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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 12TH INFANTRY  
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDB 121

22 October 1970

SUBJECT: After Action Report for Vinh Thanh Sub-District, Binh Vinh Province, 13-21 October 1970.

TO: Commanding Officer  
2d Brigade, 4th Inf Div  
ATTN: S3  
APO San Francisco 96262

1. The 1st Battalion 12th Infantry conducted joint small unit operations to upgrade the security of the population and the effectiveness of the RF/PF forces in Vinh Thanh District, Binh Dinh Province from 13 October through 21 October 1970.
2. Task Organization: 1-12 Inf (-)  
1 Sec 4th MP Co  
A/4/42 ARTY  
2/3/4th Eng
3. Preparation for Operation:
  - a. Three visits by Commanding Officer, 1st Bn 12th Inf with Captain Ty, commander of Vietnamese forces in Vinh Thanh Valley, Vinh Thanh Sub-district.
  - b. One reconnaissance by all company commanders concerned to Vinh Thanh Valley to select company patrol bases.
  - c. Battalion S5 coordinated with Division G5, and local advisors in Vinh Thanh Valley to determine location of hamlets, degree of hamlet security and support provided communist forces by the population. The Battalion S5 also identified possible civic action projects to be supported by the battalion.
  - d. The battalion S2 coordinated with Division G2, and the advisors in Vinh Thanh Valley to identify enemy units, staging areas, communication routes, and VCI personnel.
  - e. Coordination was effected with Vietnamese units on location of all friendly forces, available fire support, fire clearance procedures, and no fire zones.
  - f. Short notification for the operation precluded more detailed preparation.
4. Concept of Operation:
  - a. Combined small unit operations were conducted from company patrol bases located outside hamlet boundaries. Units patrolled by day and ambushed by night from the hamlets outward to the mountains, both east and west. Units were integrated.
  - b. Organization of Forces:  
A Co: Security mission at Camp Radcliff. Did not participate in the operation.

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B Co: One(1) squad (9) of RF 990F, RF Company attached. RF were deployed to squad level.

C Co: FSB Security Co, and had no RF/PF forces attached.

D Co: One(1) squad (9) of RF 990F, RF Company attached. RF were deployed at squad level.

Recon: Attached to RF 992F Company (120). Recon squads were employed at platoon level.

Co's B,C&D: Provided a 3-man training team to PF platoons 265, 237 and 120, respectively.

c. The concept of operation was based on supply by ground transportation only. Routes of communication restricted the location of company patrol bases. Maneuver was further restricted by the Song Con River which runs north to south through the valley. The 4th Engineer Battalion provided three assault boat crews which ferried units and supplies across the river. The only road trafficable by wheel <sup>vehicle</sup> which runs north and south through the center of the valley.

## 5. Special Projects:

- a. Training:
  - (1) 4.2" mortar
  - (2) 50 cal machine-gun
  - (3) PF training program:
    - a. Patrolling
    - b. Ambush
    - c. Language
  - (4) RF training:
    - a. Patrolling
    - b. Ambush
    - c. Bridge security
    - d. River crossing
- b. MEDCAPS
- c. Combined dispensary service.
- d. Construction of a permanent bridge sufficient to support lambretta traffic.
- e. Repair of school house in Dinh Binh 2.
- f. Joint military police and RVN national police operations:
  - (1) Patrolled populated areas
  - (2) Patrolled US base areas
  - (3) Patrolled lines of communication
  - (4) Operated traffic control points
  - (5) Controlled vendors and sales personnel(indigenous)
- g. Significant Military Events: At 1850 hours on 18 October, enemy mortar fire impacted VIC 614612 resulting in two(2) KIA and 14 WIA from C/1/12 Inf, A/4/42 Arty and HHC 4th Eng Battalion.

## 6. Problem Areas:

- a. An insufficient number of interpreters were available for this type of operation. The battalion initially had only one. On the third day of the operation five additional interpreters were assigned to the unit. As a minimum, each company, the reconnaissance platoon, each PF training team,



the medical platoon and the staff section, should have an interpreter.

b. The Vinh Thanh District advisor in Binh Khe did not feel that sufficient coordination had been made with province headquarters by 4th Infantry Division prior to this battalion's coordination with Captain Ty, the sub-district chief in Vinh Thanh Valley. No problems were encountered, however.

7. Conclusion:

a. The operation was a success. There were no reports of enemy personnel entering the hamlets during the duration of the operation. There were three reports of enemy personnel being denied entrance to hamlets. The RF and PF forces and US forces were enthusiastic about the joint effort.

b. Coordination with Vietnamese officials were easily effective, but could have been improved had a joint operation center been established. Additional coordination could have been effected with the village and hamlet officials.

c. Greater integration of forces would have resulted had US units be deployed within the RF/PF areas of operation instead of a selected number of RF/PF being assigned to work with US forces in separate areas of operation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

THOMAS L. NICHOLSON  
MAJOR INFANTRY

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