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FOR OT UT 691112

7 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry  
Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1969 (U)

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*Kenneth G. Wickham*  
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OPERATIONAL REPORT LESSONS LEARNED 4th INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY

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Incl 2 - 5 wd Hq DA

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SECTION I (C) Significant Organization or Unit Activities

1. (C) General: During the period 1 Nov 68 - 31 Jan 69 the 4th Infantry Division Artillery continued its participation in Operation MacArthur. For a portion of this period 24 December 1968 to 3 January 1969, elements of the Division Artillery participated in Operation Winner with the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division in the SOUI DOI area.

a. Task Organization for Operation MacArthur is shown at Inclosure 1.

b. Commanders and key staffs as of the end of the reporting period are shown at Inclosure 2.

c. Mission: The mission of the Artillery was to support the 4th Infantry Division with available artillery, radar, automatic weapons, searchlights and meteorological resources.

2. (C) INTELLIGENCE

a. General: The area of operations for the 4th Infantry Division during the period was the Central Highlands of SOUTH VIETNAM in KONIUM, PLEIKU, and DARIAC PROVINCES. All three provinces are characterized by steep mountains with heavily vegetated and canopied areas of teak, mahogany and bamboo. The orientation of ground units moving through dense growth continued to be a problem. Artillery was used as an aid to land navigation by employing on call artillery marking rounds. Artillery fire continued to be adjusted by sound when terrain and vegetation limited visibility. The reporting period continued to show that the enemy still has the capability of conducting mining activities, attacks by fire, and ambushes throughout the Division Area of Operations. Increased use of IRP and CSF teams by US forces have greatly hampered enemy tactical guerilla warfare by destroying his infiltration corridors, supply caches and base camp areas. Air strikes, B-52 strikes and the CHEIU HOI program have continued to have an adverse effect on VC/NVA morale. The enemy did not mount any major attacks during the election week or during the Christmas-New Year holiday period as had been predicted. Large caches of food and weapons captured during the reporting period has made it increasingly difficult for the enemy to initiate major, sustained attacks although he still retains the ability to conduct mining, ambushes, and attacks by fire throughout the Division Area of Operations.

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b. KONTUM PROVINCE

(1) During the week of 28 Oct - 3 Nov, activity centered in the BEN HET - DAK TO area with heavy attacks by fire on BEN HET and FSB 29. There were six attacks by fire, seventeen ground to air incidents, eight contacts and three mining incidents. The attacks by fire and ground to air incidents were attributed to elements of the 40th NVA Arty Regt and the minings to local force VC units. FSB 29 received 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle attack that resulted in one US killed and six US wounded when 20 of 100 rounds impacted within the perimeter on 29 Oct. BEN HET SF CAMP at YB 873 257 received 40 x 82mm mortar rounds that destroyed a 2½ ton truck and a water trailer on 29 Oct. An airstrike destroyed one mortar position at YB 840 300. On 31 Oct, BEN HET received four 122mm rockets that landed inside the perimeter. On 1 Nov an aircraft attempting to extract a LRP was hit and crashed while trying to return to BEN HET. Both crew and aircraft were extracted. The LRP Team with two wounded was extracted from the contact area at YB 815 194. On 2 Nov FSB 29 received 135 rounds of mixed recoilless rifle, 82mm and 122mm mortar and 105 howitzer fire that landed inside the perimeter. This attack was the first confirmed instance of 105mm howitzers employed against Allied Forces in the Central Highlands. There were 4 US wounded, one ammo pit, one AN/MPQ-4 radar, two POL blivots, two water trailers and several bunkers destroyed and one 81mm mortar damaged in the attack. On 2 Nov C/3-12 Inf, inserted at YB 809 299 to reinforce an Aerial Rifle Platoon, made contact and killed two NVA. D/3-12 Inf, conducting a bomb damage assessment near YB 824 285 received fire from an estimated reinforced squad. The contact resulted in two US killed, eight US wounded and three NVA killed. Lack of follow up attacks or significant probes indicated the absence of major infantry units in the area. Activity in the KONTUM CITY area was relatively light with only one mining incident that damaged the right front wheel of a 5 ton truck near ZB 073 174. The significant incidents of the week of 4-10 Nov centered in the BEN HET SF CAMP and PLEI TRAP ROAD areas. On 4 Nov, BEN HET received 13 rounds (6 duds) of 122mm rocket fire that wounded one US and one CSF. FSB 29 received 100 rounds of mixed 105mm artillery, 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire that wounded six US soldiers. During the remainder of the week an additional total of 29 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire were fired on FSB 29. These attacks by fire were attributed to elements of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment. Vehicular traffic along the Plei Trap Road showed a significant increase during the week. Extensive use of the road was observed from YB 7207 to the midpoint of the road near YA 6476, and the southern portion of the road showed evidence of light traffic. On 4 Nov reconnaissance aircraft received intense .30 and .50 Cal ground to air fire from YB 731 053. On 6 Nov a reconnaissance aircraft sighted a convoy of 20 trucks and four T-62 Soviet tanks. Artillery, airstrikes and B-52 strikes were employed in the area. Additional visual reconnaissance of the road indicated road repairs and fresh construction of new positions in addition to the vehicular traffic. The KONTUM CITY area had only one incident reported when LZ MARY LOU received two rounds of 82mm mortar fire and light small arms fire. A total of fourteen mines were found along Highway 14. One tank from 2-1 Cav

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was lightly damaged when it hit a plastic mine near YA 207 960 on 6 Nov. The second incident took place on 10 Nov when a 5 ton truck from 124th Transportation Bn was lightly damaged after hitting an unidentified mine near ZB 153 095. The remaining twelve mines were found before vehicles were damaged. One Montagnard boy pointed out six of the mines on 7 Nov at YB 147 150.

(2) Activity in KONTUM was relatively light during the week of 11-17 Nov, except for FSB 29 and the PLEI TRAP ROAD area. There was one mining incident at YB 892 272 and one attack by fire on OP 5 at AR 864 997. The mine was found and destroyed in place on 11 Nov and the OP received mortar and small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force that killed five ARVNs and wounded one ARVN. FSB 29 was again the target of enemy artillery and received 125 rounds of mixed 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifle, 82mm mortar, and 105mm artillery fire that wounded two US soldiers, destroyed one 106mm recoilless rifle and the main ASP and damaged one 81mm mortar on 11 Nov. On 12 Nov the enemy again attacked using 75mm recoilless rifle and 82mm mortars from YB 824 210, approximately 2 kilometers south of FSB 29. An airstrike against this target produced a secondary explosion that sent black smoke 500 feet into the air. Evacuation of FSB 29 was completed without incident on 12 Nov. LRP teams operating along the PLEI TRAP ROAD confirmed Red Haze and APD sensings that indicated large enemy forces along the road from its entry point into SOUTH VIETNAM, YB 7207, to YA 7389, approximately 18 kilometers south. Large work forces and repair teams were observed 15 Nov. Activity increased this week with six attacks by fire, three contacts and a total of 17 minings. DAK PEK SF CAMP received two B-40 rounds on 22 Nov when an unknown size enemy force hit the camp. Small arms fire was exchanged with no casualties. DAK SEANG had two incidents, the first on 19 Nov when a CSF unit made contact with an estimated NVA company and the second on 22 Nov when 2-3 VC attempted to probe the DAK SFANG perimeter. Activity in the BEN HET - DAK TO area resumed after a short lull. BEN HET SF CAMP received mortar and recoilless rifle fire 18, 20, and 21 Nov. Only seven of the twenty rounds landed inside the perimeter. On 21 Nov, a SRP from D/3-12 Inf found a small ammunition cache containing 35 x 82mm mortar rounds and 12 fuzes. Intensive reconnaissance of the PLEI TRAP ROAD confirmed the continued use of the road by enemy vehicles and personnel. Airstrikes produced seven secondary explosions and photo analysis revealed two tracked vehicles at YB 746 035. On 22 Nov a tank was observed vicinity YA 744 972. The tank avoided rockets, artillery, and airstrikes by moving into heavy underbrush. Activity in the KONTUM CITY area was relatively light with one attack by fire on an OP at AR 823 960 that received six rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 18 Nov. Elements of the 42nd ARVN Regt made contact with 4-5 individuals at BR 046 743. Individuals broke contact immediately and friendly elements found an abandoned 100 bed enemy hospital complex. During the week of 25 Nov to 01 Dec, action was light. DAK PEK SF CAMP received a squad size probe on 29 Nov and on 30 Nov CSF elements killed one VC near YB 873 673. Two rounds of 82mm mortar were received by a DAK TO OP on 25 Nov vicinity of ZB 078 278. Operation "DEAD END" in the PLEI TRAP VALLEY revealed two explosives caches at YB 739 031 and YB 739 052 on 25 and 26 Nov, respectively. Fortifications, bridges and roads were destroyed in the area. The 4th Engr Bn

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constructed an abatis from YB 744 022 to YB 746 025 on 27 Nov effectively closing the northern portion of the road to vehicular traffic and greatly hindering the movement of men and supplies to and from the tri-border area. On 25 Nov, POLEI KRONG village, ZA 102 913, was attacked by 10-15 terrorists who employed small arms, B-40 rockets and hand grenades before distributing propaganda leaflets.

(3) During the week of 2-8 Dec, activity in KONTUM was generally light with no incidents reported in DAK PEK and DAK SEANG areas and a slight increase in the BEN HET - POLEI KLENG area. On 6 Dec, radar on FSB 12 detected two aircraft that landed near YB 836 266. Twenty rounds of artillery were fired on the area with unknown results and C/7-17 Cav observed imprints from a heavily laden aircraft on 7 Dec. BEN HET SF CAMP received 14 x 82mm mortar and 10 x 75mm recoilless rifle fire on 7 and 8 Dec with all rounds landing outside the perimeter. FSB 29 received six rounds of mortar fire on 2 Dec with unknown effect since the base was unoccupied by any friendly forces. The enemy has continued to use the POLEI TRAP ROAD for foot traffic, but has not removed the obstacles emplaced during OPERATION DEAD END. Headhunter aircraft observed signs of foot traffic on 3 Dec near YB 733 040. On 7 Dec, unusually heavy Red Haze readings were recorded on both sides on the road from YB 7501 to YB 7593. Heavy .50 caliber anti-aircraft fire west of POLEI KLENG at YA 906 975 indicated that the enemy may be preparing for a future operation in the POLEI KLENG area. Eight mining incidents were recorded along Highway 14 from DAK TO to KONTUM CITY. One US was killed and three were wounded when a 4 ton white trailer hit a mine at ZB 152 139. Activity in KONTUM CITY increased significantly when the 42nd ARVN Regt conducted operations north of the city. On 2 Dec a PF unit captured a member of the Kontum District Committee who indicated that there would be an attack on KONTUM CITY before 1969. An airstrike employed near AS 7920 on 4 Dec resulted in ten enemy killed, eleven secondary explosions, 18 bunkers, one machine gun position and one tunnel destroyed. On 6 Dec Recon of the 42nd ARVN Regt found a cache containing documents at AS 794 204 and on 7 Dec the unit found an ammunition cache near AS 798 202, and a possible hospital area near AS 806 208. Activity during the week of 9-15 Dec was relatively light with most activity being initiated by friendly operations. A FAC observed a large, suspected enemy supply and training area approximately 30 kilometers east of DAK PEK. Numerous fortifications, enemy personnel, 200-300 structures and 2-3000 acres of cultivated area were observed in the area bounded by AS 7766 - 8761 - 7761. An airstrike employed near AS 836 666 and AS 838 664 resulted in nine enemy killed, six secondary explosions and 24 structures destroyed after an L-19 aircraft received ground fire on 12 Dec. On 13 Dec a FAC observed signs of heavy foot traffic vicinity AP 7803. Airstrikes along the Cambodian Border west of POLEI KLENG at YA 656 933 and YA 654 935 resulted in two secondary explosions. On 14 Dec, the KONTUM CITY AIRFIELD received ten 122mm rockets and 24th STZ Headquarters received five 122mm rockets. Artillery and gunships were employed on four suspect enemy positions north of the city. The rocket attack was attributed to elements of the 40th NVA Artillery Regt. A combined 1-8 Inf and 42nd ARVN operation north of KONTUM CITY yielded discovery of 15 tons of rice, 59 bunkers, 75 huts and numerous fighting positions, trails, and booby traps. The enemy continued to avoid contact and the large amount of rice captured was a heavy blow to his food supply.

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(4) KONTUM PROVINCE experienced a slight increase in activity during 16-27 Dec and KONTUM CITY received several small contacts and attacks by fire. An airstrike, employed at YB 789 423 after a CSF company made contact with an enemy platoon, resulted in a possible 20 enemy killed. An additional 20 enemy were possibly killed during an airstrike after three enemy platoons initiated a contact with CSF at ZB 889 433 on 19 Dec. On 18 Dec the BEN HET SF CAMP received 22 x 82mm mortars, two that landed inside the perimeter. The camp received three rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire on 20 Dec and on 22 Dec received 11 x 82mm mortar. A PF Company made contact with an estimated VC company after receiving 12 x 82mm mortar rounds at ZB 148 150 on 22 Dec. One civilian and one RF/PF were killed, two civilians and five RF/PF's were wounded and one RF/PF was missing. The enemy also employed 82mm mortars on two positions held by C/2-1 Cav with six rounds landing at ZB 094 175 and two rounds landing at ZB 058 185. The enemy resumed interdiction attempts on Highway 14 between KONTUM CITY and DAK TO by planting six mines. A LRP team made contact with an enemy force and received six 60mm and one 82mm mortar rounds and observed seven individuals who were six foot tall and wore red berets. KONTUM CITY received 15-20 rounds of 122mm rocket fire that wounded one RF/PF and damaged three houses. The airfield also received 15-20 x 122mm rocket fire and 8-12 rounds of unknown fire on 22 Dec. The enemy conducted ground attacks on 19 Dec and 22 Dec against a village west of KONTUM CITY and at ZA 133 898 and ZA 213 898. Activity during the week of 23-30 Dec was relatively quiet in KONTUM area. On 23 Dec a LRP employed claymores and possibly killed one enemy before being extracted near YB 892 111. C/2-1 Cav received two 82mm mortar rounds on 21 Dec at AR 792 789 and on 22 Dec received an additional 2 rounds at ZB 058 185. All rounds landed outside the perimeter. Another element of 2-1 Cav received six rounds of 82mm mortar at ZB 094 175 all of which impacted outside the perimeter. One NVA was killed when 1/C/2-1 Cav made contact with an estimated 4-8 individuals at ZA 208 959. On 26 Dec, an RF/PF force ambushed two VC, killing one and capturing his weapon at ZB 142 146. A security element from C/2-1 Cav received 6 x 82mm mortar rounds that impacted 200 meters from the north, south and west of the perimeter at ZB 063 225 on 27 Dec. On 29 Dec a LRP Team killed one NVA at YB 889 212 and a CSF 3/4 ton truck was ambushed at ZA 043 931 by an estimated enemy squad, wounding two civilian women.

(5) A slight increase in activity was noted during the week of 30 Dec to 5 Jan. DAK PEK SF CAMP was probed on 30 and 31 Dec, receiving two B-40 rounds and light machine gun fire on 30 Dec and one B-40 round on 31 Dec. DAK TO and BEN HET reported moderate activity with two contacts that resulted in one US killed, four US wounded and three NVA wounded when Recon 1-22 Inf made contact with two enemy squads at YB 948 312 on 4 Jan. A LRP Team killed two enemy at YB 988 312 in a contact on 5 Jan. Visual reconnaissance and Red Haze detected only light traffic activity and no sign of vehicular traffic since OPERATION DEAD END. Activity was light in KONTUM CITY though the incidents indicated an increase in enemy activity. A US advisor and four National Police Field Force personnel made contact with four VC resulting in one NPPF and one VC killed on 31 Dec near ZA 204 912. On 2 Jan, one enemy was killed in an ambush at ZA 223 923. These incidents and a booby trap that killed two RF/PF's and wounded two others indicate increased activity close in to Kontum

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City. Action characterized by enemy probing, attacks by fire and harassing attacks on villages indicated increased enemy activity in KONTUM PROVINCE during 6-12 Jan. Reconnaissance also indicated possible use of the northern PLEI TRAP ROAD. DAK PEK SF CAMP received an attack by fire on 6 Jan that consisted of 38 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and B-40 rocket fire. The area around BEN HET and TANH CANH was characterized by reports of movement and sightings followed up by attacks on two villages located at ZB 096 102 and ZB 087 134. Five PF's and six civilians were wounded in two contacts, VC were reported to have lost three men killed and five wounded. On 10 Jan a village at ZB 095 180 received 16 rounds of 60mm mortar that killed one civilian and one PF and wounded three civilians. A photo mission flown on 12 Jan detected recent signs of vehicular traffic and APD sensings yielded significant readings. A helicopter was observed and tentatively identified as CZECH model HC2, at YA 730 887 on 11 Jan. The aircraft withdrew before the SHADOW aircraft could clear it as a target. On 6 Jan a SF operation received three B-40 rounds and small arms fire from an estimated VC squad at ZA 044 845. The KONTUM CITY area received two attacks by fire on 8 Jan. The airstrip received 8-9 rounds of 122mm rocket fire that wounded one US and one RF and destroyed one POL tank. A 23 STZ OP at AR 871 996 received an unknown amount of 60/82mm mortar in the second incident on 8 Jan. Operations north of KONTUM CITY by 1-8 Inf and 1-10 Cav elements yielded five small contacts that killed six enemy and the discovery of three large enemy base areas at AS 778 110, AS 815 063 and AS 908 068. All fortifications were destroyed.

(6) The week of 13-19 Jan showed a decrease in enemy initiated incidents, with no attacks by fire and major enemy activity was confined to continued harassment in the PLEI TRAP ROAD and harassing attacks on friendly operations north of KONTUM CITY. Red Haze missions flown around DAK PEK have not yielded significant readings. Movement and several sightings were the only activities around DAK TO-BEN HET during the week. Activity around KONTUM CITY declined this week and no incidents were reported in the city itself. Mining activity on Highway 14 was moderate with a B-40 attack on a convoy at ZA 235 765, and the discovery of a new 4" by 5" mine with a fiber glass top. These mines produced large craters and caused heavy damage. On 17 Jan, a 52 Avn Chinook received small arms fire and a B-40 round that struck the rotor blade at AS 798 118, forcing the aircraft down vicinity of AS 780 125. Fire destroyed the aircraft and the crew was extracted with no casualties.

c. PLEIKU

(1) During the week of 28 Oct - 3 Nov activity was characterized by increased activity in the IA DRANG RIVER area. On 31 Oct artillery was adjusted on an estimated two enemy platoons that were guarding two barges on river near YA 655 260. One barge was sunk, the other partially sunk and estimated 20 NVA killed. Radar on LZ Jean detected helicopters each succeeding night through 3 Nov, there were no known friendly aircraft in the area at the time of the sightings. On 3 Nov a 1-69 Armor tank received one B-40 and small arms near YA 945 374 and C/1-10 received small arms fire at YA 869 393. A total of three US were wounded. The IA DRANG VALLEY south and southeast of DUC GO was the center of activity with numerous ground to air incidents, one in which one US was killed by ground fire near ZA 023 094. Air strikes were

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employed and D/1-35 was inserted. A total of ten NVA were killed and a sweep disclosed a bunker complex containing enemy equipment. On 3 Nov D/1-35 Inf made contact with an unknown size enemy force at ZA 018 100 resulting in two US killed, two US wounded and one NVA killed. In the CHU GROH MOUNTAIN area, 1-42 ARVN found a large ammo cache near AR 902 720 on 31 Oct, consisting of 150 x 60mm mortar rounds, 30 x 107mm rockets, and 100 pounds of TNT. Mining activity continued at a moderate level with three mines found in the sector. One detonated, wounding one US on 31 Oct at ZA 175 334. Small scattered contacts in the western part of the province characterized the activity during the week of 4-10 Nov. In the DUC CO area SRP's made contact on 4, 6 and 10 Nov with groups of 10 enemy. An air strike was employed by a SRP on 6 Nov that resulted in one NVA killed. In the other two contacts, six US were wounded and one US was killed. The PLEI MRONG area reported only two incidents where small arms fire was employed against a village at ZA 167 607 on 4 Nov, and against the 240th RF Company at ZA 195 712. A significant increase in minings took place during the week, not in one specific area but on roads and trails, throughout the province.

(2) Activity generally increased in PLEIKU PROVINCE the week of 11-17 Nov. In the DUC CO area, the enemy stepped up his attacks by fire although three members of a SRP from D/1-35 were killed by an estimated 10 NVA using claymores and automatic weapons. On 13 Nov FSB's JOAN, VERA and JEAN, located south of DUC CO received intense attacks by 75mm recoilless rifle, 82mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire that killed six and wounded 41 US. On 14 Nov FSB VERA received enemy artillery fire that included several 105mm howitzers rounds, marking the first time the enemy has employed 105mm howitzers in the DUC CO area. Ground to air fire was intense with 14 reported incidents during the week. LZ LANETTA at YA 853 457 received 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar on 13 Nov for the only incident in the PLEI D'JERENG area. The 3rd Brigade Headquarters at Oasis received a sapper ground probe on 11 Nov with the enemy employing 30-40 grenades and a mixture of satchel charges and RPG rounds. Results of the probe were 10 US wounded and 9 NVA killed. Activity in PLEI KE was moderate with four incidents. A IRP team made contact with an estimated 15 individuals near ZA 051 171 on 11 Nov and approximately one hour later again made contact with 8-10 individuals in the same area. Activity in the PLEIKU CITY area picked up considerably with a seemingly coordinated attack against the 88th Supply and Services which received a sapper attack in which four enemy were killed. Within 30 minutes, an OP at ZA 2245 received automatic weapons and B-40 fire that resulted in one friendly and eight VC killed. CAMP HOLLOWAY received an estimated 20-30 rounds of 122mm rocket fire that wounded two US and destroyed one helicopter. Two VC were killed in PLEI BOI KOTU when an estimated company size force entered the village at AR 900 458. Two incidents of small arms fire and a possible probe were reported by the village of Ploi Klane Ngol on 14 and 16 Nov. Mining was moderate throughout the province with no single area receiving a concentrated enemy effort. Activity in PLEIKU remained at a moderate level that consisted primarily of intense attacks by fire in the DUC CO area and on installations in PLEIKU CITY. Five rounds of an unknown type mortar were received by SRP's operating three kilometers north of DUC CO on 19 Nov. On 22 Nov LZ JEAN received 3 rounds of 60mm mortars and 20 rounds of 82mm mortar and 11 rounds 75mm recoilless rifle fire. LZ VERA

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received 25 rounds of 100mm artillery fire and 16 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on the same day. One US was wounded on LZ JEAN and nine were wounded on LZ VERA. On 21 Nov a Snoop aircraft crashed and burned killing all six aboard the aircraft at YA 637 505. On 20 Nov a THANH AN PF platoon was probed by a platoon size force at ZA 213 355 and the 446th RF Company received a company size ground attack at ZA 130 347 on 21 Nov. In the FLEI ME area, activities continued at a moderate level with several contacts with platoon and company size units. Seven enemy were reported killed. FLEIKU CITY was extremely active during the week with a mortar attack on several locations on 18 Nov and a 122mm rocket attack on NEW FLEIKU AIRPORT and an 82mm mortar attack on the MONTAGNARD TRAINING CENTER on 21 Nov. Seventeen US were wounded at the airport and three ARVN's were wounded at the training center. FLEI BREL DOR and FLEI BOI KOTU, 15 kilometers southeast of FLEIKU were attacked on 21 Nov. The 937 Engr's received 50-60 rounds of 82mm mortars on 24 Nov, wounding 15 US personnel. CONNELL QUARRY at AR 827 483 also received ten rounds of 82mm mortar on 24 Nov. Two incidents took place at CAMP ENARI on 24 Nov, one at AR 864 420 when a patrol received small arms fire from an unknown size enemy force, slightly wounding one patrol member. The other was an attack on FLEI KONG BRECH at AR 864 420. The 'A' team in the village drove back an attack from an unknown size enemy force.

(3) The week of 25 Nov - 1 Dec enemy activity remained at a moderate level. The DUC CO area continued to be harassed by attacks by fire. LZ JOAN received 25 60mm mortar rounds and LZ JEAN received 42 rounds of mixed 75mm recoilless rifle and 82mm mortar fire. THANH AN and OASIS showed a marked increase in activities. Two contacts with platoon and squad size enemy units on 26 Nov, a mortar attack and combined ground attack on 27 Nov and a brief contact on US forces indicate that the enemy intends to concentrate terrorist activities in THANH AN. On 26 Nov 3-C/2-8 received four B-40 rounds that wounded five personnel when the platoon was attacked at ZA 166 399. On 27 Nov an RF Company was attacked by an estimated VC Company at ZA 135 352 with two killed and ten friendly personnel wounded. Mining activity continued along HIGHWAY 19W indicating the presence of the K25 Battalion. Ground to air activity north of FLEIKU CITY indicated the presence of enemy units north east of the city. The week of 2-8 Dec was relatively light with most incidents being small scale harassing attacks. DUC CO had only two incidents during the week with a 4th Engr tank receiving 12 rounds of small arms fire on 3 Dec at YA 923 268. On 7 Dec at YA 962 289 A/1-69 Armor convoy escort received small arms fire. Two rice caches were found by A/1-69 Armor on 4 Dec and on 7 Dec A and B/1-69 Armor received two rounds of B-40 or 75mm recoilless rifle fire at ZA 059 313. On 5 Dec, a CSF Company from FLEI ME found a one ton rice cache near ZA 114 114. Mining activities in FLEIKU have decreased although the enemy continued sabotage activities by severing the POL pipeling along Highway 19E on 2 and 5 Dec. The week of 9-15 was characterized by small harassing attacks throughout the province. There were small arms fire, B-40 and grenade attacks on Highway 19W east of DUC CO that resulted in one US wounded and five CSF wounded and fifteen CSF wounded on 11 Dec in two separate attacks. The third attack on 13 Dec had no friendly casualties. On 9 Dec, two enemy were killed and one ton of rice was captured when a 15th Intel Platoon and a platoon of the 446th RF Company made contact with an unknown size enemy force at AR 835 615. On 13 Dec

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a 7-17th Air Cav vehicle had three flat tires. An infantry squad and three vehicles escorting the vehicle back to CAMP ENARI received four rounds of unknown type fire that slightly wounded four US near AR 805 435. Mining activity decreased with only two incidents reported in the province, one that damaged a tank at ZA 217 348 and the other a Soviet anti-tank mine found at ZA 225 354. Both incidents occurred on 15 Dec.

(4) The week of 16-22 Dec saw a general increase in activity in the entire province. A LRP contact at YA 835 378 resulted in two NVA killed on 16 Dec. On 17 Dec LZ JEAN received 35-45 rounds of unidentified artillery or rocket fire and a DUC CO CSF Company received a ground attack from an estimated battalion at YA 784 200. Three incidents of enemy harassment of the 1-69 Armor resulted in one US and one Vietnamese wounded by B-40 attacks. On 19 Dec, a PF Platoon and a Revolutionary Development Team were attacked at ZA 215 355 resulting in two PF killed and eight PF wounded. On 20 Dec, an ICC Patrol from CAMP ENARI made contact with an estimated 20 men enemy force at ZA 167 423 resulting in one US wounded. In the PLEIKU CITY area there were two attacks by fire on the PLEIKU ASP and a village south of Pleiku at AR 778 421. On 20 Dec OP 12 at AR 913 436 received a ground attack by an estimated VC company. Most activity was centered in the DAK PAYOU VALLEY (VC VALLEY) where large base areas, storage areas, and caches were found on 20 Dec. Harassment and terrorism has continued with two significant incidents occurring on 16 and 19 Dec. PLEI PIOM, AR882 484 received fire B-40 rounds that killed one civilian and wounded one PF and ten civilians on 16 Dec. Five civilians were wounded and one killed when a civilian bus received small arms fire from an estimated enemy squad at AR 850 140 on 19 Dec. The most significant mining incident occurred on 21 Dec when a PLEIKU SECTOR vehicle hit a mine near ZA 135 470 that killed one US and five Vietnamese, wounded one US and six Vietnamese and destroyed the vehicle. Activity centered in the DAK PAYOU VALLEY during the week of 23-30 Dec. B/3-8 Inf found a new Chicom radio with AM, FM, and CW capability adjacent to a new hut vicinity of BR 258 332 on 24 Dec. Numerous rice caches containing several thousand pounds were also found by D/3-8 Inf vicinity of BR 210 333. An additional find of mortar charges, grenade, explosives and shovels was reported vicinity of BR 209 338. D/3-12 Inf found a cave containing a civilian radio, documents, a B-40 launcher and one round, an NVA entrenching tool and miscellaneous clothing at BR 156 261. On 27 Dec A/7-17 ARF was inserted at BR 250 208 and swept a previous contact area, confirming one VMC killed by air and killed an additional two VMC hiding in a bunker. Radar at LZ CHARMAINE continued to detect helicopters in the vicinity of the LZ and could track them toward the Cambodian Border. On 27 Dec a DISCOM Patrol made contact with an unknown size enemy force in their night location at ZA 192 414. The enemy employed small arms and 60mm mortar, resulting in one US killed and one US wounded. On 28 Dec, PLEI GAO at ZA 236 376 received a ground attack supported by mortar and B-40 fire, resulting in 4 US wounded, 7 civilians and 3 RF wounded. A sweep during daylight revealed one NVA killed and one B-40 launcher and B-40 round and three grenades captured.

(5) During the week of 30 Dec to 5 Jan there was a decrease in contacts, but large amounts of rice and equipment was captured. The western portion of

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the province has remained relatively quiet with only light contacts. In the DAK DOA area, northeast of FLEIKU CITY, friendly units sweeping through the area uncovered large base areas and rice caches totaling 11,400 pounds of rice. In the DAK PAYOU VALLEY, scattered contacts were reported and 15,500 pounds of rice were captured or destroyed. Harassment and terrorism continued. The pipe line along Highway 19E was blown at AR 972 493 on 30 Dec and again at AR 971 494 on 1 Jan. The first incident a tank from A/1-69 hit a mine at ZA 233 352, the second incident, C/2-8 Inf found a mine buried on the north side of the road at ZA 147 727. Activity in the province during the week of 6-12 Jan has been characterized by an increase in activity in the CHU PA mountain area and continuous activity in the DAK PAYOU VALLEY area. Friendly units captured 8000 pounds of rice and destroyed numerous huts sweeping through the southwestern portion of the valley. On 6 Jan, a LRP Team killed five and captured one NVA in the vicinity of AR 782 136. The captured NVA identified his unit as part of the 95B Regt. Friendly elements, initiating operations in the CHU PA mountain area have uncovered three caches and have made contact with squad to company size units. One cache contained ten 122mm rocket warheads. It has been noted that enemy units may be moving from BASE AREA 702 in CAMBODIA to the CHU PA area, in northwestern FLEIKU. In a contact, near ZA 078 477 on 6 Jan, B/1-12 Inf killed one NVA and captured one NVA and one VMC. Mining activity continued at a low level with only three incidents that caused damages to vehicles and no casualties.

(6) The week of 13-19 Jan was characterized by continued activity in the CHU PA mountain area and an increase in harassment along HIGHWAY 19E. Thirty-seven NVA and fourteen VC were killed by ARVN's operating in the CHU PA area. On 15 Jan a Cobra was shot down and D/1-35 inserted to secure it. Contact was initiated by the enemy that resulted in five US killed, 21 US wounded and six NVA killed. NEW FLEIKU AIR BASE received 17 rounds of 122mm rocket fire on 15 Jan that resulted in six US wounded and approximately 75,00 gallons of fuel destroyed. The FLEIKU ASP at ZA 182 527 received 13 rounds of 60mm mortar that killed one US. Also on 15 Jan, the village of PLEI PHAM KLANH, AR892 293, was attacked by an estimated VC platoon. Fire was returned by the CA Team resulting in one VC killed. Eastern FLEIKU PROVINCE showed a decrease in activities in the DAK PAYOU VALLEY and an increase in harassment along Highway 19E. On 14 Jan 2-1 Cav FOL storage had one FOL bladder blown. A total of five section of the FOL pipeline were blown by satellite charges. On 16 Jan, 2-1 Cav received small arms and B-40 fire near BR 176 515. Fire was returned and one NVA was killed.

d. DARLAC PROVINCE

(1) Enemy activity in DARLAC PROVINCE for the week of 28 Oct to 3 Nov was light. Contacts with small enemy forces and harassing mortar attacks characterized the activity. There were three small contacts around BAN ME THUOT that resulted in one friendly and two enemy killed. On 28 and 29 Oct, B/2-35 Inf received 15 and 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, all rounds landing outside the perimeter at YU 833 773. BON SAR PA, YU 812 739, received 50 rounds of mortar which wounded two civilians on 28 Oct. On 31 Oct, four members of a SRP from B/2-35 were killed and two members were wounded by sniper fire near YU 806 612. The 2-45 ARVN Regt made contact with an NVA platoon near YU 824612 on 3 Nov and found an arms and munitions

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cache consisting of 250x82mm mortars, 6 cases 7.62 ammo, 2 boxes TNT, 2 packs of food, 200 kilos of rice and 2 CHICOM fuzes. Enemy activity was light and sporadic during the week of 4 to 10 Nov. BUON EA TRUM, AQ 829 109, received two rounds of unknown type mortar fire that killed seven civilians and set fire to four buildings on 4 Nov. On 9 Nov, an ARVN unit made contact with a VC platoon that resulted in one ARVN and one VC killed at AQ 961 197. The 2-45 ARVN made contact with a VC force on 4 Nov vicinity YU 824 603, resulting in one ARVN and two VC killed. Three decomposed bodies were also found during this period. Enemy activity in DARLAC PROVINCE during the week of 11-17 Nov was characterized by increased attacks by fire and contacts with squad to company size units. One US was wounded on 12 Nov when Recon 1-12 Inf received sniper fire vicinity AQ 838 223. A SF patrol wounded and captured a VC on 12 Nov at AQ 873 391. The 155th Assault Helicopter Company in BAN ME THUOT received 21-25 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire on 12 Nov that wounded two US and moderately damaged two aircraft and two buildings. On 14 Nov, the 155th received an additional 20-25mm mortar rounds that wounded five US and damaged ten aircraft, five vehicles and one building. On 11 Nov elements of the 2-45 ARVN received 26 rounds of 82mm and 60mm mortar fire that landed outside their perimeter vicinity of YU 816 734. Other elements of the 2-45 Regt found ten VC bodies southwest of DUC LAP at YU 837 737. Ten additional bodies and numerous graves estimated to contain 50-60 bodies were also found near YU 833 726. All bodies were estimated to be three months old. A CSF platoon killed three NVA on 14 Nov vicinity YU 958 663. Another CSF unit ambushed a VC company at YU 956 663 that resulted in three CSF and three NVA killed.

(2) The week of 18-24 Nov was unusually quiet in DARLAC PROVINCE with activity consisting of small contacts. On 19 Nov two B-40 rockets were fired at the 245th RF Company near AQ 826 167 while an element from the 70th Engr Company received 2 rounds of 82mm mortar fire vicinity BQ 209 160. Artillery was employed on a bunker complex at AP 875 041 on 21 Nov that resulted in 40 bunkers destroyed. Six ammunition caches were found from AP 777 898 to AP 786 896 on 21 Nov. Five civilians were killed and eight were wounded when a hamlet vicinity AP 915 988, received mortar fire on 23 Nov. Three NVA bodies were found in a heavily damaged bunker complex by 3/D1-35 Inf on 22 Nov near YU 861 786. Two NVA were killed in a contact with a 2-35 Inf SRP on 23 Nov at YU 824 761. On 24 Nov, at YU 834 777, B/1-35 Inf received 20-25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire that impacted outside the perimeter. Enemy activity remained relatively light in the week of 25 Nov-1 Dec. Mortar attacks and small contacts were characteristic actions. One ARVN was killed and another was wounded in an ambush at BQ 194 144. BUON TRIANG, EQ 050 287, received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and small arms fire from an estimated three VC/NVA platoons that resulted in nine PF's and three civilians killed, one PF and three civilians wounded and four houses destroyed on 28 Nov. Twelve civilians were wounded by 60mm mortars when an unknown size enemy force attacked BUON TUK, AP 956 971, on 26 Nov. Bushmasters made contacts in the DUC LAP area and killed eight NVA while losing 2 US killed. Two other mortar incidents occurred in the DUC LAP area on 27 and 29 Nov.

(3) Activity in DARLAC PROVINCE was light during the week of 2-8 Dec, characterized by mortar and recoilless rifle fire. On 4 Dec, the 155th Assault Helicopter Company at AQ 804 034 received 27 rounds of 82mm mortar fire with no

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casualties or damages. On 6 Dec, the 155th was hit again, receiving 23 rounds of 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire with no casualties or damages. Simultaneously, the 23rd Div (ARVN) Dependent Housing Area in BAN ME THUOT received two rounds of 82mm mortar fire that wounded one ARVN and ten civilians. On 5 Dec, B/2-35 Inf received 12-15 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire. Seven rounds impacted inside the perimeter with negative effects. The week of 9-15 Dec was characterized by two contacts and two mortar attacks. The 1-45 ARVN made contact with seven VC on 13 Dec at BQ 192 333 resulting in the capture of two VC. BUON HO, BQ 081 335, received 17 rounds of 60mm mortar fire on 12 Dec. On 13 Dec, the 155th Assault Helicopter Company received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. The 23rd Intelligence Platoon made contact with an estimated enemy company on 12 Dec vicinity AQ 843 115.

(4) Activity in DARRAC PROVINCE during the week of 16-22 Dec was characterized by an increase in harassing attacks. The center of activities was in the northeastern portion of the province with two small contacts in the DUC LAP area. The 155th Assault Helicopter Company received 18 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle fire on 16 Dec and seven helicopters were moderately damaged. Gunships and artillery were employed against suspect firing positions and three secondary explosions were observed. B-40's were employed on 16, 17 and 18 Dec in attacks that damaged one tank at BQ 006 365 and wounded two US at BQ 019 352. On 17 Dec, two MSF Companies made contact with an estimated NVA company at YU 816 778 that resulted in nine NVA killed and one MSF wounded. Also on 17 Dec, a MSF unit from NHA TRANG made contact with a platoon size enemy unit at YU 818 767 that resulted in one US and seven MSF wounded and one NVA killed. The week of 23-29 Dec was characterized by small contacts and attacks by fire and the finging of 18,000 pounds of rice during a cordon and search in the MEWAL PLANTATION at AQ 863 228 on 28 Dec. BAN PAN LAM, AQ 813 036, received 22 rounds of 82mm mortar fire that killed four civilians and wounded 26 others on 24 Dec. On 27 Dec, 2-15 Inf and the National Police began a cordon and search that resulted in 24 HOI CHANH and 59 Detainees. All of the HOI CHANH were on the Blacklist and wore 37 of the Detainees.

(5) Enemy activity in DARRAC PROVINCE during the week of 30 Dec - 5 Jan was characterized by small scale contacts, mortar and recoilless rifle attacks. Another large rice cache was found in an abandoned village at AQ 996362 on 30 Dec. The cache consisted of approximately 112,500 pounds of rice. On 1 Jan, an ambush element from 2-35 Inf at AQ 878 212 employed claymores, M-60, M-79, and small arms fire that killed four VC and wounded one NVN. The 155th Assault Helicopter Company received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 2 Jan. On 3 Jan, the 185th Aviation Company at the same location received two unknown type mortar rounds. On 5 Jan the DUC LAP SUBSECTOR at YU 897 785 and an OP received approximately 43 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire that killed one RF and wounded four others. The week of 6-12 Jan was characterized by small scale contacts and mortar and B-40 attacks. US and ARVN units in the area conducted cordon and search operations that resulted in documents, detainees and a weapons cache. ARVN's re-established a contact with an enemy platoon near AQ 770 070 that resulted in one ARVN wounded and three enemy killed. Two enemy were killed and one was captured

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by 3-4 ARVN in a contact at AQ 856 332 on 6 Jan. Five more enemy were killed by the recon 45th ARVN at AQ 868 332. On 11 Jan, A/2-35 Inf discovered a weapons cache dug into the side of a stream at AQ 812 331. On 6 Jan, the 155th Assault HELICOPTER Company at BAN ME THOUT received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire that wounded one US, killed one US, and damaged one BOQ. On 8 Jan, BON SAR PA outpost, YU 818 729 received 50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire that wounded a PI.

(6) Enemy activity in DANLAC PROVINCE during the week of 13-19 Jan was characterized by round attacks, mortar, B-40 rockets and 122mm rockets attacking military installations. An estimated VC Company attacked a Military Advisory team at AQ 883 363 using B-40's and small arms fire on 19 Jan. The 23d DIV (ARVN) Headquarters, vicinity AQ 722 035, received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire on Jan 18. The attack wounded three ARVN nurses, damaged one barracks and destroyed one barracks. On 19 Jan, the 23d ARVN ammo dump, AQ 760 017 received 10-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire and a ground probe by an unknown size enemy force. An estimated squad penetrated the perimeter but they were expelled by a PE company that was located at the dump.

e. Base Camp Defense (CAMP ENARI)

(1) No significant changes were made in the defense plan for CAMP ANARI during the reporting period. The total perimeter of CAMP ENARI is approximately 9000 meters defended by 147 bunkers and towers. During daylight, only the towers are occupied while at night all bunkers and towers are manned by three men. The number of individuals awake at any given time varies according to the tactical situation around base camp and intelligence reports received concerning activity in the TAOR. Division Chemical added several command detonated, bounding plasticized white phosphorous mines at critical points on the perimeter of the base camp.

(2) The plan of defense for CAMP ENARI included extensive daily patrolling, aerial reconnaissance, counter mortar radar, personnel detection radar, and sweeps of the TAOR by base camp defense forces in addition to the bunkerline defense. All activities were coordinated by the Installation Coordination Center (ICC).

(3) Patrols were conducted daily in each sector for a total of five patrols operating in the TAOR at all times. Patrol routes and night locations varied daily.

(4) Aerial reconnaissance consisted of assigned aerial observers conducting sweeps of the TAOR at first light and prior to darkness each day. The TAOR was divided into equal segments for reconnaissance purposes. During each sweep one sector was designated to be extensively VR'd while the other sections received general coverage. Sectors were varied for each sweep resulting in complete and detailed coverage of the TAOR at least every three days.

(5) One AN/MPQ-4 counter mortar radar (CMR) was located at CAMP ENARI during the reporting period. The radar operated during the hours of darkness, varying its sector of search on a predesignated schedule. A primary sector of

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scan was not assigned. Only one enemy attack took place on a village in range of the radar and CMR failed to detect the incoming rounds because the firing positions were masked by Dragon Mountain and the attack itself was of short duration. The other attack that took place within the TAOR was beyond the range of the CMR.

(6) The Division Artillery AN/TPS-25 radar was employed at CAMP ENARI and at LZ JEAN, YA 808 233, during the reported period. The radar proved very effective in detecting movement at both locations. Artillery was fired on targets detected on the radar. There were no significant attacks on CAMP ENARI during the entire reporting period.

(7) Two "CLEANSWEEP" operations were conducted involving the personnel from base camp. All personnel not involved in the missions essential duties were moved to the periphery of the TAOR by vehicle and helicopter and then conducted a sweep, on foot, back to the base camp. Each operation involved approximately 4500 personnel. These operations were conducted to insure that enemy positions had not been prepared within the TAOR and to give a "show of force" to both friendly and enemy elements.

f. Survey

(1) Survey operations were conducted again on a limited basis during the reporting period. Surveys were conducted mainly using Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). Terrain in the area of operations severely limited the use of 5th order survey equipment except over very short distances and limited areas. The terrain and tactical situation dictated that the 4th order survey equipment (DME) be used to extend control to battery centers that would normally be emplaced using 5th order equipment.

(2) Some planned surveys were aborted or delayed due to nonavailability of theodolites and the lack of operational DME's.

(3) Directional control was put into several firebases using the azimuth gyro after the first of the year when all organic units lacked the available equipment to complete astronomic observations.

g. Metro

(1) The Division Artillery Metro Station produced both NATO and computer messages on a daily basis during the reporting period.

(2) Only 25 aborts were necessary for the entire period while over 700 messages were produced.

h. CounterMortar Radar (CMR)

CMR contacts in the AO were limited due to the relatively low level of active enemy mortar, rocket, and artillery fired on friendly installations within the range of the radar sets.

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3 (C) OPERATIONS:

a. PLANS: During the period the 4th Infantry Division participated in operation MAC ARTHUR.

b. OPERATION MAC ARTHUR: 12 October 1967 - 31 January 1969

(1) Concept of Operation: Direct support artillery was provided on a maneuver battalion - artillery battery basis, with batteries changing OPCON from their parent battalions as the brigade task organization changed. Medium and heavy artillery were used in general support reinforcing missions to weight critical areas. Artillery and automatic weapons were used for convoy and firebase/base camp security. Artillery coverage was provided in the border areas, especially in the vicinity of the USSF/CSF camps.

(2) Execution:

(a) The 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery was in direct support of the 1st Brigade; the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery was in direct support of the 2d Brigade; the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was in direct support of the 3d Brigade; and the 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and the remainder of the 52d Group Artillery units were employed in general support and general support reinforcing roles.

(b) Offensive enemy activity was continuing as the period began. Fire support bases in the DAK TO - BEN HET and PLEIKU areas came under heavy weapons and coordinated ground attacks. Throughout the Division AO, smaller attacks were directed against district and sub-sector headquarters and local villages.

(c) With the increased enemy buildup in the DUC CO area combined with the rapid decrease of activity in the BAN ME THOUT - DUC LAP area, a major shift of forces took place in the Division AO to counter the enemy threat west of PLEIKU. The major activity in the DAK TO area, centered around the attacks by fire on FSB 29 and FSB 12 at BEN HET. In the PLEIKU area, elements from the 2d Brigade at BAN ME THOUT and the 1st Brigade at DAK TO were moved in to counter the buildup of enemy forces across the border. With the buildup at PLEIKU, the 2d Brigade moved its operations from the BAN ME THOUT to KONTUM in order to counter the threat that might move north from PLEIKU. With this move, OPERATION DEAD END was initiated west of Kontum. The Plei Trap road, constantly showing signs of heavy use, was successfully blocked to vehicular traffic during the operation.

(d) The early recognition of the enemy threat and the rapid deployment of Division resources into the 3d Brigade AO countered the enemy activity there in late November and the activity diminished.

(e) In December and January, The Division initiated operations into the known enemy base areas. In mid-December, elements of the 1st and 2d Brigades moved into the SQUI DOI - VA Valley area. Little enemy contact resulted, however large caches of rice, foodstuffs, munitions, weapons, equipment and enemy documents were captured. With the elements of the 1st and 2d Brigades, Task Force Winner operations began on 24 December 1968 and ended on 3 January 1969 in this area.

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Upon dissolution of TF WINNER, the 1st Brigade assumed responsibility for the area of operations and established a new Brigade Base Camp at LZ Blackhawk in SOU DOI with its DS Artillery, the 6th Battalion 29th Artillery. Responsibility for the Dak To area was transferred to the 2d Brigade. In January, the 3rd Brigade initiated operations in an enemy stronghold by combat assaulting elements of the 1-12 Infantry and B Battery, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery into the FUNCH BOWL area, south of the CHU PA mountains. From there, the brigade conducted joint US/ARVN operations with the 42 ARVN Regiment. Heavy enemy contact in this area continued throughout the month with significant casualties for the US, ARVN and enemy personnel. Toward the end of the reporting period, the enemy threat moved north of the CHU PA mountains toward KONTUM. The threat was countered by deployment into previously established increases that were abandoned in mid-July during the monsoon season. The reporting period ended with little activity in the 1st and 2nd Brigade AO's, but activating in the 3rd Brigade AO continued to be moderate.

- c. Chronological Summary of Significant Activities (See inclosure 4)
- d. Ammunition Expenditures - Operation MAC ARTHUR (1 Nov 1968 - 31 Jan 1969)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
A/2-9	105T	5726
B/2-9	105T	6194
C/2-9	105T	10147
A/6-29	105T	8803
B/6-29	105T	4818
C/6-29	105T	5783
A/4-42	105T	3044
B/4-42	105T	9931
C/4-42	105T	9379
PROVISIONAL BC BATTERY	105T	2135
A/3-6	105SP	10692
B/3-6	105SP	3955
C/3-6	105SP	9494
TOTAL	105mm	

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A/5-16	155SP	6577
B/5-16	155SP	3819
C/5-16	155SP	4911
PROVISIONAL BC BATTERY	155SP	1426
A/1-92	155T	7454
B/1-92	155T	4537
C/1-92	155T	9403
TOTAL	155mm	_____
D/5-16	8"SP	4262
A/6-14	8"SP	1588
C/6-14	8"SP	2131
C/7-15	8"SP	960
A/5-22	8"SP	4589
B/5-22	8"SP	1498
TOTAL	8"SP	_____
A/6-14	175SP	3796
B/6-14	175SP	6241
C/6-14	175SP	4938
C/7-15	175SP	1658
A/5-22	174SP	5016
B/5-22	175SP	3089
TOTAL	175SP	_____

GRAND TOTAL \_\_\_\_\_

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REGULATION

105mm

155mm

8"

175mm

4. (C) TRAINING:

a. GENERAL: The Division Artillery continued with scheduled training as required by 4th Infantry Division Regulation 350-1. Emphasis on cross training of personnel continued in all Division Artillery units. Combat activity was generally light throughout the Division AO during the reporting period and intense training programs were conducted while combat support continued.

b. Schools:

(1) During the period, the 4th Infantry Division Artillery conducted Forward Observer Training Courses for 44 Officers. The FOI for this course is discussed in detail in inclosure 7 to the 31 July 1968 ORLL.

(2) The 4th Infantry Division Artillery conducted 2 courses for Artillery Liaison Officers. 16 officers attended this course.

(3) 31 Officers attended the IFV Artillery Fire Direction Course during the reporting period.

(4) The Division Artillery continued its enlisted Fire Direction Course for the 105mm and 155mm howitzer. The first class graduated during the reporting period and 34 enlisted students completed the course of instruction during the 5 subsequent courses.

c. Training conducted during the period continued to emphasize artillery safety directed towards the reduction of artillery incidents and the improvement of individual and unit proficiency. The Division Artillery Firing Safety SOP was reviewed and updated during the reporting period and will be distributed soon. This SOP stresses the Do's and Don't's of artillery procedures and is issued to each officer in Division Artillery.

d. The Division Artillery inspection/instruction team visited all the headquarters and firing batteries in the forward areas during the reporting period. A Division Artillery inspection team visited each of the base camp areas also. The purpose of the team was to determine those areas requiring assistance and/or instruction and to improve the efficiency of all Division Artillery units.

e. The artillery battalions continued to conduct assistance programs for ARVN, CSF, MSF, Special Forces Camps, RF/PF elements and non-artillery units in the area of operations. A break down of assistance rendered is as follows:

(1) 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery completed its evaluation training and received the new M102 howitzers. Artillery Training was conducted for CSF personnel.

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at DUC CO and PLEI MRONG SF Camps. At DUC CO, training in artillery adjustment, firing battery, and fire direction procedures were conducted for 2½ days. At PLEI MRONG, a 3-day training program on artillery procedures was conducted. Training was well received and plans have been started for the training visits to the PLEI ME and PLEI D'JERENG SF Camps. A training plan for SRP'S of each infantry battalion was conducted in all phases of observed fire techniques.

(2) 5th Battalion, 16th artillery conducted a Division mortar crewman program in order to better qualify the mortar crewman being assigned to the 4th Infantry Division. The Battalion also began forward observer training for SRP members of the 1/10 Cavalry. This instruction greatly improved the ability of the SRP teams to adjust artillery.

(3) 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery participated in a joint operation with the 42 ARVN regiment on 15 to 17 December. Through effective liaison and coordination between the US and ARVN elements, the operations were highly effective. At Mang Buck Special Forces Camp, the battalion provided a three man team to train the CSF in FDC procedures and service of the piece. The battalion also visited the DAK PEK SF Camp and conducted training in firing battery and FDC procedures. During the visit, one of the howitzers was found to have a traverse problem and the 704th maintenance Bn at DAK TO was contracted to repair the howitzer.

(4) The 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery also considers the training of non-artillery men in the adjustment of artillery fired critical and conducted two classes to members of the 2d Brigade LRRP. During the period, 46 members of the LRRP attended this training.

5. (C) LOGISTICS:

a. Basic Loads of Ammunition.

(1) Current basic loads of ammunition for operation MAC ARTHUR continue at the same level stocked in previous quarters.

<u>WEAPONS</u>	<u>TYPE AMMUNITION</u>	<u>STOCKAGE AT POSITION</u>
105mm Howitzer (5 tubes)	HE	1250
	ILL	100
	WP	100
	SMK	50
155mm Howitzer (5 tubes)	HE	750
	ILL	50
	WP	50

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	SMK	60
8 Inch	HE	400

(2) Variations of stockage at battery positions were authorized based on enemy contact and imminence of unit movement.

b. Because of the sporadic action within the sector, stockage objectives at the OASIS ASP were revised from a fixed amount to a variable figure based on tube density within the area serviced by the ASP and the enemy threat.

(1) Available supply rate 105mm

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>ASR</u>	<u>FIRE</u>	<u>TACTICAL SAVING</u>
241801 Oct - 091800 Nov	33.8	11.7	22.1
091801 Nov - 241800 Nov	36.0	12.9	23.1
241801 Nov - 091800 Dec	27.0	10.9	16.1
091801 Dec - 241800 Dec	27.0	10.6	16.4
241801 Dec - 091800 Jan	26.3	14.0	12.3
091801 Jan - 241800 Jan	28.0	15.5	12.5

(2) Available supply rate 155mm

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>ASR</u>	<u>FIRE</u>	<u>TACTICAL SAVING</u>
241801 Oct - 091800 Nov	20.7	6.4	14.3
091801 Nov - 241800 Nov	22.0	11.5	10.5
241801 Nov - 091800 Dec	21.0	9.3	11.7
091801 Dec - 241800 Dec	21.0	10.0	11.0
241801 Dec - 091800 Jan	19.7	13.5	6.2
091801 Jan - 241800 Jan	21.0	13.3	7.7

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(3) Available Supply rate 8 inch.

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>ASR</u>	<u>FIRE</u>	<u>TACTICAL SAVING</u>
241801 Oct - 091800 Nov	20.9	16.6	4.3
091801 Nov - 241800 Nov	22.3	14.3	8.0
241801 Nov - 091800 Dec	17.0	7.7	9.3
091801 Dec - 241800 Dec	17.0	12.9	4.1
241801 Dec - 091800 Jan	18.8	11.0	7.8
091801 Jan - 241800 Jan	16.7	10.4	6.3

d. Equipment

(1) Deadline Rates during the Period 1 November 68 to 31 January 69.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DOWN DAYS</u>	<u>D/L %</u>
Truck 1/4 Ton	390	4.7
Truck 3/4 Ton	589	5.7
Truck 2 1/2 Ton	1441	8.4
Truck 5 Ton	372	16.2
Truck 5 Ton Wrecker	66	17.9
Carrier M577	32	5.0
Carrier M548	447	23.1
Vehicle Rec M88	62	67.4
Vehicle Rec M578	38	86.4
Howitzer M109	55	3.3
Howitzer M110	44	12.0
Howitzer M101A1	110	2.5
Howitzer M102	64	9.1

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(2) Major equipment losses. One (1) 2½ ton truck and destroyed during an ambush on 18 Jan 69 by a 3-40 rkt and AK-47 fire. Total loss resulted from the action.

(3) Cargo truck deadlines were considerably less during the report period primarily because of increased maintenance support rendered by the 704th Maintenance Battalion and vastly improved repair parts receipt time.

(4) During the month of November, and December the 2-9 Arty received M102, 105mm howitzer. The excessive down time for the period can be attributed to problems with the panoramic telescope and sight mount. Presently, the defective instruments are direct exchanged between the unit and the 704th Maintenance element.

(5) Both 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery VTR's were salvaged during the period.

(6) Truck ½ ton and ¾ ton levels were reduced below TOE during early January as the result of USARV approval of a 4th Infantry Division G4 study on vehicle utilization. Current authorizations are.

	½ TON		¾ TON	
	<u>TOE</u>	<u>PRESENT</u>	<u>TOE</u>	<u>PRESENT</u>
HHB Division Artillery	15	10	18	17
105 Battalion	35	18	31	16
155/8 Inch Battalion	19	14	26	18

e. During the rating period, the Division Artillery initiated a CMMI inspection team to determine the current status of the units Maintenance Management Program and provide assistance for the forth coming 4th Division CMMI's.

6. (C) ORGANIZATION.

(1) Organic units during the period.

- (a) HHB, 4th Infantry Division Artillery
- (b) 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105T)
- (c) 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105T)
- (d) 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105T)
- (e) 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (155/8"SP)

(2) Supporting Artillery Units during the period.

- (a) 52d Arty Group
- (b) 3d Battalion 6th Artillery (105SP)
- (c) 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155T)
- (d) 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery (175/8"SP)

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- (c) 5th Battalion, 22nd Artillery (175,8<sup>th</sup>SP)
- (f) Two Radar Sections, 26th Target Acquisition Battalion
- (g) Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) (M42)
- (h) Battery D, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (AW) (M42)
- (i) 1st Platoon, Battery B, 29th Artillery (Searchlight)
- (j) 237th, 253d, 254th, 256th Radar Detachments
- (k) Battery C, 7th Battalion, 15th Artillery (175,8<sup>th</sup>SP)

7. (C) Personnel

a. Summary of personnel daily and periodic strength reports.

(1) Average assigned strength:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTEDMEN</u>
(a) Nov 68	224	13	1995
(b) Dec 68	228	12	1996
(c) Jan 69	228	11	1982

(2) Average present for duty strength:

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTEDMEN</u>
(a) Nov 68	226	11	1943
(b) Dec 68	222	12	1915
(c) Jan 69	228	13	1894

(3) Summary of losses for period:

(a) Battle Casualties.

1. Nov 68 - KIA	1	WIA	8
2. Dec 68 - KIA	0	WIA	2
3. Jan 69 - KIA	1	WIA	5

(b) Non-battle casualties.

1. Nov 68 - Deaths	1	INJ	4	SICK	2
2. Dec 68 - Deaths	0	INJ	16	SICK	7
3. Jan 69 - Deaths	0	INJ	7	SICK	9

(c) DEROS and ETS.

	<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICERS</u>	<u>ENLISTEDMEN</u>
1. Nov 68 - Officer	10	1	102
2. Dec 68 - Officer	6	1	166

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3. Jan 69 - Officer 11 WO 1 EM 73

(4) Summary of replacements received:

(a) Nov 68 - Officer 37 WO 2 EM 139

(b) Dec 68 - Officer 13 WO 1 EM 191

(c) Jan 69 - Officer 22 WO 2 EM 97

b. Summary of Welfare and Disciplinary activities:

(1) Non-Judicial punishment

(a) Nov 68 - 25 Cases

(b) Dec 68 - 33 Cases

(c) Jan 69 - 32 Cases

(2) Courts martial.

(a) Nov 68 - Summary 1 Special 5 General 0

(b) Dec 68 - Summary 0 Special 12 General 1

(c) Jan 69 - Summary 1 Special 8 General 0

(3) Rest and Recuperation Program.

(a) During the period 649 quotas were utilized by Division Artillery.

(b) Breakdown of quotas is as follows (in country/out of country).

UNIT	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOTAL
HQB, Div Arty	0/14	0/20	0/17	0/51
5th Bn, 16th Arty	4/55	7/49	6/56	17/160
6th Bn, 29th Arty	10/41	9/40	10/47	29/129
4th Bn, 42d Arty	8/37	9/28	7/33	24/98
2d Bn, 9th Arty	10/34	9/39	9/41	28/114
TOTAL	32/181	34/176	32/194	98/551

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c. Summary Re-enlistment activities.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ELIGIBLE</u>	<u>REENLISTED</u>
HMB, Div Arty	3	3
5th Bn, 16th Arty	9	2
6th Bn, 29th Arty	5	1
4th Bn, 42d Arty	13	0
2d Bn, 9th Arty	7	2

d. Chaplain Activities: During the past quarter, 1 November 68 - 31 January 69, the Division Artillery Chaplain's Section, comprised of two chaplains and two chaplain's assistants functioned as follows:

- (1) Conducted 147 Protestant Worship Service with a total attendance of 2,563.
- (2) Conducted 161 Catholic Masses and Services with a total attendance of 3,477.
- (3) Made a total of 12 visits to the men of our units in the hospital. Another 11 visits to the men of other units of the 4th Infantry Division.
- (4) Made daily visits to troops located at base camp and an average of two visits weekly to men in the forward fire bases.
- (5) Worked on four Division wide Chaplain Programs.
- (6) Three Chaplains Retreats were attended.
- (7) In addition to regular coverage of Division Artillery units the Protestant Chaplain provided coverage for:
  - (a) 124th Signal
  - (b) 2-35 Infantry
  - (c) War Dogs Detachment
  - (d) 278th Signal
  - (e) 71st Evac Hospital
  - (f) Special Christmas coverage and Thanksgiving coverage of units in the 1st BDE area.
- (8) In addition to regular religious coverage of Division Artillery units the Catholic Chaplain provided occasional coverage for:
  - (a) 1st Brigade units, 4th Division
  - (b) 2nd Brigade units, 4th Division
  - (c) 3rd Brigade units, 4th Division
  - (d) 2-1st CAV
  - (e) 20th Engineers
  - (f) 71st Evac Hospital
  - (g) CA Village (Yellow Sector)

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(9) Conducted Character Guidance Lectures for Division Artillery and the 4th Administration CO personnel.

(10) The Division Artillery Chapel was also used for denominational Service including:

- (a) 15 Jewish Services with a total of 211 in attendance.
- (b) 13 Latter Day Saints Service with an attendance of 104.
- (c) 13 Church of Christ Services with an attendance of 67.

8. (C) AVIATION

a. Aircraft Status

(1) Disposition of aircraft during the reporting period:

Observation:

1 November - 30 November: 9 Authorized, 9 ON HAND (6-OH23G; 3-OH6A)

1 December - 31 December: 9 Authorized, 9 ON HAND (4-OH23G; 5-OH6A)

1 January - 25 January: 9 Authorized, 9 ON HAND (4-OH23G; 5-OH6A)

26 January - 31 January: 9 Authorized, 8 ON HAND (4-OH23G; 4-OH6A)

Utility: UH-1C: 2 authorized, NONE-ON HAND.

b. Aircraft Damage

- (1) One OH23G sustained major damage resulting from a crash during a test flight.
- (2) One OH6A sustained major damage on a training mission autorotation.
- (3) One OH23G sustained major damage after being dropped from a recovery CH-47 which had a power failure.
- (4) Two OH23G sustained bubble damage after tree strikes.

c. Personnel

(1) The aviation section experienced an unusual turnover of aviators during this period. Two officers were transferred to the 4th Aviation Bn and three commissioned officers and one warrant officer were newly assigned to the section. One officer received instructor pilot training and an instructor pilot rating in the OH6A. Three officers are presently under going transition training and local in country orientation in the OH6A aircraft.

(2) Personnel status at end of reporting period,

(a) Officer Status at the end of the reporting period.

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6 Officers Authorized  
7 Warrent Officers Authorized  
8 Officers Assigned  
2 Warrent Officers Assigned

b. Enlisted status at the end of the reporting period.

17 Enlisted Men Authorized  
19 Enlisted Men Assigned

(3) 7 enlisted men participated in refresher training for crew chief duties and two enlisted men received OH6A training at AARTS, WUNG TAU, RVN.

d. Operations

During this reporting period, revised scheduling of aircraft assignments played a major role in operations. Units were given guidance in better utilization of aircraft which has been a continual problem area. Closer control of the daily command and control aircraft, furnished by the 4th Aviation Battalion, enabled the supported battalions to increase their airlift capability. Two aircraft with crews were stationed at DAK TO to support operations for the 6-29 Arty and the 4 4/2 Arty. The aircraft support the 2-9 Arty and the 5-16 Arty were based at Camp Enari. Near the close of the reporting period, the section was hampered in this mission by a lack of qualified OH-6A pilots. Training program was established by the section and the 4th Division Aviation Standardization Section. The section received superior ratings in the USARV CMMI and Divisional AGI. Courtesy inspections by the USARV Standardization Team and Divisional Maintenance Teams proved beneficial in developing a more efficient operation.

e. Summary of Aircraft Utilization:

	NOV	DEC	JAN
Hour Flown	568	551	488
Passengers Carried	2030	2392	1757
Cargo Carried (TONS)	6	5	3
Sorties Flown	1517	1618	1242

It should be apparent that greater aircraft utilization was accomplished by additional OH-6A aircraft. Although less blade time was needed, a greater number of sorties and passenger lift has been accomplished in Dec. The adaptability of the OH-6A has enabled the battalions to rely on the OH-6A over the UH-1 as a command and control aircraft. It is anticipated that a combination of well planned aircraft utilization and a full complement of OH-6A's will increase the aviation mission capability to a greater efficiency.

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f. Summary of Aircraft Maintenance.

A planned program of aircraft scheduled maintenance has enable the section to continue its aircraft support mission although a shortage of OH-23 repair parts exist these parts are being depleted and phased out of the system. This coupled with the acute shortage of OH-6A parts, has lowered aircraft availability. However, the close supervision of maintenance and utilization scheduling has allowed no appreciable decrease in aircraft flying hours and support.

	NOV		DEC		JAN	
	OH-6A	OH23G	OH-6A	OH23G	OH-6A	OH23G
Percent Availability	53%	60%	72%	78%	62%	49%
Percent NORs (EDP)	32%	9%	7%	0%	19%	16%
Percent NORM	13%	31%	21%	22%	19%	35%

The low availability for both models of aircraft for the month of November can be attributed to a significant down time awaiting special request oil samples. Although availability was decreased by those samples, excessive wear was detected in two aircraft engines and two aircraft transmissions before a total malfunction occurred. Thus aircraft damage and possible injury to crews was avoided. It is anticipated that OH-6A repair parts will remain critical in the system. The centralized location of crews and aircraft being based at Camp Enari will show a definite decrease in down time for aircraft in both organizational and support maintenance activities thus enabling continued effective and efficient battalion support.

9. (C) Civil Affairs

a. Division Artillery and 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery

(1) During the reported period, the Division Artillery S5 had staff supervision of the Civil Affairs Teams of 5-16th Artillery; 12th Signal Battalion; Headquarters Battery DIVARTY; Headquarter Company, 4th Inf Division; and 4th MP Company. These teams continued to operate in the hamlets within yellow sector of the Division TAOR.

(2) The primary objective during this period was to consolidate six (6) hamlets in the vicinity of PLEI HO BY to provide protection for the people and security for livestock and rice. Planning was begun on 19 October 1968 in a meeting with the hamlet chiefs, and a tentative site was selected. At subsequent meetings the villages chiefs had changed their minds and could not agree to a location. The sub-district chief was asked by the CA Team to assist in location of a site. He, in a meeting with all hamlet chiefs, selected a location and directed movement. On 16 December 1968 the first house was moved. Moving of houses was completed 7 January 1969. Two hundred-thirteen houses and eight hundred-forty nine people were moved.

(3) Additional emphasis was placed on improvement of the consolidated village at PLEI KLAN NGOL. Banks and outer perimeter has been continually improved.

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(4) Activities of the CA Teams included medical assistance and projects to improve health and sanitation of the villages.

(5) During the rice harvest security forces were located in the Division Artillery sector to protect the villagers from enemy harrassment.

(6) Civil Affairs activities of the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery; 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery and 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery were conducted in conjunction with the Brigades, both in the rear and forward areas. Major accomplishments are as follows.

(a) 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery - Significant civil actions included the relocation of four complete villages in the TABR. These will be consolidated in the one village with a population of approximately 1800 persons. During the period over 700 persons were immunized for smallpox, cholera and plague. Five villages were dusted with DDT for insect control. In the THANH AN area, 4,884 persons were treated during MEDCAPS.

(b) 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery - The battalion completed the relocation of three villages within the TAOR. A hamlet self defense force is being trained and a hospital facility is being constructed for the sick and injured of these villages. In the DAK TO area, the battalion aggressively pursued its civil affairs program and since its movement to a new area of operations plans are being formulated to continue its work there.

9. (U) Psychological Operations: An audio visual team of the 8th PSYOPS Battalion operated in the villages of the Division Artillery sector for seven days. Their activities were confined to showing low key, educational movies. No efforts were made to conduct propaganda or counter propaganda because of limited planning capabilities for such activities.

10. (C) SIGNAL - During the reported period, Division Artillery relied on the following means of communications: VHF and wire, secure and non-secure FM Radio, Radio Teletype, and messenger. This portion of the report is divided into two parts: Artillery communications and base camp defense communications.

a. Artillery communication:

(1) VHF & WIRE: Division Artillery operates no VHF systems, but used VHF circuits provided by the Division Signal Battalion and the area system provided by 43rd Signal Battalion. Primary VHF circuits include two to each forward direct support 105 battalion, two to 52d Group Artillery, and one circuit to 52d Group Battalions when required. Local wire circuits are available to the 155 battalion, each rear headquarters of the 105 battalions, the Fire Support Coordination Element, the Base Camp 105 Battery, the division tactical switchboard, and the base camp switchboard. Other circuits, which have been installed primarily for base camp defense coordination, are available as alternate routes for artillery communications. The primary modification of wire facilities during the reporting period was accomplished by the installation of an AN/MTC-10 switchboard to replace the separate SB-86's formerly used as the HHB, Div Arty, and Div Arty TOC switchboards. The AN/MTC-

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10 provides up to 120 circuits, including local subscribers and trunks, and a hot-line console to provide additional operator alert on priority circuits. Although this switchboard provides improved facilities for artillery wire communications, it was installed primarily to support the additional missions of base camp defense operations coordination, as well as to provide adequate facilities in the event the Division Tactical Operations Center is incapacitated and it becomes necessary for the Division Artillery TOC to assume the functions of the DTOC.

(2) FM RADIO: The following nets provided the majority of DivArty FM communications during the reporting period: DivArty CF A, Survey, Sector Defense, and the Base Camp Command (ICC) net. A OF B Net and Aviation Net were available as required. Secure voice was available on the CF A Net to those stations within line-of-sight. Non-secure FM was maintained with battalions beyond line-of-sight through and FM retransmission station on Dragon Mountain. KY-38 secure voice devices were issued to Division Artillery and subordinate battalions during this period, increase the short-range secure voice capability.

(3) RADIO TELETYPE: A significant increase in the use of Radio Teletype was accomplished during this period. Div Arty implemented and maintained a 24 hour radio teletype net using newly issued AN/GRC-142s. The net provides secure hard copy communications between Division Artillery headquarters and each of the subordinate battalions. Additional equipment has permitted widely separated batteries and alternate command posts to join this net.

(4) MESSENGER: Messengers are used within base camp extensively, and to the forward areas as required.

b. Base Camp Defense Communications: As Division Artillery has the additional mission of coordinating base camp defense operations, additional wire and radio communications are required for this purpose.

(1) WIRE: Direct circuits are available from the DivArty switchboard to each of five sector controls, who are responsible for coordination of defensive measures in designated portions of the perimeter. Additional wire circuits are available to DTOC, 4th Aviation, and 4th Medical Battalion for the coordination of air evacuation missions. Circuits to the DivArty Radar detachment and searchlight team allow coordination of those activities. Two sole user circuits, to G3 Opns and the Commanding General, are terminated in telephone instruments located at the control center for defensive operations, ICC. These lines are not routed through any switchboard. In addition to these, a newly installed "hot loop" from ICC to the fire sector controls and the DivArty Radar Detachment provide instant conference capability for coordination of base camp defense activities, with no switchboards involved.

(2) FM RADIO: FM provides back up communications to the sector controls, and, when required, communications to patrols and/or aircraft in areas adjacent to base camp. No secure voice is in use at this time.

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SECTION II, LESSONS LEARNED: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

1. (U) PERSONNEL: None.

2. (C) OPERATIONS.

a. TITLE: Data For Air Advisories

(1) OBSERVATION: The maximum ordinate for each charge is placed on their range deflection protractor (RDP). Each charge shows the maximum ordinate in a different color.

(2) EVALUATION: By placing the maximum ordinate on the RDP in this manner, the chart operator, after he has plotted the target, can record range, grid and maximum ordinate directly from the RDP. This procedure eliminates approximately 45-60 seconds reaction time and allows the FDC to post the Air Advisory almost immediately.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That all firing batteries consider placing the maximum ordinate data on the RDP and further expedite the posting of Air Advisories.

b. TITLE: 81mm Mortar Registrations

(1) OBSERVATION: The 81mm mortars of the Base Camp Mortar Battery were not being registered.

(2) EVALUATION: Prior to the use of the new M374 81mm HE round there was no established procedure for the registration of the 81mm mortar. Using the new series ammunition and the artillery mean point of impact registration, it is possible to register the 81mm mortar. The base camp 81mm mortar fire has significantly improved due to the use of registration corrections. Met messages are worked regularly and met data is used to update the registration data.

RECOMMENDATION: That all 81mm mortar sections be registered and that corrections be applied and updated by the use of met corrections.

c. TITLE: Checking Sheaf by Radar

(1) OBSERVATION: Due to the nonavailability of an air observer or artillery forward observer, radar can be utilized in firing a sheaf check.

(2) EVALUATION: In using radar for a sheaf check, it is best to begin the procedure with a charge 5 or charge 6 registration. When the registration is completed, fire three rounds with each of the other pieces. Have the radar observe those rounds and obtain an average of the last two rounds (provided they meet the requirements for useable rounds in a registration). Plot the mean point of impact on the firing charts for each piece. From this it can be determined if

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special piece corrections must be applied for any piece that is firing across the sheaf. Next, the range to burst for each high burst must be measured and compared to the height of burst. EXAMPLE: The data from the six useable rounds for a charge 6 registration for a 105mm howitzer battery (5 tubes) was: height of burst 494 meters, range to burst 6080 meters. (This data is used as a basis of corrections for the other pieces). The mean data obtained from the three rounds of the other pieces was:

- #1 - Height of Burst 496M, Range to Burst 6020M.
- #2 - Height of Burst 489M, Range to Burst 6100M.
- #4 - Height of Burst 446M, Range to Burst 6040M.
- #5 - Height of Burst 491M, Range to Burst 6070M.

100/R = 17 (This is used as the basis for correction).

Taking into consideration piece distribution, the data for each piece is compared to the registration data fired by the base piece. Looking at the results from #1, the range was short of the mean, but the height of burst was 2 meters above the mean. Considering piece distribution, negative corrections were applied to #1 as the correction to quadrant was less than 1 mil. No corrections were applied to #2 as the height of burst was 5 meters below the mean, but the range greater. Here again the total correction would have been less than 1 mil (using 100/r). #4 gave us a difference of -48 meters height of burst. This amounted to a piece correction +8 mils. (48% of 17 which was 100/R). No corrections were applied to #5 as the -3 meters in height of burst again gave a correction of less than 1 mil. After the correction of +8 mils was applied to the quadrant of #4, two more rounds were fired and the following mean data was obtained from radar. Height of Burst 498M, Range to Burst 6,050M.

RECOMMENDATION: That artillery units use this method of checking their sheaf when no forward observer or air observer is available.

d. TITLE: Use of Firecracker in Defense of a Battery Position.

(1) OBSERVATION: Firecracker can be effectively employed by a firing battery in defense of its own position.

(2) EVALUATION: Upon receipt of an azimuth and a range to individuals in the open 500 meters from the battery position, the fire direction center converts the azimuth to a firing deflection and the following firecracker data was fired by a 105mm Howitzer M101: Charge 1, time 2.0 Quadrant 90C. A surveillance of the target area revealed excellent ground coverage from 450 to 550 meters out from the battery position.

RECOMMENDATION: That artillery units consider using this method of self-defense when the terrain is favorable and support by other artillery units is very limited.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

e. TITLE: Self Illumination.

(1) OBSERVATION: In the environment of South Vietnam, a battery can effectively illuminate the area around its own position.

(2) EVALUATION: For a 105mm howitzer (M101) battery illumination of the immediate area outside a battery position can be accomplished by placing the tube to fire on the desired azimuth (taking into consideration possible effects of the wind), firing charge 1 with a fuze setting of 5.0 and a quadrant of 1,050. A fuze setting of less than 5.0 frequently causes the parachute to rip. At this quadrant, the illumination burns out 3 to 5 seconds before hitting the ground.

RECOMMENDATION: When no light or medium artillery is available to cover a fire support base with illumination, self-illumination is a very adequate solution to the problem. Impact of the canister must be considered.

f. TITLE: Capabilities of FADAC - Firing Three Danger close Missions Simultaneously

(1) OBSERVATION: FADAC is advantageous in the simultaneous firing of three danger-close missions.

(2) EVALUATION: If a FADAC is set up (and continually update) with all pertinent firing data typed into A, B, C, and D batteries, when the situation occurs that three mission must be fired at the same time, one mission is assigned to and computed by "A" Battery, the second mission by "B" Battery, and the third by "C" Battery. Each time the observer makes a correction, the battery to which the mission is assigned is given the correction and new firing data obtained. Having the FADAC set up in this manner helps to alleviate a complicated situation.

RECOMMENDATION: Artillery units should set up their FADACS so that three or four missions can be fired simultaneously.

g. TITLE: Fire Hazards On Fire Bases.

(1) OBSERVATION: During the dry season in Vietnam, the high grass poses a definite threat of fire which can sweep through the fire base in a matter of minutes.

(2) EVALUATION: Experience has shown that it is imperative that special attention be given to the areas selected for fire bases particularly during the dry season and a capability to remove the dry grass be provided.

RECOMMENDATION: That the dry grass be removed from the battery position area prior to the arrival of the battery. This can be accomplished by the advance party or by including WP in the preparation fires or by air lifting with the advance party a bulldozer to clear the areas. If burning is to be accomplished by the advance party, fire breaks and other control methods must be utilized.

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31 January 1969, RCS GSFOR-65 (R1)

h. TITLE: Clearance of Fires - 81mm and 4.2" mortar Illumination rounds

(1) OBSERVATION: There is no SOP for debris and cannister impact clearance for the firing of 4.2" and 81mm mortar illumination rounds.

(2) EVALUATION: A thorough study of mortar firing techniques was recently conducted at the 4th Infantry Division Base Camp Mortar Battery. Illumination tables for the 4.2" mortar (FT 4.2-H-2, Aug 68) give the predicted range to impact. Thus, for firing of a 4.2" illuminating round, an area is cleared as shown in figure 1 below proper clearance for the firing of an 81mm illumination presents a two-fold problem. The illumination burst can come on either the ascending or descending branch of the trajectory. Illumination tables for the 81mm mortar (FT 81-AB-2, Dec 65) do not give the predicted range to impact. The most accurate data given in the table which can be used to determine an area which must be cleared is the Range to Burst distance. As the 81mm trajectory is nearly vertical when the burst occurs, a suitable buffer zone can be devised. A clearance area can be easily constructed for a burst which occurs on the descending branch of the trajectory and the predicted point of impact can be assumed to be at or near the point on the ground directly below the burst point. Using this point as a point of origin, a circle of 500m radius is cleared as shown in figure 2 below. Clearance of 81mm illumination which is to burst on the ascending branch of the trajectory presents a more difficult problem. Not only must the area under the predicted burst point be cleared but provisions must be made to clear an area at the burst (impact) range of the descending branch of the trajectory, should the fuze malfunction and the round continue on to impact. Figure 3 depicts the area cleared where 81mm mortar illumination, bursting on the ascending branch, is fired.

RECOMMENDATION: That the buffer zones as depicted by figures 1 through 3 be accepted as SOP for the clearance for firing 81mm and 4.2" mortar illumination rounds.

i. TITLE: Capabilities of FADAC - Firing beyond maximum range or GFT and TFT.

(1) OBSERVATION: FADAC is advantageous when firing targets at a range beyond the maximum range on the graphical and tabular firing tables.

(2) EVALUATION: If the battery altitude is greater than the target altitude and/or the direction of fire is affected by a tail wind, FADAC will compute firing data beyond the maximum range listed in the firing tables. When a target is located beyond the maximum range fan, FADAC will compute firing data up to 1,000 meters beyond the maximum. The maximum range that can be fired depends on the amount of difference between battery and target altitude and the intensity of the tail wind.

RECOMMENDATION: Before a mission is cancelled because it falls just beyond the range capabilities fan, try computing the mission with FADAC.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

3. (C) TRAINING

TITLE: Artillery adjustment Training for SRP's

(1) OBSERVATION: Artillery adjustment classes presented to short range patrols by artillery forward observers and liaison officers are increasing the proficiency with which infantrymen employ artillery.

(2) EVALUATION: Informal classes in calling for and adjusting artillery have shown a marked increase in the proficiency with which infantrymen employ artillery. The classes are accompanied by a service practice whenever possible. The classes have replaced the hesitancy by the infantrymen to use artillery with a feeling of confidence in the use of artillery. The infantry has shown a desire to learn and improve upon calls for fire. The need for these classes arose as a result of the short range patrols not being able to have an artilleryman co-located with them. It is planned to continue these informal classes to maintain the infantrymen's proficiency.

RECOMMENDATION: That the program of small, informal sessions on artillery calls for fire and subsequent adjustment be continually implemented.

4. (C) INTELLIGENCE

TITLE: Use of Radar Shields

(1) OBSERVATION: In a weapons attack on a fire base that is covered by radar, the NVA utilize two or more firing positions. These positions are far enough apart that the beam of the radar will only be able to cover one firing position at a time.

(2) EVALUATION: The NVA set up multiple firing positions in planning a weapons attack on a fire base that is within observation range of a Radar (or a fire base that has a Radar set located on it). The NVA tactic is to observe the radar orientation and to fire from a position that is outside of the radar's beam. When the radar screen is turned to this firing position, the NVA employ the second firing position. A canvas or camouflage net shield can be constructed around the radar screen using a light wooden frame or bamboo poles to hold the canvas/net in place. This should be a temporary shield to be utilized only when a weapons attack of this type occurs. The shield will deny the enemy observation of the direction in which the radar screen is oriented without hindering the operation of the radar set.

RECOMMENDATION: That artillery units consider using a shield to prevent the enemy observing the direction a radar screen is oriented.

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AVDEED-AC

31 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending  
31 January 1969, TCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

5.(c) LOGISTICS

a. TITLE: Controlled FADAC Maintenance Program.

(1) OBSERVATION: The FADAC system which includes the FADAC itself and the 400 cycle generator is a highly sensitive system and as such is subject to a high deadline rate.

(2) EVALUATION: A carefully controlled maintenance program is required to keep FADAC system operational. A FADAC maintenance program can be established under the direct control of the S3. A FADAC project officer (assistant S3) is assigned the responsibility of supervising both the preventive and repair maintenance for the FADAC system. The project officer instructs the batteries in the proper maintenance of the FADAC. He also monitors the FADAC publications status to insure that all required publications are either present or on requisition. When either a FADAC or generator becomes inoperable, the project officer is notified. With all the resources of the Battalion at his command, the project officer quickly determines the problem and with the help of the battalion and support maintenance, the FADAC is quickly returned to operation.

RECOMMENDATION: That units having the FADAC system appoint a FADAC project officer.

6. (U) ORGANIZATION: None

7. (U) TACTICAL COVER AND DECEPTION: None

8. (C) OTHER:

a. TITLE: Regular Visits to CA Villages by a Medical Doctor.

(1) OBSERVATION: Frequent and regular visits to each village provided more comprehensive medical care and allows for the use of drugs which could not be employed if follow-up visits were sporadic.

(2) EVALUATION: A considerable amount of rapport must be established with the Montagnard and Vietnamese Villages and their hamlet chiefs before medical care can be provided effectively. Further the definitive treatment of many of the common diseases especially malaria and tuberculosis requires the use of drugs for a relatively long period of time and which may have adverse side effects. Both objectives can only be achieved by regular and frequent follow-up.

RECOMMENDATION: Units engaged in civic action should encourage regular visits by the medical officer.

b. TITLE: Use of Higher Echelon Medical Facilities

(1) OBSERVATION: Medical units which provide a holding facility and laboratory are available to the indigenous population upon referral by a medical officer.

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(2) EVALUATION: Many of the common diseases can not or should not be treated without as much laboratory confirmation of the presumptive diagnosis as is possible. This is true, either because therapy need be protracted, because treatment varies for different types of the same disease (e.g. malaria) or because therapy may be somewhat hazardous.

RECOMMENDATION: Medical officers whose units are engaged in civic action should not rely totally upon the judgement of aidmen in diagnosis, treatment and follow-up of many of the serious but common maladies. Unit surgeons must be personally aware of the activities of his civic action aidmen and the medical condition of his indigenous patients in order to make appropriate referrals for laboratory testing or treatment unavailable at the aid station level.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WILLIAM F. DWORSAK  
Major, FA  
Adjutant

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AVDDH-GC-MH (31 Jan 69) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Division Artillery, 4th Infantry Division  
for Period Ending 31 January 1969

DA, HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO SF 96262

Commanding General, I Field Force, Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96307

(U) This headquarters has evaluated and concurs with the Division Artillery  
Operational Report - Lessons Learned.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
HERBERT J. McCHRISTAL, JR.  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

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AVFA-GC-OT (31 Jan 69) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 4th Infantry Division Artillery for  
Period Ending 31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 7 MAR 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,  
APO 96375

(C) This headquarters has reviewed subject report and makes the following comments:

a. Reference Section I, paragraph 2g(2), Metro. I FFORCEV Artillery records show that 87 soundings were aborted during the reporting period. It is also stated that over 700 messages were produced. If six successful soundings are made each day, the maximum possible number of soundings is 552 for the reporting period.

b. Reference Section II, paragraph 4, Use of Radar Shields. The screen is not practical where helicopters must operate close to the radar unless it can be taken down quickly.

c. Reference Section II, paragraph 8a(2), Regular Visits to CA Villages by a Medical Doctor. These visits are most beneficial when coordinated in advance with GVN village and hamlet chiefs through US advisors. RECOMMENDATION: That prior coordination be effected with appropriate US advisors.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Arthur B. Busbey*  
ARTHUR B. BUSBEY, III  
Colonel, AGC  
Adjutant General

Cy furns:  
4th Inf Div Arty

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

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AVHGC-DST (31 Jan 69) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending 31  
January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 14 MAR 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1969 from Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division Artillery and concurs with the report and the indorsements of the intermediate headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON  
1LT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
4th Inf Div Arty  
I Field Force RVN

GPOP-DT (31 Jan 69) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Inf Div Arty for Period Ending  
31 January 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 APR 1969

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.
2. Reference Section I, paragraph 9, Psychological Operations: The reference to limited planning capabilities is not clear. The effectiveness of PSYOP is directly related to the planning devoted to its employment. The absence in this report of any other reference to the employment of PSYOP forces or materials is noteworthy.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. I. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

Cy furn:  
CG USARV

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**ARTILLERY TASK ORGANIZATION**

1. (C) Artillery Task Organization as of 1 November 1968:

1st Bde

6-29 Arty DS  
A/6-29 DS 1-8 Inf  
B/6-29 DS 3-12 Inf

2d Bde

4-42 Arty DS  
A/4-42 DS 23d ARVN  
B/4-42 DS 1-12 Inf  
C/4-42 DS 1-22 Inf

3d Bde

2-9 Arty DS  
A/2-9 DS 1-14 Inf  
B/2-9 DS 2-35 Inf  
C/2-9 DS 1-35 Inf  
C/6-29 DS 3-8 Inf

Base Camp

RHB Div Arty  
5-16 (-)  
E/5-16 (3-155)  
EC Btry (6-105)(2-105ea DS Arty)  
4-4.2 Mortars  
4-81mm Mortars

Div Arty

5-16 Arty GS  
A/5-16 GSR 2-9  
B/5-16 GSR 4-42  
C/5-16 GSR 6-29  
D/5-16 GSR 6-29

2. Supporting Artillery

52d Arty Gp

3-6 (-) Arty GS  
A/3-6 GS Pka Def  
B/3-6 DS 2-8 Inf  
6-14 Arty GS  
5-22 Arty GS  
B/5-22 Arty GSR 4-42

1-92 Arty GS  
A/1-92 GSR 6-29  
B/1-92 GSR 2-9  
C/1-92 GS  
C/7-15 Arty GS

IFFV Arty

D/4-60 AW (M42)  
B/4-60 AW (-) (M42)  
B-29 SLT

1. On 1 Nov 68, A/3-6 moved to Arty Hill GS of the Pleiku District.
4. On 2 Nov 68, B/3-6 moved to ZA 079 220.
5. On 3 Nov 68, B/5-22 (1-8", 1-175) moved to Ban Me Thuot (ZA 189 958), GS of Sector.
6. On 6 Nov 68, D/5-16 (2-8") moved to YB 957 239, GSR 6-29 Arty.
7. On 8 Nov 68, C/4-42 moved to ZA 000 220, DS 1-22 Inf.
8. On 9 Nov 68, B/5-22 (1-8", 1-175) returned to Ban Me Thuot E (AQ 882 017), GS.
9. On 11 Nov 68, B/1-92 moved to YA 832 178, GSR 2-9 Arty under OPCON 3-6 Arty.
10. On 11 Nov 68, B/4-42 moved to AQ 841 219, DS 1-12 Inf.
11. On 11 Nov 68, C/2-9 moved to YA 844 251, DS 1-35 Inf.
12. On 12 Nov 68, A/6-29 moved to YB 839 221, DS 1-8 Inf.

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13. On 13 Nov 68, A/4-42 moved to AQ 826 101, DS 23d ARVN Rangers.
14. On 15 Nov 68, B/3-6 moved to AR 982 378, DS 4th Inf Div Provisional Bn.
15. On 16 Nov 68, B/3-6 moved to ZA 078 221, DS 2-8 Inf OPCON 6-14 Arty.
16. On 16 Nov 68 B/1-92 moved to ZA 058 313 and reverted to GS mission.
17. On 18 Nov 68, B/1-92 moved to ZA 226 535 GS Pleiku Defense.
18. On 19 Nov 68, B/1-92 (PLT) moved to ZA 22 83 OPCON to 6-14 Arty.
19. On 20 Nov 68, A/3-6 moved to ZA 058 312, DS 1-10 Cav.
20. On 20 Nov 68, C/3-6 moved to ZA 226 535, GS Pleiku Defense.
21. On 20 Nov 68, C/1-92 moved to ZA 224 535, GS Pleiku Defense.
22. On 25 Nov 68, C/1-92 moved to ZA 223 829, GS, OPCON to 6-14 Arty.
23. On 2 Dec 68, C/4-42 move to ZA 226 836, and was assigned a GS mission.
24. On 4 Dec 68, A/1-92 moved to AR 818 737, GS, Opcon 6-14 Arty.
25. On 5 Dec 68, A/3-6 moved to ZA 183 907 GS, OPCON 6-14 Arty.
26. On 6 Dec 68, C/2-9 moved to ZA 087 456 DS Task Force Bravo III.
27. On 11 Dec 68, B/2-9 was split 3 ways, 2 tubes moved to AQ 825 184 in DS of 2-39 ARVN; 2 tubes moved to YU 864 767 in DS 2-35 Inf and the other 2 tubes were moved to YU 903 755 in DS CSF Camp Da Lap.
28. On 12 Dec 68, B/6-29 moved to ZB 007 216, DS 1-22 Inf.
29. On 13 Dec 68, B/6-29 moved to ER 207 531, DS 3-12 Inf.
30. On 13 Dec 68, C/6-29 returned to Base Camp, GS of Camp Enari Defense.
31. On 13 Dec 68, C/2-9 moved to YA 853 457 DS 1-35 Inf.
32. On 14 Dec 68, C/6-29 moved to ER 034 535, DS 3-8 Inf.
33. On 15 Dec 68, B/2-9 regrouped as one battery at AQ 825 184, DS 2-35 Inf.
34. On 15 Dec 68, C/4-42 moved to ZB 006 217, DS 1-8 Inf.
35. On 16 Dec 68, C/4-42 moved to YB 988 153, DS 1-22 Inf.
36. On 22 Dec 68, A/1-92 moved to ER 038 540, GSR 6-29 Arty.
37. On 24 Dec 68, A/1-92 (PLT) moved to ER 090 630 GSR 4-42 Arty.

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38. On 24 Dec 68, C/1-92 (PLT) moved to ER 038 540, GS TF Winner.
39. On 24 Dec 68, A/4-42 returned to Base Camp, GS Camp Enari Defense.
40. On 26 Dec 68, Div Arty Formed a TOC at ER 063 534 ( FB Blackhawk ) in support of TF Winner. Operation terminated on 4 Jan 69.
41. On 27 Dec 68, A/4-42 moved to ER 233 253 DS 3-47 ARVN.
42. On 28 Dec 68, C/3-6 moved ZA 186 903 to relieve A/3-6 in place DS 1-10 Cav.
43. On 29 Dec 68, A/3-6 returned to Arty Hill, GS Pleiku Defense.
44. On 30 Dec 68, C/5-16 moved to ZB 048 217, GSR 6-29 Arty.
45. On 3 Jan 69, C/1-92 (-) moved to ZA 117 673, GS 24th STZ, OPCON 6-14 Arty.
46. On 13 Jan 69, A/4-42 returned to Base Camp, GS, Camp Enari Defense.
47. On 16 Jan 69, A/4-42 moved to AR 963 342 DS TF Blaze.
48. On 17 Jan 69, C/1-92 (PLT) moved to Plei Mrong to provide mutual support for C/2-9 in Vic ZA 035 664.
49. On 19 Jan 69, A/4-42 moved to ZA 228 838 (FB Mary Lou), GS 2d Bde.
50. On 19 Jan 69, A/1-92 moved to ZA 222 533 (Arty Hill), GS Pleiku Defense.
51. On 22 Jan 69, A/1-92 moved to ZA 057 312, GS in 3d Bde AO, OPCON 3-6 Arty.
52. On 24 Jan 69, C/5-16 moved to ZA 110 276 (Old Plei Djéreng) GSR 2-9 Arty.
53. On 27 Jan 69, D/5-16 moved to ZA 098 833, GS in 2d Bde AO.

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Figure 1:




Figure 2:

AREA TO BE CLEARED FOR

FOR 81MM Mortar  
DESCENDING BRANCH  
ILLUMINATION





Figure 3:

AREA TO BE CLEARED FOR

81MM MORTAR ASCENDING BRANCH



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