

Hdq

Subj = CAAR

To = C.O. 2d Bde

1. (W) Name of Operation: ~~Se San Base Area Opn~~ ^{Binh Tay I,}
2. (C) Dates of Opn: 5 May 70 - 16 May 70
3. (C) Location: West of Se San River, ^{general latitude of New Ai Djereng,} Cambodia
4. (C) Command HQ: 1/12 Inf, RED WARRIORS, 2d Bde,
4th Inf Div
5. (C) Task Organization: ~~See Incl # 1~~ 1/12 Inf Bn, BBth
4/42 Arty (DS), ~~Plat # 020,~~
6. (C) Key Personnel: See Incl # 2 4th Eng.
7. (C) Supporting Forces:
 - a. Artillery:
B/4/42 - DS
 - b. Fac Air:
Extensive Fac Air support was provided by the
2d Bde TACP.
 - c. Army Aviation: 7
The 2d Bde and 1st Bde Avn Sections provided
LOH, Slick and Hook supt. required for CTC, VR,
CA and RS missions.
 - d. Engineer: ~~(copy from Bde order)~~
~~2 C ^{Section} platoons of C Co, 4th Eng Bn - DS~~

8. (c) Intelligence

o. Weather

(1) Climate: The transition from the northeast monsoon season to the southwest monsoon, which began in March and is completed in May passing over warm tropical waters, arrived over the area as a new moist, unstable tropical air mass which produced extensive convective clouds and heavy rain showers & thunderstorms.

(2) Precipitation: May is a wet season month. Rainfall increased primarily in afternoon and evening rain showers and thunderstorms.

Light Data for Period of
operation

Day	BUNT	SR	SS	EENT	MR	MS	PHRE	PHI
7	0601	0624	1905	1927	0635	1955	NEW	02
8	0601	0623	1906	1928	0817	2152	"	06
9	0601	0623	1906	1928	0911	2245	"	12
10	0601	0623	1906	1929	1006	2334	"	19

11	0600	0622	1906	1929	1100	—	"	28
12	0559	0622	1907	1929	1152	0019	"	37
13	0559	0622	1907	1929	1242	0100	"	46
14	0559	0621	1907	1930	1329	0137	157 QTR	55
15	0559	0621	1907	1930	1446	0211	"	65

6. Terrain:

(1) The ~~northern~~ portion of the area of operations was covered with multi-canopied dense undergrowth forest with patches of cultivated areas and cut down trees which enable tropicality to some extent. Elevation runs from 129 meters in the Tule Song River Valley to 671 meters to the east and southeast. Availability of LZ's was good.

(2) Cross-country movement conditions were fair to good, observation and fields of fire were excellent.

(3) Concealment from aerial observation was excellent and cover was abundant.

e. Enemy Situation:

(1) The B-3 Front HQs with a strength of approximately 500 was believed to be located in the vicinity of YA 473560. An infantry Bn normally secures the B3 Front HQs. The 211 Hospital, K-23 Replacement Bn and the C-7 and C-2 Transportation Bns were located just north of Base Area 702. The 24th NVA Regt HQs, its support companies and one Bn, possibly the 4th Bn with a strength of 260 men, were also believed to operate in our assigned AO. The 24th NVA Regt HQs was believed to be located vicinity of YA 518474. The area consisted of some T and Q Stations along with other base and refitting areas.

(2) The 24th NVA Regt is well equipped, has good morale and is considered combat effective. The 24th NVA Regt along with the 66th NVA Regt are considered the best units under the B-3 front.

(3) In 4 contacts in which units of the Bn participated the enemy was well dug in and had good overall defensive positions. They seem to be well trained individuals even though the amount of casualties inflicted to friendly's were small. In only one of the contacts was the Bn able to exploit the contact area.

OK ✓

8. (c) Intelligence: (to be submitted by S-2)

- a. Weather
- b. Terrain
- c. Enemy Situation

9. (c) Mission: To reposition forces ~~as~~ into assigned portion of BA 702 (see overlay, Incl #2) and to initiate aggressive S+D ops to locate, capture and/or destroy enemy forces, installations and facilities.

10. (c) Concept of Operation: The 1/12 Inf moved to staging area vic Pleiku via CV on 5 May, conducted CA's into Cambodia on 7-8 May and established two consecutive firebases to support the S+D ops of its maneuver elements. On 15 May the Bn was extracted from Cambodia.

11. (c) Execution:

a. On 3 May A/1/12 Inf was extracted from the field by A/C and lifted to Camp Radcliff. The following day, the Bn (1) returned to basecamp via CV. On the morning of 5 May the Bn moved overland to LZ Oasis, vic _____, to prepare for a CA into Cambodia. The CA took place on 7-8 May into FSB Inva-sion (Patty Pan), vic YA 599443. D Co assumed the firebase security mission on 8 May, while the other

maneuver elements initiated search & destroy operations (see overlay, Incl # 2).

b. On 10 May the Bn was chopped to 1st Bde control.

On this date A Co CA'd to the new AO to secure a new FSB, LZ Comanche, vic YA 430629. The Co was placed opcon to the 1/14 Inf until the remainder of the Bn (minus C Co) closed on 11 May. C Co was

chopped to the 1/12 Inf on 11 May and did not CA ~~to~~ from its present AO to the new AO vic YA ~~430629~~ until 12 May ^{to become opcon to the 1/12 Inf again.} D Co again secured the FSB while the maneuver elements resumed ^{their} search & destroy operations.

c. On 14 May A Co CA'd to vic YA 478558 and chopped to the 3/506 AB Inf Bn. The next day the entire 1/12 Inf Bn was extracted and airlifted to its trains area in New Plei Djereang. Upon closing, A Co returned to the control of its parent unit. On 16 May, the 1/12 Inf trucked from Plei Djereang to Camp Radcliff to re-join the 2d Bde and commence its stand-down.

~~d. For a detailed report of all contacts and significant findings the after-action report of A, B & C Co's submitted as Inclosure # 3, 4 and 5, respectively.~~

~~d. A chronological summary of significant events is attached as Incl # 3.~~

d The synopses of major contacts are attached as Incl # 3, 4, 5.

12. (c) Results:

a. Friendly Losses:

1) Personnel

13 KIA (4 were the result of a helicopter crash due to mechanical failure)
7 WIA

2) Equipment

1 - 81mm Mortar

Assorted FDC Equipment

1 - PRC-25 Radio

b. Enemy Losses

1) Personnel

39 KIA (by Small Arms) 26 KIA (by Air + Artillery)

2) Equipment / Supplies (^{Structures} CIA or destroyed)

187 Hootches (incl 1 hospital + 1 training area)

66 Bunkers

120 ~~Rigs~~ ~~Uniforms~~

75 Chickens

15 1/2 T Rice

76 Uniforms and other assorted items of clothing and webgear

10 Rucksacks

Numerous cooking utensils

30 Cases Medical Supplies

23 Drums POL (55 gal ea)

1 SKS Rifle

3 Muskets

6 Pds 82mm Mort. rds.

6,150 Pds Small Arms Ammo 1 - Chicom Grenade

numerous MG and Rifle magazines

1 Bayonet

1 .51 cal MG barrel

Numerous documents

13 (c) Administrative Matters.

a. ~~Transportation~~ ^{Logistics} ~~and~~: Insufficient number of trucks was made available to the Bn on 4 May for the movement of personnel and equipment from FSB Aquarius to Camp Radcliff. As result shuttle runs were required which wasted valuable time needed to prepare for the new mission. Air assets to CA the Bn into Cambodia and to resupply it thereafter were adequate while the Bn was under the control of the Second Brigade. While open to the First Pde, however, water and rations shortages were experienced due to the lack of aircraft. On the day of final extraction, the number of aircraft, as well as the time of their availability was made unavailable until the last moment. Furthermore, the final extraction was effected without the support of gunships.

b. Medical Evacuations: Medevacs were effected both by R/S and Dnat-off helicopters. This service was generally prompt, except when hampered by

severe weather, a problem experienced by A Co.

14. Commanders Evaluation:

To be written by C.O. / S-3

FTC:

5 Inclosures

1. Key Personnel
2. Overlay of AO
3. A Co's Contact
4. B Co's Contact
5. C Co's Contact

ADJ. SIG. BLOCK

June 1

Key Personnel

1. C.O. - LTC Norris P. Sterling
2. X.O. - Maj Donald R. Pastella
3. Staff
 - a. S-1 - Cpt Frank K. Williams
 - b. S-2 - Cpt James R. Childs
 - c. S-3 - Maj Gordon S. Marley
 - d. S-4 - Cpt Cecil Boatwright
 - e. Comm - Cpt Harold L. Slover
4. Co Andros
 - a. HHC - 1LT Louis J. Perry
 - b. A - Cpt Benjamin D. Koerselman
 - c. B - Cpt Gary P. Conklin
 - d. C - ~~Cpt~~^{1LT} Richard T. Rhoades
 - e. D - ~~Cpt Richard T. Jones~~ Cpt Ernest A. Jones
 - f. E - 1LT David E. Kline
5. Supporting Andros
 - a. B/4/42 - Cpt Barry W. Slack
 - b. 2/c/4th Eng - 1LT Charles A. Darrak

Enclosure 3 - A Co's ^{Major} Contact

1. Background: On 14 May at 1100 hrs, A Co conducted a CA from PZ YA 443 650 to LZ YA 478 558. The lift was complete at 1145 hrs. The Co was to conduct a S+D operation ^{to the} east, along the stream near their LZ, under the operational control of the 3/506 AB Inf.
2. Actions leading up to the contact: A Co proceeded to move NW ^{for the day} three hundred meters ^{later} from ~~the LZ~~ the Co discovered an NVA training area, consisting of five large hooches, a rifle range, classrooms, six 82 mm mortar rounds, one .51 cal MG barrel and assorted documents. The barrel & documents were evacuated while the facilities and other items were destroyed.
3. Contact: At 1400 hrs the ^{company's second platoon} ~~lead element~~ received sniper fire near YA 482 559, resulting in one EM being killed and the platoon leader being wounded. Artillery fire could not be employed because of the close proximity of another friendly element. A Co, 1/14 Inf was located a mere 400 meters to the East and requested that no Art'y be fired after the observation of the initial smoke round. Gunships which arrived on

station received heavy G/A fire ~~on their first gun run~~
and the COH's received sustained hits after the first
gun run. A replacement set of gunships arrived and
expended on the KEL. The contact lasted 2-3 hours,
~~and resulted in a total of~~ US KIA and ~~US WIA~~
after which the Co was ordered to withdraw to
the NW and establish a night defensive position.
The Co Cmdr, realizing he was in a lucrative area
and having knowledge of his extraction on 15 May, was
determined to search the area and received permission
~~from~~ from the CO. 3/506 AB Inf. The Co proceeded to
move to the SE. During the search, one platoon loca-
ted a 20 hooch hospital complex containing 30 cases
of medical supplies vic YA 480 562. The remainder of
the Co searched the flanks of a trail and found numerous
full 55 gal Shell oil-drum. At YA 485 558 a total
of 12 drums were located. An ~~apex~~ element deployed
to secure the destruction of the POI, it received heavy
automatic weapons fire, killing two, and wounding one.
An attempt to recover the casualties was thwarted by in-
tense RPG, MG and small arms fire. A total of five MG ~~MG~~
and numerous small arms positions were detected.
All friendly attempts to maneuver were effectively
suppressed as they ~~they~~ ^{friendly elements} approached the superior, well-en-
trenched enemy force. A Co did prevent an enemy

flanking maneuver however, and with the aid of artillery managed to break contact. This contact resulted in 2 US KIA and 6 US WIA.

On 15 May, A Co returned to the contact area and recovered their dead. The Co destroyed 8 barrels of 50 Weight Oil, 8 barrels of gasoline, and 7 barrels of kerosene. Shortly thereafter the Co was extracted to Plei Dzing ^{moved to an LZ and}

4. Analysis: a. A Co made contact with an estimated 75 to 100 individuals guarding a logistical installation or HQ's facility. Although the enemy was well entrenched, the Co killed 20-25 soldiers. This figure is based on ^{body counts,} ~~an~~ observation of personnel hit and blood pools. An accurate figure is unavailable due to darkness on 14 May and the premature extraction on 15 May.

b. Art'y support of the contact was extremely poor. Initially, it could not be used due to the proximity of A/11. ^{That element was actually working in the HQ of A/12.} A/12 was not ~~used~~ ^{made} ~~located~~ ^{made} and thus was very vulnerable. Later, during the heavier contact, art'y support took a very long time and was interrupted several times for 5-10 minutes. It was only due to the onset of darkness and the skill of A Co's FO that contact was broken.

Enclosure 4 - B Co's Major Contact

1. Background: On 11 May C Co was A/L'ed to FSB Commanche, vic YA 430 629. After spending the night near the FSB, the Co moved out along a 40° azimuth, to conduct a S+D operation.
2. Action leading up to the contact: At 1620 hrs the Co stopped, ^{vic YA 457 647.} A squad was given the mission to reconnoiter the area to the N and E ^{of the tentative} ~~of the tentative~~ night location. The squad departed at 1650 hrs.
3. Contact: As the squad's point stepped out of the brush into an open area it was engaged by an estimated 5-7 enemy soldiers at a distance of 50-75 meters. The point man, detecting the enemy, returned fire immediately, permitting the squad to deploy & engage the enemy. During the fire exchange he was mortally wounded. The remainder of the platoon immediately reinforced the squad in contact. An M-60 LMG provided a base of fire while another squad approached the contact site. At this point the enemy broke contact. The Co CP and an additional platoon swept the contact area 125-150 m to the NE. Meanwhile, the KIA was recovered and moved to a PE to the SW by the platoon which made the initial contact. The sweep platoon had reconsolidated & returned to within 40 meters

of the contact platoon when an estimated enemy platoon engaged both platoons. AK-47 fire came from the north and MG fire from the NE. The fire separated the Co CP from the platoons. As the CP tried to move, an additional MG engaged them from the NW. All enemy weapons fired from a range of 50-75 meters. ^{The Co CP's} attempts to ~~outflank~~ ^{rejoin the two platoons} the MG's were prevented by app 20 enemy soldiers which had maneuvered between them. The CP engaged the enemy soldiers while the two platoons outflanked the two MG positions. The action subsided with the employment + adjustment of a 4.2" Mort concentration and the onset of darkness. During the hrs of darkness the CP finally managed to rejoin its elements and reconsolidate its subordinate elements.

The enemy was manning 2 MG's with 6 men ea and 1 BAR with 2 men, making maneuver extremely difficult and resulting in friendly casualties of 4 KIA and 3 WIA. The enemy sustained 12 KIA's based on ^{body counts} ~~observed~~ hits. An additional 20 ^{BRA's} ~~BRA's~~ are estimated on the basis of ^{observing direct hits on enemy positions and the abundance of blood} ~~analysis~~ trails and pools discovered the following day. Another 4 ^{Analysis} good indication of enemy losses was the bundance of enemy webgear, uniforms, rucksacks, personal effects and documents located at the contact site.

4. Analysis: The enemy ^{element} strength appeared to have been of Co size as indicated by the no. of enemy personnel observed and additional voices heard and the volume of fire received. A HQ's element + reserve platoon was located directly N of the contact. The reserve element could not be committed due to heavy + accurate friendly fire. Art'y + heavy mortars, as well as GS, effectively engaged the enemy, as well as covered their escape routes. A RIF the following morning discovered that the enemy had withdrawn from the contact site.

Enclosure 5 - Co's Major Contact

1. Background: On ~~11~~ 11 May the 1/12 Inf Bn was placed under the control of the 1st Bde + redeployed to a new AO. Co remained in its present AO + was placed upon to the 1/22 Inf Bn.
2. Actions leading up to the contact: At 110815 May 70 an ambush returning to the Co's night location received small arms fire ^{from a woodline} ~~from an east 540 bearing~~ ~~my address~~, vic YA 564 476.
3. Contact: The squad sized ambush party was engaged both in front + rear ^{by an estimated enemy platoon}. This squad was extracted by a platoon which also recovered scattered equipment. Enemy fire increased, pinning down the relief platoon. An additional platoon reinforced the contact ^{to} prevent ^{the} enemy's escape while G's and Art'y engaged enemy positions and covered avenues of approach/escape. Under the protection of this suppressive fire, the two plat's were able to drive the enemy out of their positions in a woodline and sweep the area. The enemy lost 2 KIA's in the encounter. Two blood trails indicated further casualties. A trail network, just beyond the contact site revealed led to a B-52 target area, which revealed six bodies and assorted equipment + ammunition of 8-10 individuals. Friends

losses were 2 KIA and 2 WIA. After searching approx 1 square km the Co established a night defensive position via YA 556 476. The following day the Co was extracted to rejoin its parent unit.

4. Analysis: The size of the enemy element was not determined. The area was full of fresh enemy indications, however, and additional time to exploit the objective was definitely needed.

The act'g in support of the contact was not timely and was hampered by A/C above the contact site. Effective coordination was finally achieved. Supt would have been much prompter if the G/S which were AB near the contact had been employed. The request for them was denied because they covered a final extraction ^{at the time.} Eventually, effective coordination was achieved and three batteries were ~~successfully~~ employed. The air ~~can~~ unit on station proved to be invaluable, particularly their scouts.