) received 60 rounds of suspected 100mm artillery fire. At YB 828206, a patrol from Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry exchanged small arms fire with seven NVA. The patrol withdrew and artillery was employed, while one US was wounded. At YB 841212, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA KIA estimated to be three days old. At 1421H, a Hoi Chanh walked into FSB #29, identifying his unit as 4th Battalion, 102d Regiment, 325C NVA Division. At YB 830193, the Aero-Rifle Platoon from Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry recovered two US MIA from downed light observation helicopter of 24 May. Individuals were confirmed KIA. At the same location, the Aero Rifle Platoon observed ten NVA KIA estimated to be two-three days old. HQ, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry moved from Dak To base to FSB #12 (Ben Het) closing at 1405 hours.

2 June

At YB 808278 Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry Battalion received 25-30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in two US WIA. At YB 884303, Company B, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry (Airborne) made contact with an NVA platoon in bunkers. The enemy employed small arms, automatic weapons, unknown type mortars, and 75mm recoilless rifles, wounding 11 US while ten NVA were killed. At YB 846221 the Reconnaissance Platoon from 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA KIA with two B-41 rocket launchers and seven B-40 rockets. Later, the same Reconnaissance Platoon found one NVA killed by artillery at YB 847223. A patrol from Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found two NVA bodies at YB 839223. The CP of the 3d Dde, 101st Abn and the 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry (Abn) (-) moved from Dak Pek to Dak To Base, closing at 1750 hours.

3 June

At YB 818299, the point element from Company D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received small arms fire from an estimated 12 individuals resulting in two US wounded. In the same area, Company D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body in a grave. Long Range Patrol 1C found two NVA bodies killed by air or artillery. 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry moved their FSB from Dak To Base by convoy to FSB #13 (YB 919255).

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- 4 June A truck from the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry struck a mine wounding one US at YB 886270. At ZA 208948 a north bound convoy was ambushed by an estimated NVA Company from the east and west side of Highway 14N. Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry and ten gunships from the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, 4th Aviation Battalion, and the 52d Aviation Battalion provided support. Air strikes were employed. One US was killed in the contact, eight US wounded, and 41 NVA were KIA. Companies A, B, and C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry received a probe on their perimeter at YB 794274 by an estimated two NVA companies, killing three US, while 23 US were wounded. A sweep around the perimeter found a total of two NVA bodies. At YB 883303, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body at YB 883303. At YB 786271 Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an estimated two company NVA force wounding four US. Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged five NVA and killed two at YB 886303. Company A, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, YB 935188, received 20 rounds of 122mm mortar fire, all of which landed outside the position. Counter mortar fire produced a secondary explosion at YB 942167. At 1915, an ambush from Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, YB 886303, ambushed 5 NVA, killing two NVA.
- 5 June At YB 801178, Companies B and D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received sporadic small arms fire resulting in one NVA KIA. The Reconnaissance Platoon from the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found two NVA bodies at YB 881292. Companies B & C, 3d Battalion 12th Infantry swept through an abandoned enemy bunker complex at YB 786271, the site of the 4 June contact. One NVA body, weapons, and supplies were found. Long Range Patrol H2A found one VC at ZA 088720 believed killed by Spooky. 2d Battalion, 42d ARVN found 2000 kg of rice at ZB 026279. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry moved by air and convoy to Polei Kleng (ZA 028935) and became OPCON 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.
- 6 June Company D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body at YB 808308, and another at YB 808305. At YB 823222, the Reconnaissance Platoon from 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry captured one wounded NVA. Individual indicated his unit to be 23d Transportation Company, 2d Regiment, 325C NVA Division. At YB 785227, Companies B and C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found a total of 18 NVA bodies in graves. In the same area a hospital complex with four operating rooms was located. At YB 964786, Company A, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry (Abn) found three damaged bulldozers. In the same area two US were wounded when an individual from Company A stepped on a mine.
- 7 June Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed three NVA at YB 782296. At YB 957243, two ARVN Rangers were killed when they detonated a booby trap which they had emplaced. Headhunter aircraft received .50 cal fire from YB 772268. At 1100, OMEGA Team #52 made contact on an attempted insertion at YB 768303. The team was extracted and airstrikes were employed.

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- 8 June 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry relieved the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry (Airborne) at Dak Pek. At ZB 170028, a northbound resupply convoy was ambushed by an estimated platoon size force. Troop B 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment reacted to the contact with two platoons, while four gunships initially supported the friendly forces. One wounded NVA was captured and one NVA was killed, while friendly losses were three US KIA, and four US wounded. At YB 797296, Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA killed by artillery or airstrike. 3d Brigade 101st Airborne Advance Party departed Dak To by C-130 aircraft enroute to Phuc Vinh.
- 9 June 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry (Airborne) departed the Area of Operations enroute to Phuc Vinh. 3d Brigade CP and Company D, 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry also departed enroute to Phuc Vinh and closed at approximately 1830. 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry moved from FSB #13 (YB 906323) to Dak To Base and began preparation for redeployment.
- 10 June A reinforced NVA company employing small arms, automatic weapons, hand grenades and flame throwers initiated a ground attack on Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located at YB 910677. The enemy breached the perimeter and occupied three bunkers. Company B remained in heavy contact until 0300, with artillery and Spooky supporting. One US was killed, 22 US wounded, and four NVA were KIA in the contact. 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry began moving to reinforce 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry at Dak Pek. Dak Pek Special Force Camp (YB 956686) received an estimated 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, coupled with a ground probe by an estimated enemy squad size force. Three CSF were wounded and one CSF was killed in the action. At 1440, Dak Pek Camp received one 122mm rocket which landed near the airstrip. Gunships fired on the suspected launch site and received heavy ground fire from YB 893693. Fire was returned and an airstrike was employed. 2d Battalion, 506th Infantry deployed by C-130 from Dak To to Phuc Vinh. The movement required 80 sorties and was completed at 1800.
- 11 June Three CSF were wounded at Dak Pek when the Special Forces Camp received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At YB 816247, the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA body. At Dak Pek, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire that impacted 2-300 meters east of the airfield. There were no casualties. Two rounds of 122mm rockets were also fired from YB 920694 and landed north of the airstrip.

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12 June At 1500H TF Mathews relinquished operational control of AO SPAATZ and AO CHEROKEE to 1st Brigade 4th Infantry Division. At YB 893675 an airstrike was employed by a Forward Air Controller and Head Hunter aircraft, resulting in two NVA killed by air. Three US were wounded when a UH-1D helicopter received .50 caliber ground fire at YB 905714. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received 32 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at YB 913713, killing two US and wounding three US. Between 1345-1410 Dak Pek received ten 122mm rockets on the airstrip. Cider 12 observed 6 rocket positions at YB 884735 that were occupied 2 positions were destroyed by airstrikes. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry at Dak Pek had 2 US KIA by one 82mm mortar round. A patrol from Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with estimated 6 NVA at YB 805271. Results: 2 NVA KIA.

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TF MATHEWS

Dak To, RVN

261600 MAY 68

FRAGO 1-68 to OPORD 11-68 (Lucas Green)

TASK ORGANIZATION:

1st Bde

- 3/8 Inf
- 3/12 Inf
- 1/35 Inf (Eff D-Day)
- 6/29 Arty (DS)
- C, 4/42 Arty (DS)
- A Det, Ben Het CSF

3d Bde, 101st

- 1/506 Abn Inf
- 2/506 Inf
- 3/187 Abn Inf (-)
- 1/22 Inf
- 1/8 Inf (-) (Eff 270800 May)
- Plt, ARVN Ranger Bn
- C, 2/1 Cav (-)
- Plt, B, 2/1 Cav

1. (C) TF MATHEWS continues operations to destroy the 325C NVA Div and other enemy forces in AO MATHEWS by conducting a 3 battalion assault West, North and Southwest of Ben Het on D-Day followed by a battalion sized assault on D+1 and an exploitation assault o/a D+3.

2. (C) 1st Bde:

a. Secure Objective 1 (Hill 990) and Objective 3 (Hill 900) with simultaneous combat assaults on D-Day.

b. Establish liaison with A Det, Ben Het CSF Camp and coord CSF Opn to secure Hill 705 West of Ben Het CSF Camp beginning H+2 hrs.

c. Be prepared to secure Objective 2 on D+1.

d. Be prepared to secure Objective 4 on D+2.

e. Be prepared to release OPCON 1 Bn to 3d Bde, 101st for exploitation West of FSB #15.

3. (C) 3d Bde, 101st:

a. Secure Dak To, FSB's along Rte 512, and Bridge (FSB) 3.

b. Secure LLOC from Kontum to Dak To and Dak To West to FSB 13.

c. Secure Objective 5 (Hill 889 at YB 825152) on D-Day after completion of combat assault to Objective 1 by 1st Bde.

d. Be prepared to relieve/reinf 2/42d ARVN NE of Dak To.

Incl 5

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FRAGO 1-68 to OPORD 11-68 (Lucas Green) (Cont)

- e. Be prepared to relieve/reinf Dak Seang and Dak Pek GSF Camps.
- f. Be prepared to receive 1 Bn, 1st Bde to exploit contacts West of FSB 15.
- g. Be prepared to release 2/506 Abn Inf to 1st Bde to secure Objective 4 o/a D+2.

4. (C) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

- a. D-Day is 27 May.
- b. DIRLAUTH.
- c. Submit aviation requirements NLT 1700 hrs the day prior.
- d. Maneuver units will have helicopter air cover at all times while moving overland.
- e. Minimize radio traffic until H-Hour.
- f. AO in accordance with OPORD 11-68.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

OFFICIAL:

HICKMAN
BG

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Preston W. Holtry
 PRESTON W. HOLTRY
 CPT, Infantry
 Division Historian

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TF MATHEWS
Dak To, RVN
280030 MAY 68

FRAGO 2-68 to OPORD 1L-68 (MATHEWS)

1. Major NVA forces threaten USSF Camp at Dak Pek. TF Mathews continues operations in present AO, and airlifts Battalion Task Forces to AO CHEROKEE under OPCON 3d Bde, 101st.
2. 1/4:
 - a. Cont pres mission.
 - b. Assume AO of 3/101 effective 280100 May 68.
 - c. Assume OPCON of 1-22 Inf, 1-506 Abn Inf, 3-187 Abn Inf and C/2-1 Cav effective 280100 May 68.
 - d. Release 1-35 Inf effective 280600 May 68.
 - e. Be prep to release 3-187 Abn Inf to 3/101.
 - f. Be prep to assume OPCON of elements of 42d ARVN.
3. 3/101:
 - a. Release 1-22 Inf, 1-506 Abn Inf, 3-187 Abn Inf (-) and C/2-1 Cav effective 280100 May 68.
 - b. Assume OPCON 1-35 Inf effective 280600 May 68.
 - c. Move to Dak Pek with 1 bn, assume OPCON of AO CHEROKEE and destroy en forces in area. Move 2d bn on order.
 - d. Assume OPCON of USSF A Det, Dak Pek.
 - e. Be prepared to assume OPCON of 2 MSF Co's on closure of MSF to Dak Pek.
4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:
 - a. Log buildup will be supported by USAF lift.
 - b. AO CHEROKEE bounded by: ZB 1090, ZB 1055, ZB 55 grid line West to border, ZB 90 grid line West to border.

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FRAGO 2-68 to OPORD 11-68 (MATHWS) (Cont)

c. Operation Lucas Green renamed Operations MATHWS.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

OFFICIAL:

HICKMAN
BG

EDMONDS
S3

A TRUE COPY

Preston W. Holtry

PRESTON W. HOLTRY
CPT, Infantry
Division Historian

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TF MATHEWS
Dak To, RVN
022100 Jun 68

FRAGO 3-68 to OPORD 11-68 (MATHEWS)

1. Enemy threat Northwest of Ben Het CSF Camp continues while the threat to Dak Pek has been reduced. 1st NVA Div continues to threaten positions and installations in the Kontum area.

2. 1st Bde:

a. Phase I:

(1) Assume OPCON 2/506 Abn Inf (-) upon closure Dak To on 2 Jun.

(2) Cdt CA with 2/506 Abn Inf (-) on 3 Jun to secure Hill 1043 (YB 8832) and cdt RIF to NW and West.

b. Phase II:

(1) Continue offensive operations West of Ben Het to engage and destroy the 325C NVA Division. Sweep draws and suspected base areas West of Ben Het.

(2) Prepare to release 1/506 Abn Inf to 3/101st at 030600 Jun 68.

(3) Prepare to move 1/35 Inf to Polei Kleng on 5 Jun and CHOP to 3d Bde, 4th Bde on closure.

(4) Prepare to airlift 2 Co's, 1/22 Inf to Polei Kleng on 6 Jun.

(5) Prepare to relieve 3/187 Abn Inf in Dak Pek with Bn (-2 Co's) o/a 8 Jun.

c. Phase III:

(1) Relieve 3/101 on Rocket Ridge and assume control of 3/101 AO.

(2) Secure FSB's 1, 3, 5, 6, 25, 29, and 30.

(3) Protect Dak To and Dak Pek.

(4) Cdt RIF opns within capability.

3. 3d Bde, 101st:

a. Phase I:

(1) Release 2/506 Abn (Inf (-) to 1st Bde 2 June.

(2) Protect Dak Pek with Bn Task Force.

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FRAGO 3-68 to OPORD 11-68 (MATHEWS) (Cont)

b. Phase II:

- (1) Assume OPCON 1/506 Abn Inf 030600 June.
- (2) Coordinate operation along connecting boundaries with 42d ARVN Regt.
- (3) Prepare to receive 2/506 Abn Inf (-) o/a 8 Jun.
- (4) Prepare to extract 3/187 Abn Inf from Dak Pek.

c. Phase III:

Prepare to revert parent unit control o/a 8 Jun.

4. Coordinating Instruction:

Opns overlay (Annex A) effective 030600H Jun.

ACKNOWLEDGE:

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Preston W. Holtry
 PRESTON W. HOLTRY
 CPT, Infantry
 Division Historian

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TF MATHEWS
Dak To, RVN
080800 June 68

FRAGO 4-68 to OPORD 11-68 (MATHEWS)

1. TF MATHEWS continues to pursue NVA forces West of Ben Het and SW of Dak To and continues to protect Dak Pek with 1 Bn Task Force.
2. 1st Bde:
 - a. Cont present msn of destroying units of 325C NVA Div in AO.
 - b. Relieve 3/101st units in Dak Pek with Bn Task Force and assume OPCON AO CHEROKEE on 8 Jun. Protect Dak Pek and destroy enemy forces in AO CHEROKEE.
 - c. Exploit B-52 strikes vic FSB 28 with minimum force of 2 companies on 9 Jun.
 - d. Relieve 1/506 Abn Inf on FSB 5 and FSB 6 beginning 9 Jun.
 - e. Assume OPCON 3/101 AO vic Dak To on order.
 - f. Exploit B-52 strikes vic Hill 1043 (YB 7630) with battalion force on order.
3. 3d Bde, 101st:
 - a. Deploy from AO MATHEWS 9-11 Jun.
 - b. Release OPCON AO CHEROKEE to 1st Bde 8 Jun.
 - c. Release OPCON AO vic Dak To to 1st Bde on order.
 - d. Revert II Field Force control on departure Dak To.
4. COORDINATING INSTRUCTION:

Sortie schedule for departure 3/101st:

 - 9 Jun - 50
 - 10 Jun - 50
 - 11 Jun - 14

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AVDDH-GC-MH

18 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for
Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

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1 - CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf	
1 - CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf	
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf	
1 - CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf	
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2 - CO, Avn Bn	

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