

10 Feb 69  
all of OP MacArthur

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HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 12TH INFANTRY  
2d Brigade 4th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96262

AV DB-12I

10 February 1969

SUBJECT: After Actions Report-Operation MACARTHUR

THRU: Commanding Officer  
2d Brigade 4th Infantry Division  
ATTN: S-3  
APO San Francisco 96262

TO: Commanding General  
4th Infantry Division  
ATTN: G-3 AVDDH-GC-MH  
APO San Francisco 96262

1. This After Action Report covering the participation of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (Red Warriors) will be submitted utilizing time frames, with all significant items included in each time frame.

A. Pre-TET Period

Beginning 2 December 1967, the 1/12 Infantry under the OPCON of 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div was established on a FSB vicinity Hill 875 west of Dak To, with the rifle companies conducting search and destroy operations to the west of Hill 875. During this period, the battalion had with it A Btry, 4/42 Artillery, who provided continuous and rapid fire support. Prior to movement into the Dak To area, it was learned from higher headquarters that elements of the 174th NVA regiment were operating in the area, with additional forces (units unknown by the headquarters) available in the Cambodian sanctuary to the West. One POW captured during operations around Hill 875 substantiated the presence of the 174th NVA regiment. Shell reps, sensings and visual sightings from enemy rocket and mortar attacks during the operation were greatly beneficial in locating portions of the enemy elements. Actual contact with the enemy after 2 Dec, in spite of extensive patrolling, was negative.

On 10 December 1967, the battalion moved to Dak To by air. On 11 December, the battalion moved by road to establish a FSB at ZA107684, near Plei Mrang, at this time returning to the control of the 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div.

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The mission of the battalion was to prevent movement of forces through the area to attack Kontum or Pleiku, or to interdict Highway 14. In addition the battalion was to be prepared to secure some PLAW operations along Highway 14 and prevent use of the area as a base camp for NVA/VC operations. Intelligence from Sector Headquarters in Kontum indicated that the 4th battalion, 958 regiment and the 200th NVA artillery regiment were operating in the area. The primary source of information during the operation was from the CSF Camp at Plei Mrang. Additional information was gained during the operation from local villagers. The terrain in the area, although being open primarily, afforded cover and concealment in heavily wooded areas along streams and gorges. None of the streams in the area could be considered obstacles to foot movement, since they were low, due to lack of rain. Observation was good except in the wooded areas, where heavy undergrowth made observation difficult.

The battalion was to move into the Plei Mrang area to conduct search and destroy operations in areas of likely enemy concentrations and conduct cordon and search operations of local villages in an attempt to gain added information in the area. The OS Artillery Battery was to remain at the FSB and provide indirect fire support.

On 11 December, as previously stated, the battalion, with B Btry 4/42 Arty, moved to ZA107684, vicinity Plei Mrang to establish a FSB. Search and destroy operations, in conjunction with CSF forces from Plei Mrang. In addition, several villages were cordoned and searched. As a result of questioning the villagers, the movement of the enemy, to include the 32d NVA Regiment became established. Acting on the information, the battalion moved west to vicinity ZA030545 on 17 January 1968, and then on 20 January moved further west to YA858541 in order to interdict the major infiltration route in the area.

The operation in the vicinity of Plei Mrang was conceived on 8 December 1967 and was implemented on 11 December 1967.

There were only two brief contacts throughout the period of this operation, both of them of less than three minute duration. In both instances, the enemy was 50-75 meters from friendly elements.

During the period of the Plei Mrang operations aircraft broadcasts were employed to undermine the morale of the enemy, and to encourage him to surrender under the Chieu Hoi Program. In addition, curfew broadcasts were made to warn innocent civilians about the rules of engagement during the hours of darkness. In conjunction with the cordon and search operations, the unit medical personnel conducted MEO CAP activities and distributed clothing.

During the Plei Mrang operation, there were three VC KIA, with no friendly casualties. A total of 40,000 lbs of rice was found in numerous caches throughout the area.

During the period 2 to 10 December 1967, resupply was effected by air from Dak To, where the battalion trains were located. During the Plei Mrang operation, the trains returned to Base Camp and all resupply was transported by convoy.

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When engaged against a well dug-in enemy force, the M72 LAW was found to be very beneficial, primarily due to its light weight and the ability to distribute it throughout the rifle company.

In the Plei Mrong area, the numerous rice caches were found by searching along the base of hills in the vicinity of villages. Upon discovering a rice cache, it might well be productive to by-pass the area, leaving a stay behind force under cover to observe the area. Persons coming into the area could then be detained for interrogation, or ambushed.

Operations in the Plei Mrong area painted up the availability of immediate interest, low level intelligence available through local sources that is not normally available through higher headquarters. This information was made available by the CSF Commander after rapport was established.

## B. Tet Offensive and Post-Tet

30 Jan thru 26 Feb 68

During this period, the 1st Bn, 12th Inf was engaged exclusively against NVA forces in the Dak To and Kontum areas.

### Task organization:

1st Bn, 12th Inf

B Btry, 4/42 Arty

1st Plat, B Co, 4th Eng

During the period 6-10 Feb, A Company was OPCON to 1/22 Inf, and during the period 8-10 Feb, C Company was OPCON to 1/12 Inf.

Intelligence: Reports, captured documents and POW's taken by maneuver elements, reports from higher headquarters sources indicated that large scale infiltration was taking place throughout the Dak To-Kontum area and that an attempt was being made to mass a large unit capable of conducting an attack against the military installation at Dak To and/or the city of Kontum.

The terrain in the Dak To area was mountainous with heavy vegetation, with the exception of scattered, small fields cut by Montagnards. Cover and concealment was excellent in the majority of the area of operations, while observation was restricted to 25-50 meters, except in the fields. In the Kontum area the terrain was relatively flat and open, with scattered small forests.

The weather was generally clear throughout the period, with some early morning ground fog.

The local Civilians were primarily pro-US/ARVN, but many, when threatened, were sympathetic and helpful to the NVA Forces.

Mission: Conduct search and destroy operations in the Dak To area, to prevent or minimize infiltration of enemy forces into the Dak To area, and to establish contact with enemy forces in the area.

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## Execution:

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On 1 Feb, the battalion FSB was located at FB 24 YB911121 with B Btry 4/42 Arty and D Company as security. C Company was located at Dak To, providing perimeter security. A and B Companies were conducting search and destroy operations to the south of the FSB.

On 3 Feb, Dak To received a 122mm rocket attack, in which C Company suffered 4 KIA and 7 WIA. The following day, C Company was air lifted to the FSB.

On 6 Feb, A Company was airlifted to Kontum to support the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, which was operating in that area. On 8 Feb, A Company made contact with an estimated NVA Company north of Kontum City. They were repulsed in two attempts to overrun the dug-in enemy positions. They withdrew for the night, having suffered 3 KIA and 21 WIA.

Also, on 8 Feb, C Company was airlifted to Kontum and joined A Company in their night location. After a short pause to organize, C Company conducted a night assault on the objective. The objective was taken at 2230 after a heavy air and artillery preparation. C Company met no resistance when they moved onto the objective. The battalion CP at FS 24 received an extensive B40 rocket and mortar attack that resulted in one KIA and 7 WIA.

On 10 Feb, C Company made contact with an estimated NVA Company at 1745 hours. The company tried twice to maneuver against the positions but was forced to withdraw by intense small arms, machine gun, rifle grenade, and B40 rocket fire. They established a night defensive position, while an extensive H and I program was fired on the enemy position. At first light on 11 Feb an air strike and artillery preparation were put on the area, and the company again assaulted. They were again repulsed, with a total of 3 KIA and 20 WIA for the two day operation. On the afternoon of 11 Feb, A and C Companies were airlifted back to Dak To. Also, on 11 Feb, the battalion FSB displaced by air to FB 6 (YB934188).

On 12 Feb, B Company made contact with a delay force, northeast of Dak To. The enemy position consisted of mutually supporting machinegun bunkers, which had to be taken one at a time. This action resulted in 1 US KIA and 21 WIA. After extensive use of air and artillery, a sweep of the contact area produced 9 NVA bodies.

On 21 Feb, A Company made contact with an enemy force of unknown size which resulted in 2 US WIA and 5 NVA KIA.

On 23 Feb, a four man patrol from D Company made contact with 4 NVA, and killed two of them.

On 26 Feb, the battalion FSB displaced by air to FB 30 (YB971267).

The period 26-29 Feb produced no further enemy contact or significant activities.

## Results:

NVA: KIA-16, CIA-0

Those NVA who were KIA in the Kontum phase were not tabulated for

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credit to 1/12 Inf.

US: KIA-12, WIA-78

## Enemy equipment and material captured:

30 cal machinegun (on wheels) -1,  
AK47-3, 75mm RR rounds 25, 82mm  
mortar rounds-93, fuze kits-5, Chicam grenades-5

Airstrikes were frequently used, and all strikes were followed by a sweep of the area, with the exception of the air strike employed in support of C Company on the morning of 11 February. However this area was subsequently swept by B Company, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry.

## Administrative Matters:

The battalion trains were set up at the Dak To airstrip and resupply was very timely and complete, hampered only slightly by harrassing enemy fire.

## Commanders Analysis:

During operations in the areas where large enemy forces were deployed, the use of small (four man) patrols proved successful in locating and disrupting enemy infiltration. Small recon units of four or five men are forced to move under maximum security measures. The reaction of the patrol in an enemy area is such that the enemy is detected and reacted against (primarily by indirect fire) without the enemys knowledge of the patrols location.

## C. Operations in the Ban Me Thuot area 1 Mar 68 thru 21 Apr 68

### Task Force organization:

1 to 4 March 1968

1st Bn 12th Inf(-)  
C Btry 7/17 Arty (SP)  
B Btry 5/16 Arty (SP)  
C Btry 3/6 Arty (SP)  
B Co (-) 1/69 Arm  
B Trp (-) 1/10 Cav  
21st Co (MSF)  
3d Plat E Co 20th Inf (LRP IFFV)  
630 Eng Det  
124 Sig Det  
704 Maint Det  
4th Sgd 4th Plat 4th MP Co

4 to 22 March 1968

1st Bn 12th Inf  
C Btry 7/17 Arty (SP)  
B Btry 5/16 Arty (SP)

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C Btry 3/6 Arty (SP)  
B Co (-) 1/69 Arm  
21 Co (MSF) - returned to parent unit 24 Mar 68.  
3d Plat E Co 20th Inf (LRP IFFV)  
630 Eng Det  
124 Sig Det  
704 Maint Det  
4th Sgd 4th Plat 4th MP Co

During the period 22 Mar to 3 Apr, the task organization was:

1st Bn 12th Inf  
D Co 1/22 Inf  
C Btry 7/17 Arty (SP)  
B Btry 5/16 Arty (SP)  
C Btry 3/6 Arty (SP)  
B Co (-) 1/69 Armor - returned to parent unit 8 Apr 68  
3d Plat E Co 20th Inf (LRP IFFV)  
630 Eng Det  
124 Sig Det  
704 Maint Det  
4th Sgd 4th Plat 4th MP Co


During the period 4 to 21 April, the task organization was:

1st Bn 12th Inf  
C Btry 7/17 Arty (SP)  
B Btry 5/16 Arty (SP)  
C Btry 3/6 Arty (SP)  
3d Plat B Trp 1/10 Cav  
3d Plat E Co 20th Inf (LRP IFFV)  
630 Eng Det  
124 Sig Det  
704 Maint Det  
4th Sgd 4th Plat 4th MP Co

Supporting forces: All three arty batteries were continuously used in direct support of the rifle companies, either from the FSB or an a hip shoot. The Arm Co (-) was used continuously, and very effectively to assist in security of the FSB by night, and to escort resupply convoys to and from Ban Me Thuot East (trains location) during the day. On numerous occasions, they were utilized to help secure one or more of the SP artillery batteries while they conducted a hip shoot. The LRP Plat was used as a long range surveillance net for the battalion. There were always a minimum of two LRP teams in the outer reaches of the AO. The 630th Eng Det provided bridging capabilities during the initial move to the fire support base, and on two hip shoot maneuvers. The 124th Signal Detachment provided secure voice and teletype communication with Division Headquarters. The 704th Maintenance Detachment, in operation at the trains area, provided 2d and 3d echelon maintenance capabilities, especially required by the armor and artillery elements. Their presence was greatly beneficial, in that the nearest maintenance facility was at Camp Enari, some 100 miles away. The MP squad was utilized to escort and guard detainees, as well as to control the flow of traffic and indigenous personnel around the trains area.

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AQ 930375

**Intelligence:**

Prior to the deployment of TF 1/12, the area north of Ban Me Thuot was known to be both a staging area and infiltration rout for NVA and VC battalion-size units operating in Darlac Province. The 32d and 33d NVA regiments were known to have two (2) battalions each operating north of Ban Me Thuot. The 32d was staging in Base Area 238 (AQ930375) and the 33d, who had taken part in the Tet Offensive, was operating north of Ban Me Thuot. Their operations and movements were being supported by local VC elements operating in the AO.

Estimated enemy strengths were: 401 Local Force Battalion-300 men, 301 Local Force Battalion - 90 men, 32d NVA Regiment-750 men, 33d NVA Regiment 800 men.

The terrain in the AO was flat and moderately open with heavy vegetation along streams and low areas. These heavily vegetated areas offered good cover and concealment for moving forces.

The majority of the stream beds and the closely cultivated trees of the plantation areas were obstacles to the SP artillery, but offered no resistance to fast movement. Observation was generally good, except in areas of heavy growth, where it was restricted down to 25 meters.

The weather during this phase of operations was hot and humid, with no precipitation.

Local Civilians were both Vietnamese and Montagnard, and were basically pro US/ARVN. However, they were cooperative with NVA/VC through necessity.

Mission: Conduct search and destroy operations northwest of the Mewol Plantation in coordination and conjunction with the 45th ARVN. <sup>mewol plant</sup> Mewol Plant-

Concept of Operation: Motor march from Dak To to Base Camp on 2 March 1968 to form task force. Continue motor march on 3 March 1968 to establish FSB northwest of the Mewol Plantation vicinity AQ9329. Establish a trains area at Ban Me Thuot East. Conduct search and destroy operations in assigned AO commencing 4 March 1968.

Execution: On 29 February 1968, 1st Bn 12th Inf received a warning order to move from Dak To to Base Camp to form a task force designed to conduct search and destroy operations in the area northwest of Ban Me Thuot.

On 1 March, the battalion, minus A and B companies, assembled at the Dak To airstrip. A and B companies remained under operational control of the 1st Bde until completion of a combat mission which was still in progress.

On 2 March, the battalion minus, with B Btry, 4/42 Arty, moved by convoy to Base Camp. Upon closure of Base Camp, B 4/42 was released to its parent unit. On the night of 2 March, the task force was assembled and plans finalized.

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On 3 March, the task force moved by convoy from

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On 3 March, the task force moved by convoy from camp [redacted] to a new FSB location at AQ938291 and the trains continued south, closing Ban Me Thuot east. AQ 938 291

Beginning at 0251 and ceasing at 0410 on 4 March, the battalion trains were the recipients of a mortar attack, suffering one KIA and eight WIA. Also, on 4 March, A and B companies moved from Dek To to Ban Me Thuot east by C130, and convoyed to the FSB location, closing at 1730.

During the period 5-10 March, search and destroy operations were conducted with increased emphasis to the southwest. There were scattered spottings of 1-3 individuals, but nothing significant.

Early on the morning of 10 March, A Company received a mortar attack. All rounds fell outside the perimeter, causing no casualties. Also, on 10 March, C Company fired on 8 NVA, wounding one and capturing his AK-47. The POW died enroute to the hospital. That night, the trains received another mortar attack with no casualties.

On 13 March, the FSB began a combination convoy and hook move to the southwest to better support the maneuver units as they continued to operate further to the southwest. This move, which was accomplished in two days, also enabled the task force to give artillery support to Ban Me Thuot. During the period 13-17 March, operations continued in coordination with a Bn from the 45th ARVN Regiment, with no US Contacts. However, artillery support was given to ARVN and PF units who became engaged with the enemy on two occasions.

On the night of 18 March, A, C, and D Companies received 30-50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at their night location. Again, all rounds landed outside their perimeter, causing no damage or casualties.

On 20 March, at 1117 hours, the lead element of A Company made contact with a estimated battalion sized force. In a day long contact involving A, C, and D Companies, the enemy was pushed from the battle area, leaving behind 40 KIA's and 2 CIA's. The action began when A Company, the lead company, ran into an enemy company vicinity ZV227187. The enemy was moving at sling arms. A Company pulled into a horse shoe defense set up, allowing C and D Companies to join them. The fighting closed in to less than 75 meters at times, averaging 100-125 meters. Artillery and air strikes assisted in the breaking of contact. Friendly casualties were 7 KIA and 23 WIA. The POW's indicated that they were from the 33d NVA Regiment. Captured equipment totaled 4 RPD machineguns, 3 AK-47's, 7 BKSS's (3w/grenade launcher), 4 B40 rocket launchers, one 60mm mortar, 114 B40 rockets, 4 rifle grenades, 18 chicom hand grenades, 10 lbs of TNT, 250 Lbs of AK-47 ammunition and 200 rounds of machinegun ammo for RPD's.



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On 22 March D Company 1/22 Inf came under operational control of TF 1/12 and moved in to assist A Company in security of the FSB. On the next day, D 1/22 moved to secure a forward firing position at AQ767120 for the SP 105 and 155 batteries.

During the period 23-31 March, the TF continued operations throughout the AO with no significant findings or activities.

Beginning 1 April, a change in the tactical concept brought about the employment of stay behind forces in vacated patrol bases. On 2 April at 1230, a C Company stay behind force surprised 4 persons policing up their recently used patrol base, killing one and scattering the rest.

On 3 April, D Company 1/22 Inf left the AO and returned to its parent unit.

On 6 April, the FSB shifted back north and west of the Mewol Plantation in an attempt to find and destroy the 32d NVA Regiment. C Btry 7/17 Arty displaced to Ban Me Thuot east in order to take advantage of the great range capability of the 8" howitzers and 175mm guns.

On 8 April B Co (-) 1/69 Armor was replaced by 3d Plat 8 Trp 1/10 Cav. The FSB, now at AQ835287, received 40 rounds of mortar fire, the majority of which landed outside the perimeter, resulting in one WIA from the 155 SP Btry.

On 13 April, a patrol from the Recon Plat made contact with 2 individuals, killing one and wounding one. The wounded POW, after interrogation, admitted that they were both VC.

On 17 April, the Task Force began inserting LRP teams in Base Area 238, a long known VC stronghold. On that day, one team made contact shortly after insertion, killing one VC and wounding another, whom they brought with them upon extraction. Base Area 238 was swept by two Companies (C&D) on 19 April with negative findings.

On 21 April, the two companies were lifted from Base Area 238 to Ban Me Thuot east, the beginning of the movement of TF 1/12 back to 2d Bde control. The remainder of the battalion was lifted to Ban Me Thuot east.

On 22 April, the SP Arty batteries, battalion trains, and other supporting elements convoyed from the Ban Me Thuot area to Camp Enari. The 1/12 Inf moved by C130 from Ban Me Thuot east to Poldi Kleng, staging in for the next phase of this report.

Results: NVA/VC KIA-53, CIA-2  
US KIA-9, WIA-32

Friendly equipment and material losses: 1 machinegun (M-60), 1 water trailer, 1 transmitter PRT 4, 1 folding desk, 1 grenade launcher, 11 antennae AT 892/PRC 25, 1 binocular set 6X30, 40 air mattresses, 4 radio control groups; 4 radio sets AN/PRC 25, 13 receivers AN/PRC 9, 2 hexagon tents, 1 tent GP small, 1 tent GP medium, stove 2 burner, and 1 holster 45 cal pistol.

Airstrikes in close support of friendly forces were very timely and accurate, and were followed by a sweep of the area. Areas of those air strikes delivered on intelligence targets were not swept.

#### Administrative matters:

The trains area was located at Ban Me Thuot east, and supply items were delivered directly from Cam Ranh Bay by road and air, through the assistance of a contact team from the 1st Logistical Command. Daily flights of aircraft from Camp Enari ferried personnel, mail, and items of resupply not provided in the logistical train from Cam Ranh Bay. A daily allocation of three slicks and two gun ships from division provided the necessary recon, C&C resupply and LRP insertion capability.

The detachment from 704 Maintenance, which was located in the trains area provided 2d and 3d echelon repair and replacement capabilities.

Dust-off ships were provided by the 155th Aviation Company from Ban Me Thuot. A dispensary at the same location provided emergency medical treatment, in addition to the battalion aid station in the trains area.

A direct secure voice and teletype link with 4th Inf Div was supplied by a detachment from 124th Signal Bn.

Special equipment and techniques: An engineer bridge team, through rapid placement of a bridge over a questionable ford provided ease of movement for vehicles in and out of the forward fire support base. Also, a water purification unit (urtilator), operated by the engineers, was invaluable in the constant production of potable water.

#### Commanders analysis:

The use of 175mm SP artillery greatly restricts the movement of a FSB to rapidly exploit enemy intelligence. The range of the 175mm gun lends itself to employment in a secure area with a corresponding fan to fit the maneuver elements. This can allow for ease of displacement of the FSB and simultaneously provide an artillery fan that covers the FSB and the maneuver elements.

The continuous movement of maneuver elements over great distances and in terrain that forced the use of short antennae created great communications difficulties. The required solution was constant air cover for moving elements. This air coverage provided aerial surveillance and radio relay.

#### D. Operations in the Polei Kleng area 22 April to 17 June 1968

1st Bn 12th Infantry arrived at Polei Kleng airstrip on 22 April, in preparation for operations to the west of Polei Kleng. At this time 1/12 Inf went under operational control of 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div.

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Task organization:

22 to 26 April 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

26 April to 17 June 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
C Co 1/14 Inf  
D Co 1/14 Inf (replaced by B Co 1/14 Inf 2 Jun)  
C Btry 2/9 Arty (joined Bn on 21 May)  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

Supporting Forces: B Btry 4/42 Arty provided regular direct support, through continuous and very rapid fire for forces on LZ Alamo, Bunker Hill, and support of its own perimeter (direct fire) on LZ Brillo Pad. 1st Plat, B Co, 4th Eng assisted in construction of overhead and barriers on all three positions.

Intelligence: Indications were that the 66th and 320th NVA Regiments were preparing for an assault on Polei Kleng with designs to overrun this CIDG camp and continue the attack to the east to Kontum City. All indicators pointed to their movement out of the high ground west of Polei Kleng to take place during the month of May. During the operation, it was also confirmed that the 174th NVA Regiment had moved into position south of LZ Bunker Hill o/a 20 May 68.

Estimated strength of all regiments was 500-650 each.

The terrain in the AO was mountainous with extremely heavy vegetation throughout.

Excellent cover and concealment was afforded throughout the area of operations. Vehicular movement, both track and wheel was impossible, and foot movement was difficult. Avenues of approach to the LZ's were good due to the cover and concealment offered.

The weather during this period of operations was generally clear during the day, with heavy ground fog during morning hours in the lowlands. At times the fog reached the tops of the mountains, enveloping them until 0900-1000 hours.

Mission: Fix and destroy enemy forces in highlands west of Polei, and block enemy movement into lowlands west of Polei Kleng.

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Concept of operation: Establish a FSB on LZ Brillo Pad (YA962855), conduct company size sweeps to west and south west of LZ Brillo Pad. Following sweeps to neutralize the area, establish patrol bases on selected high ground, and by use of short range patrols, prevent enemy infiltration to the east.

## Execution:

On the evening of 25 April, A Company moved by slick to join the 1/22 Inf on LZ cause (YA868888).

On 26 April, C Company and the Battalion CP moved to LZ Brillo Pad, B Company moved to join 1/8 Inf at LZ Short YA918802, and Co D joined B Company 1/8 Inf on Bunker Hill (YA996825).

During the period 26-30 April A, B, and D Companies conducted company size Recon in Force missions with negative significant contacts. In the meantime, 1/8 Inf and 1/14 Inf moved to new AO's to the north, with the exception of C&D Companies, 1/14 Inf, who became OPCON to the "Red Warriors".

1 May 1968 found the "Red Warriors" in a semi-defensive posture with the battalion FSB, C Company and D Company 1/14 on LZ Brillo Pad, A and B Companies on LZ Alamo, and B Company, with C Company 1/14, occupying LZ Bunker Hill.

During the period 1-16 May; numerous patrols and sweeps were conducted to the west, southwest, and northwest of the three positions. There were scattered sightings of small groups of NVA (3-6 individuals), but no significant actions.

On 6 May, the FSB at Brillo Pad received a ground probe by an estimated NVA platoon, damaging two bunkers with B40 rockets and sachel charges.

On 13 May, an unsuccessful penetration of the perimeter at LZ Alamo occurred by an estimated platoon size NVA force.

On the night of 16 May, the enemy launched an attack against a friendly outpost on Hill 1124, approximately 1200 meters northwest of Brillo Pad. By dawn on 17 May, the enemy (estimated one company) forced the withdrawal of the 10 man outpost back to the FSB. An attack by C Company on Hill 1124 on 17 May failed to dislodge the enemy forces who now held the hill.

During the period 16-31 May, the enemy continuously attempted to dislodge the battalion from LZ Brillo Pad. The enemy attacks consisted of indirect fire by 60, 82, and 120mm mortars and 75mm RR fire combined with ground attacks supported by heavy automatic weapons and-as in the case of Hill 1124-flame throwers. A total of 1059 rounds were placed on Brillo Pad. During the same period, LZ Bunker Hill received 115 rounds, and LZ Alamo received 20.

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On 1 June 1968, the enemy ceased effective indirect fire and began to withdraw to the west. At 0630 on 1 June, a B52 strike was employed on Cu Pu mountain, 1800 meters west of Brillo Pad. From Cu Pu Mountain, the majority of the enemy indirect fire had been directed on Brillo Pad. The B52 strike was followed by a combat assault conducted by D Company. No enemy bodies were found, but there were numerous mortar positions and underground living areas, partially destroyed by the B52 strike. Final destruction was completed by D Company.

On 3 June, D Company returned from Cu Pu Mountain to LZ Alamo on foot.

On 7 June, A Company conducted a three day sweep from LZ Alamo down the valley to the east to check for enemy infiltration and to conduct a BDA of an arclight in the valley. In two enemy contacts, there were four NVA KIA. The contacts lasted 5-7 minutes each and were from 50-75 meters distant.

On 10 June, A Company closed LZ Brillo Pad.

The period 11-17 June was uneventful, as the enemy had withdrawn to the west and southwest.

Results: NVA KIA 107, CIA 0  
US KIA 17, WIA 17

Enemy equipment and material captured:

AK47-12, SKS-2, RPD-6, RPG2 launchers-3, RPG 2 rockets-15, 60mm mortar-2  
60mm mortar rounds-10, TNT-5lb.

Numerous airstrikes were employed in close proximity of LZ Brillo Pad and Bunker Hill, and all were followed by sweeps of the area, though on numerous occasions, it was 3-12 days after the strikes before the sweeps could be effected.

Administrative matters:

The battalion trains area was located at the 3d Bde CP in Kontum, and later at LZ Mary Lau. All resupply and personnel movement to and from the trains area was conducted by air.

Commanders analysis:

On numerous short range patrols of 4-5 men each had been moved 3-4 kilometers west of the battalion positions, it is probable that the movement of the enemy from the west would have been detected early, and artillery/air could have been brought to bear. This could possibly have minimized the heavy fire and ground attacks on friendly positions.

E. Other Operations

18 June thru 22 July 68

During the above noted period, 1st Bn, 12th Inf was involved in three separate operations in different areas. Since there were no significant activities as a result of these operations, they will be covered jointly in this phase.

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Task organization:

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
A Co 2/8 Inf (MESH) (OPCON 20-23 June 68)  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

Supporting forces: N/A

Intelligence:

Plei Djereng (20-29 June 68): It was suspected that elements organic to the 1st NVA Division were infiltrating north to south, along the Se San River, and crossing the river in an attempt to move toward the Pleiku, Kontum area.

VC Valley 29 June-10 July 68: Intelligence indicated increasing enemy activity in VC Valley involving the 95 B NVA Regiment and some local force VMC units, due to the sighting of several recently constructed bunker complexes.

Duc Co 15-22 July 68: It was anticipated that elements of the 1st NVA Division would be moving into the area west of Duc Co and establish a staging area for the upcoming monsoon season.

In all three areas of operation, the lack of hard intelligence made it impossible to accurately estimate the strength, accurate location, or in most cases, the unit designations of suspected enemy forces.

Terrain in all three areas of operation was hilly to mountainous with heavy vegetation, affording excellent cover and concealment. Observation was limited to 25-125 meters and avenues of approach, for foot traffic, were good.

The weather was clear, with partial to heavy ground fog during early morning hours. There were, however, numerous rain showers during the VC Valley operation.

Mission:

At Plei Djereng, mission was to block enemy movement south along and east of the Se San River.

In VC Valley, mission was to search for and destroy suspected enemy forces operating in VC Valley,

In Duc Co area, mission was to provide a blocking screen against any enemy forces moving from Cambodia toward Duc Co, or the Oasis area.

Execution:

On 18 June, A and D companies moved from Plei Kleng to Plei Djereng by C7A and joined the CP of 2/8 Inf at Plei Djereng. On 19 June, the remainder of the battalion moved to Plei Djereng by convoy.

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During the period 20-25 June, the battalion conducted extensive patrolling and sweep operations in the AO, with no enemy contact.

On 26 June, A Company moved by air to join 1/22 Inf in VC Valley. On 28 June, D Company moved by air to join 1/22 Inf in VC Valley. On 29 June, B Company moved by wheel to Camp Enari, in preparation for the conduct of a CAA to the vicinity of VC Valley.

On 30 June, the remainder of the battalion and B Btry, 4/42 Arty, secured by C Trp, 1/10 Cav, moved to Camp Enari and linked up with B Company. On that same day, 1/12 Inf conducted airlift operations into VC Valley, and a FSB was established at BR094396. At this time, A and D Companies rejoined the battalion.

During the period 1-9 July, extensive search and destroy operations were conducted, with the only activity being destruction of bunker complexes. On 6 July, A Company killed one NVA, 2 VMC in a very short-lived contact. No fire was returned by the enemy soldiers.

On 9 and 10 July, the battalion was airlifted to Camp Enari, where they began a 5 day standdown for rest, refitting and reequipping.

On 15 July, the battalion moved by wheel to LZ Jean to relieve C Company 2/35 Inf in place. B Company moved by air to LZ Diane to relieve B Company 2/35 Inf in place.

On 17 July, the Bn CP, C Company and B Btry 4/42 Arty moved by air to LZ Karen (YA813310). D Company moved by air to LZ Esther. At this time, 1/12 Inf assumed control of the AO from 2/35 Inf.

On 18 July, B Company was airlifted to the Oasis, where they assumed the security mission previously assigned to elements of 2/35 Inf. Also, D Company moved by air to LZ Betty to relieve elements of 1/22 Inf in place.

On 19 July, 1/12 Inf left control of the 2d Bde, and came under operational control of the 3d Bde. Local patrolling was conducted from the established bases with no findings or contact with the enemy.

On 21 July, the Bn (-) moved back to Duc Co airstrip in preparation for movement to the Ban Me Thuot area.

Results: NVA KIA-1 CIA-0  
VMC KIA-2 CIA-0

Equipment and material captured: SKS-2, Type 51 Chicom pistol-1, assorted medical equipment.

#### Administrative matters:

During the Plei Djereng operation, the battalion trains were located at the Oasis and resupply was effected by air.

During the VC Valley operation, the trains were kept at Camp Enari and resupply was effected by air from Hensel Field.

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When the battalion moved west of Duc Co, the trains, per se, were placed at the Oasis, with a forward supply point at Duc Co airstrip. Resupply was effected from the Oasis to Duc Co by both road and air, and was moved forward of Duc Co by air.

F. Operations in the Ban Me Thuot-Duc Lap area  
22 July thru 31 October 68

During this period, the 1st Bn 12th Inf was active in the defense of Ban Me Thuot and Duc Lap, relocating to seek out and block the advance of enemy forces. In addition, numerous cordon and search operations were conducted to assist in the disruption of the VC infra-structure. 1/12 Inf was under the operational control of the 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div.

Task organization:

22-26 July 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng  
\* A and D Companies OPCON 1/22 Inf from 22 1600 July to 23 1200 July 68.

27 July to 13 August 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
C Btry 1/92 Arty (155)  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

13 August to 25 August 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

25 August to 16 September 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
C Trp 1/12 Cav  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

17 September to 27 September 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Trp 1/10 Cav  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng



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27 September to 1 October 68

1st Bn 12th Inf (-) (C Co OPCON 1/10 Cav)  
B Co 2/8 Inf (MECH)  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

1 October to 22 October 68

1st Bn 12th Inf (-) (C Co OPCON 1/10 Cav)  
(B Btry 4/42 DS 1/10 Cav)  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

22 October to 27 October 68

1st Bn 12th Inf (-) (C Co OPCON 1/10 Cav)  
B Co 2/8 Inf (MECH)  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

27 October to 31 October 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
B Btry 5/16 Arty (SP)  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

## Intelligence:

Reliable reports and intelligence from higher headquarters indicated the presence of a large enemy force moving into position for a major attack on Ban Me Thuot. Moving from the northwest was the 66th NVA Regiment (estimated 600 strong), as well as the 301 and 401 VC local force battalions (estimated 200 each). Reports indicated that they would be staging through base area 238, which lies north of the Mewol Plantation, to gather for the attack and pick up supplies. During the month of September, it appeared that the 66th NVA had withdrawn to the northwest, probably into Cambodia.

During late September, the Special Forces camp at Duc Lap underwent a heavy attack. Around 30 September, the enemy withdrew into Cambodia, but it appeared that elements of the 1st and 5th NVA Divisions were regrouping and refitting for another attack on the Duc Lap area. Their combined strength was unknown after the first battle of Duc Lap, but was estimated to be well over 2,000.

Back in the Mewol Plantation area in late October, small groups of the 301 and 401 VC local force battalions were present, but were quite inactive, evidently avoiding contact while resupplying and recruiting.

The terrain in the Mewol area north of Ban Me Thuot was flat and generally open, interrupted by numerous plantations and cultivated areas. Observation was good, except along streams and low areas, where it was restricted by heavy vegetation. In these areas, cover and concealment were excellent.

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The weather was characterized by daily rain showers and long periods of low overcast.

The terrain in the Duc Lap area was rolling and relatively open, with scattered small forests and plantations. Vegetation along streams and low areas was thick, affording good cover and concealment with limited observation. Observation in all other areas was excellent.

The weather was usually clear, with intermittent rain showers.

The local populace in both areas was neutral in most cases. It appeared that the civilians would sympathize with whomever happened to be in the area at the time.

#### Mission:

Block the movement of the 66th NVA Regiment from the north into Ban Me Thuot, and prevent the entry of enemy forces into Base Area 238. Prevent the movement of enemy forces from the west to a position which would enable them to launch an attack on the Duc Lap area.

#### Execution:

On 22 July 1/12 Inf moved by convoy from Duc Co to Ban Me Thuot east. B Company joined them enroute, at the Oasis. 1/12 closed Ban Me Thuot east at 1600 hours. A and D Companies moved west of Ban Me Thuot, OPCON 1/22 Inf.

On 23 July 1/12 (-) and B Btry 4/42 moved north of Ban Me Thuot and established a temporary FSB at Q890015. A and D Companies rejoined the battalion that day at that location.

On 25 July, the battalion by convoy to LZ Allen (AQ777182). On 26 July, A, B, and C Companies conducted recon in force operations to the west, northwest, and north of the FSB, while D Company secured the FSB. The companies established patrol bases and kept a constant short range patrol screen. The only contact was on 7 August, when a patrol from the Recon Platoon killed two NVA and captured 2 AK47's. An unknown size element (estimated 5-7) came upon a short range patrol unexpectedly, so the patrol opened fire from a distance of 10-15 meters, killing the two. The others fled. The contact lasted less than one minute.

On 9 August, the battalion moved south of Ban Me Thuot to establish a series of blocking positions against a suspected NVA regiment. B Btry 4/42 and C Btry 1/92 remained at LZ Allen, secured by D Company 2/35 Inf. There were no enemy contacts, so the battalion returned to LZ Allen on 12 August.

On 13 August, the battalion moved by air north to LZ Sally (AQ772327) and established a FSB. A, B, and C Companies moved on foot to west, northwest, and north, conducting recon in force operations enroute. The companies again set up patrol bases and established a short range patrol screen, oriented north and west.

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On 17 August, a four man patrol from A Company observed 200 individuals moving southeast toward base area 238. Extensive artillery and air strikes were employed on the unit. A sweep of the area was made by A Company on 18 August, and evidence showed there had been extensive damage done. Although there were no bodies found, there were numerous blood trails and drag marks.

C and D Companies conducted two sweeps of arc light areas to assess bomb damage. One sweep resulted in one brief contact, killing two NVA. Contact was initiated by a short range patrol from D Company at a distance of 30-35 meters, and the duration was 5-7 minutes.

On 25 August the battalion moved to LZ George (AQ837217), and the companies maintained a short range patrol screen to the west, north, and east of the Mewol Plantation. No significant activities.

On 17 September, due to the employment of other US units to the Duc Lap area, it became necessary for the battalion to move further south in order to maintain a protective screen north of Ban Me Thuot. Accordingly, the battalion moved to LZ Schugler (AQ821183), while A and D Companies maintained patrol bases to the east and west. B Company remained at LZ George to keep an eye on the Mewol. C Company was placed OPCON to 1/10 Cav and moved to LZ Rosa (ZU256055). B Trp, 1/10 Cav, OPCON 1/12, secured the FSB. There were no significant activities during this period, other than scattered sightings of 2-3 individuals, too far away to engage. On 27 September, B trp 1/10 Cav was replaced by B Co, 2/8 Inf (MECH).

On 1 October, the battalion moved to Duc Lap to assist in the defense of the area, and to block enemy infiltration from the west, and to prevent a suspected NVA offensive on 4 October. B Btry, 4/42, remained at LZ Schuyler, and became OPCON 1/10 Cav. The battalion established a FSB at LZ Pack Rat (YU218638). D Company secured the FSB, while A and B Companies located themselves to the west and established short range patrol screens. There were no significant activities throughout the period, other than infrequent sightings of 2-5 individuals, upon whom artillery fire was placed.

On 22 October, the battalion returned to LZ George in the Mewol Plantation, (joined by B Btry 4/42) to disrupt the activities of the 301 and 401 VC local force battalions.

On 26 October, A and D Companies performed a cordon and search on the village of Mewol, causing the VC to suffer one KIA, 5 WIA, and two CIA. One of the captured was the chief of the Ban Me Thuot District autonomous committee.

On 27 October, C Company rejoined the battalion.

On 30 October, the battalion returned to LZ Mace in the Duc Lap area.

Results: NVA/VC KIA-9 CIA-2 (VC)  
US KIA-5 WIA-5

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## Captured enemy equipment and material:

AK47-5, SKS-4, Carbine M1-1, Carbine M2-1  
M1 rifle-1, B40 rockets-54, 82mm mortar  
rounds-298, Chicam grenades-7, rocket propellents-34,  
12.5 ammo-30 cases, rice-3 tons.

National Police, Armed Propaganda Teams, and MI teams were employed to conduct the search portion of cordon and search operations, and to conduct initial interrogation of suspects. On 18 and 19 August, tracker dog teams were used to sweep the area where the 200 NVA were hit by artillery and air-strikes.

All airstrikes were followed by a sweep of the area, as were those arc-lights employed within the AO.

## Administrative matters:

The primary means of resupply was by air. While the battalion was at LZ George and LZ Schuyler, limited overland resupply was accomplished. The trains area remained at Ban Ne Thuet east. While the battalion was in the Duc Lap area, a forward supply team was located at Duc Lap airstrip to facilitate the distribution of supplies.

During this period, AN/PRC 77's with secur voice attachments were made available at company level, making possible secure transmissions between battalion and companies, saving many man-hours usually required in the shackling of messages, and eliminating the possibility of errors in encoding and decoding.

## Commander's analysis:

It is very important that members of four man patrols be adept in calling for and adjusting artillery fire, and must be able to call in air strikes. These patrols should never engage enemy forces unless they are observed or must break contact. Four man patrols are very valuable as forward observers (eyes and ears) for friendly forces, but are not of sufficient size to engage in combat. By observing the enemy and adjusting fire on them, the patrols can interdict and/or destroy the enemy and can usually remain unobserved and safe. Members of patrols must understand their role thoroughly.

It is felt that cordon and search operations would be more successful if the search and interrogation agencies joined the cordon unit and moved with them during the night to the target village. Thus, at first light, when the element of surprise is greatest, the search and interrogation could begin immediately. If the village is cordoned for 2-4 hours before the National Police arrive, the villagers have an opportunity to conceal documents, weapons, even persons, and have ample time to establish "tales of innocence".

## G. Pacification

1 November 68 thru 31 January 69

The 1st Bn 12th Inf, during this period was involved primarily in pacification operations, including cordon and search, MEDCAP, and search and destroy-these operations designed specifically to undermine and help disintegrate the VC infra-structure. Also, the battalion was in a supporting role for SVN operations.

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Task organization:

1 thru 12 November 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

12 thru 14 November 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng  
23d ARVN RNGR Bn (OPCON)

20 November thru 2 December 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
A Co 1/22 Inf (OPCON)  
B Co 1/22 Inf (OPCON)  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng

2 thru 8 December 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
1st Plat B Co 4th Eng  
(No DS Arty Btry during this period)

8 thru 15 December 68

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat C Co 4th Eng

15 thru 18 December 68

1st Bn 12th Inf (-) (B&C Companies OPCON 2/8 Inf)  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat C Co 4th Eng

18 December 68 thru 6 January 69

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
1st Plat C Co 4th Eng

6 thru 31 January 69

1st Bn 12th Inf  
B Btry 4/42 Arty  
2d Plat C Co 4th Eng

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## Intelligence:

Enemy activity in the Duc Lap area during early November was light to negligible, as well as in the Mewol area north of Ban Me Thuot.

In the Plei Trap Valley, west of Kontum, a road was under observation upon which there was reportedly heavy vehicular traffic as the NVA began moving men and supplies south following the rainy season.

Intelligence sources indicated a planned meeting of VC leaders in early December in an area southeast of Kontum City.

There were also indications of possible NVA movement in the valleys west of Plei Kleng, with a possibility of the enemy maneuvering for attacks by fire on Plei Kleng and Kontum City.

Intelligence revealed the possibility of NVA artillery elements moving in a southwesterly direction north of VC Valley with designs of attacks by fire on Pleiku and neighboring military installations.

It had also been determined, through intelligence channels, that the lowlands west of Pleiku may have been used as high-speed personnel and supply transport thruways.

Mission: Disrupt and assist in disintegration of VC infrastructure, disrupt NVA/VC lines of communication, and whenever possible seek out and destroy NVA/VC forces. Support ARVN and CIDG operations aimed at same goals.

## Execution:

During the period 1-10 November, 1/12 Inf was in the Duc Lap area, but there were no contacts or significant findings.

On 10 November, the battalion returned to LZ George in the Mewol area north of Ban Me Thuot, and conducted short range patrol operations with negative results.

On 16 November, the entire battalion and B Btry 4/42 moved by convoy from Ban Me Thuot to Camp Enari.

On 17 and 18 November, the battalion under went standdown and refitting at Camp Enari.

On 19 November, the battalion, a move by convoy was made to Pleiku Air Base. From there the battalion and B Btry were lifted by C130 to Plei Kleng.

On 20 November, a FSB was established at LZ Swinger (YA837935) to provide fire support and reaction forces (if required) for 5 CIDG Companies who were destroying the road network in the Plei Trap Valley.

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On 26 November, A and B Companies moved into the Plei Trap Valley to continue clearing and destruction operations begun by the ARVN forces.

On 2 and 3 December, the battalion and B Btry were returned by air to Polei Kleng.

On the afternoon of 3 December, the battalion moved by vehicle to LZ Mary Lou, south of Kontum City.

On 4 December, the battalion (minus B Btry) conducted a CAA to LZ Red (ZAO32931) and LZ White (VA920740). C and D Companies conducted a sweep of the AO with negative results.

On 6 December, the battalion returned to Polei Kleng.

On 8 December, the battalion CP moved to LZ Anne ZAO64904. A Company established a patrol base to the north, B Company did likewise to the southeast, C Company secured B Btry 5-16 Arty at Polei Kleng, and D Company secured the FSB on LZ Anne.

On 11 December, C Company returned to LZ Red and conducted another sweep of the AO, returning to Polei Kleng from LZ White on 12 December.

During the period 15-18 December, B and C Companies were OPCON 2.8 Inf (MECH) to participate in a series of cordon and search operations.

During the period 20-23 December, A and C Companies conducted joint sweep operations with two CIDG Companies from Polei Kleng. The valley west and southwest of Polei Kleng was swept, with negative results.

On 23 December, the battalion moved to LZ Mary Lou to stage overnight, and on 24 December, moved by convoy to LZ Blackhawk, prepared to support (through the use of a solid short range patrol screen) ARVN Ranger sweeps north of VC Valley. On 26 December, the remainder of the battalion moved into the chosen locations.

During the period 1-5 January, B and D Companies conducted recon in force operations through the AO north of the FSB, with negative results.

On 6 January, under the operational control of 3d Bde, the battalion and B Btry moved by convoy from LZ Blackhawk west of Pleiku to LZ Stacey (ZAO87457). Beginning at midnight on 6 January, B Company moved to cordon the village of Plei Brock (1), with cordon in place at 0430 on 7 January. A courier team from the B 3 Front was ambushed as they approached the village on the morning of 7 January. The courier and one of his security guards were WIA (CIA) and a sachel of highly classified documents was captured. In addition, one VC was captured within the village.

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On 7 January, A and C Companies moved north from LZ Stacey, cordoning and searching villages enroute, with negative results.

On 10 January, the battalion began a movement by air to the Punchbowl (ZA939586). By nightfall, B and D Companies, the forward CP, and B Btry were at the Punchbowl. That night, 18 rounds of 75mm recoillessrifle fire and heavy machinegun fire were received from a ridge line east of the FOB.

On 11 and 12 January, the remainder of the battalion closed the AO, with A and C Companies located at LZ Victor, northeast of the Punchbowl. Extensive short range patrols and platoon sweeps were conducted, resulting in the discovery of an extensive bunker-hospital complex, which was destroyed by air strikes and C-4.

On 15 January, B Company moved from the Punchbowl on a recon in force mission to the west, and then north to the vicinity of Chu Pa Mountain, with negative results.

On 18 January, C Company began a recon in force to the southeast of Chu Pa Mountain, with negative results.

On 20 January, D Company moved north on a recon in force, wounded one NVA, and captured him. He was evacuated to the 71st Evac Hospital in Poeiku.

As of 31 January, the last day of Operation MACARTHUR, the battalion was in the above posture.

Results: NVA KIA-3 WIA (CIA)-3 CIA-1 (VC)  
US KIA-2 WIA-1

#### Enemy equipment and material captured:

95mm RR rounds-23, rifle grenades-12,  
Chicom grenades-4, B40 rockets-17, pistol,  
Russian made-1, AK47-2, carbine-1, rice-  
700 lb, one pouch of classified documents

#### Administrative matters:

Forward resupply was effected primarily by air from LZ Mary Lou ( 20 Nov to 24 Dec), LZ Blackhawk (24 Dec to 6 Jan) and the Oasis (6-31 Jan). The trains were in the aforementioned locations during those periods. Resupply was effected from Camp Enari to those locations by convoy.



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## Commanders analysis:

During the cordon of a village, it has been found that after there are individuals entering the village during first light, as well as leaving it. It could well be assumed that those entering are enemy personnel. With this in mind, an outer cordon (which can be comprised of OP's) should be placed about 150 meters outside the regular cordon, to watch for individuals entering the village. If party is small enough, the OP could engage them. If it is too large for the OP, the regular inner cordon can be alerted.

ROBERT H CARTER, JR  
LTC INF  
Commanding

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