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
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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This the 2d Volume of the 1969 USMACV Annual Command History, sixth in a series of Histories covering the years 1964 thru March 1973, prepared in accordance with CINCPAC Instructions for Unified Commands.			
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) RVN Armed Forces, Special Operations, Pacification, Nation Building, Logistics, Prisoners of War, Vietnamization, Herbicide, Sensor Programs, Maintenance, Transportation, Construction, Enemy Prisoners.			
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This Volume II, Command History, 1969, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam contains Letter of Promulgation, Title Page, Table of Contents, and Chapters VI thru X. Chapter VI - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (Page VI-1 - VI-166). Chapter VII - Special Operations (Page VII-1 - VII-30). Chapter VIII - Pacification and Nation Building (Page VIII-1 - VIII-102). Chapter IX - Logistics (Page IX-1 - IX-152). Chapter X - Prisoners of War (Page X-1 - X-90).			

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
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COMMAND HISTORY
VOLUME II
1969

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CHAPTER VI

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES

IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION

Introduction

(U) The year of 1969 was a year of RVNAF force structure increases and an accelerated expansion of all military and paramilitary services. It was a period of intensive effort on the part of both MACV and JCS in planning and developing programs designed to improve the effectiveness of the RVNAF. Improvement and modernization was the overall major emphasis. Consequently, many in-depth studies were undertaken to identify existing limitations and to describe specific actions which would be required to energize the RVNAF toward greater self-sufficiency. The studies exposed the magnitude of effort on the part of RVNAF, with continued MACV/US support that would be required in years to come to achieve this objective.

(C) War weariness, lack of qualified aggressive leadership, lack of technical know-how, and high desertion rates were special problems in the RVNAF. It was apparent that immediate steps were required to improve morale, welfare, and training of RVNAF personnel as rapidly as possible. Command emphasis was placed on these problem areas which are discussed in this chapter.

(U) This chapter also reviews the force structure plans for RVNAF improvement and modernization, the major programs developed to overcome existing limitations, and insofar as can be determined at this early stage, the progress of the Vietnamization effort.

Background

(S) Early in 1968, SECDEF had directed planning to develop a more self-sufficient and effective RVNAF. A plan had been submitted by MACV in May, which had been returned in June with SECDEF instructions to submit the plan in two phases with Phase I designed to maximize ground combat forces and consider US participation at current levels, and Phase II directed toward a self-sufficient RVNAF based on a scaled-down threat. The Phase I package, which provided for a force ceiling of 801,215 had been submitted on 27 Aug 68 and had been approved by JCS on 23 Oct 68. The Phase I equipment requirements had been programmed and deliveries begun in volume although shortages in some critical items existed. The release of stocks for support of Phase I and the expedited supply actions had assisted materially in obtaining the required equipment to meet activation schedules. On 8 Oct, MACV had submitted its Phase II portion of the plan which included an increased force structure of 855,594. Prior to this, on 4 Oct, a force increase (Phase I modified) of 48,785 had been requested from OSD. This increase, intended to prepare RVNAF for the Phase II program, had been approved on 5 Nov. On 9 Nov, MACV forwarded an accelerated Phase II plan to the JCS. This plan had called for a force level of 877,090 and had included Phase I forces which were to be deactivated or reduced once operational requirements diminished. On 18 Dec, OSD had approved the accelerated Phase II plan, with the exception of the VNN portion and the ammunition requirements. This approval had authorized an RVNAF force level of 866,434 at the end of 1968. The MACV

proposal to accelerate the Phase II activations, especially in the ARVN had been approved. On 26 Dec, MACV had submitted new equipment requirements for the accelerated Phase II program. At the same time, a 9,400 strength increase in the RVNAF logistical system had been proposed for FY69-71 in response to a JCS request to review the RVNAF logistical system to ensure that the RVNAF would be able to make maximum use of combat strength without being hindered by inadequate logistical support (a detailed study of all facets of the foregoing summation is contained in the 1968 MACV Command History, Vol 1, pp 249-270). At the end of 1968, approval of the accelerated Phase II equipment lists, the logistical add-on, the VNN force structure increase of 10,461, and the ammunition requirements were pending. ¹

(S) At the beginning of 1969, the RVNAF strengths were as follows:

<u>Service</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
ARVN	374,132	380,270
VNAF	32,587	18,625
VNN	19,344	18,882
VNMC	9,304	9,134
RF	252,927	219,762
PF	178,140	172,536
TOTAL	866,434	819,209

All authorized strengths, with the exception of the VNN, were the accelerated Phase II RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (I&M) authorizations as approved by DEPSECDEF on 18 Dec 68. The VNN strength, above, reflected the Phase I authorization.

(S) Phase II authorization for VNN was approved in February for 9,456 additional spaces, instead of the requested 10,461. This brought the VNN authorized force structure to 28,700 and total RVNAF force to 875,790. Later in the year, there were additional spaces released by MACV to RVNAF for VNMC, RF, and PF (see section on CVN Midway Proposal), so that by the end of December, the RVNAF authorized and assigned strengths were as follows:

<u>Service</u>	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
ARVN	374,132	410,378
VNAF	32,587	16,469
VNN	28,700	10,141
VNMC	10,419	11,528
RF	255,167	240,455
PF	182,725	214,383
TOTAL	883,730	969,256

Accelerated Phase II I&M Program

(S) On 28 Apr, DEPSECDEF gave final approval of the Accelerated Phase II RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan as modified by the JCS, and, in the case of the VNN, by SECDEF (a discussion of this follows under Vietnamese Navy). In his approval memo, he also stated:

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Vietnamizing the war should have the highest priority. Providing needed equipment for the RVNAF is therefore of greatest importance. To assure that equipment turned over to the RVNAF can be used effectively, it must be supported by (1) training and (2) logistic support.

In implementing the Phase II plan, because of its high priority, selective equipment turnover from US units in South Vietnam should be utilized whenever this can be effective, and some impact on non-SEA Army unit readiness can be expected.

To expedite implementation of the Phase II Plan, COMUSMACV may make minor (five percent of each service strength) adjustments to RVNAF service ceilings provided the total RVNAF force strength remains within the approved total of 875,790 personnel. ³

(C) On 24 May, MACV submitted its new RVNAF unit authorization listing and activation schedule for the accelerated plan, including a revised ARVN logistic structure and the ARVN tradeoffs to accommodate the revision. On 5 Jun, MACV requested an early approval of this listing and schedule, and on 12 Jun, approval was received from JCS. ⁴

Phase III and IIIA I&M Program

(S) When DEPSECDEF approved the Accelerated Phase II Plan on 18 Dec 68, he had included a request for the JCS to formulate a concept of RVNAF force structures appropriate to hypothesized "optimum" (Phase III) and "intermediate" (Phase IIIA) security conditions. In response, COMUSMACV, in early January, submitted his concept of forces for both phases and stated that these phases were considered as follow-ons to the "worst" security condition for which the Phase II force was tailored. The following was COMUSMACV's concept of force structure:

<u>Service</u>	<u>Phase IIIA</u>	<u>Phase III</u>
ARVN	281,000	250,000
VNAF	12,600	12,600
VNN	26,100	24,500
VNMC	9,300	9,300
Subtotal	349,000	316,400
RF	252,900	252,900
PF	256,300	235,000
Subtotal	509,400	487,900
Grand Total	858,400	804,300

(S) The Phase IIIA structure was formulated on the assumptions that all NVA combat forces would have withdrawn from RVN, Laos, and Cambodia, but that NVA support and fillers

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remained in RVN and infiltration of material and up to 3,000 personnel per month continued. The VC strength was seen as approximating the 1964-65 force level. Operations of RVNAF would be aimed at destroying VC units, interdicting infiltration routes, screening the pacification effort, and defending threatened population areas and other critical terrain. Substantial effort by conventional forces would be required in the areas contiguous to border sanctuaries and support bases.

(S) The Phase III concept was formulated on the assumptions that all NVA forces would have withdrawn from RVN, Laos, and Cambodia; infiltration had ceased; an effective inspection and verification system had been established to supervise withdrawal and border crossings; VC strength and capabilities had been seriously reduced; and the intensity of combat, terrorism, and sabotage had been substantially reduced. The combat operations of RVNAF would be aimed at eliminating the remaining VC units. As area security increased, the territorial forces would move in to extend government control; as the enemy threat was reduced, conditions would approximate peacetime in a developing nation.

(S) Transition of the RVNAF force structure assumed an improving internal security situation and a decrease in, or elimination of, the threat. It was estimated that at least two years would be required to transition to Phase II completely, 2-4 years for Phase IIIA, and 4 years plus to Phase III.

(S) In his submission of these levels, COMUSMACV emphasized his position that the assumed situations provided to Phase IIIA and III did not reflect the views of his command as to the situation and related needs which could be reasonably forecasted for the future, and that the only realistic program, in light of all that was known at that time, was the accelerated Phase II program previously approved (See 1968 MACV Command History, Vol I, pp 257-259).⁵

GVN Midway Proposal

(S) At the 8 Jun US-GVN Presidential meeting at Midway Island, President Thieu presented a plan to support an increased force level and improved standards of living for RVNAF soldiers and their dependents. Following the meeting, SECDEF requested COMUSMACV and AMEMB Saigon's comments and recommendations regarding the proposals. On 27 Jun, those comments and recommendations were furnished to CINCPAC.

(S) Basically, the GVN proposals were divided into two parts - a basic plan and other (additive) proposals. The GVN basic proposals, the number of spaces requested, and COMUSMACV's position on each are shown below:

1. ARVN

<u>Area</u>	<u>Total Spaces Requested</u>	<u>COMUSMACV Position on General Validity of Requirement</u>
Infantry Div. Reorg	13,311	Valid; but modified to provide only 7,000 additional spaces.
Improvement of Logistics	4,477	Valid; approved previously.

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Signal (ICS+DTE+ATS)	2,271	Valid; signal approved previously, equipment to be supplied by turn-over of in-country assets.
Increase Command and Staff College	170	Deferred; insufficient detail provided to validate the proposal.
Increase in Admin and Finance	3,454	Deferred; insufficient detail provided to validate the proposal.
Logistic Trade-Off	9,236	Valid; approved previously in RVNAF space tradeoffs.

2. RF/PF

PF	2,969 platoons (103,915 spaces)	Valid but modified; recommend 1,670 platoons with 58,450 spaces.
RF		
CIDG Conversion	10,297	Valid.
Increase for CMD	6,064	Valid but modified; 3,800 spaces in support of PF increase (A & DSL companies).
46 Additional RF Companies and Support (Not part of Mid-way proposal; added by MACV Staff).	7,346	Validated for use in areas where platoons cannot be recruited or PF employment not feasible.

3. VNMC


3 Inf Bn	2,628	Valid.
1 Arty Bn	510	Valid.
Support	628	Valid.

4. VNN

Personnel Increase	510	Valid but modified; 550 personnel for FY70 required to man and maintain 2 DEs and 10 WPBs.
Equipment		
2 DE		Valid; authorized previously.
10 WPB		Valid; under consideration by JCS.

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2 LSSL		<u>Not</u> valid; none available in US inventory.
2 YOG	Not specified	<u>Not</u> valid; no additional requirement.
Added by COMNAVFORV		
2 WHEC	320	Deferred; will be reviewed in 3/70 to see whether the WHECs could be manned within VNN ceiling.

(S) The list of additive proposals, strengths requested, and COMUSMACV's position on each is provided below:

1. ARVN

<u>Area</u>	<u>Total Spaces Requested</u>	<u>COMUSMACV Position on General Validity of Requirement</u>
<u>Air Def Arty</u>		
1 1/2 Hawk Bn	Not specified	<u>Not</u> valid; this applied to entire air defense artillery... US aircraft was adequate deterrent.
14 M55 Btrys	Not specified	
5 M42 Bns	Not specified	
11 Vulc/Chap Bns	Not specified	
TOTAL SPACES	6,512	
<u>Armor</u>		
2 A:md Bde HQ	Not specified	<u>Not</u> valid; this applied to entire request for more armor. The currently authorized 17 squadrons were considered adequate.
3 ACS	Not specified	
13 M106 Mort Plts	Not specified	
TOTAL SPACES	2,035	
<u>Artillery</u>		
Four 8" FA Bns (towed or SP)	1,900	Only part of this arty request was valid. It was modified as follows: Approved 3 battalions (2-105mm and 1-155mm towed) with 1,490 spaces for FY 70.
Four 105mm FA Bns (SP)	1,920	
Eighteen 155mm How Btrys and Sixty-five 105mm How Btrys	10,462	
TOTAL SPACES	14,282	
<u>Equipment Modernization</u>		
<u>Repart</u>	<u>With</u>	Entire request for these particular items to be modernized was <u>not</u> valid; currently authorized equipment was adequate.
M101 105mm How	M102 105mm How	
M113 APC (Gas)	M113 APC (Diesel)	
M41 Tank	M551 or M48A)	

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2. VNN

<u>Area</u>	<u>Total Spaces Requested</u>	<u>COMUSMACV Position on General Validity of Requirement</u>
Personnel	615	See comment below.
Equipment 3 RAIDs		Valid but modified to incorporate the personnel as shown.*
*Personnel (Not recommended at Midway but personnel are essential for the equipment (3 RAIDs) requested in Midway proposal.)		
VNN LOG	1,205	Valid; required for the support for VNN.
Manning for 80 RACs	1,190	Valid to man 80 RACs.
Equipment modernization		
<u>Replace</u>	<u>With</u>	
Motorized Junk:	PCFs	<u>Not</u> valid; currently authorized equipment was adequate.

3. VNAF

Increased Logistics/Base Support	3,498 (FY71)	Valid but modified for FY70, 3,199 pers for VNAF expansion from 20 to 40 squadrons and establishment of Base and Log Support.
Air Defense	Not specified	Entire air defense request <u>not</u> valid; may be considered in a post hostilities MAP program.
2 F4 Sqdn (36 acft) 8 Radar stations 2 Hawk Msl Btrys		
Search and Rescue	Not specified	Entire search and rescue request <u>not</u> valid; a reasonable amount of help recovery was inherent in the current expansion program.
8 C-47 8 SA-16 13 H-43 12 UH-1		
Coastal and River Surveillance	Not specified	Entire coastal and river surveillance request <u>not</u> valid; limited capability for this mission existed in current and programmed forces.
15 Ps/PSB 2 C-1A 22 UH-1B 3 UH-3X 4 C-117		

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Increased SAM Sqdn 2 VC-47 2 UH-1 4 U-21	Not specified	Entire request for increase in SAM Sq <u>not</u> valid; overriding operational requirements precluded consideration.
CONVERSION (Equipment Modernization) 1 Sqdn C-47 to C-130 1 Sqdn C-119 to C-130	Not specified	Entire request for conversion of these aircraft <u>not</u> valid; primary need was for short haul delivery. 3 Sqdn C-123 aircraft planned; C-130 aircraft <u>not</u> required.
Priority LOG Support	Not specified	Request <u>not</u> valid; VNAF currently received priority LOG support.
Increased Number of Tech Reps/Advisors For Maintenance	Not specified	Request <u>not</u> valid; presently assigned number was adequate.

4. Improved RVNAF Standard of Living.

<u>PROPOSAL</u>	<u>EST COST</u>	<u>COMMENT</u>
Free Messing	\$VN 30.5 Billion	<u>Not</u> recommended if US funded.
RF Allowance Increase	\$VN 1.1 Billion	<u>Not</u> recommended if US funded.
PF Pay Increase	\$VN 3.2 Billion	<u>Not</u> recommended if US funded.
Hospital Ration Increase	\$VN .26 Billion	<u>Not</u> recommended if US funded.
Free Rice Issue	\$637.0 Million (US)	<u>Not</u> recommended. RVNAF did not have capability to receive, store, and issue additional rice. Would increase overall tonnage handled by 30 percent.
Increased Number of Combat Rations (from 1,050,000 to 2,000,000 per month)	Not estimated.	<u>Not</u> recommended. Recent MACV/JGS review only validated a request for 900,000 ration per month.
Working Capital for Commissary	\$100 Million (US)	<u>Not</u> recommended. Sufficient GVN funds were available to accomplish this if GVN authorized off-shore procurement.
US Property Disposal to RVNAF	Not estimated.	<u>Not</u> recommended. Prohibited by PL 151; GVN had priority purchase rights.

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Joint Support for Housing Allowance Increase

Not estimated.

Not recommended. Was internal GVN problem; MACV should not address increase of standard of living for one segment of GVN population.

Curtail Commercial Consumables Transfer Program

Not recommended. Was a key element to upgrade industrial base; was proceeding slowly due to GVN problems. GVN should be encouraged to overcome problems. Imports of related raw material through CIP was also a determinant to level of USAID joint support funding.

Increase Joint Support from \$VN 14.8 Billion (FY69) to \$VN 49.5 Billion (CY70)

Not recommended.

(1) Provide Joint Support funds directly to GVN in US dollars, or

(1) Not recommended. The commercial import program and PL 480 (Food for Peace Program) were sources of Joint Support Funds for GVN. Under present laws, funds provided recipient country must be in local currency and controlled by US. Proposal would reduce or eliminate US control of funds and aggravate gold flow problems.

(2) Support RVNAF as third country forces are supported.

(2) Not recommended. Third country type support too expensive to consider.

(S) A summary of increased personnel authorizations requested by GVN and those validated by MACV are as shown in Table VI-1.

(S) The US Embassy and MACV commented that, based on the Embassy's information concerning manpower, the GVN proposal should not be completely implemented. Based on the preliminary evaluation of the Midway Proposal and other related matters, the Mission recommended an approval of an RVNAF FY70 force structure increase of 92,883 (including 15,000 AID/DOD-funded spaces for the National Police). Even this was expected to place a heavy strain on RVN manpower resources, particularly in view that the preponderance of the increase in RVNAF would be in the Popular Forces. However, they felt that this calculated risk should be taken. If approved, these spaces would be controlled by MACV and released as the RVNAF met utilization requirements, taking into account the manpower and budget situation.

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(S) Comments made by COMUSMACV indicated that:

1. Logistical support of the program within the time frame indicated would be dependent on early Congressional approval, DOD allocation, and production availability. The turnover of assets from redeploying US units would be required in many cases. COMUSMACV did not, however, recommend approval of any GVN equipment modernization proposals beyond those in currently approved programs.

2. The increased standard of living demand, amounting to some \$VN 68 billion, would be highly inflationary or would involve a very large aid burden, depending on whether the program were RVN or US financed. In either case, it would tend to extend and perpetuate the country's dependence on imports. The financial assistance proposals were therefore, considered undesirable.

(S) Also COMUSMACV pointed out that the following restraints were applicable for future RVNAF force structure increases:

1. Spaces should be released by MACV for approved increases by increments based on RVNAF's capability to recruit and train forces, MACV's capability to equip the force, and budgetary limitations.

2. No new sophisticated equipment should be introduced until RVNAF established a capability to train personnel and to maintain and operate that equipment, in addition to maintaining their present equipment at a high state of readiness.

3. A joint evaluation should be conducted quarterly, beginning in 3d Qtr, FY70, to determine the readiness of RVNAF and the progress in the Pacification Campaign. The requirement and priorities for any FY71 force structure change should be based on this joint evaluation.

(S) In summary, COMUSMACV stated that before any space increases are released for ARVN and RF/PF units, the problems impairing the effectiveness of the present structure would be addressed. These included attaining and sustaining acceptable combat effectiveness, reducing desertions, improving leadership and specialist training, and improving the logistic system. Consideration would also be given to the impact on the budget and the civilian economy.

(S) The CINCPAC forwarded his concurrence in COMUSMACV's analysis and proposals to JCS on 18 Jun. The former also pointed out that current manpower problems must be given serious consideration before moving toward another large increase. Much of the equipment requested was sophisticated, and the pool of talented Vietnamese was already overburdened. Personnel to man the additional equipment could not be trained until after the current long lead time training requirements were met. He recommended that the proposals be approved for further RVNAF expansion planning, that the currently approved ceiling of 875,790 should be reached before further expansion, that existing regular units should show a visible qualitative improvement before new regular units are authorized, and to approve increases in force structure incrementally. ⁶

(S) The JCS completed their review of the GVN proposals for expanded RVNAF I&M made at Midway and submitted their comments and recommendations to the SECDEF on 28 Jul. In general, JCS supported the comments and recommendations made by the US Mission, MACV, and CINCPAC.

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(S) Specifically, the JCS observed that:

As pointed out by the Mission, the financial proposals would be highly inflationary and tend to perpetuate RVN dependence on imports. Some of the financial proposals were also unwarranted or lack sufficient justification.

The GVN proposals call for appreciable quantities of sophisticated equipment, whereas the type already being provided appeared adequate in terms of current requirements and the limited Vietnamese technical capability. As these capabilities improve and if operational needs change, more sophisticated weapons systems should be considered for introduction into the RVNAF.

The RVN proposals for further RVNAF modernization and expansion envisions these forces taking over the major fighting responsibility against the current VC/NVA threat. The currently outgoing RVNAF I&M Program, however, was not designed to cope with the current threat but rather with residual insurgency. While the GVN proposal provided for some additional offensive capability, it was not considered sufficient in itself for RVNAF to take over the major fighting responsibility against current threat, particularly in view of such problems as leadership and desertions.

Based on available manpower information, the GVN was rapidly approaching the upper limits of its manpower capability to sustain the present RVNAF force structure of 875,790. The force structure increase, proposed by the GVN, could exceed manpower resources. However, a limited increase, with the preponderance of spaces going to territorial security forces, probably could be supported within acceptable risk limits.

(S) The JCS recommended that:

1. The FY70 RVNAF strength increase of 77,883 recommended by COMUSMACV be approved together with the validated increases in force structure.
2. COMUSMACV be authorized to release to the JCS the FY70 force structure spaces on an incremental basis commensurate with qualitative RVNAF improvement and GVN capability to recruit and train additional personnel.
3. An FY71 RVNAF strength increase of 39,164 together with the MACV-validated increases in force structure be approved for planning purposes.

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RVNAF FORCE STRUCTURE RELEASES 1969

	Accelerated Phase II Authorized	Midway MACV Validated Released		End Dec 69 Total Authorized	End Dec 69 Assigned	End FY 70 Authorized
		FY 70	CY 69			
ARVN	374,132 +	13,703	none	374,132	416,278	387,835
VNN	28,700 +	2,945	none	28,700	30,143	31,645
VNMC	9,304 +	3,766	1,115	10,419	11,528	13,070
VNAF	32,587 +	3,199	none	32,587	36,469	35,786
RF	252,927 +	17,570	2,240	255,167	260,455	270,497
PF	<u>178,140</u> +	<u>36,700</u>	<u>4,585</u>	<u>182,725</u>	<u>214,383</u>	<u>214,840</u>
TOTAL	875,790	77,883	7,940	883,730	969,256	953,673

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TABLE VI-2

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4. Interagency agreement be obtained for support of National Police increases of 15,000 in FY70 and 15,000 in FY71.
5. Funding and procurement authority be provided for replacement of that equipment delivered to the RVNAF but which is required in the approved US Force Structure.
6. Ship loan legislation be obtained for two DEs, as appropriate.
7. Agreement be obtained from the Department of Transportation for turnover to the VNN of 10 US Coast Guard patrol boats and two high-endurance cutters with the understanding that availability and turnover of the cutters should be reviewed in March 1970.
8. The military departments be authorized to deliver specified major equipment required in FY70 at an estimated unprogrammed cost of \$118 million.
9. Funding and procurement authority be provided for replacement of equipment delivered to RVNAF which is required in the approved US Force Structure. 7

(S) On 18 Aug, SECDEF approved the recommended FY70 RVNAF force structure increase (77,883) and the FY71 increase (39,164) for planning purposes. The 15,000 increase in National Police strength for FY70 was also approved, and an additional 15,000 increase for FY71 was approved for planning purposes. In the approval, COMUSMACV was authorized to release the FY70 force structure to the JCS on an incremental basis with the recommendation that the added personnel spaces should be released as the GVN demonstrates its ability successfully to expand and improve the RVNAF and to recruit and train the next increment. Military departments were requested to deliver necessary items of equipment and supplies as required by COMUSMACV.

(S) By the end of December, out of the total 77,883 spaces validated for release in FY70, COMUSMACV had authorized release of 7,940 spaces for RF (2,240), PF (4,585), and VNMC (1,115), respectively (See Table VI-2).

(S) With respect to the budgetary considerations of the new authorization increase, SECDEF stipulated that, in accordance with the FY70-71 Budget Guidance (which was approved 30 Jul 69), increased funding requirements in FY70 would be accommodated by reprogramming within the specific appropriations involved or by proposed transfers between appropriations involved or by proposed transfers between appropriations if such reprogramming were not possible. The FY71 increases were to be accommodated within the fiscal guidance contained in DEPSECDEF Memorandum of 10 Jul 69. Maximum use was to be made of equipment turnover from redeploying US units to satisfy these additional requirements. The military departments were authorized to replace equipment and supplies used to satisfy these requirements to the extent that their overall inventories did not drop below that required to support their post-hostilities baseline force structure.

(S) The SECDEF desired that SECNAV take necessary action to obtain appropriate ship loan legislation and an agreement from the Department of Transportation for the turnover of US Coast Guard assets as recommended.

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(S) SECDEF also said:

Earlier RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Programs were designed to provide a balanced and self-sufficient RVNAF force capable of meeting insurgency requirements, and were based on the assumption that US, Allied and North Vietnamese forces would withdraw from South Vietnam. Now the object of Vietnamization is to transfer progressively to the Republic of Vietnam greatly increased responsibility for all aspects of the war, assuming current levels of North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces remain in the Republic of Vietnam, and assuming US forces redeployments continue.

(S) Accordingly, he desired that the JCS and service secretaries review, and submit the results to him by 30 Sep, the current RVNAF I&M Program, and other on-going and planned actions to enhance RVNAF capabilities, with the goal of developing an RVNAF with the capability to cope successfully with the combined VC/NVA threat. ⁸

(A full discussion of this review and subsequent queries and answers may be found in the Effectiveness Section of this chapter.)

Army of the Republic of Vietnam

Logistics Add-on

(C) As has been noted previously, COMUSMACV had requested an increase of 9,400 spaces for logistical support of the RVNAF on 26 Dec 68. The FY69 portion of this increase, 1,791 spaces, was approved by JCS on 4 Mar 69 with instructions to incorporate the spaces within the present overall ARVN authorization.

(S) On 14 Mar, COMUSMACV requested an early decision on the remaining logistics increase for FY70-71 (7,629 spaces) in order to enhance combined planning between RVNAF and MACV. This increase consisted of the following type units:

<u>Units</u>	<u>Spaces</u>	<u>Activation Date</u>
QM Depots & Exchange		
Commissary Personnel	783	FY70
Ord DS Units & Repair Units	1,404	FY70
Signal Support Elements	405	FY70
Engr Const Units & Topog- raphy Company	3,107	FY70
Trans Floating Crane Det	14	FY70
Inventory Control Ctr/Misc Spt	95	FY70
3 Engr Const Bns	<u>1,821</u>	FY71
	7,629	

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1969 ARVN Activation Schedule, Revision, and Progress

Type Unit	Originally Planned Schedule			Actual 3/69 Activations	Revised 4/69 Schedule	Actual 4/69 Activations
	3/69	4/69	Totals			
Inf Bn	1		1	1		
Armd Cav Sqdn		2	3	1	1	1
105mm Arty Bn	2	2	9	4		
155mm Arty Bn	2	1	5	3		
Signal Bn	1		1	1		
Engr Const Bn	2		4	2		
Engr Spt Bn		1	1			
Engr Dump Truck Co	1		1	1		
Engr Hvy Equip Co		1	2	1		
Ord DS Co		2	6		2	2
Trans Lt Truck Co	4	1	6	4	1	1
Trans Med Boat Co		1	2		1	1
Trans Hvy Boat Co		1	1		1	1
TOTALS	13	11	42	18	6	6

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TABLE VI-3

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JCS approved this increase for planning purposes on 27 Mar and requested a list of planned trade-offs to accommodate the logistics structure increase within the approved ARVN ceiling of 374,132. The trade-off list was provided by MACV on 24 May and approved by JCS on 12 Jun. This approval did not raise the overall RVNAF strength authorization. ⁹

(S) With respect to this FY70-71 Force Structure approval, this was the total logistic structure increase that COMUSMACV had requested in December 1968 after a SECDEF-requested logistics review. At that time, it was envisioned that, in FY70-71, security conditions would continue to improve and, therefore, trade-offs in combat elements that were not possible in FY69 could be planned for FY70-71. The large increase was proposed in recognition of the LOC and nation-building role that would fall to the ARVN engineers. This increase would also provide a better balance in the overall force structure with respect to engineer support. ¹⁰

ARVN Activations

(S) With the approval of the Accelerated Phase II I&M Program in December 1968, the wheels had been set in motion for the activation, training, and equipping of additional ARVN units through the FY69-71 time period. However, the majority of the activations-42 out of 51 units-were scheduled for the last two quarters of FY69 and the first two quarters of FY70. ¹¹ The original schedule for unit activations by quarter during this period is shown in Table VI-3.

(S) The 1969 first quarter activations progressed so satisfactorily that, by the end of the quarter, some of the year's second quarter scheduled activations had already been accomplished, and only six units required activation in the second quarter in order to maintain the planned schedule (See Table VI-3).

(S) These six units were activated in the second quarter of the year, thus putting the originally-planned schedule back on course (See Table VI-3). ¹²

(C) During the first two quarters of FY70, all ARVN units originally planned for activation as shown in Table VI-3 were activated by the JCS. By the end of 1969 the following actions had been completed:

1. 10 Engineer construction battalions had been deployed, including two which were part of Phase II accelerated force structure increase.
2. 47 truck companies (light and medium) had been deployed which met the Phase II accelerated goal.
3. 20 Ordnance direct support companies had been deployed.
4. 10 logistical direct support battalions included in the Phase II accelerated force structure increase had been deployed, one for each infantry division.
5. The activated armored cavalry squadrons had completed training and were deployed. This completed an expansion of ARVN armor of approximately 70 percent over the last 17 months. ¹³

NOTE: The ARVN and VNNC Forces and locations at the end of the year are shown in Figure VI-1.


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**ARVN & VNMC UNIT LOCATIONS
AS OF DECEMBER 1969**



* SPECIAL ZONE
 ** STRATEGIC RESERVE BATTALIONS
 *** THERE ARE TWO MARINE BRIGADES, DESIGNATED A & B WITH A TOTAL OF 7 MANEUVER BATTALIONS (1 BN IN TRAINING)
 **** NUMBER OF RF/PF AND CIDG UNITS AS OF 31 OCT 69. DOES NOT INCLUDE UNITS IN TRAINING.

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FIGURE VI-1

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Equipment Turnovers

(S) The majority of the equipment required to outfit the 1969-activated ARVN units under the accelerated Phase II plan was programmed to come from CONUS production. However, to resolve the deficit between the equipment that was needed and that which was available from CONUS, a program of equipment turnovers to selected ARVN units from US units which were scheduled for inactivation or redeployment was established. 14

(S) On 26 Jan, COMUSMACV requested approval of supporting actions pertaining to the equipment turnover to selected ARVN units scheduled for activation in the 3d Qtr, FY69. On 20 Feb, JCS approved the supporting actions as requested. The dates and "donating" units as applicable required to furnish the equipment to support these activations were as follows:

<u>ARVN Unit</u>	<u>Date Equipment Required</u>	<u>Supporting US Unit</u>
1-Abn FA Bn	Jan 69	None
1-FA Bn	Mar 69	6th Bn, 77th FA
1-FA Bn	Mar 69	None
2-Engr Bn (Const)	Mar 69	87th Engr Bn (Const)
1-7th Engr Const Gp Hq	Mar 69	None

The 3d Abn FA Bn had received its first increment of howitzers in January and was scheduled to receive all mission essential equipment by March. Turnover of equipment from the 6th Bn, 77th Arty (105mm How-T) was to begin in March. The 87th Engr Bn (Const) was programmed out of the USARV force structure in March and was to provide mission essential equipment to both newly-activated ARVN engineer battalions. As the ARVN engineer units progressed in training, additional equipment was to be provided from the assets of the 87th Engr Bn and, if necessary, by temporary drawdown on other US units. The temporary drawdown would, if necessary, be replaced by equipment from the 116th Engr Bn (CBT) which was scheduled to redeploy to CONUS in August. 15

(S) On 15 Mar, COMUSMACV requested immediate approval of all supporting actions involving the turnover of US equipment to meet 4th quarter, FY69 activations schedules for the following selected ARVN units:

<u>ARVN Unit</u>	<u>Date Equipment Required</u>	<u>Supporting US Unit</u>
1-FA Bn (155 How)***	Apr 69	6th Bn, 84th Arty*
1-Engr Co (Hvy Equip)	Apr 69	87th Engr Bn (Const)*; 131st Engr Co (Lt Equip)**; 116th Engr Bn (Cbt)**
1-Trans Co (Med Boat)***	N/A	231st Trans Co (Med Boat)**
2-Ord DS Co	May 69	1st LOG Comd (USARV assets)

- * Unit scheduled for inactivation.
- ** Unit scheduled for redeployment
- *** Equipment turnover had been completed to ARVN unit by end of the year.

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At the same time COMUSMACV forecasted activation of the following units over and above those previously reported for FY70 and requested that equipment turnover requirements be approved for planning. These units would be part of the FY70 logistics add-on which at that time had not yet been approved: ¹⁶

<u>Unit</u>	<u>FY Qtr Equipment Required</u>
1-Medium Boat Co	1/70
5-Tug Boat Teams	1/70
1-Engr Const Bn	1/70
1-Engr Const Bn	2/70
1-Engr Hvy Equip Co	2/70
1-Floating Crane Det	3/70

(C) On 27 Mar, JCS approved the requested supporting actions for the 4th quarter, FY69 activations. In addition, the equipment turnover for FY70, as included in the Accelerated Phase II plan, and the supplemental logistic structure increase mentioned above were approved for planning purposes pending OSD's final overall approval of the accelerated Phase II plan. ¹⁷

(S) On 28 Apr, DEPSECDEF gave final approval to the overall Accelerated Phase II plan as supplemented and the following schedule of equipment turnovers for the 1st Qtr, FY70, which had already been established for planning purposes, became firm:

<u>ARVN Unit</u>	<u>Supporting US Unit</u>
1-Trans Co, Hvy Boat	329th Trans Co, Hvy Boat
1-Float Craft Depot Maint Co	USA Marine Acty
1-Tugboat Team	271st Trans Det (FJ)
1-Tugboat Team	272d Trans Det (FJ)
1-Tugboat Team	565th Trans Det (FJ)
1-Tugboat Team	566th Trans Det (FJ)
1-Tugboat Team	567th Trans Det (FJ)

Equipment was to be made available for training only. Transfer was not to be made until US requirements were satisfied. ¹⁸

Engineer Asset Turnovers

(C) In conjunction with the Accelerated Phase II plan for turnover of equipment to the RVNAF, USARV was tasked in March to provide minimum essential equipment (MEE) for two newly-activated RVNAF engineer construction battalions from USARV resources. The MACV concept envisioned a unit-to-unit transfer of the equipment; however, it was decided to take as much equipment as possible from depot assets in order to provide the newest possible equipment for the RVNAF. Equipment not available from depot stocks was being transferred from USARV non-divisional units. The objective of completing the turnover before the end of March was not achieved due to the time required to identify depot stocks on hand for transfer and the time required to inspect, repair, collect, and transport equipment from widely dispersed engineer units. The turnover of MEE to the two new RVNAF battalions commenced on 29 Mar and was

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scheduled for completion in April. The USARV had further been tasked to provide equipment for an engineer heavy equipment company in May. ¹⁹

Equipment Deliveries

(C) One of the cornerstones to the I&M Program was the timely delivery of equipment to the RVNAF in order to activate new units and better equip the ones already in existence. In order to establish a limit and priorities, the various I&M Programs established authorized strengths for the different type weapons. Deliveries were then made from CONUS against this authorization. On Table VI-4 are listed major items of selected equipment approved in support of RVNAF I&M according to: the accelerated Phase I FY69; the Phase II FY70 authorizations; the improved FY70 authorizations as a result of the Midway proposals; and MACV revision in Nov 69 for FY70, based on MACV restatement of requirements. ²⁰

Vietnamese Air Force

(S) At the beginning of 1969 the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) had five air wings with 19 subordinate flying squadrons. One of the wings was located in each of the Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) with the exception of III CTZ which had two wings (See Figure VI-2). The VNAF was organized as shown in Figure VI-3. Against an authorized strength of 32,587, there were 18,625 personnel assigned.

(S) The major 1969 VNAF goals were:

1. Convert four helicopter squadrons (CH-34s) to UH-1Hs.
2. Convert three fighter squadrons (A-1) to A-37 aircraft.
3. Convert one transport squadron (C-47) to a combat squadron (AC-47).
4. Activate a Special Air Mission squadron (SAM) at Tan Son Nhut.
5. Program and train pilots and maintenance personnel (both in-country and offshore for the expansion and activation of VNAF units in FY 71-74 (See 1968 MACV Command History, Vol 1, pp 337-341 for VNAF units concerned). ²¹

(S) Each of the above VNAF goals was achieved by the end of September as a result of concerted effort to improve and modernize the VNAF program. Additionally, final approval was received during the 3d Qtr, CY69 for a force structure increase for VNAF of 3,199 personnel. This raised VNAF's approved manpower authorization from 32,587 to 35,786. However, MACV did not authorize release of the spaces to RVNAF during 1969. ²²

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Equipment Delivery Status

	Phase I, Accelerated FY69	Phase II FY70	Approved Midway FY70	MACV Nov Revision FY70	Total shipped as of 31 Dec
Rifle, M16A1	637,861	701,925	772,866	764,311	764,311 1
Machine Gun, M60	14,028	13,776	12,277	11,729	10,689 2
Grenade Lchr, M79	35,166	41,362	39,597	40,505	35,612 3
Mortar, 81mm, M29	1,633	1,589	1,388	1,649	1,388 3
Carrier, Mort, 81mm, M125A1	116	149	137	134	132 2
Armored Car, Comdo, M706	451	503	483	490	481 2
Howitzer, Lt, 105mm, M101A1	602	776	731	731	730 4
Howitzer, Lt, 105mm, M102	60	61		60	60 1
Howitzer, Med, 155mm, M114A1	701	274	290	289	294 4
Carrier, Pers, M113	1,100	1,234	1,332	1,061	1,070 4
Tank, Lt, M41A3	216	301	275	272	263 4

- Remarks:
1. Program completed
 2. On programmed schedule
 3. Behind programmed schedule
 4. Ahead of programmed schedule

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
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FIGURE VI-4

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VNAF UNIT LOCATIONS
AS OF 1 JANUARY 1969



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
FIGURE VI-2

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FIGURE VI-3

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Conversion of CH-34 Squadrons to UH-1H Squadrons

(C) The conversion schedule of the four squadrons with their locations was as follows:

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Standdown Date</u>	<u>O/R Date</u>
211th	Binh Thuy	1 April	1 May
217th	Binh Thuy	1 April	15 June
215th	Nha Trang	1 May	Between 1 Aug & 1 Oct
213th	Danang	1 June	Between 1 Sep & 1 Nov

(C) The four squadrons designated for conversion were initially authorized a unit of equipment (UE) of 20 aircraft each. The approved aircraft delivery schedule permitted fulfillment of UE requirements for all squadrons during 4th Qtr, FY69. Subsequently, during the 3d Qtr, FY70, the increasing availability of VNAF helicopter pilots from CONUS training and follow-on helicopter deliveries permitted the beginning of a program to expand the squadron UEs from 20 to 31 aircraft, which was to be the standard for all VNAF UH-1H squadrons.

(C) The concept of operations for the initial 20 UE squadrons was as follows:

1. A minimum in-commission rate of 71 percent was to be maintained. This would provide 14 aircraft for daily operations of which two would "stand-down" for special inspection and preventive maintenance.
2. The 12 remaining operational aircraft would be utilized for troop transport as follows: 10 for transport, one for maintenance support, and one for standby to replace aircraft which became nonoperational during a mission.
3. The required gunships and command and control helicopters would be provided by USARV until the VNAF squadrons were equipped with additional aircraft commencing in 3d Qtr, FY70.
4. The squadrons were to be used for operational purposes in the following priorities: 1-airmobile combat operations, 2-medical evacuation, 3-aerial logistic support.

(C) In order to train pilots for the UH-1s to be assigned to the four squadrons, an agreement was drawn up between the VNAF and the 1st Avn Bde whereby the VNAF would provide a total of 55 rotary-wing-qualified pilots to the 1st Avn Bde in a TDY status for UH-1D/H transition and operational training. The training commenced in February with an initial allocation of 13 pilots in the first month and 14 pilots in each of the succeeding months. There were four training cycles of 90 days each and each cycle was divided into two phases:

1. Phase I was transition training of 30 days.
2. Phase II was practical experience of 60 days flying various types of missions with special emphasis on airmobile operations. VNAF pilots were to receive a minimum of 20 and a maximum of 100 hours of flying time per month. Also, they were to fly all types of missions and not be restricted to any "specialized" flying.

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(C) It was envisioned that the pilot needs for the reduced UE (20 aircraft) squadrons would be satisfied through this method of in-country transition training. It was also envisioned that when the squadron UE was increased from 20 to 31, the additional required pilots (based on a crew of ratio of 1:1) would be available from off-shore training in CONUS.

(C) Air gunner, flight engineer, and maintenance training courses also were initiated to transition and upgrade personnel on the UH-1 systems. Transition training was scheduled to commence during the stand-down dates of the different squadrons. ²³

Proposed Modification of VNAF Improvement & Modernization

(S) In a related development, based on DEPSECDEF guidance, DA reviewed the program and, on 7 Jan, submitted recommendations to JCS. In order to provide for an accelerated program and, at the same time, maintain the combat readiness of US forces worldwide, DA suggested a major substitution of CH-34 helicopters for the UH-1s which were programmed, a revised pilot training program, and a reduced UE for the VNAF squadrons. The justification for each suggestion was as follows:

1. Substitution of CH-34 for UH-1. The US investment in the RVNAF would be reduced by \$193,000 for each CH-34 substituted because the purchase price of a new UH-1H was \$307,000 and the estimated retrofit cost of a CH-34 was only \$134,000. Sufficient CH-34s were available, according to DA, to support this proposal and could be made available to VNAF by withdrawing them from US forces, retrofitting them in CONUS, and then shipping them to RVN. This process could be accomplished within the time frame that VNAF personnel could be trained to operate and maintain them. As a corollary, the procurement of UH-1s would continue but with delivery to US forces, rather than to VNAF, to replace CH-34s withdrawn for retrofitting. The Department of the Army also proposed that procurement should not be considered as an additional cost since the CH-34 was scheduled to be phased out eventually.

2. Revised pilot training program. It was DA's contention that the pacing factor in any plan to increase the VNAF helicopter force was the training program for the VNAF pilots and that the full training requirements that COMUSMACV had proposed in the acceleration of the Phase I and Phase II programs could not be met without significantly reducing the US helicopter pilot training output. Army aviator training facilities were, at the beginning of 1969, operating at near capacity, with loads geared to meet Service requirements in RVN. Since Army aviator requirements for USARV had to be met concurrently with the VNAF pilot program, the use of CH-34s by VNAF would lighten the training load since fewer would be needed. This would also mean that DA's VNAF expansion alternative using CH-34s could be completed earlier than other plans.

3. Providing a reduced UE. Due to the adverse impact of the readiness of US forces worldwide, as well as budgetary implications, DA proposed modifying the authorized strength of the VNAF helicopter squadrons. According to DA's proposal, sufficient helicopters would be made available to support a total of 14 squadrons, as follows:

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The USARV experience in RVN indicated that the 25 UE would provide approximately 10 lift helicopters daily. This was not sufficient to provide the minimum daily operational requirements that a VNAF helicopter squadron would be required to support in performing the missions mentioned above. A full UE of 31 (23 airlift and 8 gunships) was considered necessary to meet minimum daily operational requirements of the 12 UH-1 Phase II VNAF squadrons. Also, the 14 squadron force proposed in the Phase II plan already represented a significant shortfall in the desired lift capability since the force was predicated on a level judged attainable by the VNAF and not on the level of the RVNAF lift requirement. The force, according to the Phase II plan, was structured to support a 12 division force (one airborne, one Marine, and 10 infantry divisions), and the UE was modeled after the UH-1 helicopter companies supporting US divisions (non-airmobile). The current USARV planning factor called for 1.5 such units for support of each ARVN division, in contrast to the MACV Phase II plan which proposed only one helicopter squadron per division. Thus, to reduce the squadron UE would further decrease the level of support to the RVNAF. 25

(S) CINCPAC concurred fully with COMUSMACV's views and recommended early execution of the Accelerated Phase II plan to JCS with the following additional justification:

1. Since the inception of the RVNAF I&M program, the UH-1 had been the helicopter planned for issue. A change, such as substituting the CH-34 for the UH-1, could well be interpreted by the Vietnamese as a shift in US policy.
2. The DA proposal reduced the total number of helicopters by substituting 180 CH-34s for 262 UH-1s, thus considerably reducing the planned airmobile capability.
3. Comparison of utilization rates of UH-1s and CH-34s in-country indicated a much better rate for the UH-1, even though it had been in the VNAF inventory for a much shorter period of time.
4. The conversion of the four CH-34 squadrons to UH-1s was not dependent on the CONUS training of pilots or maintenance personnel but could be accomplished by in-country transition training which was underway. Furthermore, COMUSMACV had indicated that he was willing to accept degradation of the US capability in order to divert to VNAF 60 UH-1s which were scheduled for delivery to USARV (discussed below).
5. Total US helicopter assets both in being and scheduled for production would be identical under either the Phase II plan or the DA proposal. The DA proposal provided the VNAF with a capability which was less than the maximum attainable by the RVNAF both quantitatively and qualitatively. The Phase II plan would still leave the RVNAF with an airmobile capability well below that desired, but it would be a more desirable and better configured capability than the DA plan. 26

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(S) In a related development, COMUSMACV, in late December 1968, had requested diversion of 60 UH-1 helicopters from USARV's scheduled deliveries to VNAF in order to accelerate the VNAF Phase II program. These were intended as a partial fill in converting four CH-34 squadrons to UH-1 squadrons (discussed elsewhere in this chapter) in accordance with the Phase II plan. The CINCPAC had concurred on 31 Dec 68 and had forwarded the request to JCS. However, JCS deferred decision and action pending completion of a joint CINCPAC training conference which was scheduled for 6-10 Jan 69.

(S) Following the conference and a review of COMUSMACV's and CINCPAC's views on the DA proposal to modify the VNAF Improvement and Modernization plan, JCS, on 17 Jan, approved the proposal for diversion of the 60 USARV-bound UH-1s to VNAF and directed DA to implement action to expedite delivery and reduce USARV's authorization by 60 aircraft. ²⁷

(S) Shortly thereafter, DA submitted its plan of projected delivery dates of the 60 UH-1s to VNAF. Also projected were 25 USAF-funded UH-1s. Following was the total projected deliveries through the end of FY69:

<u>Month</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Jan	-	3	3
Feb	-	3	3
Mar	5	4	9
Apr	18	3	21
May	19	1	20
Jun	18	-	18
TOTAL	60	14	74

Note: Also included in FY69 figures were nine USAF-procured aircraft already on hand and two en route prior to January, making up the total 85 helicopters initially required. ²⁸

(C) The CH-34s to be replaced were programmed for redistribution to other VNAF CH-34 squadron, for attrition, storage in-country, or for withdrawal and preparation for redeployment to CONUS. ²⁹

(C) All four squadrons stood down according to the plan for the transition training and conversion. Training was accomplished on schedule and aircraft deliveries from CONUS were also, for the most part, on time. The 211th Sqdn at Binh Thuy was declared operationally ready (OR) on 1 May with its UE of 20 UH-1s. The 217th Sqdn also at Binh Thuy followed suit and was OR at the end of May. They achieved their 20 UE on 3 Jun. The 215th Sqdn at Nha Trang, which stood down in May, received their first UH-1 on 26 May, started their transition flying on 28 May, had their 20 UE by 20 Jun, and were declared OR on 5 Sep. The 213th Sqdn, which stood down on 1 Jun, received their first aircraft on 26 Jun. On 24-25 Sep, the squadron passed the ORI with a C-3 rating. The combat capability C-3 rating was primarily due to a shortage of personal equipment, i.e., a shortage of flying suits, gloves, body armor and ballistic helmets. ³⁰

(C) As of 30 Sep, 85 UH-1H helicopters had been delivered and all four squadrons possessed their UE of 20-21 aircraft. The next input for VNAF was scheduled to begin in January 1970. ³¹

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Logistical Support of VNAF Helicopter Squadrons

(C) A conference with DA, USAF, and MACV representation was conducted on 18-19 Feb in Washington to develop policies and procedures for procurement, distribution, and logistical support of helicopters in support of the VNAF I&M program. Agreement was reached on the following:

1. The Army assumed full responsibility for providing necessary UH-1 helicopters to meet the currently planned VNAF activation schedules and attrition requirements. Procurement, production, and distribution of the aircraft was to be through Army channels with USAF reimbursing the Army for transportation costs of delivering the aircraft to RVN. Title transfer of the UH-1s would take place in RVN. The USAF would assemble and test fly the helicopters after transfer of title.

2. The USAF had, at that time, contracted for 63 UH-1s, 11 of which had already been delivered. One hundred and twenty nine additional UH-1s were included in the supplemental FY69 and 332 in the FY70 budget for a total of 514. Using the approved attrition rate of 3.0 per 100 aircraft, the forecast requirement through December 1971 was 580 aircraft. The total requirement through FY73 was 720. In this light, the conference decided that, if necessary, a supplemental budget request would be submitted to OSD. The USAF agreed that all UH-1s procured by the Army would be replaced and that, except for the initial 60 supplied (diverted) by the Army, as many as possible would be drawn from in-country resources.

3. All UH-1s for VNAF would be H models.

4. Logistical support for replacement components and engines for VNAF helicopters would be through the existing Army pipeline.

5. In addition, VNAF required aircraft for one CH-47 squadron (UE of 22, taking six into consideration for attrition) in May 1971. But USAF plans called for only 16 aircraft in the FY71 budget and the remaining 6 in the FY72 and FY73 budgets. Since the production leadtime was 24 months, this would require that the aircraft be furnished from the Army inventory. The DA and USAF staffs were directed to study the feasibility of including the requirement in the FY70 budget. ³²

Training of VNAF Helicopter Pilots

(S) A VNAF Training Plan Coordination Meeting was held by CINCPAC in Hawaii during the period 6-10 Jan to address fixed wing and rotary wing pilot training, maintenance and support training, and English language training. In regard to the VNAF helicopter pilot training, the meeting produced three courses of action.

1. Train 1,475 VNAF pilots during the period October 1969 through September 1970 by increasing the US training base to maximum capacity and decreasing the number of US pilots trained during the period by 2,214. This plan would have a serious impact on the tour intervals for US pilots or on manning levels for US pilots in RVN and other short tour areas.

2. Continue US pilot training at the required level but expand the training base to accommodate VNAF pilot training. This would involve expansion of facilities at a cost of approximately \$16 million and procurement of an additional 215 primary helicopter trainer and

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102 UH-1 aircraft. This alternative would extend the MACV activation schedule by two to six months and the overall program by approximately one year.

3. Combine courses of action one and two by expanding the training base and training 1,475 VNAF pilots in the required time frame. This would result in a shortfall of 1,482 in trained US pilots during the period as opposed to the 2,214 which would result from the first alternative. ³³

(S) In response to a CINCPAC query, COMUSMACV stated a preference for the first course of action. However, CGUSARPAC favored the second and proposed a fourth: conduct only the primary helicopter course in CONUS and return the cadets to RVN for transition training. This training could be conducted by using the prevailing VNAF helicopter capability, by attaching the cadets to US assault helicopter companies scheduled for inactivation, or a combination of both. This alternative would be advantageous in that it would:

1. Obviate the need for expanding the CONUS training base.
2. Obviate the requirement for diversion of the 102 UH-1 helicopters.
3. Reduce CONUS training time by approximately 50 percent, thus reducing the draw-down on US pilot training.

(S) CINCPAC opposed this additional course of action on the grounds that it was not advisable to undertake transition training in RVN at this time because of the adverse impact on combat operations and the drain on the limited logistical support. Instead, he recommended that:

1. The first alternative be adopted; i. e. train VNAF pilots in lieu of US pilots.
2. An in-country VNAF transition program be established when combat conditions and logistical support permit.
3. An in-country VNAF helicopter pilot undergraduate program to train replacement pilots be established when conditions and resources permit. ³⁴

(S) On 13 Feb, JCS approved support for CINCPAC's recommendation to train VNAF pilots in lieu of US pilots commencing in October and urged that any modifications which may develop in the VNAF I&M program be reported as soon as possible in order to diminish the severe impact of the reduced US pilot output which would occur for the duration of the VNAF training program. JCS also pointed out that, with reference to in-country training programs for VNAF pilots, approval to plan for them when conditions and resources permitted was implicit in the approval of the Phase II plan. ³⁵

Helicopter Maintenance and Support Training

(S) The VNAF Training Plan Coordinating Meeting conducted in Hawaii 6-10 Jan concluded that:

1. An additional 2,440 spaces were needed to support the VNAF I&M Program for training helicopter mechanics.

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2. The Army's resources should be utilized since USAF did not have the training facility.

3. The current capacity of the Army's training facilities (6,630 spaces per year) was inadequate to support both the VNAF and Army requirements.

4. If projected losses in the Army training base personnel could be restored and if sufficient funds could be provided, an adequate training capability could be established to support the total requirements in time to meet the VNAF I&M Program activation dates.

(S) Based on these conclusions, CINCPAC recommended that funds and personnel be provided to the Army training base to support the total training requirement.

(S) In early February, JCS approved these recommendations and directed that action be taken to increase the CONUS training base to permit the training of VNAF mechanics and support personnel in addition to meeting US and other foreign requirements. ³⁶

A-1E/A37B Conversion

(C) A portion of the VNAF I&M Program included the conversion of part of the fighter force from the old propeller-driven Douglas A-1E aircraft to the new and modern jet-powered A-37B aircraft. The overall plan called for the conversion of three units - the 516th, 520th, and 524th Ftr Sqdns - in 1969. The equipment necessary for the conversion had started to arrive in-country in November 1968 with delivery of the first A-37. Follow-on shipments continued every month until May at which time the full complement of 54 A-37B aircraft was realized. As the aircraft arrived and were assembled, they were distributed to the 524th, 520th and 516th Sqdns in that order. Each squadron's UE was 18 aircraft. During 1968 and the first half of 1969, aircrew and maintenance training was conducted for the three squadrons at both in-country and off-shore (CONUS) sites, with the same squadron priorities as had been established for distribution of the aircraft.

(C) The final results were achieved when the three squadrons underwent VNAF Hq-directed Operational Readiness Inspections (ORIs). The 524th Sqdn took its ORI on 18 Mar and was declared OR on 26 Mar, and the 520th Sqdn underwent its ORI on 28 Apr and was declared OR on 1 May. However, when the 516th Sqdn took its ORI on 25 Jun, it failed, primarily because the ORI was conducted one month prior to the date scheduled according to the master plan. There were insufficient pilots, aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and special tools were lacking, and, in general, training had not progressed sufficiently. It was given another ORI in July which it passed and was declared OR in the same month. ³⁷

C-47/AC-47 Conversion

(C) On 30 Jun, the VNAF took delivery on their first five AC-47 gunships as a further step in the I&M program. The aircraft were delivered to the 417th Trans Sqdn at Tan Son Nhut AB. On that same date, the squadron was redesignated the 417th Cbt Sqdn and was relieved of its transport mission. Its new mission was to provide responsive and effective aerial fire and illumination support of friendly forces. The squadron UE was 15 aircraft, and the transfer of the balance of the gunships (16) to the squadron was completed by the end of August. In

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reciprocation, the VNAF transferred eight C-47s that were previously used by the squadron back to the USAF.

(C) The 417th Sqdn started the conversion on 30 Jun as a C-1-rated, C-47 transport squadron. During July, the first month of conversion, it reverted to a C-2 rating but regained a C-1 in August. Also in August, the 417th Cbt Sqdn assumed full responsibility for the Tan Son Nhut AC-47 gunships and illumination missions in III and IV CTZ. By September, the squadron had completed AC-47 conversion training, well within the 90 days allocated. An ORI was conducted by the VNAF-IG on 6 and 7 Oct and the 417th Cbt Sqdn was declared operationally ready with a C-1 rating. ³⁸

Special Air Mission Squadron

(S) On 25 Mar, the Chief of the Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP) advised MACV that an excessive number of VNAF combat aircraft, particularly the UH-1, were being used for VIP support of GVN officials. He recommended that VNAF VIP support be limited to the proposed Special Air Mission (SAM) squadron and that the SAM squadron UE be reviewed for sufficiency. He also requested early approval of the UE and activation of the squadron. It was determined that all aircraft and equipment for the VNAF SAM squadron had been requested in January and February. Evaluation of the UE for the squadrons indicated no change was required, and on 22 Apr, CofS, MACV informed AFGP that it supported the SAM squadron UE as approved and requested that VNAF be advised to activate the VNAF SAM squadron at the earliest practicable date. ³⁹

(C) On 30 Jun, the 314th VNAF SAM Sqdn was activated at Tan Son Nhut Airbase and had in its inventory four UH-1H helicopters, two U-17s, and five VC-47s. Its mission was to provide in-country and out-of-country air transportation for designated VIPs. ⁴⁰

Note: VNAF units and locations as of the end of the year are shown on Figure VI-4.

Shortage of O-1 Aircraft in VNAF

(S) In late October 1968, the Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP) had reported to Chief of Staff, Air Force (CSAF) that a serious shortage of 28 O-1 aircraft existed in VNAF. The VNAF had only 52 out of an authorization of 80 aircraft, a 65 percent fill rate. These aircraft were urgently needed for VNAF ALO/FAC operations and AFGP requested the scheduled delivery dates and mode of transportation of these much-needed aircraft. CSAF advised AFGP that the only source of O-1s was from redistribution and that there were no O-1s projected to become excess to requirements in the near future. He had stated further that future availability depended on three factors:

1. Receipt of new production FAC aircraft (O-2As and OV-10As).
2. Attainment of authorized UE strength.
3. Status of conflict.

He also had indicated that delivery dates of currently-programmed MASF requirements could not be given at that time (5 Dec 68).

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
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LOCATIONS OF VNAF ORGANIZATIONS
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1969



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FIGURE VI-4

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(S) Under the VNAF I&M program, USAF was scheduled to transfer O-1s to VNAF. However, delivery to VNAF from 7AF inventory had slipped by mid-January because 7AF had not received the O-2 replacements for the O-1s. ⁴¹

(S) In late January, CINCPAC informed JCS that the problem of O-1s for VNAF still existed, that there were no O-1 aircraft available in PACOM to fill the shortages, and recommended that necessary action be taken to provide VNAF with the required O-1s from other than PACOM resources. ⁴²

(S) In response to this request, JCS, on 10 Feb, informed CINCPAC that the Army currently had a requirement for more O-1s than were available or projected to become available. Also, the USAF had no O-1s currently available and could not accurately forecast meeting the VNAF requirements. JCS planning of O-1 deliveries to VNAF was primarily dependent on O-2 and OV-10 production and deliveries to USAF units in SEA. Based on current projection of FAC aircraft deliveries to these units, sufficient O-1s were programmed to become available to provide VNAF with the required 28 O-1s starting the first quarter FY70 and being completed in the second quarter FY70. ⁴³

(S) On 20 May, CINCPACAF requested HQ USAF approval to transfer 42 O-1 aircraft to the VNAF at a rate of 10 per month, June through August, and two per month, September through February 1970. This transfer schedule would permit 7AF to maintain its authorized FAC aircraft strength in June and be five to 13 aircraft short of authorization in July and August, due to the schedule and timing which the replacement aircraft were being delivered in-country. However, this degradation was acceptable in view of the I&M Program. Approval was given to this plan and the first 10 aircraft were turned over to the VNAF on 23 Jun. These aircraft were distributed among the 110th, 112th, 114th, and 116th Ln Sqdns. ⁴⁴

(C) The second increment of O-1s were transferred on schedule during July bringing the total delivery to 20 for the year. ⁴⁵

(S) Twelve more O-1s were delivered in August bringing the total to 32 aircraft in the inventory. This amount was enough to bring the four VNAF O-1 squadrons up to their authorized strength. The remaining 10 O-1s which were scheduled for transfer between October 1969 and February 1970 (two per month) were for attrition purposes. ⁴⁶

VNAF Recruiting

(U) In order to alleviate the shortage of VNAF pilot candidates, JCS had issued a memorandum on 29 Dec 68 which authorized the VNAF to recruit, without limitation, service personnel in the grades of private through second lieutenant in ARVN and RF units who fulfilled the prescribed criteria, which included:

1. Possess a Baccalaureate I Degree.
2. Attained 28 years of age or under.
3. Sign a pledge which committed the person to eight years of service effective the date of graduation from pilot training.

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Training for those who were qualified and could pass the physical examination included in-country English language training and off-shore pilot training in the CONUS. NCOs and EM who volunteered for transfer to the VNAF would be promoted to regular aspirant upon graduation and to second lieutenant after 24 months. 47

(U) Despite this recruiting campaign, the prestige, flight pay, and officer commission (for the NCOs and EM), the program was not very successful as the majority of the ARVN and RF commanders did not adequately support or properly encourage their qualified personnel to apply for transfer to the VNAF. As a result, JGS issued a second memorandum on 10 Feb in which it reiterated the extreme importance of this program. The memorandum also directed the commanders at all levels to support the recruiting program, help and assist VNAF representatives who would be visiting the units for recruiting purposes, and forward without delay any and all requests for transfer to the VNAF. It further warned that unit commanders would be held responsible to the JGS for all complaints made by those who did not attend the pilot training course due to failure to forward requests. At the same time, MACV sent word to its advisors to urge their counterparts to comply with the two memorandums and to render maximum support to the program. 48

(U) On 2 Mar, JGS issued still a third memorandum to the field. This one was an adjunct to the 29 Dec 68 memo and further expanded the recruiting base for pilot trainees to include all PF personnel, conscripts, and newly recruited volunteers. Additionally, the memo amended the requirement for visual acuity to permit the wearing of corrective lenses for farsightedness and modified the procedures for the medical processing of program volunteers in order to facilitate early determination of their physical qualifications. 49

(C) On 15 Mar, JGS, in still another attempt to recruit VNAF pilot trainees, drew up a roster of second lieutenants and aspirants, by unit, who were to be given screening physical examinations which were intended to identify those individuals to receive flight physicals. Flight physicals for qualified officers were to be announced at a later date and training physicals were to be completed by 15 Apr. The purpose of this move was to identify a reserve of pilot candidates as a third priority resource to ensure achievement of the VNAF pilot recruiting goals. 50

Vietnamese Navy

(U) The Vietnamese Navy (VNN) had been organized in 1954 when the French relinquished their control of the country to the Vietnamese. The French Navy had left the VNN with 14 ships, 6 Dinassauts (River Assault Groups), and a small cadre of well trained Vietnamese officers and petty officers. In 1955 USN advisors had been assigned to assist in the development of the VNN. This effort had expanded as the VNN had embarked on a full scale insurgency. To counter sea infiltration of arms and men from the north, the VNN reestablished the sea anti-infiltration force concept used by the French. A fleet of ten sail-only junks had been formed and assigned to operate in the area of the 17th parallel. It had been manned by paramilitary personnel. By 1961 the VNN had a force of 23 ships, the largest of which were LSMs, 197 boats, and a personnel strength of 5,000 men. Morale had been high, but the VNN forces had not been sufficient to counter the growing enemy infiltration threat. Additional assets had been requested from the

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US. The years 1962-1964 had marked a rapid expansion of the VNN. Training facilities, repair bases, and logistics support facilities had been established; communications equipment and networks had been improved; and organization and administrative procedures were strengthened. The number of ships had increased to 44 and the personnel strength to 8,100. By the end of 1965 the VNN had almost doubled its 1964 personnel strength. This was in part, the result of having integrated the paramilitary junk force into the Navy. This force, an off-shoot of the small anti-infiltration fleet established by the VNN in 1956, had been taken over by the Ministry of Defense in 1960. By 1965 it had grown to well over 100 junks, and the RVN ordered it re-incorporated into the VNN. At the end of 1967 the personnel strength of the VNN had increased to 16,300. The number of ships had increased to 65, the River Assault Group (RAG) craft to 232, junks to 290 and 52 other miscellaneous craft. Throughout 1968 the VNN had placed emphasis on the improvement and expansion of their training programs. This action was predicated upon anticipation of gaining increased responsibility in the war effort as well as additional waterborne assets from the US. By the end of 1968 long range plans for the turnover of the majority of the USN waterborne assets in RVN had been formulated.

Force Structure and Equipment Increases

(S) At the beginning of 1969, the Phase II force structure of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) was under consideration and study at DOD. The requested allocation was for 30,805 spaces, an increase of 10,461 over the Phase I approved structure. On 12 Feb, DEPSECDEF, in a memorandum to CJCS and SECNAV, approved the VNN force structure with two changes. First, he deferred the decision on providing the two destroyer escorts (DEs) to VNN due to future uncertainties which made it difficult to determine the role of the USN in a post-war RVN. Second, DEPSECDEF approved a VNN force structure of 28,700 spaces which he considered adequate to man all the equipment which was to be provided to the VNN. This authorization was 2,105 spaces short of that requested. 51

(C) The approved Accelerated Phase II plan increased the number of ships and crafts for VNN from 171 to a total of 257 (an 86 increase). For specific identity of vessels selected for increase, turnover to the VNN and year end progress see Chapter V, ACTOV section.

(S) On 26 Feb, JCS requested CINCPAC to furnish, if appropriate, additional justification for the two DE. This request was passed on to COMUSMACV and on 13 Mar, justification outlined below was provided to CINCPAC:

1. The VNN had to patrol over 1,200 miles of coastline to prevent infiltration from the sea. The VNN had no ship capable of operating effectively in the 8-foot seas which occurred 15 percent of the time during the northeast monsoon, a highly probable infiltration period. The NVN historically preferred coastal infiltration into RVN and had repeatedly attempted to infiltrate trawlers which represented a potential VC resupply of 100 tons of war material per trawler. If not deterred, NVN could use coastal infiltration rather than the Ho Chi Minh Trail or the Sihanoukville--Cambodian border route. These DE would provide the VNN with the detection and intercept capability required.

2. The DE was the only all-weather ship capable of intercepting a 20-knot trawler.

3. Indications were that for many years the VNAF would not be able to furnish assets for an air barrier similar to the MARKET TIME P3 barrier. For this reason the DEs were

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even more necessary in the outer surface barrier to provide an all-weather detection and intercept capability during periods of no air cover and a reaction capability in case the USN should fly a covert MARKET TIME patrol in the future.

4. Should the NVN oppose coastal surveillance forces, the VNN was inferior in fire-power, speed, and all-weather capability. In any attack, NVN would have the further advantage of being able to concentrate its forces while the VNN would be required to defend a 1,200 mile coastline.

5. There were no ships in the approved VNN that could successfully oppose PCEs or the torpedo boats of the north. In fact, a DE against these forces would be marginal, but what was proposed for the VNN was the minimum cost force that had at least a modest capability against the NVN Navy.

6. If the war continued at its present pace and MARKET TIME forces were continued, it was argued that two DEs turned over to the VNN could replace USN DEs that would save over \$1.6 million per year in US personnel costs and would release about 370 USN personnel for other duty. ⁵²

(S) CINCPACFLT strongly endorsed the requirement to provide two DEs to the VNN and on 13 Mar stated in a message to CINCPAC:

CINCPACFLT concurs with (COMUSMACV's) comments... A DE for VNN is approved in the JSOP. The seaborne infiltration threat to the SVN coastline is very real and the potential for a surge in enemy capabilities is quite evident. To counter this real and potential threat, it is incumbent on the US to provide the VNN with the necessary defensive equipment. The ships and craft currently approved for VNN are not adequate. The seaborne threat is more real to SVN than to other countries in PACOM which have DEs.

As a matter of concern is the effect of not meeting our previously announced intention of providing at least one DE to the VNN. Should we fail to deliver on what the VNN certainly considers a US commitment to properly provide for the VNN, the high level of esprit de corps which is evident will fade and may affect our overall Phase IIA plans. Active enthusiastic support by the VNN is essential to accomplish the ACTOV program. Any delay costs money and lives possibly far out of proportion to two DEs scheduled for inactivation soon. Additionally, we must be prepared to logically explain why we have decided that the VNN has less need for a principal combatant ship than other US supported PACOM navies. Some principal combatant ship numbers are: Korea 5, China 12, Philippines 1, Thailand 1, Indonesia 23. The mere fact that other navies perhaps are overstrength will scarcely mollify the VNN disappointment at our reluctance to support them fully. ⁵³

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(S) On 15 Mar, CINCPAC concurred in the justifications submitted by COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT and recommended to the JCS that the two DEs deleted from the Phase II Plan be restored as a necessary augmentation in order to achieve and maintain a balanced VNN, capable of coastal patrol and fire support activities. He further requested early approval of the two DEs to permit commencement of the required training and associated planning necessary to accept these ships. 54

(S) On 30 Apr, the SECDEF approved the two DEs for the VNN that had been deferred in his decision of 12 Feb.

(S) On 7 May, COMUSMACV requested an increase of 250 spaces and 10 Coast Guard Patrol Boats (WPB) for the VNN. The rationale behind this request was that only 69 of the 100 PCFs requested in the Phase II plan had been approved by SECDEF, and the increase in WPBs from the approved 16 in the Phase II plan to 26, which represented the total Coast Guard assets in RVN, would partially offset this deficit in PCF requirements and would provide some relief to the shortfall in RVNAF coastal defense and surveillance which existed at the time. The 250 personnel were needed to man and maintain the additional WPBs. CNO, CINCPACFLT, the Coast Guard Commandant, and CINCPAC concurred in this action. 55

(S) Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was notified on 14 Jun that informal coordination with OSD indicated probable approval of the turnover of the additional 10 WPBs; however, the increase in the VNN spaces would probably be disapproved unless there was strong justification. The OSD view was that the required increase in the VNN strength could be accomplished by adjusting the service strength within the approved RVNAF force structure. (COMUSMACV was authorized to make adjustments up to five percent of each service so long as he remained within the limits of the force structure.) This was the same rationale that prevailed in the approval of the transfer of the two DEs without a corresponding increase in the VNN strength.

(S) The JCS suggested that maximum use should be made of COMUSMACV's adjustment authority for all minor adjustments of service strengths until the RVNAF demonstrated its ability to fulfill the currently-approved force level. The JCS also suggested that, in view of the previous OSD position on strength increases for the two DEs, it might be more appropriate to raise the strength ceiling by a significant single increment rather than by a series of small increases. 56

RVNAF Amphibious Task Force

(C) As far back as Mar 1968, MACV had been urging the Vietnamese to form a force similar to the US Mobile Riverine Force (for a detailed discussion of the US MRF, see 1968 MACV Command History, Vol 1, pp 242-243). At that time COMUSMACV had forwarded a recommendation to the CJCS for the formation of a Vietnamese Riverine Warfare Group composed of VNN and VNMC elements. During the ensuing six months, there had been numerous exchanges of letters and several conferences between MACV and JCS on the subject. The JCS agreed in the need for such a force, but had wanted to defer its formation until the VNN's River Assault Forces could be modernized. In September 1968, COMUSMACV had recommended to the CJCS that an Amphibious Task Force be established without waiting for the turnover of USN craft. At about the same time, the Phase II RVNAF force structure had been finalized. The rationale, at that time, had recognized that the Mekong Delta would remain the center of insurgency and would require amphibious/riverine forces for surveillance and control. To meet this requirement, the RVNAF-approved force structure included sufficient VNN ships and river assault

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craft to lift a total of nine VNMC battalions. It was envisioned that the combination of VNN and VNMC units operating from strategically located bases in the Delta and formed into an integrated amphibious team would provide a significant force capable of countering insurgency throughout the region. In late October 1968, the JGS had directed the formation of an amphibious task force (ATF) composed of one VNMC battalion and two VNN RAGs to be activated 1 Dec 68. The ATF had been reluctantly activated as scheduled but only operated for one week before operations were suspended because of poor coordination between JGS and ARVN commanders. This problem had been the subject of a mid-December JGS conference, but no solution was reached. The subject had been temporarily dropped by the JGS.

(C) In March, the JGS prepared a draft SOP for the new formation of an ATF (TF 211) to be composed of six new RAIDs and three VNMC battalions. Soon thereafter, the VNN prepared a somewhat different SOP for the assimilation of the same six RAIDs into the Navy.

(C) According to the JGS proposal the primary mission of the ATF would be to conduct riverine operations. It would be utilized as an element of the general reserve, with OPCON to the CTZ commanders of the CNO, VNN depending on the type of operations. It would be employed as a "joint" entity with only JGS having the authority to separate it into VNN and VNMC elements. Also, the CTZ commanders could request OPCON of the ATF or an ATG from JGS.

(C) According to the VNN proposal, the ATF would be composed of only the six VNN RAIDs with infantry elements attached, as necessary and required for operations. The primary mission would be to control water LOCs. It would be used as an organic unit of the VNN under the VNN CNO, who would determine the AOs, or under the OPCON of the CTZ commander, upon request, for limited operations.

(C) In the final analysis, MACV favored and recommended employment of the JGS proposal for the following reasons:

1. It was a more versatile and effective force and would be preferred for any type of riverine operation.
2. The JGS proposal made better use of the specialized training and capabilities of both the VNN and VNMC. Separate employment of these forces could only be authorized by JGS.
3. The joint ATF better replaced the US MRF than would a solely naval force.
4. The ATF, as an integrated force of the General Reserve, could react faster than a force that would have to be organized for each operation.

(C) The ATF, under the JGS proposal would have the following command and control relationships:

1. The CNO, VNN and the CG, VNMC would be responsible for their components of the ATF and would have command, less OPCON, of their elements. Since the ATF would be an element of the General Reserve, the JGS would have OPCON.
2. For large operations, where the entire force would be required, the JGS could pass OPCON to a CTZ commander.

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
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VIETNAMESE NAVY ORGANIZATION



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FIGURE VI-5

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3. If only one of the task groups would be required for an operation, the JGS could pass OPCON of one task group to a CTZ commander who could then pass it to DTA commander if conditions warranted. The other two task groups of the ATF would remain under the OPCON of the JGS.

4. For an interdiction mission, the JGS could pass OPCON of a task group to the CNO.

(C) The JGS proposal did not address the question of a specific commander for the ATF or any of the task groups, but, in accordance with the MACV doctrine for riverine operations, if the mission of the ATF or any of the groups were to deny the use of a waterway system or to maintain control of riverine LOCs, the overall commander should be a naval officer. If the mission, however, was to establish or maintain control of riverine LOCs and contiguous land areas, or to locate and destroy enemy forces, supplies and equipment, the overall commander should be a ground commander.

(S) The JGS proposal, which MACV concurred in and highly recommended an early execution date for, was a positive JGS response to a MACV proposal for the attainment of the Phase II force structure goals in the improvement of the RVNAF.⁵⁷

(C) The Vietnamese Navy was organized into six operational forces, four coastal forces, and four area commands. (See Figure VI-5.) Lines of command had been clarified and operational control of the various forces delegated to Force commanders. Additionally, the country was divided for organization and simplicity into four coastal zones and two riverine areas, each under a zone or area commander.

(C) Coastal Forces. The Coastal Forces of the VNN consisted of 20 coastal groups. Each of the coastal groups was subordinate to one of the four VNN Coastal Zone commanders. A coastal zone corresponded geographically to one of the four CTZs with the exception of III CTZ which extends into IV CTZ. (See Figure VI-6.) The primary mission of the groups was to conduct coastal surveillance in order to prevent infiltration from the sea and to prevent illegal coastal transshipment of military contraband. The secondary missions included the support of small unit amphibious warfare operations, resources control, intelligence, and psychological warfare operations. Because of the variance in the tactical situation which existed in the vicinity of the coastal groups, their make-up varied considerably, using assets of Command, Yahuta, and Kien Giang junks as required.

(U) River Forces. The River Forces included the RAGs, RAIDs, and RPGs. The primary missions of these groups were amphibious assault and interdiction operations. Their secondary mission was riverine security/waterway control. RAGs 81 and 91 were responsible for escorting shipping and minesweeping on rivers and canals of the Delta. There was no Vietnamese commander of the River Force; however, the commanders of TF 211, 212, 214, Third and Fourth Riverine Areas, who commanded the RAIDs, RAGs, and RPGs had advisors assigned to coordinate information and studies on the various components of the River Forces. River Forces were composed of 12 RAGs, six RAIDs, and four RPGs. The units were administratively assigned as follows in the locations indicated:


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COASTAL GROUP LOCATIONS & PATROL AREA RESPONSIBILITY



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FIGURE VI-6

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<u>Third Riverine Areas</u>	<u>Location</u>
RAG 22	Nha Be
RAG 24	Cuu Long
RAG 28	Nha Be
RAG 30	Cuu Long

<u>Fourth Riverine Areas</u>	
RAG 21/25	Dong Tam
RAG 23/31	Vinh Long
RAG 25/29	Can Tho
RAG 26	Long Xuyen

<u>CTF 211</u>	
RAID 70	Tan An
RAID 71	Ben Luc
RAID 72	Dong Tam
RAID 73	Dong Tam
RAID 74	Long Xuyen
RAID 75	Long Xuyen

<u>CTF 212</u>	
RPG 51	Cat Lai
RPG 52	Nha Be
RPG 53	Ben Luc/Tan An
RPG 54	My Tho/Chau Doc

<u>CTF 214</u>	
RAG 81 (E)	Cat Lai
RAG 91	Cuu Long
RAG 27	Cat Lai

<u>First Coastal Zone</u>	
RAG 32	Hue

(U) Fleet Command. The VNN Fleet Command included the "blue water" ships of the navy. It was organized into two flotillas: a patrol flotilla made up of PCEs, MSCs, PGMs, LSSLs, and LSILs; and a logistics flotilla made up of PCs, MSCs, PGMs, LSMs, LSM(H)s, LCU's, LSTs, AKLs, YOCs, and YRs. (See glossary for definition of abbreviations). The Fleet Command was directly responsible to the VNN Chief of Naval Operations for the readiness of these ships and craft. The Fleet Commander assigned and scheduled ships to operate in the Coastal Zones, Riverine Areas and the Rung Sat Special Zone. When deployed to those areas, the ships changed operational control from the Fleet Commander to that of the respective zone or area commander. When deployed, the ships operated from the following ports:

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- I Coastal Zone - Danang
- II Coastal Zone - Nha Trang/Qui Nhon
- III Coastal Zone - An Thoi/(Phu Quoc Island)
- IV Coastal Zone - Vung Tau/Can Tho/Chau Duc
- Rung Sat Special Zone - Nha Be

All Fleet Command ships were homeported in Saigon and normally returned there after deployments. Overhauls, major repair, and maintenance of the Fleet Command ships were accomplished at the Vanal Shipyard and the YR 9601 in Saigon. The shipyard was capable of performing major overhauls on any ship in the VNN. The YR 9601 (Floating Workshop) was equipped to perform all repair and overhaul work except shaft, screw, and underwater hull work. Normally the YR was reserved for PGM repair support, however, "ship-to-shop" repairs were accepted from other ships.

(U) Flotilla I - Patrol Ships. Flotilla I was composed of 41 patrol ships. They were organized into four squadrons. The patrol types included LSSLs and LSILs which were normally operated only in Riverine Areas or the Rung Sat Special Zone; although, on occasion, they were assigned the four coastal zones. Such duties included gunfire support for the coastal groups or other units requiring assistance, PSYOP light logistic/personnel lift missions and patrol of MARKET TIME stations. These operational commitments required 50 percent of the patrol flotilla be deployed at all times. To meet that requirement, normal patrol routine was 40 days at sea for PGMs and 50 days for LSILs, PCEs, PCs, and MSCs. Fleet Command patrol ships assigned to the riverine areas provided naval gunfire support as well as patrolling the main waterways in the riverine areas. They enforced area curfews and conducted light logistic personnel lifts. One river patrol unit was assigned as convoy escort on the Mekong River to and from the Cambodian border.

(U) Flotilla II, Logistic Ships. Flotilla II was composed of 24 logistic ships which were further divided into two squadrons. The primary employment of these ships was to support the naval units and bases throughout RVN. Logistic ships were under the administrative control of the Fleet Commander, and under the operational control of the VNN Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics who acted upon orders from the Central Logistics Command of the JCS.


(U) Saigon Naval Shipyard. The 57-acre Saigon Naval Shipyard, located on the southwest bank of the Saigon River about 50 miles from the South China Sea, represented the largest single industrial complex in SEASIA. The shipyard had been created by the French in 1863 as its major repair and resupply base in SEASIA. In 1969, 1,800 men were employed working six days a week, repairing and overhauling vessels ranging from the largest in the VNN (423-foot LST) to the smallest (35-foot LCVP). The shipyard's primary mission was support of the VNN enabling it to maintain its day and night patrol of the over 1,200 mile RVN coast line. The shipyard was equipped to perform the most complex kind of repairs including overhaul. A ferro-concrete construction project was completed late in the year. The first ferro-concrete PCF and Viper came off the line in December. (See pp VI-46, 47 for the description of ferro-concrete craft.) The shipyard was heavily committed to training programs to fill the critical job vacancies which existed during the year. (See Figure VI-7 for the organization of the Saigon Shipyard.)

(U) Training. The VNN training establishment consisted of a Training Bureau located at VNN Headquarters; Training Centers located in Saigon, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh Bay; and Organic Mobile Training Groups located in each coastal zone. The VNN Headquarters

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ORGANIZATION OF THE SAIGON NAVAL SHIPYARD



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FIGURE VI-7

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promulgated an annual training plan by calendar year. The annual training plan contained a listing of courses to be conducted at each training center, convening and graduation dates for each course, and the number of students to attend. A basic on-the-job training program was promulgated by VNN Headquarters for use on board ship. The CO of each ship was responsible for scheduling and conducting such training. ARVN schools were utilized for training in administration, finance, supply, intelligence, and various other subjects. VNN Headquarters assigned all personnel to Class "A" and "B" schools. The short courses, which were conducted at Naval Training Center (NTC) Saigon were the only ones which accepted personnel from units at the request of their COs. Policy required that all personnel attend the Class "A" schools. Trainees were selected on the basis of classification assigned each recruit upon graduation from the Recruit Training Center.

(U) Training Bureau. The Training Bureau promulgated the school schedules and approved and issued curricula for courses; established training goals and needs; conducted inspection of training centers, and selected and assigned students to schools.

(U) Naval Training Center Saigon. The Naval Training Center (NTC) was located at Fleet Command Headquarters. It conducted Class "B" and "C" schools, English language training, and Warrant Officer training. Prospective commanding officer and executive officer courses were scheduled to begin in spring of 1970.

(U) Naval Training Center, Nha Trang. The NTC at Nha Trang included the Vietnamese Naval Academy and the Enlisted Training Center. The training center conducted classes in the English language and Class "A" training. The course length of the 540-man Naval Academy was 44 weeks, preceded by nine weeks of ARVN basic training. Two classes were in training simultaneously where midshipmen could specialize in either line or engineering studies.

(U) Naval Training Center, Cam Ranh Bay. The center at Cam Ranh Bay conducted training in Class "A" schools for Boatswains Mate, Gunners Mate, Yeoman, Disbursing Clerk, and Commissaryman. An Advisory team of three officers and nine enlisted USN personnel were assigned to the center.

(U) Off-shore Training. In addition to in-country training, the VNN students received a wide variety of training in USN schools through the Military Assistance Off-Shore Training Program. The program consisted of both officer and enlisted trainees and took the form of formal schooling, indoctrination tours of US facilities, and OJT on board US ships. The off-shore training needs of the VNN were reviewed once annually, in the fall, and requests for the next fiscal year were made. Anticipated needs for a five year period were projected. When the program for the next fiscal year was approved, selection of candidates were selected on the basis of English language ability, rank/rate, previous experience, and education.

Vietnamese Ferro-Cement Swift Boat and Viper

(C) Although the idea of utilizing ferro-cement for naval construction originally was tested in Europe during the mid-nineteenth century, the VNN had not been introduced to it until May 1969. Quick to see some of the possibilities for ferro-cement waterborne craft, the VNN began construction of a prototype ferro-cement junk. The project was completed in September when the first such junk was launched at the VNN Shipyard in Saigon. With the purpose of the ferro-cement building program outlined to provide the VNN with the capability to meet their operational requirements for boats, the decision was made to design and develop a ferro-cement Swift

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boat (PCF) similar in construction to the aluminum USN PCFs and an experimental river craft termed the VIPER. After the VNN engineers had completed the design of the vessel, they joined forces with the shipyard employees to complete the prototype of each craft in only four months. On the afternoon of 20 Dec, the launching of the two craft was held in Saigon.

(C) The ferro-cement Swift boat displaced 55,000 pounds, and was 50-feet long and 12-feet wide. It had a designed top speed of approximately 20 knots and armament identical to the aluminum USN craft. See Chapter V. The 28-foot VIPER was an experimental river craft designed for river interdiction missions and escort and heavier fire support for the PBRs. It displaced 12,000 pounds and had a top speed of 16 knots. The VIPER was armed with an automatic grenade launcher and two M-60 machine guns. There was a four-man crew for the boat. The cost of the ferro-cement PCF was approximately one-half the USN version. Similarly, the construction cost of the VIPER was one-sixth the estimated cost of a fiberglass version.

Regional Forces/Popular Forces

(S) In late February, COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC's approval to plan for a 10,000 space increase in the RVNAF force structure ceiling to accommodate a conversion of CIDG troops to RF. His justification for this action was as follows:

1. The Phase II plan called for a reduction of CIDG spaces from 48,000 to 24,000. The December 1968 assigned strength of the CIDG was 42,251.
2. Rather than effect a general demobilization to cut the CIDG back to its authorized limitation, it was considered feasible to upgrade some of these combat capable personnel to RF status.
3. A cutback of 18,000 CIDG personnel was necessary in order to meet the new authorization. It was estimated that 5,000 personnel would be unsuitable for service in the RVNAF, and 3,000 conversions had already been approved and funded in FY69. This left 10,000 personnel for possible conversion to the RF.

(S) On 12 Mar, CINCPAC granted approval to plan for the 10,000 man increase but stipulated that a request to the JC5 for a raise in the RF ceiling would be dependent upon the ability of the RVNAF to fill the 252,927 RF spaces currently authorized. As of 31 Mar the RF strength was only 237,814. ⁵⁸

(S) On 24 May, COMUSMACV expressed concern over the RF strengths. Overall authorized strength was 252,927 but overall tactical unit strength was only 160,980. This left a 91,927 overhead strength. He indicated that a reduced RF overhead might be an appropriate place to obtain new space requirements rather than increase the force structure authorization. ⁵⁹

(S) From June onward, RF strengths steadily increased and by the end of September had exceeded the authorized strength. This growth continued through the end of the year, with year end strength at 260,455 for RF and 214,383 for PF. The RF and PF combined strength constituted about one-half of the total RVNAF (See Table VI-6).

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Accelerated Activation of RF and PF units

(S) In early November the RVN Minister of National Defense requested accelerated activation of territorial forces programmed for activation in FY71, pursuant to the Midway agreement. These forces consisted of four RF group headquarters, 23 RF companies, and 670 PF platoons along with command and logistic support. The GVN wanted to activate these units in FY70 in order to maintain the momentum of the Pacification Program and free ARVN forces, which were then committed to territorial security, for use in mobile operations.

(S) On 19 Dec, the JCS recommended to the SECDEF approval of the GVN request. The proposal would result in an early increase of 29,725 RF/PF spaces and 2,964 ARVN support spaces for a total increase of 32,687 spaces. If approved, the following activations and the resultant increase in force levels would result:

<u>Element</u>	<u>Spaces</u>	<u>New Force Level</u>
<u>Popular Force</u>		
670 Platoons	23,450	
PF Pipeline	1,000	
Total PF	24,550	239,390
<u>Regional Force</u>		
23 Rifle Companies	2,829	
4 RF/PF Group Hq	76	
Command and Logistic Support for PF	1,500	
Command and Logistic Support for RF	608	
RF Pipeline	160	
Total RF	5,173	275,670
<u>ARVN</u>		
Command and Logistic Support for PF	2,645	
Command and Logistic Support for RF	319	
Total ARVN	2,964	390,799
RVNAF Total Increase	32,687	986,360

(S) The JCS pointed out that although new equipment for the recommended force increase would be desirable, budgetary considerations might not permit additional equipment in FY70. Alternatively, units should be equipped and supported temporarily on an austere basis from within command resources by reallocation of existing assets and use of older equipment made available as more modern equipment was delivered to other RVNAF units. However, to realize full effect of the activations, new equipment should be provided as soon as funds could be made available. 60

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PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

Mobilization

(C) In order to meet the force levels of the RVNAF Accelerated Phase II I&M Program, several mobilization measures were necessary to fill the ranks. On 24 and 25 Oct 67, the GVN had published a partial mobilization law which had continued in effect until mid-1968. On 19 Jun 68, the 1967 law had been succeeded by a General Mobilization Law which provided that:

1. Personnel in the military service would serve for an indefinite period as long as a state of war in RVN existed.
2. All males between the ages of 16-50 would be mobilized, with those between 18-38 serving in the RVNAF and the other age groups serving in the Peoples Self-Defense Force.
3. There were provisions in the law for various categories of draft deferments. ⁶¹

(C) During the first quarter of 1969, the RVNAF Mobilization Directorate conscripted 19,102 personnel, exceeding the JCS quota by 4,689 persons. The fourth quarter, 1968, had yielded 25,638 conscriptees.

(C) On 22 Jan, the Ministry of Defense announced the callup schedule for 1969 which included men born in 1951 and having no baccalaureate or equivalent diploma. They were to be called up on a quarterly basis corresponding to the quarter of their birth. Personnel not knowing their date of birth, but only the year, were scheduled for the first quarter. Personnel born in the first half of the year and who were attending school were deferred until the end of the 1968-69 academic year and were scheduled to report for induction during 1-30 Sep.

(C) In order to return some schoolteachers who had been drafted to their positions in the civilian schools, the JCS, on 2 Feb, authorized active duty reserve officers who had graduated from officer training classes during the period 30 Sep - 30 Dec 68 and who were former government schoolteachers to apply for detached service with the Ministry of Education and Welfare.

(C) On 9 Mar, the MOD directed the callup, by name, of 226 doctors, pharmacists, dentists, veterinarians, and medical students who had completed their last year of studies during the school year 1967-68. ⁶²

(C) By end of the year a total of 80,443 personnel had been conscripted (See Table VI-5 for monthly RVNAF Manpower acquisitions). For RVNAF assigned strengths, which showed a steady increase over the year, see Table VI-6.

Morale

(C) RVNAF morale, while improved during the year, continued to be low enough to have a significant adverse impact on RVNAF effectiveness. Analysis of morale indicators, such as

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RVNAF MANPOWER ACQUISITIONS - 1969

Service	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
ARVN (Vol)	2,220	1,426	5,720	6,441	4,688	6,423	9,978	5,703	6,430	10,180	8,090	5,909
(Conscripts)	6,788	6,698	5,286	6,715	7,678	7,121	9,816	7,484	4,365	6,092	7,144	4,659
VNAF	285	395	701	532	604	1,569	1,824	1,206	1,175	3,876	182	2,400
VNN (Vol)	800	808	1,600	0	1,001	800	0	538	696	2,164	1,005	--
(Conscripts)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--
VNMC	232	170	630	330	683	402	476	661	1,265	860	743	500
RF (Vol)	3,095	6,663	9,825	8,055	6,068	4,206	4,785	3,390	3,124	3,537	5,578	4,746
(Conscripts)	5	325	122	87	1	3	19	--	3	--	--	31
PF	1,716	1,673	2,108	2,065	3,857	1,885	14,302	14,831	7,417	5,694	5,016	6,558
TOTAL	15,141	18,158	25,992	24,225	24,580	22,509	41,200	33,815	24,476	32,403	27,758	24,803

NOTE: All figures represent volunteers except as indicated.

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TABLE VI-5
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RVNAF ASSIGNED STRENGTHS

	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
ARVN	380,270	381,273	382,642	380,625	384,158	389,712	392,686	394,608	399,600	401,595	408,432	416,204	416,278
VNAF	18,625	19,041	19,387	20,583	21,550	22,340	24,527	26,856	28,139	29,385	33,720	34,127	36,469
VNN	18,882	20,287	20,997	22,524	22,503	23,683	24,635	24,598	25,498	26,401	28,741	30,019	30,143
VNMC	<u>9,134</u>	<u>8,472</u>	<u>8,321</u>	<u>8,716</u>	<u>8,714</u>	<u>9,142</u>	<u>9,314</u>	<u>9,419</u>	<u>9,625</u>	<u>10,504</u>	<u>10,840</u>	<u>11,198</u>	<u>11,528</u>
Regular Force Total	426,911	429,073	431,347	432,450	436,925	444,877	451,162	455,481	462,862	467,885	481,733	491,548	494,418
RF	219,762	220,865	228,488	237,814	244,840	248,540	249,553	252,057	253,582	254,800	253,892	257,581	260,455
PF	<u>172,536</u>	<u>173,219</u>	<u>174,673</u>	<u>174,367</u>	<u>174,927</u>	<u>176,299</u>	<u>175,118</u>	<u>186,365</u>	<u>200,169</u>	<u>206,998</u>	<u>206,545</u>	<u>210,380</u>	<u>214,383</u>
Regional Force Total	<u>392,298</u>	<u>394,084</u>	<u>403,161</u>	<u>412,181</u>	<u>419,767</u>	<u>424,839</u>	<u>424,671</u>	<u>438,422</u>	<u>453,751</u>	<u>461,798</u>	<u>460,437</u>	<u>467,961</u>	<u>474,838</u>
RVNAF Total	819,209	823,157	834,508	844,631	856,692	869,646	875,833	893,903	916,613	929,683	942,170	959,509	969,256

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TABLE VI-6

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high desertion rates and failure to receive full entitlements, provided a clear indication that more positive action would be needed to improve the morale of the forces. Discussion of problems and actions underway at the end of the year follow.

Leave

(C) A significant morale problem had been the lack of enforcement of a liberal leave policy by RVNAF field commanders. JGS leave policies authorized an annual leave of 15 days duration for each service member. However, unit commanders were granting leave on a three or four day basis which did not provide sufficient time for personnel to get back home and return to place of duty. Available RVNAF transportation assets were limited, and most of the short period of leave time was lost in waiting-out transportation.

(U) On 25 Feb, JGS issued a directive which restated the RVNAF leave policy and strongly urged the unit commanders to grant leave in a single 15 day period rather than splitting it into shorter periods. It was believed that this procedure would provide the serviceman more ample time for travel, conducting family business, and could minimize one cause of desertion. Also, the longer period would reduce the workload on transportation.

(C) As a follow on, RVNAF instituted a test leave program to improve morale and eliminate transportation problems encountered by the serviceman taking annual leave. The test program was completed toward the end of the year, and JGS was preparing another memorandum to field commanders emphasizing the need for units to have between 5 and 10 percent of their personnel on leave all the time. MACV was supporting this action by advising, assisting, and making available airlift.

Promotion

(C) The importance of an improved promotion program for increasing the morale and performance of RVNAF personnel was not disputed. The problem lay in identifying and promoting qualified personnel in sufficient numbers to overcome the existing lack of experienced combat and support unit personnel in positions of leadership at all levels. The shortage of senior ranking personnel was acute at the beginning of the year. RVNAF had not achieved their end-of-year 1968 promotion goals and implementation of the promotion system, established by RVNAF in October 1968, was lacking.

(C) As 1969 began, two major actions were being taken in regard to the promotion system. The first action was taken by the JGS to add the 1968 shortfalls to the 1969 annual promotion quotas. The 1969 annual promotion board had been in session since early December 1968; however, results of the board were not released by JGS to MACV until February. Results were disappointing and showed the limited extent to which the approved annual promotions had filled the quotas for both annual and special promotions (See Table VI-7). As a result, MACV strongly encouraged the JGS to fill the remaining quotas by special promotions or by a combination of special promotions and additional annual promotions. MACV formally requested that JGS develop and forward a plan for filling the remaining 1969 quotas. 63

(U) On 10 Apr, JGS announced that the following actions would be taken to increase the 1969 annual promotions:

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RVNAF 1969 ANNUAL PROMOTION DATA

Grade	Eligible	Recommended by Board	Selection Percentage	Approved by Promotion Authorities*	Approval Percentage	Approved Grade Change Promotions**	CY69 Quota***	Percentage of quota filled
COL	182	66	36.3	64	97.0	36	357	10.1
LTC	1,080	598	55.4	428	71.6	237	903	26.2
MAJ	4,321	1,647	38.1	1,345	81.7	930	2,362	39.4
CPT	6,642	5,260	79.2	4,458	84.8	2,986	8,528	35.0
MSG1	Unk	4,909	Unk	2,064	42.0	2,064	4,328	47.7
MSG	Unk	10,968	Unk	3,496	31.9	3,496	7,078	49.4
SFC	Unk	27,876	Unk	9,530	34.2	9,530	16,418	58.0

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* The figures for officers include both those promotions involving actual grade changes (from permanent grade to next higher permanent grade or from permanent grade to next higher functional grade) and those promotions (conversions) not involving actual grade changes (from a functional grade to the same permanent grade). (A detailed discussion of permanent and functional grades and conversions may be found in the 1968 MACV Command History, Vol. 1, pp 284-288.)

** The figures for officers include only those promotions involving actual grade changes. They do not include promotions (conversions) from a functional grade to the same permanent grade.

*** Includes JCS-approved 1969 quotas for both annual and special promotions.

TABLE VI-7

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1. The original 1969 promotion board would be reconvened in May to reconsider all personnel who, though previously eligible, had not been selected by the board nor approved by the promotion authorities.

2. A new 1969 annual promotion board would be convened in August to consider those personnel who became eligible for promotion during 1969.

3. These boards would not be limited by a minimum point requirement in the development of their recommendations. The RVNAF promotion directive established points to be given for time in grade, time in service, awards, decorations, reports, etc., and a base total was established. Personnel whose total was below the base would not be considered.

(U) It was believed that these actions would permit the RVNAF to achieve fully their 1969 quota except that for colonels which appeared to be high. In April, MACV recommended to the JGS that they reevaluate their three-year realization plan goal for colonels. ⁶⁴

(U) The annual promotion board was convened in May as scheduled. The board's recommendations were submitted in June to the promotion authorities for approval. Approval of the board's recommendations could permit all combat and combat support branches to achieve their 1969 promotion goals in the grade of Major, and with the exception of Artillery and Armor, to achieve 1969 goals in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel. However, the grade of Colonel and Captain would still experience a substantial shortfall of 1969 goals. Lieutenants and Aspirants in all branches remained overstrength. ⁶⁵

(C) Results of the Board which convened in May were announced by the JGS in September. ⁶⁶ Approximately 1,900 officers were approved for promotion to grades for the services shown below.

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>RF</u>
COL	26	3			
LTC	183	7	17	2	5
MAJ	468	85	72	10	9
CAPT	<u>849</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>140</u>
TOTAL	1,526	106	95	20	154

(C) The second major action taken in regard to the RVNAF Promotion System was to realign the RVNAF authorized officer and NCO strength requirement by grade. This realignment was based on an assumed RVNAF Accelerated Phase II I&M force level of 877,414. In late March, the JGS established, for planning purposes, the following authorized strength levels by grade for Regular and Regional Forces: ⁶⁷

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>REGULAR FORCE</u>	<u>REGIONAL FORCE</u>
5 STAR GEN	1	
GEN	2	1
LTG	19	1
MG	61	5
BG	104	2
COL	591	56

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<u>GRADE</u>	<u>REGULAR FORCE</u>	<u>REGIONAL FORCE</u>
LTC	1,774	133
MAJ	4,215	982
CPT	11,349	3,761
1 LT, 2 LT, ASP	23,509	13,211
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>41,625</u>	<u>18,152</u>
MSG1	5,121	2,808
MSG	14,694	3,117
SFC	31,843	13,724
SGT	61,723	28,667
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>113,381</u>	<u>48,316</u>

(U) The special supplemental promotion board convened in August, as originally directed in April by JGS, to consider those personnel who had become eligible for promotion during 1969. The results of this board are shown below.

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>MARINE</u>	<u>RF</u>
COL	28		4		1
LTC	31	4	25	3	
MAJ	8	15	37	2	
CAPT	<u>474</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>195</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>259</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>541</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>261</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>260</u>

(U) As of 30 Sep officer grades (with the exception of Lieutenants and Aspirants) were still below the authorized ceiling, as expected, as well as below the assigned strength goals established for end 1969. The assigned strength goals compared with the actual assigned by grade as of 31 Oct are shown below:

	<u>Current Assigned (percent of authorized)</u>	<u>Assigned Strength Goal (percent) CY69</u>
COL	36%	60%
LTC	52	70
MAJ	63	80
CAPT	60	90

The RVNAF Three Year Plan for Officer Realization, Capt through Colonel, and NCO (E-6 through E-8) is shown in Figure VI-8 through 12.


(U) In the RVNAF promotion system, as established in JGS Directive 630-400 (U), 19 Oct 68, Subj: Procedures for Promotion of RVNAF Personnel, annual promotion boards were normally scheduled in August for officers and in September for NCOs to consider those personnel who would be eligible for promotion in the following calendar year. Only one annual promotion board a year was permitted to recommend promotions for officers of all ranks and services. In 1969, however, the board which convened in August was primarily concerned with the current year eligibles as an additional action to reach the original promotion quota goals. The annual promotion board to consider those officers eligible for promotion in CY 1970 was convened on 25 Nov. As of 31 Dec, the results had not been released by JGS.

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RVNAF 3 YEAR PLAN FOR OFFICER REALIZATION COLONEL




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FIGURE VI-8

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RVNAF 3 YEAR PLAN FOR OFFICER REALIZATION LIEUTENANT COLONEL




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FIGURE VI-8

RVNAF 3 YEAR PLAN FOR OFFICER REALIZATION MAJOR




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FIGURE VI-10

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**RVNAF 3 YEAR PLAN FOR OFFICER REALIZATION
CAPTAIN**



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
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FIGURE VI-11

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RVNAF 3 YEAR PLAN FOR NCO REALIZATION E-8, E-7, E-6



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FIGURE VI-12

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(U) The formulation and publication of the JGS directive on promotion procedures, previously cited in this section, was considered by MACV as a significant achievement on the part of the RVNAF. It simplified and incorporated into one document, the numerous policies that had been issued heretofore in a multitude of separate media, usually in JGS memorandums. As a result, it should increase the system's overall responsiveness to force demands, particularly since it is applicable to all services. It was implemented for the first time during 1969 with only one change, i. e. on 28 Oct, JGS published a memorandum which provided for additional points towards promotion for Captains of Navy ships. Undoubtedly, as in all systems, there would be other changes. There was growing pressure being exerted on the JGS by VNAF, ARVN, and VNN to permit separate promotion boards for each of the services. It was doubtful, however, that the JGS would favor any such major change in the near future, other than to scale the promotion quotas downward. 68

Awards and Decorations

(U) In 1968 it was disclosed that a disproportionate share of RVNAF awards had been granted to Regular Force units in comparison to the number awarded Regional and Popular Force units. Also, there appeared to be a disparity among the four CTZs in award policies, except in III CTZ where essentially an equality of awards existed. Since the judicious use of awards and decorations could be a significant morale factor and an effective deterrent to desertions, the RVNAF awards program became a significant area of interest during 1969 (See 1968 MACV Command History, Vol 1, p. 289).

(U) In April the RVNAF JGS published a bilingual reference booklet for RVNAF awards. Although the booklet did not prescribe award policies or procedures, it did consolidate into one reference document specific data pertaining to RVNAF awards to include promulgation authority, purpose of the awards and a listing of reference documents applicable to each award. Awards consisted of approximately 50 medals of varying classes and degrees, encompassing the whole spectrum of military achievements.

(U) As RVNAF, with US advisory assistance, placed more emphasis on recognizing RVNAF service men for outstanding combat performance and meritorious service, the number of award presentations increased. For comparison, in 1967, 34,727 decorations had been awarded. With increased emphasis in 1968, award presentations more than doubled (78,890). By end of Sep 1969, the number had already reached 60,891.

(U) Although an analysis had not been made at the end of the year on the awards presented to ARVN and RF/PF personnel to determine if a disproportionate share still existed by CTZ, the data below indicated that, as of August, for example, ARVN personnel continued to receive the greatest share:

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>ARVN</u>	<u>RF/PF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
I	7,059	1,859	8,918
II	4,623	242	4,865
III	11,588	5,221	16,809
IV	11,426	7,886	19,312
TOTAL	34,696	15,208	49,904

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(U) Another constructive step was taken when JGS issued a memorandum in April which extended the authority of CTZ commanders to award the Gallantry Cross, Corps level and lower, to civilian cadres and civilians. The authority included awards to non-indigenous civilians and to Chieu Hoi returnees serving with RVNAF and FWMAF units. Results of this expanded program, as of end of November, are shown below:

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>Mil</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Total</u>
I	11,207	50	11,257
II	4,015	23	4,038
III	9,090	247	9,338
IV	<u>10,467</u>	<u>433</u>	<u>10,900</u>
TOTAL	34,780	753	35,533

(C) Although the system for RVNAF awards and decorations had improved during the year, a MACV assessment concluded that it had not been utilized in full measure, and it still needed minor modifications to fully stimulate morale. 69

Pay and Disability Gratuities

(C) Combined inspection reports of RVNAF units revealed that transfer of pay to dependents and payment of disability gratuities to dependents had a significant impact on servicemen's morale and well-being. JGS policy prescribed three methods by which service personnel could send money to their dependents: power of attorney, military money order, and civilian money order. The power of attorney authorized the designated dependent to receive the serviceman's pay from the unit paymaster. The other two were designated for the serviceman whose dependents did not reside with him. The lack of continued emphasis on the program, in view of the RVNAF soldier's concern for the welfare of his family, had been a contributor to high desertion rates in RVNAF. JGS had a program for paying disability gratuities, but the amounts were not adequate to support physically-impaired servicemen upon discharge from the service. Toward the close of the year, a combined personnel management and service study group of MACV and JGS Personnel Systems Evaluation Committee was studying the entitlements and financial benefits with a view toward improving and making those services more responsive to the needs of the serviceman and his family. An additional supporting action by MACV was to encourage the Minister of War Veterans to examine the entitlements and financial benefits granted to war veterans and their dependents with view toward providing adequate support.

Commissary

(C) Inadequate stockage in commissaries also had an adverse impact on the morale. Many preferred items were not available, or had been severely rationed. This was due in large measure to a lack of sufficient import credits released by the Minister of Economy (MOE) for replenishing stocks in the commissary system. Consequently, items not available had to be bought on the local economy. However, in remote areas, civilian markets did not stock some of the items and the distance factor between the consumer and the market made economy buying inconvenient. Several attempts had been made by the Ministry of National Defense to have import permits issued for the RVNAF commissary food items. All requests however met with negative results, even though US action supported the Minister of Defense in his requests.

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Family Shelter for RVNAF

(C) Poor living conditions for RVNAF soldiers and their dependents was another factor contributing to low morale. In 1968, RVNAF had estimated that 277,951 additional units were required. In 1969, ARVN established a self-help housing program. However, experience gained during the year from III Corps indicated that initial enthusiasm wore-off and self-help programs were not completed as planned. At the end of the year, the scope of the unsatisfied requirements for RVNAF dependent shelters had not been firmly established, but it was estimated to be at least 275,000 units for the Regular forces and the RF. It was MACV policy that, to the greatest extent practicable, the GVN should provide the necessary financial, labor, and material resources to execute the program. The development of an effective plan for overcoming the severe shortage of dependent shelters for the RVNAF was under study by a combined MACV/JGS committee.

Postal Service

(C) The RVNAF military postal system provided complete postal services to all elements, including Regional and Popular Forces. This service covered personal and official correspondence, postal financial services (sale of stamp and money orders), and limited postal directory services.

(C) A recent "Highland Study" (Pleiku and Kontum Provinces) forwarded to JGS in December for appropriate action, revealed that the procedure for handling mail was generally unsatisfactory and, therefore, adversely affected morale of RVNAF members. For example, each man had to sort through all the mail to find the letter addressed to him. There was also a problem of inequities in free mailing privileges. For example, military persons hospitalized, in training status, or on combat operations were entitled to free mailing privileges when mailing to a civilian address. Free mailing privilege was limited however to two letters per month for enlisted personnel, whereas officers did not have the privilege at all. It was believed that if all servicemen were given free mailing privileges for the duration of the conflict and postal facilities were expanded and upgraded, morale of RVNAF personnel could be improved. This was identified as an area of RVNAF responsibility for improvement. 70

Staff Visits

(C) The JGS, CTZ Commanders, and senior staff personnel did not make frequent enough visits to units in the field. As a result, they were not always aware of the morale and welfare problems. In turn, field commanders remained uninformed and felt their efforts were going unnoticed. It often fell upon US advisors to pass information between units in the field and higher headquarters. US effort would still be required to encourage personal visits by high GVN and military officers to visit RVNAF organizations to provide additional guidance, assistance and recognition as required. 71

1969 Battlefield Promotions

(U) In order to enable ARVN military services, and branches to recognize, in a timely manner, Regular and Regional Forces personnel who had distinguished themselves by

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outstanding achievement on the battlefield, the JGS, on 20 January, allocated a battlefield promotion quota, broken down as follows, for each quarter, CY69:

PROPOSED	ARVN AND REGIONAL FORCE				AIR FORCE	* NAVY	SPECIAL FORCE	AIR BORNE	MARs	TOTAL
	CTZ	CTZ	CTZ	CTZ						
	I	II	III	IV						
MSgt 1st Class (E8)	16	23	23	30	49	42	6	3	4	196
MSgt (E7)	24	32	35	38	110	58	7	5	6	315
SFC (E6)	73	95	102	118	144	91	10	8	9	650
SGT (E5)	62	85	87	100	100	76	12	13	6	541
TOTAL, NCO	175	235	247	286	403	267	35	29	25	1,702
CPL 1st Class (E4)	259	356	390	435	195	179	30	100	29	1,973
CPL (E3)	474	662	710	834	203	299	40	150	91	3,463
PFC (E2)	583	780	859	978	225	417	60	250	140	4,292
TOTAL, EM	1,316	1,798	1,959	2,247	623	895	130	500	260	9,728
GRAND TOTAL	1,491	2,033	2,206	2,533	1,026	1,162	165	529	285	11,430

* Included Regular Forces and RF in service with Rung Sat Special Zone.

(U) The quota given to CTZs was for promotion of Regular and RF personnel of all grades who met the prescribed criteria, without distinction of military service, branch, technical service, or status (organic, reinforced, or attached personnel) who participated in combat operations within the related territory and under the operational control of the CTZ, DTA, or sector involved.

(U) The quotas for the Air Force, Navy, Marines, Airborne, and Special Forces were intended for promotion of Regular and RF personnel (organic, reinforced, or attached), for participation in special operations organized by the military service and branch concerned, by themselves, or in cooperation with other units. Also, these operations were not to be within the operational campaign or plan of the territorial authority involved.

(U) With regard to battlefield promotions for officers, including Aspirant, the CTZ headquarters, military service, and branch concerned were to prepare and forward recommendations to AG/JGS for consideration and issuance of orders each time an officer accomplished an outstanding achievement.

(U) Finally, in order to ensure the success of this program which was intended to boost the morale of personnel who had distinguished themselves by feats of valor, the JGS reminded unit commanders of considering and utilizing, in a fair manner, the battlefield promotion quota given by the JGS. Moreover, particular attention was to be exerted to the consideration of outstanding personnel of units that were operating within the territorial sphere and reinforced/attached units so as to avoid dissatisfaction. ⁷² Reports for the first half of 1969 received by JI/JGS indicated that only 48 percent of the battlefield promotion spaces allocated to the four CTZs were used. ⁷³

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(U) During the last half of the year, 6,788 personnel (32 percent of allocated quota) had received battlefield promotions, shown below:

	<u>ARVN/RF</u>	<u>VNAF</u>	<u>VNN</u>	<u>VNMC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Allocation	16,526	2,052	2,324	570	21,472
Promotion	5,796	674	11	307	6,788
Percent of Allocation	33	54	.5	35	32

(See Table VI-8 for Battlefield promotions by Corps and Branch.)

(C) End of year review reconfirmed that substantial battlefield promotion quotas had been allocated to all Corps; however, it was clear the commanders were not fully utilizing this means of promoting outstanding people. If they had been used, the serviceman, while serving under combat conditions, could have expected at least a one-grade promotion in one-fourth the time required for regular promotions. JGS had taken further action by sending messages to Corps commanders urging them to utilize battlefield quotas to the fullest extent. Correspondingly, action expected by US advisors was to encourage RVNAF counterparts, in all combat areas, to recognize outstanding individual qualifications and performance of officers and non-commissioned officers for a battlefield promotion.

Vietnamese Military Reactions to US Troop Reduction.

(C) Appraisal of Vietnamese military morale was a continuing process and reports generally reaffirmed that attitudes were mixed but leaned toward proclaimed confidence in RVNAF ability to replace US troops. This optimism, however, was tempered by insistence that substantial American combat support must be continued. Confidence appeared to be greater among junior and middle-grade officers than among generals; some younger officers were, in fact, increasingly willing to express impatience with the slow pace of "Vietnamization." Optimism was most pronounced in areas, such as the Delta, where American presence was already minimal, in contrast to areas where US was still present in force. Two of three ARVN division commanders in III Corps, for example, privately expressed a very pessimistic outlook.

(C) Contacts with enlisted men suggested the following conclusions regarding their morale: they were less concerned with larger issues of troop replacement of "Vietnamization" than with the problems of war and life in the army and more concerned by austerity tax-induced price rises. The most important factor, however, in developing the "fighting spirit" of the men seemed to be neither prices nor troop replacement, but the character and image of commanding officers. The enlisted men tended more to be war-weary and preoccupied with the well-being of themselves and their families. This attitude, although reflected in traditionally high desertion rates throughout the country, was not the major factor influencing their effectiveness in battle or their willingness to fight. Their combat morale depended more than anything else on their commanding officers, particularly at the battalion and regimental levels. "When the RVNAF soldier has someone to follow who is worth following (perhaps one of the 'impatient' officers), he apparently will do just that." 74

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SPECIAL BATTLEFIELD PROMOTIONS
BY CTZ & BRANCH

(For Period 1 Jul to 29 Nov 69)

RAK	I CTZ		II CTZ		III CTZ		IV CTZ		VNAF	VNN	VNMC	TOTAL	
	Regular	RF	Regular	RF	Regular	RF	Regular	RF				Regular	RF
MSGT 1st	9	1	4	1	7	2	5	1	49	0	2	76	5
MSGT	32	3	5	3	18	6	7	10	78	1	26	167	22
SFC	93	10	18	0	44	12	42	3	164	2	92	455	25
SGT	81	5	22	2	42	14	56	2	121	1	4	327	23
NCO TOTAL:	215	19	49	6	111	34	110	16	412	4	124	1,025	75
CFC	211	64	31	53	107	121	162	155	158	3	7	679	393
CPL	282	114	32	79	196	241	293	257	63	0	12	878	691
PFC	582	124	24	84	173	274	352	233	41	4	164	1,340	715
EM TOTAL:	1,075	302	87	216	476	636	807	645	262	7	183	2,897	1,799

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TABLE VI-8

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RVNAF Desertions

(C) Toward the end of 1968, JGS had instituted a vigorous anti-desertion program in an effort to curb the growing desertion rate in the RVNAF. (For discussion of this program, refer to the 1968 MACV Command History, Vol 1, pp. 278-288). This program apparently had a beneficial effect because the total numbers of desertions was down in the last two months of the year, but the fact remained that the RVNAF had lost 139,670 men to desertion in 1968.

(C) The desertion problem was an item of major interest to COMUSMACV and he emphasized this in a 6 Feb message to all advisors in which he said: ⁷⁵

The overall decline in November and December is encouraging and especially noteworthy for Popular Force elements. However, desertions continue to be the largest single cause of manpower losses in the RVNAF. In CY69 a major effort must be made to effect a drastic reduction in desertion rates.

This headquarters has worked continuously with JGS to develop programs and policies designed to reduce this useless loss to the GVN manpower base. Current programs and policies are considered to be adequate. However, vigorous implementation of JGS directives is not being accomplished at the unit/province level.

The magnitude and seriousness of this problem must be understood by US advisors at all levels and in all aspects of the advisory effort, and similarly conveyed to counterparts. Vietnamese counterparts must implement JGS directives and take positive action to reduce desertions in their respective units. US advisory personnel must convince their counterparts that a reduction in desertions is of major importance to the attainment and maintenance of RVNAF force goals and effectiveness. Advisors at all levels are directed to counsel their counterparts and assist them in the review and implementation of existing JGS desertion control policies and directives.

The importance of this effort dictates aggressive positive action by US advisors. Reduction in desertions will be a priority US effort at all levels. Senior US advisors will urge the immediate formation of local permanent US/RVNAF desertion control committees at Corps, major unit and sector levels and the establishment of active anti-desertion programs for all units down to battalion/subsector level. Emphasis should be placed on the reception and indoctrination of new recruits, and on those units that maintain the highest desertion rates.

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(S) By the end of the first quarter of 1969, the RVNAF net desertion rate had dropped to 10.9 per thousand. This was a big improvement over 1968 during which desertions had risen to an all-time high of 17.2 per thousand in October. This downward trend in desertions was attributed to the actions initiated by the GVN in September 1968 which included, but were not limited to:

1. Improvement in transportation for RVNAF personnel on leave to include providing additional air transportation.
2. Establishment of acceptable maximum rates of desertions for all commands, with punishment and/or relief of commanders who failed to meet these standards.
3. Increase in the award of the Cross of Gallantry to lower ranks in combat units to include RF and PF personnel.
4. Increase in the number of personnel authorized to be on leave at any one time from five to 10 percent of assigned strength.
5. Granting graduation leave of 10 days after completing basic training. This leave was in addition to the 15 days leave authorized annually.
6. Organization of guidance sections to provide assistance to personnel on leave.
7. Indoctrination and motivation of servicemen in training centers and at all levels of command down to squad level.
8. Participation in the National Police Records System which provided for the establishment of a Central Fingerprint File with related systems for providing information on all wanted personnel.

(S) It should be noted that the sharp reduction in the RVNAF desertions in February (see Figure VI-13) is less significant when viewed in light of the stringent limitations and controls that were placed on RVNAF personnel throughout the Tet holiday period, 9-25 Feb. ⁷⁶

(U) The decline reported in the RVNAF desertion rates during the first quarter of 1969 leveled off during the second quarter. Decreases in one military force were offset by increases in the others. The overall RVNAF rate appeared to have stabilized at a gross rate of approximately 12 deserters per thousand (See Figure VI-13). However, the rates were still at an unacceptable level. Over the first six months there had been approximately 60,000 deserters, an equivalent of five or more divisions. Fault could not be found in policies established by JGS to reduce desertions. An analysis in May by MACJ1 ⁷⁷ reaffirmed that policies and directives from RVNAF were considered more than adequate and should have contributed to lowering the rates to more acceptable levels. Apparently, however, the guidelines and directives had been uniformly ineffective due to lack of implementation at unit command level. As stated by the ACoS J1, MACV:

The JGS-published desertion control measures are sound and adequately cover all aspects of the problem. The major emphasis needed is to insure effective implementation and enforcement of JGS


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VI-69

RVNAF GROSS DESERTION RATE - 1969



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- - - - - RVNAF NET RATE
 RVNAF GROSS RATE
 - - - - - REGULAR FORCES GROSS RATE
 - - - - - REGIONAL FORCES GROSS RATE
 - - - - - POPULAR FORCES GROSS RATE

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FIGURE VI-13

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directives at all levels. This is the responsibility of the commander. The commander aided by the staff must implement the numerous programs at the unit level and then force compliance by active supervision.

In an additional effort to stimulate command interest, the JGS scheduled Desertion seminars which were held at the 25th ARVN Inf Div on 3 Jun for III and IV Corp Desertion Control Committees and in July at the 2d ARVN Inf Div for I and II Corp committees. The specific purpose of these seminars was to discuss mutual desertion problems and possible courses of actions. Also in July the JGS activated desertion control committees at regimental level and MACV organized a Desertion Control Committee to augment and support the RVNAF in their efforts. Some of the findings from various RVNAF/MACV reviews, studies and conferences follow.

(C) A review of the desertion rates by CTZ indicated that IV CTZ had consistently experienced the highest desertion rate for the six month period from October 1968 to April 1969. A June 1969 MACV analysis of some of the causes of desertion revealed:

1. IV CTZ:
 - a. Compared favorably with the other corps overall.
 - b. Had the best ratio of friendly to enemy maneuver battalions.
 - c. Units spent an average amount of time in combat operations.
2. The fact that there were no NVA battalions in IV CTZ should have caused a lower desertion rate.
3. Pay, housing, commissaries, leave, and transportation compared favorably with other CTZs.
4. IV CTZ appeared to be average as far as morale and welfare were concerned.
5. The only factor to support a higher desertion rate was that there were fewer US units in IV CTZ and the friendly KIA rate/1000 was the highest of any CTZ.

(C) Apparently, the MACV analysis was overlooking some factor which had a significant effect on the overall desertion rate and, on 28 Jun, MACV requested DMAC to provide an analysis of the situation in order to assist overcoming the IV CTZ desertion rate imbalance. 78

(C) In answer to the above request for analysis, CG, DMAC advanced the following theories to explain the disproportionate desertion rates: 79

1. Poor leadership was the primary cause.
2. The IV CTZ, as compared to the other provinces, had a higher ratio of farmers. These personnel deserted the Regular and RF to return home to be with their families.
3. The ARVN deserter could change his identity due to the lack of sufficiently high GVN priority on the National Identity System to provide the classification and identification

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search measures required for positive identity. This problem was compounded in IV CTZ since it was the heaviest populated CTZ in RVN.

4. IV CTZ also had the highest friendly KIA ratio per thousand of the four CTZs, the fewest US units working with the RVNAF, and the least desirable operational area in which to fight.

5. The high incident of immersion foot also affected operations and desertions.

(U) JGS recognized the need for emphasis on reducing the rising regional force desertion rate and initiated RF/PF Desertion Seminars in each of the CTZs. The first was held in IV CTZ on 3 Sep in Go Cong Province. The RF/PF Commander in Go Cong had taken several measures cited below which he believed were the best to reduce desertions, at least in his area:

Explain the Decree Law 15/66 (punishment for desertion).

Publicize victories.

Leaders visit outposts.

Reward achievements.

Improve living conditions.

Assist the men to obtain legal papers.

The ColS, IV CTZ, at that seminar, directed all provinces in IV CTZ to organize 3-man teams, a procedure piloted by Go Cong, to assist new recruits in receiving their entitlements. MACV requested that all RF/PF advisors country-wide encourage other CTZs to adopt this concept. MACV also suggested that JGS direct all CTZs to do likewise. As a result, the Deputy Chief, JGS directed all RF/PF Commanders to carry out the following actions in an effort to control desertions: explain Decree Law 15/66, issue pocket card of provisions of 15/66, establish control point/check points to find deserters, improve commissaries, promote deserving personnel, and publicize victories.

(U) During a seminar held by III CTZ on 5 Sep, the DCG, particularly emphasized the following points:

Desertion control is a command responsibility.

Stress POLWAR activities.

Curtail corruption (no deserters on the payroll).

Apply Decree Law 15/66.

Commander visit outposts.

Apply JGS directives to control desertions.

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RVNAF GROSS DESERTION RATES/1000 1969

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>
AVN	16.1	12.8	14.7	16.2	13.5	14.7	15.7	14.4	13.0	15.9	15.8	15.9
VNAF	1.6	0.2	1.1	1.2	1.1	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.1
AVN	1.8	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.5	1.1	1.7	1.5	1.4	0.7	2.0	1.4
VNMC	41.4	25.1	18.9	19.9	16.0	23.5	24.9	26.1	26.9	30.8	18.9	23.6
TOTAL RECONSTRUCTION FORCES	15.3	11.9	12.4	14.7	12.3	13.4	14.2	13.1	11.9	14.3	14.0	14.1
RF	12.4	8.9	11.2	13.3	15.4	13.8	14.8	13.3	10.3	8.6	9.2	8.7
FF	6.3	3.9	7.1	7.7	7.0	8.1	5.8	5.3	5.6	5.0	5.3	7.0
TOTAL Territorial FORCES	9.7	6.8	10.6	10.8	11.9	11.4	11.0	10.1	8.2	7.0	7.4	7.9
TOTAL RVNAF	12.6	9.4	12.1	12.8	12.1	12.5	12.6	11.6	10.1	10.7	10.8	11.1

TABLE VI-9

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ARVN DESERTION RATES BY CTZ/GROSS RATE/1000

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>
I	16.1	12.7	16.3	18.2	13.4	17.0	18.7	15.5	11.4	18.5	14.4	15.2
II	13.4	10.5	16.5	12.2	13.2	13.0	15.5	12.4	13.4	13.8	17.3	16.8
III	20.8	15.3	15.0	18.7	16.3	17.4	18.8	18.6	18.2	20.6	18.8	18.6
IV	28.2	22.1	25.8	29.4	21.9	22.6	22.4	21.0	19.2	23.8	25.9	25.0

TABLE VI-10

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SEP	9,355	1,151	8,204
OCT	10,113	1,392	8,721
NOV	10,379	2,225	8,154
DEC	<u>10,726</u>	<u>1,378</u>	<u>9,348</u>
TOTAL	123,363	15,369	107,994

(C) The highest desertion rate consistently occurred in the VNMC, compared with the other services (ranged from 16 to 41 deserters per 1,000). However compared with the rate at the beginning of the year, the VNMC had made the greatest progress in reducing desertions to almost half by December. Desertions in the Popular Forces were relatively low (ranged from 5 to 8 deserters per 1,000), while VNAF and VNN were consistently low (usually 1 per 1,000). The ARVN rate was high throughout the year (ranged from 12-16 per 1,000) with IV CTZ consistently the worst (19-28 per 1,000). (See Tables VI-9 & 10.)

(C) Although there was an overall lower rate of net desertions from January to December (11.5 to 9.6), the fact remained that the RVNAF lost 107,994 men and desertion continued to be the largest single cause of manpower loss in the RVNAF.

Leadership

(C) Perhaps the most serious problem facing RVNAF was the quality of leadership. In spite of both JGS and MACV efforts over the course of the year, the quality of leadership was still one of the major obstacles to aggressive prosecution of the war and the achievement of RVNAF self-sufficiency. The problem was chronic and not amenable to rapid solution. A discussion of leadership problems with year end programs and actions required to resolve them follow.

Command and Staff Assignments

(C) The shortage of senior commanders in combat units resulted in a serious leadership problem. Commanders were generally below the authorized grades. The greatest problem was in infantry battalions and armored cavalry squadrons. For example, 47 percent of battalion commanders were two grades below authorization. Lieutenants and Aspirants were called upon to assume responsibilities beyond their experience or training. A major effort during the year centered on identifying and promoting qualified leaders. Yet, despite an increase of 2,653 senior officers between December 1968 and October 1969 (more promotions than in any other year), Regular Forces still had only 63 percent of their authorized senior officers assigned. Rapid force expansion simply outpaced officer strength increases and the RVNAF supplemental August promotion board actions had little effect in raising the percentage of assigned senior officers. Additionally, staff officers lacked formal training. MACV and JGS were developing plans toward increasing the amount of formal training conducted at RVNAF leader-producing schools. ⁸³

Shortfall of Officer and NCO Personnel

(C) A major problem which continued to plague both the regular and territorial forces was an imbalance of the officer and NCO grade structures. The problem stemmed mainly from the

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past inability of the RVNAF officer and NCO production and promotion systems to keep pace with the rapid mobilization. This was compounded by the fact that most of the officer and NCO input had necessarily been at the bottom of their respective grade structures. The RVNAF had no large pool of reserve officers or NCOs from which to draw: when some 1,055 reserve officers were recalled to active duty in early 1968, the pool was almost depleted. The RVNAF developed a "three year officer and NCO realization plan" which provided for a progressive system of officer and NCO promotions designed to achieve at least a 90 percent fill in all grades by the end of calendar year 1970. Forecasting RVNAF capability to achieve 1970 goals appeared remote, however, due in part to continued force structure increases, lack of eligible and qualified personnel for promotion, and unrealistic promotion goals (See section on Promotion). JGS planned to review its Three Year Officer and NCO Realization Plan with a view toward identifying future personnel requirements and establishing realistic promotion goals for 1970. 84

Officer Rotation Program

(C) JGS adopted a limited officer rotation program to develop leadership and additional competence. It was designed to permit officers who had served two years in one unit, upon request, to be reassigned to more desirable duties such as central agencies, schools, or the JGS. The policy was not fully implemented, however, and progress in the program was slow. Some officers had never served away from the JGS Headquarters, while others had stayed in combat units during their entire service. MACV initiated the development of a combined Personnel Systems Evaluation Committee, which at the end of the year was studying the RVNAF officer rotation program in order to improve and modernize the program. It was believed that more rotation would enhance leadership ability, professional development, and technical competence. 85

Governmental Requirements for RVNAF Officers

(C) Civil requirements had caused a drawdown on the availability of officers for purely military duties. As of 1 Dec, JGS/J1 reported that 6,828 military officers were performing duties with various civilian agencies. This drain had a significant impact on leadership in the RVNAF. The JGS and the Mobilization Directorate were at the end of the year refining personnel requirements for key leadership positions for 1970, to better cope with force structure increases and expansion of the RVNAF.

Leadership Training

(C) A program to develop more effective leadership from the ranks of RVNAF was considered worth trying. Reports from the field invariably stated that NCOs and officers who had progressed through the ranks were more effective in the field than leaders who had gone directly from recruit training to officer or NCO school. Toward the end of the year, a program was being developed that would identify those junior leaders who had risen through the ranks and to send them to preparatory training in-country, with training specifically tailored to the students. Additionally, and because the current career courses and Command and General Colleges were too time-consuming for attendance by a large number of officers, a proposal was being readied to start selected four to five month associate career courses in CONUS for attendance by RVNAF officers. 86

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Career Management

(C) The most significant breakthrough by the JGS in career management discipline, was a plan for the progressive development of infantry officers. This was JGS's first manpower management program concerned with a particular category of personnel. It spelled out consideration for the career management of infantry officers, specified rotation of duty assignments between remote and the more desirable areas, and included provisions for alternating tours between command and staff duty. Newly commissioned infantry officers were to serve their initial tours with combat units. Educational criteria, specifying both military and civilian schools, were prescribed for the selection of division, regimental, battalion, and sector commanders; for staff officers at all levels; and for service school cadre, to include the Command and Staff School. The program, in fact, was basically similar to the US Army's program for officer career management. Although the infantry branch made the first step in officer career development, all other branches experienced substantially less progress in career management discipline. ⁸⁷

RVNAF Personnel System Evaluation

(FOUO) An evaluation of the entire RVNAF Personnel System was conducted by the MACV staff between 8 Sep and 30 Dec and submitted to the Chief, JGS and COMUSMACV for approval and subsequent implementation. ⁸⁸ Each major system and sub-system of the RVNAF personnel programming was analyzed by first hand observations at every organization level including District, Province, Division, CTZ, Central Departments, Schools and General Staff, and Ministry of National Defense (MOD). Results of the study disclosed the RVNAF lacked sufficient procedures to accomplish effective personnel programming and management control over manpower resources. Some of the significant programming problems and recommendations included in the final report were:

1. PROBLEM: (Short Range): Adequate directives to disseminate policy and procedural guidance for programming personnel requirements do not exist.

RECOMMENDATION: That JGS prepare, publish, and disseminate a directive containing specific instructions for programmers at major subordinate commands.

2. PROBLEM: (Long Range): JGS had no long (5 year) or medium (3 year) range plans for manning an optimum RVNAF force structure.

RECOMMENDATION: That the current one year plans be supplemented by three and five year plans to allow for procurement, training, and distribution of qualified personnel.

3. PROBLEM: (Short Range): Staff procedures for force structure programming do not include coordination with JGS/AG, JGS/CLC, JGS/CTC.

RECOMMENDATION: That staff procedures be developed to ensure proper coordination of the personnel aspects of force structuring actions at JGS level and at major subordinate levels of command prior to approval.

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4. PROBLEM (Long Range): The current strength reporting system did not provide information in sufficient detail to facilitate accurate and timely personnel programming.

RECOMMENDATION: That a strength reporting system be developed reflecting excesses and shortages by occupational specialty and skill level so that personnel are recruited and trained in needed or critical specialties as future replacements.

5. PROBLEM (Long Range): RVNAF occupational specialty codes had not been implemented to the degree required of a programming data base.

RECOMMENDATION: That job descriptions and job specifications be updated and career patterns developed. Personnel requisitions contain occupational specialty and skill level in addition to the number of personnel required. School quotas be filled by occupational specialty and training received be reflected by the award of occupational specialties or skill levels.

6. PROBLEM (Long Range): There was no single agency charged with the responsibility for manpower allocation.

RECOMMENDATION: That GVN/MOD determine manpower priorities for all national agencies including RVNAF. Each province be levied to provide a portion of the national requirement based on available manpower resources in the province. Shortfalls that occur must be made up from national resources.

7. PROBLEM (Long Range): RVNAF Personnel officers and US advisors lacked understanding of RVNAF personnel system.

RECOMMENDATION: That orientation briefings on RVNAF personnel system be provided to personnel advisors. That RVNAF officers at JGS and component level be selected for advanced management training.

8. PROBLEM (Long Range): Specialist training was not being accomplished prior to assignment to RVNAF units.

RECOMMENDATION: That this problem be an area of further study to ensure that best possible specialist training program is developed.

9. PROBLEM (Long Range): The present RVNAF data base did not provide detailed information on shortages and overages on each occupation specialty and skill level. (A recommendation was not stated.)

10. PROBLEM (Long Range): Subordinate commands/organizations did not always receive or comply with JGS guidance. Even the most perfect system could not function under such circumstances.

RECOMMENDATION: That periodic inspections be conducted by responsible JGS agencies, especially JGS/J1, to ensure that guidance documents are on hand and being used.

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Personnel Verification

(U) In March, JGS initiated a program of verifying and auditing personnel listings for all Regular, Regional, and Popular Force units. Each unit was to receive a roster which would contain the name, rank, service number, and all personnel data currently recorded in the RVNAF computer center for each individual assigned to a unit. Each unit was to verify the data on the roster against the current data in the individual personnel records which were located at unit level, make all corrections, additions, and deletions on the roster, balance the roster with the unit strength report, and return the roster to MACV. ⁸⁹

(U) On 1 Apr, the RVNAF Computer Processing Center began updating the Personnel Master File using the verified personnel rosters and the by-name entries in the unit strength figure reports. ⁹⁰

Fingerprinting Program

(U) The RVNAF Fingerprinting Program had begun on 1 Nov 68 with a programmed completion date of 31 Mar 69. Extensive combat operations, lack of transportation, and faulty preparation of individual cards delayed completion of the program beyond the projected target date; however, AG/JGS redistributed the available fingerprint teams and the program was progressing to a probable completion in May. ⁹¹ By June, 96 percent of the RVNAF had been fingerprinted and by July 100 percent of the original requirement had been completed. As was recognized, however, the program which was carried out by the National Police Records Center would be a continuing one, particularly in light of the force structure increase in 1969. New personnel were fingerprinted on a routine basis as they were inducted. By the end of October, 867,707 RVNAF cards had been forwarded to AG/JGS from each of the major RVNAF components as follows:

	<u>Fingerprint Cards</u>	<u>Total Assigned Personnel</u>
ARVN	399,148	401,595
RF	231,255	254,800
PF	174,464	206,998
VNAF	28,790	29,385
VNN	24,155	26,401
VNMC	9,300	10,504

Out of this total, the National Police Records Center had received 760,000 cards and had classified approximately 50,000. Completion of the RVNAF files by the National Police was programmed for January 1971. ⁹²

Inspector General

(U) On 1 Feb, the JGS published a memorandum which reminded members of the RVNAF of the correct procedures for submitting complaints, grievances, and requests for assistance. The contents of this memorandum received wide publicity in the radio, TV, and press subsequent to its promulgation.

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(U) This memorandum served only as a reminder to all servicemen who believed that they had suffered injustices or wanted to report violations of law, corrupt acts, violations of individual rights or deficiencies in the promotion system, of the proper method to submit complaints. It provided for appearing in person or writing to the IG/RVNAF where complaints would be considered and investigated.

(U) The reason for this memo was that, in the past, some servicemen had sent complaints to news media or to branches of the government. This not only violated military discipline but also slowed the processing of the complaint. Personnel were also reminded that all complaints must contain name, rank, serial number, organization, and signature. Names were to be kept confidential, and any servicemen who made a complaint to any agency other than the IG would be subject to disciplinary action. ⁹³

(U) During the period 31 Mar - 12 Apr, the Office of the Inspector General, Department of the Army, conducted an inspector general orientation course for approximately 100 Vietnamese officers assigned as Inspectors General within RVNAF.

(C) TOE 62-218A for the Inspector General Directorate/RVNAF was approved by MACV for programming and budgeting on 8 Sep. The new TOE authorized 103 military spaces, an increase of 32 personnel. ⁹⁴

(U) The first combined MACV/JGS Inspector General conference was hosted by the MACV Inspector General on 14 Nov. RVNAF and US Inspectors General and inspector general advisors attended. Better coordination among RVNAF, US and other FWMAF Inspectors General in accomplishing the objectives of the Combined Campaign Plan was the theme. ⁹⁵

(U) The RVNAF Inspector General held a seminar in early December with Inspectors General of all echelons participating. Problem areas were discussed and reorganization plans for IG offices at all command levels were developed.

(C) The JGS Inspector General briefed the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Committee on 31 Dec. The current organization, mission and functions of the RVNAF inspector general system were presented. A major problem, the fragmented inspection activities at the Central Agency level was discussed. The JGS IG presented a plan which called for consolidation of the Central Agency inspection activities into the JGS IG Directorate for centralized control, elimination of duplicative inspections, standardized criteria, and more efficient operations. He also revealed plans and requirements for training approximately 200 IG students annually. ⁹⁶

Training

RVNAF Academies, Colleges, and Schools ⁹⁷

(U) A major portion of the formal training which was administered by the Central Training Command (CTC) was conducted through the many and varied military academies, colleges, and schools throughout the Republic. Some of these institutions were relatively new while others had been in existence before the RVNAF was established, and no less than four of them - the Command and Staff College, the NCO Academy, and the Engineer and Medical Schools - were

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originally located in North Vietnam. Almost all of the major schools have at one time or another been located at and been a part of the Thu Duc Military School Center. This now-defunct Center and forerunner to no less than 10 schools was the hub of RVNAF training during the period immediately following the Geneva Accords of 1954. In time, the different schools expanded and, finally, most of them moved to other sites because Thu Duc was too small to contain the budding training base of the new RVNAF. These institutions continued to expand their facilities and develop, revise, and update their training curriculums in light of the emergence of the new military force. Also, new schools were instituted to broaden the training base and develop a well rounded and balanced RVNAF - a military force in which all personnel regardless of speciality, could receive formal training. A listing of the academies, colleges, and schools together with a brief history of each follows (for locations see Figure VI-14).

(U) The Vietnamese National Military Academy (VNMA) had been founded in December 1948 in Hue. Under French operation, the Academy was simply a nine-month officer training school designed to produce infantry platoon leaders. In 1950 it had moved to Dalat because of better local weather. It remained under French operation until after the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954, at which time the Vietnamese had assumed control. In 1955, the American advisory effort had begun, and the curriculum was extended to one year; in 1956 to two years; and in 1959, President Diem decreed the VNMA to be a full four year, degree-granting, university-level institution. Expansion planning and construction had begun, but the program floundered because of the conflicting short-term demand for junior officers and a lack of qualified academic faculty. As a result, the academy had graduated three 3-year classes but no 4-year classes and, in 1963, had reverted to the production of enlightened platoon leaders with two years of training. The concept was similar to US officer candidate school through 1965. In December 1966, Premier Ky had issued a decree which had reinsituted a four year educational institution, with graduates entitled to receive a Bachelor of Science degree, and had changed the Academy mission:

The Vietnamese National Military Academy is responsible for training regular army officers for the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam who possess a university level of instruction and a firm military background.


(U) A VNMA applicant had to be a citizen of RVN between the ages of 18 and 22, unmarried, and a high school graduate to be considered for acceptance. Appointment to the Academy was based upon the results of a two-day competitive academic examination and a complete physical examination. The student quality obtained from this competition had provided a basis for developing the potential of an 'elite' professional corps. Approximately one out of 10 applicants had been accepted. In 1968, for example, out of over 2,500 applicants, only 270 had been accepted into the four year program. The attrition rate had been minimal since its conversion to a four year college, averaging 4-5 percent (the approximate average rate for USMA as well as the Philippine and Korean Military Academies is 30 percent). At the beginning of 1969, the Academy had an enrollment of 900 cadets with plans to expand the enrollment to 1,000 by the end of the year.

(U) The physical plant consisted of 10 buildings including four cadet dormitories, three academic buildings, an academy headquarters, a cadet mess hall, and a cadet club. Under construction were faculty quarters, a fourth academic building, a library, and a cadet regimental headquarters.

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**LOCATIONS OF RVNAF ACADEMIES,
COLLEGES, AND SCHOOLS 1969**



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FIGURE VI-14

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(U) The four year curriculum was diverse. Besides military subjects and courses in mathematics, physics, history, English, law, philosophy, chemistry, engineering, and surveying (50 percent of the academic program is devoted to engineering sciences), the curriculum provided courses to help solve some of RVN's unique problems. For example, a course in hamlet planning covered everything from where to put the village chief's house to how to drill wells for water. A course conducted in sanitary engineering was designed to improve the sanitation in hamlets and villages.

(U) Subjects were taught by the Academy's all-RVNAF military faculty of approximately 100. Classes were held as seminars with small groups of cadets. All cadets had their own textbooks which was something rare in civilian Vietnamese universities. Although the VNMA curriculum was patterned after the US service academies, the cadets were exposed to more classroom hours than the cadets at West Point; however, both participated in the same amount of athletic activity.

(U) In 1969, there were 12 US military personnel in the VNMA advisory detachment. Advisory efforts were geared toward improving the quality of entering cadets, obtaining a better qualified staff and faculty, developing a balanced curriculum, and supporting the VNMA's physical expansion. The US Senior Advisor noted that, although reports and comments about the VNMA graduates have been excellent, "The future of the Academy rests with how well it can keep pace with the changing situation and times. Updating texts, expanding facilities to meet needs, bettering the faculty; these are what are important."

(U) In December, the 'West Point' of RVN turned out the first class of 92 cadets to graduate from its four year program. This event set the stage for a crucial test of one of the most ambitious plans of Vietnamization to date. During the colorful pass in review graduation ceremony, the long range importance of the academy graduates was punctuated by the presence of President Thieu and a host of top political and military leaders of the country. In remarks by President Thieu, he told them 'they must be more than military leaders and urged the graduates to be in the forefront of a nation building generation.'

(U) The graduated cadets were assigned to the three services as follows: ARVN -- 77, VNAF -- 10, VNN/VNMC -- 5. During the period 15-20 Dec, 196 candidates for class #26 reported to VNMA for in-processing examinations. Eight candidates were declared unfit for military service for medical reasons; 250 primary candidates and 119 alternates had been selected for the class. On 24 Dec, 188 fully qualified candidates were admitted as new cadets and formal training commenced.

(U) The National NCO Academy had been founded by the French Army in 1951 in Quang-Yen Province, North Vietnam and had been called the Commando School. After the Geneva Accords of 1954, the school had reverted to the RVNAF and had moved to Khanh Hoa Province in II CTZ. Its mission had been changed from training commandos to that of conducting all basic infantry courses. Due to lack of space, the school had been transferred again to Nha Trang and renamed the Commando and Physical Training Center with the expanded mission of conducting commando, reconnaissance, anti-guerilla, physical training, boxing, judo, and basic infantry courses. In late 1958, the school had been again redesignated as the National NCO Academy, RVNAF and received its new mission of training selected NCOs in the principles of leadership and command. In 1967, the Academy had incorporated airmobile training courses into its curriculum, and in 1968, in order to relieve the training pressure on the Infantry School, had conducted and graduated four officer candidate classes. This course was discontinued after the fourth class graduated in early 1969.

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(U) Nine Reserve NCO Courses were conducted at the National NCO Academy during the year, and a tenth class began on 1 Dec. Student input was 460 out of the programmed 600.

(U) During December, construction began on 15 new student barracks and three latrines. In addition, self-help projects were initiated to construct two family reception buildings and to enlarge existing mess halls. This construction and renovation was part of the overall modernization and improvement program to upgrade facilities and improve morale. Also, during December, the National NCO Academy was issued an additional 750 M16 rifles bringing the on hand total to 1,000. This represented a significant step toward obtaining the minimum authorized of 3,000 rifles to improve and modernize training at the Academy.

(U) The National Defense College (NDC), one of the newest of the RVNAF schools, had been established by National Decree on 22 Aug 67. It had been given the twofold mission of:

1. Educating outstanding and high ranking military and career government civilians to become better qualified to perform important functions relevant to the national security.
2. Studying, planning, and developing national defense policy.

The first group of 15 officers (O-5 and O-6) and high ranking civilians constituted the first class which had convened on 6 May 68. All 21 students completed the course and were graduated in April 1969. The second class of 16 military and eight civilians commenced on 3 May 69. The overall curriculum of the NDC consisted of an orientation, 10 courses and seven seminars which fell into three major categories (international setting, national resources, and national defense strategy), and an individual research program. In addition, the college offered an elective English program and conducted a unique senior seminar. In this weekly senior seminar, key general officers and distinguished career government officials were invited to hear important guest speakers as they lectured and discussed significant topics with the regular class. Following the lecture, the guest speaker met with the regular class in a seminar on subjects related to the lecture. This procedure promoted understanding at the highest governmental level, not only of the vital topics under discussion but also of the role of the college and how it contributed to the achievement of national goals.

(U) The Command and Staff College had its beginning in Hanoi in 1952 when the French Expeditionary Corps established the "Tactical Instruction Center" with the mission of training platoon group, battalion, and company commanders. In late 1953, the school had been transformed into the Military Research Center with a mission of providing wartime officers with accelerated training. After the Geneva Accords of 1954, the college had moved from Hanoi to Saigon and was redesignated the Command and General Staff College and assigned the mission of training high ranking officers for the RVNAF. In 1961 the college had again moved, this time to Dalat, where it occupied the buildings which had previously housed the VNMA. During 1962 and 1963, the courses of instruction had been shortened and oriented to stress counterinsurgency techniques. After relocation to Dalat, the college had expanded and battalion staff, battalion command, and extension, or correspondence, courses were added. (The battalion command course was transferred to the Infantry School in 1964.) In addition, the battalion commander's combined arms course, a 16-week mobilization course, had been inaugurated at the college in December 1965. A CTC study in early 1967 had resulted in a change in the names of the residence course, a broadened scope of instruction, and a new name for the college - the Command and Staff College (C&SC).

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(U) In 1969, as the senior tactical school in the country, as a joint service institution, and as the only institution (other than the NDC) that offered the education and prestige so vital to the developing nation, the C&SC possessed a five-fold training mission:

1. To train selected field grade officers for duty as commanders at regimental and senior sector level or higher, and staff officers at division level or higher.
2. To train selected captains and majors for duty as battalion commanders, district chiefs, or staff officers at battalion and regimental level.
3. To provide a limited number of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps officers of combat arms and technical services with sound knowledge of the armed forces in order to foster a high degree of coordination in joint operations.
4. To conduct an extension course for non-resident, active duty officers in grades from First Lieutenant to Major.
5. To organize special courses as may be directed by the JCS.

(U) The curriculum of the college consisted of two separate courses of instruction - a 20-week Advanced course for Major through Colonel and a 12-week Intermediate course for Captains and Majors. The Intermediate course was also offered via a correspondence course for First Lieutenants through Majors. The curriculum was designed to support a joint service college, and the programs of instruction for each course were continually revised and modified to support the requirements of the RVNAF and of province and district leaders. There was a certain degree of repetition between the two courses that was both necessary and desirable in providing background fundamentals, information on current developments, and continuity. Both courses emphasized combined arms training appropriate to the level of the course, and over the past five years (1964-1969) continual reorganization of the programs of instruction had permitted good coverage of unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, sector and territorial security, pacification, political warfare, revolutionary development, and general subjects dealing with national and international problems.

(U) By JCS directive, an officer must be a graduate of the Intermediate course to be eligible for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and of the Advanced course for eligibility for promotion to Colonel.

(U) The graduation exercise of the 5th Advanced Command and Staff Course took place on 19 Dec at the college auditorium and was presided over by the Chief, Central Training Command. Ninety-seven students successfully completed the course, seven failed.

(U) The Political Warfare (POLWAR) College history dated back to a Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) training center which had been established at Fort Cay Mai, Saigon, in 1956. Its annual output was 212 personnel in 1961, 884 in 1962, and 940 in 1963. In 1964, the training center had moved to Camp Le Van Dayet in III Corps. The facilities at this new location had been totally inadequate and their student capacity had decreased from 350 to 80 personnel. This student output had later increased to 150 through self-help projects, but the 1965 output was still below previous years, graduating only 427 students.

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(U) With the advent of the political warfare structure in the RVNAF, the training center had been redesignated the Political Warfare School in 1965 and had moved in 1966 to its present location in Dalat. At about the same time, it was upgraded to a college with the primary mission of providing a two-year college level course to train professional POLWAR officers. Political warfare cadets were recruited and sent to the Infantry School to receive basic training with OCS candidates. Upon completion of basic training, they moved to Dalat to begin their POLWAR training. The first class graduated in May 1969 and the graduates were assigned to POLWAR battalions and to ARVN regiments and RF companies as POLWAR advisors. Thus, as a result of the college and its training, the RVNAF possessed professional POLWAR officers in the field.

(U) Other missions of the college included providing POLWAR Branch training for RVNAF officers and organizing and directing POLWAR specialist training as required. The 1968 quotas for the course at the POLWAR college included 379 cadets for the two year program and 475 students in each of the three month courses for POLWAR Branch training.

(U) The Infantry School, originally called the Thu Duc Reserve Officer School, had been established at Thu Duc in October 1951 along with its sister school in Nam Dinh, North Vietnam. Both schools were originally administered by the French Army, and all instruction was presented in French.

(U) In 1952, after the closing of the Nam Dinh Reserve Officer School, the Thu Duc School had become the only Reserve Officer-producing school in RVN. In 1954, after the Geneva Accords, the management of the school had changed from the French to the RVNAF.

(U) In 1955, the Infantry School had been given the mission of training cadres and specialists of other branches of the ARVN in addition to the Infantry. At that time, its name was changed to the Thu Duc Military School Center and comprised the Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Engineer, Signal, Ordnance, Transportation, and Administrative Schools. In October 1961, all of these schools, with the exception of Infantry and Armor, had moved from the Thu Duc area to provide space for the greatly expanded ARVN Reserve Officer Procurement Program.

(U) After several name changes associated with its changing mission, the Thu Duc Reserve Officer School had been officially renamed the Infantry School during July 1964.

(U) The school had expanded until, at the end of 1967, it had a capacity of 1,800 students. Its training program included the Officer Candidate, Company Commander, Regional Force Officer Refresher, and Methods of Instruction courses. However following the enemy offensive of Jan 1968, all courses were cancelled, except for the two for officer candidates.

(U) In June 1968, a dramatic change had occurred in the school's curriculum and training program. To meet increased officer requirements as a result of the general mobilization, the capacity had increased to approximately 6,000 students. The officer candidate program of instruction had decreased from 17 to 24 weeks, with the first nine weeks being basic and advanced individual training at the Quang Trung Training Center and the balance of training being conducted at the School.

(U) Since becoming an officer-producing school in 1952, the Infantry School had graduated over 40,000 students (as of Nov 69) and continued to be the largest source of officers in RVNAF. The importance of its mission and the success of its graduates made the school unique as one of the most important military installations in RVN.

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(U) On 15 Dec, construction began on nine prefabricated classrooms, as a special construction project to upgrade facilities. On 27 Dec, 1,495 additional M16 rifles were issued to the Infantry School bringing the total on hand to the authorized level of 2,400. The receipt of the additional weapons would significantly enhance the future weapons and tactical training at the school.

(U) Also during December, the 22-week Reserve Officer Candidate Programs of Instruction (POI) was revised and approved by the CTC. The revisions provided for additional tactical training and more effective utilization of available training time. The revised POI was also designed to correct deficiencies noted in previous graduates and would provide future graduates who are better prepared to contribute to the Vietnamization of the war effort.

(U) The Artillery School had been originally the French Army's Artillery Training Center of Indochina and was located in Phu Hoa in RVN. In 1955, after the signing of the Geneva Accords, the training center had been turned over to the RVNAF and was redesignated the RVNAF Artillery School. In October 1955, the school had moved to the Thu Duc Military School Center and shared its facilities with the Engineer School. In October 1957, the Engineer School had moved out and the Artillery School had taken over the entire area. With this additional space, the school had been reorganized and the training activities were expanded. In July 1961, the school had moved again, this time to its present location in Duc My where it was again reorganized with its own administrative and logistic support. It has continued training RVNAF artillery officers and NCOs in the operation and maintenance of all artillery equipment and also conducted basic and advanced unit training for ARVN artillery battalions as they were activated under the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program. A four-week Counter Battery Course was established at the school, along with two AN/MPQ/4A radar sets and equipment in 1969.

(U) The rated capacity of the school was 600 students. During December, the peak student load was 1,086 which placed an extreme strain upon facilities and instructors. The overload was a result of the requirement to train additional personnel to fill newly activated units and units scheduled for activation. Under the overcrowding conditions, the amount of practical work done and personal supervision received was reduced, adversely affecting the quality of graduates.

(U) The Armor School had been first established by the French at the Vietnamese Military Academy in Dalat in 1950 and was manned by French officers and Vietnamese enlisted men. In late 1952, the school had moved to its present location and become part of the Thu Duc Reserve Officers' School. In February 1955, the armor portion of the Officers' School had been established as a separate school, which had increased its training facilities and had been reorganized under the newly formed Thu Duc Military School Center. When the other schools of the training center had been moved to the new locations in October 1961, the Armor School had become a separate entity under the Armor Command and has remained so since then.

(U) The mission of the school was to train armor personnel in the use and tactics of all armor-type vehicles found in the RVNAF inventory. It also conducted basic and advanced unit training for all newly activated ARVN armor units to ensure that they were combat ready before going into the field as operational forces.

(U) On 14 Dec, construction of a tank gunnery range was completed for the Armor School at Trang Bom. The range, approximately 40 km from the school, permitted the firing of

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principal weapons without having to travel excessive distances to tank ranges under US or Australian operational control.

(U) The Signal School had been originally the Communications Training Center of the French Army in Indochina and was located in Gia Dinh. In 1954, it had become the ARVN Signal Communications Training Center and consisted of two separate centers -- the Signal School in Thu Duc, which had the primary mission of training signal officers for the ARVN and enlisted men of all services in signal equipment repair, and the Signal Training Center in Vung Tau, which had the primary mission of training RVNAF enlisted men in the use of all types of communications equipment.

(U) In October 1961, the Thu Duc portion of the school had been transferred to and consolidated with the Vung Tau portion in their present location. The consolidated portion was designated the RVNAF Signal School and given the combined mission that had previously been assigned both centers. In August, the school's organization expanded to include personnel and equipment for a cryptographic facility for the purpose of training all RVNAF personnel in the use of the new cipher equipment.

(U) The Engineer School had its beginnings as a training center near Haiphong, North Vietnam. Here, until 1951, the French had maintained an Engineer Center with the responsibility of instructing and training Vietnamese engineer soldiers. In 1951, it became desirable to integrate a greater number of Vietnamese officers into the Corps of Engineers, and the center was moved to and became part of the Thu Duc Reserve Officers' School. In 1954 the school had been turned over to the Vietnamese, and the Engineer Training Center was moved to Bien Hoa. In September 1955, it had moved back to Thu Duc and was designated as the Engineer School. It was here that the entire family of courses in military engineering, from basic training to generalized education, was developed and presented.

(U) Because of the need for expanded facilities and more adequate training areas, the school had moved to Vung Tau in October 1957. Many new courses were developed and presented, including specialized operator courses for all types of engineer equipment. The student capacity at Vung Tau had been 400 officers and men.

(U) In August 1961, the school had closed and moved to its present location at Phu Cuong in Binh Duong Province. Classes resumed in January 1962, and the school has since trained officers, officer candidates, NCOs, and enlisted personnel of the RVNAF Corps of Engineers in the techniques, procedures, and methods of military engineering. The training mission was based on the concept of making combat engineers through courses on engineer equipment operation, first and second echelon maintenance, and career-type courses.

(U) The student capacity at Phu Cuong was 1,000, a capacity which became inadequate for future expansion requirements. The Engineer School developed a five year plan to increase its capacity to 3,000. The Central Training Command Upgrading Plan considered relocating the Engineer School. However, in coordination with the Engineer Department, the CTC on 15 Dec decided to keep the school at the present location and upgrade the facilities to increase the capacity to 3,000. The decision permitted a more orderly expansion program for training and implementing the five year plan.

(U) The Military Police School had been first organized as a training center in Danang in 1957, the same year that the ARVN Military Police Corps was established. It was given the

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mission of conducting basic Military Police training courses at a rate of five 12-week courses every two years. Each class consisted of approximately 250 personnel, and graduates were initially assigned only to I Corps. Later, assignments were made to units throughout the country. In April 1962, the center had moved to its present site in Vung Tau and was renamed the RVNAF Military Police School.

(U) In January 1965, the school's organization had been expanded to include personnel and equipment for a criminal investigation laboratory which was to be responsible for scientific analysis of evidence submitted by field units and the training of criminal investigators. However, this laboratory was still not operational as of the end of 1969.

(U) The school received an approved expansion plan for the 1967-1969 period which permitted training of 500 students at any one time. This included the training of Military Police Corps junior officers, NCOs, and criminal investigators. The school also conducted the basic combat training course for all recruits assigned to the MP Corps.

(U) Administrative Schools. In October 1955, the RVNAF had established the Military Administration School at the Thu Duc Military School Center with the mission of providing specialized training in quartermaster, finance and administration, and personnel administration subjects. As the program expanded, and student capacities were raised, it had become necessary, in 1958, to reorganize the school into two separate branches -- the Finance and Administration Branch and the Quartermaster Branch. The arrangement had proven satisfactory until 1962 when it was decided, as a result of a lack of space and the rapid expansion of the different branches, to divide the School into three separate schools. This had resulted in the creation of the Adjutant General's School in March 1962 and the Quartermaster School and Administration and Finance School in July 1962. All three schools were located in Saigon where they trained specialists in their respective fields.

(U) The Transportation School had its beginning in 1954 when a highway transport officers' basic course was organized and conducted at the Thu Duc Reserve Officers' Training Center. Officers were transferred into this course upon completion of their infantry training. In February 1955, the Highway Transport School had been officially activated as part of the Thu Duc Center and was transferred as a separate school to the supervision of the Transportation Command which was formed in April 1955. The school's mission of training drivers and organizational mechanics and NCOs had required such an expansion of facilities that in January 1957 the school had been split, and the regional driver and second echelon mechanic courses were moved to the Quang Trung Training Center. The rest of the school had remained at Thu Duc until September 1958 when the school was consolidated back into one location -- the Quang Trung Training Center area, 14 km northwest of Saigon. The school's mission remained essentially the same as when it was established in 1955 and had an increased training capacity of 700 students. During this year, the school advisory detachment was increased from one to three personnel.

(U) The Medical School had been first established in 1951 in Hanoi to provide the Vietnamese Medical Battalion under French command with its first formal medical training capability. The mission of this school was to train regular medical officers, pharmacists, and dentists. The school had moved to Saigon in 1954 and, in 1956, was combined with the Medical Training Center whose mission had consisted of training enlisted medics and NCO medical specialists. This combination of the two schools had been officially redesignated the Military Medical School in 1961. Shortly thereafter, planning was instituted to construct a modern facility which would

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enable the school to meet the increasing medical requirements of the expanding RVNAF. This facility, constructed in the Phu-Tho area of Saigon, was completed and operational in April 1964. The school conducted 35 different courses in its training of Medical Specialists for the RVNAF.

(U) The Ordnance School had been first established in 1952 as the Materiel Training Center at Thu Duc. Its mission, like other branch-type schools, was to train ordnance personnel in their speciality. In 1957, it was redesignated as the Ordnance School and had retained its primary training mission. In 1961, the school had separated from the Thu Duc Center and moved to Saigon where it conducted 68 different courses in its training of ordnance specialists for the RVNAF.

(U) The RVNAF Military Intelligence School had been first established in 1955 at historic Fort Cay Mai in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area with the mission of training the intelligence platoons and squads of the ARVN. In 1962, its mission had been expanded to include training of the intelligence units of the Regional Forces. This latter mission was withdrawn in October 1967. In 1968, the school had instituted the Aerial Intelligence Interpreter's Course and graduated its first class in September of that year. In April 1969, the Combined Intelligence Course seminars were begun between ARVN intelligence personnel and their US counterparts; later in July, Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Order of Battle courses were instituted. These courses had previously been conducted offshore in Okinawa. The normal programmed input to the Combined Intelligence Course was 30 students per class (15 Vietnamese and 15 US). The program objective was to train all Sub-Sector S-2 personnel and this objective was met with the completion of the final class in December. A total of 534 officers attended the four day courses and received instruction designed to enhance the exchange of intelligence information on a daily basis.

(U) The RVNAF Logistics Management School had started in 1959 but was not officially dedicated until March 1960. The mission of the school was twofold:

1. Provide high level logistic instruction for RVNAF.
2. Research, study, and develop logistic organization and doctrine for the RVNAF.

(U) The school taught three levels of instruction, each designed to cover a specific portion of the overall logistic system in RVNAF. The Logistics Management Course concentrated on preparing selected officers for General Staff duties. The Logistics Staff Officers' Course prepared officers to work at the intermediate level and the Supply Officers' Course prepared officers to work at unit level. During this year, two new programs of instruction were added: The PRAISE course and the US Advisor Orientation Course. Also, the school's capacity increased from 125 to 175 students.

(U) The Army Social Training School in Saigon had been established unofficially in October 1952. The school provided basic and advanced technical training in social welfare to Women of the Armed Forces Corps (WAFC) officers and NCOs whose actual or anticipated assignment was as a Social Service Assistant in the RVNAF Social Service Department. In addition, the school provided technical refresher training for civilian kindergarten teachers administered by the Social Service Department and provided such other appropriate technical training as might be directed by the JGS.

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(U) The RVNAF Band School had been founded in Saigon in February 1959, due mainly to the efforts of the incumbent bandmaster. Originally, it was known as the Army Band Center and, shortly after establishment, had developed a training program of basic and intermediate courses. In 1961, it was renamed the RVNAF Music School and moved to Thu Duc where it continued to train musicians for the 20 RVNAF Bands. In December, at the request of the Senior Advisor, the English translation of the Vietnamese school was changed to RVNAF Band School.

(U) The RVNAF Armed Forces Language School had opened in Saigon in June 1956 with the mission of teaching English to Vietnamese who were programmed to attend off-shore schooling in the United States. Its student capacity at that time had been 1,000. In July 1967, the school had doubled its input by increasing facilities and operating on a two-shift basis. The school's mission was then expanded to include training Vietnamese translators for in-country requirements. During the Tet Offensive of 1968, 70 percent of the school's facilities had been destroyed. However, new facilities were secured and the training continued almost without interruption. As the RVNAF expanded and the requirement for off-shore schooling increased, the school expanded its facilities until, by the end of 1968, it had a capacity of 5,000 students.

(U) Graduates of the school who were offshore trainees were released with a 70 percent language capability, thus permitting direct attendance at US schools without the previously required three month TDY period of English schooling in CONUS.

(U) An additional facility for the school was established at Vung Tau, by renovating the Kiet Compound building for a capacity of 660 students. The facility was completed on 5 Dec and first class of the RVNAFLS, Vung Tau began on 8 Dec. Four hundred sixty-four ARVN Signal Corps students entered the class to learn English in preparation for further training in the ICS program.

(U) Junior Military Academy (JMA). The first Junior Military School had been established in Vung Tau in 1915 under the French and was later relocated to Gia Dinh and My Tho. Similar schools had also been established in Mong Cay, Hue, Hanoi, Ban Me Thuot, Song Mao and Thu Dau Mot, all supported by the French. The RVNAF Junior Military Academy was activated in 1956 at Vung Tau bringing together at a single location the several Junior Military Schools once located in Central and South Vietnam. Since 1956 the Junior Military Academy had been supported and administered by the Government of Vietnam. By end of 1969, the CTC provided the instructors and facilities and the Ministry of Education established the curriculum and Programs of Instruction (POI).

(U) The mission of the school was to provide secondary education and military training to the sons of Vietnamese Military, Regional Forces, Popular Forces, Police and Village Administration Personnel who had served or had given their lives in the war.

(U) The RVNAF JMA academic year began on 15 Sep and ended on 30 Jun. The courses taught included an Elementary School Course (equivalent to US fifth to ninth grade), a Junior High School Course (sixth to ninth grade), a Senior High School Course (tenth to twelfth grade), and Military Basic Training. Ages of the students ranged from 12 through 18. 98

(C) The most important factor in the program for the Improvement and Modernization (I&M) of the RVNAF was training. As new equipment was brought into the RVNAF inventory, personnel had to be trained in its use before any value could be received; as the RVNAF

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expanded, additional recruits, specialists, and leaders had to be trained to fill the newly created units; as the RVNAF accepted an increasing share of the burden of combat, both the quantity and quality of the training product had to be upgraded. During the first few weeks of 1969, orientation visits were made to the 47 training centers, service schools, and commands for which MACV provided advisory support. Although the overview gained from these visits indicated that the training base had made considerable progress toward self-sufficiency, it was obvious that many improvements had to be made to ensure that the training base could cope with its role in the I&M Program. Numerous studies and programs had been initiated to correct deficiencies within the training base. Many other actions were initiated and/or completed by August 1969, which allowed the training base to move closer to self-sufficiency. Below, in resume, are the more salient accomplishments.

Programs of Instruction (POI)

(C) POIs formed the outline upon which all training was based. Each POI listed the subjects to be taught, the instruction time, the manner of presentation, the training aids and ammunition used, and the length and scope of end-of-training tests. Initial studies of existing POIs revealed that, in most cases, the basic recruit cycles were too short to prepare individuals for combat; however, in an expanding army, the need for trained replacements often required a reduction in the length of training programs. Therefore, while MACV developed longer and more comprehensive POIs for basic and advanced individual training and recommended to the Central Training Command (CTC) their adoption when the situation permitted, an immediate impact approach was adopted. Existing POIs were analyzed as to scope and completeness and changed in content, if appropriate, without increasing the length of training cycles. An example was the Popular Force (PF) recruit POI. Standardized at 10 weeks, the POI broke down into six weeks of military subjects and four weeks of Revolutionary Development (RD) and Political Indoctrination training. The scope and length of the military training received by a PF recruit was totally inadequate. The RD training could be reduced to a brief orientation period with more comprehensive RD training conducted after the recruits reported to their unit. The POI was changed, not in length, but by increasing the number of weeks devoted to military subjects from six to over eight weeks, thus providing the recruit with the opportunity to gain the basic military knowledge required to perform his mission while reducing the RD training accordingly.

Tactical Training

(C) Subsequent to the 1968 Tet Offensive, tactical training at many training centers and most service schools had been drastically curtailed because of insecure conditions surrounding the installations. This had been especially true of night training. The hours devoted to tactical training in the POIs were not reduced, but commanders had been forced to conduct training in areas close to the perimeter of the installation -- and then only during the day. In February, MACV tried to improve this situation and strongly urged the CTC to provide realistic tactical training, both day and night. Thus, a JGS/CTC directive on 10 Apr required all prescribed night training to be conducted by the training centers and schools and, subsequently, every training center and school began conducting, as a minimum, the day and night tactical training prescribed by the POIs.

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M16 Marksmanship Training

(C) The ARVN training programs had incorporated M16 rifle marksmanship training on a limited basis in February 1968 with the first issue of M16s. However, priorities did not provide early issue of these weapons to the training base, precluding the training base from changing completely to an M16 marksmanship program until a year later. During the interim, the CTC developed a 76-hour basic M16 rifle marksmanship course with the understanding that it would become effective upon issuance of sufficient quantities of M16s to the training centers and schools. The full M16 marksmanship program began in March 1969. Definitive guidance and training publications were lacking in the implementing instructions, i. e., no specific record course of fire or qualification standards were prescribed. Therefore, MACV developed two comprehensive training directives designed to provide necessary guidance to the training centers and schools, convinced CTC of their worth, and assisted in their publication and dissemination. The results of this program were a marked improvement in the number of recruits qualifying with the M16 and improved management of the marksmanship program.

Expansion of RF and PF Unit Training

(C) Programs to increase the number of RF companies and PF platoons were prepared and implemented during the first nine months of 1969. In the fourth quarter, 1968, MACV had assisted CTC in preparing a program to train 278 new RF Companies during 1 Jan - 30 Jun 69. These new companies were allocated as shown below:

<u>CORPS</u>	<u>NUMBER OF COMPANIES</u>
I	50
II	29
III	80
IV	119
TOTAL	278

Major actions included preparation of the program and a system to monitor its progress. In December 1968, the initial program had been disseminated to each Corps and to all training centers selected to conduct this training. Subsequently, a modification was published and distributed. Because the total training requirement was to be completed by 30 Jun 69, it was necessary to develop a monitoring system to allow early detection and correction of unauthorized deviations from the program. An informal spot report with instructions at training centers provided timely information concerning input of the new RF companies. Additionally, report requirements and formats for higher headquarters were determined. Certain problems developed early in the execution phase of this training program, particularly the tendency of the Corps to deviate from the CTC input schedule through delayed input to training centers and, in the case of one Corps, shifting of training requirements among training centers. Eight new RF companies from IV Corps did not complete training by 30 Jun and, in III Corps, three new companies did not complete training by 30 Jun. Each Corps was informed of unauthorized deviations and reminded that approval must be obtained from JCS/CTC for deviations.

(C) As of 31 Aug, 1,477 RF companies had been activated out of the 1,479 authorized in Phase IIA and 1,475 were operational. By September only one more RF company required activation and all but two out of the total authorized were operational. Effective 1 Nov the JCS ordered the activation of an additional 23 RF companies for training to begin 1 Jan 70. 99

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(C) In June, following the Midway US-GVN Presidential Meeting, the JGS was ordered to activate, train, and equip 863 PF platoons prior to 31 Dec. Although MACV approval for this increase was not granted, the training base was totally committed to this program.

(C) In August the JGS activated the new PF platoons. Recruitment and training progressed at a rapid rate during the subsequent months. By the end of September, all the 863 platoons had been recruited, 825 were in training (which resulted in overcrowding of the Popular Force Training Centers) and 10 had completed training. By the end of the next month, 530 had completed training, with the status by CTZ shown below: ¹⁰⁰

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
Authorized	144	125	167	427	863
Recruited	144	125	167	427	863
In Training	0	83	80	170	333
Completed training	144	42	87	257	530

(C) The JGS/CTC program to recruit and train 863 new PF platoons during the second half of 1969 was completed with final graduation on 29 Dec. The successful, timely completion of this program, in spite of programming and training difficulties, was considered by MACV to be a significant achievement. ¹⁰¹

(C) Effective 1 Nov, a JGS message ordered the activation of an additional 137 PF platoons for training to begin 1 Jan 70 with CTZ quotas as follows: ¹⁰²

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
PF Platoons	32	25	15	75	137

RF/PF Group Headquarters Training

(D) As a terminal action to the almost three years of planning and organizing the activities surrounding the formation of RF/PF Group Headquarters, the Central Training Command, on 20 Dec, published a formal training program applicable to that organization. The program was the end result of joint planning and staffing among the Training Directorate, ACoS, GORDS, and CTC. The ultimate goal was to establish a span of control at the sector and subsector level. Fundamentally, the training program established 36 hours of staff training, a 68-hour field exercise and 40 hours of administration/miscellaneous, all to be conducted over a three-week period. ¹⁰³

Shortfall Problem

(E) An analysis of the 1968 training program showed that serious shortfalls had occurred in the number of trainees reporting for training as compared with the number programmed. Because of the number of new units being organized under the 16M Program, the need to mesh carefully the graduation of trainees and junior leaders with the production of the varied technical specialists became extremely important. The first few months of 1969 indicated that the shortfall continued to exist and was creating serious problems in meeting activation schedules

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in accordance with the force structure increase. A conference with field advisors was held on 29 Mar, during which the seriousness of student shortfalls at service schools was presented and recommendations for solutions solicited. In early April, a joint MACV/CTC shortfall monitoring and control system was established in the form of a Training Coordination Center (TCC). It received shortfall feeder reports from service school senior advisors 24 to 48 hours prior to the start of each class. The advisors to those units which failed to fill their allocated spaces were informed and requested to urge their counterparts to fill the spaces.

(C) While the Training Coordination Center vastly improved the student fill at the service schools, a deviation reporting system was also established to handle shortfall or overfill problems at training centers. The main difference between the Schools and Training Centers systems was that corrective action could be directed at those organizations failing to fill their allocated spaces at service schools, while the unfilled spaces at training centers normally were caused either by a failure to recruit sufficient numbers or a failure of units, scheduled to undergo refresher training, which could not be released by their parent organization because of operational requirements; therefore, there was little immediate corrective action that could be taken. However, the deviation reporting system forced on the CTZ HQs and the JCS an awareness of the importance of realistically forecasting training requirements to provide the inductees and volunteers to fill classes.

OJT

(I) From the outset of the I&M Program, new equipment had been introduced into the RVNAF and no expertise existed within the training base to provide the necessary instruction. This situation was solved by using in-country US expertise and equipment to train RVNAF personnel through on-the-job training (OJT).

(II) While OJT of RVNAF by US units had been going on for years, there was no requirement for a formal OJT program until the I&M Program came into operation. I&M developed more rapidly than the training base could develop to support all required training. As a result, OJT became a supplemental means of upgrading RVNAF and was formalized with the publication of MACV Directive 150-16, RVNAF On-The-Job-Training, 13 Oct 69.

(III) OJT consisted of numerous programs, varying in length from a few days to six months, and in scope from upgrade of an individual's current skill to qualification in a new MOS. This training was conducted for both RVNAF officers and enlisted personnel. There were four categories of OJT outlined in the MACV directive:

1. Category I. Trainees detailed to commute and report on a scheduled basis to a US unit for OJT.

2. Category II. Trainees attached full time to US units for a specified period of training. Upon completion of the OJT cycle, trainees would be returned to RVNAF units for proper skill utilization.

3. Category III (in Planning stage). Trainees would be attached to US units for a specified period of training. Upon completion of the OJT cycle, trainees would be assigned to a TOE or TD position in the same or similar unit, replacing US personnel. More trainees would then be attached for OJT. This program sequence would then continue until sufficient personnel were trained to allow turnover of equipment to and assumption of mission by RVNAF.

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4. Category IV. RVNAF personnel trained on-the-job in their present units by US training teams. Upon completion of this training, trainees would be utilized in their current unit.

(U) All the above were considered programs which would realistically contribute to maximizing the effectiveness of RVNAF commanders, staffs, and units. Experience showed that the most effective programs were in the mechanical fields where students learned by watching, imitating, and doing. Effectiveness diminished in programs which required a knowledge of theory and related applications. The conclusion drawn was that the expansion potential of the OJT Program was limited only by the complexity of modern equipment introduced in Vietnam as compared to the qualifications of the trainees. The language barrier remained as the major problem and stumbling block in the program. In many instances of technical terminology, there was simply no Vietnamese word equivalents to use for full and precise understanding.

Offshore Training

(C) The FY69 Offshore Training Program provided formal training to 934 officers and EM in 29 different US military schools and 42 officers in 23 civilian universities. This reflected 95.5 percent of the programmed offshore training for the fiscal year. During FY70, approximately 947 officers and EM were programmed to receive offshore training at 29 different installations. To assist US advisors and ARVN counterparts to process recommendations for offshore training in FY71, an ARVN/US offshore training conference was conducted on 28 Jun and proved to be most beneficial for all participants.

English Language Training (ELT)

(C) In December 1968, the requirement to accelerate the VNAF and VNN ELT programs had created an increase in the 1969 peak load to 4,610 students. The increase in required capacity had necessitated immediate action to acquire additional facilities in Saigon by a temporary US lease for both a classroom facility and the headquarters of the school. Added VNAF training requirements identified in January and the placing of more students into the school to offset the high attrition rate indicated that the 1969 peak load would be 6,110. Expanded requirements for instructors, classrooms, and language laboratories were met by increasing the advisory detachment to 300, the Defense Language Institute Training Detachment from 4 to 18 personnel, the acquisition of another facility, and the receipt of 170 language laboratory positions. Training aids were developed and produced by MACV. Lack of student motivation, the primary cause of student failure to progress satisfactorily, resulted in action to provide adequate messing and billeting facilities in a tent city complex constructed at Tan Son Nhut AB. A remedial training program was also established. In the spring of 1969, actions were taken to establish an annex of the Language School at Yung Tau to support the Integrated Communications System (ICS) and to obtain 106 additional instructional personnel to provide this language training with a target date of 1 Sep for commencement. Through 31 Jul, the number of Signal Corp students who successfully completed ELT were:

I. ARVN	
Interpreters	925
Signal (ICS)	40
Offshore	415

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2. ROK	185
3. VNAF	
Cadets	114
Airmen	311
4. VNN	161

(C) In September, an English Language Aptitude Test (ELAT) was introduced into the RVNAF Language School. ELAT was designed to identify and eliminate the slow learners early in their language training. It was introduced on a test basis, found successful, and adopted as a standard procedure for screening potential candidates for follow-on training in the various technical in and out of country training schools for which understanding of English was a must. For example, in October, VNAF initiated action to employ ELAT as a prerequisite to recruit candidates for the Pilot Cadets and Mechanics Courses.

(C) Accelerated English training for ARVN Signal Corps students, programmed for follow-on hard and soft skill training to support the Integrated Communications System (ICS) program, was retargeted from September to November, with commence date dependent upon completion of an additional facility at Vung Tau RVNAFLS. There were 567 ARVN Signal School students awaiting ELT when the facility opened on 8 Dec. They were given the ELAT and 103 failed to qualify (a 19 percent attrition rate). Thus, 464 students entered the first class, with student input expected to reach 600 (the school's capacity) by 1 Feb 70.

(C) Also in November, a total of 1,070 VNAF personnel were given the ELAT out of which 189 (18 percent) did not qualify for entrance into English language training. In the three months of using ELAT, it appeared that a 19 percent attrition rate could be expected for RVNAF personnel in qualifying for the ELT at RVNAFLS. 104

(C) At the end of the year, 61,355 RVNAF personnel were in training in 23 training centers and 4,416 personnel were in ELT of the RVNAFLS (both Saigon and Vung Tau locations). There had been a significant increase in the number of students who had graduated from the various in-country Service schools of the RVN Central Training Command, 85,000 as compared with 59,957 in 1968. 105 Although quantity of training had increased there were still major problems to overcome to improve the effectiveness of RVNAF training programs (see identification of problems see end of this section).

RVN Local National Training for the Integrated Communications System (ICS)

(C) The Army was tasked to prepare a detailed plan for training 2,000-2,500 Vietnamese to assume control of a portion of the Integrated Communications System (ICS). A training plan developed by the 1st Signal Brigade was submitted to DA which proposed training ARVN personnel in five separate skills over a 3-year period. The plan proposed that the training facility in RVN would be contractor-operated initially until US-trained ARVN instructors were available. It was estimated that two years from the start of the school, sufficient Vietnamese would be on the faculty to allow 100 percent operation by them. The cost of the program was estimated to be \$1.9 million. Shown below was the estimated training requirement. 106

FY71	FY72	FY73	FY74
100	600	600	600

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(C) Following this, the DEPSECDEF directed preparation of the following two plans to train local nationals to assume the entire control of the ICS-SEA:

1. JCS prepare a detailed time-phase plan for the turnover of selected ICS equipment and facilities in RVN and Thailand.
2. Army prepare a detailed plan for training Vietnamese and Thai personnel needed to operate the residual C-E systems.

(C) The JCS established the following specific responsibilities for training of RVN and Thai personnel:

1. Formal Training:

a. Army will plan, fund, and conduct the formal training for all services in operation and maintenance of the ICS-SEA, including cable systems, tandem switches, dial telephone exchanges, electric power generators, and air conditioning equipment.

b. The Navy will plan, fund, and conduct the formal training for all services in operation and maintenance of Navy C-E systems.

c. The Air Force will plan, fund, and conduct the formal training for all Services in operation and maintenance of air traffic control systems, navigational aids, and surveillance and warning systems.

d. Management training: The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) will plan and arrange for such training as may be necessary to prepare local national C-E personnel for systems management. The plan would be submitted to the DA for budgeting and funding.

e. On-the-Job Training: The military Services and DCA will conduct on-the-job training on their sites of equipment, regardless of Service affiliation of the local national personnel.

(C) On 8 Dec, SECARMY forwarded to the DEPSECDEF a copy of a plan developed by MACV, USARV, and the 1st Signal Brigade, as part of 7-Day Planning. This was an interim response to the DEPSECDEF's request for a detailed training plan. It was pointed out that the plan assumed the students would be English-qualified prior to their entry into the training program. However, if training was conducted in Vietnamese both training time and cost would be reduced. The feasibility of conducting the training in Vietnamese was to be evaluated as the final plan was developed. A revised Army training plan would be submitted after the specific facilities and items of equipment to be left in-country were identified by CMC PAC and a Joint Service Team. 107

Upgrading of Cadre/Faculty

(C) It was determined early in 1964 that the overall quality of cadre and faculty within the training base was substandard. Little action had been taken by JCS to implement an 8 Jan 64 directive which would have replaced personnel assigned to training activities for long periods of time with personnel recently experienced in combat operations. After attempts to resolve this program through informal coordination with CTC were unsuccessful, MACV, on 14 Apr, formally proposed to CTC the following four-point program for upgrading cadre and faculty:

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1. Identification of cadre and faculty requirements for all training centers and schools to include:
 - a. Increased assigned strength of cadre and faculty to 100 percent of TOE.
 - b. Replacement of those of long tenure (5-years).
 - c. Replacement of ineffectives (those without field/operational experience, incompetent, lack of motivation).
2. Determination of an equitable levy to be placed forcibly on the four CTZs to provide the field-experienced replacements identified in action 1 above at a ratio of 3:2, anticipating that some would not meet the desired prerequisites.
3. Tasking one or more training facilities to conduct a program of instruction to qualify selected personnel as instructors.
4. Assignment of graduates of the instructor's course by priority based on individual qualification and training facility needs.

(C) To provide impetus, the CofS and COMUSMACV discussed the program with their counterparts: the CofS with CofS, JGS on 18 and 29 Apr; COMUSMACV with CJGS on 28 Apr. As early as 22 Apr, the JGS/J1 presented an analysis of the proposed program to CJGS which he approved. The analysis determined that existing TOE officer shortages would be filled and a slight overstrength authorized and filled at the training centers and schools. In addition, CTC was directed to replace unqualified instructors. On 31 May, MACV was requested to comment on a draft CTC program designed to fill all cadre positions with combat-experienced personnel, except those involved with administrative or logistical support. After incorporating MACV's comments, on 4 Jul, CTC disseminated the formal program to implement the 4-point program for upgrading the cadre/faculty as originally submitted by MACV.

Logistical Support of Training

(C) Discussion of efforts to keep pace logistically with other improvement programs can best be divided into four functional areas: facilities, logistics, budget, and development of tables of organization and equipment (TOE).

(C) Facilities. On 1 Aug 68, 39 small provincial Popular Force Training Centers (PFTCs) had been consolidated into 12 inter-provincial PFTCs under control of CTC. The seven Highland PFTCs in II CTZ had remained as provincial PFTCs under control of the CG, II CTZ to provide local facilities for the training of Montagnards (In June, a decision was made by the JGS to consolidate the seven highland PFTCs into three IPFTCs under the control of CTC. This was the result of constant effort by MACV to convince CTC that the training effort in II CTZ would improve through consolidation). The closure of so many PFTCs in the consolidation required the capacities of those which remained to be increased as much as five-fold. A joint MACV/CTC survey was initiated to determine what new facilities were required to support the desired capacities of the IPFTCs. Requirements were determined and a three phased construction program began to provide housing, messing, storage, and training facilities. All but the third phase was completed by mid-August. During the joint survey of the IPFTCs, it was found that

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there was no comprehensive inventory of facility assets at the other training centers and schools. Thus, survey sheets were sent to all training centers and schools in October 1968, through both advisory and Vietnamese channels, and were followed up by visits of a combined MACV/CTC team to ensure the completed surveys reflected accurately the existing facilities. The comprehensive inventory of facilities made it possible to plan realistically for short range and long term construction as well as major rehabilitation projects. This inventory proved valuable during the preparation of the FY71 MASF/MILCON submission by MACV in June 1969. The facilities survey highlighted one of the most serious facility problems: water supply and distribution -- a problem compounded by a lack of command emphasis within RVNAF and improper maintenance of the equipment incorporated in the water systems. Coordination with the CTC and Central Logistics Command (CLC) staffs did secure command interest. As the water systems were repaired or constructed in the months ahead, continued emphasis on proper use and maintenance at all levels should reduce the deterioration.

(C) Logistics. During the first seven months of 1969, the RVNAF logistics system was required to support the training of over 200,000 trainees/students. A significant improvement in the supply of training ammunition during this period reflected considerable MACV/CTC effort to accurately forecast needs long before the training was conducted. Prior to November 1968, ammunition forecasts had been based primarily on previous requests, modified normally by adding a small "fudge" factor. However, as a basis for the 1969 forecast, each POI was analyzed to determine the ammunition required for one trainee and/or unit for a particular POI; thus, it was relatively simple to forecast the ammunition needed for the training base, and the accuracy of the forecast equalled the forecast of training to be conducted. Using these same analyses as a basis, formal POI-related tables of allowance were prepared which reduced the advisor's role in computing future ammunition forecasts while forming a valid basis for checking RVNAF forecasts.

(C) A major accomplishment of the RVNAF logistics base during the first six months of 1969 was equipping and transporting the 278 new RF companies activated during the early months of 1969. Some companies were delayed for short periods because of a lack of readily available transportation and not all RF companies were fully equipped as prescribed by TOE. However, the logistics base reacted to problems as they became known with solutions following soon thereafter.

(C) The most serious logistical problem was the low equipment priority of training centers and schools. This low priority, resulting from operational units being given an almost unrestricted priority for new equipment, impacted in three interrelated problem areas:

1. Equipment reached the field before personnel were trained in its operation and maintenance.
2. The quality of the trainees graduating from the training base was lowered.
3. Units were required to devote time, men, and material resources to provide necessary training on items of equipment.

(C) In early May, MACV approved in concept the granting to the training base of first priority on items required for training, and filling the current shortages within the training base during the next year (25 percent per quarter). This concept was discussed with the JGS on 9 May. In order to provide the training base with items otherwise not readily available, MACV developed a Supply Management Project in which materials were obtained from US Property

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Disposal Yards and provided to the training centers and schools on an accountable basis. After approval of the project on 2 Apr, an accountable officer with authority to draw materials from US Property Disposal Yards was assigned on orders. At the same time, training centers and schools were informed of the project and told that lists should be submitted to the project officer. The project officer was able to obtain material far beyond initial expectations. Almost 375 requests were received as of 1 Aug, 33 percent filled completely and 10 percent partially. The salvage yard value of the material obtained was over \$43,000. Commanders of the training facilities enthusiastically improved their facilities with the materials provided.

(C) Budget. Prior to the fall of 1968, budget procedures had lacked necessary controls to efficiently manage funds. Since that time several changes were incorporated into the funding system to upgrade the use of training funds. Two fundamental requirements of a budget system are the formulation of realistic plans and the review of expenditures. About 50 percent of the training centers and schools initiated budget advisory committees in 1969. The National Defense College's plan for establishing budget review procedures was reproduced and forwarded as guidance to a number of schools that were studying its provisions for adaptation to the individual school's requirements. Each training center and school submitted its own budget to CTC to be used as a basis for submitting the overall training budget. This was an important change. In addition, once the annual budget was approved, training centers and schools were informed of their anticipated quarterly fund allocations in advance of each quarter, permitting more rational budgeting during the period.

(C) The outstanding action in the fiscal area was concerned with a budget inspection system. After criteria for evaluating the financial administration system was prepared, they were consolidated into a checklist. This list was used by a CTC inspection team for evaluating each facility. Priorities of locations to be visited were determined on the basis of amount of money expended and special problems. This process served notice that CTC would monitor the budgets closely and provided the means to correct inefficient and ineffective budgetary procedures in a timely manner.

(C) Development of Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE). The MACV Training Directorate was the proponent for 94 ARVN authorization documents, including infantry, armor, artillery, and ranger units, training centers, and schools. All these tables of organization and equipment (TOEs) were reviewed between August 1968 and August 1969 with recommended changes being submitted to MACMA. In addition, JGS agreed to develop staffing guides for all CTC organizations as a means of managing manpower resources since CTC organizations were not tactical units and, therefore, did not have a TOE for appropriate reference. To permit the quantities of weapons authorized for training to be more responsive to fluctuations in student load, it was recommended and approved that training weapons of CTC facilities be removed from the TOE and placed in a TDA.

RVNAF Base Study Group

(C) The 1969 RVNAF training base had been developed in response to daily requirements rather than through an overall plan, and it was inevitable that gaps and duplications had been introduced. With this in mind, MACT submitted a proposal to the CofS, MACV on 5 Jun to form a combined US/RVNAF Study Group to make a comprehensive evaluation of the entire RVNAF training base. The study group would be co-chaired by US and Vietnamese general officers not specifically involved with the training effort. The study would encompass the

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	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Actual</u>
OCS	2,200	2,300
NCO	8,112	7,576
OCS PREP	2,000	1,440
NCO PREP	2,000	1,100

(S) The NCO shortfall was a result of the shortfall in NCO Preparatory training. The total shortfall (890) was partially offset by overfills in Reserve NCO courses at the NCO Academy. The shortfall in OCS and NCO preparatory courses occurred because the Mobilization Directorate could not obtain sufficient trainees who met the prerequisites for selection, and because of the continuing reluctance of some commanders to release personnel for school attendance. MACV continued to encourage JGS to reemphasize to RVNAF commanders the necessity to release personnel for attendance at these schools. 111

Training Deficiencies

(S) At the close of the year, there were major training deficiencies which would require improvement in order that training in the RVNAF could be considered effective. The most significant deficiencies were:

1. The Central Training Command was not staffed to effectively control the training effort.
2. The Central Training Command did not control the specialized schools. Personnel assigned to specialist schools were under the control of the respective technical service.
3. The quality of training did not meet required standards.
4. There was a lack of standardization in training programs.
5. Proficiency testing was not adequate. There was no proficiency test for recruit training and unit training tests were often marginally effective.
6. The system for rotating cadre into and out of training centers was ineffective. Marginally effective cadre had remained at training centers for as long as seven years.
7. Many key personnel at training centers and service schools had no combat experience. It was desirable that all training center commanders, combat arms schools commanders, and all tactics instructors have combat experience.
8. There was no effective program to relate combat experiences/lessons learned in combat.
9. Training base facilities were inadequate.

(S) Further, the GVN budget was so constructed that all costs supporting training could not be identified. It was known however that the Ministry of National Defense (VN) Budget for FY70-73 was planned to provide training funds in the following general areas: 112

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
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RVNAF LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION



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ARVN Logistical Organization

(C) The overall support for ARVN units was furnished through three major subdivisions: the ALCs, the Central Procurement Office, and Technical Services. Additionally, ARVN provided logistic support to the territorial forces (RF/PF), accomplished by the administrative and direct support logistical (A&DSL) companies.

(C) Logistic support for the four corps and the CMD was provided by the five ALCs, whose command and control logistic units and installations, including the post engineers, were located in the respective areas. The ALC boundaries were not necessarily the same as the CTZ boundaries in that there were two ALCs in II CTZ, dividing the CTZ into approximately two equal geographical areas. The other three ALC boundaries corresponded with the CTZ boundaries. The ALCs supported the ARVN, VNAF, and VNN on common service items and supported paramilitary forces and the FWMAF on designated items. Each ALC had field depots, general support maintenance units, and direct support units which provided logistic support on an area basis.

(C) The Central Procurement Office (CPO) had the mission of procuring all in-country supplies and services in the Saigon area for RVNAF, except small purchases (less than \$VN 2,000,000, construction, and perishable subsistence). Procurements in areas outside of Saigon were made by the I, II, IV and V ALC's. The CPO's approval was required for formally advertised ALC contracts exceeding \$VN 1,000,000 and all negotiated contracts in excess of \$VN 5,000,000.

(C) There were six ARVN technical services, (discussed below) and each service, with the exception of Transportation, maintained a base depot in the Saigon area. Base depot missions included supply (receipt, storage, and issue) and maintenance (4th and 5th echelon) missions. Backup support to field depots and local direct support was provided by these ARVN base depots. The technical services commanded the base depots and any other logistic units not assigned to the ALCs or Corps. Though they did not command logistic units assigned to the ALCs and the Corps, the technical services exercised technical supervision over such units to include inspection.

(C) The six ARVN technical services, mentioned above were Engineer, Medical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Signal, and Transportation, each with a separate mission, and supply and maintenance functions.

(C) The missions of each were as follows:

1. Chief of Engineers: Plans, directs, and supervises engineering construction, supply, equipment and facilities maintenance, fire protection/prevention; provides administrative and technical supervision to RVNAF engineer units and area construction offices; provides maps, topographic survey and engineer intelligence materials for RVNAF; manages careers of engineer officers, trains individual engineer soldiers, and provides technical guidance to the engineer school.

2. RVNAF Surgeon General: Exercises command and control of the medical base structure consisting, in the logistics field, of the Medical Base Depot; functions as technical service headquarters and provides control over field medical depots in the medical groups.

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3. Chief of Ordnance: Exercises command and control of the ordnance base structure consisting of one supply depot, one rebuild depot, two ammunition depots, and one collection and classification company; provides technical assistance and guidance to all ordnance units and personnel.

4. Chief of Quartermaster: Responsible for providing technical assistance and guidance to all quartermaster units and personnel.

5. Chief of Signal: Exercises command control of the ARVN Signal Corps; provides signal logistic service to the Central Logistics Command; develops all plans for ARVN signal logistic support and distribution; recommends location of support installations; prepares and supervises the Signal Corps GVN budget.

6. Director of Defense Transportation (DOTD): Commands and controls the Saigon Transportation Terminal Command and the 10th Truck Group; provides technical supervision to the RVNAF transportation system; operates the RVNAF portion of the Saigon port complex; provides highway transport support for the Saigon area local haul and ALC line haul; provides commercial and ARVN-operated water transportation.

(C) The supply and maintenance functions of each of the services were as follows:

1. Engineer supply and maintenance functions were performed by an Engineer support battalion located in each ALC. Also under the support battalion was one or two direct support companies depending on the size of area supported and the density of equipment. These support battalions requisitioned supplies from the base depot located in Saigon, which also controlled off-shore requisitions under the MAP.

2. The RVNAF Surgeon General:

a. Supply:

(1) The Chief of Supply was responsible for all medical supply policies, functions, procurement, maintenance, and construction in RVNAF.

(2) Field depots located in each CTZ provided logistical support to hospitals, separate dispensaries, and divisional medical units.

(3) The Medical depots served all services (ARVN, VNAF, VNN) and para-military forces.

(4) In-country receipt of Class VIII supplies, including direct shipments from CONUS and Okinawa, was through the Base Medical Depot in Saigon to the field medical depots located in Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Saigon, and Can Tho. In addition, direct shipments from Okinawa were made to field medical depots (except Can Tho).

b. Maintenance:

(1) The Chief RVNAF Medical Maintenance Officer was responsible for overall management of medical equipment repair to include new equipment capability requirements, preventive maintenance programs, and drafting applicable regulations. He was also responsible for providing technical assistance to all medical facilities.

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(2) The Chief of the Medical Base Depot was responsible for operation of the base depot maintenance shop, technical assistance to the stock control section for requisitioning of medical repair parts, and inspection of field medical depot maintenance facilities.

(3) The field medical depots performed third and fourth echelon maintenance for hospitals, separate dispensaries, and divisional medical units. The 70th Base Medical Depot performed limited fifth echelon maintenance of medical and dental equipment. Repair of dental handpieces, microscopes, X-ray tubes, and calibration of audiometers was performed by the US Army Medical Depot RYUKYUS (Okinawa).

3. Ordnance:

a. Supply: In-country receipt of Class II and IV supplies were primarily through the Ordnance Base Depot in Saigon, and direct shipments for designated Class II and IV supplies were also made to the ordnance medium support battalions at Danang, Qui Nhon, Can Tho, and Nha Trang.

b. Maintenance: First and second echelon maintenance was conducted at the organizational level in ARVN units; third echelon by direct support units; fourth echelon by the five medium support battalions (one in each ALC); and fifth echelon by the Ordnance Rebuild Base Depot in Saigon. This depot also provided a limited manufacturing capability for batteries, tire recapping, and canvas and box fabrication.

c. Ammunition: In-country receipt of Class V supplies was through the six deep draft ports: Danang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, Cat Lai, and Vung Tau and the shallow-draft port at Can Tho which was operated in conjunction with Vung Tau. There were two ammunition base depots in RVN: one served by the port of Cat Lai, with the mission of distributing ammunition in the 3d and 4th ALC areas, and one served by the port of Qui Nhon, with the mission of distributing ammunition in the 1st, 2d and 5th ALC areas. Because of their ability to receive ammunition directly from CONUS, field depots in Danang, Nha Trang, and Can Tho assumed the mission of base depot support for their respective ALCs. In addition, the field depots served by Cat Lai and Qui Nhon also received ammunition directly from CONUS.

4. Quartermaster:

a. Supply:

(1) In-country receipt of Class I, II & IV supplies was through the Quartermaster Base Depot in Saigon and the depots at Danang, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang.

(2) In-country receipt of Class III supply was through three commercial oil companies (Caltex, Esso and Shell) for bulk and some packaged fuels and lubricants. The balance of package requirements were requisitioned, stored, and issued by the POL base depot in Saigon, which obtained these items through MILSTRIP channels. In addition to the base depot, there were POL field depots located in each ALC. All POL was MASF-supported.

b. Maintenance: The Quartermaster Base Depot fabricated tents, furniture, and other items rather than performing maintenance. Second and third echelon maintenance of quartermaster items was performed by A&DSL Companies and the Maintenance Companies of the

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Division Logistical Battalions. Items not repairable at this level were evacuated to the ALC-controlled QM field depots where 3d and 4th echelon maintenance was performed. Items not repairable at this level were salvaged.

5. Signal:


a. Supply: In-country receipt of signal supplies were processed through the Signal Base Depot which issued to signal support groups in III and IV CTZ and to signal support battalions in I and II CTZs. An exception was the shipment of selected dry batteries direct to the signal field depots at Danang, Qui Nhon, and Nha Trang. The signal field depots issued to the units and activities in their area of responsibility.

b. Maintenance: The Signal Base Depot performed backup fourth and fifth echelon maintenance to include rebuild of selected high density items. Signal support groups in III and IV CTZ and signal support battalions in I and II CTZs performed third and fourth echelon maintenance. Evacuation of equipment requiring higher echelon maintenance was the reverse of supply distribution.

6. The Transportation Directorate was unique among the technical services in that, while it provided service, it did not have a supply or maintenance mission.

VNN Logistics Organization

(C) The Vietnamese Naval Supply System was patterned after an amalgamation of French and Vietnamese Army systems. It was headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics who, through the Navy Logistic Group, provided both policy and technical guidance to all echelons of the system. The Logistic Group compared with the US Navy Office of Naval Material in organizational structure:



The functions of the various bureaus of the Navy Logistic Group were as follows:

1. Supply Bureau: performed broad logistic planning for material support; provided direction and control for the supply system; responsible for procuring and distributing major equipment; established system stock levels; controlled the effective utilization of system stock; coordinated with ARVN supply agencies for support of the VNN in common consumables and equipment; coordinated the supply operations of all Naval units; and administered the excess material program.

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2. Transportation Bureau: coordinated with the JCS Transportation Board to schedule tactical use of Naval logistic lift assets; took operational control of logistic lift ships when committed to a logistic lift mission; arranged transportation of Navy material; prepared cargo manifests; monitored utilization of all Navy transportation assets; and recommended distribution or redistribution of transportation equipment.

3. Technical Bureau: exercised technical and management control over the Naval shipyard and repair facilities; promulgated maintenance programs for ships, rivercraft and junks; directed salvage operations; prepared and disseminated instructions regarding utilization and maintenance of equipment; maintained technical publications; performed technical inspections; prepared and disseminated damage control plans and programs; developed and monitored training programs for technical personnel; monitored the assignment of technical personnel; cooperated with the Finance and Budget Bureau in budgeting for repairs and maintenance of ships, craft, junks, and equipment; directed the program for major repairs and overhauls of ARVN, RF, and PF boats; and reviewed, approved, and authorized ship and boat alterations.

4. Finance and Budget Bureau: responsible for drafting, submitting, implementing, and accounting for the VNN Budget; apportioned funds among various activities; audited the use of Navy funds; approved contracts made by Naval activities; administered salaries to civilian employees; and performed financial analysis.

5. Estate and Housing Bureau: responsible for establishing and maintaining a comprehensive base development program; initiated requests for new construction to the JCS; coordinated the efforts of mobile light construction teams; determined requirements for dependent housing; recommended port construction projects; requisitioned real estate; planned base fortifications; prescribed standards for barracks, piers, and beaching sites; and monitored construction, major rehabilitation, and base maintenance projects approved for Army Engineer or contract accomplishments.

6. Planning Bureau: monitored the organization of the Naval Logistics System; responsible for systems analysis; prepared and issued operating instructions; prepared and reviewed table of equipment for all Naval units; established logistic inspection schedules; performed inspections in cooperation with other logistic bureaus; provided guidance in implementing directives issued by the JCS Logistic Department; reviewed the requirement for logistic installations; monitored the implementation of logistic plans; coordinated logistic training other than technical with Training Bureau; and prepared the VNN logistical plan for submission to JCS.

(c) The following is a listing of VNN supply and maintenance activities, their locations, and responsibilities:

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>
Naval Supply	Saigon	Compiled requirements, requisitions received, stored and issued Navy-peculiar material for the Navy, Army, Regional and Popular Forces. Also requisitioned, stored and issued RVNAF common material for naval activities in the CMC. Supported auxiliary supply depots with Navy-peculiar material.

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<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>
Repair Facilities	Eastern, Cuu Long Western, Can Tho	Performed 3d, 4th and 5th echelon maintenance and maintenance and repairs on riverine force craft.
Junk Repair Facilities	I CTZ, Danang II CTZ, Qui Nhon & Nha Trang III CTZ, Cat Lo IV CTZ, An Thoi & Rach Soi	Performed 3d, 4th and 5th echelon maintenance and repairs on junks operating in coastal zones. Cat Lo and An Thoi performed limited repair and maintenance for fast patrol craft.
Auxiliary Supply Depots	I CTZ, Danang II CTZ, Qui Nhon & Nha Trang III CTZ, Cat Lo IV CTZ, An Thoi & Rach Soi 4th RA, Can Tho	Served as supply issue points for Navy peculiar and common consumables and repair parts for units operating in coastal zones and riverine areas.
Fleet Command	Saigon	Operated, in addition to coastal surveillance force, a logistics lift flotilla in support of RVNAF.

VNAF Logistics Organization

(C) The VNAF logistics organization consisted of Headquarters, VNAF Materiel Section; a depot at Bien Hoa airbase; and consolidated base supply organizations at the six bases. The materiel section of Headquarters VNAF, through a staff of technical specialists, issued directives to the field for the Commander, VNAF and directed their implementation through the wing commanders. The depot supported the entire VNAF aircraft maintenance and supply effort.

1. Maintenance Support: Inspection-and-Repair-As-Necessary (IRAN) on aircraft was accomplished by both indigenous or off-shore contractors and the VNAF depot. The depot also had the capability to perform crash and battle damage repair. Occasionally, when work load volume was high, contractors also performed crash and battle damage repair. Arrangements were made with the US Army for UH-1H repairs that were beyond the VNAF capability. US Army support was provided in-country and, when necessary, helicopters or components were evacuated to CONUS for repair by Army depots. The VNAF tactical units performed all organizational and field maintenance within their capability. Work beyond their capability was sent to the VNAF depot.

2. Supply Support: Aircraft and associated end items and supplies were requisitioned from CONUS by the Bien Hoa Depot. Consolidated base supply activities requisitioned the aircraft and associated end items and supplies from the VNAF depot to support the squadrons on their respective bases. Common use type items, excluding clothing, were requisitioned by base supply from ARVN technical services depots. Common clothing items were requisitioned by VNAF depot from the technical services for all VNAF bases.

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(C) Aviation fuel and oil in support of VNAF was provided by US forces and commercial contract, depending upon the storage facilities, joint use operations, agreements, etc, applicable to the particular base. Initially, a forecast of VNAF requirements, including a request for contractual coverage, was submitted to COMUSMACV semiannually by the AFGP. With the increasing conversion of VNAF from reciprocating engine aircraft to jet engine aircraft, the proportion of JP-4 fuel requirements was expected to increase and those of AVGAS to decrease. All VNAF bases had their own JP-4 issue capability.

(C) Air munitions were supplied against requirements requisitioned in accordance with the monthly VAMP (Vietnamese Air Munitions Program) procedures. The VAMP report was prepared by AFGP, and inventory and expenditure data for this report was furnished by VNAF. More positive control of requisitioning procedures and timely response by CONUS Depots enabled multi-port shipment of air munitions.

(C) Transportation in the VNAF involved air, sea, and land modes. The VNAF provided air transportation for its own requirements, the needs of other Vietnamese armed forces and GVN agencies. A system of scheduled flights and special missions linked the Bien Hoa and the Saigon/Tan Son Nhut airbases with various in-country bases. The RVNAF airlift requirements, in excess of VNAF capability, were supported by USAF airlift. Sealift and barge movements were provided by the ARVN and US Army to destinations having marine facilities. Since there were numerous rivers and seaports throughout the country, water transportation was very important to VNAF in the accomplishment of its mission. Ground transportation continued to remain a problem due to highway conditions and security; however, a large volume of motor transport was used between the Bien Hoa Depot and the Saigon/Tan Son Nhut area.

VNMC Logistical Organization

(U) Primary supply support for the VNMC Division was provided by the ARVN. This included common item support-notably subsistence, ammunition, POL, communication, and automotive repair parts. Automotive maintenance above 2d echelon for the VNMC Division was furnished by the ARVN. This supply and maintenance support was provided by the nearest field depot or direct support unit. Major end items of equipment and other mission essential line items were furnished through USMC's MASF provisioning sources and were issued directly from the VNN supply center where the equipment was delivered in-country.

(U) The Commandant, VNMC Division was responsible for supply and maintenance in the division. Its staff included a G-4 and a division supply officer.

1. The G-4 functioned as a logistic advisor to the commandant and was responsible for developing plans and policy, coordinating logistical matters, maintaining records on the status of major items of equipment and critical items of supply and recommending distribution within the VNMC and training logistic personnel.

2. The division supply officer functioned as a special staff officer and he provided technical advice and assistance on supply matters of the commandant. He was responsible for developing supply requirements, and maintaining liaison with ARVN supply sources.

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RVNAF Logistical Situation

ARVN

(C) During FY69, the ARVN continued to improve their ability to support themselves against internal threats and insurgency. The supply system responded well during the past Communist offensives and although instances of shortages were reported and a number of logistic installations were damaged or destroyed, the ARVN logistic system displayed the capability to support the combat units. However, US materiel and advisory assistance continued to be required, as well as continuation of the existing levels of airlift and sealift, if the ARVN logistical system was to meet the requirements placed upon it. The ability of ARVN to support itself against external aggression carried the same or greater limitations that were applicable to the insurgency situation. The ARVN continued to lack depot repair, hospital facilities, and medical capabilities. The implementation of the Territorial Medical Plan during 1969 relieved the medical problem to a considerable degree. Command support was lacking in the ARVN preventive maintenance program. Corrective action was being taken to acquaint ARVN Commanders with the fact that maintenance was a command responsibility. This subject was stressed during a Command Maintenance Management Inspection (CMMI) Program conference held in July. The conference was attended by representatives of each Corp, ALC, and Division and was chaired by the RVNAF DCS/LOG. During the conference, the area of responsibility for the control of inspection teams was changed to require each Corps to field its own inspection team and to report its findings directly to the Corps Commander. This was a significant step taken by the RVNAF to increase the command influence and involvement in insuring that corrective action was taken by his units. 114

(C) In August, the CMMI directive, which had been developed by the DCS/LOG and his staff with assistance of US advisors, was issued to major ARVN units in the field. Developed over a seven month period, the new directive enhanced the maintenance management at all levels within ARVN. 115

(C) Transportation improved with increased road security and restoration of military highways and borders. Security also improved to a point where 95 percent or more of the military essential highways were in green or amber condition at all times (See chapter IX). The movement of supplies and equipment continued to be hampered by shortages of intra-coastal shipping and inland transportation, as well as war-damaged secondary roads and insecure lines of communications to outlying areas. Direct shipments of supplies and equipment from offshore sources to up-country ports relieved the congestion in the Saigon Port. Competition for civilian labor between RVNAF and US forces and civilian firms continued with the result that ARVN was still short of technically skilled civilians. This problem was expected to continue until the GVN revised the present system of wage controls. Approved and recommended force structure increases included additional logistical personnel to support the present and planned force structure and enhance the possibility of a self sufficient ARVN logistic system. (See RVNAF I&M section of this chapter for a more detailed discussion of FSI.)

VNN

(C) The VNN logistic system, although continuing to show improvement over the past year, had to be reorganized and expanded in order to support the VNN force which was increasing

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rapidly under the RVNAF I&M program. The magnitude of change was reflected in a projected 67 percent increase in personnel strength over a one year period, an increase of some 400 assorted ships/craft by end of FY70, and construction/rehabilitation/turnover of some 33 bases scheduled for completion by the end of 1970.

(C) The desired degree of VNN self-sufficiency under VNN expansion could not be achieved within the existing organization as described above. The following major deficiencies had to be resolved:

1. The current logistic command and control structure was weak and undermanned.
2. Stock and inventory control procedures were ineffective.
3. There was no system for control and distribution of assets between depots.
4. There was a lack of adequate storage facilities for material ammunition and POL.
5. Obsolete and excess stocks were taking up needed storage space.
6. Availability of skilled, trained military personnel was inadequate
7. There was a shortage of skilled civilian personnel at VNN maintenance/repair facilities.
8. The VNN preventive maintenance program was ineffective.
9. There was a lack of adequate base maintenance and facilities support from ARVN.
10. There was a shortage of bilingual technical publications.

(C) The above deficiencies were recognized in an in depth analysis of the VNN logistic system. This analysis was part of a program to develop a plan for the improvement of the VNN logistic system. The resultant plan, ACTOVLOG (The logistic aspects of the accelerated turnover of US Navy assets to the Vietnamese Navy) was designed to improve VNN logistical systems as a merger was affected between the in-country US Navy logistic system and the VNN logistic system. During the process, weaknesses were to be eliminated and the strengths of both systems adopted (See Chapter IV).

(C) The VNN Logistical Support Command was established on 1 Oct. Although key personnel had been assigned to the billets, the overall shortage of officers in the VNN at that time was creating a problem for the VNN Logistical Support Command; primarily, the lack of expertise in the middle management was evident. ¹¹⁶

(TS) It was estimated that the VNN would only have an overall 30 percent capability to satisfy their logistic requirements by 1 Jul 70. ¹¹⁷

VNAF

(C) The VNAF logistical system provided supply and maintenance support for 12 types of aircraft, located at six widely dispersed bases. It had not achieved the desired degree of

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self-sufficiency and had to be augmented by support from ARVN, US Forces, and CONUS. In order to improve the system, plans and procedures had to be developed which would: 118

1. Strengthen command control at each echelon.
2. Improve coordination of materiel matters among the different VNAF staff agencies.
3. Develop a more responsive communications system between logistic activities.
4. Develop management and supervisory skills to achieve optimum use of materiel, manpower, and facilities.
5. Improve training capabilities and skill levels of logistic personnel.
6. Improve response to high priority aircraft spare parts requirements and expedite requisitioning, processing incoming shipments, and issue to using activities.
7. Reduce time span for return of repairable parts to depot for shipment to CONUS.
8. Increase and effectively use VNAF airlift capability.

(U) Courses of actions to overcome the deficiencies in VNAF logistical system as well as in ARVN and VNN systems were identified in the Country Logistics Improvement Program (CLIP) and initiation of those actions started in the 1st qtr FY70 (see CLIP section under RVNAF Logistic Improvement and Modernization, this chapter).

RVNAF Logistics Improvement and Modernization

(U) RVNAF had a logistics system in being which worked moderately well, but significant improvements throughout the entire spectrum of logistics were required before RVNAF could approach complete logistic self-sufficiency. Changes in the conduct of the war had increased RVNAF logistic support requirements at an accelerated rate. The decision to Vietnamize the war magnified the urgency of improving and modernizing the RVNAF logistic system toward self-sufficiency at the earliest possible time. Major factors during the year which affected the RVNAF system with considerable impact were:

1. Force Structure Increases. Rapid increases in the RVNAF combat force structure required commensurate increases in the logistic support base. Although additional logistic personnel were authorized in the force structure increases, efforts to fill authorizations with trained, qualified personnel had yet to achieve desired results.
2. Improvement and Modernization Program. The introduction of modern sophisticated weapons and support equipment in significant densities into the RVNAF inventory enlarged the scope and complexity of the logistic support requirements. Large inventories of aircraft, helicopters, boats, vehicles, weapons, and communication assets would require extensive supply, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition systems to support them. Basic to those systems were the requirements for technically-trained military and civilian personnel and modern depot facilities. Competition for civilian labor between RVNAF,

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US Forces, and civilian firms had left RVNAF short of technically skilled civilians. Depot repair capabilities and physical facilities were inadequate to support requirements generated by the Improvement and Modernization Program.

3. Expansion of Territorial Forces. The rapid expansion of territorial forces had placed a tremendous support burden on the administrative and direct support logistical (A&DSL) companies. They were simply unable to handle the increased support required and immediate significant improvement was required in all aspects of the A&DSL companies.

(U) To develop RVNAF logistics self-sufficiency, a Logistics Master Plan concept was developed which combined several individual logistic plans, programs, projects, and studies, each designed to improve the RVNAF logistic system. The Master Plan contained a total of eight (two plans, three programs, two studies, and one project) as follows:

1. Combined Logistics Offensive Plan (CLOP), 22 Jul.
2. Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP), 31 Jul.
3. Base Depot Upgrade Plan, Oct.
4. Plans for Turnover of Facilities and Functions Program.
5. Budgeting and Funding Concept for Improvement Program.
6. A&DSL Company Study.
7. Automated Data Processing (ADP) Systems Study.
8. On-the-Job Training (OJT) Program (Project Buddy).

NOTE: See Figure VI-16 for Master Plan Management.

The overall program to improve the RVNAF logistical support system to achieve self-sufficiency represented an ambitious and all encompassing undertaking which would require extensive action on the part of JCS and assistance by the US. Out of 36 major action tasks, 26 were targeted for completion by end of FY70, with the remaining 10 phased through FY71, 72, and 73. Summary and status of above plans follow.


Combined Logistics Offensive Plan (CLOP)

(U) The CLOP was basically a short range, immediate action plan designed to foster a positive, aggressive logistic offensive spirit in the conduct of logistic operations and solve specific problems. It was a unique logistic plan in that it was a combined RVNAF/MACV plan, directive in application to RVNAF and was the only one of its kind in the logistic area. The CLOP listed 121 specific problems by service (73 ARVN, 27 VNAF, 21 VNN), provided problem solutions, and actions required. All actions were scheduled for completion by September 1970. See Chapter IX for additional treatment of CLOP.

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MASTER PLAN MANAGEMENT CHART



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FIGURE VI-16

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Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP)

(U) The CLIP was a coordinated long range program of major objectives for improving the logistics operations of RVNAF. The plan was composed of 81 specified projects, by RVNAF service, containing broad project objectives, background/current situation, sequenced courses of action, and time completion criteria. Each project identified host country and US responsible agencies. Over half of the projects were scheduled for completion in FY70, with the majority of the rest due for completion in FY71. It was estimated that the RVNAF logistic system would approach self sufficiency to the degree that CLIP projects were implemented and completed. Major projects were:

1. Develop a plan to establish a viable self sufficient VNN logistical system.
2. Develop plans and procedures; publish directives and regulations; authorize personnel spaces; and program for equipment.
3. Develop a petroleum system capable of providing a single coordinated effort for receipt, storage, and issue of bulk petroleum products to RVNAF.
4. Develop a manual management information system jointly with RVNAF to measure progress of logistics programs in areas of supply, maintenance, and transportation.
5. Program and develop maintenance facilities, establish a maintenance training program, and develop the skill level of personnel to operate quality maintenance systems and associated equipment.
6. Establish an orientation and formal training program, effect equipment turnover, and phase out US units.
7. Evaluate current RVNAF medical preventive maintenance procedures, and develop a comprehensive program to upgrade procedures.
8. Define and develop systematic procedures suitable for ADP applications to sorting, collating, and reporting generation requirements for ordnance at the 20th Ordnance Storage Base Depot.
9. Train personnel; reorganize the 12 support units into support battalions; obtain civilian technical advisors and equipment in each ALC.

(U) By the end of the year, nine projects out of the original 81 were completed. In addition, three new projects were submitted during the second quarter and several existing projects were expanded by additional courses of action. Based on a detailed review of projects requiring action during the 1st and 2d quarter FY70 and the actions reported as accomplished during those quarters, it appeared that overall progress on implementation of the CLIP was on schedule and in many cases ahead of schedule. 119

Base Depot Upgrade Plan

(U) The Base Depot Upgrade Plan was established to upgrade RVNAF base depot capabilities through improvement of facilities, utilities, and equipment. The accelerated introduction into

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RVNAF of modern ordnance, signal, and engineer equipment in high densities had taxed the support capabilities to the limit. Discussion of this follows.

(U) Base Depot Maintenance Upgrading. There were serious limitations at the base depot sites (Engineer, Signal and Ordnance Depots in greater Saigon area) which impaired the effectiveness of the RVNAF Logistic Support System. The potential of the facilities had been reduced primarily due to heavy usage, inadequate water and electrical power supply, and worn out equipment and tools. Consequently, the Ordnance, Engineer, and Signal Base Depots experienced significant shortfalls between rebuild capability and actual production. At the Ordnance Base Depot, selected tracked vehicle end-items and major assemblies were retrograded for out-of-country rebuild. The Engineer Base Depot had an appreciable backlog of engineer equipment for rebuild. The Signal Base Depot was incapable of performing 5th echelon maintenance on signal equipment. Additionally, each depot was considerably undermanned in skilled civilian personnel. The development of an effective, viable depot maintenance capability was essential in the Vietnamization of the logistic effort and this became even more important during the year as additional assets were being introduced into the RVNAF inventory. MACJ4 initiated an upgrade program and requested Army Materiel Command (AMC) to furnish technicians to survey the facilities and determine how they could be improved. An eight-member team from AMC conducted a survey in July. Additional studies were conducted by the Vinnell Corporation and the US Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam (USAECAV). The findings and recommendations were incorporated and published in October as a MACV/RVNAF Base Depot Upgrade Plan. The plan identified the current capability of each of the base depots and what would be required to bring each of them up to a posture to support the RVNAF improvement and modernization program and force structure increases. It did not envision the conversion of the depots into highly automated sophisticated facilities, but rather those upgrading actions required to support the expanded depot maintenance mission. Specifically, improvements were required to develop personnel skills, improve training, facilities (sites, buildings, utilities), equipment, and tools. The plan set forth the requirement for \$30.8 million to upgrade the three depots (See Table VI-11) and a realistic schedule for phasing actions (See Table VI-12). When implemented, the plan would achieve the following required objectives:

1. Assist RVNAF to become logistically self-sufficient.
2. Augment the development of the Vietnamese economy through the creation of job opportunities, increased employment, wages, and consumer spending.
3. Eliminate the out-of-country transportation costs for the retrograde program.
4. Reduce the overhead and labor costs for repaired end-items or major assemblies relative to the costs of repair at out-of-country depots.
5. Minimize equipment down-time and thus reduce the size of the maintenance float.
6. Ensure that in-country depot maintenance was available to support an equipment investment of \$887,500,000 (\$144,000,000 for Engineer, \$116,300,000 for Signal and \$627,200,000 for Ordnance).

(U) In addition MACV recommended:

1. Provision of production equipment for each depot, primarily from DIPEC assets, if available; and secondarily from commercial sources.

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COST SUMMARY

BASE DEPOT UPGRADE


	<u>40TH EBD</u>	<u>60TH SBD</u>	<u>80TH ORBD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Site Improvement, Building Repair and Construction	\$5,295,700	\$5,227,590	\$4,635,589	\$15,158,879
2. External Power Requirements	820,764		3,271,899	4,092,663
3. Power Distribution System	287,535	239,584	863,079	1,390,198
4. Internal Electrical Requirements	983,013	1,094,437	4,324,035	6,401,485
5. Equipment Procurement	101,195	399,693	2,475,882	2,976,770
6. Miscellaneous Tools & Accessories	96,405		280,925	377,330
7. Technical Assistance & TDY Costs	72,180	53,000	85,000	210,180
8. Training	<u>75,500</u>	<u>19,900</u>	<u>55,000</u>	<u>150,400</u>
TOTAL	\$7,732,292	\$7,034,204	\$15,991,409	\$30,757,905

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TABLE VI-11

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IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
FOR THE BASE DEPOT UP-GRADE PLAN



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TABLE VI-12

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2. Appointment of an AMC team to acquire the designated equipment and tools and to move the equipment to a central CONUS location for assembly, check-out and final shipment to RVN. Further, the team should accompany the equipment to RVN and remain for a six-month period at each depot to supervise equipment installation, insure complete shutdown of shops would not occur, and to conduct necessary operator training.

3. Improvement of depot locations (installation of water supply and electrical power systems, repair of buildings, development of interior road net and open storage areas) be accomplished in phase with the acquisition of equipment.

4. Approval of funding in the amount of \$30,800,000 through Military Assistance Service Funding Program.

5. Designation of HQ, MACV as the coordinating agency for all actions of the project.

(U) At the end of the year, MACV was prepared to proceed with the Base Depot Upgrade Plan, and awaited notification of approval for release of funds.

Plans for Turnover of Facilities and Functions Program

(U) The objective of this program was to provide for the orderly transfer of US facilities and logistic functions to RVNAF. Development of a US plan, procedure, or directive was considered necessary, as well as an RVNAF equivalent plan for receipt of facilities.

(U) Basic US guidance was developed and included in MACV Directive 735-3, Disposal of Excess US Armed Forces Real Property and Related Property in the Republic of Vietnam, 3 Nov 69. The directive set forth the following procedures and requirements:

1. MACV reserved approval authority for transfer of excess real and related property for transfers having operational significance; transfers to RVNAF and GVN agencies, transfers to US non-DOD agencies in RVN, and to FWMAF; transfers of communications-electronic facilities or property that would effect such facilities.

2. For above transfers, an initial conceptual proposal and a detailed plan would be submitted to MACV for approval.

3. When installations or facilities were transferred to RVNAF, the component service being relieved must insure continuity of operation and maintenance responsibility and that RVNAF personnel receive adequate training in the operations and maintenance of associated equipment and systems.

4. Advisors would actively assist RVNAF elements on planning long term utilization of property transferred to RVNAF, to include fund and personnel programming to support operational and maintenance requirements. (The advisory assistance actions were provided specifically to insure that logistic functions would not be neglected in the process of transferring facilities.)

(U) RVNAF guidance and procedures were stated in JCS/RVNAF Central Logistics Command Memorandum dated 7 Feb 69, Subj: Transfer of US Compounds to the RVNAF. The memorandum was the RVNAF equivalent of MACV Directive 735-3 and each complemented the other.

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(U) By the end of the year, a combined US-Vietnamese Committee for coordinating facility transfers had been established at the JGS/MACV level. Similar committees had been established at CTZ level. While several minor installations and isolated facilities were transferred during the year, the major transfers completed were:

<u>Facility</u>	<u>Receiving Organization</u>
Dong Tam	ARVN 7th Inf Div, IV Corps
Black Horse	ARVN 18th Inf Div, III Corps
Dong Ha (portions)	ARVN 1st Inf Div, I Corps
Bien Hoa (RMK facilities)	VNAF

Twenty-two additional transfers were pending which included such installations as a base camp at Quang Tri, the Saigon Port, and Vung Tau Sub Area Command. (See Chapter IX for additional discussion of facilities turnover.)

Budgeting and Funding Concept for Improvement Program

(U) Budgeting and Funding for Improvement. A plan on this subject addressed the steps necessary to ensure the availability of funds in support of RVNAF self-sufficiency. It was not a formal program but rather a concept that alerted action officers to the requirements for funding, in order to accomplish the tasks, such as fund depot upgrading, ADP system, and transfer of US facilities.

Administrative and Direct Support Logistical (A&DSL) Company Study. 120

(U) Expansion of the Regional/Popular Forces resulted in personnel equipment and weapon increases, which impacted heavily upon the A&DSL companies. For the most part, the A&DSL companies were not capable of providing satisfactory support to the RF/PF.

(U) On 13 Jul, DEPCOMUSMACV directed a study be made to identify problems of A&DSL companies and to determine appropriate corrective actions. A MACV ad hoc committee was formed to conduct the study and JGS/CLC was requested to participate (participation by the JGS, however, failed to materialize). The study, which concluded on 19 Aug, identified 29 problems and disclosed numerous shortcomings. A summary of findings follow:

1. Lack of aggressive command emphasis and interest in company operations was evident at all levels. This was considered the greatest single cause of problems which existed in the A&DSL Company.
2. Shortage and misuse of trained personnel hindered all facets of the support effort. For example, company personnel were used for many non-related duties such as city security, ambush patrols, airfield security, and province bands. Diversion of personnel greatly reduced functional capability of the companies. Shortages of trained personnel in all areas of personnel management, administrative, finance, supply, maintenance, and transportation seriously detracted from potential support capability.

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3. Lack of and untranslated publications resulted in RVNAF and US advisor personnel being unaware of procedures for handling and storage of supplies/equipment, maintenance of records, payment of the troops, and cash control.

4. Inadequate real estate, facilities, ammunition, and POL storage areas resulted in unsafe storage conditions, supply and equipment deterioration, and damage.

5. Inadequate guidance, malassignment, and mismanagement of US advisors resulted in a general failure to provide full effort toward upgrading and improving A&DSL Company operations. Tendency on the part of advisors to by-pass RVNAF logistical channels and divert supplies provided through US channels to RF/PF use, diluted the demands upon the RVNAF supply function.

6. Failure to conduct in-depth inspections of technical operations and utilization of facilities, equipment, and personnel deprived commanders and key personnel of knowledge required to base decisions for improvement of operations.

7. Lack and non-use of, and failure to enforce procedures caused delay in support, ineffective control, and frustration which resulted in wasted man hours and sub-standard support to RF/PF units.

8. Deficient command and control arrangement caused confusion, delay and lack of responsiveness to the requirements of customers. The A&DSL Company was under operational control of the sector commander, however, instructions and technical supervision were received from the ALC and the Administrative and Finance Service (A&FS). This, coupled with staff guidance from sector and Corps, served to further complicate an already complex situation, caused difficulties in coordination and had a degrading effect on the efficiency of the unit.

(U) The A&DSL Company Study identified principle JCS action agencies and MACV coordinating offices for taking actions on correction of the problems. The majority of actions lent themselves to a long range time frame due to the complexity, i.e. developing command interest, training of administrative and technical personnel, obtaining real estate, adequate facilities, and translating documents. Those actions, which were primarily the responsibility of MACV to correct (those concerned with the US advisors) and scheduled for completion by end of the year, were completed.

(U) The MACV A&DSL Company Study was not accepted by RVNAF for implementation. Instead, they published a RVNAF counterpart plan, called the RF/PF Logistics Improvement Plan, on 30 Sep. This plan was translated into English in November, and MACJ4 used this to cross reference their actions to those in the A&DSL study. Where A&DSL action could not be identified, MACV planned to request the CLC to include them in their quarterly update of the RF/PF Improvement Plan. 121

ADP Systems Study

(U) The purpose of this study was to provide RVNAF with an automated capability to manage logistics at the national level. Installation of an automated logistics system for RVNAF would: provide necessary interface with the US supply system in the command language of MILSTRIP; and, generate management information not presently available for RVNAF and US needs. The following objectives were established:

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1. Develop an effective materiel management information system which will standardize the supply procedures within the RVNAF and provide visibility to the asset position.

2. Develop and implement sub-systems within an overall systems concept of compatibility.

3. Time phase sub-systems to assure that the standardization effort progressed in an orderly fashion, outlined below:

a. Phase I: Develop a computer-assisted, standard supply system for the ARVN technical services and base depots.

b. Phase II: Expand the materiel management information system to incorporate the VNAF and VNN logistic systems into the inventory control capability developed in Phase I.

c. Phase III: Organize and staff a National Materiel Management Agency to provide centralized direction to the logistic effort with support from the Logistics Data Processing Center.

(U) Results of the study were incorporated into a Combined RVNAF/MACV Plan 192-69, RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS). Major tasks were broken down into time phase estimates. The estimate from start to completion of all major tasks was set from October 1969 through October 1971. By November, the RVNAF had activated an ADP Logistics Data Processing Center at CLC. Studies were underway at the end of the year to enlarge its scope of activities with the final goal of developing the ADP Center into the National Logistics Management Center. At the close of the year, a development implementation plan was in the final stages to be presented to USARPAC, CINCPAC, DA, and DOD in February 1970. (2)

OJT Project BUDDY

(U) In January the 1st Log Comd piloted a program called Project BUDDY and submitted it through USARV to MACV for approval. This was one of the many OJT Programs under development by the commands to support P&M of RVNAF. Subsequently, MACT was charged with the coordination, evaluation, data collection, and monitoring of the program. MACT staffed a proposed directive which was published on 13 Oct (MACV Directive 156-16, Republic of Vietnam On-The-Job Training (OJT) Program). It was applicable to all MACV subordinate and component commands. It established a combined effort by MACV and RVNAF to identify skills in need of improvement, and to provide RVNAF personnel with OJT in those skills. At the end of the year, all indications were that the various OJT Programs were exceeding original expectations. Since the publication of MACV Directive 156-16, the following OJT training of RVNAF personnel by US forces had been accomplished and programmed:

<u>Training Agency</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>In-training</u>	<u>Programmed</u>
US Army*	1,489 (173)	876 (41)	1,310 (19)
US Navy	1,174	561	0
US Air Force	488	153	1
TOTAL	3,142	1,570	1,311

*Logistics training only.

() Number of individual classes conducted.

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EFFECTIVENESS

General

(S) As mentioned in the Improvement and Modernization section of this chapter, SECDEF on 18 Aug requested that the JCS and service secretaries review and submit the results of the current RVNAF I&M Program and other on-going and planned actions to enhance RVNAF capabilities, to him by 30 Sep, with the goal of developing an RVNAF capability to cope successfully with the combined VC/NVA threat. This review was to consider: Actions to improve RVNAF leadership and esprit and reduce desertion rates; possible increased use of combined operations and planning; the RVNAF optimum force structure; ways to improve RVNAF logistics and intelligence capabilities; and, most important, development of strategy and tactics best matched with RVNAF capabilities. 123

(TS) After reviewing the approved RVNAF force structure and the RVNAF I&M Program, MACV forwarded its views on 2 Sep to CINCPAC. 124 The review considered:

1. The combined VC/NVA threat which would possibly confront RVNAF.
2. The RVNAF capability to cope with the combined threat.
3. Measures being, or which could be, taken to improve RVNAF.
4. Strategy and tactics matched to RVNAF capabilities.

(TS) The combined VC/NVA threat.

1. Although the enemy capability had continued to reduce since 10 Jun, the enemy still had approximately 232,000 troops constituting a direct military threat to RVN. The enemy launched his autumn campaign, indicating that he planned to continue military pressure, and he had increased the threat to Allied forces in northwestern III CTZ and IV CTZ.

2. The assessment by MACV of the combined VC/NVA threat was based on enemy capabilities known at that time and included the enemy capability for reinforcement from NVN, Laos, and Cambodia.

(TS) The RVNAF capability to cope with the combined VC/NVA threat:

1. RVNAF/US/FWMAF forces deployed in RVN were considered the forces necessary for dealing effectively with current VC/NVA capabilities. The present RVNAF force, even when improved as a result of the RVNAF I&M Program (with Midway add-ons), would be insufficient alone to counter effectively the present combined threat.

2. The RVNAF combat effectiveness could be improved either by expanding the force, by improving effectiveness in combat operations, or both.

3. As stated in the MACV recommendations concerning the GVN Midway proposals, the GVN was rapidly approaching the limit of its manpower capabilities. The maximum military

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force that GVN could man and sustain through FY72 was considered to be approximately 993,000, i. e., the presently authorized force, including the FY71 Midway projections. Quantitative improvement in RVNAF did not appear to be feasible or a realistic course for the foreseeable future.

4. Qualitative improvement in RVNAF could be made, however, there was no feasible way for RVNAF to improve qualitatively to the degree necessary to deal with the current enemy threat, given a drastically reduced US troop strength in-country.

5. In summary, given the manpower constraints faced by the GVN and the current enemy capability, it was not considered possible for RVNAF to improve, either quantitatively or qualitatively, by an amount sufficient to cope with the combined threat. This situation was expected to persist so long as the present enemy threat remained.

(TS) Measures being taken to improve RVNAF.

1. Improvement of leadership and esprit de corps. RVNAF had consistently been cited for inadequate leadership, especially at the company grade and NCO levels. This shortcoming had, in turn, an adverse effect on esprit de corps, which, it was anticipated, would continue, especially in the NCO ranks. NCO recruitments for the past three years had been well short of requirements. Recently authorized force structure increases would compound the problem. A number of actions, which were underway to help alleviate this problem, were:

- a. Increased emphasis on merit promotion of officers and noncommissioned officers.
- b. Increased emphasis on prompt recognition of achievement by appropriate awards and decorations.
- c. Increased emphasis on officer and NCO schools.
- d. An on-going study of RVNAF pay and entitlements.
- e. Increased emphasis by internal communications media on encouraging, in military personnel, a stronger sense of loyalty to GVN, and a feeling of responsibility to the nation, in addition to traditional family ties.

2. Reduction of the RVNAF desertion rate. The desertion rate appeared to have levelled off at a rate of about 12 per thousand assigned personnel per month. A number of actions were underway to further reduce desertions and included:

- a. Formulation of permanent desertion control committees, improved awards and decorations policy, a liberalized leave program, expanded political warfare activities at the unit level, and a fingerprint identification system for RVNAF servicemen.
- b. Expanded activities by psychological media to educate the populace, advertise a reward program, and to emphasize punishments under the law for harboring deserters.

3. Improvement of RVNAF intelligence capability. Actions were underway to improve RVNAF capabilities in:

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- a. Counterintelligence.
 - b. Communications security.
 - c. Communications intelligence.
 - d. Intelligence training.
4. Increased reliance on combined planning and operations. There were on-going efforts to encourage this trend, among which were:
- a. The JGS/MACV staffs had initiated combined strategic objectives planning.
 - b. The Combined Campaign Plan (AB series) was the product of combined planning.
 - c. Combined planning with regard to US troop redeployments was being conducted within appropriate security constraints.
 - d. Combined planning related to US residual force concepts were being conducted, constrained by appropriate security safeguards.
 - e. Combined planning at unit level.
5. Improvement in RVNAF logistics capabilities. On-going programs for improvement of RVNAF logistics included:
- a. The Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP).
 - b. The Country Logistics Offensive Plan (CLOP).
 - c. Improvement of VNAF airlift capability.
 - d. Improvement of VNN, sealift capability.
 - e. RVNAF depot upgrade plan.
 - f. A&DSL company study.

It was considered that effective programs existed and were being implemented to improve RVNAF logistic capabilities to a level commensurate with anticipated requirements of the programmed RVNAF force structure.

(TS) The optimum RVNAF force structure.

1. An optimum force structure would have to be much larger than the maximum force the GVN could man and sustain. Accordingly, optimization of the RVNAF force structure became a question of how best to organize, equip, and train forces within the presently authorized force level.

2. Under study were proposals to improve further RVNAF utilization of existing resources by increasing:

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- a. Ground and air mobility of ARVN divisions.
- b. Firepower available to support ARVN divisions and territorial forces.
- c. Minesweep and coastal surveillance capabilities of VNN.
- d. Air support capability of VNAF, by the addition of helicopters and A-37 squadrons.

3. Action on territorial force improvement was underway. The schedule of redeployment of US units with the aim of transferring to RVNAF a greater responsibility for the war may have had considerable impact on territorial security force requirements in FY71 and FY72. As US forces were withdrawn, an increased territorial force would be required in areas from which US units were redeployed.

4. The foregoing proposals could provide additive capabilities for RVNAF; however, these could not enable RVNAF to bear the full burden of a war against the combined threat.

(TS) Strategy and tactics best matched to RVNAF capabilities.

1. Strategy and tactics for Allied forces were derived from missions, objectives, and concepts set forth in the Combined Campaign Plan. The Combined Campaign Plan 1970 (AB 145), was prepared by a combined JCS/MACV planning group and incorporated concepts, missions, and objectives in extension of its predecessor plans. Major objectives set forth in AB 145 which would govern strategy and tactics employed by Allied forces were:

a. Full participation in the GVN Pacification and Development Plan, to assist in securing the populace, pacifying the countryside, and neutralizing the VCI. Military civic action, psychological operations, refugee settlement assistance, resource control programs, and the detection and interdiction of enemy infiltration were related tasks.

b. Defeat of VC/NVA forces through sustained, coordinated, and combined military operations against enemy forces, base areas, and logistic systems. Resource denial, counter-infiltration, border and coastal surveillance, psychological operations, active intelligence, and counter-intelligence operations were related tasks.

2. Plan AB 145 provided for transition from the current security system to one that would ultimately not require participation by US/FWMAF combat forces at their present levels. As major enemy forces were withdrawn, or forced to withdraw to NVN, as Pacification and Development goals were met, and as the effectiveness of RVNAF showed demonstrated improvement, the requirement for US/FWMAF combat forces would reduce accordingly.

3. Territorial forces were being expanded and improved in order to maintain the momentum of the Pacification Campaign, secure the populace, and where possible, free regular ARVN forces for operations against enemy main forces. Territorial forces were to eventually bear the brunt of operations to secure the populace.

4. The JCS/MACV combined strategy and tactics had been designed to exploit improved RVNAF capabilities, defeat the enemy, and support the pacification program. The strategy of securing the population, reflected in the "one war" concept of AB 145, would isolate

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enemy base areas from the populace and rely more heavily on small unit ambushes, patrolling, and selective use of firepower. Additional supporting tactics would be determined, tested, and implemented as appropriate to the developing situation. Since ARVN could not turn full attention to the enemy main force so long as regular units were required in the pacification role, provisions were made for improvement in territorial forces. Thus, a realistic strategy had to take into account, not only strategic goals, but also focus clearly on the enemy situation and activities, and on progress in pacification. The current strategy and tactics not only met these criteria, but placed increased responsibility for self-defense on a greater number of the Vietnamese people, which in turn could help increase their commitment to the GVN. 124

(TS) On 7 Sep, CINCPAC forwarded concurrence in the COMUSMACV evaluation of the RVNAF and the measures outlined for improvement of the RVNAF. He also forwarded comments as follows: ¹²⁵

1. In regard to the RVNAF desertion rate, he recommended that any presentations or briefings which displayed both RVNAF and US desertion rates specifically address the fact that RVNAF personnel were identified as deserters after a 15-day unauthorized absence as opposed to a 30-day absence for US personnel.

2. Information available clearly indicated that the scope and comprehension of the current accelerated VNAF I&M Program was at its maximum. Further, add-ons or compression of this program prior to 2d qtr, FY72 could produce a pernicious effect on existing and planned actions and jeopardize the I&M objective. For example: there were no programmed squadron activations in FY70 due to the already large VNAF training program which included 1,821 pilots and 3,817 technicians. This training represented a maximum effort and must proceed uninterrupted and be concluded successfully if the 12 squadrons scheduled for activation in FY71 are, in fact, to be activated. The point that had to be recognized was that RVNAF personnel were being trained to the upper limit of their resources and their technical ability. Activation of the 12 squadrons in FY71 would be contingent on the VNAF-demonstrated capability to receive, operate and maintain the aircraft and related equipment at that time.

3. The accelerated Phase II RVNAF I&M Program and the approved addition from the Midway proposal outlined an extremely ambitious program for the improvement and modernization of the VNN. Further acceleration could prove self-defeating. The success of the on-going programs depended heavily upon the proper training of the VNN officers and enlisted personnel. The training of personnel to take over the new ships and craft in itself was a major undertaking. When one also considered the support (logistic and maintenance) personnel that had to be trained during the same time frame, the magnitude of the job was clear. The next few years would be critical for the VNN and CINCPAC believed that the present schedule should not be compressed.

4. From the overall training viewpoint, analysis of past and current message traffic indicated the in-country training school system to support the approved programs was already being taxed to the limit. In addition the in-country capability to train effectively sufficient RVNAF personnel in the English language, to a level adequate for comprehension at CONUS training schools or in the expanding OJT program with US forces in-country, could prove to be a major limiting factor in improving the qualitative aspects of RVNAF effectiveness even in the presently approved programs.

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5. Combined operations and planning were being used in all areas. As an example, the VNN had assumed responsibility for Areas Eight and Nine in MARKET TIME (Gulf of Thailand and southwestern coast of the Ca Mau Peninsula). VNN personnel also assumed control of the coastal surveillance center at An Thoi at the same time. Three RAIDS were on Operation GIANT SLINGSHOT. One RAID was on the Vinh-Te Canal, and two RAIDS were scheduled to operate in the 4th Riverine Area with the VNMC. These responsibilities had been assumed within the past six months. Joint manning of PBRs and PCFs was proceeding with no major problems. Mutual acceptance of USN/VNN by each other was encouraging and considered a direct result of the personal response program.

6. In summary, CINCPAC concluded that it was quite clear that the RVNAF I&M Program as approved should not be expanded at the present time. The program should be allowed to be implemented as planned, with qualitative improvement being the key factor.

(S) With reference to MACV's submission of its RVNAF assessment and review, JCS, on 6 Sep, requested additional detailed information.¹²⁶ Specifically, JCS requested:

1. Regarding the improvement of RVNAF intelligence activities, a description of actions taken and comments on the capability to be provided to the RVNAF with tactical sensors.

2. A description of the proposals to improve the RVNAF utilization of existing resources and the possible extent of RVNAF reorganization and the time period being considered.

3. In reference to the approaching upper limit of manpower capabilities, comments regarding the feasibility of placing an additional 15,000 to 20,000 women in the RVNAF in clerical and administrative roles, thereby freeing men to fill additional combat and combat support units.

4. Regarding manpower, comments on the feasibility of extending the draft at this time to include the 39-42 age group and the effect, if any, on such an increase on RVNAF capabilities, assuming the necessary equipment were provided.

(TS) On 10 Sep, MACV supplied JCS with the additional information requested above. MACV stated that, with regard to improvement of RVNAF intelligence, a number of actions, summarized below, were being taken:¹²⁷

1. Counterintelligence: Military Security Service (MSS) was the RVNAF agency primarily engaged in CI activities. With improvement activities currently in-being and programmed, all indications pointed to MSS being capable of carrying out counterintelligence activities necessary for the maintenance of domestic security and personnel security within the RVNAF. To further improve this capability, action was underway for an expanded ARVN-supported training base, increased logistic support, and standardized funding procedures. Counterintelligence courses for the RVNAF MI School were being accelerated from FY71 to FY70. Although the MSS was at approximately 90 percent of authorized strength, a request was made to GVN for higher quality personnel for assignment to MSS. Shortages of TOE equipment were being handled by priority action. The MSS training in financial and funding actions also was being accelerated by US MI Group.

2. Communications Security (COMSEC): increased personnel and equipment of the RVNAF COMSEC units were authorized, and MACV had requested the RVNAF to raise personnel

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and equipment priorities for COMSEC. US crypto material was furnished and KL-7 operator training target dates were advanced. A formal course of instruction was underway, and efforts were being made by the RVNAF COMSEC personnel to increase troop awareness of vulnerabilities. The provision and use of the M-209 convertor at subsector level was accelerated from 4th Qtr, FY70 to 2d Qtr, FY70. Additional emphasis was placed on the translation and distribution of ACP-122 (C) by the RVNAF.

3. Communications Intelligence (COMINT): the limiting factors in the COMINT area were the lack of qualified personnel and equipment. Personnel and equipment increases which were authorized in the fall of 1968 had only been partially filled, and 10 direct support units were programmed. Two of these units were currently in the field undergoing Advanced Unit Training, scheduled for completion in January 1970. All units were scheduled to be trained, equipped, and operational by 1 Sep 70. Higher personnel and equipment priorities were being requested.

4. Intelligence Training:

a. The RVNAF MI School was capable of training intelligence personnel in specialized intelligence and security courses, with exception of DAME-DASE photography. As a result, offshore school requirements for FY71 were programmed to be greatly reduced. Previous planning for implementation of the DAME-DASE photography course was FY71. Planning had accelerated the target date, and actions were under way to start this course in January 1970.

b. A review of specialized requirements for the VNN and VNAF was being made and oriented toward those portions of intelligence training available in-country that would satisfy the particular needs of these services and was being conducted by the respective advisory groups of the RVNAF. Target date for completion was 1 Jan 70. Completion and implementation of specialized requirements of the VNN and VNAF was expected to reduce future requirements for CONUS training.

c. In the IDHS area, actions had been taken to recruit and train US-hire Vietnamese civilians to facilitate training of ARVN personnel and phase out of US military. Increased use of USAID ADP courses would supplement in-house training. Action was under way to obtain translation from English to Vietnamese of necessary Automatic Document Storage and Retrieval Systems Manuals. These actions were expected to accelerate attainment of self-sufficiency in this area by one or two quarters.

5. Tactical Sensors: the 2d Regt, 1st ARVN Div had been active in DUEL BLADE/DUFFEL BAG operations since December 1968. The Combined Instruction Team (US/RVNAF) completed initial training for selected personnel from 2d ARVN Div on 9 Aug 69 and these elements were currently undergoing OJT with US units in I CTZ. Selected personnel from 1st ARVN Div had completed training on 23 Aug. Training for III and IV CTZ was to follow in order. Progress to date had been satisfactory.

6. In addition to the foregoing, accelerated actions were being taken to reduce US presence in the combined centers and intelligence field advisory elements. Specifically, a review was being made of the role of the intelligence advisor and US combined center personnel with the objective of further limiting US activities and presence and preclude US active participation in the day to day support of operations. Achievement of this goal would substantially accelerate ARVN self-sufficiency throughout the intelligence system.

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(TS) With regard to improving RVNAF utilization of existing resources, MACV stated that the proposals which were under study were not sufficiently developed to provide detailed information at that time. However, it was clear that neither individually nor in the aggregate could the effect of proposals under study provide RVNAF with a capability to cope with the combined VC/NVA threat. All studies underway concerned, for the most part, qualitative improvement. Quantitative improvement of RVNAF to the extent necessary to enable the Vietnamese to deal with the current VC/NVA threat would require quantum expansion of the force by orders of magnitude not considered feasible in view of the limited manpower base, with its shortage of leadership and technical skills.

(TS) With regard to actions being taken to improve territorial forces, MACV stated that beginning in 3d Qtr, FY70, a quarterly joint MACV/JGS evaluation of the readiness posture of RVNAF and progress of the pacification campaign would be in full swing. Based on these joint evaluations, force requirements, and priorities for FY71 RVNAF force structure changes would be drawn up. Redeployment of US combat forces could have a significant impact on territorial force requirements in FY71 and FY72. Specific requirements and programs were to stem from the joint evaluations; however, like other elements in RVNAF, the territorial forces were competing for limited manpower. It was anticipated that the overall effectiveness of RF/PF would continue to improve by the continuation or institution of the following:

1. Deployment:

- a. Advising and assisting RVNAF in the deployment of RF and PF, and advising and assisting in the activation of 23 RF companies and 1,000 PF platoons during FY70.
- b. Continuing to review RVNAF-proposed RF and PF force structure changes aimed at increasing their combat effectiveness.
- c. Maintaining the US advisory effort on the GVN Central Pacification and Development Council.

2. Operations:

- a. Continuing to evaluate operations using TFES; advising and making recommendations to JGS.
- b. Continuing the combined JGS/MACV inspection visits to RF and PF units.
- c. Assisting RVNAF and GVN ministers in planning for the use of PSDF and National Police in secure areas to enable the RF/PF to be employed in other areas.

3. Training:

- a. Activating and utilizing 145 more MATS during 1970.
- b. Keeping RVNAF adherence to the 6 hours per week in-place training for RF/PF.
- c. Assisting in scheduling RF and PF unit refresher training at training centers.

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4. Equipment:

a. Issuing AN/PRC 25 radios as they became available. Completion date for this program would be June 1970.

b. Continuing to upgrade the weaponry. All RF and PF units in the FY69 force structure increase were scheduled for replacement of the older family of weapons with M16 rifles, M60 machine guns, and M79 grenade launchers as appropriate by October 1969. (See status in section on Equipment Deliveries.)

5. In addition, it was stressed that all measures taken to improve the operational effectiveness of RVNAF were applicable to RF and PF, as these forces were an integral part of RVNAF.

(TS) With reference to expanding the use of women in RVNAF, MACV's position was that it was possible that RVNAF could utilize as many as an additional 15,000 to 20,000 women in clerical and administrative roles. For this to be a feasible course of action, however, the following problems would have to be resolved:

1. Inherent nonacceptance of females in the military role by both male and female segments of the South Vietnamese populace. This was the primary obstacle in Vietnamese society. RVNAF had never recruited its current quota of females, i. e., 3,512 assigned vs over 9,500 authorized.
2. Competition for the female labor force by civilian agencies.
3. Requirement for considerable expansion of RVNAF training facilities for females.
4. Question as to the ability of RVNAF recruiting to meet the requirements.

(TS) As for expanding the draft, it was stated that the MACV manpower estimates were based on those of the GVN Mobilization Directorate. The MACV manpower estimate concluded that an additional 12,000 persons were all that might be realized in 1969, and 10,000 in 1970, if the 40-43 year groups were to be mobilized. Until the qualitative deficiencies were overcome, it was not felt that these modest strength augmentations could significantly improve RVNAF effectiveness. In addition, the resulting degradation in the civilian economy might more than offset compensating gains to the military.

Summary of RVNAF Effectiveness

(S) In order to provide a quantified objective evaluation of RVNAF unit effectiveness in the performance of the mission assigned, and to identify problem areas which reduced RVNAF combat and pacification, the System for Evaluating the Effectiveness of RVNAF (SEER) had been instituted on 1 Jan 68. However, in view of the inherent differences in ground, sea, and air forces and the differences in the mission, organization, employment, and equipment of the regular and territorial ground forces, direct comparison of levels of performance or of statistical indicators was not meaningful. A fair appraisal of any unit required that its scores and statistics be compared directly only with other units in a roughly comparable combat environment. Its effectiveness rating had to be considered in the light of its level of effort, type of

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mission, the combat support received, and the results achieved. This evaluation could then be correlated with such factors as leadership, personnel (including morale), and logistics.

(S) With these qualifying statements in mind, the following represented a progress synopsis by quarter toward the goal of enhancing the effectiveness of the RVNAF based solely on operational reports.

(S) During the first quarter: 128

1. Regular ground forces of RVNAF results measured in terms of enemy KIA per battalion and weapons captured per battalion increased, and KIA ratios and weapons captured to lost ratio generally improved or remained at high levels which was indicative of improved leadership.

2. The RVNAF desertion rate declined reflecting the emphasis given to the program to reduce this rate to a manageable level. (See the Desertion Section of this Chapter for figures.)

3. Due to issuance of the M16 rifle and M2 carbines, March TFES reports for the RF/PF indicated that 84 percent of the RF units and 79 percent of the PF units had attained a status where these units possessed firepower equal to or better than nearby VC units.

4. The VNN continued to improve its operational capability, and the turnover of in-country US naval assets to the VNN began in February. (See "VNN" in the I&M Section of this Chapter for details.)

5. The modernization and operational improvement of the VNAF also progressed and the first of three VNAF squadrons completed conversion of the A-37B. (See "VNAF" under the I&M Section of this Chapter.)

(S) During the second quarter: 129

1. RVNAF ground forces results measured in terms of enemy KIA per battalion and weapons captured per battalion decreased, and weapons captured to lost ratios also declined, while KIA ratios remained at approximately the same level.

2. The VNN continued to improve its operational capability, and the turnover of in-country US naval assets to VNN continued.

3. The modernization and operational improvement of the VNAF also progressed, and conversion to the UH-1 helicopter commenced during the quarter.

4. The expansion of RVNAF continued at the maximum practical rate (see Mobilization Section of this Chapter); however, this expansion had the anticipated effect of temporarily degrading the effectiveness of the RVNAF regular ground forces. As the overall strengths of the RVNAF increased, many combat units lost strength, and the effectiveness of those units was constrained by the lack of experienced junior officers, a high desertion rate, and the lack of adequate training time.

(C) ARVN/VNMC units showed slow but noticeable improvements during the first quarter of 1969. There were signs of increased confidence in their ability to defeat the enemy. The trend

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toward more combat operations and fewer security missions continued. There was improvement in training, in the planning and conduct of large unit operations, and in the conduct of independent battalion operations. The issue of modern equipment continued to enhance performance. ARVN artillery provided rapid and accurate fire support. Still, there were some perennial weaknesses which degraded the effectiveness of most units to some degree. A few of the problems which proved least amenable to rapid solution were as follows: 130

1. Leadership: the reluctance of senior commanders to delegate and their willingness to tolerate poor performance; lack of supervision by the chain of command in the execution of orders.

2. Grade imbalances and slow promotion: many battalion commanders were captains and most company commanders were lieutenants.

3. Lack of school-trained officers and technicians: skill levels in many units were substandard.

4. Desertion: great improvement was attained by some units, but in others it was still a very serious problem. Desertions caused a critical drain on manpower by requiring extra trainees to replace deserters, thus requiring a disproportionate share of qualified NCOs and officers to remain with the training base rather than go to tactical units.

5. Failure to exploit supporting fires: more prompt follow-up by ground troops was needed.

6. Lack of thoroughness in planning and coordination: more planning was needed in the integration of military operations with pacification.

7. Poor exploitation of tactical intelligence: failure to react rapidly and to pursue aggressively was still a frequent comment by advisors.

(S) During the third quarter:

1. RVNAF ground forces results measured in terms of enemy KIA was lower than for the previous quarter. Although country-wide enemy KIA decreased, there was an increase in IV CTZ. Friendly losses were lower and the number of enemy weapons captured declined, both in line with fewer enemy contacts.

2. The role of the Vietnamese Navy was becoming more important in the war since naval blockades of infiltration routes were hindering the enemy's movement more than ever. Combat effectiveness continued to improve with additional turnover of new craft, increasing size of the forces and improvement through training of VNN personnel. Although modernization of the VNN was on schedule, problems persisted in the form of officer shortages, lack of a responsive promotion system, inadequate standard of living, and a lack of skilled shipyard workers. Partial solutions had been found to those problems and progress was being made in all areas.

3. There were considerable gains in VNAF effectiveness and the modernization and improvement program. The VNAF goals for conversion of aircraft units had been completed. A much-improved operational capability was realized with an 8 percent increase of assigned

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New Horizons Programs

(C) The New Horizons Campaign was a program, first initiated in 1967, to improve the administration, logistics, command/leadership techniques, and political warfare (POLWAR) activities in the RVNAF. It was first implemented in the 46th Inf Regt, 25th ARVN Div, which was selected for this preplanned POLWAR and administrative improvement program because it had demonstrated a poor performance record and a high desertion rate. In effect, it was one of the worst regiments in the RVNAF at that time. A national General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) team visited the regimental area, gave classes and guidance, trained small unit leaders in leadership and POLWAR techniques, helped set up or improve the regiment's administrative and logistic machinery, and helped establish unit SOPs. The campaign was moderately successful with the 46th Inf Regt and the JGS decided to implement an improved program in 1969 on a larger scale. This program was to be the main effort in 1969 to improve the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF. 134

(C) On 6 Jan, the CJGS directed that the JGS choose one main force regiment and two RF companies in each CTZ and one PF platoon in each sector to be pilot units in the rejuvenated program. These units were to be the most inadequate in operation, logistics, equipment, training, leadership and command, and POLWAR, and they were to have the highest desertion rate in the CTZ - in other words, they were to be the worst units in the CTZ/Sector. Immediately after the selection of the pilot units, the CTZs and Sectors were to detail POLWAR officers from division level and lower to make an on-the-spot study of the pilot unit status at the time of selection. This would be a base from which to measure the effectiveness of the program. These on-the-spot studies were to include such areas of information as unit strength, desertion statistics, status of military dependents and the local populace, amount of entertainment available (books, films, sports activities, etc.), enemy activities in the area, status of morale, command attitudes, logistics, and soldiers' rights.

(C) As a result of these reports and inquiries conducted by the Central Desertion Prevention Board, JGS noted that most RVNAF units had the following shortcomings: 135

1. In the area of leadership and command, there was a lack of close cooperation between the soldiers and the commanding officers, the esprit de corps was not improving, the commanding officers' ethical conduct and work procedures still had many defects, leadership in low level units was poor, and unit activities were weak.

2. In the area of POLWAR, the troops' negative attitude was not being corrected; education on politics, military conduct, and discipline were not given regularly or properly; unit areas had inadequate recreational facilities, educational and social welfare facilities were inadequate to meet requirements; low-level units lacked trained POLWAR cadre; and social welfare and religious activities were not being properly carried out.

3. In the area of administration and training, military records and civil status files were not kept up to date, replacements were not on time, awards and punishments were not just, adequate leave time was not provided for the troops, and the refresher training and rotation of duty were not carried out often enough.

4. In the area of logistics, quarters requirements and public utilities problems were not being satisfactorily solved, medical care for servicemen and dependents was inadequate, the

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organization of mess service was inadequate and the rations were not sufficient, PX rations were inadequate and sporadic, clothing and equipment issue were not corresponding to TOE, and periodic replacement of these items was not being made on a timely basis.

(C) These shortcomings naturally led to discontent, loss of confidence, and non-observance of discipline in the ranks, and a general breakdown of morale. Commanding officers became discouraged, and there was too much negligence of duty and loss of discipline. The end consequence of all this was a sapping of combat effectiveness in the RVNAF and an alarming desertion rate. These shortcomings and subsequent consequences were the targets of the New Horizons Campaign whose objectives were to:

1. Improve and make the units effective in all fields.
2. Lead the troops in the unit toward discipline, unity, confidence, and eagerness for military life.
3. Effectively support the Pacification and RD programs.
4. Prove POLWAR could be effective when closely combined with the activities inside as well as outside of the units.
5. Provide a basis for ideological motivation within the framework of the "RVNAF Effectiveness Developing Program."

(C) The pilot program was developed and divided into three phases:

1. Preparation Phase (1 May to 30 Jun 69) during which New Horizon committees would be formed which would study and fully understand the plan, increase support and issue equipment for pilot units in accordance with the estimated requirements, and use practical solutions to solve valid grievances of the troops so as to raise their morale.
2. Implementation Phase (1 Jul to 31 Oct 69) during which the committees would carry out corrective actions for shortcomings found in the first phase; implement the programs devised for all fields of activity in all pilot units; and organize teams, at Central and CTZ level, to visit pilot units frequently.
3. Continuation Phase (1 Nov to 31 Dec 69) during which the efforts of the first phases would be maintained, the program would be carried out in accordance with the prescribed standards, observation tours for teams from other RVNAF units would be organized, and development of plans to carry the program into other units would be initiated.

(C) New Horizon Committees were established at all levels of command from the JCS down to Division (for ARVN) and Sector (for RF/PF) level. Commanders or their deputies at the various levels were designated to be the New Horizon Committee chairmen to insure that the program received top-level emphasis. Also included on the various committees were the Chiefs of the POLWAR, Logistics, and J/G 1, 3, and 5 staff officers at the different headquarters. These committees, composed entirely of RVNAF personnel, were to administer this RVNAF program to the best of their ability and to make the RVNAF system function as it properly should.

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(C) The New Horizons campaign was directed primarily at two areas -- logistics and POL-WAR. It was the thinking of the planners that these two areas were inseparable and helped one another to make common progress. By concentrating principally on these two areas, it was felt that the lot of the RVNAF soldier could be enhanced and upgraded with the end result being a more effective fighting force.

(C) The first of these areas -- logistic -- brought the Central Logistics Command (CLC) into the fore as one of the prime agencies responsible for the success of the program. The CLC activated special logistics committees whose job it would be to inspect the pilot units and perform immediate and practical corrections for minor shortcomings in order to immediately promote confidence in the pilot unit. Inspections were to include status and training of assigned logistic personnel, unit records, status of soldiers' individual equipment, and status of facilities such as mess hall, kitchen, billets, preventive medicine, medical evacuation, recreation, and dependent housing areas.

(C) The execution or problem-solving of the New Horizons campaign for the logistic area was divided into three segments -- immediate, three months, and six months. The immediate portion was to be accomplished concurrently with the inspection. Included in this were:

1. Additional issue and replacement of military clothing.
2. Distribution of kitchen tools and food for the messes.
3. Haircuts.
4. Medical care.
5. Materials for maintenance of the compounds with priority to dependent housing.
6. PX commissary rations.

(C) The three-month plan called for the following measures:

1. Reorganize the procedures for requesting military clothing (military clothing record, requesting cycle, change of one against one, special issue).
2. Reorganize the mess.
3. Reorganize the medical system (sick call, distribution of medicines, evacuation, preventive medicine).
4. Insure strict execution of the first echelon preventive maintenance of military equipment.
5. Rehabilitate the dependent housing area; initiate the movement of items procured for sale.
6. Assist the collective recreation program.
7. Continue inspections.

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(C) The six-month plan called for the following optional measures:

1. Follow up on the replenishment of logistic reserve.
2. Establish a plan for the training of specialists (basic-advanced).
3. Follow up the use of specialists.
4. Review, implement the above three month program again.
5. Improve the capability of 2d echelon preventive maintenance of military equipment.
6. Improve the medical facilities (dispensary).
7. Execute the activity of production in Dependent Housing Areas (a vegetable garden or a coop of three chickens or a sewing-machine for each family).
8. Implement the rehabilitation of available dependent apartments (partitions, water, latrines).
9. Construct a dispensary or a class-room (three classes) or a kindergarten.
10. Continue inspections.

(C) The second area of prime concern was POLWAR, and specific guidelines were drawn up and issued to the committees to follow in executing their portion of the plan. These specific guidelines were broken down into four major categories:

1. Improvement of the Organization:
 - a. Assure that POLWAR cadres are at 100 percent strength in each pilot regiment.
 - b. Provide 60 percent of the equipment required by the POLWAR organization.
 - c. Issue POLWAR MOSs to all cadres.
 - d. Give advanced training in the form of seminars for all Regiment/POLWAR sections and for the POLWAR cadres at battalion level.
 - e. Give basic training for all Deputy Company Commanders/POLWAR Officers.
 - f. Give priority for specialized training of POLWAR cadres (NCO-enlisted men) of the regiment.
 - g. Make use of POLWAR soldiers in the POLWAR Committees in the companies of the regiment.

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2. Troop Affairs Activities:

- a. "Order of the day activity": daily.
- b. Political education activity: weekly.
- c. Off-duty morale-building activity: semimonthly.
- d. Set up a club and library for each regiment.
- e. Issue one mobile library to each battalion.
- f. Issue one set of musical instruments (guitar, mandolins, and harmonica) to each company.
- g. Issue one "Republican Fighter" magazine for every three soldiers and one "Vanguard" magazine for every two officers.
- h. Issue two short play scripts and two books of songs each year to each regiment.
- i. Provide cultural performances or movies once a month.
- j. Issue PSYWAR and unit activity funds on time.
- k. Improve the sports activities down to company level.
- l. Establish one soccer ground and one volley-ball court for each regiment and one volley-ball court for each battalion.
- m. Organize contests twice a year at battalion level and above.
- n. Organize physical training for 30 minutes every day according to the local situation with the participation of 75 percent of the personnel.
- o. Organize Taekwan-Do (karate) courses for each regiment. The participating strength should be at least 10 percent.
- p. Contest operation: Select one exemplary soldier at battalion level each quarter and publicize the reasons for his selection.
- q. Religious activity: organize mass sessions or periodic preaching under the appropriate chaplain with the participation of 30 percent of the soldiers, not including the followers.
- r. Assign adequate chaplains to each regiment.
- s. Assure Social Service Sections of the regiment are at full strength.
- t. Set up one more elementary school and one kindergarten in each regiment.

All with the participation of 80 percent of the strength.

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u. Assign an adequate number of teachers to the regiment's educational facilities in accordance with the estimated requirements.

v. Organize a tailoring course and an animal husbandry program on the basis of 10 sewing-machines for each course and 10 families, in charge of breeding animals, for each Dependent Housing Area.

w. All wounded and sick soldiers must be consoled (visit by the unit commander once a month).

x. Utilize the regiment's Military Security organization to the fullest extent.

y. Organize an indoctrination program to teach preventive measures against enemy troops proselyting activity for all soldiers.

z. Review the security status of all personnel in confidential positions and for new draftees.

aa. Complete 80 percent of the individual and unit records; improve 80 percent of Z records (records of suspect personnel -- suspect because of VC family connections, etc.).

bb. Set up a plan to check and separate the suspect elements in the unit.

cc. Give support to all military operations and territorial security operations.

3. Civil Affairs Activities:

a. Show movies and perform cultural shows for the people in the area of operations once a month.

b. The commanders of the units stationed in districts or villages should visit or talk with local authorities and influential citizens at least twice a month.

c. Participate as much as possible in the local activities (parties, condolences, congratulations, festivals, etc.).

d. Fifty percent of the unit strength should participate in and guide the activities of religious and traditional ceremonies (Buddha's Birthday, Christmas, Mid-Autumn).

e. Motivate 80 percent of the populace to participate in the National Day Ceremony and the Commemoration of the Hung Emperor. Organize cultural performances, movies, and loudspeaker broadcasts to explain the meaning of the anniversary.

f. The unit should motivate 80 percent of the populace to participate in the PSDF.

g. POLWAR training should be given to 50 percent of the PSDF members.

h. Coordinate and support 80 percent of the Census and Grievance Committee activities in the assigned area.

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i. Achieve 80 percent of the community and social development program goals (repair of roads, organization of classes, construction of medical stations, sick call, and distribution of medicines and gifts).

4. Enemy-oriented Activity:

- a. Motivate soldiers and civilians to establish contact with Communist soldiers and call them to rally through family relationships.
- b. Motivate soldiers and civilians to drop leaflets, post slogans, hang banners, and distribute documents during combat operations to call the enemy to rally.
- c. Welcome, award, exploit, classify, and employ ralliers.
- d. Establish a 50 ralliers a month goal in the regiment area of operation.

(C) The POLWAR guidelines set down for implementation in RF units were similar to those established for Regular Force units except for the areas of religious activity, schools, tailoring and animal husbandry programs, and a monthly rallier goal. This goal for the RF was 20 ralliers in the company area per month.

(C) The program set down for the PF was more abbreviated than for the Regular or Regional Forces and included only basic training for POLWAR officers and soldiers; the same type of recurring activity as established for Regular and Regional Forces; magazines, monthly cultural shows or movies, a volleyball court, and animal husbandry program; basically the same type of civic affairs activity as set down for the other forces; and a goal of two ralliers per month in the platoon area.

(C) By the beginning of April, the pilot units were selected-by virtue of their being the worst units in their respective CTZs. The main force units selected were: I CTZ -- 4th Regt, 2d ARVN Div; II CTZ -- 44th Regt, 23d ARVN Div; III CTZ -- 48th Regt, 18th ARVN Div; and IV CTZ -- 15th Regt, 9th ARVN Div.

(U) By November, the New Horizons Campaign, as applied to the selected pilot units, was in the evaluation phase with results expected to be published by February 1970. ¹³⁶

(C) By the end of the year however, due to slippage in the program, it was decided to terminate the Campaign for the above group of pilot units on 30 Jan 70, with the evaluation phase to be conducted at a subsequent date. Also, the campaign was extended indefinitely to afford more pilot units to undergo "New Horizons" training. ¹³⁷

VIETNAMIZATION

(U) The term "Vietnamization" came into the vocabulary in 1969. This term was first alluded to in a memo by the DEPSECDEF, when, in April, he gave final approval of the Accelerated Phase II RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan. In the approval memo, he stated,

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among other things "Vietnamizing the war should have the highest priority". It was not until President Nixon's statement on Vietnam in November, however, that Vietnamization brought world-wide focus and a requirement for more precise definition. President Nixon used it as identifying a "plan developed with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal, first of all U. S. combat ground forces and eventually of other forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable." In December, COMUSMACV, in a letter to all subordinate commands, spelled out the approved definition of the term as follows: 138

Vietnamization is the process by which the US assists the Government of Vietnam to assume increasing responsibility for all aspects of the war and all functions inherent in self-government.

It means building a stronger government with an improved economy; and strengthening the military and internal security forces sufficient to permit the US to reduce its military and civilian presence in Vietnam without unacceptable risks to the objectives of the United States and to the security of Free World and GVN Forces.

The MACV letter, also provided the DOD statement concerning use of the term Vietnamization:

Vietnamization, of course, refers only to the assumption by the Vietnamese of that portion of the war effort carried on previously by the United States. It does not refer to the total war effort in which the South Vietnamese themselves have carried such a large and heavy burden for so many years.

(S) The USAF expressed the essence of Vietnamization as applied to the VNAF as follows: 139

Vietnamization is not just another project or a special approach to an old problem. It is an entirely new concept for both the USAF and South Vietnamese. It represents a radical departure from previous USAF strategy in that it proposes to transfer combat and support responsibilities to the Vietnamese Air Force at the earliest practical time. It includes the earliest preparations and transfer of facilities and equipment to the VNAF, and all technical assistance necessary to enable them to effectively employ their newly acquired weapons system... Vietnamization is the maintenance of a USAF presence only so long, and in such numbers, that the basic security of the country is assured. It is a decision not to decide--but to allow our allies to take the initiative. It is determining when the assumption of a function by the VNAF relieves the need for continuance of USAF participation in that function...

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In citing the task ahead, USAF stated:

The timetable suitable for Vietnamization is not necessarily one of our own choosing, nor one subscribed to by the Government of Vietnam. Rather, it is a process predicated on the ability of all USAF and VNAF commanders and planners to manage, innovate as required, and assist in the training and equippage of the VNAF so they are capable of assuming total control in minimum time.... By fostering VNAF leadership now, at both the headquarters and the grass roots level, boldly utilizing "cut and try" techniques, and providing a qualified ounce of advice rather than the usual American pound of doing, VNAF self-sufficiency and USAF disengagement will most certainly become realities in the time frame we are seeking.

Examples of Vietnamization progress follows.

Vietnamization Status of ARVN Operations

(S) The following were examples of ARVN Vietnamization during 1969: 140

1. Vietnamization of the Capital Military District was essentially complete. All US troops had been withdrawn except for a small number of radar and generator operators, and these personnel would be replaced as soon as RVNAF personnel had completed training. Special efforts were being directed toward ensuring that RVNAF units assumed complete responsibility for contingency plans for reaction and reinforcement of critical installations and bridges.

2. In I CTZ, more and more of the ARVN units were becoming less dependent on US support in tactical operations. ARVN operations, by the end of the year, included the ability to form and operate multi-battalion task forces to execute their own plans. Rather than working with US units exclusively, the ARVN had developed separate plans and executed them with ARVN artillery and VNAF air support. Combined planning was being reoriented to assume responsibility for military facilities as US forces were redeployed from Dong Son II and FSBs. Also in I CTZ, the 1st and 2d ARVN Divs and the 51st ARVN Regt had implanted their own sensor strings and were reading out and reacting on a real time basis. ARVN engineers were assuming increasing responsibility for mine sweeping, bridge repair, and combined land clearing operations, and would assume responsibility for LOC maintenance in the near future. All railroad bridges were secured by RVNAF units and of the 92 bridges on primary and secondary roads, 72 were being secured by RVNAF/GVN personnel and the remainder were under combined US/RVNAF security. USASF advisors had withdrawn from Gia Vuc CIDG Camp, which allowed the VN Special Forces to assume all operational and administrative responsibilities.

3. In II CTZ, RVNAF had assumed responsibility for most of Kontum Province. Major battles, such as those of Ben Het (Kontum Province) and at Bu Prang and Duc Lap (Quang Duc Province) were fought by ARVN ground maneuver forces, supported by US combat support and combat service support units, as required. US ground maneuver forces were being used to

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assume security missions of designated ARVN battalions, which freed those battalions for deployment in the battle areas. The ARVN 18th Engr Bde had initiated a program to develop an ARVN horizontal construction capability (quarry, road and airfield construction, and paving operations).

4. In IV CTZ, ARVN engineers were assuming a larger share of airfield maintenance and were building major highway bridges; the 40th Engr Gp had taken over a quarry operation in Nui Sam; ARVN personnel were being trained to operate 14 active helicopter stage fields, but assisted only in the handling of cargo at mini-ports and ammunition at stage fields. At Dong Tam stage field, ARVN personnel were conducting the entire operation, except for hauling the cargo in and out.

5. Intelligence functions and operations had been strengthened in several areas; the ARVN IV CTZ Interrogation Center (combined POW and Hoi Chanh facility) which began operations in April, was fully operational by the end of the year; Combined HUMINT operations with ARVN intelligence collection agencies were operating in IV CTZ; the G2 effort at IV Corps Hqs and DIV/STZ was being accomplished by ARVN with US advice and support; in I CTZ, ARVN G2 controlled all intelligence activities and coordinated directly with the US/FWMA forces in the Corps area; all administrative and operational functions, requirements and records had been transferred from the I Corps G2 Advisor to the ARVN I Corps G2. Also in I CTZ added US counterintelligence support was being provided to each PIOCC and DIOCC in high threat areas to increase the flow of intelligence and to train counterparts in more sophisticated intelligence techniques.

6. Numerous training programs, both formal and OJT were being conducted by US counterpart units for RVNAF personnel on such diverse matters as leadership, combat loud-speaker operations, medical corpsman procedures, mechanical maintenance, stock control and storage, operations, scout sniper, and artillery firing procedures.

7. Transportation responsibilities were being assumed by RVNAF particularly in carrying out port clearance and long haul responsibilities. With the activation of medium boat companies and receipt of additional LCM-8s, RVNAF had increased its water transport capability. Port operations at Saigon had been turned over to RVNAF, and plans were progressing for turnover of port operations at Tra Noc port in Binh Thuy/Can Tho in IV Corps, and at Vung Tau.

8. Psychological operations and political warfare matters were being emphasized by RVNAF in several ways:

a. The General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) had formed a national level combined PSYWAR Development and Coordination Center, to provide overall direction of the PSYWAR effort, develop media, and to assume operational functions.

b. The production of PSYOP material was increasingly being assumed by the Vietnamese. Contingency plans had been prepared to turn over the 4th PSYOP Group printing and development assets to RVNAF. At battalion level, the leading role in media development, through Propaganda Development Teams, was being assumed by Vietnamese.

c. The Vietnamese had assumed increasing responsibility for planning and directing large scale PSYOP campaigns. GPWD conducted the Nguyen Trai I and II campaigns which were intensive and highly successful in increasing VC defection rates.

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d. In III CTZ, DCS POLWAR and 30th POLWAR Bn had assumed an expanded role in planning and coordinating combined PSYOP. Overall responsibility for operation of the combined headquarters, execution of combined plans, and exploitation of ralliers had been assigned to 5th ARVN Div.

e. A new Political Mobilization Committee had been established at the national level, with provincial counterparts, to coordinate and provide policy direction to the entire information effort of the GVN.

9. A single integrated telecommunications systems to serve the needs of GVN civil and military authorities was receiving high priority. A training plan had been developed and initial language training begun which would enable RVNAF to gradually assume management, operation, and maintenance of the telecommunications system. ARVN personnel were in an OJT status at several ICS-SEA sites and others were in classroom training prior to OJT. Training was oriented toward development of skills necessary for operation and maintenance of the ICS-SEA and associated dial-telephone exchanges and tandem switches. Off-shore training for ARVN personnel in hard skill communications-electronics MOS was underway and was programmed to continue through FY70.

10. ARVN doctors and nurses were receiving OJT in US Army hospitals, and ARVN personnel were being trained in air-ambulance techniques. ARVN medical units were assuming care of PW casualties as US Army medical units redeployed.

Vietnamization Status of Air Operations 141

(S) The following are examples of Vietnamization accomplished or being accomplished at the end of the year:

1. An Air Logistical Command had been formed in VNAF to operate the country wide logistic system and the VNAF supply system had been converted to interface with the USAF supply system.

2. VNAF personnel were being trained to take over complete operations of two bilateral HUMINT programs (POW interrogation and covert collection) by end of FY70. In addition, VNAF personnel were being trained at the TACC and DASCs to assume the intelligence support functions at those facilities.

3. Control and Reporting Posts and Centers and navigational aids were jointly VNAF/USAF manned and operation of those facilities would be turned over to VNAF personnel as soon as they had become fully qualified.

4. In IV CTZ, the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) was operated primarily by VNAF personnel with USAF assistance only. VNAF had assumed responsibility for the 7th and 9th ARVN DTA where VNAF Forward Air Controllers (FAC) had been controlling USAF and RAAF tactical air strikes on a regular fraged basis since 1 Apr. There were 37 VNAF FAC (21 pilots and 16 observers) operating in IV CTZ, qualified to control USAF/RAAF air strikes. Because of this significant progress, early activation of the 122d Ln Sqdn at Binh Thuy would be recommended.

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5. VNAF was participating more in the combined USAF/VNAF PSYWAR sorties (approximately a 34 percent increase of participation).
6. The VNAF Air Training Center was being expanded to add 17 new courses to begin in March 1970. To meet the VNAF increased requirement for liaison pilots, Air Training Command (ATC) expanded the Liaison Pilot Training course to graduate 72 O1/U-17 pilots.
7. USAF was training VNAF personnel to attain self-sufficiency in fire fighting, base defense, base operations, aerial port operations, communications-electronics, construction supervision, and other critical support areas.
8. Of the combined USAF/VNAF transport operation in support of RVNAF, VNAF moved twice as much cargo and people than during 1968.
9. VNAF participation in in-country strike sorties rose significantly (33 percent of the Combined USAF/VNAF sorties as compared to 19 percent in January).

Vietnamization Status of VNN Operations

(S) The Vietnamization process in naval operations was progressing exceedingly well and to the degree that the following forecasts were made: ¹⁴²

1. By continued gradual shift of emphasis from unilateral USN operations to unilateral VNN operations, turnover of nearly all barrier/interdiction operations and associated areas of responsibility and command and control functions would be accomplished by end of FY70. Already there was an increasing expansion of VNN communications-electronics capabilities to support the enlarging VNN combat operations role.
2. Logistic versatility would be attained through the establishment of strategically-located depot level maintenance bases, repair facilities, and operating bases, and by using support ships as mobile bases to counter the shifts in the enemy's areas of operations. Turnover of logistic assets to VNN (ACTOVLOG) by end FY72 would result in the transfer of 30 shore bases, eight advanced tactical support bases, and six afloat support ships. This would provide VNN with the logistic self-sufficiency to support their expanded forces.
3. Continued effort in turnover of combat assets to VNN (ACTOV) would result in the transfer of 520 boats and craft to VNN by end of FY70.

Trends of RVNAF Reaction to US Troop Reductions

(S) RVNAF reactions to announced withdrawal of US combat ground and other forces, based on opinions of both officers and enlisted RVNAF personnel were generally guarded and expressed specific concern. There was guarded optimism and confidence in overall RVNAF ability to assume a greater combat role. There was deep concern at all levels of RVNAF, from generals to NCOs, that the US would withdraw precipitously and without regard to the military situation or the ability of ARVN to fill the gap. There was fear that a precipitous withdrawal

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would result in a military defeat, a Communist take over, and a blood bath purge similar to Hue. There was concern that artillery, tactical air, helicopter and logistic support would be withdrawn; the VNAF expressed concern about their lack of equipment and training to assume the air defense role, in view of the NVA superiority in aircraft. ¹⁴³

RVNAF PHASE III I&M and US Related Planning

(TS) On 10 Nov the Secretary of Defense directed planning for RVNAF Phase III development. The JCS tasked CINCPAC for input to the Vietnamization Plan, a plan to create a self-sustained RVNAF capable of countering the present VC/NVA threat, with the US/Free World commitment phase down to a support force by 1 Jul 71, and then, by continuing steps to the level of an advisory force (MAAG) by 1 Jul 1973. ¹⁴⁴ COMUSMACV was tasked with major inputs to the plan. Statement of problem, assumptions, analysis, discussion, and data requirements for the plan were as follows: ¹⁴⁵

1. Problem. To provide a Phase III Plan for development of RVNAF which will raise RVNAF effectiveness to the point where the GVN can maintain at least current levels of security while US forces are phased down to a support force (by 1 Jul 71 and to the level of an advisory force by 1 Jul 73).

2. Assumptions.

- a. The VC/NVA Army threat will continue at its current level through 1 Jul 73.
- b. The US objective and missions in the RVN will continue as currently stated through 1 Jul 73.
- c. US support force strength will decline, alternatively:
 - (1) to 260,000 by Jul 71 and an advisory level by 1 Jul 73; or
 - (2) to 190,000 by Jul 71 and an advisory level by 1 Jul 73.
- d. Third-country forces will decline to two division force equivalents (DFES) by 1 Jul 71 and remain at that level through 1 Jul 73.
- e. Resources and funds required to support the plan will be made available to the DOD for all in-country and out-of-country requirements, and resources and funds required by other than DOD agencies to support their programs will be available.
- f. No major change in US effort will occur in Laos; any restructuring of US forces in Thailand to support the effort in RVN will be accomplished within the current authorized strength in Thailand.
- g. There will be no significant decrease in the level of support of an elected government by the population of RVN; there have been no major political upheavals.

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3. Current Situation. State in terms of enemy and friendly situation the strength, composition, disposition, and significant trends. Provide a summary of factual data and best estimates establishing the limits of GVN ability to develop and support an effective defense against the current threat, to include but not limited to, demographic and economic factors.

4. Discussion.

a. Optimum use of GVN resources to consider:

(1) best allocation of GVN resources, in view of the assumptions and situations, leading to a postulated allocation of manpower to military and paramilitary forces by fiscal year.

(2) the most effective allocation of the military/paramilitary strength, to support a table of authorized strengths by FY for RVNAF services and GVN paramilitary organizations.

b. Maximum development possible for RVNAF, to consider:

(1) means of developing the maximum RVNAF capability and effectiveness in the shortest time possible.

(2) estimated requirements for basic, advanced, and technical training, based on abbreviated UALS and activation schedules.

(3) means of reducing requirements and expediting required training and identification areas in which increased US effort might assist in training.

(4) estimate the cost, by service, of the total RVNAF program, including expansion, operation, training, and support by FY year, with expanded detail provided in the areas of intelligence, communications, training and logistics functions, morale, leadership, air support for VNN, psychological operations, specifically designed equipment and system, and estimated US costs for RVNAF Phase III for FY71, 72, and 73 DOD budgets.

c. Comparative analysis of enemy vs GVN/Free World capabilities, to:

(1) compare the enemy threat to the maximum achievable capability of GVN/Free World Forces, by fiscal year.

(2) identify shortfalls by fiscal year in terms of units or effort.

d. US effort required to offset shortfalls, to:

(1) describe the US effort required by FY to offset shortfalls in GVN/Free World Forces, in terms of units in-country and effort from out-of-country and offshore.

(2) identify the strengths and locations of US out-of-country/offshore forces which are regarded as essential preconditions for attainment of the objectives in-country, in compensating for any unavoidable RVNAF shortfalls in air and naval support.

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(3) identify missions that should pass to RVNAF, missions for which US forces must be retained as critical and cannot be transferred within the alternative times stipulated, and those which should cease as US forces depart.

(4) provide total force structure breakout, by service, for both the alternative in-country forces (260,000 and 190,000).

e. Optimum total force, to:

(1) describe, by alternative, the optimum total in-country forces by fiscal year required to accomplish conclusions in C and D above.

(2) include tables showing major GVN, Free World, and US units or elements in-country by fiscal year; GVN, Free World, and US total strengths by fiscal year; and estimated total cost, by service, by fiscal year.

f. Statement of risk, to analyze:

(1) risks which would be incurred if GVN/Free World shortfalls are not offset.

(2) the nature and extent of risks, by alternative.

(3) whether risks can be limited or localized, vary as a function of time, whether results of various risks are precipitous or delayed.

(TS) MACV's response was developed and forwarded to CINCPAC on 29 Dec. This history will not attempt to repeat the content of the input, in that the two volume document should be used directly in any future planning and assessments. However, for the purpose of this history, it was considered appropriate to cite the conclusions submitted to CINCPAC, in response to the JCS requirement to establish a plan for development of RVNAF, under the assumptions provided. Conclusions were as follows: ¹⁴⁶

1. The proposed GVN military/paramilitary force (See Tables VI-13 & 13A) was considered to be the optimum in view of constraints imposed by the competing requirements of other GVN programs and by the sustainment capability of the total available manpower pool.

2. The combined US/RVN/FW forces are not adequate in FY71 or FY73 against a continuation of the current in-country and out of country threat (See Table VI-14).

3. Should progress in pacification and population security continue at the same general pace as in CY69, the in-country enemy threat should be significantly reduced, and the risks that the combined forces could not meet the total threat would be correspondingly lessened.

4. If pacification and RVNAF improvements were to continue at reasonable rates, the 260,000 US support structure appears to be a reasonable planning objective for end FY71; the feasibility of the 190,000 force would depend upon substantially greater progress in pacification than can be foreseen at this time.

5. US force reductions, when required, are best accomplished in the light of the enemy threat and GVN capabilities existing in the time frame under consideration--the so-called "cut and try" approach which has proved valid in earlier planning.

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VIETNAMIZATION RVNAF I&M (Phase III) and Related US Plannings

Allocation of Manpower to Military/Paramilitary/Civil Forces

Forces	<u>Approved End FY70</u>	<u>Proposed End FY70</u>	<u>Proposed End FY71</u>	<u>Proposed End FY72</u>	<u>Proposed End FY73</u>
RVNAF					
Regulars					
ARVN	387,835	391,235	406,962	410,720	422,224
VNN	31,645	37,697	37,697	37,697	37,947
VNAF	35,786	38,536	38,536	41,766	43,737
VNMC	<u>13,070</u>	<u>13,070</u>	<u>13,435</u>	<u>13,435</u>	<u>13,435</u>
Total Regulars	468,336	480,538	496,630	503,618	517,343
<u>Territorial</u>					
Regional Forces	270,497	275,670	287,591	287,591	287,591
Popular Forces	<u>214,840</u>	<u>239,390</u>	<u>247,399</u>	<u>256,571</u>	<u>256,571</u>
Total Territorial	<u>485,337</u>	<u>515,060</u>	<u>535,390</u>	<u>544,162</u>	<u>544,162</u>
Total RVNAF	<u>953,673</u>	<u>995,598</u>	<u>1,032,020</u>	<u>1,047,780</u>	<u>1,061,505</u>
<u>Paramilitary and Civil</u>					
National Police	107,200	107,200	119,200	122,200	122,200
Provincial Recon Units	6,000	6,000	6,000	--	--
Revolutionary Dev Cadre	47,200	47,200	40,000	32,000	23,000
Son Thon RD Cadre	7,300	7,300	6,000	4,000	2,000
Armed Propaganda Teams	6,660	6,660	6,660	4,660	2,660
Kit Carson Scouts	2,916	2,916	1,050	525	--
CIDG	<u>26,258</u>	<u>17,506</u>	--	--	--
Total Paramilitary and Civil	<u>203,534</u>	<u>194,782</u>	<u>178,910</u>	<u>163,385</u>	<u>149,860</u>
Total RVNAF, Paramilitary and Civil	<u>1,157,207</u>	<u>1,190,380</u>	<u>1,210,930</u>	<u>1,211,165</u>	<u>1,211,365</u>

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TABLE VI-11A
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Total Strengths of the 260,000 US Force Alternative

	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>	<u>FY73</u>
RVNAF	1,031,526	1,047,786	1,060,986
FW	42,007	42,007	42,007
US	<u>249,674</u>	<u>194,730</u>	<u>43,066</u>
TOTAL	1,323,207	1,284,523	1,146,059

Total Strengths of the 190,000 US Force Alternative

	<u>FY71</u>	<u>FY72</u>	<u>FY73</u>
RVNAF	1,031,526	1,047,786	1,060,986
FW	42,007	42,007	42,007
US	<u>198,130</u>	<u>194,730</u>	<u>43,066</u>
TOTAL	1,271,563	1,284,523	1,146,059

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TABLE VI-14

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6. From the US viewpoint, the proposed RVNAF structure is a good basis for continued planning with the GVN. There appears to be a consensus with JGS on certain significant areas, but it should be recognized that considerable adjustments can be anticipated.

(TS) There were three overall recommendations, as follows:

1. That Phase III RVNAF I&M continue to concentrate primarily on qualitative improvements, together with those minimum structural changes required for force balance.

2. That the recommended concepts, programs, strengths, structures, equipment authorizations and funding set forth in the plan be approved as a basic requirements plan for continuing discussions with the GVN.

3. That the 260/190/MAAG structures be considered goals to be reached under the "cut and try" approach, rather than specific FY end-strengths.

Summary

(S) Progress in the key areas of RVNAF improvement and modernization and Vietnamization had been major considerations in the strategies of the US and GVN Governments. Considerable progress had been made in setting the groundwork for RVNAF improvement and there were encouraging signs by the end of the year, that a reasonable amount of success was being achieved. It was estimated that as a result of the accomplishments so far in expanding the RVNAF, that the greatest part of the Phase II I&M program, as amended at Midway, would be completed by summer 1970. There was conviction that the programs and plans developed over the year when fully implemented, would build an effective on-going RVNAF military force. In evaluating the past and looking to the future, it was determined that additional programs would be needed to fill the gaps required to round out the RVNAF and improve effectiveness. Wherein the major attention had been focused on the Regular and Territorial forces, the new phase for emphasis for 1970, extending over the next three years, would be to consider the associated requirements of the National Police and paramilitary forces, and to ensure these forces would be adequately considered in the combined JGS/MACV planning for Phase III, RVNAF Vietnamization and related US planning. 147

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CHAPTER VII

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

SENSOR PROGRAMS

General

(S) Intrusion detection equipment in the form of trip wires, visible and infrared searchlights, surveillance radar, day and night vision devices, etc. had been introduced into RVN during the earliest days of the conflict. On 15 Sep 66, the SECDEF had directed the development of an anti-infiltration capability to support an interdiction program against vehicles and personnel moving overland into the RVN. Major systems had been identified and development initiated.

(C) An outgrowth of this development program was a system of ground sensors. By the end of 1967, anti-infiltration system equipments had been delivered to SEASIA. During 1968, however, increasing and at times particularly strong emphasis had been placed on families of attended and unattended personnel and vehicle sensors which would sound an alarm in some relatively distant observation post or surveillance center when activated. In general, these items fell into categories according to the principle of sensor operation, i.e. magnetic, seismic, acoustic, infrared, etc., and the method of emplantation, such as, hand-placed, jet-or helicopter-dropped, or mortar/artillery-delivered.

(C) The variety existed because each sensor had inherent weaknesses. For instance, the infrared type which used an interrupted beam to trigger the alarm was susceptible to false alarms by trespassing animals, waving or falling branches, and the like. At the same time, the seismic detectors which appeared to be the most promising of the group, could be activated by artillery or mortar rounds landing some distance away. Also, no sensor could differentiate between friend or foe. However, a mix of the different types of sensors could assist in screening false information. When properly integrated with other intelligence sources, the sensors generated both targeting and intelligence information and assisted in refining existing information obtained from other sources.

(C) Data was collected at sensor monitor stations which were equipped with one or more sensor monitor receivers. These monitor stations were ground-based or airborne. Data was analyzed on a near real time basis at the stations and then was used for both immediate targeting and long term intelligence collection.¹

(S) The anti-infiltration sensor management was divided into four programs:²

1. DUEL BLADE. The designation for the sensor-supported anti-infiltration system in northern Quang Tri Province in the area bounded on the north by the southern boundary of the DMZ, on the east by the South China Sea, on the south generally by QL-9 from Laos in the west, east to Ca Lu, direct to Dong Ha and then along the Cua Viet River to the South China Sea.

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2. DUFFEL BAG. The designation for the employment of attended and unattended sensors in support of tactical surveillance operations against the enemy within RVN.

3. IGLOO WHITE. The designation of that portion of the overall sensor program that was administered by 7AF.

4. TIGHT JAW. The designation for the combined US/RVNAF sensor-supported border surveillance plan.

Duel Blade

(S) DUEL BLADE was the anti-infiltration system operated by the III MAF just south of the DMZ in Quang Tri Province. Its purpose was to impede infiltration across the DMZ. DUEL BLADE was divided into two parts--the Strong Point Obstacle System (SPOS) on the eastern coastal plains and the Defiles System (DFS) across the mountains westward to the Laotian border. The SPOS was to consist of a combination of strong points, support bases, observation posts, obstacles, and sensing devices; the DFS was to consist of combat operating bases, observation posts, and sensing devices. The two systems were to be linked together to provide a continuous anti-infiltration system across RVN immediately south of the DMZ.

(S) Progress on DUEL BLADE had been sporadic. Work on clearing a 600-meter swath between Gio Linh and Con Thien had commenced in March 1967 when the DMZ area had been relatively quiet. Twenty thousand civilians had been evacuated from areas forward of the swath and fortification materials moved in. By the time bunker construction had started in August, the NVA had invaded the area attacking Con Thien, Gio Linh, and logistic bases at Dong Ha and Cua Viet. Construction had continued nevertheless, hampered as well by heavy September and October rains during the monsoonal transition. By mid-January 1968, the four eastern strong points and all four bases had been largely completed and work had started on the obstacle just east of Gio Linh. Almost immediately, however, the Khe Sanh battle had erupted, drawing off combat forces providing security for the construction troops. Construction of a fifth strong point, the linear obstacle, and second generation living facilities had been deferred. A contingency plan had been prepared to permit this additional construction to begin on five days notice with completion in four months, assuming limited enemy action and favorable weather.

(S) The SPOS offered a good opportunity to demonstrate confidence in ARVN by giving them an important role in the direct confrontation with the NVA across the DMZ. To this end, the 2d Regt of the 1st ARVN Div had been augmented with additional infantry and mechanized forces, additional crew-served weapons, and priority logistic and personnel support. This regiment had compiled an outstanding combat record since Sept 1968, killing over 2,200 of the enemy while suffering 260 KIA in and around the SPOS area. Occupying most of the forward strong points, they provided clear evidence of ARVN capabilities to meet and defeat strong NVA military forces even those that enjoyed heavy artillery support in sanctuary from ground attack north of the DMZ.

(S) A revision of the entire DUEL BLADE operation had commenced on 29 Oct 68. The mission remained to conduct an anti-infiltration program in areas adjacent to the DMZ:


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FIGURE VII-1

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however, the methods and means were updated to be consistent with current and anticipated tactics and the operational posture of both friendly and hostile forces. Sensors had been hand-emplaced along known enemy infiltration routes just south of the DMZ in the eastern area and the first combined US-ARVN sensor training school had been completed. Utilizing all means of surveillance detection, with emphasis on unattended intrusion detection devices, the FWMAF maintained a mobile operational posture, supported by air strikes, artillery, and naval gunfire to detect and deny or impede enemy infiltration across the DMZ.³

(S) MACV review of the revised DUEL BLADE Program (DUEL BLADE II) had been completed and approved by COMUSMACV on 30 Dec 68. Implementation of the plan was directed within programmed funds and available resources. During the period 9-10 Jan 69, CINCPAC and his staff were briefed on DUEL BLADE II. The former expressed his personal satisfaction with the plan.⁴

(S) At the beginning of the year, any plans to continue the construction of SPOS were cancelled. DUCK BLIND, the sensor project, and DUEL BLADE I, the strong point effort, were combined and became known as DUEL BLADE II, though the term was usually shortened to just DUEL BLADE.

(S) By the end of January, a total of 26 strings consisting of 92 sensors had been hand or air-implanted and activated throughout the DUEL BLADE area. A project to defoliate a trace 2,000 meters wide adjacent to the border of Laos and immediately south of the DMZ was incorporated into the western portion of the DUEL BLADE area. By 31 Jan, RANCH HAND spray aircraft had completed 79 percent of the total defoliation required and land clearing operations had commenced adjacent to Route 561 north of Cam Lo to clear 2,400 acres.⁵ (See Figure VII-1.)

(S) There was no appreciable gain in the number of sensors available for allocation to DUEL BLADE. March was a very active month for sensor operations. Implant teams encountered heavy opposition in the area immediately south of the DMZ and in the Ba Long Valley. Several teams were engaged by the enemy and, on two occasions, teams were forced to destroy sensors to prevent possible capture. Detections during early March were very heavy in the west-central portion south of the DMZ and gradually shifted to the east-central portion of the zone. Sensors were particularly helpful in early detection around FSB ALPINE. Construction of 614 second generation, functional, steel arch bunkers commenced in March and it was planned that 300 would be completed during the 1969 dry weather building season. Gun pads and observation towers were also started at the base areas.

(TS) During April, ground implant teams continued to encounter stiff enemy opposition during implant operations along the southern edge of the DMZ. Because of this intense opposition, the Rules of Engagement were re-interpreted to permit aircraft emplacement of sensors south of the PMDL in the DMZ.⁶

(S) The defoliation project north of Cam Lo that was underway at the beginning of the year was completed on 5 May. At mid-year, construction of 37 second generation, functional, steel arch bunkers was in progress at sites throughout the DUEL BLADE AO.

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(S) By the first of July, the average number of sensors available in the DUEL BLADE AO was up to 200 and remained at that level through August. The data received by the system produced a successful ARC LIGHT mission in July conducted west of Con Thien along the southern edge of the DMZ. Construction continued on the 37 steel arch bunkers.

(S) In August, 1,124 activations of the sensors brought the combined reaction of mixed artillery, mortar, and air strikes; the attacks resulted in 21 enemy confirmed killed and 17 secondary explosions. Battle damage assessment was generally precluded by the inaccessibility of the areas to combat sweep operations. In September the average number of sensors was increased to 261. The activations and engagement results remained virtually unchanged from the preceding month. Due to the 3d Mar Div standdown in November, the readout sites on Hills 812 and 950 were closed as was the readout site at Signal Hill. In addition, COMUS declared all DUEL BLADE M-14 and M-16A antipersonnel mines excess to in-country needs and requested CINCPAC to forward disposition instructions. A problem existed due to the large number of mines, approximately 669,000 on hand, and this problem was compounded by badly deteriorated packaging. By October the largest part of the 3d Mar Div had redeployed, causing a major adjustment and reduction of sensor coverage in the DUEL BLADE AO. The 3d Mar Div sensor strings and assets were transferred to the 101st Abn Div (Abnl); 1st Bde, 5th (Mech) Inf Div; and the 1st ARVN Div.

(S) During October there was an average of 262 active sensors in the DUEL BLADE AO with a total of 760 targets detected, and 245 fire missions called in response to them. Confirmed results were 32 enemy KIA and 70 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition captured with no US casualties.⁸

(S) The number of active sensors in the DUEL BLADE AO decreased during November and December dropping to 150 by the end of the year. Likewise the number of detections were reduced from 1,173 in November to 720 in December, with 629 and 385 fire missions of mixed mortar and artillery conducted in response to the activations.

Duffle Bag

(S) The DUFFEL BAG program was developed as a result of the successful use of sensors at Khe Sanh. The use of the sensor devices for battlefield surveillance and real time intelligence gathering was instrumental in directing the air and artillery strikes that destroyed the attacking forces and broke the siege at Khe Sanh.


(S) On 1 Apr 68, COMUSMACV had stated a need for the development of sensors, readout equipment, concepts, and tactics for the employment of sensors against the enemy within RVN. During April, requirements had been stated and plans developed to implement this program. In May, the SECDEF had approved the Phase I implementation of the DUFFEL BAG program and had directed that the Phase II follow-on program be approved for planning purposes.

(S) The Phase I program employed IGLOO WHITE/DUEL BLADE assets in a variety of tactical operations for the purpose of establishing operational concepts and validity of applications. During Phase I, completed on 25 Aug 68, sensors were evaluated in eight applications: combat sweep, ambush, enemy base area surveillance, targeting, convoy protection, route surveillance, base area defense, and the monitoring of helicopter landing zones. The scope of the evaluation had been limited by availability of sensors, time, and lack of enemy activity in

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DUFFEL BAG SENSOR LOCATIONS AS OF JANUARY 1969



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FIGURE VII-2

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the test areas. While dramatic BDA had not been obtained, sufficient success was attained to justify an expansion and continuation of the problem.

(S) Limited availability of sensors and ancillary equipment had restricted in-country sensor operations through the remainder of 1968. At the end of the year, however, DUFFEL BAG sensors were being used in the defense of Saigon, riverine/Delta operations, defense of Danang and along border infiltration routes. It was expected that increased availability would permit the expanded use of hand-and air-implaced sensors in support of tactical operations in 1969. Sensors would be employed in support of border anti-infiltration operations, enemy base area surveillance, main supply route surveillance, base and city defense. ⁹

(S) At the beginning of 1969, DUFFEL BAG operations reflected the constraints of a continued low sensor inventory, although the situation was improving. The priority for allocation of sensors continued to be directed to IGLOO WHITE/COMMANDO HUNT operations. The priority within DUFFEL BAG operations was to DUEL BLADE II, with remaining assets allocated to the detection of infiltration and surveillance of enemy base areas elsewhere in RVN.

(S) DUFFEL BAG operations, including the DUEL BLADE AO as of 31 Jan 69 are depicted in Figure VII-2. There were a total of 366 active sensors employed, which represented the largest number of sensors in operation at any time since the beginning of in-country sensor operations. ¹⁰ Sensors were employed by the 1st Mar Div, 3d Mar Div, 101st Abn Div (AMBL), 4th Inf Div, 25th Inf Div, 3d Bde of the 82d Abn Div, 11th ACR, 199th Lt Inf Bde, 173d Abn, plus Navy TF 116, TF 117, and TG 194. ⁹

(S) The sensor inventory steadily increased during the first half of 1969 and by the end of June numbered 1,455. Sensors were being employed along and within the DMZ and throughout all four CTZs. They were employed along border crossing areas in support of the combined US/RVNAF Border Surveillance Plan (TIGHT JAW), in enemy base camp areas throughout RVN, along waterways and routes in the Delta, and on the approaches to Saigon, Danang, Chu Lai, and other cities and military installations in RVN. Positioning of additional ARVN artillery for response to sensor activations was progressing. Operations were restricted, however, due to the nonavailability of readout devices for which requests exceeded assets. With the impending transfer of AC-47 gunships to VNAF, plans were being formulated to reconfigure AC-119K aircraft with sensor readout devices for an additional rapid reaction capability to sensor activations. ¹¹

(S) The Sensor Analog Relay System (SARS), an automatic readout and relay system, arrived in country early in the year. After orientation and tests were conducted, the first unit became operational in the border surveillance program in May. Use of SARS increased the readout distance and provided multiple channel coverage.

(S) In May, COMUSMACV was requested to provide information to enable the JCS to "properly assess the impact of unattended ground surveillance devices on current and future US operations in RVN and sensor budget requirements for FY70 and FY71." Specifically, information was requested on the extent to which sensors could contribute to the reduction of US casualties, the contribution the sensors made in producing enemy casualties, and the direct impact sensors had on planning. COMUSMACV's reply included the following:

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For approximately four months DUFFEL BAG operations have been expanding at a significant rate. At present there are over 1,000 sensors operational in-country. Almost every division and separate brigade utilizes sensors and their stated requirements continue to far exceed supply.

The extent to which sensors can contribute to the reduction of US casualties is a determination which does not lend itself to quantitative measurement. On the other hand, the 24-hour day silent sentinel function performed by sensors has contributed to economies in force, provided early warning of attacks on base camps and cities, and has contributed to the reduction of rocket attacks... It is concluded that where SA, mortar, arty, and TACAIR response to sensor activation have turned back an enemy attack on a base camp or city, or frustrated a rocket attack, there was a contribution to the reduction in possible casualties. The role that sensors can play in the future in reducing casualties will depend upon utilization. It has become accepted that sensors now provide a target acquisition means, particularly at night, which has made significant contributions to the effectiveness of H & I fire. It has also become accepted that sensor density and target generation are in a direct relation. Therefore, as the depth and density of sensor fields increase, there should be less and less opportunity for the enemy to successfully approach friendly concentrations for any purpose, be it reconnaissance, attack by fire, or ground attack.

Enemy casualties have been attributed to sensor surveillance to a significant degree, both directly (target acquisition) and indirectly (intelligence). The rationale expressed... concerning reduction in friendly casualties applies conversely to an increase in enemy casualties. The availability of sensors to date has to a degree limited their use in determining "when" the enemy is in a traditional corridor or assembly area. As sensor availability increases, the more active role of finding "where" major concentrations are taking place throughout the principal area of interest will be realized. At such time, sensors will make a more significant contribution to enhancing the validity of the estimate of the situation and consequently improve the probability of success. A case in point is the timing of Operation PURPLE MARTIN in western Quang Tri Province. The

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initial indicators of the renewal of enemy presence in this sector were sensor activations. Based on this and other intelligence the operation was launched. Enemy casualties for the 15 day battle were 250 KIA and six detained.

Sensor derived intelligence is used at all levels of command. . . Sensor information is processed with other information as an integral element of the intelligence analysis on a continuing basis at bde (regt), div, and corps. It is inherent to the daily operational planning cycle. At the Hq MACV level, sensor-derived intelligence is considered during daily ARC LIGHT targeting sessions, and has been an influencing factor in target selection in Laos the last six months.

On the basis of experience gained thus far, it appears that DUFFEL BAG sensor technology may be one of the more important developments to come out of the Vietnam War. At the present time, the only limitations on successful sensor-supported operations are the availability of sensors, and the degree of imagination, initiative, ingenuity, and resourcefulness of tactical commanders. ¹²

(S) In the third quarter, the number of active sensors increased again, and at the end of September there were 2,276 sensors in the DUFFEL BAG program. This represented more than a 55 percent increase in this three month period. In July, the first SEA LORDS sensor monitoring van became operational at Tuyen Nhon, greatly enhancing sensor operations in the GIANT SLINGSHOT Campaign. Additionally, ARVN 105mm artillery had been placed at this location to support the operation. Further enhancement of sensor readout was realized in September when the second Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal (DART II) went into operation at Pleiku. The first, DART I, had previously become operational at Bien Hoa. The two systems were similar; however, where DART I used a readout platform located atop Nui Ba Den, DART II used an airborne (EC-121 aircraft) read-out platform to cover sensors in the tri-border area. Also, the second SEA LORDS sensor monitoring van went into operation at Ba Xoai in the Seven Mountains area. The principal utilization of the van was to monitor sensors emplaced along the Cambodian border between Chau Doc and Ha Tien.

(S) The September statistics indicated the effectiveness of the DUFFEL BAG program. There were 2,474 recorded enemy activations which were engaged with 1,897 mixed artillery mortar, naval gunfire, and air strike missions, 16 troop maneuver reactions, 66 patrol boat missions, one air cushion vehicle mission, and a claymore mine field fired. Results were 361 enemy killed (body count), 11 personnel captured, 26 AK-47s captured or destroyed, and 300 pounds of rice, 34 grenades, two pistols, one M-79 grenade launcher, one M16 and miscellaneous documents captured. Other results included one Hoi Chanh, the discovery of a hospital complex, destruction of five sampans, 13 secondary explosions, and numerous bunkers destroyed. ¹³

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(S) The number of active sensors in the DUFFEL BAG program increased from 2,082 to 2,408 during October. Sensors continued to be employed by every US division, separate brigade, Navy task group and unit, as well as numerous other supporting units in RVN. The Navy sensor operations at NSA Nha Be were moved to Song Ong Doc, where they were operated in support of Navy operations on the edge of the U Minh Forest.

(S) Results for October were: 2,179 recorded enemy activations to which there were responses of 1,349 mixed artillery, mortar, naval gunfire and air strike missions. These indirect fire missions were combined with troop maneuvers and patrol boat operations which resulted in 298 enemy KIA, five PWs, 31 AK-47s and other materials captured. Eight water buffalo also were killed by artillery after activating sensor strings. Reports indicated that the enemy herded the buffalo into the area to determine the degree of surveillance.¹⁴ A Battle Area Surveillance System (BASS) was placed in operation during November for test and evaluation. The sensor signal receiver and relay portion were located atop Nui Ba Den with the readout devices located adjacent to the 25th Inf Div TOC at Cu Chi, Hau Nghia Province. During December there were 2,361 fire missions, 33 TACAIR, 26 helicopter, 241 water craft, and 54 troop maneuver reactions to sensor intelligence in the DUFFEL BAG operations. At the end of 1969 there were 3,272 active sensors employed in the DUFFEL BAG program, which was by far the largest sensor program in operation. The only significant change in sensor location occurring during the year was the addition of several sites in IV CTZ where fields were emplaced along the Vinh Te Canal and along the western edge of IV CTZ in several areas in support of the SEA LORDS operations and SEA FLOAT. There was a significant change in the units employing the sensors throughout RVN due to the redeployment of troops and qualification of ARVN units, however, the areas in which sensors were employed were basically unchanged. As assets increased and personnel were trained in use of sensors their employment greatly increased as indicated in the number of active sensors at the end of the year. A major factor in II CTZ was the use of DART which permitted greater read-out capability and explained the much greater number of sensors worked in the tri-border area over the preceding year.

Igloo White

(S) The IGLOO WHITE Program, implemented in December 1967, was an all weather, full time surveillance network of acoustic and seismic sensors, together with relay aircraft and an Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC). The program was under the operational control of a wing-level organization known as TF ALPHA, and its mission was to detect and target enemy infiltration activities from NVN through the western DMZ and Laos into the RVN. This program, which provided near real time intelligence on enemy infiltration movements, had been developed into a highly refined system and provided a major contribution to the effectiveness of the out-of-country air interdiction effort. IGLOO WHITE was originally envisioned as two separate operations: MUD RIVER--an antivehicular subsystem covering major roads in Laos, and DUMP TRUCK--an antipersonnel subsystem in the western part of the DMZ and eastern Laos.

(S) The antipersonnel infiltration subsystem had not been implemented. At the intended time of implementation in January 1968, sensor resources were diverted to support operations during the siege of Khe Sanh. As a result of a shortage of sensors, due to production slippage

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
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IGLOO WHITE SENSOR LOCATIONS



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FIGURE VII-3

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and further diversion to the DUFFELBAG Program, the proposed testing of this subsystem was indefinitely deferred. The revised DUEL BLADE concept would provide a vehicle suitable for translation into an evaluation of the application of sensors in the antipersonnel infiltration role.

(S) The antivehicular subsystem of IGLOO WHITE had first priority and had progressed through the evaluation phase into an effective, fulltime operation. Originally conceived as an aid to locating and striking fleeting targets, it proved to be most valuable in contributing critical and timely intelligence on traffic trends, location of lucrative truck park and logistic area targets, and changes in LOC utilization by the enemy.

(S) At the time of the bombing halt on 1 Nov 68, IGLOO WHITE resources were concentrated primarily in Laos in support of the COMMANDO HUNT interdiction program. A limited number of special, long-life sensors were emplaced prior to the bombing halt along LOCs in the NVN panhandle.

(S) The IGLOO WHITE sensor support for the 7AF COMMANDO HUNT interdiction program during the northeastern monsoon was expected to achieve a programmed level of 500 active sensors in early 1969. The planned introduction of new and improved sensors in late 1969 would permit a further expansion in the number of active sensors and sensor fields.¹⁵

(S) As 1968 ended, the availability of sensors had improved sufficiently to permit a continuing buildup of the COMMANDO HUNT sensor field and at the beginning of 1969, IGLOO WHITE resources continued to be concentrated primarily in Laos in support of the COMMANDO HUNT interdiction campaign. Sensor string locations as of the end of January 1969 are shown in Figure VII-3.

(S) The seismic sensor was the more effective in truck traffic detections, and the desired ratio of seismic to acoustic sensors was four to one. While this ratio was not reached due to a lack of seismic sensors, a ratio of 3:1 was reached in February and maintained thereafter.

(S) IGLOO WHITE resources continued to support the interdiction campaign in Laos. In April, distribution of sensors shifted from the heavy concentration in the COMMANDO HUNT AO to cover entry routes in STEEL TIGER NORTH and exit routes into I CTZ. The number of truck detections then decreased, due in part to the change in routes being monitored and a reduction in the total number of active sensors as the sensor field was shifted southward. Weather was also a factor in the decrease of detections, as many roads became impassable due to flooding.¹⁶

(S) Bad weather hindered operations during the monsoon months of June, July, and August. Many of the implanted sensors failed to function and it was the consensus that heavy rains had softened the ground to such a depth that the sensors penetrated too deeply to permit normal operation. Battle damage assessment was low due to the inability of forward air controllers and strike crews to make assessments in bad weather. It was not all without success, though. The enemy shifted some of his activity to the Xe Banh Hiang and Xe Kong waterways, and these were seeded with MK-36 mines with notable results. There was also evidence that the constant bombing had created serious mud problems for the enemy, partially accounting for the decreased activity.

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(S) The 7AF increased sensor implantations throughout September as the area dried out. The COMMANDO HUNT operation plan called for 504 sensors, dedicated to road monitoring, to be in place by 1 Nov. Additional assets would be used to insure monitoring of suspected truck routes and parking areas. The successful campaign of friendly forces and the absence of sensor-detected movements caused 7AF to cancel the orbit (airborne station for monitoring aircraft) in the BARREL ROLL area. Another orbit in the far south of the STEEL TIGER area was temporarily suspended due to the lack of enemy activity. Additionally, in an effort to improve readout capability in areas that were marginal during the 1968 campaign, 7AF adjusted sensor string locations in the immediate vicinity of Mu Gia and Ban Karai Passes.¹⁷

(S) By 1 Oct, the number of sensors in the IGLOO WHITE AO had been increased by one third over the start of the preceding month. Further increases during the month brought the final count at the end of October to 433 active sensors in 73 strings. The PURPLE ORBIT and ROSE ORBIT were re-established to perform manual air read-out. In mid-month, enemy truck activity showed the first surge of traffic since the end of the southwest monsoon. During the month 312 trucks were attacked by air, destroying 42 and damaging 29 others. With the redeployment of US Forces in I CTZ, CG, III MAF requested 7AF to increase the number of air-implanted sensors and air read-out of sensors in the western RVN provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien.¹⁸

(S) As the result of a thorough evaluation undertaken at a planning session on 1 Nov and subsequent sessions, a joint plan was developed by 7AF and III MAF for sensor coverage in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

(S) There was a significant increase in the sensor activity in November, as 587 trucks were destroyed by 7AF units reacting to sensor information. During December over 22,000 movements were detected by sensors in the STEEL TIGER AO compared to visual reconnaissance which detected 6,574 during the same period. Aircraft attacks against trucks resulted in 670 destroyed and an additional 542 damaged in December. Since the beginning of IGLOO WHITE operations in December 1967, 7AF had implanted 3,145 sensors in the STEEL TIGER AO, 627 in DUEL BLADE, and 88 in BARREL ROLL.¹⁹

Tight Jaw

(S) In March, CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to develop a plan for the combined US/RVNAF employment of sensors in fulfillment of a DEPSECDEF requirement. This operation was designated TIGHT JAW. Emphasis would be on combined US/RVNAF border surveillance. Subsequently, COMUSMACV directed CG, USARV and CG, III MAF to continue present sensor operations, and to plan for a gradual increase to a capability of processing 4,000 individual sensor units a month. Concurrently, they were to develop plans for personnel and facility expansion to support an additional increase to approximately 6,700 individual sensor units per month. It was anticipated that increases of 300 units per month over the 4,000 would commence in September. Support of this plan required incremental processing of a total of approximately 1,000 line sensor units for the Force Logistics Command, commencing in October 1969.²⁰

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(S) In April, MACV Operation Plan 103-69 (Ground Surveillance for ARVN) was submitted to CINCPAC. The plan, in addition to accelerating the introduction of sensors in RVNAF, established a border surveillance program using the operational concept described for DUEL BLADE II. It also provided for a gradual expansion of DUEL BLADE II-type operations, consistent with the threat priorities and the availability of personnel and equipment. As selected RVNAF forces were trained in the use of DCPG (Defense Communications Planning Group) sensors and sensory devices and could bring to bear appropriate operational response, they would supplement the US effort. Conceptually, the plan built toward a combined US/RVNAF border surveillance program, which, at an appropriate time, could be turned over to RVNAF for unilateral operation.

(S) CINCPAC concurred in the plan on 20 Apr but had these comments:

It must be recognized that the anti-infiltration provisions of this plan will not stop infiltration. Sensor systems have proven capable of only assisting in impeding infiltration. Based on DUFFEL BAG and DUEL BLADE II experience, this plan should provide an increased capability for battle-field surveillance, target acquisition, and intelligence gathering.

OPlan TIGHT JAW supports T-Day planning. It provides for a near term sensor capability in RVNAF, improved border surveillance capability, and economy of forces.

Completing RVNAF modernization plans will affect the availability of qualified RVNAF personnel for sensor operations. While at the present time not considered a major problem, as other modernization programs involving technology multiply, acquisition of trainable personnel may be increasingly difficult.

The MACV plan makes repeated reference to the existence of sensor control and management platoons (SCAMP) or sections in US Army units. It should be noted that these are provisional organizations that have been organized with available personnel and equipment. There is currently no standardization or actual authorization for them.

DUFFEL BAG operations have enjoyed a considerable measure of success and the field commander's confidence in these systems has been growing. For the foreseeable future, ongoing US sensor operations will compete for sensors and school trained sensor personnel. Changes in assignment of priorities for resources and areas of effort in sensor operations will be made to attain maximum exploitation and should be reserved to the judgement of CINCPAC and COMUSMACV.²¹

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(RVNAF use of sensors)

(S) TIGHT JAW was approved by JCS on 29 Jul and the training of the first RVNAF unit under the provisions of COMUSMACV OPLAN 103-69 began on 1 Aug. Classroom instruction and field exercise training were completed in I CTZ during August and units of the 1st and 2d ARVN Divs performed OJT with US units in I CTZ. A small VNN cadre also began training at Vung Tau and ARVN training in II CTZ was scheduled for September.

(S) The 1st and 2d ARVN Divs achieved an initial operational sensor capability in September. With assistance provided by Military Assistance Training Teams (MATTs), the divisions were each operating over 60 sensors at the end of the month. Meanwhile, on 24 Sep, training began on schedule for ARVN II Corps personnel at the Duc My Training Center in Khanh Hoa Province. The initial training of the 23d ARVN Div and 42d ARVN Regt elements was to be followed with OJT under supervision of the 4th Inf Div teams. In October, the 51st ARVN Regt and the 1st and 2d ARVN Divs continued effectively, to employ sensor-gained intelligence with other sources. These organizations executed ground operations based upon sensor-obtained information. The ARVN elements had planted over 150 sensors by month's end.

(S) Formal classroom and field training of II CTZ units was completed 3 Oct. Subsequently, both the 42d ARVN Regt and 23d ARVN Div participated in combined operations with the 4th Inf Div. Due to intensified enemy activity during the latter part of the month, the execution of the sensor program within both ARVN units was delayed. Meanwhile, formal classroom and field exercises were conducted at Vung Tau for the 25th ARVN Div with combined operations with the US 25th Inf Div scheduled for the first week in November. A retraining cycle for the 7th ARVN Div, originally given token training in early July, was conducted from 13-25 Oct. Due to a lack of US forces in IV CTZ, two members of the Combined Instruction Team (CIT) and one Technical Liaison Team (TLT) accompanied the 7th ARVN Div upon completion of the class to provide guidance and assistance for the conduct of OJT. By the end of 1969, ARVN personnel were monitoring over 200 sensors in I CTZ alone and ARVN units in all four CTZs had some degree of sensor training and assets. ²²

HERBICIDE OPERATIONS

(C) Herbicide operations conducted in RVN included two major programs: defoliation and crop destruction. These programs were primarily RVN actions supported by the US. Policy and guidance concerning these programs were established by mutual agreement between the GVN and the US.

(U) Herbicide operations had begun in RVN in 1962 on a limited basis. Defoliation missions (Operation RANCH HAND) were flown in USAF aircraft and were conducted to uncover enemy infiltration routes, safe havens, and storage sites and to improve the vulnerability of these areas to air strikes. Defoliation herbicides had also been used to improve the observation around friendly depots, supply points, and fixed checkpoints in order to prevent pilferage and improve the defense of these areas.

(S) Crop destruction missions (FARM GATE) originally used aircraft with VNAF markings and carried a VNAF observer. They were conducted in remote, enemy-controlled areas of I,

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Effects of Herbicide on grove coconut

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II, and III CTZs to deny food (rice, cereals, and broadleaf crops) to the VC and their sympathizers which forced the VC to divert manpower to crop production and weakened VC strength in these areas.²³

(U) The following herbicides were used:²⁴

<u>Name</u>	<u>Characteristics</u>
Orange	Oil based, effective against broadleaf vegetation, achieving maximum effect in four to six weeks, with a duration of approximately 12 months.
White	Water based, used on targets where spray line was critical, visible effects in about four weeks with maximum effect in six to eight weeks, with a duration of approximately 12 months.
Blue	Water based, fastest reacting, visible effects within 24 hours, used primarily on grass-type targets.

Note: All chemicals were sold commercially in the US and were nontoxic, noncorrosive, and not harmful to any form of human or animal life.

(S) Requirements for 1969 were determined to be 400 effective sorties per month. These sorties were planned based on requirements of field commanders. MACV prepared a monthly target priority list based on these requirements and available weather data. The UC-123K aircraft was used for these missions. This aircraft had the capacity to carry 1,000 gallons of herbicide, and with this capacity could spray a swath 80 meters wide and 17 kilometers long at a spray rate of three gallons per acre. Normal delivery speed and altitude were 135 knots and 100 feet. Formations included from two to 12 aircraft.

(C) Herbicide aircraft were located at Bien Hoa and Danang with additional servicing locations at Phu Cat and Nha Trang. These two additional locations permitted rapid turn around of the aircraft when a second daily mission was flown in II CTZ. Their proximity to intended targets and their capability to refuel aircraft and refill the herbicide tanks increased the efficiency of the operation.²⁵

(S) Initially, authority to approve missions had been vested in the SECSTATE. In May 1962, the AMAMB and COMUSMACV had been delegated joint authority to conduct defoliation operations providing such operations would not include crop destruction and would be limited to clearing roadsides, powerlines, railroads, and other lines of communications, and the areas adjacent to depots, airfields, and other field installations.

(S) Crop destruction was far more sensitive, unless handled with extreme care, the program could easily generate the psychological onus of "gas warfare." Although initial crop destruction had started concurrent with defoliation operations, the program had lagged for fear

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of repercussions. Operations had continued into 1963 against a background of increasing adverse propaganda from NVN. In May 1963, as a result of this unfavorable propaganda, the State Department had requested a full report and evaluation of all herbicide operations in 1963, and, as an interim measure, had required that all future crop destruction mission be approved in advance by the Assistant Secretary of State, Far Eastern Affairs, and DOD. An Ad Hoc committee, TF SAIGON, after a thorough evaluation recommended that crop destruction be continued as it was an effective weapon against the VC. It was further recommended that authority to approve crop destruction missions be delegated to the Ambassador and COMUSMACV.

(S) Such authority was not forthcoming, however, and in February 1964, it had again been requested that approval authority be delegated to the Ambassador and COMUSMACV for 12 VC areas in addition to War Zone "D" in order to avoid time consuming procedures for crop destruction approval. This authority had been granted on 3 Mar 64. The continued expansion of VC-controlled areas, however, had soon resulted in numerous VC food production farms being discovered outside of the originally approved areas. At COMUSMACV's request, the State Department, in July 1964, had delegated the authority for approval of all crop destruction operations to be Ambassador-COMUSMACV level.

(S) Crop destruction, although conducted on a somewhat limited scale, had been by far the most effective herbicide operation employed in the RVN. Even so, the food denial program had not achieved its full potential in these early years. Success had been limited by several factors. Perhaps the foremost of these had been the failure to pursue and gain early approval for crop destruction when the control of people and terrain by the VC was limited. Additionally, the JCS had not been organized to conduct these type operations on a country-wide basis, and poorly engineered spray equipment and lack of motivation on the part of the VNAF pilots quite often had resulted in inefficient delivery of the herbicides on target.

(C) Growth of the crop destruction and defoliation programs can be seen readily from the table below. Area is given in square kilometers.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Defoliation</u>	<u>Crop Destruction</u>
1962	20	3
1963	100	1
1964	338	42
1965	630	267
1966	3,001	421
1967	6,018	896
1968	5,252	312
1969	4,907	256

Note: Regrowth has occurred in many areas previously sprayed.

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(S) The increased use of herbicides as a tactical weapon in 1966 had generated two major problems: a herbicide shortage and an inadequate number of C-123 delivery aircraft. To combat this, the number of delivery aircraft had been increased to 17 by mid-1967. The herbicide shortage had not been solved, and large-scale defoliation projects had been extended in time or deferred.²⁶

(S) To avoid political repercussions, certain restrictions were observed in defoliation operations near the Cambodian border. First, a 5-km buffer zone was established, though special projects within this zone were considered on an individual basis. Additionally, only low volatility defoliant were used, mission altitude had to be as low as possible, wind direction at the time of defoliant applications had to be away from the border, and the border in the spray area had to be known and clearly identifiable from the air. Special precautions were also taken for operations around any active rubber plantation.²⁷

(S) The US/GVN policy on herbicide operations had been reviewed extensively in 1968 by a committee chaired by the US Ambassador. Committee members had included representatives from MACV, CORDS, USAID, and JUSPAO as well as ecological experts from CONUS. The review had concluded that the military benefits clearly outweighed the economic and psychopolitical costs of the herbicide program and had recommended that the program be continued. The US Ambassador had concurred in the position and the "Report on the Herbicide Policy Review", dated 28 Aug 68, was published.²⁸

(C) In February 1969, JCS stated that due to reduced SEASIA requirements and expanded industry capability to satisfy both civilian and military requirements, herbicides were no longer in critical supply. A problem that had existed since the inception of the herbicide program in RVN had finally been solved.²⁹

(C) Also in February, DA reported the feasibility of converting existing stocks of "Orange" herbicide to "Super Orange." Tests had revealed that "Super Orange" produced the longer period of effective defoliation characteristic of "White" while retaining the quicker effect of "Orange." It was also effective against a wider spectrum of broadleaf vegetation. AMEMB, Saigon suggested that use of "Super Orange" would have distinct advantages in terms of effectiveness, utilization and security of personnel and materials, and overall cost. It would also reduce the need for retreatment and double treatment with "Orange" and "White," practices that the 1968 Herbicide Policy Review had recommended be avoided. The AMEMB requested, however, that the term "Modified Orange" be used in lieu of "Super Orange" because of the undesirable political connotation of "Super" in connection with the herbicide program. Although some discussion on converting "Orange" stocks to "Super Orange" continued, the idea was dropped and "Orange" was used throughout 1969.³⁰

(U) On 15 Mar, OASD (PA) notified AMEMB, Saigon of the impending arrival of Drs. Egbert Pfeiffer and Gordon Orans, two "Scientists for Social Responsibility," to investigate the "harmful effects of herbicides in Vietnam." In the past, the two scientist had been highly critical of the herbicide program. The Mission was surprised to learn of the visit as it was thought that visitors could obtain no information of significance that was not readily obtainable in Washington. It was suspected that the primary purpose of the visit was to obtain an appearance of expertise from alleged on-the-spot inquiry which could be used to buttress future arguments against the herbicide program.

(U) Initial meetings were held with MACOI, a representative of the AMEMB, and members

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of the MACJ3 Chemical Operations Division. These visitors were afforded a correspondent's clearance for their visit by MACOI. During their two week stay, they visited the 12th Special Operations Squadron (RANCH HAND) and flew on a defoliation mission, toured the Rung Sat Special Zone by river patrol boat, and were taken on an orientation flight in III CTZ to observe the effects of defoliation and ARC LIGHT strikes. They also spent several days on their own conducting visits with the University of Saigon, professional colleagues in US civilian agencies, and the French Rubber Institute.³¹ Doctors Pfeiffer and Orians published several articles upon their return to the US. The following is indicative of their changed attitude toward the herbicide program:

In the harsh and loose lexicon of the Vietnam War, defoliation is a bad word. But it oughtn't to be, not unqualifiedly so, at any rate. This is the judgment of two zoologists--Dr. Egbert W. Pfeiffer of the University of Montana and Dr. Gordon H. Orians of the University of Washington--who went over there recently to investigate the matter at the request of the Society for Social Responsibility in Science.

The Scientists conducted their study over a wide area. They found some unpleasant effects in terms of both plant and animal life, but the picture was not all negative by any means. In one area, for example, defoliants did an effective job against tall grasses, but did not injure the health of rats there, or of carnivores preying on the rats. The herbicides, in short, though killing off vegetation and chasing away birds and the like, have been considerably less horrible than some lurid accounts have depicted.

Dr. Pfeiffer has put the matter in good perspective. In one region, according to this report, he and Dr. Orian "scarcely saw a living plant," and birds--apart from the fish-eating variety, were nowhere in sight. But at the same time he has emphasized that the two of them probably would not have returned alive from their trip, a 65-mile journey between Saigon and the sea, had it not been for the defoliation--a program that is decidedly effective against the danger of lethal ambushes by the Viet Cong.

This is a point that needs to be kept in mind by those who think it evil to use chemicals against the jungle. In Pfeiffer's words, it is "completely unrealistic" for anybody to expect military commanders to forego the detaching safeguards: "There is no question about it; they save American lives," and also the lives of the South Vietnamese and others engaged in the allied struggle against the Communists.

There can be no rational argument against this. The

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(S) In early May, a French Embassy officer called at the US State Department and stated, "On Apr 20 and 25, US planes spread defoliants on the Vietnamese side of the GVN/Cambodian border in vicinity of Mimot and Krek. As a result of a southwest wind, the defoliants fell on rubber plantations owned by two French companies, . . . seriously damaging some 4-5,000 hectares." After a preliminary investigation, AMEMB, Saigon reported that defoliation of a strip of vegetation in northern Tay Ninh Province, extending from 5-10 km from the Cambodian border, had been underway since 16 Apr. Between 16 and 30 Apr, eight missions, involving 44 sorties, had been flown in this area; however, plots of the coordinates revealed that the closest points to the Mimot and Krek plantations were 12 and 14 km, respectively, with all but very small portions of the plantations lying 14 and 18 km or more from those points. AMEMB, Saigon went on to say ". . . experience in Vietnam with alleged herbicide drift as well as direct application of herbicides on rubber trees would indicate, however, that the French claim of serious damage to 4-5,000 hectares is grossly exaggerated." In spite of this, however, it was suggested that if the Cambodian government would agree, US civilian experts be sent to the plantations to investigate the claim and assess any probable loss.³⁶

(S) AMEMB, Saigon believed that the investigation should take place as soon as possible while the alleged botanical traumata were still in the early stages. It was further believed that because of the continuing inflation of damage claims, terms of reference should be as broad as possible. The team of experts should suggest the duration of their visit and appropriate equipment and supplies; however, a brief stop at Saigon for orientations was recommended.³⁷

(S) MACV, meanwhile, had conducted a comparative aerial photography survey of the Mimot rubber plantation between 28 Apr and 3-5 Jun. This survey revealed considerable thinning of the canopy over large areas of the plantation. On the 28 Apr mission, the plantation looked normal with all trees apparently healthy; however, the photography for 3-5 Jun showed an unexplained thinning of the canopy over large areas of the plantation. In the most serious areas of defoliation, the trees were almost bare, while in others little change was noted. However, lines of demarcation between varying degrees of leaf fall were straight and regular and there was no noticeable leaf fall in the jungle areas surrounding the plantation, even those adjacent to the most serious leaf fall in the rubber.³⁸

(S) The team arrived in Saigon on 26 Jun. It was composed of Dr. C. E. Minarik, Director Plant Science Laboratory, a plant physiologist and specialist in the use of herbicides; Dr. Fred Tschirley, Assistant Chief, Crop Protection Research Branch, USDA, a plant ecologist; Dr. Nader G. Vakili, Agronomy Adviser, USAID, Saigon, a plant pathologist; and Mr. Jack B. Shumate, Chief Forestry Division, USAID, Saigon. After briefings by MACV and the Embassy, the team departed for Phnom Penh on 30 Jun. By this time, the RKG claim for damages said to have been caused by US defoliant operations covered an area of some 37,000 acres and damages were estimated at \$8.5 million. This sum was broken down to \$7.6 million for damage to rubber trees, \$227,668 for damage to fruit trees, and \$857,142 for one year's relief to laborers thrown out of work.³⁹

(S) The team of experts returned to Saigon on 8 Jul and completed their report of findings on 12 Jul. Their report stated.

Herbicide damage in the southeastern part of Kompong Cham Province Cambodia, was extensive due to a combination of two factors: (a) Defoliation of fruit trees on the Cambodian side near the border was a result of drift from

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spray operations in Tay Ninh Province, and (b) Defoliation of rubber, fruit, and forest trees farther north was probably caused by a direct spray application by an unknown party on a north-south line running through the plantations of Dar and Prek Chlong.

SECSTATE recognized that no such mission had been directed and that navigational error of such scale was unlikely. On the other hand, there was no reason for the RKG to defoliate plantations, and there was no basis for believing that the VC/NVA had the capability or the desire for doing so. SECSTATE, however, did leave open the possibility of accidental over-flight. Subsequently, COMUSMACV requested the Cdr, 7AF to conduct an investigation to assure that permanent records existed to document this matter. The investigation was to cover all herbicide missions flown which could have accidentally caused the reported damage. It was to include statements by lead pilots, navigators, and other appropriate personnel, pertinent radar surveillance records of the Cambodian border area, aircraft operating records which might indicate unauthorized aircraft use, statements of policy regarding navigation techniques used on herbicide missions, and any other pertinent information. The documentation would be in a format appropriate for eventual presentation before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as Prince Sihanouk had talked of taking this case to the ICJ.⁴⁰ When the 7AF investigation was complete, AMEMB Saigon sent the following message to SECSTATE:

Full investigation of aspects of US-supplied herbicide operations in Viet-Nam for possible presentation to international tribunal in connection with RKG claims of herbicide damage in Cambodia... has been completed and is being forwarded to Department... Report concludes, *inter alia*, that no US aircraft dispensed herbicide within the territorial jurisdiction of Cambodia during period 29 March - 25 April 1969.⁴¹

(S) In September, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's views on a phasedown of herbicide operations to an objective of 25 percent of current capability by 1 Jul 70. In response to this, COMUSMACV stated, in part:

GVN herbicide program continues to be responsive to requirements of ground commanders throughout RVN. Current capability of an average of 400 productive sorties per month is minimum required for the priority targets in the CY 69 program. Demand for herbicide missions continues at a high level with most priority missions against border infiltration routes. Priority crop missions in I and II CTZ have contributed to current critical food shortages affecting VC/NVA troops.

CY 70 program is expected from JCS and US advisors in October. Indications are for reduced mission requirements in lowland areas adjacent to population centers as pacification progresses but for continued high priorities to border areas, infiltration routes, and against enemy crops.

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The trend to shift focus to border areas is intensifying and this will result in reducing accidental damage. It will not necessarily reduce the alleged damage referred to in ref message. This headquarters investigates nearly all alleged damage and has found consistently that allegations are nearly all unfounded. Recent examples include the peanut crop at An Khe which was alleged as herbicide drift but which was determined by the experts from Fort Detrick as disease and not attributable to herbicide; the alleged damage adjacent to Long Binh Post resulting from improper transplantation; and most recent claims near Da Nang which resulted from the extreme drought situation and resultant susceptibility to disease and insects. In both latter cases, affected individuals had seen insecticide spraying by helicopter or UC-123 and assumed the spray was herbicide. This assumption is widespread throughout Vietnam. Insecticide spraying, which is done over friendly areas and is easily observed has been found to be behind the majority of damage claims.

Out-of-country use of herbicide appears to be increasing and is an additional factor to be included in discussions of the overall herbicide program. Decreases in missions flown during July and August resulted from 7AF measures taken to reduce the number of hits of herbicide missions, weather, and action taken by this headquarters deleting lower priority targets. This headquarters continually monitors approved targets and issues monthly priority designations to 7AF. During CY 69 to date approved targets have been denied, curtailed or cancelled in the following provinces: Binh Duong, Long Khanh, Bien Hoa, Chuong Thien, Tay Ninh, Kien Giang, Dar Lac, Quang Duc, and Binh Dinh.

In light of continuing GVN/FWMAF requirements for herbicide operations and the high priority placed on these missions by tactical commanders, it appears unrealistic to anticipate a phasedown to 25 percent from current level. Some reduction may be possible but reduction to 70-75 percent appears more likely in the time frame considered. This headquarters will continue to review the herbicide program with the intent of phasing down as rapidly as the tactical situation permits.

(S) CINCPAC accepted this rationale and directed that herbicide operations be phased down to an objective of 70 percent of current capability by 1 Jul 70. CINCPAC further stated, however, that at a later date, further review of the herbicide program would be undertaken to determine the impact of this reduction and to make other changes to the program which might be indicated. In accordance with CINCPAC's order, COMUSMACV directed that herbicide operations be phased down as follows:

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Ranch Hand Aircraft (UC-123) conducting Herbicide Mission

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1. Continue current level of 400 productive sorties per month until 1 Nov 69.
2. Phase down to:
 - a. 380 productive sorties per month for November and December 1969.
 - b. 350 productive sorties per month for January and February 1970.
 - c. 320 productive sorties per month for March and April 1970.
 - d. 300 productive sorties per month for May and June 1970.
 - e. 280 productive sorties per month for July 1970 on.⁴²

(S) In order to prepare SECDEF to answer congressional queries, COMUSMACV furnished detailed operational information on herbicide activity in Laos from the inception of the program in December 1965.

TOTALS:		
ORANGE	-	291,015 gals
BLUE	-	56,630 gals
WHITE	-	41,500 gals
CROP	-	20,485 acres
DEFOLIATION	-	109,125 acres

The defoliation missions were accomplished to improve visibility over enemy infiltration routes and bypasses. All anticrop operations were designed to deny food being cultivated by the enemy to sustain his infiltrating troops. All targets in both categories received prior approval by the AMEMB, Vientiane.⁴³

(C) In summary, herbicide operations continued to play an important role in support of combat operations throughout RVN during 1969. Continued emphasis was placed on assuring that UC-123 herbicide targets were remote from populated areas.

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2. MACV DIRECTIVE 525-27 (S), 13 Oct 69 MACJ3, Subj: Sensor Management (U), Gp-4.
3. Rpt (S), MACJ3-051, 15 Jan 69, Subj: Year-End Review of Vietnam, 1968 (U), Gp-4.
4. MACJ3-04 Fact Sheet (S), undated, Subj: DUEL BLADE (U), Gp-4.
5. Rpt (S), MACJ3-053, undated, Subj: J3 Historical Summary for Jan 69 (U), Gp-4.
6. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CG III MAF, 091100Z Apr 69, Subj: DUEL BLADE Planning Guidance (U), Gp-3.
7. Rpt (TS), MACJ3-053, undated, Subj: J3 Historical Summary for June 1969 (U), Gp-4.
8. Rpt (TS) MACJ3-05, Subj: Historical Summary Sep-Oct 69, Gp-4; Msg (C) COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 120719Z Dec 69, Subj: Excess AP Mines (U), Gp-4.
9. Rpt (S), MACJ3-051, 15 Jan 69, Subj: Year-End Review of Vietnam, 1968, Gp-4.
10. MACJ3-04 Fact Sheet (S), 31 Jan 69, Subj: DUFFEL BAG Operations (U), Gp-4.
11. Rpt (TS), MACJ3-051, undated, Subj: J3 Historical Summary for March 1969 (U), Rpt (TS) MACJ3-053, undated Subj: J3 Historical Summary for June 1969 (U); Both Gp-4.
12. Msg (S), JCS to CINCPAC et. al, Subj: Effectiveness of DUFFEL BAG (U), 122103Z May 69; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, Subj: Effectiveness of DUFFEL BAG (U), 181116Z May 69, Both Gp-4.
13. Rpt (TS), MACJ3-05, undated, 14 Oct 69, Subj: Historical Summary for August 1969; Rpt (TS), MACJ3-05, undated, Subj: Historical Summary for September 1969 (U); Both Gp-4.
14. Rpt (TS), MACJ3-05, Subj: Historical Summary for October 1969, Gp-4.
15. Rpt (S), MACJ3-051, 15 Jan 68, Subj: Year-End Review of Vietnam, 1968 (U), Gp-4.
16. Rpt (TS), MACJ3-053, 12 Jun 69, Subj: J3 Historical Summary for May 1969 (U), Gp-4.
17. Rpt (TS), MACJ3-05, undated, Subj: Historical Summary for June 1969; Rpt (TS), MACJ3-05, 14 Oct 69, Subj: Historical Summary for September 1969; Both Gp-4.
18. Rpt (TS), MACJ3-05, 14 Oct 69, Subj: Historical Summary for October 1969, Gp-4.
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24. Directive (C), COMUSMACV, 12 Aug 68, Subj: Herbicide Operations (U), Gp-4.
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27. Bklt (TS), MACJ031, 16 Sep 68, Subj: Command History 1967 (U), Gp-1.
28. Bklt (TS), JCS, 15 Jan 69, Subj: Year-End Review of Vietnam (U), Gp-4.
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CHAPTER VIII

PACIFICATION AND NATION BUILDING

INTRODUCTION

(U) Pacification in RVN was a complex military, political, economic, and socio-psychological process with the principal thrust of providing security to the population of RVN as well as peace, prosperity, political stability, and social justice. Broad in concept, it combined dozens of individual programs and efforts which had, among other aspects, the following basic objectives: establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to the citizenry and involving their participation; providing sustained credible security; destroying the enemy's underground government or infrastructure; asserting or reasserting GVN political control; involvement of the people in the central government; and initiating economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion.

(U) A sound pacification program was inherently essential to a successful counterinsurgency. Experience had shown that it should be a viable and dynamic program with major and timely emphasis. Experience had also shown, however, that this was rarely, if ever, the case. Apathy, faulty, and self-centered leadership, the urgent demands of immediate civil and military crises were usually enough to push pacification into the background. This was particularly true in RVN. While President Ngo Dinh Diem had initiated specific pacification efforts shortly after he became president of the RVN in 1954, inherent weakness within the government, historic traditions which permitted corruption and created little or no national consciousness, and crises precipitated by subversive elements within the society permitted only uncertain, spotty, and slow progress.

(U) In late 1966 the GVN, with US help, had initiated a major effort designed to avoid past mistakes while embarking upon a meaningful program to deny the enemy his vital base of popular support. It was not until the establishment of the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) in late 1966, that efforts to coordinate security plans with revolutionary development (then considered by some another name for pacification) had begun in earnest.

(U) In 1967 the fully integrated Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) organization was integrated into MACV and with it the opportunity to coordinate and incorporate all major planning processes which affected pacification. It also brought further refinements to the GVN pacification structure including increased emphasis on providing security throughout the RVN. Overall therefore, 1967 was a year in which the GVN, backed by MACCORDS (the MACV staff section), had moved towards one plan for pacification together with a more effective organization for directing it.

(C) The peak of enemy military efforts in a timetable to effect a military decision had occurred in 1968. The Communist offensive began with the Tet Offensive on 30 Jan 68, followed by four offensives, each with less intensity, ending with the Tet 1969 Offensive. The enemy Tet 1968 Offensive viciously attacked Allied forces and the people of the RVN in an attempt to

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effect a military defeat and coerce the people into an uprising. Both attempts failed. The offensives, however, were helpful to pacification in the long run. They provided both an opportunity and a requirement to review past pacification policies and concepts. After the Tet attacks, for example, the GVN realized clearly that one central authority was required to coordinate and direct the vast recovery operation. The Central Recovery Committee (CRC), first under the chairmanship of the Vice President and later under the Prime Minister, provided the direction required at this critical time. Equally important, however, the CRC established the vital precedent of a central planning and implementing authority in a coordinating body at a top government echelon, something that later would be vital to the pacification program.

(C) After the crisis of Tet 1968 had passed, a comprehensive review of pacification policies and management techniques had been undertaken. Particular attention had been devoted to ways of strengthening pacification management, the need to focus on priorities, and establishment of the proper mix between development and security-oriented programs. At the same time, MACCORDS, on its own initiative, had undertaken a comprehensive review of pacification which resulted in a document entitled "Thoughts on Pacification." This important paper placed great emphasis on territorial security as the first essential stage of pacification, stressed the need for centralized direction and improved management, recommended greater concentration of pacification resources on the most important geographical areas and programs, and urged the establishment of strong governmental authority in villages on a permanent basis. It also urged that the pacification effort be centered on the village rather than the hamlet, and it strongly recommended the involvement of the permanent technical ministries. Finally, "Thoughts on Pacification" set up a series of priority objectives, all of which eventually found their way into the 1969 pacification guidelines.

(C) Encouraged by initially favorable reactions by high GVN officials to the concepts presented in "Thoughts on Pacification," MACCORDS had developed a complete package of pacification guidelines which were specifically designed to be used as a basis for negotiations with GVN officials at the working level. The result had been formulation of the plans and guidelines to be followed in 1969, to include a preliminary surge effort, beginning 1 Nov 68, and known as the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC).

THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN

(C) After the failures of the enemy's 1968 August offensive, the GVN had taken a decisive step which, in retrospect, had served to coalesce thinking on 1969 pacification strategy. It had been decided that a "special campaign" should be launched immediately to "seize initiative from the enemy and expand GVN control and authority in rural areas."¹

(C) President Thieu announced the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) on 11 Oct 68. "In the present situation which is favorable to us in all fields," he said, "we must seize the initiative to conduct strong military counteroffensives in all the battlefields in order to exploit the enemy's weaknesses, and most of all, to support our Pacification and Reconstruction efforts." "Its objective," he added, "is to consolidate what we have achieved, and furthermore, to extend a firm control over the necessary territory and a minimum of 80 percent of the whole population."²

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(C) Under the general concept of pacification, President Thieu made the following point:

We should direct our efforts to secure effectively the territory, chiefly the population and economic centers and strategic areas, at the same time to set up an effective local government entrusted with full power for implementing successfully the national policies supported massively and enthusiastically by the people.

The reconstruction should encompass both the rural and urban areas in order to bring the people freedom, justice, prosperity, and a brilliant future.

The territorial security should be assured by consolidating an effective territorial defensive system in which the Regional Forces assume the main role, supported by Popular Forces and People's Self-Defense Forces. The territorial forces, especially the PF, should be stationed permanently in the villages and hamlets to support the local government and reconstruction activities. The territorial defensive system should be supported adequately by artillery and an effective net communication.

All lines of communications necessary to military and economic efforts should be secured at all cost.

The Communist infrastructure should be eradicated because these cadres are the Communists' most effective tools in the struggle to win the people and seize the territory. Their presence constitutes a permanent threat to our territorial security.³

(C) In touching on what he called "main efforts," President Thieu stressed the necessity of maintaining "absolute security" in those hamlets rated "under GVN influence" (A, B, or C) by the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). He insisted that "local government must be incorrupt and efficient" and that "new life should be developed at full swing in the spirit of community development." In those areas rated as "contested" (D and E hamlets), he ordered "concentration of efforts to restore security" and "limited development of new life with uncostly and mostly necessary facilities." As for the Communist-controlled hamlets, he emphasized the necessity of "conducting search-and-destroy operations," disrupting the enemy's logistic and troop movement systems, maintaining an insecurity status in the enemy's base areas as the proof of our capability to be wherever and whenever over the whole country according to our initiative."⁴


(C) President Thieu then proceeded to the "prime tasks." He listed these as improving the Regional Forces and Popular Forces, promoting the PHUNG HOANG (PHOENIX) or anti-VCI plan, reforming local governments, organizing the people into Self-Defense Forces, enforcing economic revival measures, improving information and propaganda systems, properly implementing the Chieu Hoi or "Open-Arms" policy, and assisting the rehabilitation and resettlement of refugees.⁵

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CENTRAL PACIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL



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Figure VIII-1

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(S) Although President Thieu did not openly announce it at the time because of its classification, he had set specific target goals to be achieved before the official termination of the campaign on 31 Jan 69. These were as follows: (1) To drive the enemy from populated areas; (2) to upgrade 1,000 D&E hamlets to C category; (3) to neutralize 3,000 members of the VCI each month; (4) to rally at least 5,000 Hoi Chanh by 31 Jan; (5) to expand the People's Self-Defense Organization to one million, of which at least 200,000 would be armed; and (6) to expand the information and propaganda campaign to exploit enemy failures and demonstrate the GVN's seizure of the initiative to end the war in victory. ⁶

(C) The various organizations and units necessary to implement the directives were set up, the target hamlets selected and the supporting military campaigns arranged. Included, of course, was a massive PSYOP effort. To COMUSMACV, the new program represented a "fine framework" for a "vigorous overall pacification program." "It deserves," he wrote, "our fullest effort and support." ⁷

(C) The program was launched with vigor as scheduled on 1 Nov 68 with the GVN calling the unclassified portion of the effort "Determined to Win." There were problems of course, but for the most part these were overcome. An early and potentially difficult problem, for example, was that of central pacification management. It soon became clear that the loosely organized Central RD Council was ill equipped to manage effectively something as broad and as urgent as the APC. The result was the establishment, under the Prime Minister, of a permanent Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC) (See Figure VIII-1). Under this arrangement, the Prime Minister actually chaired the council, with the First Minister serving as Secretary General and all other ministers participating in pacification and development as equal members. There was, however, a smaller coordinating committee chaired by the Secretary General and composed of representatives from the ministries most directly involved in pacification. There was also a Current Affairs Committee, which was equipped to handle planning, reporting, inspecting, and analysis and which, as a result, was charged with handling the Council's "daily business." This new arrangement was by no means perfect and further refinements were made in the 1969 program. But the changes during the APC were significant because in fostering authoritative centralized control, the GVN was greatly increasing the possibility that the all important momentum of the APC would be maintained.

(C) Since the Accelerated Pacification Campaign carried over into 1969, its final results were not known until well into the period covered by this history. These gains, when they were announced in February, were impressive, although they did not always meet target objectives. In the category of hamlet security which was a basic foundation to any permanent type pacification, a total of 1,870 hamlets were raised to A, B, and C status. However, only 889 of those were "target hamlets" specifically picked for the APC. (It is important to realize that the APC was a surge effort aimed in certain directions. Regular pacification programs continued largely as before.) Of the 889 APC target hamlets, 591 came out of the D&E ("contested") category and 298 out of the VC-controlled category. In addition, 13 target hamlets in Pleiku Province were reported as upgraded but because of the Montagnard names, they could not be identified by the working Hamlet Evaluations System (HES). ⁸

(C) Countrywide, the statistics revealed that 14 provinces had upgraded 100 percent of the D, E or VC-controlled APC hamlets to relatively secure status. Fifteen provinces upgraded 25 or more of them. Eight provinces achieved less than 60 percent of projected APC hamlet security goals; however, as one report pointed out, "significant progress is masked if only

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movement to relatively secure status is noted. An Xuyen Province, where only one of 14 target hamlets advanced to relatively secure status, had 12 VC hamlets move to 'D' status."

(C) Measured in terms of people, the results were even more impressive. Almost 2.5 million people in contested areas or under VC control were brought up to A, B, or C status with nearly one million coming directly from VC control.⁹

(C) The final percentages provided President Thieu by MACV for his press conference at the end of the APC was that 79 percent of RVN's hamlets were now in the ABC categories, 10 percent in the D and E categories, and 11 percent classified as under VC control. President Thieu, however, felt that A, B, C, D, and E should be lumped into a new category called "population under GVN control" with the remainder "not yet fully under GVN control." He thus announced at the end of APC that 89 percent of the people were "under GVN control." The point could be disputed but even with the 79 percent figure of MACV, the overall ABC gain for the three month period was 9.2 percent.¹⁰

(C) Before the APC was launched, GVN programs were neutralizing members of the VCI at the rate of about 1,200 per month. The APC objective was to raise this figure to at least 3,000 per month but in this respect, the effort fell short. During November, 2,338 were neutralized, 2,372 in December, and 1,294 in January. (The January figure came under new and more stringent criteria for determining what constituted VCI. Under the old criteria, it would have been approximately double.)

(C) If the GVN had proven overly optimistic in the estimate of its ability to neutralize VCI, it proved overly pessimistic about the number of enemy who would rally under the Chieu Hoi (Open-Arms) program. The goal of 5,000 returnees (Hoi Chanh) for the three-month period was exceeded by 3,646, with nearly three-quarters of the 8,646 total coming from IV CTZ.

(C) This number of Hoi Chanh represented a markedly successful exploitation of the declining enemy military capability, especially in the large rural population of IV CTZ. The primary contributing factor was the aggressiveness of Allied military operations conducted during late 1968 and early 1969. Additionally, a reward program whereby Hoi Chanh were given money for inducing others to rally was more remunerative in IV CTZ due to the nature of the population and terrain which enhanced interpersonal communications. However, the most significant aspect of the Chieu Hoi program was the effect on enemy recruiting which steadily declined during the year, and forced the enemy to reinforce his forces in IV CTZ with NVA units, personnel replacements, and political cadre. The Chieu Hoi rates by month and by CTZ for the APC period were as follows:

	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Jan</u>	<u>APC Total</u>	<u>Percentage of Returnees</u>
I CTZ	221	287	273	781	9%
II CTZ	145	235	257	637	8%
III CTZ	368	397	321	1,048	12%
IV CTZ	<u>1,519</u>	<u>2,269</u>	<u>2,376</u>	<u>6,180</u>	<u>71%</u>
Total	2,269	3,148	3,229	8,646	100%

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(C) Expanding the Peoples Self-Defense Force (PSDF) to one million, of which 200,000 would be armed, was a vital part of APC program. The aim was to organize a 50-man force, armed with at least 10 weapons, in each of the target hamlets. At the same time, the PSDF would be expanded in urban areas so that some of the RF/PF elements presently guarding those areas could be redeployed to target hamlets.

(C) In some respects, the PSDF portion of APC progressed better than expected although the goal of arming 200,000 fell short by 30,000. The overall total of PSDF members rose to 1,107,000 by 31 Jan, with 659,000 of this number considered trained. Generally the PSDF had little capability for providing territorial security, except in areas where there was high esprit and strong leadership. With a relatively new program such as PSDF, this was probably inevitable. No doubt the value of the program would increase with the passing of time. In the meantime, there was real benefit in involving the people, even if ineptly at first, in the defense of their own communities.

(C) Another important aspect of the APC program was the extension of GVN presence into the targeted areas through the development of local governments at the hamlet and village level. This, in itself, was an announcement that the GVN intended to remain in the area permanently. For this reason, all target hamlets were provided with functioning administrative committees, usually through GVN appointment but sometimes through elections. In many cases former officials, who may have been either appointed or elected but had been living in exile, were brought back and reestablished in the target hamlets. By the end of the APC, therefore, some impressive gains were evident. Of the 1,335 specifically targeted hamlets during APC, 554 had elected GVN administrations, 730 had appointed ones, and only 61 had none at all. (Note: The initial list of targeted APC hamlets contained approximately 1,100 names. Between the time this list was drawn up and the beginning of the program, some 200 of the named hamlets had already moved to "relatively secure" status. A supplemental list was then made up, bringing the total to 1,335.)

(C) The progress of the PSYOP portion of APC, which had the rather vague objective of expanding the information and propaganda campaign to exploit enemy failures and impress the people with the GVN initiative, was difficult to measure. Two hundred eight-five radios and 245 television sets were placed in strategic locations, 304 information offices were built, 813 Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) cadres were assigned to target areas, 570 bulletin boards were established, and propaganda leaflets and newspapers were distributed in appropriate places. Indeed, only 66 of the target hamlets received no special propaganda and information emphasis.

(C) Based on an "attitude survey" run in III CTZ, MACCORDS officials believed that the effort had a beneficial effect on the population in general. In one area, the local inhabitants indicated that they favored the campaign but wished that officials would stop bothering them about self-defense and other civic duties during harvest time. Also, in a number of areas, the people expressed concern over the permanence of improved security and wondered if GVN interest in them might not wane after the campaign was over. The real value of the PSYOP effort, therefore, was to be measured in terms of the future.

(C) One aspect of the APC remains to be noted. Although not a specific objective, military operations which shielded the pacification effort and, in many instances, were organized and conducted with pacification in mind, are worthy of mention. These intensified military operations had the effect of pre-empting enemy reaction and preventing concerted enemy activities

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against target pacification areas. Moreover, US combat divisions were able to lend considerable support by reconnaissance in force operations close to target areas and by conducting continuous operations against selected enemy elements which otherwise might have seriously interfered with the APC. As one report stated, "Essentially all military operations during the APC directly supported the campaign. The involvement of both US and ARVN in the campaign under the 'One War' concept proved highly beneficial and was a major factor in its success." (See Ground Operations, Chapter V.) This same point was also made in those documents which emphasized that the lack of systematic enemy opposition was one of the primary reasons for the APC success.

(C) When President Thieu held his press conference announcing the end of the APC, he termed it a great success. COMUSMACV agreed. The assessment portion of the wrap-up message from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC deserves to be quoted at length:

The Accelerated Pacification Campaign strengthened the GVN's position vis-a-vis the enemy's political/military presence in the rural areas; gave local GVN leaders considerable more confidence by demonstrating that progress could be made with resources at hand and increased pacification momentum in all CTZs and most provinces. All goals were not achieved but even in these cases there was a substantial increase in pace over the rate of earlier months. Enemy resistance was lighter than expected and the lack of concerted enemy counter-measures was a major factor favoring the campaign's success. Support from top GVN officials, including President Thieu, was excellent. The newly organized Central Pacification and Development Council was tested and acquitted itself reasonably well, although it needs more staff and a coordinator who can devote most of his time to the expanding activities of the Council and its staff. (President Thieu has indicated that he intends to strengthen the pacification organization shortly.) However, the APC demonstrated that the GVN is able to effectively integrate the several aspects of pacification. All four CTZ Commanders gave their active support as did US field force and division commanders. In sum, the APC was highly successful, has definitely given the GVN pacification initiative, and provides a strong base and forward momentum for the aggressive 1969 Pacification and Development Plan . . .

The 1969 Pacification and Development Plan

(C) In a lengthy document dated 15 Dec 68, the GVN had laid down the basic policies and objectives of its 1969 Pacification and Development Plan. This authoritative document was not only the foundation for the 1969 program, it was itself a notable achievement in cooperation and coordination. For one thing, it was the first time the GVN had put all the guiding elements

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of pacification into a single document. Also, it was the combined effort of the newly formed Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC), various ministries, and MACV. The basic directive at the beginning of the document, for example, was drawn up by the CPDC but closely resembled a proposed draft suggested by MACCORDS. Before going to the field, it was signed by 16 ministers, deputy ministers, and the Director General of National Police. The various annexes were drawn up by the appropriate ministries; however, the final drafts were written at CPDC with a representative from each of the ministries present. Each ministry, therefore, had the opportunity to defend its own policies as expressed in the annexes while CPDC members ensured that the ministerial policy was consistent with national pacification policy.¹¹ A representative from MACCORDS also was included to coordinate US policies and objectives.¹²

(C) The extensive preparation and cooperation meant that the 1969 pacification program would have widespread support within the GVN. (This was a most important consideration, since previous programs had generally faltered for lack of unified support.) It also ensured that the policies, objectives, and programs that made up the 1969 plan would be basically sound. For this reason, the document is worth detailed examination.

(C) The seven page Basic Directive gave as "our essential task" the "liberation of people from coercion and control of the enemy." In this regard, it went on to say, "the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan is . . . a continuation and extension of the APC." Pointing out that the "village is the basic community of the people, so the people will participate actively in the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan within the operational scope of their village," the document went on to stress what it called the basic principle of "Community Spirit."

The Community Spirit Principle must originate with the people; every effort of the Government must be developed based on that principle, while carrying out any program or operation.

The Community Spirit Principle must work on a three-fold basis: cooperation among the people, cooperation between the people and the Government, and cooperation among Government organizations. Only then can the Government be more powerful and stable; then the people will realize that they are involved and will cooperate with the Government to defeat the common enemy.

(C) The Basic Directive then outlined eight objectives. In the achievement of these mutually supporting objectives, it stressed, "following the one Principle, is essential to reach the common objective, which is to drive out the enemy and prevent his coming back." The eight objectives, and the rationale behind them were as follows:

1. Bring security to 90 percent of the population by the end of 1969, and extend national sovereignty throughout the country.

The security factor is the most important in the pacification process. RF and PF are our territorial

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security forces. They must conduct active patrols and be determined to defend the people living in the hamlets and villages, mostly at night when enemy activities are more intense. As these forces are being increased both in quality and quantity, they will help us defend the rural people more efficiently. Moreover, they will be able to perform other tasks pertaining to the Pacification and Development Program.

The Province and District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers must provide adequate information for territorial security operations, and simultaneously support and develop close links with security elements in the villages.

The National Police (NP) duty is to maintain security and public order in the hamlets and villages. In 1969, at least 50 percent of the NP forces must be deployed from the district level downward.

70 percent of the population are now living in relatively secure areas. The accelerated Pacification Campaign is expected to liberate an additional large number of people from the enemy's tyranny. Security protection for 90 percent of the population is the first of the eight objectives to be achieved in 1969.

If we correctly apply the Community Spirit Principle we will be supported by the whole population in achieving the said objective.

2. Eliminate 33,000 VCI by the end of 1969.

The Phoenix (PHUNG HOANG) Campaign is achieving realistic results. The accelerated Pacification Campaign will easily eliminate 9,000 VCI in three months. The elimination of 33,000 VCI by the end of 1969 is simply an extension of the APC. In addition to this, if we correctly apply the Community Spirit Principle, the population will help us identify the VCI and thus we can eliminate them more easily.

3. Involve additional people in the People's Defense Groups (PSDG) to bring this strength up to 2,000,000 members.

A million PSDG members will be organized by the end of the special campaign. The objective of the 1969 campaign is to organize more members to attain the 2,000,000 members strength and to arm at least 400,000 men. To arm the people for their self defense is an important fact in the application

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of the Community Spirit Principle. Those who are not armed will participate in common self defense, such as fire fighting, first-aid, and other activities.

4. Establish local Government in the villages throughout the country.

The degree of importance of the village has been pointed out above. The establishment of local Government in those villages with contested hamlets and VC-controlled hamlets included in the 1969 campaign framework is very necessary to realize and insure a durable and real presence of the Government in rural areas as well as the application of the Community Spirit Principle.

Organization of elections is the best way to establish local Government in areas where popularly elected administrative entities do not exist and also is a method we should use wherever we can. Only in places where the Province Chief deems it unsuitable to organize elections, would the local Government be designated. In such a case the Province Chief has to indicate the reason for his doing so.

The present hamlet and village officials as well as the potential ones will have to undergo training for improvement. Besides, qualified hamlet and village officials will have to be trained and made available for the administration, upon the enemy's withdrawal, of the villages previously controlled by the VC.

5. Rally 20,000 Hoi Chanh (returnees).

Our basic concept and Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program is steadfast and the number of Hoi Chanh has increased in the past months. We can easily achieve the 5,000 Hoi Chanh objective of the special campaign, and we must increase efforts to take advantage of this available opportunity.

The enemy's morale is being lowered while our military pressure is growing stronger. The enemy must currently take heavy losses for insignificant political victories. The use of Hoi Chanh in armed propaganda units is very successful since this encourages more and more enemies to desert day by day. Good treatment has also attracted more and more Hoi Chanh. Besides, thanks to the correct execution of the presently operating programs, greater interest and attention by the Government leaders, and increased support and close cooperation of the Ministries

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involved, we should be able to rally 400 or more Hoi Chanh per week. Thus, we expect to receive 20,000 Hoi Chanh during the year 1969.

6. Decrease the number of refugees to less than 1,000,000 and resettle or return to their native places 300,000 people.

Presently, there are more than one million refugees. The number of people who are settled or returned to their native places has been increasing and we must maintain that momentum. After this resettlement or the organization for 300,000 people to return to their native places in 1969, the total number of refugees is expected to be less than one million at the end of the year. The ministries involved need to be aware of the strategic value of generous assistance to these refugees because they have left the Communists to return to the National just cause. Their cooperation when they return to their previously insecure areas is very important to the rapid re-establishment of a sound and viable local government.

7. Increase the information and propaganda effort.

The Ministry of Information has had the responsibility to diffuse and explain to the people the "one Principle and Eight Objectives" pointed out above. The information program must be carried out even to the rural areas. Mobile information teams must conduct, under the Ministry's control, frequent informational operations in the districts and villages to emphasize such themes as our determination to win, self-help and self-defense, the extermination of the VC infrastructure, and the rallying of Hoi Chanh, etc. Information cadre will be assigned even to hamlets and villages to work with the appointed or elected local government. They will work under the control of the Village Administrative Committee Chairman, but must be trained, guided and supported in their operation by the Information Ministry.

8. Encourage the rural economy.

Pacification will gradually improve the local security situation and will bring prosperity to the local people. Although substantial economic expansion occurred in rural areas in 1967, like the rising price of paddy to the farmer and the increasing production of vegetables and beans, etc.; this expansion was set back by the Tet Communist Offensive. The new programs aimed at developing "Than Nong" (TN 8) rice, increasing the production of chickens, ducks, and pigs and encouraging the use of water pumps and other farming

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equipment have been slowed down. In spite of this, the rural economy is reviving gradually.

In order that pacification may progress we need to continue to revive the economy. We must have larger rice production in order to boost the farmer's income.

The roads from the rural areas to the cities must be secured and repaired. Low interest loans must be made to the rural people. The necessary farming equipment such as water pumping machines, tractors, and other engines must be available and abundant. To foster the free movement of merchandise and produce, unnecessary permits, taxes, and checkpoints should be eliminated.

(C) The major items of the 1969 Pacification Plan, were addressed specifically to the basic objectives listed in the Basic Directive, i.e., the attack on the VCI, village and hamlet government, the PSDF, Chieu Hoi, the refugee problem, information, and improving rural economy. Because it was inherent in all the other programs, special annexes, however, were devoted to military support of the 1969 plan, the role of the National Police, the Village Self-Help Program and the RD cadre.

(C) Of special importance was the extensive emphasis on cooperation and the responsibilities of commanders from the corps level down to subsectors. At the same time, the roles of the regular, Regional, and Popular Forces were spelled out and guidelines given to these groups for the preparation of plans and reports.

(C) The National Police drew special attention to assisting in achieving the overall objectives of 90 percent security in the RVN with at least 50 percent of the force deployed at the district level or below. The intent was that each of the 253 districts in the country would have at least one National Police Field Force (NPF) platoon with a strength of 46 men. This automatically heralded a shift in police forces since some National Police would have to be shifted to the NPF. Also the Field companies, which had heretofore largely operated at province level would have to be broken up and sent down to district level.

(C) National Police support of the Pacification Plan, however, did not end with a strengthening and dispersal of police forces. Those units assigned to district level were charged with increased attention to traditional responsibilities, such as traffic control, the fight against corruption, and sanitation. Moreover, these activities were to be carried down to village and hamlet level. (Police were supposed to visit all except the VC-controlled hamlets once a week.) Also, in each hamlet, the police were required to establish an intelligence network made up of sympathizers and to explain to all concerned the importance of reporting enemy activity. Finally, police efforts were to include such things as assisting in the attack on the VCI, cooperating in armed defense of populated areas, issuing identity cards for all citizens over 15 years of age, and cooperating in that portion of the PSYOP program which stressed the police role in protecting the population.

(C) An integral part of the 1969 Pacification Plan, but not one of the eight stated objectives, was the Village Self-Help Development Program. As its name implied, this program intended that the villagers would become involved in useful projects designed to protect and maintain the

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public interest while creating a favorable atmosphere for cooperation with the ARVN. RD cadres, and the GVN. Such projects would help restore the local economy in addition to fostering the basic concepts of "community spirit."

(C) Self-help plans were not new to pacification in the RVN. The 1969 program differed from previous ones, however, in that it was more carefully conceived, had stronger financial backing, and was part of a large, well supported campaign. All villages were eligible for financial support under the program and, as an added inducement, those villages which had already organized their elections were eligible for additional support of relatively expensive projects. All villages qualified for \$VN 400,000 which would be used for activities ranging from the cultivation of fruit trees to the building of volleyball courts for the youth. No single project could cost more than \$VN 150,000 however. On the other hand, those villages which had held organized elections were allocated an additional \$VN 600,000, which could be used for projects such as roads, schools, dikes, and sewers costing more than \$VN 150,000 per project. Generally, all projects at all levels fell into the basic categories of education, health, public works, and agriculture.

(C) Organizationally, the self-help projects fell under the objective of establishing local government in the villages throughout the country. (See Figure VIII-6.) The philosophy behind self-help, however, was manifest in several of the announced objectives. Under "Concept of Operations," the 1969 plan explained it as follows:

During previous years, in many places the villagers and the village/hamlet authorities did not actually choose their projects, implement them by themselves, or control the distribution of funds and materials. The province and district authorities often infringed upon the rights of the villagers and the Hamlet Managing Boards. On the other hand, in several places the people took pride in their achievements on these projects and in the democratic spirit demonstrated in their villages and hamlets. Therefore, in 1969, the Self-Help Program will aim at increasing the achievements realized through past programs, and at the same time, creating for the villagers favorable opportunities for self-improvement within the democratic process in the villages and hamlets.

(C) The use of Revolutionary Development (RD) cadres was vital to the 1969 Pacification Program. The cadres, comprising Vietnamese nationals skilled in certain specialties, had been in use in RVN for some time, usually as 59-man teams which entered a target village, performed the assigned functions, and moved on to another village. The 1969 Plan, however, included several significant improvements over previous years. Training at the National Training Center at Vung Tau was intensified, with emphasis on quality rather than quantity. The old 59-man teams were reorganized into teams of 30 men each who, with their families, were to be permanently assigned to a particular village. There, operating directly under the Chairman of the Village Administrative Committee - the group leaders would automatically become assistants for Political Affairs and Revolutionary Development to the Chairman; they would innervate the village and hamlet infrastructure. The focus of their operations was to be the D, E, and VC hamlets with the announced intention of upgrading them to at least C category by concentrating on the following objectives: identifying the VCI, organizing and training the PSDF, organizing

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the elections of local officials, and starting the implementation of self-help programs.

(C) Under the 1969 Plan, the RD cadre teams became the vanguard of the GVN, carrying its political doctrine to the target people, and assisting them in developing those facilities and organizations which would unite them with the government under the "community spirit." This was vital work and would no doubt provoke VC retaliation. As a result, the RD cadre moved into an area after clearing operations by Regular and RF/PF troops. Moreover, the cadre was assigned to a particular village or hamlet only when it could be supported permanently by at least one PF platoon. This explains, in part at least, why the RD cadres themselves were involved in organizing the PSDF.

(C) The "Geographic Areas of Precedence" portion called for concentration of effort in selected regions to ensure that pacification resources would be used where they would do the most good. In the guidance the GVN listed what is called "national" and "provincial" areas of precedence. "By applying criteria in selecting target villages resources can be distributed most logically and efficiently." It also specified the criteria and the national-provincial breakdown.

The first and foremost is population density. The purpose of pacification is to bring security to people, to gain and retain their loyalty to the GVN. Hence, resources must be concentrated where the people are.

Other criteria are lines of communication, important government centers and installations, and major economic resources. Pacification of areas where such assets are located will improve their strength and security and thus increase their value and usability. Of course, the above-mentioned installations are usually in populated areas"

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For these reasons, the Central Council has applied the criteria discussed above to define 28 important geographic areas of precedence. These areas will be given first priority in the allocation of management attention and new pacification resources.

In addition, the Central Council has applied the same criteria to define geographic areas of provincial precedence for each province. These areas will be accorded second priority.

(C) The 28 areas of national precedence contained an estimated 58 percent of the population of RVN and the areas of provincial precedence contained an additional 19 percent. Since 13 percent of the people were already residing in areas classified as "relatively secure," a full 90 percent of the population could be brought to category C state by gaining control over everyone living inside the areas of national and provincial precedence and by preserving the security of the aforementioned 13 percent. In this way, the first of the eight objectives would be met,

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i. e., the "use of local security forces, reaction forces, and police forces at the hamlet and village level to control and secure 90 percent of the population (and) extend the national sovereignty throughout the country."

(C) Finally the 1969 plan addressed itself to the "organization and preparation of the province pacification plan and reports." An integrated plan for the employment of all pacification resources within each province was to be developed and monitored throughout 1969. The GVN requested that the province plan be simple, use map overlays if possible, and contain a minimum of narration. Specific attention, however, was to be directed to each of the eight specified objectives of the national plan although the provinces were also directed to include annexes on intelligence, pacification targets, military support, civil forces, and province forces and resources.

THE 1969 ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN

(U) With the 1969 pacification program progressing relatively smoothly (see the various sections in the pages following), the GVN Prime Minister suddenly announced to a Central Pacification and Development Council meeting on 23 May that the Program was being stepped up to meet the 1969 goals by the end of October. This new program, entitled the 1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), was formalized in a circular issued from the Prime Minister's office on 26 Jun. ¹³ "Phase I of the 1969 Pacification and Development Campaign," the circular said, "will cover the four month period 1 Jul through 31 Oct 69." It then listed a two-fold objective for Phase II:

1. The fulfillment or over-fulfillment of the eight objectives originally set for the 1969 campaign.
2. The achievement of a fully secure (HES security rating of A or B) status for 50 percent of the hamlet population.

(C) Treating each of the eight objectives in the original 1969 plan, the Prime Minister offered guidance on each. With regard to hamlet and population control, for example, he announced that "first priority (italics his) will be given to bringing at least a C level of security to 90 percent of the population." Second priority went to "the task of raising enough of the population now in a security status of C or lower to an A or B status, so that 50 percent of the hamlet population will be in an A or B status by 31 Oct."

(C) As for the objective of rendering the VCI ineffective, the Prime Minister added a new goal to the one already in effect. Five thousand VCI were to be sentenced during the four months period, however, he stressed that "the purpose is not to convict the innocent but to expedite decisions one way or the other and establish sentences for the convicted which will effectively remove them from the war for the duration of the insurgency."

(C) The objectives concerning the PSDF, village and hamlet government and the Chieu Hoi program received little discussion. The Prime Minister did say, however, that women and youth could be used as necessary in the PSDF, that emphasis would be placed on the staffing and training of all authorized village and hamlet positions as well as the Village Self Development Program, and that "emphasis will be placed . . . on the rehabilitation and useful

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employment of Hoi Chanh, particularly in APTs and mobile PF units."

(C) Refugees presented something of a problem. The Prime Minister acknowledged that the revised Phase I goals had not been met and it was unrealistic to expect the year-long objectives to be met by the end of October.

Every effort will be made, however, to re-establish as many refugees as possible, keeping in mind that the main objective is to restore these citizens to a normal life in such a manner that they will consider themselves to have been fairly treated by their government. In particular no effort will be made to force refugees or ex-refugees to participate in return-to-village campaigns against their will. Heavy emphasis will be placed during the campaign on the re-establishment of villages and hamlets for the refugees.


(C) The 1969 APC goals in the information and propaganda category emphasized the "complete staffing of information cadre positions and the training of personnel, plus the use of varying techniques to explain to the people the goals of the PD program and their role in it." Also, emphasis should be on "informing and educating the people, rather than merely on recording government successes and enemy atrocities."

(C) The only goal prescribed under the objective of stimulating the rural economy related to the existing land reform program, which was then in the final stages of development. (See Land Reform, this chapter.) Province authorities were told, however, that they must continue to stress the "several other programs contributing to this directive, including LOC improvement and security, reduction of unnecessary provincial restrictions and LOC checkpoints, the promotion of 'miracle rice' production, etc."

(C) In a presidential directive dated 1 Jul, President Thieu endorsed the 1969 APC and added some emphasis of his own. He raised the second priority objective of having 50 percent of the population in "full security" (HES rating of A or B), for example, to a primary objective. In so doing, he announced his expectation "to have 50 percent of the countrywide population with a strong national stand, under the control, organization and guidance of an effective administrative and political system which means that these 50 percent are loyal to the National Government and are determined to support the National Government."¹⁴

(C) President Thieu also listed several items for special emphasis. He called these items decisive and suggested that if some were not completely accomplished, he would not consider the campaign a success. These items were: efficient security, efficient administration, and effective enforcement of law and order. He further mentioned three important programs which must be effectively implemented to guarantee success of the special campaign. These were the PHOENIX (PHUNG HOANG) program, the Information Program, and the Land Reform Program. He charged the province chiefs with "personal responsibility" for "planning and executing" these programs.¹⁵

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operations in which contact with significant numbers of the enemy could be expected. The RF/PFs would be used to provide local security. By staying in an assigned neighborhood, security in that general area would be more or less permanent. Security for individual hamlets and villages on a continuing basis was a matter of special attention in the 1969 Pacification Plan. (This is treated in the section of this chapter devoted to the PSDF.) The same was true of security against the VCI. Overall, both the concept for providing adequate security and the methods for securing it were in keeping with COMUSMACV's one war concept.



Continuous checking of identify papers restricted Viet Cong movements.

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Security and Major Military Operations

(C) While defeating the VC/NVA remained the prime objective of many major military operations, with pacification and improvement of RVNAF significant byproducts, other large scale operations were initiated specifically as an aid to pacification. Operation BOLD MARINER/RUSSELL BEACH was a case in point. (Note: BOLD MARINER was the Marine portion of the operation, including an amphibious assault. It was discontinued on 9 Feb. RUSSELL BEACH, the US Army portion continued until 21 Jul.)

(S) BOLD MARINER/RUSSELL BEACH, a combined US and ARVN operation backed by NPFF and Armed Propaganda Teams (APT), was targeted against a top priority area in the Batangan region near Quang Ngai City. This area (referred to as "Pinkville") was completely under VC/NVA control. As a pre-assault message put it.

The region contains 80 percent of the special APC target hamlets in Quang Ngai. . . . The total estimated population there is 27,470. Estimated enemy forces include two VC/NVA battalions, two to four VC/NVA companies, and a hundred or more local guerrillas. We hold blacklists containing names of 208 VCI. VC/NVA forces in the region have capability to mount battalion-size coordinated attacks anywhere in the target region. Small unit harassing attacks are occurring on a weekly basis. ¹⁸

(S) The military operations of BOLD MARINER/RUSSELL BEACH, which began on 13 Jan, are described under Ground Operations, Chapter V. Suffice it to say here that the opportunity to meet and destroy a large enemy force in battle did not materialize; however, in terms of security the operation was very successful. A USMC publication describing January operations described it as follows:

In retrospect. . . the total success of the action ashore far exceeds the enemy battlefield casualties --both those counted and the many enemy soldiers and hoards of material undoubtedly buried in collapsed or sealed tunnels, bunkers, and caves. ¹⁹

(S) Throughout the year, search and clear operations returned significant portions of the population to GVN control. These operations fulfilled their designed purpose of providing security sufficient for the pacification process to take hold. These operations had to be followed, however, with the establishment of a more or less permanent local security, which included positioning the RF/PF platoons, building up PSDF, and continuing to root out the VCI. Then with an appropriate measure of local security, other pacification processes, such as village development, establishing local government, and stimulating rural economy, were possible.

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(S) While major operations specifically targeted for pacification purposes marked one end of the spectrum, both COMUSMACV and his RVNAF counterpart stressed the relationship of pacification to all military operations. The 1969 Pacification Plan, for example, required the CTZ commanders to study and prepare for forces to assure the security in areas already pacified; forces for ensuring security in the target villages and hamlets. It also required study of a plan to support operations to be conducted either solely by ARVN infantry divisions or with the coordination of FWMAF. In addition, the CTZ commanders were to break up their overall 1969 security plans into two or three phases in order to carry them out according to the availability of troops, cadre, and the security situation in the CTZ.²⁰

(S) An example of COMUSMACV's concern for security was reflected in his Operational Guidance Number 2, dated 6 Feb. In this document, he referred to a recent incident wherein a "VC force twice, on successive days, invaded a resettlement hamlet and forced its adult inhabitants to go to adjoining areas and work for the VC." In this particular incident, "there had been no friendly reaction until the third or fourth day." "Such a slow reaction to enemy initiatives," COMUSMACV said, "is not to be tolerated." "Security must be provided to RVN population. Security is vital to pacification and is the first objective of the 1969 Pacification and Development Campaign. It is the duty of every friendly armed formation to see that necessary security is provided."²¹

(S) Providing additional guidance, COMUSMACV added:

Major force commanders are to ensure that a system is established whereby units can receive immediate flash notice of molestation of any villages, hamlets, settlements, or RF/PF elements within their AO.

Units are to maintain a reaction capability to defeat enemy attempts at disruption of the Pacification Program. RVNAF will be encouraged to play a major role in this program.

Responses are to be so prompt and decisive and the punishment of the enemy so severe that he will realize that any time he assaults a hamlet, village, resettlement project, or other community, or an RF/PF element, he will receive a massive response from friendly forces.

Commanders will insure that security of villages and hamlets within each AO is given the highest priority, and each village or hamlet is aware of the friendly unit to be contacted when reaction force assistance is required.

(S) Further, COMUSMACV then ordered that the operational guidance be incorporated into all Standing Operating Procedures for support of the Pacification Program and announced that the JGS had been asked to issue similar instructions through RVNAF channels. "It is requested," COMUSMACV concluded, "that this headquarters be informed of responsive operational procedures presently in being or planned that meet this objective."²²

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(C) Among the responses to the MACV directive, one was especially significant. In II CTZ, the CG, I FFORCEV directed his staff and the appropriate CORDS operating agency to examine their current military/pacification program and determine what changes, if any, should be made. The result was a new pacification concept to be used in an upcoming operation in Binh Dinh Province, the most heavily populated province in II CTZ. This province was also the scene of the highest number of enemy incidents in the CTZ and thus rated correspondingly low in security.²³

(C) The new concept involved an integrated effort by ARVN, US, and ROK regular forces operating in concert with RF/PF, PSDF, National Police, PRU, CIDG forces, and appropriate GVN agencies. The aim was to achieve pacification progress through the following:

1. Long Range Combined Effort. The purpose of the effort was to ensure that the concept was applied as required and that the effort involved the best possible relationship between ARVN, US, and ROK regular forces and GVN civilian agencies.

2. Common Goal. The previous practice of often pursuing different, if not divergent goals, was to cease. In its place, friendly forces, including regular forces, would concentrate on providing close-in security to village and hamlets. The anticipated effect was that RF/PF units could be released from static defense missions so they could be used in conjunction with GVN civilian agencies to assist the pacification process.

3. Change in Target. While continuing to give attention to enemy main forces, the new effort would be concentrated on the VCI, the guerrilla terrorist, and the sapper. "Massed enemy threats will be dealt with by bringing in additional forces as required... Rapid reaction by regular forces to VC/NVA attempts to disrupt pacification will be an essential consideration."

4. Geographic Concentration. For purpose of the campaign, to be known as WASHINGTON GREEN, Binh Dinh Province was to be aligned so that areas of responsibility coincided with civilian ones. This was in recognition of the fact that pacification, by definition, was basically politically oriented.

5. District Chief Direction. As usual, command and control was to remain a national matter; however, the pacification operation itself was to be directed by district chiefs in keeping with the 1969 Combined Campaign Plan and the 1969 pacification goals. "Of fundamental importance," a briefing officer at I FFORCEV stated, "the district pacification plan will be the starting point for support operation. ARVN, US, and ROK regular forces will plan military operations in support of the district pacification program. In addition, battalion CPs and district headquarters were to be collocated where possible."

(C) Operation WASHINGTON GREEN was launched on 15 Apr. Like most major military/pacification campaigns, the number of enemy dead and detained were small compared to the overall gains of pacification. Rather, success was measured in terms of an atmosphere under which the pacification process could work effectively and which, in turn, was more to be measured by whether a village chief dared sleep in his village at night than by body count. In such terms, WASHINGTON GREEN, and a number of similar military/pacification operations, were obvious successes. (Note: For a brief description of the major military operations in support of pacification, see Ground Operations, Chapter V.) Whether the pacification process would then hold and make proper progress, however, was another matter. A US Embassy report of 11 Jun, for example, praised the efforts in Binh Dinh Province, saying that "a rapid increase in Hoi Chanh and an enemy food shortage were notable signs that the other side's morale had been

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damaged, and his communications blocked, by the Allied presence." But the document also mentioned that "consultation between ARVN commanders and province officials still leaves much to be desired." In fact, it was necessary to remove the province chief, an uncommon occurrence, in order to facilitate cooperation among the Vietnamese.²⁴

Expanding Security: National Police

(C) Vital to the security level within RVN were the number and caliber of people available to provide it. The number of ARVN and FWMAF available for pacification security varied with circumstances, but it was significant that during the year efforts were made to increase the number of National Police and RF/PF. These two forces, it will be recalled, were integral parts of pacification security.

(C) In June, shortly after announcing the Accelerated 1969 Pacification Campaign, the GVN proposed major expansion and improvement in the National Police. The idea was to expand the existing force level of 77,000 to 92,000 by the end of 1969 and 122,000 by the end of 1970.²⁵ By category, the proposed breakdown was as follows:

	<u>Uniformed Police</u>	<u>NPFF</u>	<u>Special Police</u>	<u>Total</u>
Present	51,000	13,000	13,000	77,000
End CY 69	60,000	17,200	15,000	92,200
End CY 70	84,000	20,000	18,000	122,000

(C) The GVN proposal indicated that first priority in expansion should be in the NPFF and Special Police categories, primarily because these two groups were not closely connected with pacification security. (It was also intended that large numbers of the uniformed police be assigned to districts and particularly villages, where police presence was essential for continuation of pacification process. These men, assigned three to eight to a village, were to assist in maintaining law and order, which involved security. The primary purpose, however, was to strengthen local government.

(C) In the GVN view, police expansion and improvement ranked with the high priority improvement and modernization of RVNAF. In both cases, the goals seemed ambitious in view of the manpower shortages and budget limitations. Nevertheless, the GVN seemed determined to go ahead. MACV, which would finance much of the program, took the position that the best plan would be to begin orderly expansion based on the recommended new ceilings but "keep close watch to detect undesirable and unacceptable pressures on economy or other manpower requirements, so that we can operate on basis of total long range plan rather than to make piecemeal requests for a series of incremental steps." ²⁶

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Phase II Evaluation

(C) Whereas no quantitative personnel increase goals per se had been established for the National Police, they were to play a definitive role in the qualitative goal to increase the security status of the RVN during Phase II. In this capacity, they made a significant contribution. Despite the clear VC intent to increase terrorist and sabotage activities -- primarily against all components of the pacification program -- the National Police undoubtedly contributed to the 25 percent reduction in terrorist incidents during Phase II (1 Jul - 31 Oct). For instance in Saigon, they pre-empted a VC terrorist program by accelerated arrests of a substantial number of its would-be perpetrators. Also during Phase II, National Police independent operations resulted in: 1,059 VC KIA, 2,985 VC arrested, 3,621 suspects detained and contraband seized in the amounts of 1,183 individual weapons, 178 crew-served weapons and 1,602 grenades.²⁷

(C) During this period the National Police were also faced with several problems, the largest of which was the mobilization restriction on recruiting. This restriction limited them to recruiting only those over age 35. This limitation actually caused a decline in the National Police strength from 78,043 in January to 76,330 in September, which in effect placed the year end goal of 92,200 beyond reach. However, in September, the GVN authorized the transfer of 13,000 men (largely volunteers) from the military to the National Police. By the end of October, 5,534 had been selected and 3,225 were in training. This action brought the end-October strength up to 81,560. The second problem was no doubt associated with the under strength situation. Although the National Police contribution of reduced terrorist incidents during Phase II was a positive result, it did not meet President Thieu's established goal of a 50 percent reduction. Therefore, it was assumed that this point would be readdressed in the 1970 Pacification Program.

Year-End Summary


(C) Aided by the transfer of 9,229 RVNAF personnel, the National Police year-end rolls rose to 85,218 - or 92 percent of the goal. In spite of their strength level, and the enemy attempts to raise the level of terrorist activity, terrorist incidents were reduced by 25 percent during the last five months of the year.²⁸ An overall representation of National Police activities and accomplishments is reflected in Figure VIII-3.

(C) The personnel status of the National Police was of such concern to DEPCOMUSMACV/CORDS that he recommended to the Vice Minister and Chief of Staff, CPDC on 4 Dec that one of the first tasks of the recently organized National Mobilization Manpower Committee should be to look at the National Police manpower problem. He acknowledged that it was a very complex and difficult problem and suggested that either the police get more people from the military, more recruits from the Quang Trung Training Center, or modify the mobilization procedures to allow the National Police to recruit personnel below the 35-year-old age limitation. The Vice Minister replied that in addition to its increased authorized strength, the program was late in getting started on an expansion drive. Additionally, all other forces were also increased, and as the other forces reach their manpower goals the manpower drain would be eased, allowing the National Police to fill their 1970 goal of 122,500.²⁹

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POLICE ACTIVITIES

CURRENT AND PROJECTED GOALS
NATIONAL POLICE STRENGTH



1969 AVG OPERATIONS
PER MONTH

JOINT 2,988
INDEPENDENT 2,533

RESULTS
OF INDEPENDENT OPNS
1 JUL 31 DEC

VC KILLED	1,110
VC CAPTURED	3,812
SUSPECTS DETAINED	6,899
CONFISCATIONS: INDIVIDUAL WPNS	1,656
CREW SERVED WPNS	203
GRENADES	2,317

AS OF 30 NOV 1969

NP IN VILLAGES	6,253
VILLAGES WITH NP STATIONS	1,621 OR 75 %

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Expanding Security: The RF/PF

(C) As of 1 Jan, the authorized strength figures for RF and PF were 252,927 and 178,140 respectively. Actual strength figures for that period, however, showed 220,865 RF and 173,219 PF. As these figures make clear, the short-fall was not serious in the case of the PF but represented a significant percentage in the case of the RF. A prime objective for the territorial security portion of the 1969 Pacification Plan, therefore, was to increase the number of RF, a difficult task considering the manpower shortage caused by mobilization. Also, 1969 plans called for upgrading both the RF/PF by issuing more modern weapons, particularly the M16, and by increased support by small mobile advisory teams (two officers and three NCO's). (Note: See the section of Chapter VI on RVNAF Improvement and Modernization.)

(C) During the first half of 1969, considerable progress was made in overcoming the short-fall, particularly in RF. Indeed, by the end of June, the assigned strength had climbed to 249,553, just 3,374 short of the authorized figures. During the same period, the PF strength climbed to 175,118 or 3,022 short of the authorized figure.

(C) At the same time during the period, significant improvement was made in "modernization" of RF/PF. In particular, an additional 113,494 M16 rifles were issued to RF/PF during the first half of the year, resulting in increased firepower and the increased confidence that went along with it. Also, the use of some 353 mobile advisory teams increased RF/PF aggressiveness. Thus, by mid year, the RF kill ratio with the VC/NVA was a favorable 4.4 to 1. The PF ratio stood at 3.4 to 1.³⁰

Phase II Evaluation

(C) President Thieu's directive of 1 July -- which placed special emphasis on Phase II of the 1969 APC -- established a primary objective of "consolidation and upgrading of currently secure hamlets by providing "full" security (HES rating of A or B) for 50 percent of the population." One of the criteria to be used in determining "full" security was, "PF at full strength as projected and capable of defending the hamlet."³¹

(C) During Phase II the territorial security forces were expanded rapidly, particularly the recruitment and training of 863 PF platoons which the JCS had authorized in July. The RF/PF attainments at the end of the APC were:

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
Regional Forces	252,927	251,892
Popular Forces	208,345	206,545
Total	461,272	460,437

This strength was broken down to 1,478 RF companies and 3,724 PF platoons. Of the 863 PF platoons, authorized by the JCS in July, 311 were in training while the remaining 552 had completed their training and were operational.³²

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(C) The following statistics depict the operational status and effectiveness of RF and PF units as derived from the 31 Oct Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) report completed by the District Senior Advisors:³³

Training - (Percentage of units reporting conduct of required six hours)

RF - 27% PF - 21%

Fire Power - (Percentage of units rated by advisors as inferior or greatly inferior to enemy)

RF - 4% PF - 11%

Mission Performance - (Percentage of units rated by advisors as satisfactory)

RF - 97% PF - 90%

Supply Support - (Units marginally or critically short of barrier materials)

RF - 22% PF - 28%

(Units with more than 90% serviceable weapons)

RF - 94% PF - 86%

Year-End Summary

(C) In an attempt to compensate for the reduction of US forces in RVN, the JGS on 11 Nov unilaterally decided to accelerate the activation of 670 PF platoons and 23 RF companies from FY 1971 to FY 1970.³⁴ The JGS accelerated activation was to be effective 1 Jan 70 with inputs into the training centers in two phases, Phase 1 beginning on 1 Feb 70 and Phase 2 on 1 Mar 70. The JGS also determined the CTZ distribution as follows:

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>PF PLATOONS</u>	<u>RF COMPANIES</u>
I	100	4
II	107	4
III	97	3
IV	<u>366*</u>	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	670	23

*JGS directed IV CTZ to assign six of these platoons for security missions at the interprovincial PF training centers. (Two each at Vinh Long, Bac Lieu, and Kien Giang).

(C) As the RF and PF organizations grew to a strength of 467,961 by the end of November, so did their efficiency in their offensive missions. Although RF small unit operations decreased, the number of contacts and enemy KIA increased as did RF casualties.³⁵

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(U) Figure VIII-4 reflects the year-end strength of the RF/PF as compared with the previous year, total operations, and operational results.

Measuring Population and Hamlet Security (Phase I)

(C) Throughout 1969, population security was measured by the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), a computerized system which arranged and analyzed information provided by province and district advisors. The HES then supplied information on demand, with the most important being the categories living in areas graded as A, B, C, D, E, or V. These letter grades had the following definitions:

A. Adequate security forces, infrastructure eliminated, public projects underway, economic picture improving.

B. Not immune to VC threat but security is organized and partially effective, infrastructure partially neutralized, self-help programs underway and economic programs started.

C. Subject to infrequent VC harassment, infrastructure identified, some participation in self-help program.

D. VC activities reduced but still an internal threat, some VC taxation and terrorism. Some local participation in hamlet government and economic programs. Contested but leaning toward GVN.

E. VC are effective although some GVN control is evident. VC infrastructure intact. GVN programs are non-existent or just beginning.

V. Under VC control. No GVN or advisors enter except on military operations. Population willingly or unwillingly support VC.

(Note: These definitions were basic to the HES and consequently were to be found on many documents associated with the system.)

(C) As of the end of January, when the APC came to an end and the 1969 Pacification and Development Program began, 79.2 percent of the population of RVN lived in A, B, or C areas. D and E population stood at 9.4 percent and the VC population 11.4 percent.³⁶

(C) For the rural population, the percentages were slightly different, primarily because the VC could completely control some rural areas whereas complete control of a major city for any length of time was out of the question. By individual categories, the rural population breakdown was as follows: ABC, 69 percent; DE, 13.5 percent and V, 17.5 percent.

(C) Despite a lag during the Tet holidays, problems associated with shifting from the APC to the 1969 Pacification and Development Program, and the series of enemy attacks beginning on 22 Feb, the month of February showed an increase in secure population over January.³⁷ The DE and V decreased by 0.7 percent and 0.4 percent respectively, raising the percentage of secure population (A, B, or C) to 80.3. (Note: For reporting purposes, the D and E categories were often lumped together.)

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TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES




FIGURE VIII-4

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(C) Among the rural population, the ABC categories increased by 1.4 percent to 70.4 percent, reflecting a corresponding decrease in the DE and V categories. In view of the February attacks and the uneasiness surrounding Tet, this was somewhat surprising, particularly since there was no corresponding increase in the urban areas. Part of the reason for this anomaly lay in the fact that enough hamlets had been brought to near C status during January that continued security and some additional work, such as arming the PSDF and completing certain self-help projects, raised them to "C". Also, the enemy generally left rural villages and hamlets alone during the opening stages of the offensive. (As of 28 Feb, only 119 hamlets were reported to have been entered by VC/NVA units for even a short period.) On the other hand, there was some decline in rural security near the approaches to Saigon, reflecting enemy activity in that region.

(C) Since the VC/NVA continued their offensive throughout March, there was loss of security during that month in certain provinces. Quang Nam and Quang Ngai in I CTZ regressed, as did Kontum, Phu Yen and Darlac in II CTZ, Phuoc Long, and Bien Hoa in III CTZ, and Kien Tuong in IV CTZ. Elsewhere the 1969 Pacification and Development Campaign got underway despite the increased level of enemy activity. This step forward, together with enemy failure to attack pacification per se, allowed the GVN forces to enter more than 1,200 target hamlets and redeploy nearly 1,000 RF/PF platoons. As a result, security was expanded and improved in 36 provinces with the country as a whole showing a relatively secure (ABC) population gain of 1.8 percent for the month. However, more than half the gain was in IV CTZ where the enemy was least able to accomplish his objectives and where an usually high Chieu Hoi rate indicated that he was having problems with morale and discipline.

(C) Of some concern during February and March was the impact of the enemy attacks on the overall pacification effort. (Tet 1968, it will be recalled, had proven a serious setback.) In mid-March, a special study was completed which analyzed the problem. One major conclusion was that whereas the enemy had talked about the necessity of attacking the pacification effort, as yet, pacification "still apparently has not been singled out by the enemy as a special target." This conclusion was based in part on response to a special questionnaire sent to each of the senior province advisors. Of the 44 respondents, 36 reported no or only slight effect on momentum and progress; four reported momentum definitely slowed, although there had been no significant lowering of rural security; two reported that momentum had halted with some lowering of rural security as reflected in reduction of ABC population; and two reported that pacification had been set back, with a significant (more than 5 percent) reduction in ABC population.³⁸

(C) The overall conclusion of the office of MACCORDS, which prepared a report of the survey, was that pacification still appeared relatively unscathed. However, continued high level of enemy activity and the resultant more tenuous security situation could begin to have a dampening effect on pacification and cause provinces to hold back from aggressive execution of the ambitious 1969 plan. To counter this possibility, the report concluded, "Deputy Prime Minister Khiem is visiting each CTZ to check conditions and urge that 1969 plans be executed promptly."

(C) While the relative security for the population as a whole rose to 82.1 percent, the ABC categories for the rural population increased during March by 2.5 percent to 72.9 percent -- a net gain of some 265,900 people. Population in the DE and V categories declined accordingly by 1.2 percent for the DE categories and 1.3 percent for the V category. The end-March figures for these two groups stood at 11.7 percent and 15.4 percent respectively.³⁹

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(C) The net result of continued enemy attacks during the first part of the month and the increased tempo of 1969 pacification plans resulted in another favorable showing for April. The rate of increase, however, was not as great as that of March, primarily because the latter month had witnessed most of the redeployments of territorial security forces and RD cadre teams. Thus, in April, pacification resources were most active in hamlets which had already been entered earlier in the campaign.

(C) Overall, the ABC population increased during the month of April by 1.2 percent to a total of 83.3 percent, with once again half the gain coming in IV CTZ which had top pacification priority.⁴⁰

(C) May witnessed an ABC population increase of .9 percent, bringing the overall percentage to 84.2 percent. At the same time, DE population increased slightly (0.4 percent) while V population decrease (down 1.3 percent) was greater than in either March or April. Most likely this was the result of provinces carrying out President Thieu's instructions to consolidate administratively the unpopulated or sparsely populated villages and hamlets with nearby villages and hamlets having functional local governments.

(C) In 12 provinces, Quang Tri, Quang Tin, Kontum, Binh Dinh, Ninh Thuan, Binh Long, Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, Long An, Kien Giang, Chau Doc, and Sa Dec -- population within GVN security (ABC) declined during May. However, only in Quang Tri (down 6.8 percent), Chau Doc (down 2.9 percent), Kontum (down 2.4 percent), Kien Giang (down 1.2 percent), and Sa Dec (down 1.0 percent) were the changes significant.

(C) ABC categories of rural population increased during May by 1.6 percent to 76.4 percent, a net gain of 216,800 people. The V population declined 2.0 percent to 11.8 percent, but DE categories increased 0.4 percent to 11.8 percent.⁴¹

(C) The May total of 11,664 hamlets reported was down by 751 from the previous month's total, thus reflecting continued GVN consolidation of hamlets and villages having no or very small population with large hamlets having functional GVN administrations.

(C) The HES results in June underscored the trend of approximately 1.0 percent gain in ABC population each month over the past several months. Actual increase in June was 1.4 percent or 325,800 persons. At the end of the month, therefore, total ABC population stood at 85.6 percent or 14,820,400 out of an estimated total population of 17,310,600. IV CTZ showed the largest increase with 3.1 percent. VC population decreased by 160,100 to 6.9 percent of RVN population, a decrease of 0.9 percent in this category, leaving 1,189,500 people rated VC. By the same token, DE population country wide decreased by 75,200 (0.5 percent) to 1,294,700 or 7.5 percent of the estimated total population. Eight provinces suffered a decline in ABC population compared to 12 in May.⁴²

(C) ABC categories of rural population increased during June by 2.5 percent to 78.9 percent, a net gain of 493,900 people. Rural population in DE categories decreased by 51,000 (0.7 percent) to 1,223,800, while V population decreased by 155,500 (1.8 percent) to 1,110,400 people or 10 percent of the total population.

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Phase I Review

1 Jan - 30 Jun 69

(C) Looking back at the prime objective of territorial security after Phase I had come to a close, MACCORDS found the results "more than satisfactory." The gain from 79.2 percent of the population in relatively secure areas at the end of January had been increased to 85.6 percent, 2.6 percent more than the Phase I goal. Of the 1,691 target hamlets earmarked for Phase I, 1,562 or 92.5 percent had been entered and 1,080 (63.5 percent) had been raised to C category or higher. Also, the authorized RF increase was 99.5 percent complete. 43

(C) Put into more subjective terms, progress in territorial security was determined to be as follows:

	<u>I CTZ</u>	<u>II CTZ</u>	<u>III CTZ</u>	<u>IV CTZ</u>	<u>RVN</u>
Population	good	good	good	adeq	good
Hamlets entered	good	adeq	good	good	good
Hamlets raised to "C" or higher	adeq	adeq	adeq	adeq	adeq
RF Increase	good	good	good	good	good

(C) The main reason for the improved territorial security was the "favorable military situation." As the midyear report put it,

ARVN and allied forces in general kept enemy main force units away from heavily populated pacification areas. Local security improved largely through the GVN's mobilization program and increase in numbers and effectiveness of Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF)... Results were additional operations and contacts with the enemy..... and enemy's decreasing ability to roam at will to forage, conscript, and tax. 44

Population and Hamlet Security (Phase II)

1 Jul - 31 Oct

(C) On 1 Jul, President Thieu issued a directive which endorsed the Prime Minister's order of 26 Jun to execute Phase II of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan for the period 1 Jul to 31 Oct. However, he established as a primary objective the consolidation and upgrading of currently secure hamlets by providing "full" security (HES rating of A or B) for 50 percent of the population by 30 Oct. This objective was in addition to the objective of continuing to expand territorial security by providing security (HES A, B, or C rating) to 90 percent of the population. 45

(C) The first month of Phase II showed no startling innovations or developments, although statistical indicators seemed to indicate the campaign got off to a good start. As of 31 July, 87 percent of the population and 75 percent of the hamlets were rated ABC. Moreover, 52 percent of the population (less Saigon) was rated AB, thus exceeding President Thieu's goal of 50 percent by end-October.

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(C) HES results for July indicated an increase of 343,900 people in ABC population, or about double the increase for the previous few months. This increase could be attributed in part to the low level of enemy activity in the country. Also, the total DE population decreased by 79,000 during the month, leaving 7 percent or 1,215,700 of the population in this category. The VC population decreased by 258,800 leaving 930,700 people (5.4 percent) rated VC.

(C) For rural population, the HES reported 81.6 percent rated ABC, an increase of 2.7 percent during July or a net gain of 260,800. This brought the overall rural population rated ABC to 8,824,400 of a total estimated rural population of 10,817,600.⁴⁶

(C) The August ABC increase of 1.3 percent showed a slight loss in momentum from July, when impetus of the 1969 APC and low level enemy activity resulted in an unusually high increase of 2.2 percent. The August increase reflected a return to a more normal rate of progress.

(C) The ABC rural population increased during August by 2.2 percent to 83.8 percent leaving 1,760,800 (16.2 percent) of the population in the D, E, and V categories.⁴⁷

(C) Significant progress was made during September, as pacification activities intensified, meeting only light opposition. Not only did enemy military activity decline throughout RVN, but also terrorist incidents declined from 937 in August to 791 in September - - a decrease of almost 16 percent. The waning enemy activity and the steady expansion of the GVN's control resulted in 90 percent of the population rated by the HES as ABC and 51.5 percent rated AB. The primary goal of Phase II, to consolidate and upgrade already secure hamlets so that 50 percent of the population could be rated AB by the end of October and the counterpart goal of 90 percent rated ABC, were thus achieved one month in advance of the target date.

(C) The rural ABC population increased by 2.3 percent during September to a total estimated rural population of 10,766,000, or a net gain of about 215,400. The rural population in the DE categories decreased by 1.2 percent to 555,600.⁴⁸

(C) During the month of October the ABC rated rural population increased by 2.5 percent to 88.6 percent of a total estimated rural population of 10,828,600, or a net gain of about 314,300. The rural population in the DE categories decreased by 160,300 (1.6 percent) to about 774,400 and the V population decreased by 91,600 (0.9 percent) to 464,000 or 4.3 percent of the total estimated rural population.

Phase II Evaluation

(C) Phase II of the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan ended 31 Oct as a substantial success. The main thrust of Phase II was the qualitative improvement in security, administration, and law and order to consolidate the gains of the rapid GVN expansion of late 1968 and the first half of 1969. President Thieu's primary goals of 50 percent of the population being rated AB and 90 percent rated ABC by HES were exceeded. The end results were 55.1 percent and 92 percent respectively.

(C) The major factors which contributed to the success of Phase II were the lack of systematic and effective enemy opposition, and the initiative and drive shown by the GVN to make the pacification program work.

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
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POPULATION SECURITY DEVELOPMENT TRENDS



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FIGURE VIII-5

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minings, grenades, taxations, abductions, harassment and any other means the VC might exercise to subvert the control of the GVN. Most of the incidents reported were those that would affect HES Factor 1C. However, in no case, when an incident was reported by TIRS, should HES Factor 1C be A or B -- or HES Factor 2C be either A, B, or C.

(C) A comparison was made against the HES indicators and the TIRS, using August data. It was found that there were 102 incidents in hamlets rated A or B under HES Factor 1C and HES Factor 2C was A, B, or C (22 in I CTZ, 24 in II CTZ, 21 in III CTZ and 35 in IV CTZ). It was further discovered that 120 hamlets were the subjects of incidents when HES Factor 1C was less than B and Factor 2C was A, B or C -- (15 in I CTZ, 40 in II CTZ, 39 in III CTZ and 26 in IV CTZ).

(U) Following close on the foregoing review was the advise of DEPCOMUSMACV/CORDS, when confronted with a variance of comment, to DEPCORDS, II CTZ. He stated:

The obvious contrast between the tone of these two comments concerns me. I certainly hope that you will continue to encourage the PSA to speak frankly about resurgence of enemy activities. At the same time I believe we must equally strongly emphasize our desire that the HES be an accurate management tool rather than a constantly rising curve. ⁵⁴

ESTABLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN VILLAGES

1969 Program and Policy

(C) Unfortunately, the people of the RVN were not blessed with a tradition of nationalism. As a result, it had been difficult for any government to speak for the people as a whole. The VC were able to exploit this weakness, pointing out to the people the "lack of governmental interest in them and attempting to unify the people behind the NFLSVN by stressing their alienation from the existing government. If, as is generally accepted, insurgent warfare was in reality a struggle for the hearts and minds of the people, any sensible pacification program had to include efforts to politicize the people into a nation-state. (See Figure VIII-6.)

(C) The 1969 Pacification Plan was no exception. In this case, however, the GVN placed primary emphasis on unifying the village and hamlet governments with the central government rather than attempting to win individual loyalty. It was the village and hamlet governments, the GVN planners reasoned, that answered the needs of the people. By the same token, the village and hamlet governments would carry out the programs and policies of the national government. In other words, these local governments "are the medium between the people and the government and transmit to higher authorities the true aspirations of the people and at the same time explain and execute the programs and national policies in rural areas." ⁵⁵

(C) In the absence of a tradition of unity between local and national government, the task of strengthening village and hamlet administrations and tying them to Saigon promised to be

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
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FIGURE VIII-6

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particularly difficult. Historical experience suggested that the agrarian population of under-developed countries tended to regard government above the local level as a form of tyranny and the people of RVN were no exception. As long as the peasant farmer was unable to see direct benefits from having a central government in Saigon, but did have unhappy memories of contact with tax collectors from time to time, he was bound to regard the central government as less than salutary to his interests. The problem facing the GVN, therefore, was to show what it could do for the peasant, possibly in the form of security, land reform, and transportation. It could then hopefully expect the people to respond with allegiance to their benefactor.

(C) The 1969 Plan, as suggested above, centered on the village and hamlet governments. These were, or should be, responsive to the people as well as to the government. For this reason, one of the prime objectives of the 1969 Plan was to establish such administrative apparatus in every hamlet and village. "In the conduct of the APC," the document noted, "we are establishing our foundations in 1,116 contested hamlets and uncontrolled areas. In 1969 we will occupy and control the remaining villages and hamlets." The plan recognized that a rapid expansion would require a corresponding increase in the number of villages and hamlet officials, and that these officials preferably should be elected by the people. Moreover, the officials should be well trained, relatively free from corruption, and have sufficient strength and authority to carry out their assigned duties.

(C) Since part of these objectives could be achieved by holding elections as soon as areas were liberated, elections received considerable attention -- and publicity -- throughout 1969. Getting people to run for office, however, did not make them competent. Also, any would-be office holder had to recognize that effective leadership automatically made him a VC target. The GVN, therefore, sometimes resorted to the expedient of appointing qualified district or province personnel, usually from among the RF/PF or RD Cadre operating in the area. To avoid criticism and ensure that the various officials had sufficient strength, it was announced that the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan would put "much confidence in the village and hamlet officials."

The Village Administrative Committee Chairman will be invested with much authority over Popular Forces, RD Cadre, and National Police operating in the village. They themselves organize, train, and direct the People's Self-Defense Forces with the support of the technical services. The village and hamlet officials will manage the expansion of the self-help program and the village government has more authority over budget planning and implementation. 56

On the other hand, the 1969 Plan announced that "officials with bad conduct and behavior, unqualified and ineffective ones must be replaced."

Mid-Year Evaluation

(C) As of mid-year, considerable progress had been made towards the goal of strengthening local government. During March and June, 794 village and 4,461 hamlet elections were held with 89.7 percent of the eligible voters in the hamlet elections. Thus, by the end of

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Phase I (30 June), 1,891 or 88.7 percent of all RVN villages and 8,776 or 81.4 percent of all RVN hamlets had elected governments. ⁵⁷

(C) In addition to the elections, progress was also made in other programs. During the first half of the year, for example, 2,839 village officials were graduated from a special 5-week course in village duties, administration and political objectives of GVN. A village development program whereby funds were allotted for village development projects was initiated, with the village governments themselves responsible for disposition and selection of projects. A MACCORDS midyear report described this program as "slow in getting started as it was revolutionary compared to past practices and stumbled over a number of bureaucratic procedural problems, but it seems to be underway throughout the country." Primarily as a result of these problems, the village development program was given an "inadequate" rating as of 30 June.

(C) In February, the RD Cadre changed from 59 to 30-man teams in order to put greater emphasis on their political and organizational functions and less on paramilitary activity. As of the end of June, cadre members totaled 43,724 in some 1,477 teams, plus another 7,412 highlander cadres. These improvements, however, were made doubly important by the fact that government directives were emphasizing the policy that elected village officials should have operational direction over all cadre in their village, including RD cadre, National Police, and information cadre. ⁵⁸

Phase II Evaluation

(C) Throughout the accelerated Phase II Special Pacification Campaign, goals were either met or surpassed before the 31 Oct deadline. Elections, conducted during September, resulted in 147 village and 935 hamlet administrators being elected. This continued emphasis on the development of local government and responsibility resulted in 2,020 of 2,186 villages with elected governments and 9,700 of 10,750 hamlets or about 92 and 90 percent, respectively.

(C) The propensity toward local rule and responsibility, was furthered by sending 14,486 local officials to the National Training Center at Vung Tau where they received a 5-week course of instruction designed to train them in their new responsibilities, authority, and the GVN's political objectives. Additionally, the Village Self-Development Program, which provided national funds to the villages to be used on improvement projects selected by local villagers working together with their elected rather than national officials, substantially increased the self-confidence and authority of officials and fostered community cohesion. Approximately 15,000 local village projects were either completed or underway by the end of Phase II. The general reaction of both US advisors and local officials indicated that the program had performed its function of sparking new interest in the community life at the village level. ⁵⁹

Year End Summary

(C) Local government elections continued into December raising the 31 Dec HES figures to more than 2,000 of 2,117 villages and 9,800 of 10,706 hamlets with elected officials. This final surge also elevated the countrywide total to an estimated 96.4 percent of inhabited villages

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and 92.5 percent of the populated hamlets with elected governments.

(C) The Village Self-Development Program, which was started late and was beset with complications and bureaucratic pitfalls, picked up speed and finished satisfactorily with about 15,545 local projects completed or in progress. The end of year obligation was 84 percent of the two billion piasters budgeted or \$VN 1,489,505,800. Those projects not funded as of 21 Dec or those funds not expended, were to be carried over into the 1970 Village Self-Development Program.⁶⁰

ORGANIZE PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE

1969 Plans and Policies

(C) During the Tet 1968 Offensive and immediately thereafter, large numbers of RVN citizens had asked for arms with which to defend themselves. At first reluctant to place large quantities of arms in the hands of the populace, the government eventually relented and, on 19 Jun 68, had issued its Mobilization Law. This decree required all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 16 and 17, and those between 39 and 50 to participate actively in some sort of self-defense activity. The Mobilization Law thus became the foundation for the People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF). (See Figure VIII-7.)

(C) The PSDF, which is neither a political nor a paramilitary program, was formed for two basic purposes. The first was to get as many people as possible committed to the government by having them actively engaged in its defense. The second was to strengthen the security of the rural and urban areas against enemy infiltration, subversion, and attack. In this way, the GVN received much needed assistance in its vital security programs. At the same time, by giving the individual a program for self-defense, the government demonstrated its interest in the hopes and aspirations of the average citizen. According to an official GVN document, the essential duties of People's Self-Defense consisted of:⁶¹

First: Security activities in quarters, hamlets, villages in view of destroying all VC secret establishments, annihilating all underground cadres or organizations, and preventing them from infiltrating into the areas.

Second: To discover and give alarm of all VC infiltrations and assist the Army and police to stop all the schemes to attack or shell the areas.

Three: Assist the Army and police in intelligence activities, first aid, evacuation of wounded, logistics, information, liaison, fire prevention...

Four: Evacuate, assist and protect the population's lives and property in case the VC attack the area.


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FIGURE VIII-7

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(C) Organizationally, the PSDF had been controlled by a national committee chaired by the Prime Minister. At the lower levels, subordinate self-defense committees had been organized at CTZ, province, district and hamlet level, with special organizations for the six autonomous cities. Moreover, since the implementation of national PSDF policy had been carried on by the Minister of the Interior through his ministry, each committee was backed by a full-time, salaried cadre to assist, advise, and monitor the program.

(C) Beneath the committees, the self-defense units themselves were organized into groups composed of subordinate teams. Each team was a specialized unit, some of which were trained to fight and defend the local area. Some were skilled in firefighting, while other units specialized in first aid, intelligence collection, and self-improvement projects for the community. No uniforms were worn and no salaries were received. The government provided only arms and ammunition.⁶²

(C) In theory, the PSDF program fitted in very well with overall plans for the use of other military and paramilitary forces. The regular ARVN forces bore the brunt of providing national security; the RF/PF handled the small-scale local defense and offensive operations in their assigned areas and served as reaction forces. The people themselves, however, were obviously the only ones capable of providing on-the-spot protection against minor intrusions by VC tax collectors, propaganda teams, terrorists, and the like. Should RVN achieve the status of an armed camp with the citizens playing a very substantial role in their own protection against guerrillas and other marauders, the insurgency would be over. On the other hand, considering the overall circumstances in RVN, getting the people willingly to assume the responsibility in adequate numbers and with sufficient reliability would be a real accomplishment. Early indecision at top levels as to who would organize and train the PSDF and what arms should be provided had a vitiating effect. Even more important was the basic apathy on the part of many potential PSDF members. In late January, a survey of local Popular Self-Defense Groups in two villages of Gia Dinh Province revealed, in the words of the report, "that most people in these villages do not like to participate in PSDF or any other organization..."⁶³ Both villages agreed that security was improved because of PSDF presence but in response to the question of how the program could be improved, "most of the respondents in both villages stated, 'We have never thought about a way to improve the PSDF movement yet, because that is not our responsibility.'" Finally, as with all programs of this nature much depended on leadership. It goes without saying that an energetic village chief could not have a first-rate self-defense force without support from the district chief, and vice versa. Also people naturally responded poorly when poorly led, yet they showed considerable vigor when properly guided. The People's Self-Defense program in Vinh Loc District, Thua Thien Province, was a case in point.⁶⁴

The PSDF is the most dynamic single program in the district. In January the District Chief started a program of weekly bivouacs, training competitions, drama shows and civic action. The self-defense (force) from a selected village assembles on Saturday and training is conducted throughout the day. Saturday night they put on a drama/talent show. As many as 5,000 people have attended these shows and the shows have sometimes lasted until midnight. The Sunday program includes a trip to a nearby village where the self-defense from the second village acts as host. Sunday morning is spent in a civic action activity. Repair

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of roads, bridges and schools are examples. At noon the host group serves a meal and in the afternoon competition is conducted. This program was initiated to perpetuate the enthusiasm and civic interest that was obvious in each village when self-defense training started. This civic interest is sometimes manifest in gifts from citizens. Frequently meals are paid for by contributions and in one case an old man gave 10,000 \$VN to the village self-defense (Force). The unanticipated benefits may eventually prove far more important to the pacification program than the original objective of the self-defense (force). Approximately 700 weapons have been issued and approximately 250 remain to be issued. Concurrently with the training of the last 500, from An Bang and Ha Uc, a re-training program was started for the 460 self-defense (personnel) from Vinh Hien. It is planned to continue retraining on the same cycle that initial training was conducted.

(C) As of 31 Jan, which marked the end of the APC, PSDF membership exceeded 1.1 million with approximately 200,000 of them armed. The 1969 plan, however, called for increasing the PSDF to a minimum of 2 million with 1.6 million of this number trained and 400,000 weapons issued.⁶⁵

(C) The 1969 Plan recognized that, in order to meet the above objectives, Public Law 003168 which required all eligible males between 16-17 and 30-35 years of age to join the PSDF must be enforced and that "all other elements of the population should be induced to join this organization on a voluntary basis." Furthermore:

In relatively secure hamlets (A, B) the PSDF will be trained and adequately armed in order to gradually replace the RF and PF to maintain security and public order. In insecure areas, this mission will not be trusted to the PSDF, unless the local Village Administrative Committees assure that the PSDF's degree of training proficiency, armament, and the security situation allows.⁶⁶

(C) The 1969 Plan also authorized cities, provinces, and districts to recruit RD Cadre to help the people in organizing their PSDF. However, the specific duties of the cadres were left vague. This oversight was corrected in May when the Minister of the Interior announced that the first of the formal training sessions for People's Self-Defense Cadre would be concluded on 5 May and that "in accordance with their capabilities, the Ministry specifies their duties to be as follows:

1. To help the people organize into PSDF.
2. To aid the government with the tasks of training and armament.
3. To help the members to elect their own supervisors; e.g., group leaders, inter-team and team members.

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4. To guide the activities and operations of the PSDF Program in accordance with GVN national policies.

5. To execute plans for developing, improving and maintaining the organization."⁶⁷

(C) In May the GVN also sent out detailed instructions for organizing volunteers into the PSDF according to age and sex. Women from 16 - 40, for example, could join the PSDF's Female Support Group. (Women, 16 - 40, could also join the PSDF as combat members.) These women would engage in social welfare, such as education, raising poultry, health activities, and morale support, which included consoling, taking care of members of their family, music, etc. Men over 50 could become volunteer members of the Elders Self-Defense Group with duties involving people's welfare promotion (raising poultry, cultivation etc.), social welfare (fire protection, first aid), and advice and morale support to PSDF. Finally, boys and girls from 13 - 15 years of age could volunteer for the Youth Self-Defense Group, which highlighted activities dealing with information and liaison, charitable activities, sports, music, and the like.⁶⁸

(U) Another refinement of early 1969 was a series of ministerial decrees directing formation of PSD committees at ward, village, and hamlet levels. It sounded simple. One decree directed the organization of the committees and the other specified who should be on them. But the step was a very important one. Since participation was the key, the committees, in effect, were the government instrument for planning and realizing the PSD program.

(C) One of the best indications of success with PSDF was the VC/NVA reaction to the program. The first reaction was immediate, indicating that the enemy also recognized the potential of the PSDF from the beginning. Like village and hamlet officials, teachers, etc., PSDF members became subjects for special VC attention, often in the form of intimidation but also including assassination. A message from COMUSMACV to his senior corps advisors, dated 7 Feb, noted that "the enemy is obviously targeting on personnel and installations of the People's Self-Defense Force." Five months later, COMUSMACV included in his description of the general situation in RVN, the following:⁶⁹

Terrorist incidents of rocket/mortar attacks continue to take heavy toll in civilian casualties. People's Self-Defense Forces remain a prime target for abduction. Groups of trainees are frequently kidnapped and threatened with more severe punishment should they continue their support to the GVN. Many return to resume their work, but some fail to reappear. VC attacks on village/hamlet officials continue at about the same rate.

(C) An overview of enemy emphasis on the People's Self-Defense Forces is to be found in Figure VIII-8.

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
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ENEMY EMPHASIS ON THE PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE FORCES



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FIGURE VIII-8

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Phase I Evaluation

(C) The ambitious goals set for the PSDF during Phase I were based upon optimistic projections of the 1968 trends and the results of the APC. Thus, while PSDF numbers increased rapidly at the beginning of the 1969 campaign, primarily because of considerable command pressure from President Thieu, the shrinkage of the pool of prospective members covered by mobilization and a concentration on the broader objectives of the program caused a slowdown as far as recruiting was concerned. As a result, only 473,193 new PSDF were added during Phase I, less than 50 percent of the number needed to meet the Phase I objective of 1.73 million. At the same time, weapons were issued to bring the total for all PSDF to 270,527.⁷⁰

(C) Despite the fact that members of the PSDF were unpaid and only moderately trained, they gave a reasonably good account of themselves during the 6-month period from January to June. While occasionally targeted by the VC/NVA indicating growing enemy concern for the program, the PSDF killed 1,487 of the enemy while losing 1,197 of their own. During the same period, however, they lost 1,508 weapons while capturing a modest 709 from the enemy.

(C) The overall rating for PSDF during the first half of the year was judged by MACCORDS to be "adequate." This took into account the fact that while the contribution of the PSDF to overall security was still modest, the political dividends in terms of increased popular participation in the war had been substantial.⁷¹

(C) Although Phase I goals were not met by the end of June, the GVN saw no reason to decrease the year-end objectives, particularly since the trend was up at midyear. Indeed, the Phase II goals announced by the GVN in May included the addition of 375,000 PSDF by the end of October, with 300,000 of this number trained and 75,897 armed. In effect, therefore, the year long program objectives for PSDF were moved up to 31 Oct.

Phase II Evaluation

(C) As with the RF/PF, President Thieu's 1 July directive placed a special emphasis on the role of the PSDF and the part it was to play in attaining national goals.⁷² Two of the three criteria established by President Thieu to determine the A and B security status of a hamlet were: (1) PSDF for combat fully organized, trained, and armed, and (2) PSDF for support (women, children, and elders) fully organized and trained.

(C) The Phase II goal of 1.8 million PSDF members organized was met by mid-September and continued to increase rapidly to a 31 Oct total of 2.75 million. The latest surge was attributed to the unusual rate of progress during September when a special effort was made to enlist women, youths (12-15), and older men (over 50).⁷³ This latter group was destined for support roles to provide much needed first aid and logistical support. Statistically, the end of campaign goals, attainment, and structure were:

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	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Achieved</u>
Organized	1, 800, 000	2, 750, 645
Combat: Male	1, 104, 966	
Female	166, 561	1, 271, 527
Support: Elders	309, 786	
Women	688, 613	
Youth	480, 719	1, 479, 118
Trained		1, 225, 628
Armed	391, 897	385, 905

(C) Although the PSDF did not attain the goals established for training and armament, their mere presence in the countryside made a significant contribution to security of the pacification program. Measured by traditional indicators of effectiveness, e. g., contacts with the enemy, KIA and weapons captured ratios, the PSDF could not be considered a very effective force. Nevertheless, reports continued to attest to their valor and willingness to stand and fight for their communities. During the month of October they were credited with 272 KIA and 60 captured while losing 196 KIA and 355 wounded.

(S) The gathering momentum of the pacification program did not go unnoticed by the enemy. Reports were received from throughout the country which indicated the enemy's intent to subvert the GVN's growing pacification program. A typical example was contained in DIA's INTBUL 295-69: "Communist forces in southern I CTZ have increased their efforts to thwart the Government's pacification program. Since 1 Oct, 75 percent of the enemy's attacks in Quang Ngai Province have been directed against combined action platoons, refugee centers, regional and popular force outposts, resettlement camps, and other pacification installations. The pattern of these attacks reflects growing enemy determination both to wreck the program and to force Vietnamese civilians to return to VC-controlled areas."⁷⁴

Year End Summary

(C) During the closing months of 1969, the PSDF effort surpassed all established goals except for weapons issued, which failed to meet the established goal by 465 weapons. However, training still represented a problem as the total "trained" figure included some who were previously trained and then recruited into RF/PF and ARVN units.⁷⁵ Training during the year was concentrated on the combat elements to such a degree that much effort would be needed to make the support elements more than just paper organizations. The Minister of the Interior reported the following year-end statistics:


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PEOPLES SELF DEFENSE FORCES



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FIGURE VIII-9

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	<u>Goal</u>	<u>Attained</u>
Organized	2,000,000	3,219,084
Combat:		
Male	1,158,475	
Female	<u>174,111</u>	
Total	1,332,586	
Support:		
Elders	406,484	
Women	872,282	
Youth	<u>607,732</u>	
Total	1,886,498	
Trained	1,600,000	1,897,981
Armed	400,000	399,535

The growth of the PSDF is reflected in Figure VIII-9.

INCREASE THE NUMBER OF HOI CHANH

Background

(C) The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Program was considered vital to the 1969 Pacification Campaign. Easily one of the most successful programs ever initiated by the GVN, more than 90,000 Hoi Chanh or ralliers had returned to GVN control since the effort began in 1963, with more than 10,000 of this number coming from enemy military divisions and over 4,000 from important enemy civilian infrastructure elements. With respect to the 1969 campaign, the GVN took the official view that continued emphasis on the program would "lessen the burden on the Pacification and Development Program." It would also "increase basic pressure on the enemy and extend a good prospect for development of the Chieu Hoi Program both in terms of inducement and rehabilitation of Hoi Chanh." (See Figure VIII-10.)

(U) The 1968 Chieu Hoi program produced 18,271 ralliers, with 7,798 coming in the last three months of the year when the Accelerated Pacification Campaign was in effect. Based on these results and the current general situation, the GVN set the 1969 goal at 20,000 with the following quotas for the various CTZs.⁷⁶


I CTZ	2,500
II CTZ	3,000
III CTZ	5,500
IV CTZ	9,000

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FIGURE VIII-10

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1969 Objectives

(C) The objectives for 1969 naturally included more than a desired total and the inducement programs that went along with it. The pacification plan specifically mentioned the following objectives associated with the "Main Tasks" of motivation, reception, and rehabilitation:

1. Motivation.
 - a. Disseminate widely the National Reconciliation Policy in the Chieu Hoi field.
 - b. Motivate the people, military men, officials, cadre, Hoi Chanh, and particularly the people whose relatives are in the Communist ranks, to encourage defections to the government side.
 - c. Reinforce propaganda media and improve PSYOP techniques for a psychological campaign against the enemy, create division among them and widely disseminate the open arms policy.
2. Reception.
 - a. Eliminate all complex of guilt and suspicion in Hoi Chanh minds.
 - b. Elevate Hoi Chanh team spirit and determination.
 - c. Improve facilities and the management of Chieu Hoi Centers.
 - d. Improve the processing of intelligence on the enemy situation.
 - e. Improve Hoi Chanh training system.
 - f. Reinforce the protection of Chieu Hoi Centers against enemy sabotage.
3. Rehabilitation.
 - a. Create for Hoi Chanh suitable conditions to join the national community as soon as possible. However, the treatment of Hoi Chanh must be rational to avoid any possible envy by personnel in nationalist ranks.
 - b. The use of Hoi Chanh in government agencies and ARVN must be carried out based on their ability to perform, the degree of repentance, and right attitude to insure maximum security for our agencies and at the same time to exploit the latent capacity of Hoi Chanh.

(C) With the experience of 1968 as a backup and with the momentum of the 1969 APC, combined with heavy military pressure, it was not surprising that the 1969 Chieu Hoi Program, except for the aftermath of Tet, got off to an excellent start. Every indication was that the 1969 goal of 20,000 would be met. In fact, as it became evident that the quota might well be met before mid-year, MACV and the GVN responded by raising the year's goal to 33,500. ⁷⁸ Chieu Hoi rates and trends for 1969 are given in Figure VIII-11.

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CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) REUSULTS

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SUMMARY




FIGURE VIII-11

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Reasons for Success

(C) The trend in the Chieu Hoi rates provided a factor for measuring the success of pacification and security. Surges also indicated pressures placed on elements of the population that were subjected to Communist proselyting, intimidation, and other activities. There seemed little doubt that the failure of the Communists to topple the GVN during the three major 1968 offensives had not only discouraged those troops who had been promised victory but also helped stabilize the GVN. Moreover, the extension of GVN presence into the country, particularly through the APC and the 1969 P&D Plan, brought the government into contact with enemy who may have wanted to defect but who never had a chance or did not want to give themselves up to Americans for fear they could not make themselves understood.

(C) Of special interest in revealing reasons for success was the IV CTZ which produced more Hoi Chanh than the other three CTZs combined. On 10 May, DEPCORDS for IV CTZ forwarded a message to COMUSMACV in which he stated that the sharply increased Chieu Hoi rate within the IV CTZ had been analyzed to determine the reasons causing this increase.⁷⁹ "Without question," he wrote, "the primary reason is low morale associated with stepped up military pressure by GVN and US forces." He added, however, that "another and quite significant reason is emerging as a cause for defection."

This is the upgrading program currently being intensified by the enemy wherein individual members of guerrilla forces are being upgraded to become members of main and local force battalions, thus forcing them to leave their native hamlets and villages.

(C) The DEPCORDS IV CTZ then went on to quote from a recent report of a survey made of ralliers in Kien Tuong and Dinh Tuong Provinces.

All of the 27 Hoi Chanh interviewed stated that the morale of the VC in the "liberated areas" is very low. This is caused by the increase in VC efforts at recruiting, taxing, and upgrading to fill losses suffered in the main force and local force units. The youth in the hamlet and village units have no desire to participate in fighting with the large units as they are afraid they will be killed by air strikes, artillery, or friendly forces. The recruiting is being done by force and the recruits are being forced to leave their home areas, a breach of the original promise by the VC that recruits would protect their own homes. VC propaganda continues to extol the virtues of sacrifice while the people feel they have sacrificed enough in the numbers of youth who have already been taken. Approximately half of the ralliers interviewed indicated that there were many other VC in the area who were considering rallying, but VC efforts are keeping them from doing so.⁸⁰

(C) As with the Chieu Hoi program throughout its existence, it was obvious that low morale was the main force inducing VC/NVA to rally to GVN just as it was basically military

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operations that produced the hardship and low morale. Even this would not have been sufficient, however, to make the Chieu Hoi program really effective. Needed were massive PSYOP support and programs to exploit dissatisfaction and induce VC/NVA to rally to GVN. Of these programs, three were of special significance in producing the impressive results of Phase I. These were the use of Armed Propaganda Teams (APT), the Returnee or Turnabout Program and, perhaps most important, the Third Party Reward Program.

(C) The APT utilized several former Hoi Chanh, acting as a group and protected by armed escort, to enter contested areas and engage in face-to-face contact with local VC and their supports. This program had distinct advantage in that the APT members had seen both sides of the situation and hence were able to counter enemy propaganda.

(C) The Turnabout Program, as the name implied, involved sending individual Hoi Chanh back to their local villages and hamlets. The idea behind this program was the proven ability of Hoi Chanh to influence relatives and friends.

(C) The Third Party Reward Program was somewhat similar in that one person attempted to directly influence another. In this instance, however, the one who induced the other did not himself have to be a rallier. Also, a cash reward was involved, the amount varying with the calibre of the returnee.

(C) The Third Party Reward Program had been initiated in October 1968 as part of the APC. It soon had an impressive record, accounting for 34.8 percent of all ralliers in November 53.1 percent in December, and 56.9 percent for the first month of 1969. Indeed, in the first three months of its existence, the program alone accounted for 3,968 Hoi Chanh. With such a record, it was little wonder that the program was extended "indefinitely" and made an integral part of the 1969 Chieu Hoi effort.⁸¹

(C) The three programs mentioned above, along with the Chieu Hoi effort in general, received massive PSYOP support. Airborne and ground-based loudspeakers, radio, TV, and extensive printed matter announced to the populace that ralliers would be welcomed, stressed the hardship and hopelessness of the VC/NVA cause, and emphasized the favorable aspects of Chieu Hoi. There was even a surge campaign, known as NGUYEN TRAI II, which began on 15 Jun with a scheduled termination date of 15 Sep. In support of this campaign, which was designed to bring in 9,000 ralliers during the three-month period, US PSYOP personnel printed 691 million leaflets and 300,000 posters.⁸²

Special Events: The Chieu Hoi/PF Proposal

(S) Meanwhile, the success with the Chieu Hoi program, particularly in IV CTZ, led to overcrowding of the Chieu Hoi centers and, indirectly, to a significant proposal, submitted by DEPCOMUSMACV/CORDS, to Deputy Prime Minister Khiem on 2 Jun.⁸³ "A possible solution of these problems of resettlement and overcrowding," he wrote, "is to recruit PF platoons from these centers." Anticipating that there would be objections to such a proposal, DEPCOMUSMACV/CORDS acknowledged that there was some risk but reminded the Deputy Prime Minister that the Armed Propaganda Teams and the Kit Carson Scouts were also former members of the VC, and they have proven their loyalty to the GVN.

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(S) Believing the risk could be minimized by proper indoctrination and screening, he went on to submit his proposal in the following words:

By accepting this minimal risk the GVN could achieve a decided psychological advantage by offering the VC guerrilla a lucrative opportunity to become a Hoi Chanh, subsequently become a PF soldier, and return to his native hamlet under the GVN banner. By exploiting the known reluctance of the VC guerrillas to leave their native hamlets and villages as the enemy is attempting to integrate them into local and main force units, the GVN can gain a new source of manpower and, even more important, deprive the VC of trained guerrillas.

May I suggest that, on a controlled and experimental basis, and in coordination with the Chieu Hoi Ministry, the Joint General Staff, and the IV CTZ Commander, you conduct a test program to recruit PF platoons from the Chieu Hoi Centers. Within a district selected by the IV CTZ Commander, an appeal would be made to local village and hamlet guerrillas to return to GVN by reporting to the district Chieu Hoi office as Hoi Chanh. There, as a group, they would receive expedited processing and reindoc-trination as Hoi Chanh, an accelerated PF training program, and return to their hamlets in platoon strength under a GVN flag. This program could be accommodated within the currently approved PF force level and available equipment through the establishment of provisional platoons on a temporary basis. The test program would be evaluated to determine if it should be expanded, curtailed or terminated.

(C) The DEPCOMUS/CORDS proposal was discussed at the 18 July US/GVN Coordination and Liaison Meeting on Pacification and Development, and the Deputy Prime Minister stated that the President had approved the recruitment of Hoi Chanh into PF mobile platoons. He also added that the program should be carefully researched before it was launched, as many problems existed. Various aspects of the proposal were discussed by one of President Thieu's aides, the Minister of Information and Chieu Hoi, and DEPCOMUS/CORDS. Areas of interest discussed were: loyalty of the Hoi Chanh to the GVN, feasibility of organizing Hoi Chanh into special units or on an integrated basis and the psychological impact on the populace. The proposal was tabled for further study and coordination with the JGS. 84

(C) On 31 Oct the J3, JGS, requested MACV J3 and CORDS review and recommend changes to a draft directive for the establishment of mobile PF platoons consisting of returnees. COMUSMACV's coordinated response of 1 Dec 69 was:

It is considered that more benefits would be derived just now from continuing to integrate Hoi Chanh into already formed RF/PF and ARVN units rather than forming PF mobile platoons consisting entirely of Hoi Chanh....

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Part of MACV's rationale presented at that time was:

By concentrating Hoi Chanh in PF units, a valuable resource that could be distributed throughout RF/PF units would be lost. PF platoons consisting of returnees have definite sociological implications. The indication would be that the Hoi Chanh is not afforded the same privilege as other citizens by being shunted into segregated units.

There may be a reluctance on the part of province and district Chiefs to recruit Hoi Chanh units within their boundaries because of the potential security threat.

.....

The letter closed with a statement that the MACV staff would be available to discuss the matter in more detail at any time.⁸⁵

Special Grants: The Rallying of the Dissidents

(C) While some 1,100 dissident soldiers from the Khmer Kampucha Krom (KKK) and Hoa Hao groups rallied to the GVN in 1968, they were not allowed into the Chieu Hoi program. The reason was that the program, as established, recognized only three categories of VC and made no provision for armed dissident groups such as the KKK, which fought the GVN but were also known to have fought the VC from time to time. In the last week of June and first two weeks of July 1969, however, some 625 KKK and 436 Hoa Hao rallied in large groups.⁸⁶ As a result, the GVN reconsidered its Chieu Hoi criteria and, in early July, allowed the armed dissidents to rally under the "other" category.

(C) The rallying of the dissidents reflected both the rewards and problems of the Chieu Hoi program. On the one hand, the input of such numbers seemed a significant gain, perhaps worthy of PSYOP exploitation. Moreover, the KKK met the Chieu Hoi Ministry's criteria of turning in at least one weapon for every two ralliers, with most of the weapons appearing new and in good condition. The Hoa Hao did not meet this requirement; however, a deputy company commander among them reported that they decided to rally because they were finally convinced that the existing government was in firm control of the nation.

(C) On the other hand, there were several factors which diminished the value of the groups. The US Ambassador noted that the Hoa Hao explanation that they were confident that the government was here to stay "is very likely only part of the reason they chose to rally."

They were poorly equipped, had certainly not been operating very energetically for quite some time, and were probably very tired of wandering about on their own. The appearance this spring of NVA soldiers in Chau Doc for the first time may also have been a factor in inducing the ralliers to come in out of the heat at this time.⁸⁷

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(C) There was also some question about the KKKs. When the initial group of 231 rallied in Chau Doc province, the Province Senior Advisor informed MACV that "large elements of KKK have... been attempting to rally in this area for some time, but have always desired special treatment, such as being accepted as an RF unit." He also noted that the "Chau Doc Province Chief has refused to grant this, having enough problems already with KKK and other armed ethnic groups." Moreover, the PSA revealed that preliminary interrogation had turned up no information of tactical value, partly because "their stories changed with the hour of the day."

It appears highly likely (he concluded) that at least half of the 231 are not soldiers but villagers... who have gone through this bogus Chieu Hoi in hopes of improving their living status (such as evading the draft or at least assuring themselves the chance to serve as a unit with their friends.)⁸⁸

(C) The GVN was aware of the problems associated with the in-coming dissidents; however, recognizing that there were advantages and possibly a necessity, in absorbing those dissident groups willing to rally, the GVN elected to receive them. In July, leaders of both the KKK and Hoa Hao groups were taken to Saigon to negotiate their acceptance with Chieu Hoi officials.

(U) All of the dissidents were finally assembled -- not in Chau Doc Province, but in Sa Dec Province -- on 10 Jul. After many days and several exchanges of proposals and counter-proposals among GVN, Hoa Hao and KKK representatives regarding the payment of inducement and weapons awards, an award ceremony was finally conducted on 22 Aug. The Hoa Haos were paid \$VN 191,000 and the KKKs \$VN 833,000 for the weapons that they had brought in with them and surrendered. An inducement award of \$VN 635,000 (scaled down from \$VN 1,071,000) was approved by the Chieu Hoi Ministry in Saigon on 9 Aug and paid by the MACCORDS/Chieu Hoi Directorate out of its special fund.

(U) After refusing all offers for gainful employment unless they were employed as a unit, the dissidents voluntarily hired a motorcade of tri-Lambrettas and minibuses and returned to Chau Doc on 28 Aug.⁸⁹

Chieu Hoi Evaluation

(C) In its mid-year rating of the -969 Pacification and Development Plan, MACCORDS declared the Chieu Hoi program to be remarkably successful and a "star performer." Indeed, it could hardly have been otherwise when the total ralliers for the first six months (20,924) exceeded the 1968 total, was 134 percent higher than the Phase I objective, and, despite a seasonal drop during the summer months, continued its upward trend.⁹⁰

(C) The Phase II (31 Oct) goal -- which was attained in August -- was surpassed by 4,654 ralliers. Although several previous monthly totals were swelled by the addition of large numbers of non-VC ralliers -- such as Hoa Hao and KKK -- the October total of 5,609 was the highest monthly total recorded since the beginning of the Chieu Hoi program in 1963. However, only minor success had been met in inducing NVA personnel to rally -- a total of 304 by campaign end.⁹¹

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(C) There were two interesting trends in the Chieu Hoi program during October, both of which seemed to result from the extension of GVN presence over the preceding months. The number of group rallies increased significantly: Long An Province reported nine group rallies, including one 12-man local force guerrilla squad. Quang Tin Province reported four group rallies in Thang Binh District, including one unit of 33 men and one of 21 men. The second interesting trend was that similar conditions in different provinces in CTZs I, II, and III resulted in an influx of returnees far in excess of their previous rates. Quang Tin Province reported 465 in October and 112 in September; Binh Dinh, 259 in October and 96 in September; and Phuoc Long, 185 in October and 32 in September.

(C) Province reports indicated that the high returnee rate resulted from the same combination of factors, including: (a) lack of support, food, and medical supplies; (b) the withdrawal of VC main force units into the hills, leaving local forces and guerrillas exposed to Allied military pressure and PSYOP; and (c) GVN presence in previously unpenetrated areas, particularly the establishment of permanent RF outposts. Because of the withdrawal of main force units, local forces, guerrillas and low-level VC population were most susceptible to the effects of Allied propaganda and less subject to strict VC discipline.⁹²

(U) Following the October high of 5,609 ralliers it was no surprise that the remaining months of the year reflected a reduction in total numbers. However, the year-end figure of 47,023 broke all records for the Chieu Hoi Program.⁹³ A comparison with previous years showed:

1969 - 47,023	1965 - 11,124
1968 - 18,171	1964 - 5,417
1967 - 27,178	1963 - 11,248
1966 - 20,242	Total since 1963 - 140,403

(U) The upsurge in Hoi Chanh can in part be ascribed to the expanded GVN presence in new areas. This pressure and the GVN efforts to hold the areas put heavy pressure on the VC who were less able to hold up their own local control, particularly over guerrilla force members. The 1969 breakdown by region and categories showed:

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Political</u>	<u>Elements</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>NVA</u>	<u>Regroupees</u>
I	2,715	2,625	656	5,996	140	0
II	1,051	1,557	542	3,150	66	12
III	5,117	1,568	1,402	8,087	148	6
IV	<u>19,522</u>	<u>6,898</u>	<u>3,370</u>	<u>29,790</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>4</u>
Totals	28,405	12,648	5,970	47,023	368	22

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Termination of the Third Party Inducement Program

(U) The Ministry of Chieu Hoi, on 25 Nov, announced that effective 2400 hours, 31 Dec, the Third Party Inducement Program would be terminated. The ministry message stated that whereas the program had been a great success, recent suggestions from citizens indicated that payments under the Third Party Inducement Program tended to compromise the integrity of the people and the Chieu Hoi policy. Many of the people believed it was the duty of all citizens to participate in the program, even without reward. The message also stated that claims submitted prior to the specified termination date were to be satisfactorily resolved NLT 2400 hours, 28 Feb 70.⁹⁴

(U) In reality, the program was terminated because of US advisory pressure. Abuses, which became evident in the latter part of the year, caused the advisory action. The primary abuse was a Hoi Chanh, who rallied without being induced by a Third Party, would later work out arrangements to claim that he was induced and then divide the funds with the alleged inducer. Also, assistance-in-kind funds, which were supporting the program, were cut by 66 percent for CY 1970 resulting in the elimination of the program.⁹⁵

Kit Carson Scouts

(U) A valuable offshoot of the Chieu Hoi program throughout 1969 was the Kit Carson Program. This program dated back to the summer of 1966 and originally had been inaugurated by the US Marines in I CTZ. Basically, this concept consisted of integrating certain experienced VC/NVA ralliers into US and Free World combat units, with the idea that these highly qualified volunteers would be invaluable as guides and scouts in locating and identifying enemy units, installations, booby traps, assembly areas, and routes of movement. Understanding the VC/NVA modus operandi because they had participated in it, they could assist in the search for enemy equipment and supplies, join in certain psychological operations; assist in the interrogation of captives, suspects, or other returnees; assist in the identification of VC and VCI; and, last but not least, help in identification of dead and wounded enemy. This concept had proven so effective that by the following April, MACV had extended it to all CTZs.

(C) Early reservations about the reliability of the Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) had been laid to rest by their subsequent performance. Desertions were not unknown, of course, and in a few instances, the scouts defected to the enemy. Breaches of trust, however, had been relatively few in number and had been more than offset by a flood of significant episodes involving spectacular bravery and sacrifice on the part of KCSs. In November 1967, for example, an 8-man patrol of Marines had been ambushed by some 30 to 40 NVA troops firing from concealed positions within the secondary undergrowth that flanked the trail. Four Marines had been wounded in the initial burst, including a Kit Carson Scout named Nguyen Chau who had sustained wounds in both hands, his stomach, and his right foot. The remainder of the story, as related in the MACCORDS Chieu Hoi Division publication follows:⁹⁶

Despite his wounds, when a youthful Marine went down, his leg shattered by an AK-47 round, Chau shielded the American with his own body, then raked the surrounding enemy brush with devastating automatic fire.

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Seconds later, while blood flowed from his stomach, Chau took over the point, and led the Marines up a steep incline to a sheltering plateau while maintaining covering fire. Later, when a radio call for help brought a helicopter overhead, it was Chau who secured the landing zone when he killed a half dozen enemy as they attempted to charge the incoming chopper. It was only after the enemy had been driven off and the wounded taken aboard, that Chau collapsed from his wounds. When flown to an emergency field hospital with the other wounded, the medics found that Chau had stuffed one of his patrol maps into his open stomach wound to help slow down the bleeding.

(U) The story of Nguyen Chau could have been duplicated by dozens of similar incidents wherein Kit Carson Scouts had performed significant acts of bravery. Not surprisingly, an unusual bond of basic trust and loyalty soon had developed between the scouts and the units they served.

(U) As of the end of 1968 some 1,517 scouts were serving some 17 major US combat units. Also, as of that date, 71 had been killed in action with 239 listed as wounded. Desertions were not uncommon. (They amounted to 26 in the last quarter of 1968, nine less than the number killed). Only a minimal number went over to the VC, however. As with the ARVN in general, the desertions were mostly for family reasons, and, to the Vietnamese mind at least, did not bear the connotation of dishonor.

(U) By late 1968 the Kit Carson program had become an accepted institution, with the requests for KCSs exceeding the authorized figure. For this reason, on 6 Oct 68, the authorized quota had been raised to 2,500. The following March, it was raised further to 2,916. Meanwhile, it was up to 1,844. Also, by end-March, total casualties for KCS stood at 127 killed and 370 wounded.

(U) Concurrent with the increased authorizations, came a number of significant improvements in the KCS Program. In mid-March, for example, a change to MACV Directive 525-6 authorized inclusion of NAVFORV into the KCS program. This directive also clarified the draft deferment status of Kit Carson Scouts, authorized the scouts to receive US awards for valor, and indicated what GVN awards the scouts were eligible to receive. In addition guidance was provided to ensure that the scouts would not be misused by employing units. ⁹⁷

(U) Another MACV message, dated 16 Mar, established the following breakdown of KCS authorizations:

<u>USARV</u>	<u>III MAF</u>
*1,400 US Divisions (7)	*400 US Division (2)
*500 Brigades/Regiments (5)	
*300 Advisory Units, II, III and IV)	
<u>NAVFORV</u>	<u>Other FWMAF</u>
*240 US Naval Forces	*50 Royal Thai Forces VN
	*26 Australian VN

* Indicates Scout Ceiling.

Total Scouts Authorized: 2,916

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(U) During the second quarter, the number of employed KCSs rose to 1,993 in May but dropped to 1,970 in June. The reason for this decline was the redeployment of elements of the 9th Inf Div. Scouts employed by the division were offered employment elsewhere but since many of them lived with their families in the area, they elected to leave the program. Also, as of the end of the quarter, the number of KCSs killed in action stood at 168 and the wounded at 512. Praise of the scouts continued to come in, including awards for valor up to and including the Silver Star.⁹⁸

(U) The third quarter of the year reflected the continued rise in the utilization of KCSs-- both in total numbers and operational results. Their total strength rose to 2,101, while they suffered 33 KIA, 112 wounded and 4 missing. The valor, resourcefulness, and dedication of the KCSs continued to be their hallmark, and personal acts of bravery were the rule rather than the exception.

(U) A typical example of a KCS performing his duty concerned Ha Van Phong, attached to B Troop, 1st Sqdn, 11th Armd Cav Regt. On 6 Sep, on his first mission with the troop, Phong was riding on his troop commander's vehicle when the unit came under intense automatic and RPG fire. Phong immediately secured an M16 rifle, took up a prone position on the back deck of the armored vehicle, and directed fire to the exposed flanks of the vehicle, personally killing several previously undetected NVA soldiers. As the troop moved through the initial enemy positions, Phong dismounted, searched the enemy dead, and significantly aided the interpreter in the interrogation of the prisoners. As the troop reacted to on-the-spot intelligence gained from the POWs, Phong was wounded in the back by a grenade but, refusing medical attention, he continued to advance with the unit. For his heroic actions, he was recommended for the US Bronze Star for Valor and the GVN Cross of Gallantry with Palm.⁹⁹

(U) The enthusiastic employment of KCSs was not restricted to US Forces alone. The Australian Task Force, operating since January with a quota of 26 scouts, requested on 25 Oct that their quota be raised to 50. The increased authorization would allow them to use one scout with each of 39 platoons, two with each of three battalion headquarters, and five with the task force headquarters. The battalion and task force headquarters allocations were to serve as a pool for use by armored and aviation elements of the task force, and in the training of scouts. The ATF commander stated in his request, "I ATF feels strongly that, to be effective, a scout must be closely identified with a particular group, rather than be allocated as required from a central pool. The present limit of 26 scouts allows only the latter method." The request was approved on 11 Nov.¹⁰⁰

(U) The month of October marked the end of an era in the KCS program as the 3d Mar Div terminated Camp Carson -- the home of the KCS school -- with the redeployment of the division on 15 Oct. The responsibility for operation of the school was transferred to the 101st Abn Div (AMBL), and the 3d Mar Div KCSs were employed by the 1st Bde, 5th Inf (Mech) and 101st Abn Div.¹⁰¹

(U) Employment of KCSs reached its all-time high of 2,245 in the month of December -- an increase of 62 scouts over the previous month. Additionally, the ROKFV joined the KCS program with an initial authorization of 50 scouts. Existing units were asked to contribute several experienced scouts to assist the Koreans in starting their program.¹⁰²

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REDUCE THE VCI

1969 Programs and Policies

(C) Because the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program for elimination of the VCI had been in operation for some time and had received particular emphasis in the APC, the 1969 Plan was basically an extension and refinement of organizations and operations already in existence. Moreover, some of the specific refinements were reserved for the end of the APC, at which time the Central PHUNG HOANG Committee, together with member agencies, planned to get together and, drawing on the experience, good points, and shortcomings gained from the campaign, reorganize and strengthen the existing program to accomplish the following improvements:¹⁰³ (See Figure VII-12 for Organizational Structure.)

1. Consolidate, strengthen and preserve current operational results;
2. Improve manpower and material resources so that the plan can be more efficiently executed;
3. Study the evolution of the situation in order successively to launch other campaigns for the purpose of eliminating the enemy infrastructure;
4. Enlarge the area of activities of the PHUNG HOANG Committee by employing hamlet and village cadre (village chairmen, hamlet chiefs, village security commissioners, hamlet security assistants, village motivation commissioners, assistants for hamlet motivation) to identify VCI for destruction in rural areas; and
5. Increase the NPFF strength to provide additional strength to provinces and districts so the latter could have sufficient permanent forces to operate effectively.

(C) The 1969 Plan specified goals and targets, and suggested rules of instruction for the anti-VCI program. It reiterated, for example, that the main targets within the infrastructure should be members of the National Liberation Councils; Committees of National Alliances for Democracy and Peace; the Finance-Economy cadre of the PRP; all chairmen, deputy chairmen and other executive apparatus of the PRC located in hamlets, villages, districts or provinces; and the commo-liaison cadre. It also announced that the attack on VCI must be carried out continuously and energetically everywhere in the country. Particular attention and operational priority should go to certain areas. Priority 1, for example, was given to contested areas, priority 2 went to areas under temporary Communist control, and priority 3 to the secure areas. In addition, a "special priority" for "everywhere" aimed at the National Liberation Councils and Committees.

(C) For goals, the 1969 Plan called for effective elimination (through surrender or killing) of 33,000 individuals or, including January, which came under the APC, an average of 3,000 per month. Of the monthly figure, 550 were allocated for I CTZ, 650 for II CTZ, 850 for III CTZ, and 950 for IV CTZ.


(C) The 1969 Plan also offered several important guidelines. The principal ones were:

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FIGURE VIII-12

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Province and District Committees must study and apply simple and rapid measures and procedures to screen out VCI and suspects from innocent people in order to avoid a negative effect on the program

It is necessary to organize mobile interrogation teams and PSYWAR/Civic Action teams which will follow military operations for an on-the-spot screening in order to set innocent people free immediately after having heard the PSYWAR/Civic Action team's explanations of government policy. These teams will give help and comfort to the people as required.

The participation of Hoi Chanh, Information PSYWAR/Civic Action, Village and/or Hamlet Councils, and Hoi Chanh APTs in cordon and search operations is very necessary to identify the enemy, and at the same time enable the NP to take pictures for identification and preparation of order to battle (OB).

Be kind to the population as well as to the prisoners during operations.

Captured VCI cadre must be quickly exploited and their files set up so that their cases can be tried by a court or by the Province Security Committee.

The basic rules and regulations of judicial and administrative procedure must be correctly applied (in accordance with MOI directives about rehabilitation). After investigation proves a suspect to be innocent he must be set free immediately.

All authorities in the locality having jurisdiction in the PHUNG HOANG campaign must be delicate in their contact with the people in order to get their help and cooperation in the extermination of VC Infrastructure. 104

MACV Support

(C) As in all other pacification programs directed by the GVN, neutralization of the VCI received considerable support from MACV. On 23 May, MACV published Directive Number 10-20 which prescribed policies, established responsibilities, and command relationships, and outlined procedures for joint US civil/military actions to complement or support the GVN's PHUNG HOANG program. 105 This directive, more than 40 pages in length, went into considerable detail but its overall purposes, as stated in the directive itself, were to (1) "coordinate and give impetus to GVN, US, and FWMAF civil and military. . . operations directed toward

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neutralization of the VCI", (2) "ensure that overt programs and operations conducted by US components as they relate to identification, location, exploitation, and elimination of the VCI, are integrated, compatible, and coordinated with parallel GVN programs and operations, and (3) "achieve, within established priorities, maximum effective utilization of resources available for the sustained, accelerated attack on the VCI."

(C) The MACV Directive naturally emphasized some of the same points stressed by the GVN in the 1969 Pacification and Development Plan. Where the MACV Directive made its most significant contribution, however, was in setting up an organization designed to serve as the vehicle for coordination of US plans, programs, and operations to support the PHUNG HOANG organization and the attack on the VCI.

(C) US support of PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX followed the US chain of command while paralleling the GVN PHUNG HOANG structure. Thus, at the MACV level, a PHOENIX Committee and a PHOENIX Directorate were organized, the former to come directly under DEPCORDS and the latter under the ACofS, CORDS. (See Figures VIII - 13 & 14). The PHOENIX Committee, chaired by the DEPCOMUSCORDS, was designed to be a policy making committee for US support to the National PHUNG HOANG Plan whereas the PHOENIX Directorate, consisting of a Director, Deputy Director, and three functional divisions of Plans and Operations, Training, and Program Administration, would function as the PHOENIX Coordinator at the national level. In meeting its assigned responsibilities, the directorate provided staff support to the PHOENIX Committee Chairman, and, based upon the guidance and decisions of the Committee, promulgated programs, plans, doctrine, and implementing instructions for corps, province, and district PHOENIX organizations and actions. In addition, it was to maintain close and continuous liaison and coordination with the GVN Central PHUNG HOANG Permanent Office (CPHPO) and assist the CPHPO in carrying out its prescribed functions. Finally, it was to provide overall staff supervision, management and arrangement of support for the PHOENIX Program, to include programing and reporting. The PHOENIX Directorate would, as required, conduct special surveys and reviews, and assist in the coordination and planning of other major programs as they pertained to the anti-VCI attack.

(C) The MACV Directive 10-20 also spelled out which organizations were responsible for planning and implementing the PHOENIX program at the corps, province, and district levels, for several autonomous cities, and the CMD. At the corps level, for example, DEPCORDS, was listed as the US counterpart of the GVN Chairman, Province PHUNG HOANG Committee. As such, he was assisted by a Corps PHOENIX Committee, a Corps PHOENIX Coordinator, and a PHOENIX civil/military staff element. (See Figure VIII-15).

(C) At the province level, planning and implementing the PHOENIX Program differed from the corps level in that the province senior advisor had the basic responsibility. He was listed as the US counterpart to the GVN Chairman, Province PHUNG HOANG Committee and, like the various DEPCORDS at the corps level, was assisted by a province PHOENIX coordinator and a PHOENIX staff element. (See also Figure VIII-15).

(C) The district senior advisor was listed as responsible for implementation of the PHOENIX Program in his district. Also designated as the district PHOENIX coordinator, he was the US counterpart to the GVN district chief who was responsible for the execution of the national PHUNG HOANG plan at the district level. In his PHOENIX duties, the District Senior Advisor was to be assisted by one or more civilian or military personnel assigned as coordinators to the GVN District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC).

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
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GVN ORGANIZATION FOR PHUNG HOANG



———— Command, or direct supervision

----- Coordination and policy guidance

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
FIGURE VIII-13

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PHOENIX COMMAND AND COORDINATION
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• DEPCORDS/MACV Chairman of US PHOENIX Committee


— Command, or direct supervision

- - - - Coordination and policy guidance

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CORPS, PROVINCE, DISTRICT
PHOENIX RELATIONSHIPS



- Command or direct supervision
- - - - - Coordination and policy guidance
- x-x-x-x- Technical and operational guidance

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FIGURE VIII-15

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(C) The MACV Directive 10-20 did not detail the organization of US PHOENIX elements for the autonomous cities. The reason given was that the existing PHUNG HOANG elements varied considerably among the cities. Accordingly, it was left to the discretion of the corps senior advisor to determine what the US PHOENIX support organization should be. Instructions were that they should parallel the GVN PHUNG HOANG organization.

(C) The CMD, while one of the smallest geographical areas covered by the PHUNG HOANG/PHOENIX program, presented several difficult problems. One reason was that the CMD included part of a province (Gia Dinh), the autonomous city of Saigon and, within the city, distinct precincts. Basically, the Gia Dinh portion followed that of other corps areas in that its PHOENIX activities were to be managed and supported by the CMAC which, in turn, was subordinated to III Corps/II FFORCEV. (See Figure VIII-16) Thus, the CMAC effort had something of both province and corps elements in it. At the same time, the Saigon Civil Assistance Group (SCAG) was assigned responsibility for managing, supporting, and conducting the Saigon City PHOENIX effort which generally paralleled the GVN functional organization for provinces (See figure VIII-17).

(C) The PHUNG HOANG permanent office at Saigon Precinct level was known as the Combined Intelligence and Operations Center (CIOC) and operated under the direction of the precinct police chief. Due to the absence of a US military advisor/team at precinct level, however, PHOENIX responsibilities at that level were passed to a US district PHOENIX coordinator who was responsible directly to the SCAG PHOENIX coordinator.

(C) These organizations reflected MACV's view that neutralization or elimination of the VCI was a Vietnamese responsibility and that "US and FWMA Forces and agencies will perform basically an advisory, assistance, and support role in the attack on the VCI." It also reflected MACV's intention that the US effort should stimulate the PHUNG HOANG organization and its member participants, and that it should aim at producing a self-sustaining GVN organization capable of accomplishing its missions with minimum US support.

Mid-Year Evaluation

(C) During Phase I, 7,262 VCI (80.5 percent of the revised goal of 9,000) were neutralized. It was true that the numbers reflected a newer and stricter criterion for pinpointing VCI but then so did the quota. Even more important, the number represented only 9 percent of the estimated VCI strength in January, not enough for anything more than a modest impact on the infrastructure. "Measured against the need," a MACCORDS report for the period stated, "overall progress . . . has been inadequate."¹⁰⁶

(C) The reasons for this unacceptable state were supplied in a pacification status report for May, which elaborated:¹⁰⁷

PHUNG HOANG . . . lacks aggressive and continuous command emphasis by GVN and in some areas insufficient resources are applied. In a few places, Quang Nam, Phong Dinh for example, interest by province chief and other officials, together with application of substantial resources against large target, has produced significant results. On the other hand,


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CMD PHOENIX ORGANIZATION



* Chairman of the PHOENIX Committee

————— Command or direct supervision

- - - - - Coordination and policy guidance

x-x-x-x Technical advice and assistance


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
FIGURE VIII-16

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A - GIA DINH PHOENIX ORGANIZATION



B - SAIGON PHOENIX ORGANIZATION



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- x-x- Technical advice and assistance

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FIGURE VIII-17

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many provinces consistently eliminate fewer than 10 VCI per month. Such spotty performance indicates much room for improvement. In addition, detainee accounting system is just getting started. Preparation of dossiers is inadequate. Province Security Committees are mostly slow to act, and many VCI are released outright or given light sentences. Others are imprisoned for long periods without any hearing. Much improvement is necessary although rapid change in this complex business is not likely.

(C) The end of Phase I (30 Jun) report was not as pessimistic about the PHUNG HOANG program although it listed overall evaluation as "inadequate" whereas the May report had termed it "marginal." The Phase I report noted the same difficulties mentioned the previous month; however, it also noted that the GVN had further tightened the classification system in order to focus on the more important VCI.¹⁰⁸ Also, the GVN had issued instructions requiring local authorities to impose sentences commensurate with the status of the individuals involved. Moreover;

... it is working on systems to follow individuals from their arrest through legal processing to detention so that VCI picked up are actually handled so as to be taken out of the war for the duration and not slip back through premature release, light sentences, etc.

(S) One reason for the lack of aggressive, continuous command emphasis not mentioned in the end-of-Phase I Report but hinted at in the May report was what the latter termed "the present political situation and the uncertainties of the Paris negotiations." Later the matter was spelled out quite clearly in a message from the Kien Phong Province Senior Advisor;¹⁰⁹

There is an underlying concern, which became prevalent immediately after the Midway talks, about the possibility of a coalition government. It was expressed clearly here by a two-month slump in VCI neutralizations (June and July). Vietnamese officials said privately at the time that they were afraid that they might have to deal with the VCI they were trying to neutralize. (This belief was made somewhat stronger by President Thieu's offer to the NLF to hold free elections, to include NLF candidates.) This fear has slackened somewhat but has not disappeared.

Phase II Evaluation

(C) Statistically PHUNG HOANG operations during Phase II ended on the bright side and exceeded the Jul-Oct goal of 7,200 by 340; however, the attainment of the overall goal to 31 Oct -- 16,200 -- fell short by 133. During the Phase II period, several new innovations were

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instituted to standardize the procedural processing of detained VCI personnel and to overcome public apathy to the program.

(C) In an attempt to rectify a longstanding problem of the inequitable application of existing guidelines as pertained to captured VCI the Ministry of Interior Promulgated Circular 2212 on 20 Aug. Appended to Circular 2212, entitled "Improvements in the Methods for Resolving the Status of Offenders", was the Offender Dossier Form. The circular contained in almost all respects the PHOENIX Directorate's proposals regarding the implementation of the MOI's ABC Classification Sentencing Guidelines, use and content of dossiers for prosecution, use of evidence and intelligence for convictions, Security Committee activities, detainee disposition feedback, and similar legal processing matters. When effectively implemented, the guidance contained in the circular was expected to promote logical, uniform, and effective processing, sentencing, and detention of apprehended VCI. 111

(C) The second innovation instituted during this period was the nationwide PSYOP campaign to publicize the PHUNG HOANG plan. This program -- presenting PHUNG HOANG as part of the people's protection against terrorism rather than a secret menace -- was launched by Prime Minister Khiem on 1 Oct.

(C) The program was carried out from two aspects: first, the educational aspect of the program; second, the operations side. The educational and informational part of the program was designed to bring the PHUNG HOANG program to the people and tell them how it worked for the benefit of all. It was directed at fostering public acceptance and support for the crucial effort of eliminating the VC threat to the GVN. At the same time, the PSYOP campaign was directly attacking the VCI through the publication of their names and inducements to rally.

(C) This hard-hitting, well conceived, JUSPAO-supported program had a well deserved initial impact. Individuals identified from posters and photos were captured, and information which led to subsequent arrests was obtained from them. An excellent example occurred in Kien Phong Province. On the first day of the campaign, based on pictures and names, the first person on the list was turned in and arrested. Several days later, three more persons on the list surrendered and later one more was arrested. Thus, during the first two weeks of their poster campaign, five of the eight most wanted VCI were apprehended. 112

Year End Summary

(C) After reaching a highpoint in September, PHUNG HOANG operational results decreased for the last three months of 1969 to a December low of 1,637. Although the annual goal of 21,600 was not achieved, due to low neutralizations in the first six months of the year, the 1969 effort did achieve 90.4 percent of the goal. From January through December a total of 19,534 VCI were neutralized -- as compared to a total of 15,776 in 1968. However, the increase in neutralizations was more significant when compared to the more stringent criteria applied to reportable VCI neutralizations in 1969, and that 11,675 (approximately 60 percent) were priority targets. In addition to the VCI neutralized throughout the year, a total of 28,316 VCI supporters, 16,936 guerrillas and 11,323 VC/NVA soldiers were neutralized under the PHUNG HOANG program. Year end figures reflecting area and method of VCI neutralization were: 113

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CTZ	<u>Killed in Action</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Rallied</u>	<u>Total</u>
I	1,680	2,340	1,343	5,363
II	934	2,004	786	3,724
III (Incl CMD)	844	1,774	869	3,487
IV	<u>2,729</u>	<u>2,397</u>	<u>1,834</u>	<u>6,960</u>
TOTAL	6,187	8,515	4,832	19,534

INTENSIFY INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA EFFORTS

1969 Objectives and Guidelines

(C) Since "winning the hearts and minds of the people" was the ultimate aim of the pacification effort, a broad information program was essential to the 1969 PD Plan. As implied in Figure VIII-18 this information program was essentially an intensification of existing information and propaganda efforts. The 1969 plan, however, included specific objectives and concepts for execution.¹¹⁴ The two prime objectives were to:

1. Disseminate and explain to the population, particularly rural people, the decisive importance of the 1969 PD Campaign.
2. Encourage and motivate the entire population actively to participate, and to cooperate with the government to achieve the eight objectives of the 1969 PD Campaign, applying the Community Spirit principle.

(C) The same points were to be stressed in this information portion of the 1969 campaign as were stressed by the GVN in the APC. In secure areas, the aim was to exploit RVN military and political victories both at home and abroad, praise the results of the APC, and appeal for the people's active cooperation in destroying the VCI and building up the People's Self-Defense Forces. These areas would also be warned against Communist attempts to increase terrorism, sabotage, and distorted propaganda calling for a peace cabinet, coalition government, etc.

(C) In the contested areas, and particularly those "D" and "E" hamlets chosen as target hamlets, the main emphasis was to be on exposing Communist intentions and methods while portraying the good intentions and programs of the GVN. Understandably, these people were to be encouraged to cooperate with the GVN by informing government authorities about the VCI, encouraging relatives in the VC to rally to the government, taking part in PSDF and other security programs, participating in local government, supporting the program to return anti-Communist refugees to their homes, and building the community spirit necessary for a better hamlet, for a better family life, and for a better standard of living.


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FIGURE VIII-18

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(C) As steps towards effective implementation of these plans and objectives, the GVN scheduled a preparatory phase (10 Dec 68 - 31 Jan 69) during which the appropriate agencies would draw up necessary study guides, explanatory documents, leaflets, posters, and films, including documentary movies and slides. While this was going on, the regional echelons were charged with continuation of the APC Quyét Chien Thang or "Determined to Fight and Win" campaign. At the same time, the regional echelons were to organize conferences concerning "Quyét Chien Thang" and the 1969 PD Plan, draw up a schedule of specific activities to be accomplished during the year, and, perhaps most important, complete the training of Village Information Commissioners and Hamlet Information Assistants.

(C) Operations for the plan itself were also broken down into central and regional responsibilities. The central echelon (Saigon), which included the Inspectorate, the Director of Research and Planning, and the Directorate of Information, was to send representatives to each of the provinces to attend the send-off ceremony of special Mobile Information Teams that would be entering contested territory. Also, starting on the eve of 30 Jan, the central echelon would ensure that all radio and TV facilities in Saigon and in local areas "initiate this plan, read and project slogans, etc."

(C) At the regional and local level, all available media were to inform the public according to the objectives of the information campaign. One of the most notable media was the Mobile Information Team, which was designed to enter contested areas and conduct concentrated propaganda efforts. Each team, consisting of two cadres (a Village Information Commissioner and a Hamlet Information Assistant) would enter with members of the RD cadre and utilizing equipment provided, construct information stations, prepare newsletters and bulletins, select and train hamlet information cadre, and supply the latter with equipment when available and when the security situation allowed it.

(C) At the heart of this broad propaganda effort were a number of key themes and slogans, all carefully spelled out. They were as follows:

For public places:

1. We support the 1969 Rural Pacification and Development Plan.
2. Let's develop villages and hamlets together to achieve democracy, justice and progress.
3. Let's eradicate all underground VC.
4. The national policy of Revolutionary Development will give us a secure and prosperous life.
5. Join the People's Self-Defense Forces to protect your villages and hamlets.
6. Promote the tradition of "community spirit" to build a prosperous countryside.
7. The Communists destroy and kill. The Government of RVN reconstructs and protects.

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For homes:

1. We strongly support the government of the Republic of Vietnam.
2. We do not recognize the so-called Liberation Front.
3. My home does not lodge nor supply the Viet Cong.
4. Let's denounce all underground VC.
5. Let's participate in village and hamlet activities to improve our lives.

Phase I Evaluation

(C) Despite the ambitious nature of the information and propaganda portion of the 1969 Pacification Plan and the emphasis originally placed on it by GVN, results at the end of Phase I reflected only marginal improvement. Those responsible for evaluating the program recognized the difficulty of measuring an information effort except by a questionable system of attitude sampling. However, in their evaluation, they found both positive and negative indicators. On the positive side, they reported that national leaders had spent more time in recent months in communication with the nation. In particular, President Thieu and many of his ministers had traveled widely around the country explaining government policy and pacification. An important seminar on information and propaganda was held in Saigon in April and a course for information cadre began at the National Training Center at Vung Tau on 16 Jun. On the other hand:

... measures taken since 1 February 1969 to intensify the information effort have not added up to what could be expected of one of eight priority pacification programs. Intensity of information impacting to target at village/hamlet level has not increased measurably. Local leaders pay too little attention to information program, letting weak VIS (Vietnam Information Service) carry most of the load. Much more improvement is needed; overall progress has been signaled... 115

STIMULATE RURAL ECONOMY

1969 Program and Policies

(C) Except in a broad way, the 1969 Pacification Guidelines had comparatively little to say about stimulating rural economy although the document acknowledged that "the encouragement of rural economy and increase of rice production to raise incomes and to stimulate buying

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power of rural people play a very important role." In particular, the document listed the following objectives for the 1969 campaign:¹¹⁶

1. Increase rice production from approximately 5 million to 6 million tons. (This was to be accomplished primarily through the introduction and use of IR-8, (a variety of "miracle" rice) to the lowlands, and IR-5 (another "miracle" variety) in the mountainous areas.)
2. Improve and defend roads and waterways connecting the countryside with the cities.
3. Increase low interest loans to peasants.
4. Procure more production equipment and sell at low cost to the peasant, i. e., mechanical pumps, tractors, boat motors, small agricultural machines, fertilizer, seeds, insecticides, etc.
5. Strengthen and develop the farmers organizations, such as the farmers associations, cooperatives, etc.
6. Encourage the diversification of agricultural products and increase the raising of domestic animals.
7. Reform the existing rice commercial system, including eliminating exploitation by middlemen.
8. Disseminate handicraft plans in which local raw materials were used, and seek markets for the handicraft.
9. In order to promote freer movement of goods, simplify procedures regarding the establishment of retail outlets in villages and districts; facilitate the issuance of trading licenses; and abolish licenses, taxes, and checkpoints which were not necessary.

(C) In keeping with the overall tone of the guidelines, the rural economy objectives were more or less left up to the ministries concerned, particularly the Ministries of Economy and Land Reform and Agriculture; however, the document emphasized the matter of cooperation. "In order to achieve the above objectives," it stated, "it is necessary to have good coordination among various Ministries and concerned agencies at central as well as local levels in the execution of Government programs." The document also laid considerable stress on the role of the province in the rural economy. After outright abolition of licenses for the transportation of rice from western provinces of RVN to Saigon and from one province to another in the IV CTZ, it called upon each province to draft its own plan for stimulating rural economy. Each plan would include the following "main points:"

1. Acquisition of additional rice in 1969.
2. Abolition of permits or the simplification of procedures for obtaining them.
3. Reduction of the number of resource control checkpoints.
4. Preparation of a general plan for the development of the rural economy, to include development of farmers organizations and distribution of necessary products.

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(U) In other words, stimulating the rural economy was considered to be largely a provincial matter although the central government indicated that it would keep a close eye on the matter and would provide overall direction.

(C) The 1969 guidelines further stressed the importance of province development. Comparing this objective to the Village Self-Help and Development Plan, the guidelines announced that "there will be other development works closely relating to pacification operations and affecting various villages or the whole province." As a result, "these development works may exceed the people's abilities within the framework of the village self-help and development plan." What the 1969 Guidelines had in mind were projects such as bridges, roadways, schools, canals, etc., which had a general as well as a local effect and which, as a result, fell outside the village program and budget. The guidelines thus specified that funds for provincial projects would be provided by the CPDC but only after the individual projects, examined on a case-by-case basis, had been recommended by the province P&D councils.

(C) Overall, the following benefits were desired (and expected) from the 1969 rural development program.

1. Drainage, land-forming, irrigation and other land improvements which would result in expanded cultivation of "miracle" rice.
2. A more aggressive and generous program of agricultural credit resulting in stimulation to rice, pork, poultry, and secondary crop production.
3. Continue improvement in village health and sanitation services, supported by a more effective intraprovincial logistical network.
4. The rapid expansion of food processing installations by private and cooperative organizations.
5. The development of improved facilities for transporting fresh and frozen produce to Saigon and other urban markets.
6. An imaginative program of private investment promotion resulting in generation of the capital and management needed for the industrial sector.

(C) In addition to the above, the GVN anticipated related benefits in the fields of public safety and administration. In a way, this reflected the broad interrelationship of the various pacification and development efforts. The rapid expansion of the PSDF and NFFF, for example, would undoubtedly stimulate rural economy, as would a more efficient public administration. For this reason, the recurring emphasis on coordination was not misplaced.

Easing Fishing Restrictions

(C) For some time, significant portions of the GVN's coast had been subject to fishing restrictions. The purpose of these restricted zones was to deny the enemy the use of the areas for logistics and infiltration operations. As of 25 Jul, for example, the percentages of coastline in the various CTZs restricted from fishing were as follows:¹¹⁷

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	<u>24-Hour Restriction</u>	<u>Night Restriction</u>	<u>No Restriction</u>
I CTZ	65.5	23.1	11.4
II CTZ	34.8	12.8	52.4
III CTZ	23.5	36.5	40.0
IV CTZ	48.6	22.0	29.4
Total RVN	44.3	20.0	35.7

(C) In May 1968, COMUSMACV had asked the CTZ commanders to comment and make recommendations on the existing policy on fishing restrictions in RVN. Later, on 9 May, he authorized the CG, I CTZ to "study, retain, or lift the restricted fishing areas in I CTZ."

(C) In August, COMUSMACV suggested that "additional effort is required to stimulate the Vietnamese fishing economy and the pacification program." In particular, he suggested a complete reevaluation of the existing restrictions with a view toward relaxing or, where possible, entirely removing them. He recognized that the review might point up certain areas where increased restrictions were needed, such as the western coast of IV CTZ near the U Minh Forest. "Basically," he said, "the military advantage of a restricted area must be weighed against the economic gain and enhancement of GVN popularity." Nevertheless, he anticipated improvement. "It is expected," he concluded "that by 15 Sep, definite improvements in percentages of unrestricted fishing areas will be noted in all CTZs." 118

(C) Despite continued command emphasis and encouragement, through the CTZ commanders to GVN province and district officials, to submit requests for opening more of the coastline for unrestricted fishing, the progress was relatively small. As of 20 Nov the percentages of coastline restricted to fishing by CTZ were:

	<u>24-Hour Restriction</u>	<u>Night Restriction</u>	<u>No Restriction</u>
I CTZ	61.4	28.2	10.4
II CTZ	27.6	16.2	56.2
III CTZ	26.4	37.6	36.0
IV CTZ	36.7	27.2	36.1
Total RVN	36.5	23.6	39.9

(C) The foregoing figures reflect an overall improvement from the 25 Jul report by: a 7.8 percent reduction in the 24-hour restriction; a 3.6 percent increase in the night restriction; a 4.2 percent improvement in the no restriction category. 119

(C) While all possible efforts continued toward the reduction of fishing restrictions, the military situation did at times impede progress. MACJ3 presented the military situation in a fact sheet as follows:

... changes in the enemy's areas of activity might require an increase in restrictions. At the present time the western coastal areas of IV CTZ is such an area of increased enemy activity, and has resulted in the CG, IV CTZ request for changes from open and

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night curfew to full restriction over a great length of that coast. In contrast, the CG, IV CTZ requested a considerable reduction of restricted fishing areas along the eastern coast of IV CTZ. If JGS approves the changes as requested, this office will continue to evaluate the situation in western IV CTZ and as soon as the opportunity presents itself the recommendation will be made to again reduce the restrictions in western IV CTZ. 120

(C) As of 15 Dec, the existing restrictions were:

	24-Hour Restriction	Night Restriction	No Restriction
I CTZ	59.5	28.8	11.7
II CTZ	27.0	16.8	56.2
III CTZ	26.4	37.6	36.0
IV CTZ	31.8	32.1	36.1
Total RVN	36.0	24.0	40.0

(C) An example of the varied political and military factors to be considered in changing the status of a restricted area was contained in COMUSMACV's response to a request for change, and is quoted in part, 121

My comments and recommendations on the four proposed changes are as follows:

a. Phu Yen Sector: Recommend the present night curfew from CR 095115 to CQ 156910 be continued pending further coordination between CG, II CTZ and SA, II CTZ.

b. Khanh Hoa Sector: Recommended that the Nha Trang Estuary (CP 049559) be opened for boat traffic 24 hours daily.

c. Cam Ranh Special Zone, Binh Hung area: I understand that the request for the corridor may not be valid, since coast in question is in Ninh Thuan Province and Province Chief does not want restrictions changed. I suggest your staff investigate this difference of opinion between Ninh Thuan Province and Cam Ranh Special Zone. Until this matter is resolved, I recommend that the present restrictions remain in effect.

d. Cam Ranh Special Zone, CP 027210 to BP 989160: Inasmuch as this area is across the bay from US Army power ships and supply depot, and

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its control is vital to their defense, I recommend that the night curfew be continued.

Land Reform

(U) A New Year's speech by President Thieu, broadcast on TV 31 Dec 68 had contained the following statement about land reform:

I will carry out the policy to help people acquire property through a truly vigorous and revolutionary land reform program. I am not completely satisfied with the results of the 1968 program. Consequently, in 1969, I shall distribute all lands which should be distributed and at the same time I shall review, amend the supplement land tenure regulations in order to correctly implement this policy. The landlord-tenant and farming regulations and the application of land rents will also be appropriately revised so that peasants will no longer have to suffer the state of having land and not getting its revenues. The goal I want to achieve is to have by the end of 1969 an additional one million hectares of riceland for distribution to farmers. 122

(U) In view of the importance of land reform in GVN's plans for 1969, it was significant that land reform per se was not mentioned in the 1969 Pacification Guidelines. No official reason was given for this omission, though subsequent developments made it obvious that as of the first of the year, the Saigon government was uncertain as to the exact pattern land reform should take. Nevertheless, President Thieu's willingness to announce the program before it was firm was a strong indication of the importance he attached to it.

(U) The initial step in the new land reform program was a one year freeze on occupancy and rent in newly pacified villages and hamlets. As explained in the GVN circular which announced it, the purpose of the freeze was to alleviate the concern of farmers in the newly pacified areas:

When an area loses security and farmers and small owners migrate from their villages to Government-controlled areas, the land they farm is divided up for cultivation by farmers who stay in the village or is allocated by the VC to farmers of their choice.

On the other hand, when they control an area, the VC usually apply a policy of redistribution of land according to their own criteria. They confuse the land situation and put the GVN in a difficult position to solve the problem.

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Therefore, when a hamlet is pacified, farmers who are cultivating the confused land are worried and afraid former farmers may take back the land and thus they will be deprived of a way of living.

To calm all classes of farmers and to make them supporters of the National Government, the GVN decided to freeze occupancy and rent in order that all farmers can live in peace and contentment under the protection of the Republic and at the same time allow local authorities time to examine each case and to apply the right measures to avoid further confusion of the land situation. 123

(U) Breaking the farmers down into three categories, the circular decreed that the present farmer automatically became the legal tenant of cultivated land belonging to non-tiller landlords provided the latter had it for rental and there were no previous occupants. If the land cultivated belonged to a former owner-operator, the "present farmer" had two choices after the one year freeze. He could either stay on the land and become the legal tenant by signing a contract with the former owner or he could move to a location chosen by GVN where he would be provided with land equivalent to that he had just vacated. This land would be made available for ownership. In the third category, wherein the cultivated land was previously rented by another tenant, "the present occupant is entitled to stay on for cultivation, to sign a lease contract directly with the landlord and even can acquire the land if the land is put under the Land-to-the-Tiller program of the Government." Under this arrangement, the former tenant could not get back the land even though he held a legal lease contract. But he was to be given priority to rent communal land in the vicinity, if available, or he could acquire for self-ownership other Government-owned land equal in hectareage to that he previously farmed.

(U) The freeze on occupancy and rent in newly pacified villages and hamlets was merely the first step in the revolutionary land reform program. Other and more important programs designed to bring land to the tiller were essential if the overall program was to be as President Thieu intended, i. e., the most important effort of the government to provide social reforms. 124

(U) With the GVN owning 147,210 hectares of former French and other expropriated rice land in 27 provinces of the II, III and IV CTZs, President Thieu expressed his intention to take the GVN out of the land-lord business and distribute the land during 1969. Therefore, on 8 May, the Ministry of Land Reform and Agriculture dispatched a circular to the province chiefs outlining the procedures to be followed in attaining the presidential goal. 125

(U) Among other things, the simplified procedures outlined in the circular called for extensive publicizing of the program, to include training sessions for hamlet and village officials and the education of farmers on how to take advantage of the GVN offer. This circular established criteria for the collection and authentication of applications and it provided for a Village Land Distribution Committee to rule on the merits of each application. It decreed that the village committee should transmit the information and application, if approved, to the Province Land Service within seven days. The Province Land Service, in turn, would complete the dossier and again with a deadline, pass it on to the ministry for checking and issuance of an arrête.

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After the arrete was signed, the process was to be reversed. The authorization was passed down to province level again for the drafting of titles and arranging of transfer ceremonies.

(U) As the circular made clear, emphasis was on getting the job done with a minimum of delay. "Because of the top priority the GVN has given to land reform," the circular stated, "each province chief will instruct his Village Agriculture and Land Reform Commissioner to work full time on the land distribution program. In these villages that have land to distribute, they must not give any kind of excuse for not doing the job."

(C) The goal for distributing all government-owned land in II, III and IV CTZs by the end of the year was what the Saigon Embassy described as "an eminently desirable one, toward the realization of which we will provide all possible assistance." It was apparent almost from the beginning, however, that technical difficulties such as the handling of land in VC-controlled territory, might preclude realization of the year-end goal.¹²⁶ Such proved to be the case. At year's end, less than half of the 147,210 hectares scheduled for distribution had actually been handed over to the tillers.

(C) Another land reform program was also underway. This program, tentatively titled the Montagnard Land Tenure Program, was designed to facilitate the identification and issuance of titles for land guaranteed the Montagnards under a 1967 decree. By the terms of this decree, the right of the Montagnards to own the land they had traditionally farmed was recognized. Thus, the new program was, in effect, a continuation of the old. As no timetable was established by the end of 1969, no titles had actually been issued under the Land Tenure Program; however, the necessary procurement and reproduction of the required aerial photography had been undertaken. It was also evident at the end of the year that titles to an estimated 550,000 hectares in the highlands could be issued, mostly to the Montagnards but with some left over for veterans and refugees.¹²⁷

(S) Meanwhile, yet another phase of the land reform program was under serious consideration. This was the search for an appropriate method to reduce landlordism through the expropriation, with compensation, of privately owned lands above a certain hectareage. As President Thieu explained in an April meeting with the US Ambassador, he hoped to implement a voluntary purchase plan wherein landlords, particularly absentee ones, would sell their land to the tillers. This meant that the government would have to supply some incentive, including willingness to underwrite the program. President Thieu estimated the cost at nearly \$VN 48 billion, but he felt that GVN could get as many as 800,000 hectares by this means.¹²⁸

(U) USAID, which was responsible for monitoring US interests in the land reform program, went on record as strongly supporting this plan. It took the position that this program, when compared with the freeze mentioned earlier, "is a much better method of approaching the national constitutional objective of 'helping farmers to have farmland' than for the Government to amend Ordinance 57 to reduce the present landowner retention to possibly 5 to 10 hectares." USAID listed the following reasons for this position:¹²⁹

The land would be immediately transferred to the farmer without the intermediate step of going to the Government first as in expropriation.

Government financial and manpower resources would not become committed to the purchase of land

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not being farmed as happened under Ordinance 57.

A totally new land reform concept would be implemented and could not be associated as a continuation of the unpopular Diem land reform program.

(S) Despite the arguments favoring the voluntary purchase program, the Minister of Land Reform and Agriculture found sufficient disadvantages to propose a bolder revolutionary land-to-tiller scheme. In particular, he found that VOLPUR, as it was called, would require at least three years to complete the major portion of title issuance and, a minimum of six months to establish the necessary administrative machinery. Also, there was the fundamental problem that tillers would be required to pay for the land. Few could afford it even if it were offered. On the other hand, he saw considerable political benefits for GVN if the latter transferred the land to the tenants without the tenants having to pay. ¹³⁰

(C) President Thieu liked the new idea. A week later a USAID telegram carried news of the Minister's "rapidly unfolding new approach to land reform." President Thieu recalled that after distribution of government-owned lands, 700,000 farmers would still own no land. He mentioned a major new scheme to expropriate approximately one million hectares of rented riceland which the GVN intended to give, not sell, to tenant farmers. ¹³¹

Land-to-the-Tiller Program

(C) President Thieu's revolutionary land reform proposal overshadowed all previous programs. Presented to the National Assembly as the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform's "Land-to-the-Tiller Program," it proposed to distribute one million hectares of land to the 800,000 tenants then cultivating them. Also, the new program would:

1. Give title free of charge to any tenant, squatter, or VC-appointed cultivator who filed an application with his Village Administrative Committee.
2. Grant payment from the Government to the former owner following issuance of title to the new owner.
3. Preclude landlords from keeping any tenanted land for which the farmer files an application.

(C) The majority of the land in the new program was privately owned and not operated by the owner. Applying a revolutionary measure--that all privately owned rice and crop lands farmed by persons who were not the owners would be transferred to the tillers upon application--the administrative procedures were reduced to relative simplicity. The certification of tenure would be made by the village government rather than by the Central Government. ¹³²

(C) On 9 Sep the Lower House of the National Assembly passed its own version of the bill. If enacted by the Upper House, the Lower House version would seriously compromise the political and psychological objectives of the basic proposal. The major changes proposed by the Lower House version were:

1. Landlords in the lowlands would retain up to five hectares of land, those in the highlands up to 15 hectares.

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2. There was no requirement for the owner to cultivate the land himself.
3. Certain religious lands and grounds of worship were exempt from distribution.

4. The MOA< bill used a payment formula of 20-80 percent, i.e., 20 percent of the total value paid immediately in cash, 80 percent in bonds redeemable after eight years. The Lower House version required that the first five hectares be paid in cash and the remainder paid for using the 80 percent formula. (This provision alone added an estimated \$VN 8.5 billion piasters onto the \$VN 10 billion piaster cash of the program during its first two or three years -- placing an even heavier burden on an already overloaded national budget.)

(C) Additionally, the exempting of religious lands and grounds of worship from distribution would reduce the total land available for distribution by approximately 100,000 hectares. However, opposition to this provision might have caused a religious lobby and serious political repercussions, endangering the entire proposal and hence the MOA&IR did not oppose such a position.¹³³



"President Thieu presenting tiller his land title."

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(C) The year-end status of this far reaching land reform bill was contained in US Embassy Saigon message 25248, 29 Dec which read in part:

Upper House consideration of land reform bill has been delayed... UH Chairman Huyen now expects action in special session, hopefully within first two weeks of January. ¹³⁴

Improve Rice Production

(C) In furtherance of the long range objective to return the RVN to a state of self-sufficiency in the production of rice -- and eventually regain its position as an exporter of rice -- a goal of 200,000 hectares planted in IR-8 rice was established for the year. The object of this goal was to supplant an equal portion of the total RVN rice crop with the "miracle" rice and effect a greater yield per hectare. (It followed that as domestic production increased, foreign imports could be reduced and thereby stimulate the sagging economy.) As only 44,000 hectares had been planted in IR-8 rice the previous year, the increase to 200,000 hectares was a dramatic one.

(C) One surmountable problem encountered in the expanding production of IR-8 rice was that some people were not accustomed to its taste and did not like it. Therefore, the GVN Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform was tasked to expand greater effort to publicize more appetizing ways to prepare it. The results of these efforts were not discernible by the end of the year but an increased acceptance of IR-8 rice was expected.

(C) During the year approximately 190,000 hectares of land under the government program and an estimated 50,000 hectares of private lands were planted in IR-8 rice. Although the rice crop year did not terminate until 1 Feb 70, initial results of the first crop harvested indicated that 100 percent of the goals would be fulfilled or surpassed after the second harvest was in. ¹³⁵

REDUCE THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES

1969 Programs and Policies

(U) As of 1 Jan, there was a total of 1,328,517 registered refugees in RVN. Of this number, slightly more than half (681,756) were located in I CTZ where one province had more than 250,000, one province had between 160,000 and 200,000, and the remaining three provinces had between 50,000 and 100,000. The II CTZ came next with 373,292. Only one of its 13 provinces, however, had over 50,000. The exception, Binh Dinh, had 224,466, more than the rest

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of the provinces combined. The IV CTZ had a total of 192,734 registered refugees, with the heaviest concentration (31,224) in Kien Giang Province. The III CTZ had only 80,735, with individual provinces ranging from a high of 18,229 at Phuoc Long to a low of zero in Bien Hoa Province. 136

(C) The 1969 Pacification and Development Plan took careful notice of the refugee problem and listed as one of the eight main objectives the reduction of the number of refugees to less than 1 million. This meant the resettlement or return to their native villages of more than 300,000 people during the year and a number equal to the number of new refugees generated during the year.

(C) In the section on refugees, the 1969 Guidelines stressed the fact that while some refugees moved from their native land because of military operations, the mass of the people were basically anti-Communist in that they had left relatively insecure villages and hamlets to avoid Communist pressure or influence or they had suffered damage by VC attacks or shellings. For this reason, the guidelines listed maintaining the people's anti-Communist spirit as one of the three basic objectives for the 1969 program. (The other two were the short term goal of reducing the number of refugees to less than 1 million and helping the people to be self-sufficient.) 137 (See Figure VIII-19 for the program areas of intent.)

(C) Since a refugee program had been in effect for several years, the 1969 Pacification Guidelines were more concerned with overcoming existing shortcomings than outlining structure and organization. They mentioned past lack of support, motivation, and control on the part of certain agencies and province administrations, resulting in a corresponding lack of aid to the refugees themselves. Also, the provinces did not establish promptly future economic development potential. Finally, the guidelines emphasized the neglect of territorial security and its effect on the refugee problem.

The provinces were supposed to launch pacification operations in order to restore military and territorial security. Instead they have forced people from insecure areas to refugee camps. Such action not only creates dissatisfaction but also is a burden to the Government in implementing the relief program...

(C) Because of the above shortcomings, the 1969 Guidelines announced that the following principles must be applied:

The government must pacify areas and bring security to the people instead of forcing them to leave secure areas.

Avoid moving the people from newly pacified hamlets to villages, districts or provincial capitals, except for unavoidable migration that must be reported to the Central Pacification and Development Council for study and decision.

Encourage the population of D, E, and VC Hamlets in villages scheduled to be pacified in 1969 to remain in their communities.


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FIGURE VIII-19

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The Service of Social Welfare and Relief should coordinate with the Service of Information and local military, civilian and administrative agencies to exhort, propagandize, and launch the "return to village" campaign to encourage the people to resettle themselves at their native localities as soon as D, E, and VC hamlets are pacified.

After returning to their native communities, the people should be encouraged to participate in the hamlet self-defense operations and assume various functions in the Hamlet Managing Board or the Village Administrative Committee after election or designation based on the community spirit principles.

(C) Because of many needy refugees, the 1969 Plan also had guidelines for relief. As before, relief in the form of food and funds was available through civic action operations and through the Ministry of Public Health, Social Welfare and Relief. But first priority was to go to refugees in the temporary evacuation phase, either inside or outside the refugee camps. To encourage these refugees to settle in new locations or return to their native areas, a resettlement subsidy of \$VN 5,000 was allowed each family which did so, along with 500 grams of rice daily for each person for a 6-month period, \$VN 2,500 (in lieu of cement), and 10 large sheets of roofing metal.

Mid-Year Evaluation

(C) Although the total number of registered refugees climbed to 1.45 million in February, principally because of better bookkeeping, each of the first 6-months witnessed a significant number of refugees resettled or returned through GVN auspices to their native village and hamlets.

(C) Despite a budgetary disagreement between the President Thieu and the National Assembly early in the year which directly affected the refugee problem, the first six-months of the year witnessed a decline from the alltime high of 1.4 million in February to less than 1.2 million at the end of June. Of this number, nearly 100,000 were actually returned to their original villages while the remainder were dropped from the rolls after choosing to resume normal lives in a new area.

(C) The story of the refugee problem during Phase I was not all progress. The undermanned Refugee Service tended to operate in spurts, either concentrating on taking census, pushing resettlement, or upgrading refugee centers and the care of people in these centers. During Operation BOLD MARINER/RUSSELL BEACH (See Ground Operations, Chapter VI) on the Batangan Peninsula in Quang Ngai Province, for example, the Refugee Service did a creditable job caring for and later resettling the 10,000 people removed from the operational area. In the meantime, however, most work with the other 227,000 refugees in the province practically halted. Such spotty performance left the refugee program with an "inadequate" rating for Phase I in II and IV CTZs, I CTZ was rated "adequate", and III CTZ "good." Overall performance was rated as "adequate." 138

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Phase II Evaluation

(C) The nationwide refugee population, at the end of Phase II (31 Oct) had dropped to a remarkable 536,827. Of this number 216,602 were in temporary camps, 141,631 were in the process of resettlement and 172,594 were classified as out-of-camp. Despite the generation of 13,786 new refugees in October, a startling overall refugee decrease of 253,299 occurred. The greatest reduction occurred in Quang Ngai Province where 102,246 out-of-camp refugees were paid their final entitlements. 139

(C) Undoubtedly the phenomenal results attained during October -- especially in Quang Ngai Province -- could be attributed to Communique No. 8924, issued by the Ministry of Social Welfare on 23 Sep. The communique revised the procedures under which resettlement and return to village allowances were to be paid and restricted the payment of allowances to certain groups. Under the provisions of this communique, province chiefs were authorized to make return-to-village and resettlement payments without prior approval from the ministry, the end result being more expeditious payments to qualified refugees. However, the communique also prohibited payment without prior approval by the ministry to those refugees who since 1 Jan voluntarily abandoned insecure hamlets not included in the 1969 Pacification program or who were evacuated by ARVN/Allied military operations, and those temporarily evacuated during military pacification operations without regard to date. 140

Year End Summary

(C) The downward trend in total refugee population continued during November and December as the province staffs of the GVN Ministry of Social Welfare concentrated their efforts on making payments to refugees in all categories. A record high of 126,892 refugees received their final resettlement allowances during the month of December, bringing the 1969 total to 586,388. At year's end 268,252 refugees remained on the rolls, including 150,605 in camp, 65,929 in resettlement process, and 51,718 out-of-camp. This unprecedented forward movement in dealing with the refugee problem should be recognized but not misinterpreted. The assistance provided to the individual refugee was one of the most important elements in their rehabilitation. Equally important, however, was the development of resettlement and return-to-village sites considered essential to the creation of economic and social viability. 141

(C) The concentration during 1969 on goal fulfillment -- by completing refugee payments -- entailed the sacrifice of development. As the efforts necessary to complete refugee payments lessened, service chiefs were directed to focus the majority of their efforts upon completion of the developmental aspects of the refugee program, i.e., rehabilitation and upgrading of resettlement sites, including those economic projects and improvements necessary to ensure the refugee a means of livelihood.

(U) Figure VIII-20 reflects the dramatic success achieved in 1969.

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
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FIGURE VIII-20

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CHAPTER IX

LOGISTICS

...logistics is the application of time and space factors to war. It is the economics of warfare, and it comprises, in the broadest sense, the three big Ms of warfare -- materiel, movement, and maintenance. If international politics is the "art of the possible", and war is its instrument, logistics is the art of defining and extending the possible. It provides the substance that physically permits an army to "live and move and have its being."

James A. Huston

GENERAL

1968 Review

(C) The overall logistic situation in RVN had remained satisfactory throughout 1968 as the US logistic system met the requirements of supported elements. The RVNAF also had been able to meet the majority of their logistics requirements.

(C) Although some equipment and supply shortages had existed during the early months of 1968, emergency resupply actions taken had provided sufficient support for combat operations. The interdiction of LOCs during this period had dictated heavy use of air transport. Because air transport available to RVNAF was limited, major reliance had been placed on US aircraft resources. Shortages of barrier material, petroleum products, and certain types of ammunition had existed countrywide; however, resupply from RVNAF base and field depots and in-country US sources had helped to alleviate these shortages. Expedited supply action on certain critical items requested from CONUS had re-established a satisfactory overall supply posture within RVNAF.

(C) Increased combat activity in May had created some equipment and supply shortages. Again, emergency resupply action had provided sufficient support for combat operations. Emphasis during July, August, and September had been placed on upgrading and improving the quality of RVNAF logistic support. While increased quantities of modern weapons and equipment had been made available during this period, shortages had remained in weapons, radios, and motor vehicles, particularly for the RF/PF.

(U) In retrospect, the logistic posture in RVN during 1968 had showed continued improvement over the preceding years. Significant advances had been made in all areas of supply, construction, hospitalization and evacuation, maintenance, and transportation. Programs to provide more effective and responsive support to US forces had been initiated; added emphasis had been placed on the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program.

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Logistic Responsibilities

(U) There was no major change in logistic responsibilities during 1969. Following JCS Pub 1 doctrine each service was responsible for logistical support of its own forces except when agreement or assignment as common-servicing or cross-servicing was provided.

1. The MACV Directives 10-11, 405-1, 405-2, and 405-3 assigned logistical tasks in RVN as follows:

a. COMNAVFORV - For US military logistic support operations at ports and beaches in I CTZ; and for common-item support, base development (exclusive of air bases assigned to USAF), and real estate services to US and FWMAF in I CTZ; and for Navy-peculiar support to USN and Coast Guard units throughout RVN.

b. CG, USARV - For common supply and common service support to all US and FWMAF in II, III, and IV CTZ; for base development (exclusive of air bases assigned to USAF) and real estate services in these CTZs; and for Army-peculiar supply support throughout RVN.

c. Commander, 7AF and CG, III MAF - For service-peculiar support throughout RVN. Commander 7AF also was responsible for base development and real estate services at air bases where USAF had primary responsibility.

2. The MACV Directive 701-9 established responsibilities for logistical support of US/FW forces when redeployed between NAVFORV support area (I CTZ) and USARV support areas (II, III, and IV CTZ). This directive defined and outlined:

a. Common Items: Class I, III and selected II and IV items as agreed upon by the component commanders concerned.

b. Service-peculiar: All items required by a service not included in paragraph 2a above.

c. Redeployment: Movement of a unit from its original deployment area. This included units diverted prior to arrival in-country as well as the units moved within country.

d. Procedures: Procedures were established for support of US/FW forces which were deployed between NAVFORV and USARV support areas on a permanent basis, or when redeployment was for contingency operations, and the unit would be returned to home base after operations were terminated.


The Logistic Concept

(U) Logistic support was based on use of the major logistical facilities ("islands") that were established in RVN, as well as on the availability of air, land, and sea transportation. Logistic support of US forces in RVN was organized essentially on an area basis. Figure IX-1 depicts major logistical facilities used during 1969.

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MAJOR PORTS, LAND LOC's AND LOGISTIC COMMANDS



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FIGURE IX-1

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I Corps Tactical Zone

(U) The US forces in I CTZ were provided common-item support by COMNAVFORV, and Navy Support Activity, Danang (NSAD) had been established as the wholesale supplier of common-item supplies. The Force Logistics Command (FLC) of III MAF operated the support group at Danang and smaller support units at Chu Lai, Dong Ha, and Hue/Phu Bai. The USARV 1st Log Comd provided the Army in I CTZ with service-peculiar support through the Danang Support Command with direct support activities at Chu Lai. The NSAD also operated the pipelines in I CTZ. Support for items limited to units of a particular branch of service was provided by that service.

II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones

(U) The US forces located in II, III, and IV CTZ were provided common-item support by the CG, USARV through the 1st Log Comd. The Army's logistic responsibilities were fulfilled by three major support commands located at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon. Each of these support commands were major subordinate commands of 1st Log Comd. They each operated a major depot complex to provide wholesale or general support level supplies, maintenance, and services within their areas of assignment. Local support groups were established at key locations to provide retail or direct support level supplies, maintenance, and services in areas of major troop concentrations.

US Support of Free World Forces

(U) The US provided combat service support to FWMAF in accordance with bilateral arrangements. The responsibility for providing such support rested with the US component commanders in whose area these forces were operating.

RVN Support of Free World Forces

(U) The FWMAF MAP-peculiar items were provided by RVNAF in accordance with arrangements agreed upon by the national authorities involved.

Overview of 1969 Activities

(C) The logistic posture in RVN continued to show improvement in 1969. Although logistical requirements remained high during the year, components were responsive to the needs of the operating forces.

First Quarter

(S) During the first quarter the availability of supplies to support operations remained generally satisfactory, with no significant problem areas. Class III (POL) consumption was 10.96 million barrels (MBBLs) during the quarter as compared to 10.46 MBBLs during the preceding quarter. Available tankage was adequate at 2.7 MBBLs.

(S) The total throughput performance for RVN military ports averaged 1,142,168 STONs per month for the first quarter compared to a monthly average of 1,273,000 STONs during the

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last quarter of 1968. The average number of ships waiting in-country during each month of the quarter was four. The tonnage of USAID cargo handled through military facilities increased to 12,000 STONs which was over the program of 10,000 STONs. The SEASIA airlift system continued to be responsive to the needs of tactical operations.

(S) The OSD release of FY 69 funds increased the Military Construction (MILCON) funding level for use in RVN to a grand cumulative total of \$1.7 billion. Military construction in place increased by \$85 million during the quarter and brought the grand cumulative total to \$1.34 billion. Funds obligated for military construction decreased \$8 million to a grand cumulative total of \$1.55 billion. The FY 69 funds remaining unapportioned at the end of the first quarter CY 69 were \$98.8 million. The grand cumulative total of MILCON funding in support of SEASIA in the Pacific Command reached \$2.42 million by the end of the quarter.

Second Quarter

(C) During the second quarter, the logistic posture in the RVN continued to improve although logistical requirements remained high.

(S) The military construction funding level rose to a grand cumulative total of \$1.715 billion. Military construction in place increased by \$57 million during the quarter and brought the grand cumulative total to \$1.399 billion. Funds obligated in RVN increased \$24 million to a grand cumulative total of \$1.575 billion. At the end of the second quarter CY 69 there were \$92.9 million of FY 69 funds unapportioned.

(S) During the quarter the availability of supplies to support operations remained generally satisfactory, with no significant problem areas. Class III (POL) consumption was 10.88 MBBLS.

(S) The total monthly throughput performance for military ports averaged 1,169,060 STONs per month for the quarter. An average of four ships per month waited discharge in-country during the quarter. The tonnage of USAID cargo handled through military facilities was approximately 12,000 STONs which was again over the program figure of 10,000 STONs. The SEASIA airlift system continued to be responsive to support requirements of tactical operations.

Third Quarter

(S) In the third quarter, generally adequate levels of supply were maintained by components and the first effects of troop redeployments were discerned in consumption of materials and services. There were several base transfers, primarily in I and IV CTZs, as redeploying US forces transferred their facilities to RVNAF.

(S) Total military construction funding level increased to \$1.731 billion while military construction in place rose to \$1.460 billion. Funds obligated in RVN during the quarter, \$23 million, brought the grand cumulative total to \$1.598 billion, leaving \$91.7 million unobligated.

(S) There were no major problems with supply. The available POL tankage increased to 3,898 MBBLS while consumption declined to 3,326 MBBLS.

(S) The total monthly throughput performance for RVN ports averaged 1,016,105 STONs monthly and the average number of ships waiting in-country during the quarter was less than eight each month. The military handled 9,665 STONs of USAID cargo during the period. The

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command's supporting airlift maintained timely and adequate support to all components in spite of a slight decline in the number of C-130 aircraft available in-country.

(U) A significant event of the third quarter was the conception and promulgation of the combined logistic offensive aimed at accelerating development of a viable RVNAF logistics system.

Fourth Quarter

(S) Major focus of logistical activities in the fourth quarter was on Vietnamization, with maintaining the momentum of the logistics offensive and transferring of unneeded materiel and facilities to RVNAF as the major efforts.

(U) The logistics offensive made significant progress as both RVNAF and MACV Command Logistics Offensive Coordination Centers were activated, tasking for both RVNAF and MACV was completed, and several programs of the offensive were moving on schedule.

(S) Military construction funding was at \$1.717 billion while construction in place increased to \$1.507 billion. There was an increase in obligations to a grand cumulative total at year's end of \$1.651 billion. There was \$66.3 million unobligated at the end of the year.

(S) With the troop redeployments, POL consumption declined to under 3,300 MBBLs while steel tankage increased to 3,900 MBBLs.

(S) Total monthly throughput performance for RVN ports averaged well under one million STONs with October reflecting a decline to under 850,000 STONs.

(U) At the end of the year logistics operations in RVN mirrored the thrust of US policy. The build-up was clearly over and every effort was being made to transfer to RVNAF the logistical wherewithal so vitally needed for their own self-sufficiency.

LOGISTICS OFFENSIVE

(U) In 1968 US strategy in RVN had embraced a rebirth of the spirit of the offensive and the VC/NVA found themselves subject to new and increasingly aggressive offensive action from both US and Allied forces. In 1969 this spirit of the offensive was expanded to combat service support as improvement and modernization of RVNAF assumed greater importance. As RVNAF force levels increased, COMUSMACV recognized the growing requirement for accelerating the development and improving the efficacy of the indigenous logistical system. He believed there was a need for a "logistic offensive" because of the rapid build-up of the RVNAF forces which resulted in an accelerated receipt of material. He also was convinced the RVNAF combat forces must be supported by a trained, responsive, and flexible RVNAF logistic force.

(U) The task was seen as being short range - to identify basic problems which when resolved would give immediate improvements - most within a six month period. This plan contrasted with the Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP) which was a long range plan dealing in facilities improvements and other major objectives which were to be accomplished over a number of years.

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(U) The logistic offensive was not revolutionary. It was believed there were fundamental principles that could be followed or applied more effectively. The basic plan, prepared by MACJ4, identified what had to be done, who was to do it, and when it was to be done. Emphasis was placed on impetus coming from RVNAF's JGS so that all echelons would become involved. The major focus was on reorientation - not reorganization, and not more equipment and personnel spaces. The RVNAF had to do better with what they had; they had to exercise their system. Motivation, attitude, and the spirit of the offensive were the substantive objectives of the logistic offensive.¹

(U) Data were collected from the field and after evaluation and analysis the findings pointed up 121 problems whose resolution would improve RVNAF's logistic posture. Forty-three percent of the total RVNAF problems applied to two or more of the services. (See Combined MACV Plan 185-69/RVNAF Plan CLP 5769, undated, for a complete listing of the problems.) All 121 problems were identified by service, function, cause, and echelon within RVNAF. Since problems reflected the symptoms of problem areas, they were used to find the causes which had to be corrected.

(U) Ten basic causes for all the problems were determined (e.g., scrounging by RVNAF and advisors; to get the job done advisors and RVNAF bypassed the established supply system, a practice which was detrimental to the supply system's effectiveness as it was built on demands.) After the analysis of the problems, a basis for corrective action was formed that related directly to the causes of the problems. Corrective actions then were initiated through reorientation rather than reorganization and were based on the following 11 conclusions:

1. There was a need for further command emphasis at all echelons of the logistic system, starting at the GVN level.
2. The Vietnamese must use command channels for logistic operations and delegate more authority.
3. Maximum participation by the Vietnamese was essential.
4. There was a great need for progressive, responsive systems and procedures. Accomplishments in this area could have the greatest effect on the entire logistic system.
5. Inspection and information systems were needed which would require responses from commanders in the field.
6. There was a critical lack of trained specialists at every echelon in almost every area of technical expertise.
7. There was a requirement for basic and translated publications.
8. An improved program was needed for upgrading and maintenance of facilities and equipment to include preventive maintenance programs.
9. The US advisors should not get involved in operations. They should offer technical assistance to help RVNAF become self-sufficient, but not do it for them.
10. The RVNAF must use available teletype facilities for communications. Reliance on the VN postal service took too long to get instructions to the field and answers back.

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11. Increased use of assistance and training teams was needed as the teams could impart knowledge rapidly in the basic individual skills as well as in matters pertaining to depot operations, facilities management, and plant layout. It was envisioned the teams would come from CONUS and in-country sources.

(U) Based on the above conclusions the plan was formulated. In order to introduce the RVNAF into the offensive at the earliest time and maintain the momentum of the offensive three management activities were established:

1. A combined JGS/MACV Logistics Committee. This group was composed of senior commanders and staff officers and served to focus command attention on major logistic problem areas. It provided a forum for combined action to resolve logistic problems.

2. JGS Logistics Offensive Coordination Center (LOCC). It functioned as the focal point for RVNAF logistic performance information and evaluation by collecting and analyzing data, ensuring completeness and coordination of reports, developing performance standards for evaluating the adequacy of logistic support to operational units, and making recommendations as to the solution of logistic problems to the combined committee.

3. MACV Logistics Offensive Coordination Center. It performed similar functions to those performed by the JGS LOCC and provided a focal point for all MACV logistic data. (Both LOCCs used a common source of information.) These three management activities were continuous and they not only monitored the resolution of current problems but addressed future potential problems.

(U) Specific RVNAF staff agency tasking was based on the 121 problem areas. In general the tasking was as follows:

1. DCS/Logistic Actions.

a. Assume primary responsibility for the logistics offensive and initiation and control of most actions to solve the individual problems.

b. Establish the RVNAF LOCC which would monitor logistic operations for the combined LOCC.

c. Stress the importance of logistics by ensuring its consideration in operational plans, conducting conferences with key commanders, and making frequent visits to logistic activities.

d. Delegate authority to the lowest practical level to enable the system to be more responsive.

e. Develop an automated material management center for efficient asset control and distribution.

f. Standardize the diverse requisitioning procedures used by the five technical services.

g. Assist commanders by implementing the command maintenance management inspection program and using more contact and other assistance teams.

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2. RVNAF DCS/Personnel Actions.

a. There were very junior and inexperienced officers at corps and division level. To give proper emphasis to logistic planning, commanders needed trained and qualified officers.

b. A standard cataloging system was needed.

c. An established MOS system was needed to assure proper use of personnel resources.

3. RVNAF DCS/Training Actions.

a. Assure school quotas were filled with qualified people who could learn the required skills and return them to their parent unit.

b. Supplement the normal unit and organization training programs with formal school training.

c. Provide specialized technical training teams to improve existing methods and provide a base of trained personnel.

4. RVNAF Inspector General Actions.

a. Assure inspections of logistic activities.

b. Staff inspection reports through command channels to ensure commanders and their staffs were informed.

c. Require reports of corrective action.

5. RVNAF DCS/Operations Actions. Ensure inclusion of logistic considerations in operational planning so as to obviate RVNAF units seeking support from US units and province administrative and direct support logistic companies (A&DSL) rather than the ARVN supporting units.

6. RVNAF DCS/Political Warfare Actions. Publicize the logistics offensive.

(U) The MACV staff was also tasked for specific functions with MACJ4 complementing the actions of the RVNAF DCS/Logistics, ensuring selection of advisors for the RVNAF LOCC based upon MACAG's recommendations. Also, MACJ4 ensured technical channels to the corps G4 advisors were exercised to head off potential problems. Meanwhile MACJ1 arranged with appropriate CONUS activities for the selection and notification of personnel selected for advisor positions prior to their CONUS departure. Personnel selected for advisory positions were screened to ensure they possessed the required grade, MOS, and experience to function effectively. MACJ1 also arranged for newly assigned advisory personnel to attend the RVNAF Logistics Indoctrination Course.

(U) Other MACV staff agencies participated as follows:

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1. MACT

a. Initiated actions required to provide translated technical publications for RVNAF units. (The 7th AF SEAOR #181 Machine-Assisted Translation System was tested as an alternate method for expeditious translation of technical data for all VNAF units.)

b. Arranged for specialized technical training assistance teams from CONUS or in-country, to conduct training beyond the capability of RVNAF, assigned advisors and monitored existing programs. (The JGS and MACJ4 identified potential requirements for specialized technical training and assistance teams.)

2. MACJ6. Advised and assisted JGS-DCS/Operations in establishing expanded and expedited communications support for RVNAF logistics.

(U) The first meeting with RVNAF committee was held on 5 Jul and the staff sections represented displayed great interest. Evidence of the degree of urgency accorded the plan by JGS was the approval of the combined plan on 14 Jul.

(U) With promulgation of the combined plan the Vietnamization of RVNAF logistic system was underway. First, MACV's and subsequently RVNAF's LOCCs were activated and interface was established. The two facilities provided continuous liaison and monitoring of the specific tasks initiated to resolve the 121 problem areas in the master plan.

(U) Overlapping with and providing the longer range objectives to the goals of the combined logistic offensive plan was the Country Logistics Improvement Plan (CLIP). (See Chapter VI, RVNAF Logistics.)

(U) Another program that contributed to the improvement of the RVNAF logistic system was establishment of the National Materiel Management Center. The objective of the program was to provide RVNAF with a standard, automated capability to manage logistics at the national level. While US personnel assisted in developing a program technique to identify and administer the major events necessary to accomplish the program, the Vietnamese accepted the MACV recommendation to engage a US firm to analyze the system requirements.

(U) At the end of the year the logistic offensive was making significant progress. Of the 121 specific actions designated at the outset of the offensive, 101 were completed and follow up actions were underway. Additional significant progress included:

1. Major Tasks, RVNAF.

a. The Logistics Coordination Branch/Plans & Programs Division, Central Logistics Command (CLC) was activated on 20 Oct with the same basic mission as the MACV LOCC. Its mission was broadened to include implementation of the RIMMS (See Chapter VI, RVNAF I&M) within CLC. It was also charged with assembling and displaying logistic data for use by the JGS in coordinating logistic support to the field.

b. The first orientation course for US Logistic Advisors commenced at the RVNAF Logistics Management School in Saigon on 17 Nov. The course was one week in duration with mornings devoted to classroom instruction and afternoons to field trips to RVNAF depots and other logistic installations.

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c. An ADP Center was activated at CLC and studies were underway to enlarge its scope of activities with the final goal of developing it into the National Logistics Management Center.

d. A series of competitions was organized to select the outstanding A&DSL Company each six months. A committee under the auspices of the Commander CLC selected the Quang Nam Province A&DSL Company as first winner on 1 Oct.

e. A new logistic communication system was designed by CLC and submitted to MACJ6 for study. Meanwhile efforts were devoted to upgrading and increasing utilization of the existing common-user system.

2. Major Tasks, MACV

a. Mobile training teams had arrived from CONUS and were working in the engineer, signal and ordnance fields.

b. Continued emphasis was being placed on the production of translated field and technical publications.

c. Department of the Army was apprised that 54 officers selected to fill logistic advisor positions between November 1969 and May 1970 should be notified of their participation in the logistic advisory effort. Also, DA was notified that personnel selected for assignment to the advisory positions should possess grade, MOS, and experience indicated by JTD paragraphs and line numbers. Response from DA was that all effort would be made to fill these requisitions with grades and skills authorized; however, some substitutions would be necessary due to the inability of the personnel requisitioning authority to support the request. ²

SUPPLY

General

(U) Throughout 1968 the supply status of the command had been generally excellent and many improvements had been made in the system. This trend continued in 1969 as improved management of stocks and levels resulted in increasing responsiveness to requirements at the lowest possible costs to components.

(U) In USARV a comprehensive effort had been initiated in November 1968 to improve logistic policies and procedures and many refinements and improvements had been identified. In 1969 this Command and Control Improvement Program made significant strides in practically all areas of supply management. Examples of the many subprograms were:

1. Operation FILL - provided intelligence showing what the combat essential weapons systems really needed among the stocked items in order to contribute directly to the defeat of the enemy by prevention of deadlines and continued operational readiness to the maximum extent.

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2. Operation STOP/SEE - identified procedural implications, both retail and wholesale, on the levels of supply in the combat theater and in CONUS.

3. Project CLEAN - identified procedures pertaining to reconciliation of demand data and appropriate changes to stockage criteria based upon having high velocity stock in support of deadlined equipment forward with slower moving stock progressively removed to the rear and supported through rapid transportation.

4. Project FLOW - determined the ingredients both in and out of the theater which provided command and control of supplies in transit allowing for reduced stockage on the ground; supplanted knowledge and control of supplies in the pipeline.

5. Project THRU-PUT - provided the basis for procedures which eliminated unnecessary stopping and rehandling of supplies that should either go forward or be retrograded without stopping at intermediate locations.

6. Project EDIT - whereby, at the lowest level, the supply specialist and NCO began the process of determining if an item was required and challenging the priority within which it should be requisitioned.

7. Project MANIFEST - provided supply information on all manifests rather than just cube and tonnage by general nomenclature, allowing for appropriate challenge of movement and preplanning of material to be received.

8. Project CASTLES & FLAGS - a command and control system to assure, no more or no less, within two or three months stockage objective criteria availability of construction material needed in engineer and communications projects.

(U) NAVFORV also had an intensive review of supply procedures underway at the start of 1969. The Commander, Naval Support Activity, Danang was involved in identification, location, and inventory of material excesses. In a program called Operation CUTBACK, all stocked items were reviewed to revise forecasts. Requisitioning objectives were reviewed for possible reductions and requirement projections for Selected Item Management items were updated. During January, NSAD inaugurated Project RAMROD (Review All Material Retrograde or Dispose). Under this program, all elements of NSAD screened all material in use and in stock to identify excesses and determine whether to retrograde the excess material or process it for disposal.³


(U) The overall supply situation in III MAF was adequate to support the mission during 1969. Like the Navy there were concerted efforts to reconcile backorders, purify records, and identify and dispose of excess throughout the year.⁴

Class I Supply

(U) The status of Class I supply throughout the command remained at an adequate level during 1969. Improvement in on-hand stocks, which had begun in 1968, continued and no significant problem areas were reported by the components.

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Rations Nearing the End of the Line at a Forward Outpost

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(U) Reflecting the trend of improved management of stocks in all services, USARV reviewed the subsistence pipeline to determine if stockage levels within RVN could be reduced to a lower management level through the use of intransit stocks. The use of these stocks reduced requirements for reefer and other storage. ⁵ See Figure IX-2 for Class I status in 1969.

USARV

(C) The USARV Class I stocks were relatively stable throughout 1969. There were fluctuations in on-hand quantities but all three types of rations were available in sufficient stocks to support customers and maintain acceptable reserves. See Figure IX-2.

(C) A new concept was implemented in March to improve the management of refrigerated subsistence. This concept was based on the principle that there was an optimum stock level between the stockage objective, which was rarely ever reached, and the safety level, below which stocks were not permitted to go. This optimum level was called the "management" level. Thus the inventory was constantly in motion turning over at a rapid rate as long as a balance was maintained in receipts and issues. Examples of how the concept was implemented were:

1. Eggs were requisitioned so as to decrease on-hand quantities to a six-day supply before depot level stocks were replenished.
2. The stockage objective was eliminated for all items appearing only once during the 28-day menu cycle. Troop issue requirements were requisitioned to arrive 10 days before they were to be consumed while a 15-day safety level was maintained for resale requirements.
3. Those refrigerated items, such as frozen vegetables and juices, dairy products, meats, and poultry, which appeared more than once during the 28-day menu cycle were requisitioned on the basis of a 15-day safety level. ⁶

(C) During the second quarter there was some overall improvement in levels of Class I supplies with respect to stockage objectives. These improvements resulted from improved management procedures such as the inventory-in-motion concept which was fully implemented for refrigerated items by the end of April. The excesses from the previous quarter were eliminated.

(C) There was a slight improvement in status of USARV stocks in the third quarter. Gains made during the first two months tended to be offset by declines in September for both refrigerated (R) and nonrefrigerated (S) subsistence. The level of meals, combat, individual (MCI) remained in excess of stockage objectives as issues were down, reflecting the lowered level of combat.

(C) In September perishable subsistence began to arrive in RVN from 10 days early to 40 days late. This fluctuation was traced to the failure of commercial vendors to deliver to CONUS depots or ports on schedule. Upon request from 1st Log Comd; the Chief, Purchasing Division, Data Processing Service Center (Alameda, California) took steps to correct the deliveries so that shipments would arrive on dates specified on requisitions. ⁷

(C) In the fourth quarter the level of subsistence support remained relatively unchanged from the previous quarter. The overages of MCI continued though there was a decline in the level of nonrefrigerated items. There were no significant problem areas and the year ended with adequate levels of subsistence to supported elements.

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
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CLASS I SUBSISTENCE



MEAL, COMBAT, INDIVIDUAL
 REFRIGERATED
 NON-REFRIGERATED

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FIGURE IX-2

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(C) In October a change was made in the mode of transportation for fresh fruits and vegetables (FF&V) and dry ice from Taiwan. Formerly, these items had been supplied to RVN users by two WESTPAC reefer vessels arriving on a 10-day cycle. The vessels were arriving with only 16 percent of their capacity being used while the daily rental for each was \$4,915 or \$294,900 monthly. It was determined that C-130 aircraft could not only reduce the cost (rotator flights could be provided without cost to the Army), but the quality of FF&V and dry ice could be improved by eliminating transit time and rough handling inherent in hatch cargo operations. ⁸

(C) Also in October, CG, 1st Log Comd requested subsistence items be included in the Logistics Intelligence File (LIF) maintained by the Logistical Control Office - Pacific (LCO-P). This request was approved by DA and a program was developed which used transceived data to improve management of subsistence stocks. Inclusion of the items in the LIF also permitted furnishing receiving depots in RVN pre-punched receipt cards prior to arrival of the transporting vessel. ⁹

NAVFORV

(C) NAVFORV continued efforts to improve on-hand quantities vis-a-vis stockage objectives. Imbalances of the previous year continued in spite of efforts to eliminate them. See Figure IX-2. At the Chu Lai detachment of NSAD there was significant improvement; however, at Danang the imbalances increased, particularly with respect to S rations and MCI stocks. These imbalances did not affect operations. While reductions in orders and procurements were made to reduce excess S rations, reduced usage of these stocks continued to frustrate reduction of the excess quantities.

(C) During the second quarter there was little change in the status of Class I supplies in NAVFORV. On-hand quantities of nonrefrigerated items continued to be above stockage objective levels, while MCI and R items remained below objectives. The shortfalls had no effect on naval and USMC operations.

(C) Class I stocks of NAVFORV approached stockage objective levels in August. These gains were offset by an overall decline in September.

(C) A major problem developed for NSAS detachments at Dong Tam and My Tho in the Delta when the 9th Inf Div redeployed from RVN. These detachments had received Class I support from the 9th S&T Bn supply point at Dong Tam. Responsibility for support of Navy elements remaining at Dong Tam and My Tho was given to the 3d Spt Bn, 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div at Tan An; however the ISSA provided for the drawing unit to pick up at the supply point. Neither the Navy nor the Army had the transportation to deliver subsistence from Tan An to Dong Tam and My Tho. As an interim measure, the 3d Spt Bn, 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div provided transportation for perishables until September when 1st Log Comd assumed the responsibility by supplying the Navy at Dong Tam and My Tho directly from the depot at Long Binh. ¹⁰

(C) During the fourth quarter the Navy maintained Class I stocks at an acceptable level. The major problem area continued to be the inability of the Army to support some of the outlying Naval activities, notably Binh Thuy and Cat Lo where effectiveness of support received was approximately 50 percent of requirement. ¹¹

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Refrigerated Storage

(C) The components continued their efforts to free floating reefer storage during the year. Two refrigerator ships, SS Parismina and Bodia, had been released at the end of December 1968. Construction was accelerated on two refrigerated warehouses at the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon and the estimated completion dates were 1 Jul and 1 Sep 1969. Construction also was underway at the Long Binh Army Depot. At Danang, NAVFORV gained another reefer bank in February, increasing the facility's total capacity to 552,251 gross cubic feet. The added capability acquired by the new construction at Danang was partially offset by the loss of 33,252 gross cubic feet of space as the result of a rocket attack on 23 Feb. 12

(C) On 25 Jun, 166,750 gross cubic feet of reefer warehouse space became available at the Army's Qui Nhon Depot. The availability of this space permitted the release of an additional reefer vessel, the SS Hibueras, and it departed station. 13

(C) Additional Army reefer warehouse space at Long Binh was finished on 21 Jul. There were further increases in space in August as two more sections of the Long Binh Depot cold storage facilities were completed and placed in use.

(C) On 6 Sep enemy rockets again damaged the NSAD's reefer storage facility, reducing its capacity from over 612,929 gross cubic feet to 376,924 gross cubic feet. An emergency request for reefer shops was submitted and adequate levels of Class I supplies were maintained. 14

(C) The availability of refrigerated storage continued to improve during the last quarter and by the end of the year the status by component was as follows: 15

1. USARV:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>GR CU FT RQD</u>	<u>GR CU FT OH</u>
Saigon	1,071,600	1,154,325
Cam Ranh Bay	296,100	582,595
Qui Nhon	460,600	498,431
	<u>1,828,300</u>	<u>2,235,351</u>

2. NAVFORV:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>GR CU FT RQD</u>	<u>GR CU FT OH</u>
Danang/Chu Lai	642,120	584,850

US Army Commissary Sales Store

(U) A decision to limit commissary privileges was made by COMUSMACV on 15 Mar. An unpopular but necessary measure, it was based on the following rationale:

1. Only a small percentage of US military personnel in RVN had access to the commissary and, of these, only a few did not have ready access to military messes.

2. The overall effort and cost entailed in operation of the commissary at the then current scale could be reduced considerably by limiting patronage to those having a legitimate requirement.

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3. The volume of business of the commissary exceeded the capacity of the physical plant for effective operations. A reduction in patronage would enable better service for those who had a valid need to use the commissary.

4. Many US civilian employees of US Government contractors received a station allowance, including subsistence allowance; hence, the granting of commissary privileges in addition to subsistence allowance constituted an overpayment by the US.

5. Controls were needed to ensure commissary sales items were used only for intended purposes.

(U) In accordance with the MACV policy, sponsoring agencies DCG, USARV; COMNAV-FORV; CDR 7TH AF; CG, III MAF; OICC; US Embassy; and CDRs, FWMAF retained the prerogative to grant commissary privileges to the following personnel who had valid requirements:

1. Duly authorized military and civilian personnel who did not have access to an authorized mess. In making the determination, sponsoring agencies considered if a person was authorized mess privileges in accordance with MACV directives, was billeted within a reasonable distance (considering security and curfew aspects), and could be accommodated by a Government mess.

2. Individuals purchasing for authorized organizational functions on a nonrepetitive basis.

(U) The above criteria applied equally to FWMAF personnel and TCNs as well as US military and civilians. In addition, commanders of FWMAF in several cases voluntarily imposed additional patronage restrictions on their forces. 16

(U) There was a dramatic drop in sales at the commissary in April (from \$566,100 in March to \$395,180); however, sales rose again in May. By June, patronage had risen back to \$581,111 and the store's capacity clearly was exceeded once more. Commissary officials reported 13,846 patrons actually used the facility. Several additional measures were taken to reduce patronage, some of which drew criticism of commissary policies in the mass media and from Congressman L. Mendel Rivers, D-South Carolina. In spite of the outcry, DOD officials supported COMUSMACV's policies and the restrictions remained in effect. The policy changes included: 17

1. Removal of all contractor personnel from the patronage list. (These personnel had access to field ration messes or to messes operated by their employers. The latter messes were authorized to draw subsistence from Class I supply points on a reimbursable basis.)

2. Removal of all patrons who purchased less than \$30 per month in merchandise. (This measure was based on the rationale that anyone making purchases in this or a lower amount probably had access to a field ration mess.)

(C) The directive eliminating contractor employees from those authorized commissary privileges was promulgated on 2 Sep to be effective as identification cards (MACV Form 6) expired. The list of MACV-sponsored patrons also was reviewed, resulting in withdrawal of

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(C) In the second quarter the drawdown continued on paper products and furniture, and retrograde shipments combined with consumption to reduce quantities to favorable stockage objective levels. ²³

(C) During the third and fourth quarters Class II supplies were maintained at satisfactory levels and only one item was reported at a critical level. This was the combat vehicle crewmen helmet. The item was at a zero balance at USARV depots. Intensified management controls were supplied in November and at year's end the NICP in CONUS had indicated expedited shipments were en route. ²⁴

NAVFORV

(C) The level of Class II supply support was adequate throughout 1969. The most significant items on the critical list were nine types of cable wire. Quantities of these items were destroyed when enemy rockets hit the Danang Supply Depot on 23 Feb. Prompt identification the critical items to COMSERVPAC resulted in expedited replenishment. The only other significant item on the critical list was paper plates. Heavy issues of these plates during the Tet offensive activity had resulted in a resort to expedited replenishment. Indicating the responsiveness of the supply system, the plates were removed from the critical list by the end of March. ²⁵

(U) The NAVFORV reported no problems with Class II items during the last three quarters.

7AF

(U) The 7AF encountered no significant problem areas and reported no items to be in critical supply during 1969.

III MAF

(C) The III MAF reported gas masks, helmet liners, M7 bayonets, and body armor as the major significant items in critical supply during the first quarter. Expedited replenishment action eliminated the shortages of bayonets and helmet liners as the quarter ended. The supply of body armor and gas masks, however, remained at the critical level. ²⁶

(C) During the second quarter, additional shipments of body armor arrived and the item was removed from the critical list in May. All back orders were eliminated and a satisfactory level of supply was attained. ²⁷

(C) By the end of the third quarter, there were no items at a critical level and the support position for Class II supplies was satisfactory. This level of support was maintained for the remainder of the year.

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Class IIIA and IIIW

General

(U) At the beginning of 1969 there was a highly efficient system in operation for supply and distribution of petroleum products to US Forces. The system was under overall supervision of the MACV J4 through his Staff Agency, Petroleum Office, Vietnam (SAPOV). The system was meeting customer demands for bulk and packaged products, both Class IIIA (for aircraft) and Class IIIW (for ground vehicles). The SAPOV was interfaced with DSA's Defense Fuel Supply Center which was responsible for world-wide procurement of petroleum products and related services as well as coordination of their distribution for DOD. A truly unified system, it also was interfaced with component ICPs and CINCPAC's Joint Petroleum Office. In RVN the system, using both commercial and military receiving, storage, and distribution facilities, constituted a nexus of pipelines, terminals, distribution points, and motor, rail, and water tankers which provided the POL products so essential to operations. Bulk requirements were fulfilled by MSTS tanker deliveries and DSA contracts with Esso, Caltex, and Shell Oil Companies delivering US-owned fuel to RVN. Packaged products were supplied forces through MILSTRIP and through DSA contracts with Esso, Caltex, and Shell. The system functioned under the following concept.

1. Bulk petroleum products, packaged fuels, and liquified petroleum gas (LPG). The SAPOV initiated action for supply of products based on requirements submitted by components and RVNAF. In addition to marine terminal bulk deliveries by MSTS, contracts awarded by DSA required a local contractor to deliver products to ocean terminals and selected inland locations within their delivery capabilities. Distribution of products beyond the contractor's capability was accomplished by CG, USARV. To ensure timely and effective supply and to assist contractors in developing blending schedules, SAPOV, in conjunction with the commercial suppliers, established monthly supply and distribution plans based on quarterly requirements submitted by components and RVNAF. The packaged products were supplied by CG, USARV and COMNAVFORV through MILSTRIP channels. The contractors supporting US agencies requiring brand name, packaged products which were not available through the US military supply system obtained these items through their own resources.

2. Packaged petroleum products (excluding packaged fuels and LPG). The SAPOV informed components which commercial packaged petroleum products were to be provided. The SAPOV then initiated action for contractual supply of these products to I, III, or IV CTZs based on requirements submitted by component commanders and RVNAF. (All II CTZ support was through the MILSTRIP system.) Commercial packaged petroleum products were made available in the Saigon, the Delta, and Danang areas. Contractors delivered as specified in their contracts. Packaged products lifted from contractor terminals for delivery to areas not specified in the contract were moved to the final destination by government-provided transportation. Movement of these products to II CTZ required approval of and coordination with CG, USARV. To ensure timely and effective supply and to assist contractors in developing blending schedules, SAPOV, in conjunction with commercial suppliers, established monthly supply and distribution plans based on quarterly requirements submitted by components and RVNAF. The MILSTRIP packaged products were supplied by CG, USARV and COMNAVFORV through military supply channels. The contractors supporting US agencies requiring brand name, packaged products, which were not available through the US military supply system, obtained these items through their own resources.

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1969 Overview

(C) A significant transfer of function occurred on 1 Jan when the US Army assumed RVN-wide responsibility for procurement acceptance inspection of all POL products in RVN, replacing the Navy. Two civilian inspectors were authorized USARPAC for this function.

(C) During the first quarter of 1969, overall Class III posture throughout RVN remained excellent; nevertheless, there were several problem areas that required command emphasis to avert adverse impact on operations. Transitory low inventory positions were reported during February at Qui Nhon and Phu Cat due to restrictions in Qui Nhon's tanker discharge lines and enemy interdiction of the Qui Nhon-Phu Cat pipeline. Both locations were brought back up to capacity by the end of the month. A lesser problem occurred at Danang on 22 Feb when one 10,000 barrel JP-4 tank was lost to enemy action.

(C) Consumption increased sharply to 3,866 MBBLS in January. This trend continued during February with a consumption of 3,021.2 MBBLS, and was attributed to increased diesel fuel consumption in I CTZ and an improved accounting system, also in I CTZ, which provided more accurate reporting of consumption. Military tankage increased from 2,653 MBBLS in November 1968 to 2,813 MBBLS in February 1969. Commercial tankage dedicated to storage of military products increased from 1,086 MBBLS to 1,111 MBBLS. See Figure IX-3.

(C) During the second quarter POL supply operations continued responsive to operational needs in spite of two significant problem areas. The first of these was the continued enemy interdiction of POL facilities, resulting in significant losses of product. The second problem was unusually large losses of product from pipelines, primarily on the Vung Ro Bay-Tuy Hoa Air Base and Qui Nhon-An Khe lines. These losses were offset by increased tankage construction and resort to other means of transportation which were afforded by the highly flexible POL system. Total tankage in use remained well above 3,700 MBBLS, while consumption remained generally under tankage as indicated in Figure IX-3.

(C) During the third quarter consumption continued in excess of 3,000 MBBLS monthly although there was a slight decline from the previous quarter. This decline was due to the redeployment of the 9th Inf Div (-) and a generally lower level of combat. Throughout the quarter tankage increased until at the end of September there was a command-wide capacity for 3,898 MBBLS.

(C) In the fourth quarter consumption continued to decline reflecting further redeployment of US Forces. Meanwhile, steel tankage increased slightly and by the end of the year was nearly 4,000 MBBLS. There was a sharp increase in enemy damage to POL facilities during the quarter with the most significant constriction occurring at An Khe. Also JP-4 and MOGAS reached critical levels at Tuy Hoa Air Base as deliveries were constrained by pipeline interdictions.

7AF

(C) The POL status of 7AF remained stable throughout 1969. Consumption of JP-4 and AVGAS exceeded slightly the 1968 rates but the level of support was adequate. Figure IX-4 depicts consumption and inventory status during the year. 28

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
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GROSS TANKAGE IN USE BY CTZ *



* STEEL TANKAGE ONLY

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FIGURE IX-3

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POL Steel Tankage at Cam Ranh Bay

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

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AVERAGE DAILY FUEL STATUS

JP-4



AVGAS INVENTORY INCLUDES AVGAS UTILIZED BY VNAF AIRCRAFT AND REFLECTED IN THE VNAF CONSUMPTION

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
FIGURE IX-4

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POL jetty operated by the 497th Trans. Det. at Qui Nhon

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USARV

(C) Class IIIA and IIIW supply was maintained at a generally satisfactory level throughout the first quarter. A major problem developed when stocks at Qui Nhon, An Khe, Pleiku, and the Phu Cat Air Base reached undesirably low levels in January because of pipeline interdiction and low tanker discharge rates. The interdiction included a 3 Jan attack on Tank Farm No. 2 at Qui Nhon and frequent damage to the Qui Nhon-Phu Cat pipeline. On 24 Jan, the enemy also damaged a bridge, causing a two-day shutdown of the pipeline. By the end of February, these constrictions had been eliminated and stocks had been returned to normal at Qui Nhon. The stockage level at Pleiku also improved by the end of February. On 9 Mar the 13-MBBL tank farm at Phu Hiep was placed in operation with manifolding into the Vung Ro Bay-Tuy Hoa Air base pipeline, thus further improving POL supply operations. 29

(C) The Qui Nhon POL Terminal was turned over to a civilian contractor, Tong Shin Enterprise, during the first quarter. The turnover of these facilities, which included three tank farms and a T-2 jetty, took place on 1 Mar and resulted in the release of 240th QM Bn personnel for other duties. 30

(C) The Red Beach line in Qui Nhon was washed out by tidal action on 8 Jan. Rather than repairing the line, emphasis was placed on the completion of the new 8-inch buried, welded pipeline from the T-2 jetty to Tank Farm No. 1 by 4 Feb. The alternate line from the T-2 jetty to Tank Farm No. 3 was used as an interim measure although the discharge rate was limited. The T-1 Tanker Chattahoochee was utilized as frequently as possible to supplement the alternate line through the two 4-inch submarine lines in the outer harbor. Stocks were depleted to low levels due to low tanker discharge rates caused by line constriction. 31

(C) On 23 Feb, enemy rockets destroyed a tank containing 200,000 gallons of JP-4 at the Northwest Tank Farm in Danang. By using a water fire fighting system that had been constructed during the month the fire was contained and damage or destruction to additional tanks was prevented. 32

(C) Enemy action was especially heavy against petroleum installations and facilities during March. Three 107mm rockets damaged a Shell Oil Company 50,000-MBBL JP-4 tank at Nha Be Terminal, however, product loss and damage were minor. Tank Farm No. 2 at Qui Nhon was attacked by sappers on 20 Mar resulting in the loss of three 10-MBBL tanks, two 3-MBBL tanks, over one-half million gallons of fuel, and a considerable quantity of packaged oils and lubricants. This damage, however, did not significantly degrade the petroleum supply capability of Qui Nhon Support Command but did limit the degree of flexibility of operations. The 250-MBBL Vung Tau POL terminal was attacked by rockets on 21 Mar, resulting in the loss of one 10-MBBL tank. This attack and loss of product had no major effect on operations. 33

(C) During the second quarter enemy attacks continued against POL facilities. An enemy attack at Dalat in April destroyed all stocks of JP-4 and AVGAS stored in collapsible tanks at that location. The country-wide high point on 12 May resulted in damage at Qui Nhon, An Khe, and Long Binh. Despite improved security measures, the last remaining 10-MBBL steel tank at Qui Nhon's Farm No. 2 was destroyed by a B-40 RPG round. The enemy used 82mm mortar fire to destroy two 10-MBBL tanks, and 334,000 gallons of JP-4 and 414,000 gallons of diesel fuel at An Khe. The damage at Long Binh was limited to loss of several drums of packaged products. 34

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(C) For some time USARV had experienced large fuel losses from several pipelines. In May a joint investigation team under the PM, 1st Log Comd visited Phu Yen Province to determine the cause of the losses from the Vung Ro Bay-Tuy Hoa Air Base pipeline. The team determined that most of the 2 million gallons of POL lost monthly was due to civilian pilferage along an 8-km section of the line. With assistance from USARV engineers, work was begun to bury the critical segment. Also, the CG, IFFORCEV provided improved security for the pipeline. The same measures were taken on the Qui Nhon-An Khe line in June. To prevent further losses, this pipeline was filled with water until it was buried and, at midyear, similar actions were planned for the Phu Cat Air Base segment. Line haul motor transport using 5,000-gallon tankers was used during outages of the pipelines. 35

(C) During the third quarter adequate levels of Class IIIA and IIW supplies were maintained at all USARV terminals and supply points. There was continuing enemy interdiction, primarily small arms fire and satchel charges, but this action failed to have a significant effect on operations.

(C) Good progress was made during the quarter on burial of vulnerable segments of pipelines at Qui Nhon. This work, begun during the second quarter, was nearing completion at the end of September. 36

(C) On 10 July the management of packaged POL supply was transferred from the automated system at ICCV to a manual system at the Directorate of Petroleum, 1st Log Comd, Long Binh. This change provided improved record accuracy and greater management efficiency than had been possible under the automated system. 37

(C) In October, JP-4 and MOGAS reached critical levels at the Tuy Hoa Air Base. Normal resupply by ocean tanker through the pipelines to the AF tankage was not feasible in the first weeks of the month due to obstructions which were introduced when the lines were buried. Convoys of tankers from Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon were required to bring sufficient fuel to maintain operations until the pipelines were repaired. At month's end the 8-inch line was operating properly and the critical situation at the base was relieved; however, the 6-inch line was not operating in a normal manner and represented a continuing problem.

(C) Also in October, the Dong Nai jetty near Long Binh was damaged by a tug berthing a POL barge. Operation of the jetty was temporarily suspended until emergency repairs were completed. The condition of the jetty did not warrant substantial repairs and a project to build a new jetty was submitted. Another obstruction occurred when the Shell ship Amoria ran aground in Qui Nhon harbor and reduced the maximum draft to 38 feet which required further light loading of T-2 tankers before they could enter the harbor. Dredging operations began on 15 Nov. 38

(C) During November, adequate supplies of Class IIIA and IIW were maintained at all USARV terminals and supply points with the exception of An Khe and Pleiku. Stocks at these terminals were low for much of the month due to an enemy attack on the An Khe tank farm and the inability to pump product through to Pleiku.

(C) Enemy damage to petroleum facilities increased markedly over previous periods. For the first time since May, enemy sappers were able to cause large scale damage to petroleum installations. On 1 Nov enemy sappers penetrated the perimeter at An Khe and destroyed four

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3-MBBL tanks. This represented approximately 23 percent of the JP-4 capacity, 100 percent of the AVGAS capacity, 50 percent of the MOGAS capacity, and 23 percent of the diesel capacity. Seventeen 10,000-gallon collapsible tanks and one 50,000-gallon collapsible tank were installed to provide sufficient storage to assure operation of the An Khe tank farm, and the Qui Nhon-An Khe pipeline. Damage to other petroleum facilities was limited to pipelines which suffered almost nightly damage from small arms fire and satchel charges.

(C) Due to continued pilferage water was injected into the Qui Nhon-Phu Cat pipeline and it was closed down for 30 days to test the capability of resupplying the Phu Cat Air Base by tank truck and rail tank car. The contractor commenced welding and wrapping of pipeline in preparation for burial. Actual construction was delayed pending right of way clearance from local officials.

(C) Also in November, the MSTS ship Suamico broke her mooring lines at Vung Ro Bay during a period of high winds and shifted the mooring. Until the mooring was realigned, the discharge of POL tankers took place at a De Long pier which was equipped with POL discharge lines for such emergencies.

(C) In order to reduce aerial resupply requirements two LCMs equipped with 10,000-gallon bladders delivered 20,000 gallons of diesel fuel to Rach Soi in the Delta on 22 Nov. This was a trial run to determine the feasibility of delivering POL by surface transportation. The test was successful and the two boats were assigned to a regular Delta POL shuttle. ³⁹

(C) Adequate supplies of POL were maintained at terminals and supply points in December. Enemy damage was generally limited to small arms fire and satchel charges used against the pipelines. The year ended with POL stocks at a satisfactory level. ⁴⁰

(C) In a trial at two locations in the Delta in December, the Low Altitude Parachute extraction System (LAPES) was used to deliver JP-4. Four C-130-loads of product in steel drums were dropped at one location. Three of these went in without incident but one caught fire due to a raised plate on the pierced steel planking covering the airfield. Similarly, four loads of JP-4 in 500-gallon collapsible drums were dropped at another location. One complete load (nine drums) and three drums on another load ruptured on impact. Initial evaluation of the drops indicated that collapsible drums were unstable for use in LAPES operations. ⁴¹

NAVFORV

(C) The NAVFORV maintained adequate levels of Class IIIA and IIW supplies during the first quarter. The largest problem encountered was adverse weather at Danang in January and February which delayed discharge of tankers. The movement of POL on the Cua Viet and Perfume Rivers continued without interruption in spite of the weather except for the mining of a landing craft (LCM6) on 21 Feb. The latter incident blocked the Cua Viet River for that day only.

(C) The increased tempo of GIANT SLINGSHOT operations (See Chapter V, Naval Operations) created increased requirements for POL on the Vam Co Tay and Vam Co Dong Rivers. To meet these requirements, NAVFORV took the following actions: ⁴²

1. Positioned a 70,000-gallon pontoon barge at Tuyen Nhon. This stock resupplied 4,200- and 8,400-gallon lighters at Moc Hoa.

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2. Repositioned a 4,200-gallon NLP from Nha Be to Tan An.
3. Arranged for resupply to Tuyen Nhon AMMI and Tan An NLPs from USS Askari at Tan An as needed.
4. Supplemented NAVFORV resources with Army tank trucks and a Y-boat tanker.

(C) On 27 Apr NAVFORV POL facilities at Danang were reduced to 500,000 gallons per day when fire and an explosion at ASP No. 1 damaged four JP-4 and one AVGAS, 10-MBBL tanks. The loss had negligible effect on maintenance of support inventories. 43

(C) Like the other components, the Navy also experienced considerable losses of fuel due to diversion and pilferage. The installation of meters on commercial tankers had considerable effect on reducing these losses, and by May both Esso and Shell Oil Companies reported increased sales of fuel to civilian customers at Danang. 44

(C) The NAVFORV efforts to reduce diversion and pilferage of product from the supply system continued during the third quarter and the program was designated Project ASAP (Abolish Stealing of American Petroleum). At NAVSUPACT Det, Binh Thuy, a commercial truck driver unsuccessfully attempted to bribe a POL inspector. The driver was apprehended and turned over to the National Police as all NAVSUPACT Saigon elements were alerted for further bribe attempts by drivers of commercial POL delivery trucks. 45

(C) As was the case with Class I supply, NAVFORV had to provide POL to units in the Delta formerly supported by the 9th S&T Bn at Dong Tam. A Y-tanker initially was used to meet Navy requirements and new requisitioning procedures were established. As a long term solution and in keeping with Vietnamization, the ARVN was advised to operate a small craft refueling point for the VNN at Dong Tam. 46

(C) In the fourth quarter NAVFORV maintained POL supply support at a satisfactory level and no major problems were encountered. In I CTZ bulk fuel issues declined reflecting troop redeployments and neither weather nor enemy action caused any significant delays of fuel to discharge ports up the Cua Viet River.

III MAF

(C) The III MAF experienced no major problems with POL during the first quarter and significant improvements in its resupply system resulted from increasing tankage at An Hoa and Vandegrift combat bases. Losses to enemy action included 57,000 gallons of AVGAS and 6,000 gallons of Class IIIW. These losses had little effect on operations.

(C) Class IIIW capabilities were improved by the installation, in January, of a fuel hose line across the Thu Bon River at An Hoa, thus avoiding disruptions formerly experienced when the An Hoa ferry was out of operation. 47

(C) During the second quarter the III MAF maintained adequate levels of POL supplies; however, the component shared with the other services in losses resulting from enemy attacks. In April an enemy rocket destroyed 35,000 gallons of JP-4 and a collapsible bag at Vandegrift combat base. The Danang losses from the ASP No. 1 fire on 27 Apr included four 10,000-gallon collapsible bags, containing a total of 16,000 gallons of MOCAS and 16,000 gallons of diesel fuel. Additional losses occurred in May when MAG-16 lost one 10,000-gallon bag and 500 gallons of JP-4; at Dong Ha, six of the bags and 60,000 gallons of diesel fuel were lost. Losses continued into May when the 1st MAW lost three 10,000-gallon bags of JP-4 and Dong Ha lost two more bags. 48

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(C) In the third quarter there was a significant decline in losses due to enemy action and POL support operations were maintained at a satisfactory level for the remainder of the year.

Class IV Supply

(C) The overall Class IV supply situation remained stable during 1969. Intensive efforts were made by components to identify and reduce excess materials throughout RVN. The USARV established intertheater excess programs whereby non-Army customers were offered materials which were in long supply. Also, the Army studied a proposal whereby Class IV stocks in-country could be reduced by using Okinawa as a "surge tank" and shipping to that location. Project STOP/SEE was continued with intensive effort being made to identify and, through coordination with Logistics Coordinating Office-Pacific, divert and frustrate unneeded types and quantities of construction materials.

(C) The only item reported in critical supply was lumber as USARV, III MAF, and NAVFORV reported selected stocks in short supply.⁴⁹

(C) The shortage of lumber continued during the third and fourth quarters in spite of cross-leveling of stocks between components. The 1st Log Comd had requested assistance from USARPAC in July; however, improvement in the level of supply was not evident until November. At year's end there was continuing increase in stocks and all requirements were satisfied.⁵⁰



Crates of supplies await loading on the tank landing ship USS Luzerne County at Vung Tau post in South Vietnam

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Class V and VA Supply

(S) Supply levels of Class V and VA remained generally satisfactory throughout 1969. Following the trends in management of other classes of supply, the components placed major emphasis on purifying stocks, identifying excesses and unserviceable ammunition, and bringing stocks into closer conformity with stockage objectives. In March, mortar and artillery ammunition was removed from MACV management control. Emphasis was continued on retrograde of excess and unserviceable stocks, and USARV excesses were used to improve ARVN stocks.

(C) There were major ammunition losses as the result of enemy action during 1969 with 62,963 STONs valued at \$136.7 million destroyed. The following data reflect the significant losses:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>INSTALLATION</u>	<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>INVENTORY LOSS</u>	
			<u>S/TONS</u>	<u>\$ MILLION</u>
20 Jan	Qui Nhon	ARVN	2,833	3.3
22 Feb	Qui Nhon	ARVN	6,173	17.9
22 Feb	Danang	ARVN	4,490	7.1
22 Feb	An Hoa	USMC	1,292	1.5
23 Feb	Qui Nhon	USARV	8,378	10.3
28 Feb	Danang	USARV	185	.4
28 Feb	Danang	USMC	113	.3
1 Mar	Quan Loi	USARV	45	.1
2 Mar	My Tho	ARVN	10	.01
10 Mar	Qui Nhon	USARV	1,729	3.2
22 Mar	Quan Loi	USARV	26	.04
23 Mar	Qui Nhon	USARV	1,315	1.4
27 Mar	Dong Tam	USARV	934	2.0
11 Apr	Tay Ninh	ARVN	402	1.0
27 Apr	Danang	USMC	31,523	70.3
27 Apr	Danang	USAF	2,424	15.2
27 Apr	Danang	VNAF	67	.2
22 May	Go Vap	ARVN	471	1.5
26 Jun	Lai Khe	ARVN	153	.2
19 Aug	Pleiku	ARVN	300	.31
		TOTAL	62,963	\$136.76

(C) During the second quarter a major loss of ammunition resulted from a grass fire that went out of control at ASP No 1 at Danang and resulted in the loss of 34,014 STONs, valued at \$85.7 million. These stocks belonged primarily to III MAF; however, 7AF lost 2,424 STONs of the total amount.

(C) Except for the continuing shortages (shared by USARV, NAVFORV, and III MAF) of 2.75-inch rockets, illuminating signals, and offensive hand grenades, all types of ammunition were maintained at acceptable levels of supply throughout the second and third quarters.

(C) In the fourth quarter the 2.75-inch rocket shortage eased considerably while the illuminating signals and offensive hand grenades remained in short supply as CONUS production

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continued to lag. The monsoonal weather inhibited ammunition activities in I CTZ during the quarter but all requirements were fulfilled.

7AF

(S) There were sufficient quantities of all types of air munitions on hand to support monthly PACOM allocations during 1969. Air operations were supported without interruption in spite of record expenditures of general purpose bombs, 750-lb fire bombs, and CBU munitions. The only significant problem encountered by 7AF was the loss of 2,424 STONs of ammunition as a result of the 27 Apr fire at Danang. This loss, primarily base defense munitions, required immediate intratheater resupply. Stocks were reconstituted and normal operations resumed by 4 May.⁵¹

(S) Figure IX-5 reflects the total munitions expended by 7AF during 1969.

USARV

(S) The overall status of ammunition during the year was as follows:

MONTHLY STATUS OF AMMUNITION
(short tons)

Month	Issued	Received	(End of Month) On Hand*
Jan	72,119	40,216	188,131
Feb	80,173	49,383	158,452
Mar	83,340	71,266	140,589
Apr	73,739	70,748	137,104
May	77,300	76,522	137,512
Jun	78,143	104,423	166,506
Jul	70,218	75,378	176,195
Aug	74,648	46,388	144,510
Sep	78,300	65,621	132,166
Oct	72,467	48,098	121,580
Nov	82,375	103,535	147,289
Dec	74,693	96,605	163,974

*Servicable

(S) At the beginning of the first quarter, the shortages of offensive hand grenades and 2.75-inch rockets were considered the only problem areas. In both cases, efforts were made to accelerate deliveries from CONUS. In the meantime, an expedient grenade was adopted in-country that used fuze components (G872) with 1/2-lb blocks of TNT, thus in effect "making" offensive grenades. There was no early relief forecast for the shortage of rockets, and stringent management was imposed on their use. By the end of the quarter, the results of increased CONUS production began arriving and the shortages eased slightly.⁵²

(S) The intensive program to retrograde unneeded ammunition stocks made considerable progress as Phase II of the program officially began in January. Over 6,650 STONs were retrograded during the month, including 1,447 STONs which were transferred to ARVN. Because

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
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7AF MUNITION EXPENDITURES, 1969



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FIGURE IX-5

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a considerable amount of the Phase II retrograde tonnage was moved before January, the end-of-month total credited to the Phase II total was 19,464 STONs against an end-of-February goal of 35,000 STONs. 53

(C) As a result of the 22 Feb enemy action directed at the Qui Nhon Ammunition Depot, portions of that depot's missions were transferred in March to the Cam Ranh Bay Ammunition Depot. The transferred missions included storage of 8,000 STONs of the Qui Nhon Ammunition Depot stockage objective and 6,000 STONs of the Danang Support Command stockage objective. The latter tonnage already had been stored at Qui Nhon due to insufficient capacity in the Danang Support Command. 54

(C) The supply of 8-inch HE projectiles, a continuing shortage item, improved during the quarter and by late March the on-hand balance had climbed above the safety level. 55

(C) By the first of April there were only three items under DA's ASR management; however, MACV and USARV were allocating additional items, primarily mortar and artillery ammunition, 2.75-inch rockets, and selected demolitions. Through the discretionary use of intensified management controls, the shortages were not permitted to affect operational requirements. The supply of 2.75-inch rockets and offensive hand grenades continued to be critical and a third item, Mk 24/45 aircraft flares, was added. To provide temporary relief for the flare shortage, USARPAC authorized draw down on and shipments from the Japan Prepositioned War Reserve. 56

(C) In July there were seven items under DA's ASR management, three being carried over from the preceding month and four being added during the month. During August stock positions improved and by the end of the third quarter only four items required DA's ASR management. Both MACV and USARV continued to impose management controls on selected items, primarily mortar and artillery ammunition and rockets.

(C) The supply status of offensive hand grenades improved substantially in September due to arrival in RVN of increased CONUS production. These receipts permitted removal of the item from DA's ASR management and enabled USARV to meet NAVFORV's long outstanding requirement.

(C) The shortage of 2.75-inch rockets continued throughout the third quarter. There were indications that this critical shortage would ease in October. The primary flare (Signal, Illuminating, L312) used in the night detection of swimmers/sappers also continued critical in the third quarter as DA's Allocation Committee, Ammunition imposed an ASR when assets failed to meet requirements. This action impacted on NAVFORV as well as USARV since the latter component provided the item to the Navy. To help ease the demand for the item, USARV issued 40mm grenade flares to all combat units having the M79 grenade launcher, reserving L312 flares for those elements not so equipped. 57

(C) During October, 72,467 STONs were issued and 48,098 STONs were received. There were 121,580 STONs of serviceable ammunition on hand at the end of the month.

(C) Phase IV of the retrograde program commenced in July and extended through December, with a goal of 1,000 STONs per month. On 31 Oct 8,218 STONs had been retrograded.

(C) The project manager for the 2.75-inch rocket system visited RVN during 1-7 Oct. He was accompanied by two technicians from Picatinny Arsenal. The party visited gunship units in


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Ammunition storage area at Dau Tieng in III CTZ

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each of the CTZs in an effort to gain first hand information on the operational support aspects of this system. Of particular interest to USARV were the following support concepts:

1. Shipment of rockets already assembled in containers up until the rockets were loaded aboard the gunships.
2. Ready round trailers to transport rockets from storage area to rearm point.
3. Disposable launching pods to reduce the rearm time. Also provided was valuable information on funded rocket production and planned deliveries.

(C) The overall 2.75-inch rocket situation improved significantly during October to the extent that two types of 2.75-inch HE, VT-fuzed rockets did not require allocation. Assets of the other 2.75-inch HE PD-fuzed rockets also increased, and increased quantities of these items were made available in November. The 2.75-inch flechette rocket posture also improved significantly. The outlook for continued availability of the rockets for the ensuing months was good. The shortage of illuminating flares, offensive grenades, and 40mm grenades continued because of the lack of production. Other tube-fired illuminants were placed under local ASR management because of supply/distribution problems. This was considered a temporary situation. 58

(C) At the beginning of November there were four items under DA's ASR management. Four items were carried over from the preceding month: flechette and HE 2.75-inch rockets, illuminating signals, and trip flares. USARV allocated several additional items.

(C) The overall 2.75-inch rocket situation continued to improve during November. For the first time in many months supply exceeded demand. Illuminants, however, continued as a problem in spite of production increases. Projections showed improvement as CONUS production was scheduled for months previously showing no production.

(C) Also in November large sea swells resulted in a modification of ammunition unloading procedures at Qui Nhon. Waivers were obtained for discharge of Class V at the De Long Pier. General cargo receipts were such that Class V was diverted to the De Long Pier and there was little or no impact on overall support. 59

(C) During December there were shortages of some items in the Danang Support Command because shipments were disrupted by monsoonal weather. The weather restricted discharge operations at Qui Nhon also. The monsoonal pattern weakened by mid-December and discharge of ammunition was resumed at the normal rate.

(C) A significant problem occurred when DA suspended 152mm HEAT-T because of a malfunction at Aberdeen Proving Ground. The malfunction was caused by excessive tube wear and the ammunition used a fuze which was not affixed to stocks in RVN. In spite of these circumstances, USARV was required to airlift 6,000 substitute HE-T rounds to satisfy immediate requirements. In addition all of the suspended HEAT-T was recalled and strict ASR management was imposed on the substitute item, HE-T. 60

(C) The Phase IV retrograde program, begun in July, was terminated in December. A total of 10,767 STONs were retrograded under the program which had a goal of 1,000 STONs monthly. 61

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(C) At the end of the year there were four items under ASR management in addition to the 152mm HE-T described above. The items were three types of signal flares and 40mm HE grenades. ⁶²

NAVFORV

(C) There were adequate stocks of Class V and VA to support naval operations throughout the first quarter. The only significant problem areas reported were the growing demands for antiswimmer explosive devices and signal illuminating devices. The requirement for anti-swimmer explosive devices continued to increase as a result of swimmer/sapper attacks on NAVFORV ships.

(C) In addition to NAVFORV requirements, the Army requested 100,000 rounds of the device per month while only 29,000 rounds per month were available. The Army anticipated that it would be capable of providing 60,000 devices by May. Meanwhile, the 29,000 rounds available for February were supplemented by 7,500 rounds constructed from TNT blocks. The requirement for 100,000 antiswimmer explosive devices per month was considered essential to provide units in II, III, and IV CTZs with adequate defenses.

(C) The signal illuminating grenade was in short supply for the period 24 Jan-24 Feb. Of the 10,000 rounds allocated, only 6,120 were received. The Navy requirement per month was 30,000 rounds. ⁶³

(C) During the second quarter the Navy experienced a shortage of the 2.75-inch rockets and 40mm HE cartridges. To alleviate the shortage, NAVFORV requested an increase in the Intense Combat/Theater Sustaining Rates as authorized by USARPAC. In the meantime it was necessary for CNO to authorize an allocation from CONUS stocks to support operational requirements. ⁶⁴

(C) During the third quarter NAVFORV shared with USARV the continuing shortages of 2.75-inch rockets, offensive hand grenades, and L312 flares. Drawing on Navy stocks at Subic Bay, NAVFORV eased the shortage of rockets; however, the shortage of grenades and flares continued to be critical. ⁶⁵

(C) There were no problems with Class V supply reported by NAVFORV during the fourth quarter. As was the case with USARV, the 2.75-inch rockets were removed from allocation and the supply of all types of munitions was generally satisfactory.

III MAF

(U) The III MAF maintained ammunition stocks at acceptable levels throughout 1969.

(C) The only significant problem was the result of a grass fire at ASP No 1 at Danang in which \$70.3 million worth of ammunition (both A and W subclassification) was destroyed. In spite of the heavy loss, there was no significant adverse effect on operations, though 10,110 STONs of class VA and 24,413 STONs of class VW stocks were destroyed. Restoration began in early May after an on-site survey by representatives from MACV and III MAF. ⁶⁶

(C) In the fourth quarter all operational requirements for ammunition were met in spite of torrential rains that hampered supply activities throughout I CTZ.

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Ammunition for the Brown Water Navy being worked at Can Tho

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Class VI Supply

(U) The level of special services supply was adequate to the needs of the command and components reported no significant problem areas during 1969.

(U) The USARV Special Services Supply Depot completed a 100 percent inventory of stocks as of 15 Jan. This was the first inventory in the history of the depot and it revealed stocks on hand that had neither been formally received nor picked up on accountable records. An all-out effort was initiated to identify those items with valid federal stock numbers of the Inventory Control Center, Vietnam Depot for proper management and control of distribution. The Special Services Supply Depot then managed only those items which were peculiar to special services activities; e.g., craft shop, sports facilities, libraries, and entertainment workshops. Items used at unit level, for morale and welfare, were henceforth supplied through the supporting supply activity in their area of operation. 67

(U) In June the control and management of Class VI supply was returned to the components and support was provided as prescribed in respective component procedures. The FWMAF continued to be supported by USARV.

Class VII Supply

(C) While the general level of Class VII supply support was adequate for the first quarter, there were significant shortages of tactical vehicles (1/4- and 5-ton trucks), engineer construction equipment, MHE, tactical generators, countermortar radars, AN/VRC-12 radios, RC-292 antennas, mine detectors, and amphibious landing vehicles. Compounding the 1/4-ton truck shortage was the requirement to transfer large numbers of these vehicles to RVNAF in support of the I&M program. This issue depleted depot stocks in January and February. At the end of the first quarter, there were management actions underway to alleviate all significant shortages and expedite the replenishment of stocks.

(C) The shortages generally continued through the second quarter though there was slight improvement in the supply position of RC-292 antennas and 1/4-ton trucks. In May turn-ins for replacement of 107mm mortars (M30) and .50 caliber machine guns (M2) depleted depot stocks and expedited resupply action was initiated for these weapons. As in the previous quarter, most of the shortages were reported by USARV.

(C) In the third quarter the overall status of Class VII supplies improved. By the end of September, sufficient quantities of AN/VRC-12 radios, RC-292 antennas, 5-ton dump trucks, caliber .50 machine guns, and water trailers were in RVN and the items were deleted from the critical list. The shortages of engineer construction equipment also had eased and only three items remained in critical supply. The shortages of 1/4- and 5-ton cargo trucks, 4000-lb electric forklifts, and mine detectors continued.

(C) In October crane shovels and mine detectors were removed from the critical list, however, the shortages of 1/4-, 3/4- and 5-ton cargo trucks continued for the remainder of the year. The 5-ton dump truck was once again in critical supply as backorders exceeded receipts during November. The latter shortage had an adverse effect on engineer construction.


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**An M113 Armored Personnel Carrier being off loaded from one of MST's
Especially Configured Ships for Transport of Vehicles**

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7AF

(U) The 7AF reported no significant shortages or major problems with respect to Class VII Supply.

USARV

(C) Within USARV the following major problem areas by subclass required management attention:

1. Subclass B: The continuing shortage of 4,000-lb electric forklifts was partially eased in February by receipt of 21 items from Okinawa as a result of USARPAC action. Further relief was to be provided by the expected arrival of 2,000-lb forklifts as substitute items. The problem of tactical generators was critical due to TOE shortages as well as the absence of a maintenance float and depot stocks. Assistance was requested from DA, USARPAC, and ME-COM to help relieve the shortages. In addition to the critical shortages, the following items were reported in short supply:

- Compressor, rty pwr, drvn, air, whl-mtd, 600 cfm
- Crane Shovel, Crawlr, mtd, 40-ton, 2 cu yds
- Crane Shovel, Crawlr, mtd, 12 1/2-ton, 3/4-cu yd
- Distributor, bitum trk-mtd, 800-gal
- Distributor, water, trk-mtd, 1,000-gal
- Ditching Machine
- Loader, Schoop 2 1/2 VY (CLSP Item)
- Pneumatic Tool & Compressor Outfit, 250CFM tri-mtd
- Rock Drilling Equip, 75TPH
- Roller, motorized, 2-rolls, 5-8-ton
- Roller, motorized, 3-rolls, 12-18-ton
- Roller, twd, 9-ton
- Roller, twd, 7 1/2-35 Ton
- Roller, Sheepsfoot, twd

(C) During the second quarter sufficient quantities of the pneumatic tool and compressing outfits and rollers, motorized, 3-rolls, 9-14-ton and 12-18-ton, and rollers, motorized, 2-rolls, 5-8-ton were received and the items were no longer deemed to be in short supply. Shortages continued for the other items.

(C) The status of subclass B items continued to improve during the third quarter and at the end of September only four items were in a critical status: crane shovel, crawler mtd, 40-ton, 2-cu yd; distributor, bitum, trk-mtd, 800-gal; ditching machine; and roller, Sheepsfoot, twd.

(C) In October crane shovels and forklifts arrived in sufficient numbers to permit removal of the items from the critical list. As a result only the ditching machine, bitum distributor, and Sheepsfoot roller remained on the critical list at the end of the year.

2. Subclass G:

a. With the increase in enemy indirect fire attacks during the first quarter, the need for countermortar radar equipment was accentuated. There were 69 AN/MPQ-4A radars,

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the principal countermortar radar set, in-country. This number was three under the theater authorization and did not provide for a combat/maintenance loss allowance of two per year. The US Army Electronics Command (USAECOM) initiated measures to expedite delivery of 27 new sets. They arrived in RVN by the end of June, and the item was removed from the critical list.

b. A shortage of AN/VRC-12 family radios also occurred during the first quarter. There were technical problems related to a new production contract that impeded delivery of replacement sets. As an expedient, the MACV staff took action in conjunction with USAECOM to supply critical receiver/transmitter components so as to meet operational requirements. These actions envisioned timely return of unserviceable components to CONUS depots for repair and return to stock. The shortage eased somewhat during August but the overall status remained critical.

c. There was also a shortage of RC-292 antennas which continued from February. This item was subject to heavy demand and expedited resupply action continued, until stock levels improved during July. The item was then removed from the critical list.

d. In the fourth quarter the supply of AN/PPS-5 radars became critical due to reduced DADAC allocations. The shortage continued until the end of the year and relief was not expected until increased allocations were received.

3. Subclass K:

a. There was a critical shortage of 5-ton cargo and dump trucks and the DADAC allocations through June totaled 55 percent of anticipated losses, with most of the allocation intended to modernize the present transportation truck fleet. Command-wide, the shortage was approximately 30 percent of all authorizations and no depot stocks were on hand. Assistance from USARPAC was requested to obtain a revision of DADAC allocations to help fill USARV requirements. The 5-ton cargo truck was being considered as a candidate for the Closed Loop Support (CLS) program by US Army Tank-Automotive Command. Special actions by DA resulted in expediting delivery of some items from CONUS and drawdown on other USARPAC stocks; however, the shortage continued through midyear. In August, 5-ton dump trucks arrived in sufficient quantities to reduce back orders and the item was removed from the critical list. The vehicles were again in critical supply in November as backorders increased at a greater rate than receipts. The 5-ton cargo truck remained in critical supply through the rest of the year and this shortage impacted primarily in divisional and separate artillery units where it was the primary vehicle for transport of ammunition.

b. A critical shortage of 1/4-ton trucks also occurred during the first quarter of 1969 when deliveries of 400 vehicles to RVNAF were accelerated. This action, designed to expedite RVNAF I&M, caused critical shortages (approximately 20 percent) in most USARV units as depot stocks and due-ins through February were used to meet the requirement. By the end of the second quarter, shipments began arriving from CONUS. In spite of these receipts, all depot stocks continued to be issued against TOE shortages and no significant improvement was foreseen. The shortage actually worsened during the third and fourth quarters with no relief in view.

c. In April a shortage of water trailers became critical, due in part to the acceleration of deliveries to RVNAF. As was the case with the other items, USARV requested expedited

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allocations of the trailers from DADAC. The trailers began arriving in September and the item was removed from the critical list.

d. In the fourth quarter 10-ton tractors became critical as due-outs mounted. This shortage impacted in the divisional engineer units and in the engineer brigades where there was a high density of the vehicles.

e. Also in the fourth quarter the supply of 3/4-ton trucks worsened as back orders rose to 821 (258 of which were for ROKFV). To ease the near critical shortage, 708 vehicles from USAREUR stocks were shipped to RVN and this shipment plus those vehicles arriving through the regular Closed Loop Support Program were expected to eliminate back orders by late January 1970.

4. Subclass M: In May 107mm mortars (M30) and .50 caliber machine guns (M2) were in critically short supply as the result of heavy turn-ins for replacement. The shortage of mortars was eased in June when sufficient quantities were received to fill all back orders. The shortages of machine guns continued until August when all orders were filled and the items were no longer regarded in critical supply.

NAVFORV

(U) There were no significant problem areas reported by NAVFORV during 1969.

III MAF

(C) The III MAF reported only two items as being significant problems during the first quarter. These were mine detecting sets and amphibious landing vehicles (LVTE-1). The latter item was removed from the critical category by midyear. In June a number of the mine detecting sets were received from the USMC Supply Activity at Philadelphia and receipts reduced the number of back orders for the item. The shortage of detecting sets continued through the remainder of the year.

Class VIII Supply

(C) There were adequate stocks of Class VIII supplies available to components throughout 1969. In all CTZs there were intensive efforts by management to purify stocks and stocks records, identify excesses, and effect retrograde of items where indicated. Demands were high during the first part of the year reflecting a trend to accumulate sufficient quantities to support the expected intensification in level of combat during the Tet period (February-March). The major problem with respect to Class VIII supplies was lack of controlled environment storage which was needed for preservation of drugs and medicinals.

USARV

(C) Despite continued high demands, the supply support of Class VIII medical material was excellent during the first quarter and customer requirements were satisfied on a timely basis.

(C) As in previous years, the need for additional covered storage for Class VIII continued to be the most significant problem area. During FY 68, the tonnage on hand in the medical depot

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at Cam Ranh Bay had increased from 5,979 STONs to approximately 8,759 STONs. This increase in stock without a corresponding increase in covered storage had necessitated storing approximately 50 percent of medical stocks in outside storage areas. The high temperatures and humidity in RVN accelerated the deterioration of medical material. Of primary concern was the storage of medical items such as drugs, biologicals, and official reagents. Many of these items required controlled temperature (50-80 degrees F) storage, but because of the volume of items and lack of adequate covered storage, use was made of outside storage. Requests for additional covered storage space for all medical depot activities had been submitted in May 1968 and, although several projects were approved, construction was not anticipated until mid-1969. The diversion of three 8,000-sq ft warehouses of the USA Depot at Cam Ranh Bay to the 32d Medical Depot in February provided some relief at that location. ⁶⁸

(C) The identification and disposition of excesses continued throughout the quarter and over \$216,000 worth of material was transferred to Okinawa, RVNAF, and USAID. ⁶⁹

(C) With a view toward reducing breakage and pilferage, containerized shipment of medical supplies, using Sea Land containers, was initiated from the Cam Ranh Bay Base Depot to the Long Binh 1st Advance Depot. ⁷⁰

(C) During the second quarter the supply performance of the 32d Medical Depot continued to improve in response to purification of stock record data, reconciliation of requisitions and due-ins, and cross-leveling of in-country stocks. The numbers of due-outs and zero balances continued to decline to new depot lows. Because of improved management, the requisitioning objective for all medical supplies was reduced from 45 to 30 days. Also, the conversion from a manual stock record control to a mechanized system using the NCR 500 computer was completed in April. ⁷¹

(C) The storage problem improved during the second quarter with completion of six warehouses at Phu Bai and acquisition of a warehouse at Qhi Nhon Support Command in May. ⁷²

(C) In the third quarter customer satisfaction was maintained at the same high rate as in previous quarters as the number of requisitions declined in consonance with the level of combat.

(C) In August significant progress was made in identification and disposition of excesses and the following measures were taken: ⁷³

1. Stratification of assets reflected potential excesses in the amount of \$4.4 million. These excesses were screened by RVNAF and USAID in an effort to apply excesses against their requirements. As of the end of August medical material in the amount of \$408,000 was furnished RVNAF and USAID and \$1.7 million was shipped to Okinawa. (Excesses had been generated as the result of reduction in the supply levels, reductions in the number of stocked items, and hospital closures.)

2. Purification of due-in/due-out files. Reconciliations between the base/32d Medical Depot and the advance depots were begun on a monthly basis. Reconciliations were to be conducted quarterly between the 32d Medical Depot and the US Army Medical Depot, Ryukyu Islands.

3. Improvement in locator record accuracy, identification of accounting for unrecorded stocks, and reduction in processing time for receipts and issues. In consonance with this endeavor, the number of in-process documents in the storage section of base/32d Medical Depot at the end of August was approximately 150 compared to 2,500 in February.

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4. Centralization of medical repair parts management. The base/32d Medical Depot assumed management responsibility for all medical repair parts.

(C) In September the identification and disposition of excesses continued with major emphasis on: (1) Retrograde of excess hospital TOE equipment, (2) retrograde of excess MUST (Medical Unit Self-Contained Transportable) equipment, and (3) disposition of excesses generated as the result of hospital closures and reduction of requisitioning objectives. Advance instructions were received relative to disposition of excess MUST equipment generated as the result of hospital closures. Serviceable MUST equipment was to be retrograded directly to CONUS (Toole and Atlanta Army Depots). The latest stratification revealed normally generated, potential excesses in the amount of \$3.8 million. The excess listings again were screened by both RVNAF and USAID for application against their requirements. During the month of September, medical material valued at \$4,300 was issued to ARVN on a reimburseable basis and stock worth \$393,000 was shipped to the US Army Medical Depot, Ryukyu Islands.

(C) Medical supplies were maintained at a satisfactory level for the remainder of the year and no significant problem areas were reported. There were continuing efforts to identify excess which was retrograded to CONUS and Okinawa. Also RVNAF and USAID were provided excess stocks valued at approximately \$600,000.74

NAVFORV

(C) The NAVFORV reported a satisfactory level of medical supplies during 1969. Issues were up slightly during the first quarter in anticipation of an intensification of the level of combat.

7th AF

(U) The 7AF reported no significant problems during 1969.

III MAF

(U) The III MAF reported no problems with Class VIII supplies during the year.

Class IX Supply

(C) The general level of repair parts was adequate during 1969. Critical items, primarily automotive, aircraft, and radio parts, were reported by all components except 7AF; however, shortages of the items did not adversely affect operations.

USARV

(C) Reflecting the implementation of 1st Log Comd improved management controls, there was a general improvement in the supply status of repair parts during the quarter. The controls included:

1. Project FILL/FILL Expanded. This project provided for identification of ASL items which continuously reflected a zero balance and which were frequently on high priority requisition, in high demand, or listed as critical. A list of these items was then forwarded to 2d Log

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Comd (Okinawa), AMC, DSA, LCO-P, and NICPs with a request for expedited action to improve supply and delivery of the items. The project was subsequently expanded to include the top two percent of the highest number of due-out items.

2. Project IMI (Intensive Management Items). This project provided for intensive management of selected secondary items. The direct support units conducted and forwarded to depots and ICC-V 100 percent inventories of the designated items. The ICC-V reviewed, consolidated, and subsequently forwarded these reports to NICPs for expedited action. It was envisioned that the project subsequently would provide for en route surveillance of affected items.

(C) Automotive items listed in critical supply during the first quarter included 1/4-ton and 2 1/2-ton truck batteries, 3/4-ton and 5-ton truck engines, and clutch plates for 2 1/2-ton trucks. There was also a shortage of UH-1 and AH-1G aircraft parts. Modules for the AN/VRC-12 family of radios were the most significant item of communications repair parts in critical supply.⁷⁵

(C) By the end of June the clutch plates, AN/VRC-12 modules, and printing and duplicating equipment had been removed from the critical list; however, the shortage of truck engines continued. The shortage of 3/4-ton engines became so critical that issues were made only in response to Red Ball requisitions and after deadlines had been verified. There was also a continuing shortage of several minor aircraft parts.⁷⁶

(C) Overall Class IX supply status improved during July. Support was maintained at a very satisfactory level for the remainder of the quarter, and the efficacy of 1st Log Comd's improved and intensive management controls was reflected in the improved levels of support. The shortage of 3/4-ton truck engines eased significantly as receipts exceeded issues. To maintain these improvements and increase stock levels, issues continued only in response to Red Ball Express requisitions. The shortage of VRC-12 components also was eliminated as USAECOM, at 1st Log Comd's request, began shipment of the radio sets complete with installation kits. Except for the 3/4-ton truck engines, the only critical item reported by USARV for the third quarter were four items for OH-6 and UH-1 helicopters.⁷⁷

(C) While all other items were at a satisfactory supply level, the 3/4-ton truck engine continued critical until the end of year in spite of continued application of Red Ball Express management controls. The situation actually worsened in November when TACOM indicated the monthly input would be reduced from 325 to 200 monthly. This condition precluded any prediction of a get-well date for the item.⁷⁸

(C) Several aircraft items, primarily for UH-1 helicopters, continued in critical supply during the fourth quarter resulting in some inoperative aircraft. Intensive management controls were applied and receipt of the critical items was imminent at the end of the year.

NAVFORV

(C) NAVFORV reported a satisfactory level of Class IX supply support for the first two quarters. The only significant items listed in critical supply were parts for the Jacuzzi pumps used to propel patrol boats (PBR). Shipments of the needed items had begun to arrive as the first quarter ended and additional shipments were received in April.⁷⁹

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(C) During the third quarter, NAVFORV maintained its satisfactory level of repair parts support. The only items reported critically short were parts for ONAN generators, 12-volt batteries, and 12-volt 200 AH batteries. These items were removed from the critical list by the end of the quarter as the supply system responded to intensive management controls.⁸⁰

(C) There were no significant problems reported by NAVFORV in the fourth quarter and repair parts were maintained at a satisfactory level.

III MAF

(C) The III MAF reported a generally satisfactory level of Class IX supply support during the first quarter. The only critical item listed was 1100X15 tires that were awaiting special procurement action in CONUS.⁸¹

(C) During the second and third quarters repair parts support continued at a generally satisfactory level. The major problem area was with parts needed to reduce the number of NORS aircraft. These shortages worsened during August and September in spite of constant monitoring of and application of intensive management controls to the supply system. The only other repair parts in short supply were radiosonde sets (AMT-4E) and brake shoes. The latter two items were removed from the critical list in September.⁸²

(C) In the fourth quarter III MAF continued to report a number of helicopter repair parts in critically short supply. All other stocks were maintained at a satisfactory level.

SERVICES

General

(C) Logistical services were furnished by components at a satisfactory level throughout 1969. The major significant problem area was in property disposal which was reported by USARV. Graves registration activities peaked in March and declined slightly during the second quarter. In the last two quarters there were further declines in the graves registration workload reflecting the lowered level of combat and troop redeployments.

Mortuary Services

(U) Mortuary services were provided US forces in RVN by the Army and the USMC. USARV's 1st Log Comd operated facilities at Danang (under Danang Support Command) and at Tan Son Nhut (under Saigon Support Command). The III MAF FLC also operated a graves registration activity at Danang. The Tan Son Nhut facility provided services to all US forces in II, III, and IV CTZs. In I CTZ, the services were provided by both component facilities as appropriate.

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(U) A closer look at the Tan Son Nhut mortuary furnishes a representative overview of mortuary activities in RVN. The facility had been transferred from the USAF in the fall of 1965. In 1967 the increased workload had required opening of the second Army facility (at Danang). Construction of a new mortuary at Tan Son Nhut was approved early in 1968; work was begun later that year and the new facility was completed in September 1968. The facility had the normal capacity to store 200 human remains with the capability to increase this number to 400 with refrigeration modifications. This capacity was considered adequate for the levels of combat anticipated in RVN. The complex also included a Personal Property Depot.

(U) The mortuary achieved a 100 percent error-free record in the identification of deceased personnel. Continual stress on the importance of fingerprints and footprints accounted for a gradual increase of cases identified by this method. A total of 5,033 out of 7,241 cases processed during 1968 had been identified by fingerprints for a percentage of 69.51. During the first seven months of 1969, a total of 3,207 of 4,267 cases were identified by fingerprints for a percentage of 74.93. All cases were thoroughly examined for the recording of race, height, hair color, tattoos, scars, healed fractures, injuries, cause of death, markings on clothing, and jewelry. Additionally, a dental chart was prepared and compared with official dental records for each case. Continuous command emphasis was directed to the fingerprinting of every arrival in RVN. In-processing centers checked thoroughly the records of all incoming personnel for fingerprint records. Qualified personnel took prints of those arriving in country with no records.

(U) Search and recovery operations were handled well considering the difficulties presented by hostile forces and extremely hazardous terrain conditions. One of the principal problems concerned the incomplete recoveries made from helicopter crash sites. Heavy engine and transmission assemblies often pinned one or more victims beneath the wreckage. The terrain problems usually prevented the utilization of suitable mobile equipment for raising such heavy wreckage and there were several casualties which could not be recovered.⁸³

(C) Figure IX-6 depicts the level of activities at the Army mortuaries at Tan Son Nhut and Danang and the USMC activity at FLC. The February and March increases in number of remains processed reflected the intensification in level of combat during the latter part of the first quarter.⁸⁴

(C) During the second quarter mortuary activities continued at the increased rate though there was some decline from the March peak.⁸⁵

(C) In the third quarter mortuary activities declined dramatically except for the III MAF's FLC facility at Danang. The latter facility processed 736 human remains during August, a peak workload for 1969.⁸⁶

(C) In the fourth quarter graves registration activities remained at a low level reflecting the continued relatively low level of combat. Both USARV and III MAF facilities established new lows for the year.⁸⁷

Property Disposal

(C) Disposal of excess and unserviceable property during the year was hampered by a shortage of qualified property disposal personnel. To help alleviate this shortage, 1st Log Comd

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
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GRAVES REGISTRATION ACTIVITIES-1969

INCLUDES US, ROK, THAI, AUS, & VN



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FIGURE IX-6

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conducted training courses for military and civilian personnel. Property disposal efforts were further hampered by difficulties in obtaining the requisite integrity and reliability checks of indigenous employees by the GVN National Police.

(C) In spite of the shortage of trained disposal personnel, USARV held frequent sales and the 44 sales programmed for FY 69 was exceeded.

(C) There was continued progress in reducing the inventory in property disposal yards and by the end of February the total inventory for USARV had been reduced to 67,000 STONs. 88

(C) On 18 Mar a property disposal conference, hosted by 1st Log Comd, was held by USARV at Nha Trang. The conference agenda was focused on procedures and the overall disposal program. A subsequent conference was held by USARV on 19-20 Mar to formulate improved procedures for use of excess material in support of the MAP Grant Aid Requirement Release Program. 89

(C) During the second quarter disposal property was reduced further from the 1968 (September) high of 90,400 STONs, and by midyear overall USARV inventories declined to 47,900 STONs. This progress was made in spite of the continuing lack of qualified property disposal personnel and difficulties experienced in obtaining GVN customs clearances to remove items from property disposal yards. 90

(C) In July the overall command inventory excess and salvage property declined to a low of 46,000 STONs. This progress was offset in August and September when receipts once again exceeded sales and the total command inventory climbed to over 60,000 STONs. The major factors causing the increased inventory were:

1. One relatively large turn-in (3,700 STONs) by 7AF in August.
2. Difficulties of contractors in removing property from the Chu Lai-Phu Bai area. Efforts to reduce inventory levels included sealed bid sales of unserviceable items and scrap. The return on the sales ranged from 7.8 to 9.6 percent of original cost.

(C) The shortage of qualified property disposal personnel continued to constrain disposal activities and DA assistance was requested. Chief, Support Services, DCSLOG, DA assured USARV that property disposal personnel were being trained at US Army Quartermaster School and would be provided on an expedited basis. Meanwhile 1st Log Comd's training team conducted in-country training in an attempt to expedite disposal activities and reduce inventories. 91

(C) There was continued progress in reducing the inventory in property disposal yards and by the end of October the total inventory for USARV had been reduced to 67,000 STONs.

(C) Property disposal activities continued in the fourth quarter with several sealed bid sales of unneeded property held monthly. Contractors continued to experience difficulty in removing property from disposal yards because of GVN customs restrictions. At the end of the year, there were 70,000 STONs of scrap and waste, and useable property valued at \$38.7 million in salvage yards. This backlog constrained salvage operations. The difficulties with GVN customs officials, specifically at Qui Nhon, resulted in increased costs to contractors which ultimately resulted in decreased dollar return to the US. GVN officials required four customs inspectors on hand at all times at \$VN 1,000 per man per day. All loading and movements ceased unless the

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inspectors were on hand. This discouraged prospective bidders from participating in sales. The most critical operational problem however, was the vast increase in property on hand which seriously interfered with the effective receipt, handling, and disposal of all types of PDO property. At the end of the year publication of clarifying regulations was imminent and these regulations were expected to remove constraints on property disposal activities.⁹²

Procurement

(U) All DOD-appropriated procurement in RVN was accomplished in accordance with the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR). Each component was responsible for meeting its own requirements with modifications as prescribed in ISSAs; consequently the components performed procurement activities as set forth in their respective service procurement procedures as governed by ASPR. Procurement authority generally followed the service channels and contracting officers were appointed by each component.

(U) The procurement role for Hq, MACV was that of the subunified commander in consonance with JCS PUB 3 doctrine, i. e., primarily coordination and monitoring of the procurement activities of the components.

(U) The major procurement activities in RVN were:

1. Army: US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (APA, V), an element of the 1st Log Comd; located in Saigon.
2. Navy: Naval Support Activity, Danang, and Officer in Charge of Construction (OICC), Vietnam (located in Saigon).
3. Air Force: 7AF Procurement Office (7AF-DMP). There were several additional AF procurement offices in RVN during 1969; however, there were plans at the end of the year for consolidating them into one office in Saigon.
4. Marine Corps: Force Logistics Command at Danang.

(U) In addition to the appropriated procurement activities, the components also operated numerous nonappropriated fund (NAF) procurement offices in RVN for their NAF facilities. The Pacific Exchange System also operated a procurement office in Saigon which procured goods and services to support operations of RVN exchanges.

(U) In December 1968 COMUSMACV had requested DOD send a procurement assistance team to RVN to study procurement staffing and operations. The team, which arrived in February 1969, was headed by the Assistant General Counsel, OASD, Manpower and Reserve Affairs. One of the major recommendations resulting from the visit was that MACV should establish a Procurement Policy Division headed by an O6 in the office of J4. Responding to this recommendation the division was established in September.

(U) The Procurement Policy Division was responsible for the overall coordination of procurement activities relating to contracts awarded in or performed in RVN. Some of its specific responsibilities were:

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1. Develop procurement policies and guidance relative to DOD contracts awarded in or performed in RVN.
2. Monitor and coordinate procurement activities of component commands.
3. Assign single service procurement responsibilities among component commands.
4. Authorize commodities that could be purchased locally by the US forces in RVN.
5. Assume responsibility for the chairmanship and operation and management of the General Purchasing Agency, Vietnam (GPAV), a joint procurement coordinating board.
6. Maintain liaison with the US Embassy, USAID, and other US Government agencies concerning procurement matters relating to US Mission policy.
7. Develop procurement instructions to be followed by DOD purchasing offices located outside RVN but awarding contracts for performance in-country. Forward these instructions to the armed services procurement regulation committee for promulgation.

(U) Many of the division's responsibilities were discharged through the GPAV. In reality, the latter was not an agency, as it did not purchase anything. It was a board established under the provisions of JCS PUB 3 to coordinate procurement planning. The GPAV members represented all DOD procurement activities in RVN. This included not only the MACV component command, but also other in-country contracting activities such as MSTIS, OICC (which had the big RMK contract), and the PACEX Procurement Office. The procurement division chief was also the GPAV chairman.

(U) A typical resolution passed by the GPAV to improve procurement management in RVN involved the exchange of contract information. Many purchasing offices in-country awarded contracts for such things as laundry service, office machine maintenance and repair, hauling service, and potable ice delivery. Before GPAV was established, one component had no idea what another was paying for the same service in the same general locality. A program was instituted to provide an exchange of service contract prices. Member purchasing offices submitted copies of service contracts which the Procurement Policy Division used to publish a periodic pamphlet of prices paid for various services. These pamphlets assisted contracting officers during negotiations.

(U) Following a GPAV meeting in early October, COMUSMACV submitted a proposed contract clause to DOD via CINCPAC that outlined certain currency requirements concerning contractor employees' pay. The purpose of this action was to decrease the opportunity for the individual to engage in black market currency transactions. (See Chapter XIV, Discipline, Law and Order.)

(U) In addition to these two projects, the procurement policy division and GPAV covered such topics as customs clearances, wages paid to TCNs, location allowances, and petroleum contracts.

(U) The goods and services procured for US and Allied forces came from three different areas: CONUS, offshore-Western Pacific, and in-country. The Army had the bulk of the procurement activity workload in RVN as indicated in the following data:

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PROCUREMENT WORKLOAD

USARV Procurement	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	NO
	Val	Val	Val	Val	Val	Val	Val	Val	Val	Val	Val	Val	Val
(a) Total PR&C's received during Month													
In-Country	1.89	.26	3.29	17.1	.549	2.32	-0-	.010	2.27	1.20	1.18	259.2	838
Out-of-Country- WESTPAC	.107	.143	.033	.029	.044	.943	-0-	-0-	3.67	2.22	.004	13.2	274
Out-of-Country- CONUS	.159	.044	.063	.187	.092	.129	-0-	-0-	.008	.03	.0003	.70	363
Total	2.16	3.45	3.83	17.3	.686	3.39	-0-	.01	5.95	3.45	1.1843	273.1	1417
(b) Contracts under Administration													
Active Contracts	278.	279.	280.	278.	278.	278.	312.	321.	319.	318.	310.	243.5	1818
Inactive Contracts	320.	314.	313.	314.	314.	311.	452.	478.	482.	492.	500	521.9	1189
Total	598.	593.	593.	592.	592.	589.	765.	799.	801.	810.	810.	815.4	2211
(c) Contracts Awarded													
0-\$25,000	.100	.042	.025	.072	.059	.238	.102	.008	.008	.008	.047	12.1	86
\$25,001-\$100,000	.164	.072	.027	.052	.035	.126	.807	-0-	.174	.102	.326	170.7	38
\$100,001-up	.769	-0-	.163	.158	.109	.555	151.	25.4	.750	.872	-	4,133.2	60
Total	1.03	.114	.215	.282	.204	.919	152.	25.4	.932	1.062	.374		186


* Values represent millions of dollars

TABLE IX-1

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FIGURE IX-7

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<u>COMPONENT</u>	<u>AGENCY</u>	<u>VALUE IN MILLIONS</u>
Army	APA, V	235.0
Navy	NSAD	60.8
7AF	7AF-DMP	16.9
USMC	FLC	3.5

(U) Most procurement was for utilities and services. Also, certain fruits and vegetables were procured both in RVN and off shore-Western Pacific. A significant amount of the CONUS procurement involved contracts for technical representatives and for other services which were furnished in RVN. Table IX-1 (Procurement Workload, 1969) contains additional data relative to Army procurement activities for 1969.⁹³

MAINTENANCE

General

(C) During 1969 equipment maintenance continued the improvement trend that had been established in 1968. The 7AF reported meeting or exceeding USAF aircraft standards generally throughout the period except for several low density aircraft. A similar tendency was experienced by USARV as improvements outnumbered decreases in operational (OR) rates. The III MAF and NAVFORV also reported improvements in their maintenance activities.

7AF

(S) The 7AF reported overall aircraft maintenance experience well within USAF standards in 1969 with Not Operationally Ready Maintenance (NORM) and Not Operationally Ready Supply (NORS) rates well under prescribed limits. See Figure IX-8.⁹⁴

(C) In January all aircraft met or exceeded the desired OR rate except the F4C/D. There were no shortfalls reported in February; however, both A-1E/G/H and U-3B aircraft failed to meet desired OR rates in March.⁹⁵

(U) Automotive maintenance rates exceeded USAF limits during the quarter except for vehicles deadlined for maintenance during January and February. (See Figure IX-9.) The rates, though high, remained fairly consistent and were attributed primarily to the old and worn-out vehicles in the fleet.

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
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USAF FLEET NORM/NORS RATES



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
AIRCRAFT POSSESSED	1627	1591	1632	1673	1658	1691	1730	12208	1220.8	1220.8	1220.8	1220.8
PERCENT NORM	18.4	16.8	17.1	15.4	16.8	16.7	12.7	13.4	13.9	15.1	17.5	15.1
PERCENT NORS	3.0	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.2	4.0	5.4	5.2	5.0	4.3

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FIGURE IX-8


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AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE



USAF UPPER VDM LIMIT

USAF UPPER VDP LIMIT

CY 66
AVG

PERCENT VDM	5.7	---
PERCENT VDP	5.6	---
VEHICLES AUTH	8600	
VEHICLES AJSGO	8424	

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FIGURE IX-9

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(C) During the second quarter, maintenance was generally satisfactory with only A-1 (E/G/H) and VC-118 aircraft in April and RF-4C and VC-118 aircraft in May having excessive NORM rates. Automotive maintenance during the second quarter also was satisfactory with NORM and NORS rates remaining slightly under USAF standards.⁹⁷

(C) Maintenance of the vehicle fleet improved during the third quarter reflecting the intensive efforts of mobile maintenance teams organized by 7AF. In July the component achieved a 90.5 percent OR status and this high level was maintained throughout the quarter.⁹⁸

(C) In the third quarter further improvements were made in aircraft maintenance as the overall NORM rate dropped to 12.7 percent in July. The NORS rate was also maintained well under USAF standards. Only VC-54 aircraft failed to meet OR standards in July while UH-1 aircraft exceeded the USAF standard of 25 percent in August and September. In the latter month B-57 aircraft also failed to meet the standard.⁹⁹

(C) Aircraft were maintained at a high OR rate throughout the fourth quarter. In October only the VC-47D failed to achieve USAF standards due to a NORM of 38 percent. In November five aircraft (VC-47D, VC-54, UH-1P, U-3B and VC-118) failed to meet OR standards due to high NORM rates; one aircraft (AC-119) failed to meet OR standards due to a 9.7 percent NORS rate. Significantly F-100s, the highest density aircraft, exceeded OR standards throughout the period. Automotive maintenance was generally satisfactory in the fourth quarter though the USAF standard was not met in December.¹⁰⁰

(U) Table IX-2 reflects maintenance status by type aircraft for 1969.

USARV

(U) USARV maintenance activities kept equipment at a generally satisfactory state during 1969. As depicted in Table IX-3, aircraft OR rates were maintained at satisfactory levels when viewed in terms of the operational and maintenance environment.

(C) Minor fluctuations in OR rates were reported during the first quarter with significant improvements occurring in January and March while a decline occurred in February. Key ground combat equipment was maintained at a satisfactory state through MHE, heavy trucks (5-ton and larger), special purpose engineer equipment, and some radio and radar equipment continued at less than desired OR rates. Aircraft generally showed a steady improvement in OR rates except for older models such as OH-13 and OH-23 which were being phased out of the inventory. In March significant progress in the command's aircraft availability occurred as OR rates improved for 10 types while decreasing for only two.¹⁰¹

(C) The tendencies established during the first quarter continued into the second with generally rising OR rates for most items. Exceptions to this improvement were 5-ton dump trucks, 10-ton tractors, AN/PPS-5 radars, and 20-ton, truck-mounted cranes. Aircraft maintenance also showed some improvement during the second quarter with improved OR rates for 28 types while there was a decline for 23 types. Most of the down aircraft were NORM rather than NORS and the following types of aircraft failed to meet DA's OR/NORM/NORS goals: UH-1, RUH-1, U-6 and CH-47A.¹⁰²

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7AF AIRCRAFT READINESS

Types of Aircraft	Nr A/C	OR RATES (%)												OR OBJ PERCENT	
		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC		
A-1E/G/H	18	84	74	63	69	72	75	80	77	82	80	* 80	* 84	* 82	71
RB-57E	3	79	88	74	91	90	91	97	89	81	89	81	89	82	71
AC-47D	26	85	88	86	93	90	90	92	89	93	88	91	91	*	71
EC-47N/P/Q	41	77	74	77	77	74	76	80.5	79	81	80	81	79	81	71
C-7A	86	77	83	82	86	85	86	87	82	79	79	77	79	77	71
C-47A/D	21	90	90	92	93	89	91	92	89	89	85	84	84	82	71
F-106C/D/F	208	78	79	78	80	80	78	84	81	78	73	71	71	75	71
G-1E/F/G	137	93	93	92	92	91	92	95	91	93	89	90	90	90	71
U-10B/D	12	89	88	87	91	90	83	88	76	76	80	*	*	74	71
RF-4C	39	73	77	73	73	71	77	85	80	79	73	74	74	74	71
UC-123B/K	24	86	81	87	88	84	77	83	80	86	70	89	89	*	71
HC-47A	4	88	88	96	93	90	93	92	85	78	84	87	87	80	71
T-39A	6	86	88	81	86	87	82	88	86	83	74	75	75	78	71
O-2A/B	158	84	89	87	87	85	86	87	84	86	83	85	85	87	71
A-17A	23	89	85	77	84	82	81	86	84	81	81	81	85	85	71
U-3B	2	93	98	66	63	92	96	91	95	70	81	36	36	78	71
B-57	7	84	82	83	86	81	80	83	75	73	71	*	*	*	71
OV-10	94	90	89	90	89	87	85	90	82	82	80	82	82	82	71
RF-101C	18	74	79	76	80	74	78	87	80	83	79	17	17	77	71
G-123B/K	50	86	84	84	88	73	75	80	79	79	84	89	89	75	71
UH-1P	19	76	81	86	82	84	79	89	61	45	74	55	55	81	71
E-4C/D/E	114	67	71	74	77	77	80	81	81	80	75	79	79	78	71
AC-119	18	*	*	*	86	84	77	85	81	73	70	68	68	66	71
Total Types Above OR OBJ	21	22	20	21	23	23	23	23	22	21	22	16	16	17	
Total Types Below OR OBJ	1	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	4	4	1	

NOTE: Asterisks indicate nonavailability of information

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TABLE IX-2

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USARV AIRCRAFT READINESS

Types of Aircraft	Nr A/C	OR RATE (%)												OR OBJ PERCENT	
		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	OR OBJ PERCENT	
O-1	257	89	88	88	88	86	87	87	87	89	87	87	88	91	75
RU-6	21	*	77	70	73	69	79	65	87	80	86	86	78	85	70
OH-13	*	25	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	70
OV-1	107	84	88	83	86	86	96	78	77	79	81	81	77	80	77
RU-8	40	68	71	76	70	72	75	76	82	81	79	79	80	81	70
CH-47C	83	84	81	75	77	70	74	74	73	78	79	78	78	76	65
CH-54	23	58	62	59	71	74	80	76	73	75	72	69	69	70	65
U-21	43	71	64	71	72	77	80	80	68	76	67	72	72	77	78
RU-21	14	*	*	*	73	75	78	77	81	84	*	*	80	72	70
U-1	43	68	69	71	69	60	63	66	82	82	84	83	83	84	78
U-6	66	66	65	70	60	65	64	65	67	73	70	70	69	74	79
OH-6A	498	70	72	72	75	73	72	72	75	77	75	75	79	81	70
OH-23	18	51	*	*	79	66	63	64	58	54	51	59	59	49	70
AM-1C	468	*	*	*	74	74	74	77	77	79	78	78	78	81	70
UH-1B	86	72	77	83	77	75	72	77	75	76	73	73	73	72	77
UH-1C	268	69	67	65	75	74	73	76	77	75	76	73	73	74	75
UH-1D	262	78	78	77	79	79	80	78	77	77	75	75	75	76	78
UH-1H	1400	74	74	75	77	78	79	80	80	81	81	81	80	81	78
CH-47A	120	62	62	69	67	56	70	68	72	74	77	74	75	74	65
CH-47B	78	58	63	64	65	65	68	72	69	72	80	69	79	81	65
Total Types Above OR OBJ	5	8	8	8	15	11	16	15	15	13	15	15	15	13	
Total Types Below OR OBJ	12	6	8	14	8	8	4	5	6	6	5	5	5	6	

NOTE: Asterisks indicate nonavailability of information

TABLE IX-3

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(C) In the third quarter, USARV maintenance activities continued responsive to requirements and the trend of slowly rising OR rates continued. By the end of the quarter the OR rate for towed artillery exceeded 99 percent while self-propelled artillery exceeded 95 percent. The APC-family of vehicle was maintained at 92 percent OR. Items whose improved maintenance eliminated their unacceptable OR rated during the quarter were scoop loaders, recovery vehicles, wheeled tractors, and commercial forklifts. Added to the list were AN/GRC-143 radios and M48A3 tanks. 103

(C) Overall maintenance of USARV materiel was performed at an acceptable standard throughout the fourth quarter. Significant accomplishments were reflected in continuation of the 99 percent OR rate for towed artillery. Also, the APC-family of vehicles exceeded 95 percent OR. Three items (M48 tanks, AN/GRC-142 radios, and AN/PPS-5 radars) were deleted from the critical list in October and tractor, full-tracked was deleted in November. Three items (wheeled tractors, road graders, and 2 1/2-ton trucks) were added to the list.

(C) Aircraft generally met or exceeded Army standards. Only five relatively low density aircraft failed to meet OR rates during October and November. In December seven types of aircraft failed to meet acceptable rates. 104

NAVFORV

(C) During the first quarter, NAVFORV was confronted with a significant problem in the maintenance of its small craft, primarily PBRs and to a lesser degree PCFs. There was a critical shortage of maintenance parts, primarily those for Jacuzzi pumps, and fiberglass material for repair of hulls. The problem was further aggravated by the increased tempo of GIANT SLINGSHOT/SEALORDS operations (See Chapter V, Naval Operations) which resulted in greater battle damage. Efforts to improve maintenance posture included expedited shipment of repair parts from CONUS and evacuation of severely damaged hulls to the Subic Bay Ship Repair Facility.

(C) In an effort to increase availability of the large number of outboard motors used in-country, Johnson/Evinrude models were established as standard. It was hoped that this would relieve the parts problem for the motors. 105

(C) During the second quarter maintenance activities made good progress as the badly needed Jacuzzi pump parts began arriving. By the end of May, supply of the parts reached a satisfactory level and maintenance of river craft was on schedule as battle damage eased slightly. 106

(C) In the third quarter the overhaul program for PBRs (MK1) showed significant improvements due to completion of MKIV Jacuzzi pump and foam flotation retrofits on the craft. Also in-country overhaul of LCPL type craft began in August at NSAD's My Tho and Sa Dec facilities. The only problem encountered during the third quarter was a shortage of RFI 64HN9 engines at Dong Tam's Navy Supply Center. Naval Supply Center, San Diego was requested to expedite delivery of the engines. 107

(C) During the fourth quarter NAVFORV maintenance effort was focused on preparing craft for ACTOV. In October, 39 PBRs were turned over to the VNN after first being placed in mint condition. Backfitting of MK-II PBRs with foam flotation kits also continued. At the end of

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November only eight craft remained to be backfitted. There was also considerable progress in the installation of secure voice equipment (KY-8) on the PBRs. ¹⁰⁸

III MAF

(C) During 1969, III MAF maintenance was responsive to operational requirements. While there were relatively high NORM/NORS rates during the year, particularly for aircraft, the percentage of equipment in third and fourth echelon shops remained at acceptable levels as indicated below:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
January	2.7
February	2.6
March	2.4
April	2.4
May	2.5
June	2.5
July	3.2
August	2.6
September	2.7
October	2.5
November	2.9
December	2.8

Table IX-4 depicts III MAF aircraft readiness for 1969.

(C) In July there was an increase in deadlined items, however, the rate returned to 2.6 percent in the following month. This was generally in line with the year's experience prior to that time. The major problem areas during the third quarter were with UH-1B and F-4B aircraft, AN/CRC-112 radios, M51 recovery vehicles, and generators. ¹⁰⁹

(C) Record breaking torrential rains in early October placed a heavy demand on road and bridge maintenance equipment. Consequently the third and fourth echelon deadline rate rose from 3.6 percent in September to 4.5 percent in October. Meanwhile, deadline rates for ordnance, motor transport, and communications/electronic equipment were reduced, further reflecting the benefits accruing from redistribution of assets from redeploying units and reduced enemy activity. These tendencies continued into November as the heavy rains continued. Deadlined engineer equipment rose to 3.6 percent while other items were held to a deadline rate of 2.9 percent. Considerable difficulty continued to be experienced with aircraft maintenance as reflected in the number of aircraft failing to meet OR standards. ¹¹⁰

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III MAF AIRCRAFT READINESS

Types of Aircraft	Nr A/C	OR RATE (%)												OR OBJ PERCENT
		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	
A-4C/E	54	78	73	71	72	73	70	57	65	71	67	68	66	75
A-6A	33	73	68	71	68	65	55	44	47	55	67	70	68	55
EA-6A	4	50	50	60	60	60	51	48	53	67	64	45	30	55
RF-4B	8	44	50	67	65	62	45	41	36	44	43	58	46	65
TA-4F	5	40	40	50	50	49	42	31	43	50	53	51	57	75
F-4B/J	69	55	51	65	65	58	60	61	63	54	43	58	64	65
EF-10B	8	71	55	56	58	55	45	55	48	84	*	*	*	70
C-117D	5	65	44	66	60	71	77	71	81	62	61	59	71	85
O-1C/G	10	60	58	60	63	69	72	58	43	65	*	*	*	75
UH-1E	55	69	63	68	69	70	68	72	71	70	80	77	67	75
UH-34D	19	55	63	62	60	66	60	55	*	*	*	*	*	75
CH-46A/D	75	55	70	67	68	62	59	59	62	58	68	63	67	60
CH-53A/D	25	41	45	47	48	48	55	52	37	46	31	37	35	60
US-2B	3	45	37	77	72	42	52	43	58	37	36	52	56	70
OV-10A	38	60	69	69	65	70	73	70	70	74	21	72	76	(1)
AH-1G	9	*	*	*	70	86	74	65	63	68	61	66	78	(1)
Total Types Above OR OBJ	3	2	6	6	3	1	0	1	1	3	7	5	2	
Total Types Below OR OBJ	11	12	8	8	11	13	14	13	11	11	7	9	9	

Comments (1) OR Objectives not yet established
 (2) Asterisks indicate nonavailability of information

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
TABLE IX-4

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CARGO MOVEMENT BY MODE

MONTHLY AVERAGE CY 69




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FIGURE IX-10

PORT PERFORMANCE

INCLUDES MILITARY AND USAID CARGO



OUTLOAD
 DISCHARGE
 AVAILABLE CARGO UNREPORTED AFTER 30 JUNE

FIGURE IX-11

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Aerial view of ships discharging in Saigon River in March 1969 shows the lack of congestion that had plagued throughput operations in past years

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7 May, a sympathy strike was instituted, apparently in support of the direct hire employees affecting the military port facilities at Saigon, Newport, and Cat Lai. Officials from USARV and the US Embassy met that same day with representatives of the direct hire employees and the Port Worker's Union in an attempt to resolve the situation.

(U) Agreement was reached by all parties that: direct hire and commercial contract stevedores would return to work at 2000 hours that evening; 61 direct hire employees would be released; and the work schedule would be 70 hours and seven days a week for the 300 shift workers. Non-shift workers (about 115) commenced a work schedule of 60 hours, six days a week. The effective date for the change in hours was 12 May. Throughout the period of the work stoppage, the military mission of the port was not affected as military personnel replaced direct hire absentees wherever necessary.¹¹⁴

Vietnamization of RVN Ports

(C) As the full implications of Vietnamization emerged in June, it became apparent that there was an immediate requirement to initiate planning for turnover of RVN port facilities to the Vietnamese. It was recognized that a requirement would continue for US capabilities at each of the major logistical islands, however the MACV staff recognized that some facilities could be turned over to Vietnamese port authorities while others lent themselves to combined operations by both US and Vietnamese agencies.

(C) In August COMUSMACV directed the establishment of combined US-RVNAF committees in each RVNAF logistic command. The committees were to plan for and monitor the phased Vietnamization of ports. New impetus was added to the turnover in August when COMUSMACV in coordination with Director, USAID directed negotiation of an agreement for combined US-RVNAF operation of the Saigon port. There was greater urgency at this port because of considerable congestion attendant to both military and civilian use of port facilities. A plan was developed that provided the following steps, phased as indicated:¹¹⁵

1. Phase I. Target date: 1 Jul 69.
 - a. Transfer of Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) operation to Newport.
 - b. Release of Pier K-10, one opportune berth, and the K-10 RO/RO hardstand for use by the Saigon Port Authority.
 - c. Increase use of the Rice Mill area for storage.
2. Phase II. Target date: 1 Sep 69.
 - a. Full implementation of containerization of reefer cargo for Saigon area.
 - b. Release of deep draft pier MM 3 for use by the Saigon Port Authority.
 - c. Evaluation of real estate holdings within the Saigon Port area to include military (US and RVN), contractors, GVN and private.
3. Phase III. Target date: 1 Jan 70.

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Camp Davies Portion of Saigon Port

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- a. Removal of nonessential activities from the Saigon Port area.
- b. Formulation and coordination of long range plans (FY71) with an initiation of execution target date of 1 Jul 70.

(S) By the end of the year the turnover of MM piers at Saigon Port was complete. The withdrawal from Camp Davies and turnover of Piers K11 and K12 had slipped to 31 Nov 70. At Nha Trang joint usage began on 1 Dec and RVNAF was planning to assume complete takeover on 1 Jul 70. At Can Tho considerable progress was made and RVNAF assumed complete responsibility on 1 Jan 70. Off-loading of their own ammunition was assumed by RVNAF at Qui Nhon on 1 Jan 70. Vung Tau turnover also was planned for 1 Jul 70, while no date had been selected for Danang. There were no plans for turnover of Newport or Cam Ranh Bay as sole-user operation was expected to continue well into overall Vietnamization of the war. 116

Sea Land Container Service

(U) Sea Land container service in RVN had begun on 1 Aug 67 when SS Bienville had arrived at Danang with 228 containers on board. This ship, and others of the C-2 class, had called at Danang on a 15-day frequency until July 1969 when 228-container capacity, C-2 ships were replaced by four T-3 class ships having a capacity for 476 containers, calling on a 12-day frequency. Service to Cam Ranh Bay had begun in November 1967, with the arrival of the C-4 class Oakland. Initially, three C-4 class ships were used with a 16-day arrival frequency. A fourth C-4 was added subsequently, giving a 12-day frequency of arrivals. This capability had remained constant until the addition of a fifth C-4, SS Rose City which began operation in late November 1969. A sixth C-4 was to be added in January 1970, which would give an 8-day arrival frequency.

(U) A C-2 class ship had been in use since November 1967 as an intra-RVN shuttle between Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Newport on a regular basis with "as necessary" runs to Danang. This service was maintained throughout 1969.

(C) Containers had arrived in RVN at an ever increasing rate. From the 456 containers per month during the first few months of the service, arrivals increased to an average of 2,075 per month during the first half of 1969 and to an average of 2,688 per month by the end of the year. Based on an average container load of 32 metric tons (MTONs) per container, approximately 86,016 MTONs of cargo per month arrived in RVN by Sea Land containers.

(U) Reefer container cargo at Danang also increased from the 120 containers per month in 1967 to an average of 188 per month during the last half of 1969. Country-wide, an average of 503 reefer containers were received monthly for the last half of 1969. See Figure IX-12 for 1969 statistical data.

(U) These impressive achievements were not without problems. In general, most problem areas were resolved at the operational level. Specific problems that involved HQ MACV were: 117

1. Newport Marshalling Yard Hardstand. Approximately two-thirds (5-1/2 acres) of the marshalling yard at Newport was not paved. Sea Land Inc contended that they incurred unnecessary tire damage while working trailers in this area. The CO, MSTS requested the paving,

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Sea Land Containers being off loaded at Saigon Docks

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however, CG, USARV, contended that the provisions of the contract were met by the existing crushed rock hardstand. Both COMUSMACV and CINCPAC concurred in this position.

2. Regular calls at Naha by T-3 class ships departing Danang. Sea Land Inc. requested authority for the T-3 class ships departing Danang to call at Naha on a regular basis. The 1st Log Comd and 2d Log Comd (Okinawa) also requested this service for retrograde shipments. The MSTS, PAC refused permission, however, primarily on the basis that a stop at Naha would endanger the 12-day frequency cycle of arrivals at Danang and approved Naha stops only on a case by case basis. Additionally, MSTS, PAC held that the primary method of moving "container-required" cargo between RVN and Okinawa was the MSTS RO/RO shipping. Another argument expounded by MSTS was that Sea Land Inc was not rate-favorable due to MSTS bottoms sailing empty or partially laden from RVN. It was feared that cargo would be generated just to fill the containers if a regular Sea Land service to Naha was initiated. In fact, T-3 ships began calling at Danang in July 1969 and did not meet a regular 12-day arrival frequency. Actual arrivals were:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>ARRIVAL DATE</u>	<u>DATE SINCE LAST SHIP</u>
SS <u>San Francisco</u>	27 Jun	--
SS <u>Azalea City</u>	11 Jul	14
SS <u>San Juan</u>	27 Jul	16
SS <u>Los Angeles</u>	09 Aug	13
SS <u>San Francisco</u>	13 Aug	04
SS <u>Elizabethport</u>	29 Aug	16
SS <u>Los Angeles</u>	28 Sep	27
SS <u>San Juan</u>	28 Sep	03
SS <u>San Francisco</u>	02 Oct	04
SS <u>Elizabethport</u>	21 Oct	19
SS <u>Los Angeles</u>	13 Nov	23
SS <u>San Juan</u>	19 Nov	06
SS <u>San Francisco</u>	22 Nov	03

Another consideration was the report from 1st Log Comd that MSTS RO/RO shipping was not adequate to handle Naha container cargo. It was necessary to use SS Sea Train and other ships to return 2d Log Comd trailers to Naha.

3. Sailing ships with full loads from CONUS to RVN. At the time of negotiations for the expanded containership contract, troop reductions had not been announced; however, expanded service began almost concurrently with troop reductions. Because of the many advantages of containership service, a desired goal was to increase the percentage of cargo shipped by containers by sailing all container ships full while the overall tonnages of cargo decreased due to the troop reductions. Western Area, MTMTS worked constantly on this problem. One of the major problems in filling container ships resulted when containership sailings were bunched. When this occurred, vendors and stuffing points had difficulty in stuffing containers to meet sailing dates. Since stuffing activities concerned all PACOM ports, all containerships in PACOM influenced this problem. An example occurred when SS Rose City was added to the schedule of C-4s and was to follow the last C-4 by only three days. It was decided to delay the sailing by a few days to generate more cargo.

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(U) Another minor problem resulted from the increasing Vietnamization efforts. Under DOD directives all costs incident to MAP-grant aid cargo were to be borne by the recipient country. This applied equally to container cargo. This provision was not consonant with the contractual arrangements with Sea Land Inc; the latter was required to deliver all containership cargo directly to the consignee within a 30-mile radius of the port. To preclude potential port congestion and administrative difficulty in renegotiation of the contract, COMUSMACV requested and was subsequently given approval by DOD to waive the DOD requirement and permit delivery of RVNAF-consigned containers as prescribed in the contract.¹¹⁸

Highway

Motor Transport Performance

(C) Almost 1.3 million STONs of dry cargo, passengers, and POL products were moved monthly by motor transport in support of Allied operations during the first quarter. Of this total monthly performance, over one million STONs was dry cargo. (See Figure IX-13.)¹¹⁹

(C) During the second quarter highway transport continued to move large tonnages of material. In May there was a decline to 1.17 million STONs, with decreases in port/beach clearances as well as local and line haul categories. The decreases were due generally to less cargo arriving from CONUS and other PACOM ports during late April and early May. By the end of June total highway performance was back to pre-May levels.¹²⁰

(C) In the third quarter there was a sharp decline in highway performance as tonnages dropped from over 1.2 million STONs in July to slightly over one million STONs in September. This decline was directly associated with the decrease in port performance and mirrored the decline in arrivals of vessels from CONUS and other PACOM ports.¹²¹

(C) The decline in highway movements continued during the fourth quarter as less than one million STONs were moved each month. The slowly declining tendency since May reflected a significant measure of progress in Vietnamization. The redeployment of US units primarily from the Delta, I CTZ, and the Vung Tau areas had reduced requirements. A more significant factor, however, was the increasing amount of material being moved by ARVN motor transport units.¹²²

Highway Security

(C) Another factor fostering the heavy use of motor transport throughout the year was the inexorably improving security of essential military roads. See Figure IX-14. At the beginning of the year 59 percent of these roads were in "Green" or "Secure" status (Controlled by RVN/US/FWMAF during daylight hours with minimum security measures). At year's end this figure had been raised to 68.1 percent. The "Amber" or "Escorted" category (used by RVN/US/FWMAF during daylight hours with thorough security measures) had declined from 39.1 percent on 1 Jan to a 31.2 percent on 31 Dec. "Red" or "Closed" (required major military operations or engineering efforts to open) declined during the year from 1.9 percent in January to .7 percent. Security status by CTZ was as follows:

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HIGHWAY MOVEMENT PERFORMANCE




FIGURE IX-13


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MILITARILY ESSENTIAL HIGHWAYS AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1969



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FIGURE IX-14

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HIGHWAY SECURITY STATUS

KILOMETERS

	<u>GREEN</u>	<u>AMBER</u>	<u>RED</u>
I CTZ	371	106	0
II CTZ	1,044	678	0
III CTZ	686	158	26
IV CTZ	<u>495</u>	<u>247</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	2,596	1,189	26

PERCENTAGE

I CTZ	77.8	22.2	0.0
II CTZ	60.6	39.4	0.0
III CTZ	78.8	18.2	3.0
IV CTZ	<u>66.7</u>	<u>33.3</u>	<u>0.0</u>
RVN AVERAGE	68.1	31.2	.7

Transportation Support of US forces by RVNAF

(U) On 22 May, ARVN began providing highway support to the US with the movement of 10,000 lbs of high priority US Army aircraft parts from Tan Son Nhut to Vinh Long by ARVN military truck convoy. This movement continued weekly with the average shipment being 10,000 lbs. 123

(U) Throughout the year ARVN motor transport units assumed an increasingly larger share of the workload and by the end of 1969 these units had transported 3.5 million passengers and 2.14 million metric tons of cargo.

Rail

(C) Rail operations throughout the first quarter were well in excess of the previous year's performance in spite of continued problems with interdiction, particularly in I and II CTZs. Figure IX-15 reflects the tonnages and number of passengers by rail during the period. The decline in February was attributed to the increased level of combat associated with the enemy's Tet operations. 124

(C) Rail tonnage showed a sharp increase during April due to the movement of 23,000 STONS of construction rock from Nha Trang to Phan Thiet for RMK-BRJ. Also, improved security contributed to the increased tonnages for the rail mode and this tendency continued throughout the quarter. There was another dramatic increase in June which was equally divided between cargo and passengers. The increased passenger traffic reflected a growing confidence in the system as a means of secure transportation. In June there was still another increase in rail performance, primarily in the cargo category. 125

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
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RAIL PERFORMANCE



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FIGURE IX-15

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(C) During the third quarter rail performance was maintained at a high level in spite of a slight decline in cargo hauled. This decline was offset by a dramatic increase in the number of US-sponsored passengers, from 145,495 in June to 235,060 for September. From January's inauspicious total of 67,600, the passenger performance had increased 3-1/2 times. These achievements were accentuated when viewed in light of continuing VC/NVA efforts at interdiction which reached a peak for the year during August. There were 51 incidents during the quarter by CTZ as follows:¹²⁶

<u>CTZ</u>	<u>NR</u>
I	10
II	30
III	11

(C) There was a sharp increase in rail performance in October as 83,128 STONs were moved over VNRS. This was the highest total tonnage ever moved over the system. There was a slight decline in November as VC/NVA interdictions continued. These interdictions, frequently minings, accounted for a small decline in the number of passengers moved during October and November. In December there was a sharp increase in the number of passengers as a new high, 240,158, was attained for the year. Cargo tonnage for December was 76,454, a slight decrease from November.¹²⁷

Rail Security

(C) Figure IX-16 depicts the security status of the VNRS at the end of the year. Despite continued enemy interdictions (See Table IX-5) the amount of "Green" or "secure" (controlled by RVN/US/FWMAF during daylight hours with minimum security measures) almost doubled, rising from 1 Jan's 18 percent to 31 percent. "Amber" or "Escorted" (used by RVN/US/FWMAF during daylight hours with thorough security measures) declined from 25 percent to 15 percent during the year. There was only minimal progress, however, in opening new segments and at year's end the amount of "Red" or "Closed" (required major military operations or engineering efforts to open) had only declined from 56.9 percent to 54 percent.

Air

(C) The air mode continued to account for vast tonnages of cargo and passengers during 1969. Both intratheater and MAC airlift were heavily used and there were no major problem areas reported by components. One aircraft of the 834th Air Div took off or landed every 33 seconds, lifting 6,000 lbs every minute around the clock throughout the year; this dramatically manifests the magnitude of airlift operations in RVN during 1969.

1969 Activities


(C) The MACV Common Service Airlift System (CSAS) operated by the 834th Air Div, transported upwards of 100,000 STONs of cargo and passengers each month during the first quarter. (See Figure IX-17.) This lift was provided using an average of nearly 23,000 sorties per month. In addition to the CSAS movements, C-7A aircraft available for dedicated use by field force commanders and others accounted for an additional average of 13,700 sorties each month. Table IX-6 reflects the total workload for the three aerial port squadrons in RVN and the activities

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SECURITY STATUS OF THE VIETNAM RAILWAY SYSTEM AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1969



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FIGURE IX-16

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ENEMY ACTIVITIES, VNRS

	Zone I (I CTZ)	Zone II (II CTZ)	Zone III (III CTZ)	Zone V (II CTZ)	TOTAL
Bridge	5	*16	2	18	41
Track Sabotage	5	8	17	18	48
Attempted Sabotage	0	2	3	0	5
Train Mined	16	21	1	24	62
Attack	0	3	9	0	12
**Other	5	13	10	2	30
TOTAL:	31	63	42	62	98

* Seven bridges were sabotaged by the VC setting fire to the fuel pipeline located on the rail right-of-way between Phu Cat and Dieu Tri.

DAMAGES:

Locomotives - 53
Light - 28
Moderate - 11
Heavy - 14

Rolling Stock - 181
Light - 90
Moderate - 40
Heavy - 51

Bridges - 57
Light - 15
Moderate - 15
Heavy - 27

Rail Damaged - 849

Ties Damaged - 1797

FRIENDLY CASUALTIES:

MRS (ARVN)
KIA - 6
WIA - 77

VNRS
KIA - 2
WIA - 77

CIV
KIA - 33
WIA - 117

ENEMY CASUALTIES & LOSSES:

KIA - 21
WIA - 0
VCC - 2

Enemy Surrendered (Chieu Hoi) - 5

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TABLE IX-5

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All trains except those carrying only cement are accompanied by three armored cars carrying radios and heavily armed soldiers. In addition, 10 companies of regular Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops, supplemented by Regional Force companies and Popular Forces platoons, are permanently assigned to guard the tracks.

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AIR TERMINAL WORKLOAD

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
MAC												
CARGO (STON)												
RETROGRADE	8,298	7,559	9,254	9,526	9,792	9,360	8,720	8,505	7,844	7,331	7,628	6,083
NO. MAP	25,131	21,239	25,989	25,451	25,568	23,084	24,679	24,177	23,462	26,072	26,775	29,134
ACFT	12,905	13,128	13,957	12,783	12,604	12,303	12,075	11,539	11,406	11,154	11,344	12,493
MAP	16,919	15,141	15,295	15,044	15,236	14,002	13,316	13,800	13,132	12,904	12,600	12,082
STON MAP	57,347	55,774	62,156	59,577	60,586	48,414	50,015	53,538	57,934	61,440	65,764	73,153
CARGO MAP	42,983	42,393	44,303	37,987	39,514	35,244	36,192	39,904	35,098	32,245	31,902	30,960
MAP	56,084	49,168	51,367	49,840	49,474	44,654	42,323	41,863	38,639	37,013	35,268	34,101
NO. MAP	207,140	117,476	171,982	188,758	181,664	161,426	140,657	175,442	164,945	144,757	163,362	176,699
PASS MAP	208,362	190,236	222,901	236,059	221,726	222,408	244,095	233,906	208,425	218,736	212,644	222,091
MAP	286,557	248,184	280,046	269,231	273,029	266,898	279,709	271,512	229,646	226,376	228,431	216,376
EMERGENCY AIRLIFT												
TAC AIRLIFT	0	2	3	4	1	0	0	3	1	2	4	9
EMERGENCY RESUPPLY	0	8	3	10	11	10	2	21	14	6	6	0
COMBAT ESSENTIAL	51	115	90	87	86	66	73	120	96	86	125	107
TOTAL	51	125	96	101	98	76	75	144	111	94	135	116

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TABLE 13.6

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associated with emergency airlift. The latter increased significantly during February as the requirements rose with the level of combat.

(C) Retrograde cargo via MAC airlift also continued at a high rate throughout the quarter. (See Figure IX-17.) 128

(C) During the second quarter airlift operations continued at a slightly increased rate over the first quarter. The CSAS continued to move almost 100,000 STONs of passengers and cargo through May. In June there was a decline of approximately 10 percent as the number of C-130 aircraft available was dropped to a low of 55. There were no complaints from components following this reduction. The number of dedicated C-7A sorties increased during the first two months of the quarter as field commanders made increased use of this capability. As with the decline in CSAS operations, the use of C-7A dedicated aircraft also declined during June. 129

(C) On 7 Apr a proposal to restructure the CSAS passenger routes was presented by the 834th Air Div during a Joint Transportation Board (JTB) meeting at Hq MACV. Significant improvements that were expected to result from the restructuring included greater concentration of the C-130 aircraft on the long haul routes, initiation of scheduled daily service into many stations not previously served, improved interface between C-123 and C-130 aircraft schedules, and publication of a more informative schedule.

(U) The proposal was sanctioned by the Chairman of the JTB and a working committee was formed. The passenger routes were restructured on 5 May and new schedules were initiated. Since the new CSAS passenger schedule had an impact on the dedicated C-7A users they also prepared new schedules. 130

(C) In the third quarter there was a slight decline in total performance of CSAS reflecting the easing of requirements as the effects of troop redeployment became apparent. The total monthly tonnages dropped to 90,000 STONs in July and remained just under that level for the remainder of the quarter. This decline also was reflected in a decrease in air terminal workload. The revised passenger routes and new schedules initiated in the preceding quarter worked well and improved airlift for supported elements. 131

(C) Airlift operations continued at brisk pace during the fourth quarter as approximately 85,000 STONs of cargo and passengers were moved monthly. Emergency mission requests rose sharply in December as the year's high of 135 were flown by the 834th Air Div in support of friendly forces. This increase reflected the generally increased level of combat at several border CIDG-Special Forces camps. 132

Emergency Airlift

(U) The CSAS's emergency airlift procedures as implemented by the 834th Air Div were used with considerable success when the enemy attempted to overrun the Ben Het CIDG camp in late May. (See Chapter V, Ground Operations). Enemy activity intensified to the point where the CIDG camp was completely dependent upon aerial resupply. During this period of increased enemy activity C-7A aircraft were operating into Ben Het. By 1 Jun intense enemy mortar attacks and deteriorating runway conditions forced the suspension of air-landed operations. Air drops of ammunition and supplies began on 3 Jun and continued through 10 Jun with FAC and helicopter gunship support. However, the ground fire threat continued to increase. By 12 Jun the C-7As were experiencing intense ground fire in their runs over the drop zone. On 13 Jun, in

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
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MACV COMMON AIRLIFT SYSTEM (CSAS) PERFORMANCE



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FIGURE IX-17

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spite of TAC fighter and helicopter gunship support, two of four C-7As on the drop mission were hit; three crewmen were wounded. As the situation became more untenable, new procedures were employed to minimize the ground fire threat. These tactics included the use of TAC fighters to provide suppression fire, A-1E escort during the drop, close in-trail formation for the C-7A and a smoke screen laid down by A-1 aircraft. The airfield became insecure and all drops were made inside the camp. With this change in tactics, the C-7As sustained only one hit through the remainder of the operation. In summary, during the period 3 Jun-3 Jul, 98 airdrop sorties were flown in support of Ben Het CIDG camp, delivering over 200 tons of ammunition and supplies.

(U) In another situation involving increased enemy activity in northern III CTZ, the 834th Air Div responded to 62 emergency airlift requests in support of 1st Cav Div (Ambl) during August. This involved the deployment of equipment and troops into the Bu Dop/Song Be area. Of 268 sorties flown, 180 were flown by C-130 aircraft. While all unit moves were not conducted under emergency priorities, priority handling was afforded to ensure timely delivery and, to the maximum extent possible, to maintain unit integrity in accordance with the ground commander's plan.

(U) The 834th Air Div's CSAS also made a significant contribution to KEYSTONE EAGLE in airlifting some 5,000 troops from forward bases to the major air terminals involved. Over half of these KEYSTONE EAGLE troops were moved from Quang Tri to Danang.

(U) During the period 26 Jun-26 Aug a rather unique "unit move" was completed, the rotation of troops of the Royal Thai Armed Forces between Bangkok and RVN. This was the first time the entire rotation had been conducted by air, and the first time the 834th Air Div was involved in such a large scale "out of country" move. One hundred and sixty-seven C-130 sorties were flown, with the number of passengers evenly divided between inbound and outbound, however, outbound cargo tonnage was considerably higher than incoming.

CONSTRUCTION

General

(U) At the beginning of 1969 the \$1.7 billion military construction program was over 75 percent completed. The major elements of the program in RVN included:

1. Six deep water ports at Danang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Ro, Vung Tau, and Saigon with 27 deep draft berths providing a capacity of 600,000 STONs per month. (Saigon had been the only deep draft port prior to US involvement.) In addition, shallow draft facilities were provided at nine other ports to handle 800,000 STONs per month of coastal shipping. Mooring buoys and unloading facilities capable of discharging 1,250 MBBLS of POL daily were constructed at or near the various ports.

2. Eight jet-capable air bases with fifteen 10,000-foot concrete runway/taxiway systems and parking aprons (three existed prior to 1965.) In addition, there were some 83

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auxiliary logistical airfields capable of handling C-123 or C-130 type aircraft. The facilities supported over 5,750 aircraft of all types.

3. Medical facilities providing over 9,700 beds for US and FWMAF personnel.
4. Four major depot complexes at Danang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Long Binh. Each of these complexes supported a deep water port and two or more major air bases.
5. Maintenance and upgrading of 2,537 miles of RVN highways.

(U) Periodic six-month reviews were made of the US construction capabilities, workload, and requirements in RVN by the JCS and OSD. These reviews were performed to reduce unobligated backlogs, and to match funding with capabilities and requirements. Work remaining to be placed was divided between the contractor (\$260 million) and the military troops (\$149 million). While the contractor had the largest part of funds (64 percent) remaining, the troops actually had more projects to be completed since troop costs were largely unfunded by the MILCON program. The generally accepted ratios of MILCON costs between troop and contractor was 1:2.5 to 3. Total costs were estimated to be about equal.

(U) Contract construction in RVN was performed under the supervision of the Navy Facilities Engineering Command, through its field office in Saigon. Project directives were prepared and approved by MACV for submission to Office in Charge of Construction (OICC). The OICC prepared the design and assigned the work to contractors for construction. The bulk of the contract construction in RVN was accomplished by Raymond, Morrison, Knudsen-Brown, Root, and Jones (RMK-BRJ) operating under a cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contract. The RMK-BRJ work force at the first of 1969 consisted of about 25,000 personnel and was staffed and equipped to construct about \$22 million of MILCON work per month. The contractor required about \$100 million of usable backlog (projects designed, notices-to-proceed issued, and materials ordered or on hand) in order to operate efficiently. Hence, it was recognized at the time of the FY 70 budget reviews that either the FY 70 MILCON program for RVN would require phasing down or the RMK-BRJ contract would be terminated in CY 70.

(U) Some contract capability would probably be required in RVN as long as US Forces were employed there. Specifically, contractors performing dredging, electric power generation and distribution, and mechanical construction would be required. It appeared to be more economical to terminate the CPAF contractor and keep the specialty contractors because of the large overhead involved with RMK-BRJ. Local lump sum contractors had the capability of performing about \$1.5 million of work per month.

(U) At the beginning of the year the MILCON work remaining for troop accomplishment amounted to \$149 million broken out by service as follows:

	(\$ Million)			
	<u>Assigned Program</u>	<u>Work Completed</u>	<u>Work Remaining</u>	<u>Percent Completed</u>
Army	223.4	118.7	104.7	53.1
Navy	95.4	58.9	36.5	61.7
Air Force	18.4	10.4	8.0	56.5
Total	337.2	188.0	149.2	55.7 (Avg)

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(C) The military engineer work force and its assigned JCS capability for MILCON was as follows:

	<u>Program 6</u>	<u>Assigned MILCON Missions</u>	<u>Monthly Unit Capability</u>	<u>Total Monthly Capability</u>
Army				
Combat Bns <u>1, 2, 3/</u>	20	11	\$ 41,000	\$ 533,000
Construction Bns	14	13	\$183,000	\$2,379,000
Navy				
MCBs	10	10	\$150,000	\$1,500,000
Marine Corps				
Combat Bns <u>1/</u>	2	0	0	0
Force Bns	3	0	0	0
Air Force				
Red Horse Sqdns	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>\$ 80,000</u>	<u>\$ 400,000</u>
Total	54	39	\$454,000	\$4,812,000

1/ Divisional engineer battalions excluded since their work was entirely combat support.

2/ One construction battalion converted to land clearing to support combat operations.

3/ The 116th Army Engr Bn (Cbt), a reserve unit, departed RVN in September.

(U) The changing emphasis in the construction program is vividly reflected in the breakout of engineer troops by mission at the first of the year. As the following data indicate, 61 percent of the engineer troop effort was for operational support and non-MILCON base development.

	<u>Army Cbt</u>	<u>Army Const</u>	<u>Naval MCB</u>	<u>USAF CES</u>	<u>EMF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Operational Support <u>1/</u>	11	5	9	0	1	26
LOC <u>2/</u>	4	7	6	0	3	20
Base Dev (MILCON) <u>3/</u>	3	7	6	3	0	19
Base Dev (Non-MILCON) <u>4/</u>	4	7	6	14	4	35

NOTE: Percentages based on total effort of all US military engineer units, for period of 1 Jul 68 to 31 Dec 68.

1/ Operational Support - included maintenance and construction support provided in active or projected areas of operations to assist maneuver elements, combat support elements, or immediate supporting units. Effort included tactical bridging, assault airfields, land clearing, combat roads, etc.

2/ LOC - included work expended on LOCs such as national, interprovincial, and local highways and railroads. It excluded on-base roads and maintenance and construction of roads in direct support of tactical operations.

3/ MILCON Base Development - included all MILCON projects except for LOCs.

4/ Non-MILCON Base Development - included all projects built with other funds (O&M, procurement, AIC, etc.)

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(U) Most of the hard core logistical requirements (i. e., ports, airfields, and depots) were essentially completed in RVN at the beginning of 1969. Current projects reflected improvements to the existing bases and fluctuating requirements in conformance to tactical operations and the shifting of troop units. Remaining uncompleted and unfunded projects concerned primarily the LOCs and support of RVNAF accelerated I&M. The RVNAV construction requirements had been identified and analyzed by MACV. Some MILCON funding was required in RVN each year to meet expected contingency requirements and to provide for base structure adjustments. Funds to be provided, however, were to be limited to well-defined urgent requirements and matched with the construction capability in-country.

(U) In July the JCS advised CINCPAC and COMUSMACV that all future construction in RVN would be justified only on the basis of urgent operational requirements and critical requirements to support RVNAF I&M. The SECDEF's guidance limited new construction to the following:¹³³

1. Vietnamizing the war, to include RVNAF I&M and MACV advisor facilities.
2. Line of communications program.
3. Emergency facilities required for safety, health, security, or in-country redeployment of forces.
4. Necessary repair of battle damage.
5. Activities required to support redeployment of units.

Lines of Communication

(U) Land lines of communication (LOC) were in need of extensive restoration and improvement. Prior years of sabotage, lack of maintenance, and heavy wartime traffic had virtually destroyed the road and rail networks. Reconstruction of these natural assets was necessary to reduce heavy reliance on air and coastal shipping to support military operations, to improve internal security, and to assist in nation building. Prior to FY 68, the military construction program had concentrated on on-base roads and had largely ignored the railroads.

(U) The highway emphasis was placed on upgrading of approximately 4,100 km of national and interprovincial highways and city streets. This program covered minimum essential requirements to link population centers and military facilities. It did not include upgrading and new road construction required for support of combat operations in areas not served by the major road networks. Cost of this restoration was borne by a multiple funding program that included MILCON, O&MA, USAID/DOD, OPN, USAID, MAP, and GVN funds.

(U) Railroads had received increased attention during 1968. Forty-four percent (552 km) out of a total 1,240 km had been restored to an operational condition. At the end of 1969, 49 percent (611 km) were restored to an operational condition. Funding of the VNRS involved both GVN plaster funding and USAID/DOD support in commodities. The MILCON funding was limited to railway spurs connecting the VNRS with US military installations.

(U) The road program had been funded as shown in Table IX-7.

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ROAD FUNDING IN RVN 1/ (\$ Millions)

	<u>FY 67 & Prior</u>	<u>FY 68</u>	<u>FY 69</u>	<u>Total</u>
MILCON	26.5	29.8	31.1	87.4
O&MA	13.7	66.3	26.6	106.6
OPN	2.2	10.0	14.8	27.0
AID/DOD	25.5	21.3	28.3	75.1
USAID	0	10.0	3.8	13.8
MAP	<u>7.0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7.0</u>
TOTAL:	76.9	137.4	104.6	316.9

1/ DOD assumed responsibility for major repair and upgrading of key GVN roads on 1 July 66 since the GVN lacked the resources to fulfill this responsibility. Maintenance of the highways was a GVN responsibility.

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TABLE IX-7

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(C) As of the end of 1968, 805 km (19.7 percent) of highways had been restored to MACV standards. Another 800 km were under construction by a combination of troop-contractor effort. The goal called for completion of 906 km of roads so that by the end of the year, 42 percent of the road program would be completed. Final completion of the current road program was scheduled for the end of 1971.

(C) Seven classes of roads were being constructed under the program. Four-lane highways were to be built where traffic was heavy (over 6,000 vehicles per day). Lesser standards provided for traffic at various traffic densities as shown below.

LOC STANDARDS

<u>Class</u>	<u>Km</u>
A - 7m Roadway w/2.5m Shoulders	1,924
B - 6m Roadway w/2.5m Shoulders	252
C - 6m Roadway w/1.5m Shoulders	708
D - 4.5m Roadway w/1.5m Shoulders	48
E - 7m Roadway w/1.25m Shoulders	370
F - 7m Roadway w/0.5m Shoulders	755
Unclassified	49
Total	4,106

(U) Expansion of the road program to include secondary roads to province, district, and hamlet levels would add about 13,500 km of class C and D roads to the program. These roads were not considered or approved by MACV as part of the CENCOM Restoration Program but did receive increased attention in RVN as the major highways were completed.

1969 Highway Restoration and Upgrading

(U) There was generally good progress in highway restoration and upgrading during 1969 with 840 km completed to CENCOM standards. Enemy interdictions constituted a source of harassment particularly during the Tet period, but there was little significant effect on operations and repairs were completed rapidly.

(U) In the third quarter good progress continued in I, II, and III CTZs; however, torrential rains in the Delta precluded similar progress in IV CTZ. Enemy interdictions continued but had little significant effect on operations as engineer troops promptly restored damaged roads and bridges.

(U) Highway restoration and upgrading in the fourth quarter reflected the shift in the monsoonal flow over SEASIA. In II and IV CTZs the rains ended, permitting increased progress in construction while I and III CTZs experienced a slowdown as the result of seasonally heavy rainfall. (See Annex B, Weather in Southeast Asia for discussion of monsoonal patterns.) Enemy interdictions declined during the quarter, however, the rains in I and III CTZs caused considerable damage to roads and bridges.

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I CTZ

(U) During the first quarter, military engineer units and RMK-BRJ continued restoration and upgrading efforts along established priority highways in I CTZ. Crushed rock was issued in accordance with the III MAF priority listing. The shortage of crushed rock was less critical than in previous years.

(U) Enemy interdiction on roads and bridges was virtually nonexistent during the quarter except for the 10-day period from 23 Feb through 4 Mar. During that time, 32 bridges or culverts were damaged or destroyed. All of the I CTZ enemy activity occurred south of Danang and enemy efforts seemed to be concentrated on the Quang Ngai/Chu Lai areas. At no time was QL-1 closed to traffic for more than 12 hours because of interdictions in spite of enemy efforts.

(U) Bridge construction and restoration continued to show good progress during the quarter. Seabees were constructing a 609-meter, timber trestle Liberty Bridge on Route 540 to An Hoa which was completed in early April. Other bridges at Cam Lo and Lang Co also neared completion.

(U) Highway construction continued throughout the first quarter with major effort being given to QL-1 and QL-9.¹³⁴

(U) During the second quarter construction efforts made good progress in spite of continued enemy interdictions. There were 23 road and bridge interdictions during the period with 19 of the bridges either damaged or destroyed. Five of the closures required repairs in excess of 24 hours. The enemy's interdictions were heaviest between Chu Lai and Danang.

(U) In spite of the 23 interdictions during the quarter in I CTZ no major traffic delays or road closures resulted. On the positive side there were 21 bridges completed and turned over during the quarter. A significant measure of progress occurred when the street paving plan for Danang was completed. Construction was planned to begin in early October.¹³⁵

(U) During the third quarter military engineer units and contractor personnel continued restoration and upgrading efforts on QL 1, QL-9, seven highway bridges, and the 10 streets in the Danang City Street Program. Nineteen km from Song Tra Khuc (BS 643743) to Song Tra Bong, 8 km from the Cau Do Bridge to near the Thanh Quit Bridge, and three city streets were formally turned over to the GVN for maintenance. Two additional highlights of the quarter were the turnover to the GVN of the Hue-Danang segment of QL-1 and the Tra Prong River bridge on 26 Jul. There were one road and seven bridge interdictions during the quarter; none of the interdictions closed routes for any appreciable period of time.¹³⁶

(U) Military engineer units and contractor personnel continued restoration and upgrading efforts on QL-1, QL-9, five highway bridges, and seven streets in Danang during the fourth quarter. Six km through the Nam O Village, 30 km from the I/II CTZ border north of Duc Pho, 152 km from Dong Ha south to the Kim Lien Bridge, 41 km from Dong Ha west to Ca Lu, and the seven streets in Danang were turned over to GVN for maintenance. A total of 229 km of CENCOM highways was turned over during the quarter. There was only one enemy interdiction during the period. However, torrential rains and high water in October washed out one bridge, inundated and closed three bridges for three, four, and 13 days respectively. The rains also closed two sections of highway for four days. In late November additional rainfall closed one bridge for four days and one section of highway for 11 days.¹³⁷

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II CTZ

(U) Steady progress on the restoration and upgrading of national highways throughout the II CTZ was made by both the 18th Engr Bde and RMK-BRJ. A significant highlight during the period was the increased effort of ARVN engineer units in major/minor repair of CENCOM roads. These units made considerable progress in upgrading of QL-20. There were 23 enemy interdictions during the first quarter; however, none of these were of major significance. Repairs were completed rapidly in most instances. 138

(U) In the second quarter, upgrading and restoration efforts on national and interprovincial roads in the Coastal District continued. This work progressed satisfactorily with generally favorable weather conditions. Upgrading on roads in the Highland areas showed little progress, however, due to the rainy season and poor construction conditions. The 589th Engr Bn began subgrade construction on a 30-km section of QL-1 from Xom Moi north toward Phan Rang. Security was provided to crews conducting field work along various roads in II CTZ after being coordinated with IFFORCEV, province chiefs, and detachment commanders through predeployment conferences. The majority of the LOC field survey was completed in II CTZ with the exception of a portion of QL-20 (Dalat to Bao Loc) and QL-14 (Ban Me Thuot to Gia Nghia).

(U) Nineteen km of completed highway on QL-1 from Bong Son to the Binh Dinh Province boundary were turned over to GVN during the third quarter. There was also good progress made to bridge construction in the Coastal District.

(U) There were four interdictions resulting from enemy activity on the highways of II CTZ during the third quarter. Repairs and bypasses were quickly effected and little traffic delay was encountered. In the highlands several bridges and bypasses were destroyed as a result of overloading and washouts caused by heavy rains in the later part of the period. Near the end of the quarter, rains and flooding caused washouts of numerous culverts on QL-1 and LTL-8B in the vicinity of Phan Thiet. Slides and washouts also seriously interfered with traffic in the Cu Mong Pass area, south of Qui Nhon. Work was initiated by the 18th Engr Bde to repair this area, and repair work was in progress at the period's end. 139

(U) During the fourth quarter the 18th Engr Bde and RMK-BRJ continued upgrading and restoration efforts on national and interprovincial roads in the Coastal District while work was resumed in the Highland District as weather conditions improved. Inclement weather continued in the Coastal District retarding construction there. In spite of the weather, work began on restoration of Nha Trang streets. The Cai River bridge on QL-1 at Dien Khanh, a second bridge on QL-1 at Qui Nhon, 17.47 km of QL-1 from Phan Rang to Ba Rau, and Gia Long Street in Nha Trang were turned over to GVN for maintenance during the quarter. Work continued along QL-1, QL-11, QL-14, QL-19, QL-20, and QL-21 in spite of the poor weather. Interdictions during the quarter were mainly the results of heavy rainfall in the Coastal District. Bridges and bypasses were washed out due to flood waters and some sections of road became impassable due to land slides. One bridge was destroyed by enemy action and one was damaged when overloaded. In all cases repair action was quickly undertaken to prevent undue interruption of traffic. 140

III CTZ

(U) There was considerable progress both in Saigon and in the provinces during the first quarter. Five km of Saigon streets were completed bringing the overall restoration program

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to 48 percent completion; all work was accomplished by contractor forces. Improvement work on QL-1, QL-1A and QL-4 also progressed well.

(U) There were relatively few interdictions by the enemy. Of those that did occur, the majority took place during the post-Tet period and were generally concentrated in three areas: QL-1 and QL-22 north of Trang Bang, QL-4 near Cai Lay, and QL-5 between Bearcat and Ba Ria.¹⁴¹

(U) During the second quarter, the Vietnamese road maintenance effort was greatly expanded as work crews began to perform road maintenance on QL-1, QL-4, QL-13, QL-14, and QL-15. Four thousand tons of hot and cold mixed asphaltic concrete, 8,500 tons of aggregate in assorted sizes, and 750 tons of asphaltic tars and cutback were made available to selected province engineers. In addition, the first major road restoration project within the district to be let to an RVN contractor occurred during the quarter.

(U) The total number of interdictions experienced throughout III CTZ was minor; however, there was one that was significant. The Phu Long Bridge located near the town of Lai Thieu on the North Saigon Bypass was blown on 12 May. The damage consisted of the destruction of one 30-meter span of Eiffel bridging. A float bridge was emplaced by ARVN engineers within 72 hours and permanent repairs were to be accomplished by a contract with OICC.

(U) Also during the second quarter, 10 more Saigon city street projects were started, comprising 9.6 km were completed during the quarter. The total program was then 80 percent complete, with 99 km paved. All work was accomplished by the CPAF contractor. The work involved base preparation and paving on some streets, while on others only an overlay was required.

(U) During the quarter, greatly improved Vietnamese/US coordination for restoration of Saigon city streets was provided by the formation of a committee chaired by the Deputy Director General of Highways from the Ministry of Public Works. As a result of the committee, traffic interferences were reduced, right-of-way clearances were more effectively provided, and job accidents were reduced.¹⁴²

(U) Considerable progress was made on QL-1 (to the II/III CTZ border), QL-4, QL-13, and QL-20 during the third quarter. Another 4.56 km of Saigon city streets and the North Saigon bypass were completed. The Newport Bridge was repaired and reopened to traffic on 22 Sep after an entire 81-meter span was replaced ahead of schedule. Bridge security lighting projects were also completed on 28 of 29 projects.

(U) The total number of interdictions experienced throughout the Saigon District during the third quarter were very minor except for one significant incident. The Rach Hao Bridge located 3 km south of the town of Phuoc Le on QL-15 was blown on 3 Aug. The damage consisted of a 40-meter section being destroyed. A float bridge was emplaced by Australian engineers assisted by the 100th Float Bridge Company. Permanent repairs by the Australian engineers were underway as the quarter ended.¹⁴³

(U) In the fourth quarter military engineers and civilian contractors continued restoration and upgrading of roads and bridges with major effort along QL-1, QL-4, QL-13, QL-15, QL-20, QL-22, and Saigon city streets. The latter program was 95 percent complete at the end of the

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year. The Saigon to Cu Chi segment of QL-1 was completed in Hau Nghia Province with work nearing completion in Gia Dinh Province. Only minor interdictions occurred during the quarter. The most significant was the bridge across the Ca Hon Canal on TL-24 which was blown on 7 Nov. It was repaired by Ministry of Public Works forces and reopened to traffic within 26 hours following the attack. ¹⁴⁴

IV CTZ

(U) At the beginning of 1969 construction was hampered by significantly increased interdiction and lack of security at construction sites. Six days were lost in January by the contractors on restoration of QL-4 between My Tho and My Thuan due to lack of security. Elsewhere in IV CTZ during the first quarter, progress was made in the restoration of QL-4 by the 35th, 36th, and 69th Engr Bns and the 40th ARVN Engr Gp (Cbt). The ARVN unit also completed a Class 35/50 bridge at Phung Hiep.

(U) The construction of off-loading sites under the Delta Transportation Plan continued. Bac Lieu was completed on 10 Mar and Rach Gia was scheduled for completion in April. These sites were constructed by the 40th ARVN Engr Gp (Cbt).

(U) During the quarter a total of 250,000 STONs of rock was moved by the Delta Rock Agency. This was a significant improvement over previous quarters, primarily due to the receipt of additional shipping, i.e., barges and tugs. The rock forecast level was attained for the first time during January, with February and March falling slightly behind the scheduled amount. The requirements for rock in the Delta increased tremendously during the period and requirements were in excess of 250,000 STONs per month with the largest amounts required for the construction of QL-4 from My Tho to Soc Trang. This requirement limited the amounts of rock that could be delivered to the smaller sites throughout the Delta. ¹⁴⁵

(U) During the second quarter security along highways improved and this permitted considerable progress in restoration of roads. Major effort was given to work along QL-4. The Binh Thuy Bridge and LTL-27 between Can Tho and Tra Noc were accepted from the contractor by the Southern District Engineer.

(U) Work under the Delta Transportation Plan also progressed with 370,000 STONs of rock moved by the Delta Rock Agency, an increase of over 100,000 STONs over the first quarter.

(U) Enemy interdiction declined during the second quarter though infrequent sniper fire was received by work crews and some contractor equipment was damaged by enemy fire on 15 Jun at an equipment park on QL-4 between My Tho and My Thuan. ¹⁴⁶

(U) In the third quarter major progress was constrained by heavy rains which resulted in as much as 2-1/2 days being lost weekly at some sites. On QL-4 particularly, efforts were slowed by the monsoonal rains as well as deadlined construction equipment. The ARVN engineers completed construction of a ferry terminal at the Binh Minh side of the Hau Giang River at Can Tho. On 7 Sep the 35th Engr Bn completed repair of 22.5 kms of pavement between Can Tho and Soc Trang. Two bridges also were completed on QL-4 during the quarter -- a 30-meter span by 35th Engr Bn and the second of 26 meters by ARVN engineer troops.

(U) Interdictions increased significantly during the quarter. Extensive mining incidents were experienced on 12 Aug. Three bridges on CENCOM roads were blown. There were also

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three major interruptions of traffic on these roads which were not due to enemy action. Two bridges collapsed from overloading by vehicular traffic and the Can Tho ferry landing was temporarily lost when it pulled off its footing. By the end of the quarter, the Can Tho ferry landing was replaced and all damaged bridges were repaired or temporary bypasses installed.¹⁴⁷

(U) In the fourth quarter military engineers made considerable progress along QL-4 as good weather permitted a speed up in work. Also, RMK began construction of ferry terminals on the Cai Von and Can Tho sides of the Hau Giang River. Four bridges were completed during the period and work continued on six others. The lesser road program was just short of 1969 goals with 73.6 of the programmed 79.5 km completed.

(U) During the quarter the Delta Rock Agency moved 510,576 STONs of rock. There was continued difficulty with rock pilferage. Surveillance by Maritime Police and armed guards riding "shotgun" on barges appeared to diminish losses in transit; however, thefts at loading sites and construction areas were a significant problem.¹⁴⁸

Railroad Construction and Restoration

(U) During the first six months construction continued throughout the CTZs on railroad spurs to facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, Tan My, Phu Cat, Phan Rang, Saigon, Nha Trang, and Danang. Work progress among the projects varied from design stage to impending completion.

(U) The restoration of railroad lines was impeded by security considerations during the first six months of 1969. In spite of enemy interdiction, work began on 2 May to restore the segment between Hue and Dong Ha. The VNRS began rebuilding the An Hoa bridge 2 km north of Hue and US Seabees were assigned the tasks of rebuilding the Song Bo and Hien Si bridges 15 km north of Hue. Restoration of the entire line was expected to be completed by the end of the year. At midyear no other sections of railroad had been restored though regular passenger service was resumed from Saigon to Thu Duc and Long Binh.¹⁴⁹

(U) In the third quarter restoration of the 68-km segment between Hue and Dong Ha in northern I CTZ continued basically on schedule; however, a shortage of manpower for the VNRS and heavy rains slowed progress during the latter part of the quarter. At the close of the period, the VNRS had restored 5 km of rail from Hue north, including the restoration of the An Hoa bridge just north of Hue. Meanwhile US Seabees continued work on the restoration of the Song Bo bridge, 15 km north of Hue. By the end of the quarter the Seabees reported the bridge 42 percent restored with 1 Nov as the estimated date of completion.

(U) In II CTZ restoration of a 43-km segment of the Dalat spur, from Thap Cham to Song Pha, also was completed. No other restoration was started except for repair of previously restored segments that were damaged as a result of a significant number of sabotage incidents. There were no rail restoration activities in III CTZ during this third quarter. Because of security considerations, the planned restoration of the segment between Xuan Loc and the II/III CTZ border during 1969 was deferred until 1970.

(U) There was progress in construction of rail spurs to US facilities during the third quarter. Significant completions included spurs at Danang and Newport while work progressed at Phu Bai and Camp Haskins (vic Danang) in spite of heavy rains.¹⁵⁰

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(U) Restoration of the 68-km segment between Hue and Dong Ha in northern I CTZ continued behind schedule in the fourth quarter. A shortage of manpower for the VNRS, heavy rains, and a lack of suitable construction equipment slowed progress. At the end of the year, the VNRS had restored 14 km of rail from Hue northward. Additionally, Seabees restored the Song Bo Bridge (15 km north of Hue) on 31 Oct. In II CTZ there was no restoration completed except for segments damaged by land slides. The latter were caused by RMK blasting operations on nearby sections of QL-1. Because of poor security, no additional opening of the railroad in II CTZ was expected until mid-1970. In III CTZ no progress was made in restoration, again because of security conditions. The plan to restore the segment from II/III CTZ border to Xuan Loc was deferred until 1970. 151

Seabee Construction

(C) The 1969 current objectives of 3d MCB were to maintain and upgrade LOCs as directed and to provide construction for FWMAF as tasked. The upgrading of the RVN highway system was of prime importance. In January the upgrade of highways in I CTZ was in full operation. A major portion of the Seabee hauling capability was being used to stockpile both crushed rock and asphalt aggregate. Over 42,000 tons of crushed rock was made available in January. Primary emphasis was placed upon upgrading the roadway base in preparation for subsequent asphalted paving. The convoy route in Hue stood at 80 percent complete at month's end. Within the month, the 176,000-cubic foot refrigerated storage facility at NSA, Danang was completed, as was the remainder of 79 Butler buildings which provided 316,00 square feet of covered storage. The operations center for the 366th TFW was completed 25 Jan. Major construction also was underway at the An Hoa Combat Base where ammo berms, fuel storage areas, and a 500-man mess hall were being built. The January naval construction forces work load backlog averaged 24 months in the vertical area and 30 in the horizontal area. All MILCON-funded projects were undergoing validation with the expectation of some drop in the backlog as projects were cancelled. 152

(C) In February the construction at An Hoa was completed and while upgrading of roadway bases continued to get primary emphasis, concrete paving operations were in progress in several areas of I CTZ. Increased Seabee efforts were required in IV CTZ when several details from I CTZ battalions were tasked for projects at Vung Tau, An Thoi, and support for GIANT SLING-SHOT. The average workload backlog dropped dramatically in February as a result of COMNAVFORV recommended cancellations and deferrals of various projects. The backlog was 13 months for vertical and 20 months of horizontal work. 153

(C) The highlight in March was the opening of the 825-foot long Liberty Bridge over the Thu Bon River near Hoi An. Despite increased enemy action, including a ground assault against construction forces, the bridge was opened two days ahead of schedule. 154

(C) Several major projects of vertical construction were completed in April. The projects, some of which had been under construction several months, had a combined area in excess of 40,000 square feet and included: the FLC Data Processing Center Danang, the air freight/passenger terminal at Chu Lai, and five hangars at Quang Tri. The 170-foot Nong River railroad bridge, which had been destroyed by enemy action on 14 Mar, was rebuilt by crews working around the clock and opened 7 Apr. A major effort also completed in April was airfield dust suppression at Quang Tri where ingestion of wind-blown sand and dust had caused severe

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helicopter engine wear problems. Corrective action consisted of placing 44 acres of soil cement or crushed rock and 20 acres of hydromulch or peneprime on areas adjacent to the runway and parking aprons. The ASP No 1 explosion in Danang in April required a major shift of Seabee manpower to the recover/repair effort there. Major damage occurred at Camps Monohan and Hoover, as well as the 3d MP Bn compound and brig. ¹⁵⁵

(C) The recover/repair work at Danang continued in May with an outlay of 12,500-man days as Camp Monohan repairs were completed and the repair of Camp Hoover and the 3d MP Bn nearly restored. Restoration of the Freedom Hill PX/Recreation complex tasked an additional 15,000-man days to the recovery efforts at Danang on the part of Seabees. Road upgrading moved at a fast pace on QL-1 and QL-9 as total paving for the year stretched over 52 miles as the upgrading continued to be of primary importance. At Quang Tri, new medical facilities including six controlled environment patient wards, 1,000 feet of 12-foot high Armco revetment, and a patient recreation building were completed in May. ¹⁵⁶

(C) The rebuilding of Camp Hoover (148 structures) and the 3d MP Bn compound and brig (166 structures), destroyed on 27 Apr, were completed as reconstruction of the Freedom Hill PX/Recreation complex continued. Enemy harassment continued as five of the camps were mortared during the month; daylight attacks were mostly sporadic small arms fire and road mines directed against road crews. The most serious attack in June was lodged against the Phu Loc Quarry which received 95 mortar rounds resulting in 17 WIA and widespread minor damage. Paving of QL-1 was extended 18 miles north of Hue and 42 miles south by midyear. ¹⁵⁷

(C) Construction of a 537-foot, 6-span bridge on QL-1 at Dong Ha began in July. The effort would require 8,500 man days and was scheduled for completion in early December. Upon the completion of the Freedom Hill PX/Recreation complex, the Seabees were assigned the further task of restoration of ASP No 1 include earth berms, ammunition magazines, roads, and an electrical distribution system. The work backlog for Seabee forces was lowered to 6.1 months each in vertical and horizontal construction. ¹⁵⁸

(C) At Dong Ha, work on the electrical distribution system, underway since May, was resumed in August after approval of reprogramming action to increase both scope and funding. The MILCON project was increased from 25,000 linear feet to 35,400 linear feet. A high priority project was the construction of a by-pass ferry for Hue. This construction would include two ferry ramps with access roads, security towers, fencing, and lighting. A near two month lull in enemy activity was broken 11 Aug with a coordinated "offensive" throughout I CTZ. The attacks were nearly all indirect fire (mortars and rockets); however, one ground attack was launched against an isolated Seabee base south of Danang. US losses were 1 KIA and 11 WIA. ¹⁵⁹

(C) On 1 Sep the Hue highway bridge was opened to two way traffic. Also work began on 152 aircraft shelters in Danang and Chu Lai as Seabee teams started construction projects in III and IV CTZ in support of the ACTOV program. In the quarter ending 30 Sep, over \$7.9 million of work in place was accomplished by Seabees. ¹⁶⁰

(C) October saw the completion of the project to build 16 UH-1 hangars for the US Army at Camp Evans, Phu Bai, and Camp Eagle. The 11,520 square foot wood frame hangars were incrementally turned over to XXIV Corps units as completed. Beneficial occupancy was taken of the 200-bed hospital built for the 1st Med Bn. The multi-structure complex, consisting of medical, dental, and support facilities, was begun in June. The road upgrade program continued to be a high priority project and was on schedule as 3 miles of first lift and 2 miles of second lift paving were completed in October. ¹⁶¹

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(C) Enemy activity was light in November and caused no personnel casualties. The Dong Ha electrical distribution system was completed on 15 Nov as scheduled while the Dong Ha highway bridge opened the same day, nearly three weeks ahead of schedule. The ASP No 1 at Danang, though not complete, was usable and was occupied by the Fleet Logistic Center. In III and IV CTZ, work at seven locations was underway. An ATSB at Rach Soi was completed; VNN bases at An Thoi, Nam Can City, and Ha Tien also were under construction. 162

(C) Prior to 15 Dec, five of the 10 NMCB units were redeployed as part of Phase II redeployment. The road upgrade program continued to show progress with a major effort required to repair monsoon-damaged roads. The Hue ferry project was 95 percent complete at year's end with ramps usably complete. Enemy activity was light and for the second straight month resulted in no Seabee casualties. The programmed work backlog based on planned employment of five battalions was at the low for the year. The backlogs were 3.6 weeks of horizontal and 4.8 of vertical work. 163

Organization of Land Clearing Companies

(C) Six land clearing companies were organized by USARV during the first quarter. The companies were designed to perform accelerated clearing of heavily forested jungle areas in support of combat and logistical operations. Each company was given the capability of stripping 250 acres per day under average conditions, providing earth moving support for divisional engineer battalions, and clearing fields of fire. Each company consisted of a headquarters (20 men), a maintenance section (30 men), and three 23-man clearing platoons. Major equipment included 30 tractors with Rome plows, ten 10-ton truck tractors with trailers, four tracked cargo carriers, nine disc harrows, two fuel trucks, a 5-ton wrecker and three maintenance shop trucks. The companies were deployed: one to I CTZ, two to II CTZ, and three to III CTZ. 164

Base Development

Covered Aircraft Shelters

(C) Air Force Red Horse construction units and OICC's contractor continued the erection and hardening of shelters at five AF bases. All shelter erection was done by the Red Horse units. The OICC contractor placed concrete shelter covers at the three bases where he was mobilized: Danang, Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut. Limited dispersal aprons also were under construction at Tan Son Nhut by contract and at Phan Rang by Red Horse engineers. As of the end of the second quarter, 331 shelters were erected and 243 covered.

(C) The Navy aircraft shelter program in I CTZ also made significant progress and the 68,000-square yard dispersal apron at Danang was completed in June. 165

1. Air Force Program. The Red Horse units completed the erection of shelters at six air bases during 1969. Extensive apron construction and revetment relocation as well as limited dispersal aprons at Tan Son Nhut and Phan Rang were also completed. As of the end of the year 392 shelters had been erected and 377 covered. The original program was 408 units

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Rome Plows of one of the land clearing companies clear vegetation away from a fire support base

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4. Movable equipment was "personal property of a movable nature which had been fixed in place, or attached to real property, but which could be severed or removed from buildings without destroying the usefulness of the buildings." Examples of movable equipment were machine tools, production machinery, training equipment, test equipment, vats, welding equipment, and window air conditioners.

(U) The authority to approve the transfer of real and related property was delegated to components except for the following types which required COMUSMACV approval.

1. All transfers having operational significance.
2. Transfers to the RVNAF or to another GVN agency.
3. Transfers to a US non-DOD agency in RVN.
4. Transfers to FWMAF.

5. Transfers of communications-electronics facilities or of any property that affect such facilities, including TOE or TA equipment tactically interfaced with the integrated telecommunication system.

(U) In prescribing priorities for disposal of excess real and related property, COMUSMACV clearly reflected the urgency and importance of Vietnamization. The following requirements were to be satisfied in priority:

1. US forces in RVN.
2. RVNAF improvement and modernization.
3. FWMAF in RVN.
4. Owing US service outside of RVN.
5. Other US service and MAP outside of RVN.
6. US non-DOD agency and other GVN agencies.

(U) It was recognized that the priorities could not be rigidly applied in detail in every case. The location and condition of the property, the needs of all possible recipients, and the necessities of relocation had to be considered. Conflicting requirements of equal priority were referred to COMUSMACV for resolution. Real property not needed to fill a requirement was released to the RVNAF or to the owner if the land was not obtained through the RVNAF. Related property not needed to fill a requirement was disposed of through the property disposal officer.

(U) In general, items designated as critical by higher headquarters or service departments or which were of high value and in short supply were not transferred to non-DOD agencies or to the GVN unless they were critical to achieving a high priority goal in the RVNAF improvement and modernization program. Conflicts of priorities were referred to COMUSMACV for resolution.

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(U) Facilities and equipment were transferred in usable condition, but rehabilitation beyond that required for usability was not accomplished. Property other than land and structures was not transferred to the GVN unless a definite need was verified and the ability to operate and maintain the property was in being or could be attained with reasonable effort. When sophisticated equipment essential to the use of facilities was removed, appropriate substitutions were made prior to the transfer from resources available to the GVN or from resources of the owning component if substitutes were not available to the GVN, e.g., low voltage generators for high voltage generators.

(U) Although the transfer of entire installations to the RVNAF was preferred, provisions were made for collocation of RVNAF and US forces where appropriate. When installations or facilities were to be transferred to the RVNAF, the component being relieved ensured continuity of operation and maintenance responsibility and that RVNAF personnel received adequate training in the operation and maintenance of associated equipment and systems. To the extent possible, this training was accomplished within the RVNAF training system. In expedient cases, on-the-job training under supervision of US military personnel or the operating and maintenance contractor was permitted.

(U) Advisors actively assisted RVNAF elements in planning long-term utilization of property to be transferred to them. Planning included fund and personnel programming to support operational and maintenance requirements. Meanwhile, unit commanders and installation coordinators ensured that facilities being vacated by US forces were not vandalized. Damages resulting from misconduct were repaired, and installed equipment removed without authorization was replaced prior to clearance of the departing unit.

(U) Excess buildings of intermediate or higher standard at any US installation were not moved from the installation except as specifically approved by COMUSMACV. For real property transfers between US components, equipment attached to and made part of buildings and structures and items of movable equipment that improved the habitability of buildings and structures, such as air conditioners, were not removed or altered.

(U) For real property transfers outside of US forces, equipment attached to or made a part of buildings and structures was not removed or altered except as follows:

1. High voltage power generation and distribution systems were removed and replaced with low voltage systems of adequate capacity using GVN or US resources, unless long term usage was planned, or low voltage equipment was not available. In these two cases, RVNAF was to have, or be assisted by the transferring service to develop, the capability to operate and maintain the high voltage system.
2. Low voltage power generation equipment providing capacity in excess of projected requirements of the transferees was recovered.
3. Water purification equipment was recovered when no US personnel were to be served by it, if recovery was economical.
4. Air conditioning and refrigeration equipment other than that essential to critical facilities, such as hospital operating rooms and facilities, were recovered.

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5. Recoverable components of ice plants were recovered unless specific requests for transfer of the plants were approved by COMUSMACV.

6. All other items of movable equipment were recovered if they did not fill an approved RVNAF requirement and if recovery was economical.

(U) Tactical bridging, if replaced, was recovered and returned to stocks or transferred to the property disposal officer if not economically repairable. Steel airfield matting was left in place on fields for which there was no further operational requirement. Aluminum airfield matting was recovered and returned to stock, consistent with operational requirements and the economics of recovery.

(U) Revetments constructed for the protection of personnel and structures were usually left in place. The K-wall and other high dollar value recoverable revetment materials were recovered to the extent that they would be excess to the in-place needs of the unit taking over the area. POJ storage and distribution equipment and systems which had been erected or installed and had become excess to US needs, were transferred in place to the RVNAF or to other agencies if there was an approved program requirement for them.

(U) In specific cases, operational and logistical consideration warranted exceptions to the policies described but exceptions required COMUSMACV approval.¹⁶⁷

(U) By the end of the year considerable progress had been made in transfer of excess real and related property to RVNAF. The most significant was the transfer of Dong Tam facilities of the 9th Inf Div to the 7th ARVN Div which was completed on 31 Aug. The transfer, being the first of any magnitude was not without problems many of which served to highlight measures which could prevent recurrence in future transfers. Other transfers, all of which were completed without major difficulty were the BLACKHORSE Base Camp from the 11th Armd Cav Regt to the 18th ARVN Div on 24 Oct; Quang Tri Base Camp from 3d Mar Div to 1st Bde, 5th Div (Mech) on 25 Nov; Dong Ha Combat Base from 3d Mar Div to 1st ARVN Div on 4 Dec; and Camp COPPERHEAD (Tan Son Nhut) from 3d Bde, 82d Abn Div to GVN on 31 Dec. Several smaller facilities were also transferred by the end of the year.

(C) On 2 Dec, the Chief of Staff, JGS directed RVNAF participation in CTZ-level combined US-VN committees to plan for and implement facility transfers. The combined committees followed the organization and concept of operations of the JGS-MACV combined committee. The directive established VN participation in each CTZ to include representation by the G3, G4, affected division (beneficiary unit) regional security element, and the Military Property Construction Office in the area.¹⁶⁸

End of Year Status

(U) Although a great deal of construction had been completed by the end of 1969 much yet remained to be accomplished. Table IX-8 depicts the overall fund status of the Military Construction Appropriation on 31 Dec 69. Of the total \$1.717 billion, \$1.673 billion was committed and \$1.650 billion had been obligated. Further, of the total program, \$1.507 billion of the facilities had been physically constructed as of the end of the year.

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RVN CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM SUMMARY
(\$ MILLIONS)
(31 Dec 69)

	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>AIR FORCE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
FY65MCP PL88/390	13.4	9.4	16.0	38.8
FY65SUP PL89/18	36.1	17.4	21.4	74.9
FY66MCP PL89/188	29.1	30.3	13.5	72.9
FY66ADD PL89/213	36.0	32.9	39.2	108.1
FY66SUP PL89/374	353.4	177.6	148.4	679.4
FY67SUP PL90/8	217.5	76.1	100.2	393.8
FY68REG PL90/110	72.4	31.9	27.0	131.3
FY68SUP	16.4	8.7	15.3	40.4
FY69REG	42.3	23.0		65.3
MILCON TOTAL	816.6	407.3	381.0	1604.9
MAP TRANSFERS	70.8	11.4	29.8	112.0
TOTAL FUNDED	887.4	418.7	410.8	1716.9

	<u>TOTAL FUNDS</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE COMMITMENTS</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE OBLIGATIONS</u>	<u>CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS</u>
ARMY	887.4	848.1	828.4	713.2
NAVY	418.7	418.4	415.9	360.2
AIR FORCE	<u>410.8</u>	<u>406.7</u>	<u>406.1</u>	<u>381.9</u>
TOTAL	1,716.9	1,674.2	1,650.4	1,455.3

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TABLE IX-7

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(S) The distribution of engineer troop effort by percent at the end of the year was as follows: 170

	Engineer Units				
	Army Combat	Army Const	NMCB	USAF	FMF
Operational Support	60	36	11	0	8
LOC (MILCON)	2	10	0	0	0
LOC (Non-MILCON)	18	31	39	0	31
Base Development (MILCON)	10	15	28	34	0
Base Development (Non-MILCON)	10	8	22	66	61

MEDICAL

General

(U) Reflecting the improvements and adjustments in deployment of medical support activities accomplished during the preceding year, the components' facilities and procedures were at a high state of efficiency to support combat operations at the beginning of 1969. (See 1968 MACV Command History, Vol II, pp. 701-6). There was a highly coordinated organization for medical support. Tasking of the components provided an optimum mix of activities, resulting in definitive medical support the efficacy of which continued to be reflected in the declining mortality rates and a low level of evacuations. Progress also had been made in upgrading and modernizing RVNAF capabilities, these efforts taking the form of Phase II of the long term plan for the development of an indigenous medical service. There was progress in preventive medicine activities also and they were being implemented with increasingly favorable results. Throughout the period there was continuing close coordination and liaison among surgeons and medical facilities of HQ MACV, USAID, components, and RVN.

(U) The MACV Command Surgeon assumed the responsibility for military medical material for all FWMAFs in RVN on 15 May. The Medical Material Advisory Division for RVNAF was transferred to the Office of the Command Surgeon, MACV at that time. The Supply Division was established as a separate entity under the Surgeon to carry out this changed mission. Medical Supply Advisors for ARVN moved from the control of the Area Logistics Command Advisory teams to the Corps Medical Group advisory teams.

Medical Support Operations

(U) During 1968 the number of hospitalizations and evacuations had averaged just over 18,000 monthly with 6,000 of these patients being battle casualties. Of the total number a monthly average of slightly over 5,000 were evacuated out of country to off-shore or CONUS

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hospitals. The number of malaria cases had averaged 1,201 monthly reflecting the efficacy of the command's malaria prophylaxis program. (See 1968 MACV Command History, pp. 699-706, for further details of 1968 activities.)

(U) During the first two months of 1969 the number of admissions remained well under the previous year's average. See Figure IX- 18. Malaria incidence also was down. In March the increased level of combat was reflected in medical support activities as admissions exceeded 1968 averages for both injuries received as a result of hostile action (IRHA) and nonbattle injuries-disease (NBI-D) categories were up significantly, resulting in over 6,000 evacuations to off-shore and CONUS hospitals. 171

(C) The rising trend of March continued through the entire second quarter, peaking in May when there were over 20,000 admissions and over 6,000 evacuations to out-of-country hospitals. Malaria incidence also peaked in May with 1,348 cases reflecting the onset of monsoonal weather and intensified operations. 172

(U) There were nine repatriated PWs evacuated to CONUS during the first six months. In each case instructions directing the evacuation emanated from the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office in Washington, D. C. 173

(U) A refinement in processing patients occurred through the establishment of an I CTZ Joint Medical Regulating Office at the 67th Med Gp by the III MAF Surgeon. This resulted in a more even distribution of patients to hospital facilities in I CTZ and to off-shore facilities. Further, it afforded pre-regulation (up to 48 hours before departure) of all patients evacuated to off-shore facilities. 174

(U) At midyear there were slightly over 8,000 operating beds available for support of US and FWMAF in RVN. This figure, an increase of over 2,000 since June of 1968, included the beds on the two hospital ships USS Repose and USS Sanctuary. Significant organizational changes included: 175

1. Establishment of the 2d Surgical Hospital at Lai Khe on 10 Jan to provide more responsive support of tactical operations in western III CTZ.
2. Inactivation of the 7th Surgical Hospital at Long Giao on 15 Mar due to a continued low workload.
3. Relocation of the 91st Evacuation Hospital from Phu Hiep to Chu Lai in June in order to improve the medical support posture in I CTZ.
4. Increase of 100 operating beds at the hospital at NSA, Danang. This increase was made to provide additional space for malaria patients.

(U) In the third quarter admissions dropped dramatically reflecting the commencement of troop redeployments and a generally reduced level of combat. Malaria incidence also declined in July and August but increased to 1,240 cases in September. The increase in malaria incidence was concentrated in two divisions - 500 cases in the 3d Mar Div and 200 in the 1st Cav (Ambl). Further analysis revealed that 85 percent of the cases were in combat units while 5 percent occurred in support type units. 176

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
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HOSPITALIZATION / EVACUATION



■ BATTLE ▨ NON-BATTLE/DISEASE

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FIGURE IX-18

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(U) Also in the third quarter other effects of troop redeployments appeared as all actions incident to Phase I units were completed by the end of August. On 15 Jul the 91st Evac Hospital was moved from Tuy Hoa (II CTZ) to Chu Lai (I CTZ) to replace the 312th Evac Hospital which was among the Phase I units. On 24 Jul the 17th Field Hospital moved from An Khe to the Phu Thanh Valley (west of Qui Nhon) where it assumed the treatment of PW mission of the 311th Field Hospital, another Phase I unit, which departed for CONUS on 7 Aug. The 22d Surgical Hospital departed in September; it was the first Phase II hospital to depart RVN.¹⁷⁷

(U) USARV's 44th Medical Brigade set a patient ceiling during the third quarter of 1969. Army patients in the brigade hospital, requiring evacuation of an additional number of patients who normally would not have been evacuated. This caused an influx of patients to PACOM hospitals, especially those in Japan, thus creating a bed shortage during the last 10 days in August. Bed availability in naval hospitals at Guam and Yokosuka also was critical. Sufficient Army and AF hospital beds were available to accommodate the evacuation flow.¹⁷⁸

(U) In the fourth quarter admissions continued to decline as the effects of troop redeployment and generally lowered levels of combat were reflected in medical support operations. Malaria incidence was also down from the September high. The decline in admissions also resulted in a decrease in the number of off-shore evacuations. The lowered tendencies continued until the end of the year.¹⁷⁹

(U) Figure IX-19 depicts the locations of US hospitals in RVN at the end of 1969.

Training of Quarantine Inspectors

(U) With the beginning of troop redeployments in July the requirement became apparent for an interdepartmental (DOD, US Public Health Service, and US Department of Agriculture) policy and procedure for processing of retrograde material. This requirement was clearly beyond the capabilities of departmental representatives in RVN and would sorely tax capabilities if quarantine processing were to be conducted at point of entry CONUS ports. To avoid such a condition it was determined that all retrograde material would be processed and inspected prior to out-loading. A training course was established for military quarantine inspectors and advisors using the departmental representatives in RVN as instructors. The first class graduated on 27 Sep and students were deployed to stations throughout RVN on 1 Oct to assist and advise units processing retrograde cargo.¹⁸⁰

Preventive Medicine Activities


(U) There was continued emphasis on preventive medicine activities during 1969. There were indications that these efforts were producing results in control of malaria at the first of the year; however, incidence increased during the second and third quarters. Malaria control measures were intensified and increased aerial spray operations were conducted as a second special purpose UC-123 aircraft was made available by 7AF on 15 Apr.

(U) Throughout the period MACV preventive medicine advisors worked closely with their counterparts in RVNAF in planning and implementing sound preventive medicine practices. Frequent conferences were held with the Chief, Health Advisory Services, Office of the Assistant Director for Public Health, USAID, on matters of mutual concern in public health. Similarly,

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US HOSPITALS IN RVN 31 DECEMBER 1969



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FIGURE IX-19

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this office continued coordination on public health matters with the Joint Preventive Medicine Subcommittee, all US components, FWMAFs, and the Epidemiological Reference Officer (CERO) in each CTZ. 181

(U) For the remainder of the year preventive medicine activities were performed without major problem. There was increased emphasis placed on upgrading the training and capabilities of RVNAF preventive medicine detachments.

Malaria Control

(U) Efforts at minimizing the debilitating effects of malaria incidence continued during 1969. On 20 Feb, Hq, MACV promulgated a change in prophylaxis procedures by requiring all US military personnel to take one Dapsone (DDS) tablet daily in addition to weekly chloroquine-primaquine tablet, unless the DDS was withheld by a medical officer. By September, a significant number of adverse reactions had been reported from DDS and the MACV Surgeon recommended discontinuance of the drug.

(U) Other refinements in malaria control included a change in the strength of the malathion aerial spray solution from 57 percent to 95 percent. This strength permitted reducing by four-tenths the amount of spray needed for a given area. With acquisition of the second UC-123, additional targets were included in the program, including the cities of Danang and Bien Hoa. With a view toward further improvements, a MACV request for a high performance jet aircraft equipped with insecticide spray system was submitted to PACOM. 182

RVNAF/GVN Activities

Medical Advisory Effort

(U) Close coordination with the Chief, Preventive Medicine Division, Office of the Chief Surgeon, RVNAF, was maintained in all matters pertaining to the advisory effort. The MACV preventive medicine advisors worked closely with RVNAF counterparts in reviewing RVNAF directives pertaining to preventive medicine and in the publication of a new TOE for the RVNAF preventive medicine units (PMU).

(U) Preliminary groundwork was laid for the implementation of a vigorous audio-visual training program on basic preventive medicine and field sanitation training within RVNAF units. The use of 16mm training films to be shown by the RVNAF PMUs was envisioned as well as the showing of one minute film spots on TV.

(C) In an effort to increase the command emphasis on sanitation in the RVNAF, coordination was effected between the MACV Command Surgeon and the Training Directorate (MACT). As a result, MACT published a letter to all senior advisors at training facilities with instructions that sanitation should be given high priority and emphasis by all US training advisors in working with their RVNAF counterparts, and that progress in this area would be a matter of continuing concern. 183

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(U) During the second quarter Medical Group Advisory Teams were formed in each CTZ. These teams provided advisory assistance to RVNAF Corps Medical Groups in the administration of CTZ programs. The formation of advisory group teams consolidated medical advisors previously assigned to other staff agencies. The advisory group teams were placed under the administrative control of the Corps Senior Advisor and under the technical supervision of the MACV Command Surgeon.

(U) Increased emphasis also was placed on the medical advisory support of RF/PF units. Field manuals on medical subjects, printed in English and Vietnamese, were distributed to Mobile Assistance Team medical advisors. Also, a simplified medical supply catalog containing medical supplies available to RF/PF units was produced and distributed to improve medical supply support to these units.

(U) Advisory activity to the Office of the Surgeon General, RVNAF concentrated on better management procedures in the administration of student and patient pipelines. Elimination of excessive administrative procedures in disposition of patients and a more efficient method of processing orders for trainees were the initial goals.

(U) All military health assistance program personnel from the components were transferred to MACV during the second quarter. New tables of distribution and allowances for all teams were published and team designations were changed to MACV MILPHAP Teams numbered 1 thru 27. Transfer of MILPHAP functions at the Can Tho Province Hospital to the Regional Health Chief was accomplished on 16 Jun.

(U) In the third quarter considerable progress was made in implementing a joint (Ministry of Health and Ministry of Defense) utilization of hospitals. Twenty-five provinces were included in the Joint Utilization Program and joint use of both ministries' facilities in 13 provinces was directed on 18 Sep. 184

(U) The major significant achievement during the fourth quarter was the decision to activate 44 new Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) within DMAC. These teams were critically needed because of a severe shortage of medical field advisors. The teams were expected to be operational by 20 Jan 1970. 185

RVNAF Medical Activities

(U) During the second quarter the RVNAF Surgeon General directed activation of four medical groups, one in each CTZ. Under the organizational concept, the groups exercised command and control over all subordinate medical units within each CTZ. Formation of medical battalions and other elements included in the reorganization of the RVNAF Medical Service also proceeded smoothly.

(U) On 27 May, the JGS published a directive that established dedicated medical air evacuation aircraft. The directive stated that two UH-1 helicopters in each CTZ would be designated to perform aeromedical evacuation under operational control of the respective ARVN Corps Medical Groups. At the end of the September, II and III CTZ had received their dedicated aircraft and had placed them in operation. 186

(U) The final preparation and submission of Chapter 13, GVN Defense Budget (Medical) was sent to the US Mission Council for approval in the third quarter. The budget included

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recommendations for the use of Joint Support Funds for the local procurement of vaccines, serums, and an increase in maintenance support for RVNAF medical facilities.

(U) A master list of medical supplies was published and distributed by RVNAF during August and September. This list represented some 4,000 different line items of expendable medical supplies authorized in the RVNAF medical system. The document was a comprehensive listing of medical expendable supplies available to RVNAF. The master list helped standardize the ordering of supplies and thereby enabled the medical depots to purge excess stocks accumulated over many years. The overall effect of the master list streamlined the medical expendable supply requisition, issue, and distribution systems. 187

(U) On 23 Sep, the MACV's Military Assistance Service Funding (MASF) Watch Committee approved the authorization of 102 vehicles needed to support the MILPHAP teams. These vehicles were to be a new initial issue of vehicles as no new vehicles had been issued to the MILPHAP team since 1965 when the teams were established. This authorization by MACMA also permitted the MILPHAP teams to replace vehicles when needed. 188

(U) Also in the third quarter, in-depth investigations were undertaken to determine the relative importance of various disease conditions to RVNAF combat effectiveness. These studies were continued indefinitely and were used to make appropriate recommendations aimed at increasing combat effectiveness. 189

(U) In an effort to reduce combat non-effectiveness due to poor water supplies, the RVNAF Surgeon General recommended to JGS the formation of a Joint Committee on RVNAF Water Supply. The functions of the committee were to bring all available talents to bear on the multi-problems involved, to make recommendations, and to take action as appropriate to improve water supplies for RVNAF. 190

(U) An evaluation of the RVNAF medical laboratory capabilities in support of their preventive medicine programs was initiated during the third quarter. Recommendations were made, where appropriate, when deficiencies were noted in laboratory support of work undertaken to determine if a specific disease outbreak had occurred. Additionally, attempts were made to improve routine laboratory support of other preventive medicine activities, such as submission of water samples by preventive medicine units.

(U) In order to define problems related to the medical pipeline and under the concept of secondary prevention, an evaluation of RVNAF rehabilitation programs was initiated. It was hoped that the findings of this evaluation would provide information of value in determining if program changes were required in medical advisory efforts.

(U) Throughout the remainder of the year, major emphasis continued on upgrading and opening of new facilities for RVNAF. The renovation of Duy Tan General Hospital in Danang was completed in December thus opening ward space for PW patients. Also in December joint utilization of the Long An Province Hospital was initiated. This represented another significant milestone in the implementation of joint utilization of military and civilian facilities. 191

RVNAF Military Medical Training

(U) During the second quarter the off-shore observer type training program was reevaluated. The consensus, both in the MACV and the RVNAF Surgeons' offices, was that the program

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had only been marginally productive. The cost of the program in time and money was not considered consonant with the tangible results desired or obtained. It was decided that no observer training would be requested after FY 70. To compensate for this reduction in off-shore training, US military facilities in-country were tasked with providing observer and OJT for RVNAF Medical Service personnel. The advantages of providing this type of training in-country were reduced costs, increased training capability, closer control of the program and students, wider availability of more appropriate types of medical and surgical cases to study, (i. e., tropical diseases and traumatic war casualty cases), and reduced difficulties with language and cultural shock problems. ¹⁹²

(U) The in-country OJT training program, begun on 17 Mar for RVNAF physicians, had experienced certain "growing pains", but these appeared to be well on their way to resolution at midyear. The advantages of conducting in-country training became very apparent to those involved in monitoring the program. In those few instances where problems arose due to misunderstandings because of a failure to communicate, or due to cultural or philosophical differences, a combined RVNAF-US trouble-shooting team were dispatched. This procedure had resulted in the resolution of problems with a minimal expenditure of time and effort. The program progressed well, and there appeared to be potential for successful expansion in both the number of trainees and the types of training to be offered. ¹⁹³

(U) The first group of RVNAF physicians concluded its six months training cycle on 17 Sep. Of the original 21 students, 18 completed the program. Two were withdrawn for administrative reasons and one was dropped from the program because of disciplinary problems. The RVNAF Surgeon General was queried to determine if additional medical officers would be made available to continue the in-country program. A plan was prepared to place four to six students in a US medical facility in the vicinity of Saigon. This location afforded better control of the program by MACV and the RVNAF Surgeon General's Office, as well as allowing the students to live in proximity to their families and medical practices. The in-country OJT training program was proving more economical and effective than off-shore observer type training. ¹⁹⁴

(U) As of 1 Apr, responsibility for conducting the basic aidman (CC-1) medical course was transferred from Military Medical School (MMS) to the hospitals in the CTZs. Approximately 2,800 students were to be trained within the following year. The input for this course included RF/PF, National Police, and other civil agencies as well as students from the regular military forces. The RF and PF participation was much greater than previously experienced when these personnel had been required to come to the MMS in Saigon for training. Initially some difficulty was experienced in obtaining sufficient quantities of Vietnamese translations of training manuals and field manuals for use as training aids. This problem was largely overcome, but was not completely resolved at midyear. In the third quarter the CC-1 course graduated its second and third classes and the caliber of instruction was considered excellent by US advisors. ¹⁹⁵

(U) Eighteen RVNAF physicians completed six month preceptor type specialty training in internal medicine, general surgery, and radiology in selected US in-country hospitals during the third quarter. These hospitals displayed the desire and capability to accept larger numbers of RVNAF physicians for this training. However, the RVNAF Surgeon General's Office preferred a more formalized, centralized program for fewer individuals. The program was reappraised with results unknown at the end of the year. ¹⁹⁶

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Nursing Activities

(U) On 4 Mar the RVNAF Surgeon General issued a directive to all military hospitals to establish a Department of Nursing. In conjunction with this program, the Nurse Consultant and the MACV Nurse Advisor assigned to the RVNAF Surgeon General's Office initiated visits to 18 selected military hospitals to advise, assist, and coordinate the establishment of these departments of nursing.¹⁹⁷

(U) During the second quarter, a supervised on-the-job-training program was initiated at Cong Hoa General Hospital. Although the Vietnamese personnel who attended the classes absorbed the material presented and were able to utilize it in practice, the program came to a halt because of a lack of qualified instructors, insufficient time for presentation of material, and lack of support for the program by Cong Hoa Hospital staff.¹⁹⁸

(U) In the third quarter the RVNAF Surgeon General and the RVNAF JCS approved the formation of the RVNAF Nurse Corps. The officer selected to serve as Chief Nurse, accompanied by two MACV nursing advisors, visited RVNAF hospitals to make preparations for implementation of the Nurse Corps services.¹⁹⁹

(U) At Cong Hoa Hospital, nursing activities made significant progress indicating a greater appreciation for the service and its function. Significant accomplishments included:

1. Facilities.

a. Equipment was moved into the operating room suites in the new 500-bed addition. The 10 suites concerned, the central supply section, and the recovery and intensive care wards were prepared for occupancy.

b. Two more wards in the new addition were prepared for occupancy. Three wards of the 10-ward complex were opened. A fourth ward was established as a training ward, complete with projection room, nursing laboratory, and library.

c. The old wards were slowly improved in terms of cleanliness and patient care. The Chief Nurse began making rounds each day and was permitted to supervise patient care more closely than in the past. Beds and wards were painted, dressing techniques were improved, linen was changed more frequently, and more attention was paid to the simple house-keeping chores.

2. Training. The following training programs were conducted for nursing personnel:

a. Classes for the operating room nurses working in the new operating suites.

b. Classes for the ward personnel who worked in the two treatment wards.

c. Training films in Vietnamese were shown each week to the members of nursing service, food service, and housekeeping staffs.

d. Training of one female aspirant at the 3rd Field Hospital in operating room and central supply techniques.

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(U) During the fourth quarter there were continued efforts at upgrading RVNAF nursing services. Advisors were particularly active in II CTZ and DMAC. Meanwhile occupational training in typewriter repair was initiated at Cong Ha Hospital for amputee patients. 200

Civilian War Casualty Program

(C) The Civilian War Casualty Program (CWCP) as approved by SECDEF had provided 1,100 hospital beds integrated into the US military hospital system. The continued reduction of US medical forces in direct relationship to the total force redeployed would have reduced hospital beds for the CWCP below the daily average number of beds required. The 1 Jan-30 Sep experience indicated that a daily average of 569 US military hospital beds were occupied in support of the CWCP. In order to maintain the required support for continuing the function, COMUSMACV elected to retain 600 military hospital beds in addition to those needed to meet US/FWMAF requirements. It was planned that these beds would be a transitional requirement which would be phased out as the GVN developed adequate capability to provide requisite care. 201

Veterinary Activities

(U) An additional 100 new dogs arrived from CONUS during the first quarter. A training course for 50 dogs was completed and the dogs were assigned to units.

(U) The hemorrhagic syndrome that had caused numerous fatalities among the military dogs in ARVN decreased in incidence, and of particular importance, in virulence during the first half of 1969. Cases during the period were responsive to treatment and losses were minimized. However, the seasonal increase in incidence of previous years occurred in September. The combined efforts of MACV, USARV, and RVNAF veterinarians were focused in an attempt to reduce the effects of the syndrome. 202

Dental Activities

(U) The oral surgery training program for RVNAF dentists made good progress at Cong Hoa Hospital after the RVNAF Surgeon concurred in extending the course from six to eight months. The first class of eight RVNAF dentists was completed at Cong Hoa Hospital on 26 Jan. A comprehensive examination was given and the two best qualified students participating in the program were selected to continue their training at the hospital. Further plans were made to accept two additional students into the program. It was hoped that this solution would give a desirable ratio of senior residents to beginning students.

(U) The services of a board-certified prosthodontist were obtained from the Tan Son Nhut Air Base Dental Services for consultations and for teaching at the Cong Hoa Hospital Dental Clinic. His expertise greatly enhanced the program in conjunction with plastic surgery of maxillofacial injuries.

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(U) Close cooperation was maintained with the RVNAF Dental Clinic and the MACV Dental Staff Officer in revising the RVNAF Master List and the Vietnamese Army Medical Service Equipment List in an effort to update the supplies and equipment of the RVNAF Dental Service.

(U) The Vietnamese Ministry of Health accepted the recommendation and made plans to include the Ministry of Health Hygienist Training School in the new dental clinic at the Thanh Quan Dispensary. This was a step forward toward the education of RVN people in the importance of good oral hygiene. 203

(U) In the third quarter an OJT program for Vietnamese dental assistants was conducted at the 377th AF Dispensary dental clinic at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The results were excellent and the base dental surgeon agreed to continue OJT for dental assistants. 204

(U) During the fourth quarter teaching assistance on a weekly basis was provided the Saigon Dental School and additional teaching assistance in oral surgery and prosthetics was planned to begin in 1970. Also during the quarter an assessment of the outstanding equipment, facility, and utility requirements of the RVNAF dental services was completed. This assessment was coordinated with US components so as to match RVNAF requirements with US excesses. 205

MILITARY ASSISTANCE SERVICE FUNDING PROGRAM

General

(C) The Military Assistance Service Funding (MASF) Program concept in military assistance had come into existence as the counterinsurgency effort on the part of the US in RVN increased. During March of 1966, SECDEF had removed the support of the forces of RVN from the Military Assistance Program (MAP) of DOD and placed the responsibility for support of the RVNAF with the respective military departments. Thus, the US Army had become responsible for the support of ARVN, the USAF became responsible for the support of VNAF, and the USN for VNN. This action had several advantages:

1. Under MASF there was no ceiling on the amount of support that could be given RVN as there had been under the MAP foreign aid appropriation which was subject to the vagaries of Congress.

2. It also removed RVN from the competition for MAP dollars. Thus the MASF program was in dollar competition with US forces within each component. Military appropriations, being limited, had a dollar ceiling; each dollar spent through MASF program was a dollar less that was available to spend in support of US Forces.

(U) The MASF program also supported the RF/PF and the FWMAF. Funding for support of National Police, People Self-Defense Force, and other organizations not under military control was accomplished by USAID and other US and GVN agencies.

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(S) The magnitude of the 1969 MASF program was tremendous. The FY 69 expenditures were \$1.6 billion (\$1.2 billion for the Army, \$225 million for the AF, \$42.7 million for the Navy, and \$43.9 million for the USMC). More than 50 percent of the total MASF program was for ammunition alone.

(U) Requirements were determined in much the same way as US requirements were established, by use of the approved force structure and approved authorization documents such as TOEs and TAs. Attrition and maintenance floats were added which established the basic equipment authorizations. Supply requirements, such as spare parts and consumables, were computed based on authorized stock levels and usage data. Together they made up the MASF program. Each time a TOE/TA change was submitted and approved, it affected the MASF program. For example, if an infantry company requested and received a TOE increase of one additional M151 1/4-ton vehicle, not only would that company receive one more vehicle, but every infantry company in ARVN would receive an additional 1/4-ton vehicle. A one-vehicle requirement could result in a million dollar increase to the MASF program.

(U) Because of the wide-ranging implications of TOE/TA changes they were considered very carefully and only after completed staffing by MACV. A TOE change normally started at the unit level. It was processed thru the ARVN structure to JGS and into the organization branch of MACMA. Each request for a TOE increase also was staffed throughout HQ MACV to determine the validity of the requirement and its overall effect upon overall program before it was presented to the TOE subcommittee of the MASF Program Watch Committee. If approved, it was passed to the full MASF Program Watch Committee. This committee, was chaired by ACoS MACMA and included representation from all appropriate staff agencies. If the MASF Watch Committee recommended approval, the change was then submitted to the Chief of Staff for final approval. After approval by the Chief of Staff, it was put into MASF program format and forwarded to the PACOM component service for further review and approval. From there it followed component channels. Only after review and concurrence at component level did changes become part of the approved MASF program.

(U) Non-major items, spare parts, consumables, etc., received much the same critical review as the major items discussed above. Most of these items were accounted for on stock record cards and were authorized per current stockage objectives. They were programmed by dollar requirements rather than by units of issue. Approved dollar lines were maintained in the program office of MACMA and funds were released as required and requested by the various technical service accountable officers. The MACMA program office reviewed these requests for compliance with DOD and MACV policies of MASF support. No item capable of being manufactured in-country was approved. Examples of these items were office furniture and clothing. Luxury type items such as watches, individual air conditioners, or duplicate issues (both a poncho and a raincoat for the same individual) also were unacceptable.

(C) When an increase to a dollar line was requested it not only received the same review, but it was presented to the Watch Committee and followed the same procedures for approval as major items.

(C) MASF support for US advisors also followed the same procedures. The only difference was that the requirement entered the system through the MACMA advisor channels.

(U) The MASF program was extensively controlled. The MACV goal was to support only the minimum essential requirements needed by RVNAF to perform its mission. After the

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establishment of the MASF Program Watch Committee in March, excellent progress was made towards that goal. Reductions included: Army program: \$47,866,094 and the Navy \$631,311, for a total of \$48,497,405.

(S) During 1969 the MASF program made significant progress. The equipment, supplies and services required by RVNAF flowed relatively smoothly into using units and most subprograms were either on or ahead of schedule. The initial overall FY 70 program of \$1.2 billion dollars was revised upward to \$1.45 billion in response to new force structure requirements and by midyear the program was as indicated below:

MILITARY ASSISTANCE SERVICE FUNDING, FY 70
(Millions of dollars)

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Marine Corps</u>	<u>Total</u>
Major Items (Initial)	54.5	56.8	30.2	2.2	143.7
Major Items (Replacements)	41.8	.3	7.0	1.4	50.5
Ammunition	842.8	21.4	100.8	25.1	990.1
Spare Parts/ Consumables	171.1	25.3	56.6	14.2	267.2
	<u>1,110.2</u>	<u>103.8</u>	<u>194.6</u>	<u>42.9</u>	<u>1,451.5</u>

(S) The Army-sponsored portion emphasized vehicles, communications equipment, assault-type small boats, individual and crew-served weapons, follow-on spares for communications, automotive equipment, petroleum products, and other material/services. The Navy emphasized waterborne craft (1 DE, 1 LST, 2 PGM, and 83 assorted small craft and boats), motor vehicles, ship spare parts, and other material/services. The AF program for FY 70 called for procurement of F-5A aircraft, helicopters and jet engines, supporting operations of aircraft and helicopters and jet engines, supporting operations of aircraft and helicopter squadrons, communications spare parts, POL products, aircraft spare parts, and other material/services. The USMC program emphasized small arms, landing boats, communications spare parts, petroleum products, and other material/services.

(S) There were fluctuations in the various programs throughout the first half of the year, the most significant being a USAF Chief of Staff - directed \$41.5 million increase in the AF program which boosted VNAF air munitions, and provided additional F-5A and A-1 aircraft. Generally, the programs of the other services were revised downward and at midyear there was an overall reduction of over \$6.4 million without including the increase in the AF program directed by USAF Chief of Staff.

(C) Following the Midway Conference, interest in I&M of RVNAF quickened and this interest was reflected in the management of the MASF program. There was a requirement for stringent controls over the large sums of component budgets that were devoted to MASF while concomitantly furthering the rate of I&M. The MACV staff instituted a double review of

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authorization documents (TQE/TA), equipment and material authorizations were accepted only after complete justification in terms of operational requirements. An example of the rigorous efforts to hold down costs was the review of OVM for vehicles providing only the minimum needed when viewed against the function to which the vehicle was used. The efforts at minimizing costs while simultaneously providing maximum support to a growing RVNAF force level was indeed a formidable challenge to JGS, MACV, and component management.

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

The C-E System in RVN

(S) The communications system in RVN comprised three distinct elements: the Integrated Communications System - SEASIA (ICS-SEA), the Corps Area Communications System (CACS), and the tactical systems organic to combat units. The ICS-SEA satisfied the trunking requirements in RVN and Thailand, and its transmission links were designated as part of the Defense Communication System (DCS). The ICS-SEA consisted of three elements:

1. The 439L submarine cable system with five nodal points which looped along the coast of RVN.
2. The Integrated Wideband Communication System (IWCS). (See Figure IX-20.) This element provided fixed and transportable tropospheric scatter or line-of-sight radio links which were the backbone of the long haul system.
3. A considerable number of tactical, line-to-sight, and tropospheric scatter radio facilities supplementing and extending the terminal points of the DCS in RVN.

(S) The ICS-SEA, as part of the DCS, connected the theater to out-of-country stations by way of undersea cables to the Philippines and Thailand. Also, there were tropospheric radio systems from RVN to Thailand. The Defense Satellite Communication System provided links from Nha Trang to Okinawa and from Saigon to Hawaii. There were leased commercial satellite circuits from Thailand to Hawaii. Additionally, high frequency radio circuits provided communications from Cam Ranh Bay to the Philippines and from Saigon to the Philippines.

(S) The ICS-SEA included the associated fixed facilities such as dial central offices, automatic digital network (AUTODIN) terminals, and automatic secure voice communications (AUTOSEVOCOM).

1. At the end of 1969 the telephone system included 37 dial central telephone offices located throughout RVN; the offices were handling about 500,000 telephone calls each day. The long distance, common user, telephone system was a basically manual operation which was upgraded during 1969 to an integrated, long distance, automatic telephone system. The heart of the automated telephone system consisted of nine long distance switching centers, six in RVN and three in Thailand. Each of the nine centers was interconnected to all other switching centers;

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
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FIXED ICS-SEA

ICS-SEA INCLUDES THAILAND



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FIGURE IX-20

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thus, the customer had direct distance dialing to any other dial telephone in RVN or Thailand. All nine switches were completed and providing service by December.

2. Teletype and data communications. The old teletype relays had been replaced, for the most part, by an automatic system called AUTODIN. This network consisting of computers and high speed data transmission equipment, came into RVN in 1968. Each of the AUTODIN switches served a number of subscribers and was connected to each other, as well as to off-shore points. The system was highly flexible, providing out-of-country service by alternate routes in case of communications circuit failure.

3. AUTOSEVOCOM. The ability to talk "secure" was necessary and vital to operational command and control. A secure voice network called automatic secure voice communications (AUTOSEVOCOM), was rapidly expanded during 1969.

(S) ICS-SEA provided a multitude of tactical interface points furnishing combat commanders access to the common user, long haul communications system from the corps areas and tactical systems.

(S) The second major element of the communications system was the CACS which was under the command and operational control of the CG, USARV's 1st Sig Bde. It provided a network of tactical, multichannel radios and facilities, tailored to ensure flexible and rapid response to combat support requirements between relatively fixed locations. The system supplemented ICS-SEA by extending circuits from nodal points to combat and combat support units. The CACS was configured similarly in all CTZs.

(S) Tactical communications, the third major element, were conventionally deployed. Assets were organic to units and provided the commanders with a highly mobile means to exercise command and control. Equipment ranged from hand-carried radios and command and control consoles in helicopters to fairly sophisticated multichannel radio equipment mounted in 2 1/2-ton truck vans.

(S) There were also some special systems to provide dedicated command and control for MACV headquarters. An emergency action console was located in the headquarters building near the MACV Command Operations Center (COC). A 200-line, cordless switchboard provided direct telephone access from and to major subordinate commanders, operations centers, and key staff personnel.

(S) Secure teletype communications circuits extended directly from the COC to each major subordinate command. These were dedicated circuits.

(S) To keep contact with key personnel who were mobile around the Saigon area, both a tactical type FM, voice radio net and a commercial type, vehicular-mounted voice radio net were available. The base stations of both these nets were located near the COC and could be connected into the MACV telephone system.

(S) Additionally, secure voice and teletype circuits connected Headquarters MACV with CINCPAC and the National Military Command Center; Headquarters, MACV also operated in the CINCPAC voice alert net.

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throughout the world with a network of 23 satellites in random equatorial orbit 15,580 miles above the earth.

(U) The major advantage of satellite communications was the reliability of the system. Unlike the high frequency radio system, the satellite communications did not use atmospheric phenomena, such as the ionization layer of the atmosphere, to reflect signals. Further, because satellite communications was a line-of-sight link between two ground stations via the satellite, the system could use signals in the super high frequency range and avoid virtually all atmospheric interference. This satellite system was so reliable that, although the sites operated by the 1st Sig Bde had no redundant equipment, they were able to maintain an availability rate of 93 percent.

(U) The reliability of the satellite system was further demonstrated in February when the undersea cable that linked RVN to the trans-Pacific cable via the Philippines was cut. While repairs were being made on the cable, satellite communications provided the only dependable out-of-country service available. The satellite communications also offered field commanders a long distance voice, data, and facsimile communications system unmatched in any previous combat situation for reliability, quality, and versatility.

C-E Vietnamization

(C) Throughout 1969 considerable progress was made in Vietnamization of C-E activities in RVN. However, on 31 Jul a major milestone occurred when MACV OPLAN 100-69 was promulgated. This plan was an autonomous document implementing the actions to be taken for the integrated telecommunications system in RVN. Other significant measures in Vietnamization occurred as efforts intensified following the Midway conference. These measures included:

1. Completion of formal and on-the-job training of the first group of ARVN officers in operation, engineering, analysis, and management of DCA-SAM activities.
2. Switchover of ARVN's AN/URC-3 circuits to the ICS-SEA systems.
3. Start of in-country training of ARVN third and fourth echelon radar maintenance personnel.
4. Conduct of first high level C-E planning involving GVN officials.

Integrated Communication System-Southeast Asia

(U) During 1968, Phases I and II of the ICS-SEA had been completed and placed in operation. The first-- MACV to Long Binh -- link of Phase III had been accepted by mid-1968 and all but the Vung Chau Mountain to Nha Trang link were completed at the end of the year. (See 1968 MACV Command History, pp. 713-716 for detailed discussion of 1968 accomplishments.)

(U) During the first half of 1969, progress continued and the last link of Phase III was completed. While there were refinements and modifications for subsystems the overall system was handling increasing volumes of traffic and was fully responsive to needs of the various commands. (See Figure IX-20.)²⁰⁷

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(U) In the third quarter, work continued on the remaining three links of ICS-SEA. These links involved completion of switching centers at Pleiku, Vung Chau Mountain, and Warin (Thailand). 208

Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS)

(U) The IWCS comprised the fixed and transportable tropospheric scatter or line-of-sight radio links which were the main carriers of long haul traffic.

(U) During April, there was one additional link added to the IWCS subsystem. This link used a TSC-82 transportable microwave terminal at Dong Ha and fixed microwave equipment at Quang Tri. This transportable facility was designed to provide all of the control capabilities provided by the fixed IWCS stations. The Dong Ha IWCS transportable terminal was cut over into full operations on 20 Apr and linked to the fixed IWCS station at Quang Tri. An unusual feature of the Dong Ha transportable terminal was that it was completely revetted to include overhead cover.

(U) Work was continuing on three other IWCS transportable microwave facilities being installed at Di An, Sa Dec, and Dong Ba Thin. These facilities were completed in July. 209

(C) There were only minor modifications of IWCS throughout the remainder of the year. Facilities and equipment were reorganized as troop redeployments obviated or altered requirements. The assets used to maintain links no longer needed were either deactivated or used to support new requirements.

Transportable Portions of ICS-SEA

(U) Numerous transportable/tactical communications systems were reconfigured, deactivated, and new ones activated to provide appropriate communications support for combat operations. Most critical was the major reconfiguration of the I CTZ communications system which was completed in early January, releasing four temporarily deployed 60-channel AF tropo systems. During April additional AF equipment was released as the Dong Ha-Quang Tri AN/TSC-82 activation occurred. An additional AN/TRC-24 system was activated to meet tandem switch requirements between Phan Rang and Cam Ranh Bay. 210

(U) Work progressed on additional transportable microwave terminal facilities. Four sites -- Dong Ha, Sa Dec, Dong Ba Thin, and Di An -- were prepared for the 120-channel, TSC-82 line-of-sight terminals. The installation was delayed by factory wiring defects in the terminals and rewiring was necessary before the equipment became operational. The Di An and Dong Ha facilities were operational in June and the last two were ready for use by 15 Jul. 211

Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone Service

(C) At the end of 1968 the Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone Service (SEASIA-ATS) had been nearing completion. In November of that year, the first tandem switching center at Bang Pla, Thailand had been completed and cutover. Remaining switching centers had been in various stages of completion. The plan for cutover of the systems had been developed by the Joint Cutover Integrated Working Group, a MACV/MAC THAI-chartered activity. (See 1968 MACV Command History, pages 716-718, for additional coverage of 1968 SEASIA-ATS activities.)

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(C) On 22 Feb, the Can Tho (Army) switching center was completed and this cutover was followed by centers at Korat, Thailand (AF) on 29 Mar and Danang (AF) on 12 Apr. The centers at Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang were completed at the end of July. Installation continued on the centers at the remaining sites at Vung Chau Mountain, Pleiku, and Warin (AF). All sites were completed by year's end. 212

(C) The SEASIA-ATS provided direct dial service to all Class "A" telephone subscribers throughout RVN and Thailand. The system was managed by Defense Communications Agency--Southeast Asia Mainland (DCA-SAM). In a 3 Dec 68 message, COMUSMACTHAI had proposed that the MACTHAI elements of the system be established as an independent field activity under DCS, Pacific. The basis of the request appeared to be a desire to make the facilities more responsive to COMUSMACTHAI. The proposal was not favored by MACV or DCA-SAM. The latter activity urged continuation of the system under the centralized management of DCA-SAM as being in the best interests of optimum operation of the total world-wide system. The joint MACV/DCA-SAM position was that: 213

DCA-managed systems/subsystems are configured without regard to physical boundaries but to ensure customer satisfaction, reliability, and survivability. All of the systems/subsystems have been designed to support a war effort in Southeast Asia, not in two separate countries. It would be difficult to coordinate a system designed as a cohesive unit with two agencies assigned a split responsibility. Problems/Differences that arise affecting the management of the systems/subsystems would have to be resolved by DCA-PAC instead of being solved at the source of conflict. In addition, any fragmentation of the management of the systems/subsystems would require a considerable increase in the investment of personnel, equipment, and communications facilities.

As a result of the MACV/DCA-SAM position no change was made in the system.

(U) Integral to SEASIA-ATS was the dial telephone exchange (DTE) systems which were begun throughout SEASIA-Mainland (Thailand and RVN) in 1967. At the end of 1968, 36 DTEs were in service with a capability for handling 52,760 lines. By the end of June, the number of exchanges had been reduced to 35 but these facilities were capable of handling almost 55,000 lines. Figure IX-21 depicts the status of the DTEs at the end of 1969.

(U) In the third quarter additional DTEs were completed and there were 53 DTEs handling over 75,000 lines. In the fourth quarter the Vung Chau Mountain center was completed on 31 Oct and the Warin center on 19 Nov. At year's end the service breakout was as follows: 214

<u>Service</u>	<u>No. DTEs</u>	<u>Lines</u>
US Army	28	32,625
USN/USMC	6	6,800
USAF	17	36,400
State Dept	<u>3</u>	<u>2,000</u>
	54	95,825

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
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PRIMARY DIAL CENTRAL OFFICES



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FIGURE IX-21

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Automatic Digital Data Network

(U) During 1968 the automatic digital data network (AUTODIN) had achieved significant progress and the interim and final systems for RVN had been interfaced, becoming an integrated system that provided field commanders with urgently needed real-time message processing. At the end of 1968 automatic switching centers had been in operation at Phu Lam and Nha Trang, serving 28 subscribers and six interswitch trunks, and 19 subscribers respectively. Traffic volume at Phu Lam was 37,000 messages daily; Nha Trang was handling in excess of 25,000 messages during the period.

(U) At the end of March 1969, the Phu Lam switch was providing service to 26 subscribers operating at total of 30 high speed leased terminals and low speed, Mode V, Government-Furnished Equipment terminals. The daily average traffic figure was 38,500 messages. Also the Phu Lam DCS teletype relay was provided with dual AUTODIN access with the installation of a Mode-I terminal to the Korat Automatic Switching Center (ASC). This action enhanced the AUTODIN restoral posture for Phu Lam ASC subscribers. The Nha Trang ASC service increased to 24 subscribers operating 26 high and low speed terminals. The number of messages processed per day rose to 29,500.

(U) This level of performance was maintained during the third quarter and no significant problems with the AUTODIN system were reported. In the interest of better utilization of communications resources, the Long Binh Data Service Center leased Mode-I activity was deactivated. Service was assumed by the ICCV (Long Binh). Leased cost savings of approximately \$16,000 per month were realized by this action. Additionally, action was initiated to downgrade the DCA terminal by deleting the magnetic tape requirement and reducing the band rate of the terminal to 1,200 bands. This action resulted in monthly cost savings of approximately \$39,000 per month.²¹⁵

(C) In the fourth quarter, further refinements were made in the AUTODIN system. The DCS relays at Phu Lam and Danang were phased out on 3 Nov while two Mode-II activations took place at Danang. An interim AUTODIN restoral plan was promulgated during the quarter. This plan designated the Joint Pacific/Pacific Air Force Command and Control Center at Tan Son Nhut as the primary restoral center. Meanwhile a proposed permanent restoral plan was being staffed with components by DCA-SAM.²¹⁶

Automatic Secure Voice Communications

(C) The Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) Subsystem in RVN, a DCA-managed portion of the Worldwide AUTOSEVOCOM Network was initiated in 1967. The ability to talk "secure" was necessary and vital to combat command and control. The system was designed to satisfy all secure voice communications needs of the services except for tactical requirements and those specifically authorized by SECDEF. The system was built around the use of the KY-3 for wideband subscriber terminals and the paired HY-2/KG-13 for narrowband subscriber terminals. The primary switching facility was the AN/FTC-31 Automatic Switch located in Saigon. The switch was a Philco Ford producea, 80-subscriber, 10-trunk configuration which afforded direct dialing for local wideband subscribers. An associated operator console, secure voice access console (SEVAC) provided the interface between the local subscribers


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AUTOSEVOCOM



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FIGURE IX-22

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and narrowband long distance callers. Smaller secure voice cordboards (SECORDS) were installed at selected sites throughout RVN.

(C) At the end of 1968, 10 SECORDS had been operational. They were located at Phan Rang, Dong Ha, Phu Bai, Danang, Monkey Mountain, Bien Hoa, Long Binh, Cam Ranh Bay, Chu Lai and Can Tho. They served a total of 65 subscribers. Additional SECORD sites were under construction at Pleiku, Nha Trang and Qui Nhon but were delayed by equipment and material shortages. In spite of these delays these latter three sites were completed during the first quarter of 1969. A shortage of qualified maintenance personnel precluded their activation until the second and third quarters of 1969.

(C) The system, approved for the transmission of Top Secret information, was rapidly expanded during 1969. At the end of the year, the network served 78 subscribers off the AN/FTC-31 switch in Saigon and 140 subscribers through the various SECORDS. Figure IX-22 indicates the status of the system at the end of 1969.

RVNAF Communications-Electronics

RVNAF Communications Systems

(S) The ARVN as the largest component of RVNAF provided the bulk of communications throughout RVN. As the backbone, ARVN had a network of switchboards, dial central offices in the large cities, and communications centers, located at the sector headquarters. These were interconnected with organic radio relay, and by US-provided ICS-SEA. In addition, single side-band radios provided command and control communications between Saigon and six major cities. Tactical communications were provided by CTZ and division signal elements. The existing equipment was continually modernized to keep pace with increased demands. This included replacing obsolescent equipment with newer compatible, US tactical gear and the construction of permanent signal facilities, many of which were completed during 1969.

(S) A major segment of the RVNAF, the RF and PF, was responsible for territorial security of the villages, hamlets, LOCs, and logistical complexes. The forces comprised over one half of RVNAF and were assigned and under the operational control of the province chief as a sector commander. As such they were authorized complete communications capabilities and personnel to provide them with command control communications. The communications equipment was wholly tactical, consisting of over 40,000 AM/FM radios, both HF and VHF, and local wire nets with telephones and small switchboards.

(S) From the corps headquarters, each of the provinces or sectors there was a long haul system. Tactical radios linked the province to subordinate tactical units; US advisors with the units used a similar system.

(S) Communications for the VNAF differed from the ARVN's because of the use of US systems and facilities almost exclusively. The VNAF was concerned with command control communications from its headquarters at Tan Son Nhut to its subordinate commands at the five major air bases, and from those bases to organizational aircraft. The US communications centers provided long lines between Saigon and the air bases.

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(S) Air navigational facilities, such as control towers, GCA, and AC&W radars, as well as telephone exchanges, were jointly operated by USAF and the VNAF. The Air Force Advisory Group provided personnel to assist the VNAF in the operation and maintenance of the systems.

(S) The VNN was also concerned with providing command control communications between its headquarters and its operational commands. Using US and ARVN long lines communication between shore points, and high frequency radios within the command and between SEASIA forces, essential command and control was maintained.

RVNAF Military Communications

(U) The RVNAF Military Telecommunications Network-Vietnam (MTN-V) had been designed to upgrade and expand existing fixed C-E facilities, provide new facilities as required in areas of troop build-up, and to provide long distance interconnects for command and control communications within RVNAF. These facilities had been designed for intergration into the public communications systems, as appropriate, during the posthostilities period.

(C) The first of 41 buildings in the FY-67S MTN-V construction program (AMASF/MILCON) was completed and signed over to ARVN on 25 Feb. This building, designed to house a 2,000-line dial telephone exchange, served the Can Tho areas. During April, 16 additional buildings were placed on contract by the OICC. Six of these were for radio relay facilities, nine were for communication centers, and one was for a dial central office building. An outside plant project at Vinh Long was completed on 30 May and a dial central facility at Vung Tau was transferred to ARVN on 14 Jun by MACV's OICC. Additional facilities were completed at Chu Lai on 16 Jun.²¹⁷

(U) On 1 Apr, the ARVN 654th Signal Battalion (Long Lines) was activated with the mission of providing long lines communications from zone center to the CTZs. The battalion consisted of a Hq and Hq Co, and Microwave, Integrated Communications, and Single Side Band Companies. The latter unit was located at Tan Son Nhut Air Base while the remainder of the battalion was stationed in Cholon.²¹⁸

(C) In May, MACJ6 apprised RVNAF's J6 of the training program envisioned to prepare RVNAF personnel for assumption, operation, and maintenance of ICS-SEA, DTEs, and automatic tandem switches (ATS). The 1st Sig Bde was tasked to develop implementation of the training program which involved a number of hard skill MOSs.

(C) The training program was designed to take approximately four years for completion, and was based on duplicating the US manning of the ICS-SEA, DTEs and ATSs with Vietnamese personnel who had an English language speaking and reading capability and formal training in communications. The complete training program comprised three phases. The first phase consisted of training the Vietnamese to speak and read English at the Armed Forces Language School. The second phase of training was formal classroom instruction at a contractor-operated training facility. This instruction would train men to be communications specialists in one of five MOSs. The third phase provided OJT at ICS-SEA, DTE, or ATS sites. The OJT program was expected to require 18 months to two years for each individual. After OJT, the trained personnel would be used to augment and replace eventually the US personnel operating and maintaining these facilities.

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(U) The 1st Sig Bde was to develop plans to establish a contractor-operated training facility within RVN. This plan envisioned that the contractor would build the required facilities and install sufficient ICS-SEA, DTE, and ATS communications equipment to train the bulk of the required long lead time training of operations and maintenance personnel. If the contractor's proposals were economically feasible, it was planned that the civilian contract would be established the facilities constructed, and instruction started by the end of 1st quarter FY 70. If the contractor's proposals were not economically feasible, additional training spaces in the FY 70-73 Military Assistance Off-Shore Training Program would be requested to train the required personnel. At year's end the proposals were still being considered at JCS and no training had begun.

(U) USARV requested a cadre of 110 ARVN enlisted personnel be trained off-shore in five of the long lead time MOSs required in the ICS-SEA, DTE, and ATSS. These personnel would be used as instructors to teach courses at the in-country training facility under the supervision of the contractor. It was expected the use of ARVN instructors would significantly reduce the cost of operating the training facility, when compared to operating it with instructors supplied by the contractor. The following MOS's and numbers were involved: 219

<u>ARMY MOS</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF PERSONNEL</u>
26V	Microwave Radio Repairman	31
32D	Technical Controller	37
32E	Fixed Station Carrier Equipment Repairman	21
36H	DCO Repairman	15
36H4J6	Tandem Switch Repairman	6
	TOTAL	<u>110</u>

The personnel needed to fill the above requirements had been identified and programmed for in-country or offshore training in FY-69 or 70.

(C) By September the first group of RVNAF personnel had finished English language training and all was in readiness to begin MOS training. Unfortunately, DOD had yet to task the component (USARV) to conduct the training as outlined above. At the end of the third quarter COMUSMACV requested the CINCPAC stress to JCS the immediate need for tasking USARV to execute the training. It was emphasized that each delay in initiation of the training created a resultant delay in the ability of RVNAF to assume responsibilities for operation and maintenance of the systems concerned. 220

(U) The first installation of a country-wide ICS/ARVN interface program was started when the IV Corps tie cable project (1-QLVN/LQ-3-69) was approved on 5 Aug. The purpose of the project was to provide electrical interconnect between ARVN communication centers and ICS-SEA nodal points, thereby providing the first step in the integration of RVNAF and US communications facilities into the Single Integrated Telecommunications System (SITS). The nodal points were Bac Lieu, Soc Trang, Long Xuyen, Ca Mau, Rach Gia, Sa Dec, Vinh Long, and Can Tho.

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The tie cables were installed at Soc Trang, Bac Lieu and Ca Mau on 25 Jul. The tie cable at Rach Gia was completed on 22 Aug. In September two more ARVN stations were interconnected to the ICS-SEA. The new stations were Soc Trang and Rach Gia and their juncture brought to four the number of RVNAF stations in IV CTZ in the ICS-SEA. 221

(U) Also in September, 10 RVNAF officers were integrated into DCA-SAM working force. These officers were given OJT in the operations division on systems control teams.

(S) In the fourth quarter 23 additional RVNAF circuits were added to the ICS-SEA bringing the year end total to 299. Both civilian (Ministry of Post and Telegraph (P&T) and RVNAF circuits were used, thus resulting in some trade-off between the military and civilian agencies. One major problem resulted from the mix of these two systems when P&T reported a shortage of multiplex equipment needed for interface of circuits. In spite of the equipment shortage, the RVNAF communications proved reliable as evidenced by the low number of circuit outages discovered during the 34 circuit checks conducted each month by DCA-SAM. 222

Formation of Signal Advisory Teams

(U) Reflecting the increased emphasis on improvement and modernization of RVNAF, MACJ6 reorganized his Signal Advisory Branch in January. The reorganization resulted in a Signal Advisory Team for each CTZ located as follows:

<u>Team</u>	<u>ARVN Organization Advised</u>	<u>Location</u>
111	610th Area Sig Bn	Danang
112	66th Area Sig Gp	Pleiku
113	65th Area Sig Gp	Cholon
114	67th Area Sig Gp	Can Tho

(U) The purpose of the reorganization was to consolidate advisory personnel for centralized control of the signal advisory effort by MACJ6, and to realign the advisory structure to coincide with ARVN command channel. The Area Signal advisory personnel formerly assigned to each CTZ advisory team were transferred to the new Area Signal Advisory Team in their respective CTZ. 223

Posthostilities Telecommunications Planning

(S) During March the first significant steps were taken toward combined posthostilities telecommunications planning with the GVN. On 1 Mar the JCS approved contacts with the GVN for that purpose, provided such contacts were on a government-to-government basis. In keeping with that guidance, it was recommended to the GVN, through both military and diplomatic channels, that coordinated US/GVN planning begin. Concurrently, MACJ6, as Chairman of the US Communications-Electronics Staff Committee (CESC), presented to the membership a concept for two working panels under the CESC to represent the US in the US/GVN planning effort. 224

(S) The CoS approved the concept and implementing actions of the CESC on 5 May. This approval included the following: 225

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1.4 However, the management shall follow, as far as possible the model management of a private company. The limitations imposed on this private management shall be only in the following fields: security (defense and police) rate structure and fields of investments (in relation with the social policy of the government).

2. Assets and capital.

2.1 The assets and initial capital of this organization shall be all existing land, building, office, transportation, telecommunications and associated equipment belonging to all existing telecommunications agencies, and all facilities equipment which can be left over by the US Army and other US agencies.

2.2 All future foreign aid in the telecommunications field shall be concentrated into this single organization, except in those particular fields of telecommunications that this organization cannot provide.

3. Single integrated system.

3.1 This equipment shall be integrated into a single system.

3.2 The integration shall follow the following basic considerations:

- a. To be operated by a single organization.
- b. To be economically sound in operation and development within the limits of the social policy fixed by the government.
- c. To provide necessary security of operation (or reliability) for the Defense and the Police.

3.3 The telecommunications service that this system furnishes shall be:

- ...Fixed service.
- ...Mobile service for: the Navy, air navigation and control, ship-to-shore, ...etc.
- ...Radio and television broadcasting.

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...If possible, semi-mobile service for: the Army, the Police, the Railroad, and other civil uses.

4. The post-war planning group.

This group must study and help Vietnam to implement the following:

4.1 Study, recommend, and implement this organization.

4.2 Review all existing equipment. Study and incorporate this equipment into the single integrated system.

4.3 Study and implement the training program for managers and technicians.

4.4 Study and recommend the plan for the transfer of the in-war period to the post-war period.

4.5 Study and recommend the foreign aid and the contribution of the GVN necessary during the post-war period in order to implement this plan of a single organization operating a single integrated system.

5. Present problems.

We must have, if possible, clear tentative information on:

5.1 The amount of equipment left-over by the U.S. government.

5.2 The training schedule of the ARVN in the operations of the ICS.

5.3 Other estimated schedules for the transition time from in-war to post-war period.

(S) In November and in response to CINCPAC tasking, COMUSMACV prepared a time-phased schedule for the turnover of selected C-E systems. The schedule provided for a relatively austere residual communications system to support interim US requirements and it was also configured to meet the long range RVNAF/GVN requirements as the nucleus of an eventual national telecommunications system. Specific turnover dates were contingent upon development by RVNAF/GVN of the capabilities to operate and maintain facilities and equipment. Schedules for turnover of specialized categories of C-E assets such as radars, control towers, and weather communications were also included in the planning. The completed schedule was approved and forwarded to CINCPAC on 25 Nov. While the proposals were being staff at PACOM

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and JCS, the rationale and methodology embodied in the schedules were used as the basis for the C-E portions of the COMUSMACV's Phase III RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan. 227

Military Affiliate Radio System

(U) The Military Affiliate Radio System (MARS) had in operation 67 of its authorized stations at the end of 1968. These stations had been established throughout RVN generally in proportion to troop density at the respective sites. During 1968 the number of messages handled had increased 100 percent. (See 1968 MACV Command History, pp. 724-5.)

(U) During 1969, the number of stations, both authorized by GVN and in operation, increased to 80. The system continued to handle a heavy volume of traffic as indicated in Figure IX-23. The number of stations by component as of 31 Dec was: 228

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Operational</u>
Air Force	12	12
Army	47	47
Navy	<u>21</u>	<u>21</u>
	80	80

In all instances, the system sought to provide its services to the maximum number of personnel. In September the effects of troop redeployment were discerned in MARS traffic and the total number of messages / phone patches declined to just over 77,000. 229

(U) In the fourth quarter, MARS traffic began to decline again reflecting the redeployment of some of its customers. In spite of the decline in number of troops using the facilities the system handled over 2.4 million messages for the year.

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
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MARS TRAFFIC 1969



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FIGURE IX-23

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LOGISTICS - IX

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4. Rpt (C), MACJ43-LM, 20 Apr 69, Subj: LOGSUM 2-69 for March 1969 (U), Gp-4.
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14. Rpt (C), MACJ43-LM, 20 Sep 69, Subj: LOGSUM 8-69 for August 1969 (U), Gp-4.
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48. Rpt (C), MACJ43-LM, 10 May 69, Subj: LOGSUM 4-69 for April 1969 (U), Gp-4; Rpt (C), MACJ43-LM, 19 Jun 69, Subj: LOGSUM 5-69 for May 1969 (U), Gp-4.
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CHAPTER X

PRISONERS OF WAR

We then wish to bring to the attention of those charged with the urgent task of laying the foundation for this peace problem which, because of its human character, deserves our special care. The problem...is...of prisoners, whose exile is often made even sadder and harder by the inability to keep in touch by letter with their loved ones.

International rules and arrangements regulate the treatment that must be given to prisoners of war. We express the hope, in the common interest, that those who have fallen into enemy hands may be recognized as such, and properly treated. In any case, beyond what is formally prescribed, there are other no less binding rules; those of the human feeling of respect and compassion which should induce responsible authorities to adopt towards these combatants a more magnanimous and noble attitude.

For this special group of persons painfully affected by the consequences of the conflict, we dare renew our prayer that their fate be made less sad and painful.

Pope Paul, 23 June 1969¹

INTRODUCTION

(U) The question of prisoners of war (PWs) and civilian political prisoners in SEASIA continued to be an extremely difficult military/political/diplomatic problem in 1969. The US emphasized at the Paris Peace Talks the question of treatment of its PWs held by the North Vietnamese. The Paris talks also included discussion of questions relating to North Vietnamese and VC prisoners held by the RVN, and particularly procedures for the repatriation of a number of sick and wounded North Vietnamese PWs. Some problems which had appeared in negotiations at the close of previous wars in Indochina and in Korea, reappeared in 1969 relating to the Vietnam War. For instance, the issue arose of the exchange of lists of PWs held by both sides. In spite of US efforts, there was no major breakthrough on the overall issue of US PWs held by North Vietnam. Nor was there any breakthrough in establishing procedures for the repatriation of the sick and wounded NVA PWs.

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HISTORY OF PW NEGOTIATIONS IN SEASIA

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos

Introduction

(U) When the Geneva Agreements governing the settlement of the Indochina War in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were signed to settle the French/Viet Minh conflict in July 1954, only three of the nine states represented at the Geneva Conference -- France, Vietnam, and the USSR -- had ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions on PWs and Civilian Internees (CIs). Of the three countries selected by the conferees to supervise implementation of the Agreements, only India had ratified the Conventions. The Vietnam Agreement called for the release of all PWs and CIs held by either side. It specified that all prisoners, foreign and Vietnamese, were to be surrendered to "the appropriate authorities" of the other party. Once surrendered, prisoners would be given "all possible assistance in proceeding to their country of origin, place of habitual residence or zone of their choice (Art. 21c)." The agreement did not provide the safeguards against forced repatriation that had been written into the Korean Armistice Agreement. There was no stipulation requiring the International Control Commission (ICC) to take custody of, or even to interview, those prisoners (foreign or Vietnamese) who might not want to be surrendered to the side from which they had been captured. On the contrary, the ICC was specifically required to "control" the compulsory surrender of prisoners.

(U) The Laos and Cambodia agreements of 1954 provided that only foreign prisoners were to be surrendered to the other side, presumably because there was to be no partition of those countries and because the dissident fighting elements in each were supposed to be rapidly integrated into the national community. Nationals of Laos or Cambodia captured within either country were simply to be released. There was no specific requirement that Laotians and Cambodians be released within their respective countries, however, nor were there any provisions for verifying that releases that allegedly had taken place elsewhere -- for example, in NVN -- were genuine and that the former prisoners continued residence in the country of their release was voluntary.

(U) The three Geneva Agreements of 1954 referred to two categories of prisoners: "prisoners of war" (not further defined); and "civilian internees" (CIs), a term "understood to mean all persons who, having in any way contributed to the political and armed struggle between the two parties, have been arrested for that reason or kept in detention by either party during the period of hostilities" (Vietnam, Art. 21b.).

(U) In the Joint Communiqué issued in Zurich in June 1961, the three Lao Princes spoke of the proposed release of all "political prisoners and detainees." The term "prisoners of war" was not used, presumably because the parties had agreed to treat the release of Lao prisoners as strictly an internal matter, subject neither to decisions of the Laos Conference nor to the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

(U) In the Laos Protocol of 1962, the article dealing specifically with prisoners (Art. 7) referred to "foreign military persons and civilians." Elsewhere, the term "foreign military personnel" was used and was defined in Article 1a as including "members of foreign military

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missions, foreign military advisors, experts, instructors, consultants, technicians, observers and any other foreign military persons, including those serving in any of the armed forces in Laos and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, sorting and utilization of "war materials."

Lessons of the Past

(S) This section is included in order to relate previous negotiation experiences to the direct involvement of the US in the war in Vietnam. Some of the policies pursued in previous years as well as certain courses of action taken (or rejected) by NVN and RVN may prove relevant and illuminating:

1. In the previous years, the Viet Minh (and the Pathet Lao) consistently refused to supply nominal lists of all enemy PWs either before, during, or after negotiations.

a. Although they submitted partial lists after the 1954 Conference, they indicated that 70 percent of the prisoners claimed by the French/GVN side were "unknown" to the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). General Ely, who delayed in making a formal protest about the shocking physical condition of returned French PWs for fear that the Viet Minh would not return the remaining prisoners, noted in his memoirs that the delay was further prolonged by the difficulty of obtaining from the PAVN complete lists of French prisoners of war who were living or had died in captivity. The issue was compounded by the fact that such lists were even harder to come by for Vietnamese PWs, many of whom had joined PAVN units either voluntarily or under duress.

b. The French, for their part, having given to NVN the names of prisoners they were prepared to surrender, then found that they could not always produce the number promised. For example, shortly before the deadline for release, French authorities discovered that they had promised to return from the Hue area about 1,000 more NVN PWs than they had on hand. Apparently concerned lest the Viet Minh respond to the shortage by refusing to release prisoners from the French Union Forces, they asked RVN authorities to turn over Viet Minh civilian prisoners to enable them to fill the quota. When this request was refused, the French sought to persuade CIs to volunteer, but only 100 of these were willing to pose as PWs in order to be repatriated to the Viet Minh zone.

c. It is unlikely that any of the Communist commands in the Vietnam conflict -- the PAVN, the VC, or the Pathet Lao -- kept an accurate list of its men who were taken prisoner during the hostilities. Many were released by their captors, and some were subsequently recaptured. It was generally assumed, however, that the three commands had compiled lists of all captured US and Allied personnel, military and civilian, but it was doubtful that they would produce these lists during the negotiations or even immediately thereafter, unless to do so proved to be distinctly to their advantage. If, for example, the US offered to withdraw some of its forces in exchange for US prisoners, and if the Communists were receptive to such an offer, it could be tied quantitatively to the number of prisoners surrendered (i. e., so many US personnel withdrawn per prisoner released), and it could then be to the advantage of the Communists to produce lists of their US captives and to release them promptly.

2. It was a consistent policy of the GNVN to deny the presence of its troops outside NVN even when it was apparently undeniable.

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a. At the 1954 Conference NVN denied having troops in Cambodia, but it subsequently withdrew 2,384 men under ICC supervision. At the 1962 Conference, it denied the presence in Laos of an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 PAVN troops. Thereafter, it withdrew some forces surreptitiously and left many others in Pathet Lao-controlled territory. Only 40 "technicians" were admittedly evacuated through the ICC checkpoint.

b. North Vietnam continued this policy in its negotiations with the US; it refused to acknowledge that its combatants captured in Laos between 1962 and 1969 were of the PAVN and even went so far as to deny that they were North Vietnamese, two facts admitted by the prisoners themselves. Similarly, having consistently denied the presence of its military forces in RVN, the GNVN refused to concede that 7,205 NVN prisoners held by the GVN were PAVN troops and therefore, PWs.

c. After the 1954 Geneva Conference, Cambodia, Laos, and RVN deeply resented the continued presence of uniformed PAVN officers on their territory. However, as a signatory to the cease-fire agreement, NVN was partly responsible for implementation of the military clauses. It thus had legitimate grounds for keeping senior PAVN officers and political cadres, posing as interpreters, in the Associated States. They served as members of the Joint Commission and its subcommissions and teams, as liaison officers attached to the ICC headquarters and its investigating teams, and as members of "Graves Registration" teams. As a result, NVN was able not only to play an often decisive role in the formulation of policy and developments but also to strengthen its control over the local Communists. In this way, NVN was able to continue "showing the flag" in the three countries from which Viet Minh forces supposedly had been withdrawn under the agreements. Although the Viet Minh used a variety of arguments to justify extending their presence in the three countries, the governments of those states either rid themselves of the PAVN members as soon as possible by dissolving the joint bodies, or curtailed activities of the Communist representatives by strictly limiting their number and freedom of movement. After the 1962 Geneva Conference, there was no question of allowing PAVN members to join any mixed commissions, as NVN, despite the presence of its combat forces in Laos, was not an acknowledged belligerent.

d. At the end of 1969, the RVN had de jure and de facto custody of 7,205 PAVN PWs. Some were captured by the ARVN, while others were captured by US Forces and then transferred to the GVN. Under the Geneva Convention, the US had a continuing responsibility for the latter group that would require it "to take effective measures," including requesting their return, if the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were to find that the GVN had failed to carry out the provisions of the Convention "in any important respect." At one time, the US itself had held in custody 14 of an original 17 NVN seamen captured during a naval engagement off NVN. The 17 had been the only North Vietnamese recognized by NVN as military prisoners, an acknowledgement probably due to the fact that they had not been captured on RVN soil. According to Hanoi, they had been "illegally" kidnapped in international waters while on a peaceful mission.

3. The Communists tended to use every means at their disposal to avoid giving PWs their choice of destination.

a. The North Vietnamese took advantage of the loophole in the 1954 Agreement to avoid surrendering large numbers of PWs to the French/GVN side, yet at the same time demanded that the French give up all Viet Minh prisoners. In 1962 the Communists strongly opposed

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5. Another problem was the tendency of the GVN's central and provincial authorities, at times, to be as recalcitrant and as uncompromising as the Communists with regard to the release of VC and DRV prisoners.

a. After the 1954 settlement, the GVN often refused to accept even unanimous ICC interpretations of the Geneva Agreements when these applied to South Vietnamese civil or military prisoners in their custody, or to implement ICC recommendations for the release of such prisoners even when the French Command had acknowledged the accuracy of the interpretations and the fairness of the recommendations. Also, in a number of instances, provincial authorities of the GVN categorically refused to implement ICC recommendations accepted by the Central Government, especially when these called for the release of CIs known to such local authorities as key Viet Minh political organizers in their territory. In cases where the GVN had not fully concurred with all the terms accepted by the French, it frequently refused to implement agreements concluded by the Joint Commission. For example, it rejected certain provisions of the Graves Convention and the DMZ Protocol, which had been signed by both the French and the Viet Minh High Commands. Following this, the GVN's determination to use its own independent interpretation of agreements was evident in its prolonged refusal to deal with military PWs as "prisoners of war." Instead, they were officially and physically labeled "Communist Rebel Combat Captives", in violation of the Geneva Convention, of which the GVN was a signatory.

b. It was conceivable that, if the RVN was required to:

(1) implement agreements to which they were not a full party,

(2) abide by terms accepted only under strong pressure from their allies, or

(3) accept interpretations of international conventions, with which they did not concur, the US could expect to meet much the same unwillingness to heed US advice as the French encountered after 1954. The GVN authorities were expected to be particularly obstinate. Even if there was a coalition, the non-Communist element in such a government, as well as local authorities and the ARVN, were not expected to be more amenable to US guidance under those conditions. A good example of potential problems was exhibited by the GVN Lower House on 9 Jan 69 when it passed a proclamation concerning PW exchanges (See US PWs Released by VC/NVA in ARVN, this chapter.)

6. There was no guarantee that humanitarian reasons, a desire to abide by the Geneva PW Convention, or even commitment to an agreement reached during negotiations would induce NVN to hand over all prisoners during the negotiations for a ceasefire, or promptly after a settlement had been reached. To rely on such a likelihood would ignore the Viet Minh's previous tendency to use PWs in their custody as a means of gaining political objectives. Thus, it is doubtful that the Viet Minh would have released as many French PWs as they did, and as soon after the 1954 Conference as they did, had they not hoped thereby to obtain material concessions and political cooperation from the French. For example, in return for the prompt surrender of French prisoners, the Communists may have hoped for a more generous allocation of equipment as the French withdrew from the North, the retention of French technicians who would operate utilities in the North, economic and cultural cooperation of the kind elicited in Pham Van Dong's letter to Prime Minister Mendes-France at the close of the Geneva Conference, and France's support in ensuring that the general elections scheduled for 1956 would be held. On the other

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hand, when it came to the French-African PWs, the Communist interest was better served by their prolonged detention and brainwashing, which afforded the Viet Minh an opportunity to train those prisoners for future guerrilla warfare and subversive activities in Africa. As for Vietnamese PWs, the DKV chose to retain permanently an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 (including deserters) to help meet manpower needs for reconstruction of the country and expansion of the PAVN.

(S) During 1969, as in the past, NVN's major considerations in dealing with prisoner releases appeared to be pragmatic and political rather than moral and humane.

Korea

Summary

(U) The PW issue had crucial influence upon the long negotiations for an armistice in Korea. The Chinese and North Korean Communists favored an "all for all" exchange of prisoners and "forced repatriation". The Chinese Communists opposed giving Chinese prisoners a choice of returning to Communist or Nationalist China. The United Nations Command (UNC) favored allowing all prisoners to choose freely whether they wanted to return home or not. For 15 months, negotiations were stymied largely on this issue. Eventually, the Communists agreed to a process, including the participation of a neutral nation, by which prisoners who didn't want to return home could have free choice. About 50,000 prisoners were affected by the UNC commitment to voluntary choice.

PW Problems in Korea

(U) Some of the problems related to the prisoner negotiations in Korea have appeared or might appear in the future in RVN.

1. Attempts were made at times to tie the issue into a "package" arrangement, combining the prisoner issue with other issues and arranging compromises including the PW and other issues.
2. The UNC mentioned to Communist negotiators a figure of 116,000 potential prisoners for repatriation before it canvassed prisoner opinion and discovered that only about 70,000 wanted to return home.
3. Communist and non-Communist North Korean prisoners clashed in the prison camps as the Communists sought to gain control of the camps. Communist-controlled PW compounds resisted attempts to screen prisoners to discover which prisoners wanted to return to North Korea.
4. Communist prisoners in South Korean Prison camps were well organized. They were often led by North Korean agents who had infiltrated into South Korea and allowed themselves to be captured. Furthermore, the agents in the prison camps were able to maintain contact with the outside and with North Korean delegates to the Armistice Conference. Prison rebellions increased after the Armistice negotiations had begun and embarrassed the UNC. At one point, North Korean prisoners kidnapped a US general, who was a prison camp commander, as he spoke to prisoners.

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5. Prison camp rebellions "muddied" world public opinion about the process of screening prisoners. ³

A Possible Difference between Korea and Vietnam

(U) During the Korean War negotiations, the North Korean and CHICOM delegations favored for a long time forced repatriation of all PWs to the prisoners' country of origin. There were indications in 1969 that the North Vietnamese and VC might favor allowing their prisoners in the South to have freedom of choice, in part in order to increase the number of their supporters in the South. ⁴

UNITED STATES PRISONERS OF WAR

US and NVN Policy

Introduction

(S) As of 21 Jan 70, 1,473 US military personnel were listed as captured and missing in action in NVN, RVN, and Laos (See Table X-1). Of this number, the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) listed 432 as captured and 1,041 as missing. ⁵ Many of the missing were believed to be alive. As of 14 Feb 70, 369 men were known to be held in NVN. There were also some US civilians missing. ⁶ Exact figures for prisoners were not known, since the Hanoi Government, the VC, and the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) (Lao Communist Front) in Laos had not provided the names of all PWs to the US, to the ICRC, or to any other neutral, impartial organization as required by the 1949 Geneva Convention. (NVN had signed the Geneva Convention in June 1957; RVN on 14 Nov 53; and the US on 2 Feb 56.) One observer had received information that Western and Eastern diplomats, who had raised the question of US PWs with members of the North Vietnamese Ministry of Information, had been told that over 1,000 Americans were being held in NVN, but there was no way to be sure the information was accurate. ⁷ Probably, some Americans who had been captured in RVN had been transferred to NVN. A source indicated that an agreement had been reached between the NVN government and the NLHS Central Committee whereby all Americans who had been captured in Laos would be transferred to NVN for use in PW exchanges. ⁸ Two Americans released by Hanoi in 1969 cited two instances in which Americans who had been captured in Laos had been transferred to Hanoi, and the released prisoners believed that all pilots were being held in Hanoi. ⁹ The largest number of prisoners were pilots and navigators who had been shot down over NVN prior to the bombing halt. Some of these men had been held for as long as five years; longer than any other American had ever been held as a PW.

(S) American prisoners held by the North Vietnamese had been mistreated including the use of physical and mental abuse and the use of solitary confinement. Hanoi publicly stated that the PWs were treated "humanely" and "leniently," given medical care, adequate food, and other privileges. However, Hanoi refused to allow the prisoners to be visited in their places of detention by delegates of the ICRC or any other impartial body. Instead the North Vietnamese used occasional press "interviews" with a few prisoners and forced prisoners to make public statements in an attempt to convey the impression that all prisoners were well treated. NVN

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MISSING AND CAPTURED PERSONNEL - SOUTHEAST ASIA

	South Vietnam		North Vietnam		Laos		Other Areas		TOTAL
	Missing	Captured	Missing	Captured	Missing	Captured	Missing	Captured	
US ARMY	264	54	0	0	35	0	3	0	356
US NAVY	7	0	94	139	12	1	7	1	261
USAF	55	6	294	200	180	6	0	1	742
USMC	66	17	17	7	7	0	0	0	114
TOTAL MIL	392	77	405	346	234	7	10	2	1,473
US CIV	7	32	0	1	2	0	0	0	42
3 D NAT MIL	ROK 2	0	0	0	0	1	THAI 0	0	3
3 D NAT CIV	GER 1 PHIL 7 BRIT 1	CAN 1 PHIL 2 BRIT 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	16
TOTAL NON-MIL	18	39	0	1	2	1	0	0	61
TOTAL	410	116	405	347	236	8	10	2	1,534

Total US Military Personnel Missing 1041
 Total US Military Personnel Captured 432
 TOTAL 1473

CAP MIA
 SVN/LAOS 84 626
 NVN 346 405
 430 1,031

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claimed that prisoners had regular mail privileges. Periodically, NVN had stated publicly that packages would be accepted for the prisoners. Thus, months prior to 4 Jul and Christmas, hundreds of packages were sent to Hanoi via Moscow. Only a small number of these packages were received by the prisoners and it wasn't certain that all prisoners received the packages sent to them. Letters sent to the prisoners directly or through the ICRC and letters from the PWs to their families suffered the same uncertain fate. The Chief US delegate to the Paris Conference said on 5 Feb 70:

Only about 170 families have ever received a letter from a man who is missing or captured in Viet-Nam. Many of these families have only recently received their first letter. In some cases, those men have been held since 1965--that is, over four years with no word to their families.¹⁰

No letters were received from US PWs held in RVN or Laos, and there was no evidence that any of the many letters sent by their families ever reached them. Since Hanoi refused to provide complete lists of US prisoners, many families didn't know whether their loved ones were alive.¹¹

United States Prisoner of War Policy

(C) The Geneva Prisoner of War Convention applied to the Vietnam conflict and was being adhered to by the US, the RVN and other Allied forces. With strong US urging, the GVN provided the ICRC with an updated list of PWs held by the RVN.

(C) The US Government emphasized the PW issue in statements by public officials in Washington and at the Paris Peace Talks. At the First Plenary Session of the talks, the US Chief Delegate Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge stated:

We seek the early release of prisoners of war on both sides so they can return to their homes and rejoin their families. We would be prepared to discuss this at an early date so as to arrange for the prompt release of prisoners held by both sides.¹²

SECDEF Laird issued a strong statement on 19 May concerning the failure of the GNVN to adhere to the Geneva Agreement in its treatment of US PWs.¹³ On 5 Jun, SECSTATE Rogers expressed his concern about US PWs held by NVN.¹⁴ Shortly after the release of three US PWs by Hanoi in August, US emphasis of the plight of the PWs increased dramatically. The former prisoners themselves spoke out about their mistreatment. DOD permitted the PWs to speak, though it entailed a change of policy and greater risk for the prisoners remaining in NVN. DOD guidance stated that the returned PWs wanted to speak out, that they had promised the PWs remaining in Hanoi that they would speak out, and that the remaining PWs already had been exposed to risks, mistreatment, isolation and inhumane treatment.¹⁵

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(C) Paris became the focal point for the expression of US concern about the PWs. US officials at Paris stressed that the Geneva Convention should be followed, that the names of PWs held by Hanoi should be provided, that impartial inspection of the PW camps by the ICRC or some other neutral group should be allowed, that the unhindered flow of mail to and from PWs should be permitted, and that sick and wounded prisoners on both sides should be repatriated. 16 Ambassador Habib devoted his entire statement at the last session of the peace talks in 1969 to the PW issue. He gave the NVN delegation a list of all US servicemen missing in SEASIA and asked the North Vietnamese to let the US know which men they held. As US officials and delegates had emphasized repeatedly, Ambassador Habib stressed the humanitarian aspects of the PW question and that the question was a central one at the conference. He contrasted North Vietnamese treatment of US PWs with the adherence to the Geneva Convention by the US and RVN. Ambassador Habib closed out the year the same way that Ambassador Lodge had opened it, stating:

I call on your side to live up to the international standards for the treatment of those who are missing or held prisoner in Vietnam. This humanitarian issue should be dealt with separately from the political and military questions we face in the Paris meeting. We propose that our two sides enter promptly into discussions on all questions affecting prisoners of war held on both sides, including the question of their early release. The United States Delegation stands ready to enter into such negotiations without delay. 17

(C) The US appealed to a number of countries to raise the prisoner issue with Hanoi. The USG also had contact with a number of individuals who visited Hanoi or had contact with Communist diplomats and officials in Laos or elsewhere.

The ICRC

(S) The US appealed to the ICRC to intercede on behalf of the US PWs. During 1969, as in previous years, the ICRC called the attention of the GNVN to its obligations under the Geneva Convention. It requested complete lists of PWs, civilians and military internees, the authorization of visits to PWs, and the authorization of the rights of prisoners to send and receive letters. However, the NVN Red Cross echoed the statements of its government that the US PWs were "war criminals" and not prisoners. Hanoi also refused to accept a "Protecting Power" for the prisoners and rejected the offer of the ICRC to act as a substitute for a Protecting Power as envisaged in Article 10 of the Geneva Convention. 18

(C) An ICRC Conference was held in Istanbul in September. At the Conference, the Chief of the US Delegation asserted:

North Vietnam denies universally accepted standards of humanitarian treatment for prisoners and violates the provisions of the Geneva Conventions to which it acceded by:

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1. Refusing to identify the prisoners it holds and account for those missing in North Vietnam.
2. Torturing prisoners both physically and mentally.
3. Keeping prisoners in isolation cut off from their fellow prisoners and from the outside world.
4. Failing to provide an adequate diet.
5. Failing to repatriate the seriously sick or wounded.
6. Refusing to permit impartial inspection of prisoner facilities by the ICRC or another appropriate intermediary.
7. Using prisoners for propaganda purposes.
8. Denying regular exchange of mail between all prisoners and their families.
9. Failing to provide adequate medical care to all prisoners in need of treatment. ¹⁹

The Conference passed a resolution (114-0 with seven abstentions) with the Soviet Union joining the US in voting in the affirmative. The resolution, which upheld the principles of the Convention of 1949, stated:

The XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross, recalling the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of prisoners of war, and the historic role of the Red Cross as a protector of victims of war, considering that the convention applies to each armed conflict between two or more parties to the convention without regard to how the conflict may be characterized, recognizing that, even apart from the convention, the international community has consistently demanded humane treatment for prisoners of war, including identification and accounting for all prisoners, provision of an adequate diet and medical care, that prisoners be permitted to communicate with each other and with the exterior, that seriously sick or wounded prisoners be promptly repatriated, and that at all times prisoners be protected from physical and mental torture, abuse and reprisals, requests each party to the convention to take all appropriate measures

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to ensure humane treatment and prevent violations of the convention, calls upon all parties to abide by the obligations set forth in the convention and upon all authorities involved in an armed conflict to ensure that all uniformed members of the regular armed forces of another party to the conflict and all other persons entitled to prisoner of war status are treated humanely and given the fullest measure of protection prescribed by the conventions; and further calls upon all parties to provide free access to the prisoners of war and to all places of their detention by a protecting power or by the International Committee of the Red Cross. ²⁰

The American Red Cross sent appeals to Red Cross societies around the world asking them to urge the North Vietnamese Red Cross to follow the resolution. ²¹

Senate and House of Representatives Resolutions

(U) Both the US Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions and issued statements condemning North Vietnamese handling of US PWs. Included among the signatories were a number of critics of the war. ²²

Visits by Wives to Paris

(U) In 1969, wives and families of missing servicemen traveled to Paris in hope of discovering from GNVN representatives to the Paris Peace Conference if their husbands or loved ones were alive. The trips were undertaken completely independently of the USG. With courage and dignity, the visitors confronted the NVN diplomats at Paris. The visits apparently achieved only slight success. The NVN representatives did say that they "would forward... inquiries to Hanoi." ²³ One wife commented, "The North Vietnamese promised a gradual, and they stressed 'gradual', release of American prisoners, and said any list of prisoners' names would not be released to the US Government, but rather private groups." ²⁴ The North Vietnamese told many of the visitors that they should join the opposition in the US to the war in order to facilitate the return of their husbands. ²⁵ One wife of a missing serviceman, who had journeyed to Vientiane, Laos, was told that her husband was alive. ²⁶ Although the basic NVN attitude concerning US PWs in the North did not change, by the end of the year there seemed to have been some slight, grudging movement by the North Vietnamese in the areas of mail and the release of prisoners' names. A relatively small number of names of men definitely held as prisoners, who had previously been listed as missing, were released in January 1970 after the visit to Hanoi of several leaders of the antiwar movement in December 1969. However, many American families still waited without word of the fate of their husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons.

(U) An effort to aid the prisoners was made by Texas businessman, Ross Perot, who attempted to fly Christmas dinners, medicines, and other goods to Hanoi for the US prisoners. His efforts were greeted with suspicion by the North Vietnamese. One NVN diplomat in Laos commented that he had been "instructed to turn down a 'political man' who was coming named Ross..." ²⁷ Perot was told to send the gifts through Moscow, but no arrangements could be worked out. An organization founded by Mr. Perot, United We Stand, also sponsored a trip to Paris by 150 wives and children of missing servicemen.

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(U) One sign that the plight of American prisoners and of their relatives was recognized in 1969, was the response of the French newspaper Le Figaro. Its foreign editor wrote:

It is inconceivable that a government which claims to fight for justice and liberty would violate rules that are designed to insure that a certain degree of humanity is respected for the well-being of those who have ceased being combatants. 28

The North Vietnamese Position

(S) The NVN officials at Paris and elsewhere justified their handling of US PWs with a number of rationales. They argued that the PW issue was a side issue (Pham Van Dong) and that the US raised it to "side-step the central issues." ²⁹ They asserted that the central issues were the NFLSVN's "10 Points" and said that the prisoners would be released once the "central issues" had been resolved. The NVN called the pilots "war criminals" or "pirates," apparently distinguishing between the pilots and other prisoners. A fellow prisoner told SN Hegdahl, one of three PWs held in Hanoi released in 1969, that he was the only American whom the North Vietnamese considered to be a "PW" rather than a "war criminal." Hegdahl, who had not been a pilot, received "lenient treatment" compared to other prisoners. ³⁰

(S) The North Vietnamese used two legalistic arguments to justify handling the prisoners as "war criminals." They asserted that war had not been declared, so the US pilots were "war criminals." ³¹ This contention was not valid, as Article 2 of the Geneva Convention maintained that the Convention applied "... in all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them." The Vietnam War was clearly an "armed conflict" between parties to the Convention and was viewed that way by the ICRC. The US servicemen captured by NVN were uniformed members of the US forces. They qualified as PWs under Article 4A(1) of the Convention as "members of the armed forces of a Party to the Conflict." The second legalistic argument was that the North Vietnamese had signed the Geneva Convention with a reservation. A DRV delegate at Paris stated:

When participating in the 1949 Geneva Convention on the treatment of war prisoners, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam clearly made a reserve on Article 85:

"The Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared that war prisoners prosecuted and tried for their war crimes or grave crimes against humanity, in accordance with the principles laid down by the Nuremberg Tribunal, are not entitled to benefit from the provisions of this convention as stipulated by Article 85."

The delegate added that in spite of their "crimes," the men had been treated "humanely" and that they had been allowed to correspond with their families. North Vietnamese spokesmen repeatedly asserted that prisoners had been treated humanely, which wasn't true. ³² A summation of the

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legalistic arguments was provided by a DRV official. In the words of a Red Cross official who had visited NVN, the DRV official stated "that DRVN was not in war; pilots had legal right to say no to missions over NVN; pilots had obligation to disobey unlawful criminal orders, thus they must be considered criminals; and DRVN when it acceded to Geneva Conventions in 1957 reserved its position to respect Article 85."³³

(C) When the US emphasized the prisoner issue in 1969, the North Vietnamese also responded with arguments other than those cited above. In addition to citing destruction to life and property by the bombing in the North, the NVN and VC delegates accused the US of numerous atrocities in the South. One accusation was that female VC prisoners, held in Thu Duc Prison in RVN, had been tortured.³⁴ The Saigon Embassy responded to this allegation stating, "As with earlier Communist allegations of mistreatment of prisoners in SVN, those of PRG in Paris October 2 relate to real incident, although the alleged atrocities (especially those charged on Liberation Radio) bear no relation to facts."³⁵

(C) The increased emphasis on the PW issue by the USG and the visits to Paris and elsewhere by relatives of the missing men appeared to throw the North Vietnamese off balance. They reacted quickly and sharply to SECDEF Laird's criticisms of Hanoi's PW policy in May and September revealing "increased sensitivity" over the issue.³⁶ Policy concerning the visits of the wives wavered. One spokesman for the DRV at Paris, when asked about the PWs, responded in a "little lower key and acknowledged the anguish of the families of the pilots, albeit relating it in gravity to the anguish visited on the people of the North by the bombing." The spokesman then hesitated in response to a question as to whether or not the wives should continue to come to Paris. His response suggested a "confusion on the other side over the problem."³⁷ One East European diplomat commented that "NVN was nettled by the change in US attitude regarding prisoners following release of last three men."³⁸ At first, the North Vietnamese encouraged wives to come to Paris as long as they came independently of the US government. Later, they encouraged wives to write. Hanoi stressed finally that the primary communication concerning the prisoners would take place with US peace groups as the intermediaries. While this form of intercourse was reprehensible to many US officials, it was used. The US position was "we will welcome information on these men through whatever channels it comes."³⁹

An Explanation of North Vietnamese Policy

(C) The primary reasons why the DRV failed to provide lists of US PWs and followed their general policy can only be conjectured. The primary explanation probably was that the GNVN viewed the prisoners as a potential valuable asset in any bargaining to end the war. A NVA officer, who had been captured on 5 Dec 68, stated that he had been taught in 1966 that the prisoners were "of first level importance because they will be used as a means of obtaining payment for bomb damages from the US when the war ends and that for that reason they must be protected and given good treatment."⁴⁰ Hanoi also probably had political concessions in mind in addition to the payment of bomb damages. Possibly Hanoi hoped to gain concessions for each phase of the release of prisoners such as the release of a PW list. In the short run, the DRV continued to use the prisoners for propaganda purposes by forcing them to make public statements. Overall, the treatment of US PWs by Hanoi may be explained as one aspect of NVN's PSYWAR program.

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Sources of Information

(S) Probably between 400 and 500 US fliers were imprisoned in Hanoi. The Secretary General of the Swedish League of Red Cross Societies returned from Hanoi asserting that rumors among journalists, diplomats and visitors to Hanoi were that 400 to 500 US pilots were held in Hanoi. These figures coincided with other assessments. ⁴¹ Primary sources of information about treatment received by the prisoners were released prisoners, the letters from the PWs which had gotten through, and photography. One of the PWs released this year, CPT Wesley L. Rumble, had a "fantastic memory" and was a rich source of names of PWs and of information. ⁴² Other sources of information were a small number of Hoi Chanh, NVA and VC prisoners, propaganda film, forced propaganda statements by the PWs, and occasional controlled interviews with PWs.

Prison Camps

(S) It was thought that there were five prison camps in Hanoi, the Hoa Lo (Ha Lo) Prison, with more than 200 prisoners, the "Zoo" with 185-188 prisoners, the "Country Club" with 47 PWs, the "Annex" near the "Country Club" with 26 prisoners, and the Thermal Power Plant in which it was thought that some PWs were held. It was thought that another camp outside of Hanoi had been closed in 1967. The Ha Lo Prison was divided into the cell block area called the "Hanoi Hilton" and the interrogation area called "Heartbreak." The "Hanoi Hilton" was the most secure prison. The "Zoo" was crowded. The least harsh conditions existed at the "Country Club." Visitors to Hanoi had seen only three rooms of the "Country Club." The 20 PWs in the "Annex" were believed to be primarily senior officers, all of whom were in solitary confinement and were receiving relatively harsh treatment. ⁴³

(C) A Hoi Chanh named ~~_____~~ provided a description of US PWs being held in 1967 at two locations in Hanoi and working at the Yen Phu Power Plant (See Figure X-1). Approximately 20 US PWs had been detained and quartered in the houses numbered 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, and 38 on Pham Hong Thai Street in Hanoi. Two to four PWs had been assigned to a house; the prisoners were reportedly first moved into this area around March 1967. The houses were described as one-story brick buildings with a tile roof extending over the entire housing complex. A coal storage area was located behind buildings 28, 30, and 32, and a supply storage area was behind buildings 34, 36, and 38. The PWs quarters did not contain bomb shelters, but individual concrete foxhole type shelters with steel covers were located in front of each building. These shelters were about chest deep and could fully accommodate a man when he squatted. During the June and August 1967 airstrikes on the plant complex, the PWs had been taken by armed police to an underground concrete bunker in the eastern sector of the plant area. No PWs had been injured during the airstrikes, and their quarters had not been damaged.


(C) A second group of about 20 US PWs, who had been kept originally at the Pham Hong Thai Street Housing complex, had been detained at a former Chinese secondary school, Truong Trung Hoc Trung Hoa. The school area also contained the administrative section of the power plant. They were kept in an old French, one-story, tile-roofed, brick warehouse on the southwest side of Phu Yen Street. One mobile guard was stationed in front to prevent the local populace

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HANOI PW CAMP




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FIGURE X-1

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HANOI'S HA LO PRISON



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
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Release of Three US PWs by NVN

(S) Three US servicemen were released by NVN in early August 69. They were LT Robert Frishman, a navy flier shot down over NVN on 24 Oct 67, CPT Wesley L. Rumble (USAF), shot down over NVN on 28 Apr 68, and Seaman Douglas Hegdahl, washed overboard from the USS Canberra in the Gulf of Tonkin and captured on 6 Apr 67.

(C) The release took place after NVN had contacted a leader of the antiwar movement, David Dellinger. The North Vietnamese had informed Dellinger that they would release three US PWs on the Fourth of July to commemorate that occasion and to again demonstrate the principles of humanitarianism.⁴⁶ The release did not occur on 4 Jul as the North Vietnamese had announced. Rennard Davis, another leader of the antiwar movement, who became the spokesman for the team which travelled to Hanoi to assist in the release, held a press conference to discuss the situation. In answer to the question "Have you had any contact with the North Vietnamese that would indicate the reason for the delay?", Davis answered:

We've been moving as quickly as possible to make the arrangements. The delay has not been the fault of the North Vietnamese. It has been caused by the need to travel first to Paris, then back to the United States to make the arrangements with the delegation, and then to Vientiane.⁴⁷

When asked at the news conference whether he felt that he was "being used as an instrument of propaganda, rather than as a simple mediator", Davis naively replied:

There is no propaganda here. This is an expression of North Vietnam's attitude of sympathy and humanity toward prisoners. I don't think the American people understand enough about the North Vietnamese policy toward prisoners. The Vietnamese position is that the US is committing aggression in violation of international law, and that therefore prisoners are not entitled to the technical status of prisoners of war. Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese have demonstrated in the past their humanitarian policy toward prisoners. We're privileged to play this role. Our larger task, however, is to bring all American soldiers out of Vietnam. This can only come when American people make it known that they want us to get out of Vietnam.⁴⁸

(S) The three servicemen were entrusted to Davis's group on 4 Aug after first being turned over by the prison camp personnel to the "Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with American People." On 5 Aug, the man who was apparently a chief PW administrator and interrogator, drove the released prisoners around Hanoi. They then attended a dinner with the peace delegation and later flew to Vientiane, Laos. At Vientiane, the prisoners chose to fly to the US via commercial rather than military aircraft.⁴⁹ The choice by a group of prisoners released in 1968 to fly back to the US via military aircraft had ruffled the North Vietnamese (See 1968 MACV Command History).

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(S) Why these three prisoners were chosen to be released rather than any of the hundreds of prisoners held remained a mystery. It was possible that SN Hegdahl had been released because he was not a flier and that the other two men were chosen because they were injured. One of the prisoners released in 1969 thought that "humanitarian" reasons stemming from his back injury explained why he was released. ⁵⁰

(C) The reasons why Hanoi released any prisoners at all were open to conjecture. After the release of six prisoners prior to 1969, it had been suggested that Hanoi's motives might have included desires "...to gain worldwide recognition for a 'humanitarian' act", "...to give stature to American peace movements", and to use "... the possibility of future release... as an inducement to compliance..." by other PWs. ⁵¹

Capture of US PWs

(C) According to a captured North Vietnamese platoon leader, who had been a militia platoon leader until recalled into the army in late 1967, North Vietnamese militia members were carefully instructed on how to capture downed pilots. Prior to 1967, the militia personnel had been allowed to shoot crewmen, if they had put up any resistance by using weapons, or to beat them if they had resisted capture. In 1967, however, instruction had been received from higher militia headquarters directing personnel to do their utmost to capture the crewmen without inflicting harm, even if they had used weapons or physical resistance. Upon locating the downed crewman, the squad was to form a cordon around him approximately 50 meters in diameter and prevent any civilians from passing through. The squad leader, who was responsible to protect the crewman from hostile civilians, was to proceed, alone or with another member of the squad, toward the crewman. If the downed airman was injured, a medic was to administer first aid. If the crewman was in good condition, the squad leader was to show him a card containing English sentences instructing him to surrender and giving directions. ⁵²

(S) Much was still not known about conditions of life for US PWs held by NVN after capture. However, enough information was known to sketch some aspects of the PWs' ordeals. ⁵³

Treatment Upon Capture

(S) A pattern appeared to develop on how the treatment of prisoners immediately after capture fitted into an overall plan of indoctrination. It appeared that the "softening up process" began at capture by allowing the local population to threaten and vocally abuse the captives. Minor acts of physical abuse (i. e., throwing rocks, hitting with sticks or fists) may also have been inflicted upon the prisoners. Accounts indicated that this process might have been repeated at several villages before the prisoners reached the initial prison camp. One of the PWs released in 1969 believed that he was taken on a tour of AAA and SAM sights shortly after his capture. In addition to the local propaganda value of allowing the villagers to vent their rage on the prisoners, the guards were portrayed as "protectors" in the eyes of the captives, thereby introducing the feeling of dependence at the very outset. It was true, however, that sometimes the guards were necessary to prevent serious harm to the prisoners.

Medical Treatment of US PWs

(S) The North Vietnamese seemed to have provided enough treatment to keep the prisoner alive. Professionally, the treatment seemed to be quite well done. Referring to an operation

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which removed the elbow of LT Frishman, medical officials at the National Navy Medical Center at Bethesda, Maryland commented that the North Vietnamese had used the proper techniques and termed the basic operation an "excellent job." However, it had taken six months for the incisions to drain; the cast had been removed too early, after one month; and metal fragments had remained in the arm until his return. Frishman himself said that "the North Vietnamese are capable of giving good medical care, but they are basically willing only in doing what is necessary to keep us alive." Frishman cited LCDR John McCain as an example of a flier who had received "basic treatment to keep alive", but stated that McCain and other fliers would "require further treatment before they are in good shape again."⁵⁴

PW Contact with Hanoi Populace

(C) According to a captured NVA prisoner:

About 0600 hours on a day in February 1967, the NVN government had announced by public loudspeakers that a parade of captured U.S. pilots would occur in Hanoi. The people had been encouraged to gather and view the captured pilots but had been warned to abstain from all violence and to observe international rules for prisoners of war. By 0700 hours large crowds had gathered and at 0730 hours the gate of Hoa Lo prison had opened and 53 U.S. pilot prisoners, formed in a column of twos, had marched out. The prisoners had ranked from 1st Lieutenant to Major (announced by loudspeaker) and had been dressed in white clothes with stripes. Each prisoner had worn a number from 1 to 53 on his back. The prisoners had been bound to each other in pairs by a 40 centimeter chain (left hand to right hand). The route of the march had followed Hoa Lo, Tran Hung Dao, Ly Thung Kiet, Trang Tri and Hang Bai Streets. Ten of the prisoners had been Negro. The prisoners had appeared to be in good health and had walked with their eyes on the ground. They had been guarded by two Armed Public Security squads armed with AK 47s.

The NVN government had constantly instilled hatred for the U.S. by various means of propaganda so there had been some people in the crowds who had demonstrated against the pilots by shouting "down with the Americans" and who had wanted the pilots killed. Others, however, had exhibited more sympathy for the pilots and had discussed their large stature, never having seen men that large.⁵⁵

In 1966 and 1967, other residents of Hanoi had seen prisoners, either at work in Hanoi, or while the PWs probably were being shown destruction caused by the bombing.⁵⁶

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The PW and US Air Strikes

(S) An NVA soldier captured by RVN forces stated that the PWs had been put on display at night to avoid airstrikes from US aircraft.⁵⁷ An East European military attache in Hanoi asserted that the North Vietnamese became concerned after President Nixon's 3 Nov 69 speech that the US would renew bombing the North. In addition to refurbishing bomb shelters in Hanoi, the attache claimed that authorities reimposed strict security around the central PW camp in Hanoi to keep all foreigners out of the area. Such measures had reportedly been in effect during the bombing, but had been relaxed somewhat following the halt. According to the attache, the diplomatic community in Hanoi had speculated that PWs, who had been moved after the bombing halt, had been returned to the area so that they could be used as hostages should the bombing resume.⁵⁸ During the air raids, US PWs in the "Heartbreak" and the "Zoo" had been told to crawl under their bunks. At the "Country Club", guards had run through the camp in confusion, jumping into the bomb shelter or foxholes and attempting to fire at the aircraft. The PWs had been forgotten and they had stood in the yard to watch the aircraft. Prior to the bombing halt, US aircraft had overflown the camp frequently. Following the first PW release, reconnaissance overflights had increased, and these flights continued after the halt. AAA sites surrounded the camp but no guns had been observed. LT Frishman had known that there were SAM sites in the area of the "Country Club," but only once had he actually observed a SAM lift off very close to him, and that had been while he had been at the "Hilton". The closest bombing had been that on the nearby Hanoi Railroad and Highway Bridge, although bomb craters had been observed three blocks away from the camp. One PW had recovered a 20mm projectile that had entered his window and lodged in the wall; otherwise, no ordnance had ever hit the camp.⁵⁹

Interrogation

(S) Ha Lo Prison (Heartbreak/Hanoi Hilton) had been the initial processing camp for most PWs. Initial interrogation took place there and seemed primarily designed to break the prisoners' will to resist rather than to gain strategic or tactical intelligence. Inducing the prisoners to answer questions or to discuss subjects beyond name, rank, serial number, and date of birth seemed to have been the primary objective of the North Vietnamese, and they had been willing to go to almost any lengths to achieve their objective. Interest in detailed military information appeared to have been insignificant except to obtain answers to simple questions such as squadron, air wing, launch base, and last mission. To obtain these, the North Vietnamese had applied psychological pressure such as throwing a pair of leg irons into the interrogation room and the denial of medical treatment or the threat of physical punishment. If psychological pressure tactics failed, hard physical abuse had been applied. This treatment often had taken the form of "ropes" or "straps", but also could have involved the denial of food and water, solitary confinement, beatings, and standing or sitting in one position for long periods of time. In addition to interrogation, PWs had received indoctrination in camp policy during the initial sessions including memorizing camp regulations, "respect" and "politeness" toward their captors. The extended application of the ropes treatment at times had resulted in the loss of control of bodily functions and in the temporary loss of sanity.

(S) Prisoners had been attempting to abide by the Code of Conduct, although they had believed that the North Vietnamese would ultimately gain the desired information. The degree of significance or truthfulness of the answer did not seem to be as important to the Vietnamese as the fact that eventually the PW did comply with the demands of the interrogator. This was

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consistent with the theory that the main objective of the North Vietnamese indoctrination had been to gain compliance with all demands with a minimum of resistance--or as previously stated, to break the will to resist. With this theory in mind, the PWs learned to withhold or delay answering questions until a point bordering on torture was reached, and then to say something merely to satisfy the interrogator. While it might have appeared to the Vietnamese that they had accomplished their goals, the prisoners, in reality, had been saving themselves from needless torture by practicing still another form of resistance. Approaching the extreme condition, or having experienced it, the PW would have arrived at his breaking point and would then have given more than rank, serial number and date of birth. Returned PWs said that using out-and-out lies for answers was not particularly good policy, because it might be difficult to remember later exactly what had been said and secondly, the Vietnamese seemed to know the answers to some questions before they were asked.

Indoctrination

(S) After this point, the sessions became more politically oriented. The "soft sell" approach was still being used by interrogators. One of the returnees said he was never pushed on any subject about which he was reluctant to answer. The approach was intended to cause the prisoners to consider the interrogators as "nice guys". The interrogators would ask a simple political question; the PW would answer. The interrogators would then "prove" the answer wrong by using known "true" statements. This created doubt in the PW's mind as to the validity of his own convictions, and this doubt caused considerable mental stress when he turned it over in his mind in the isolation of his cell. Attempts to resist answering these questions by remaining silent resulted in physical abuse, and argument had soon proved useless. Only straight forward answers, whether true, false, or ignorant satisfied the interrogators. Some of the PWs developed serious guilt complexes after having answered the questions.

(S) Reading material had been provided which had included Vietnamese, Soviet, North Korean, and Eastern European propaganda periodicals and books, and articles and books written by Americans such as Doctor Spock, LTC Duncan, Walter Lippman, Felix Greene, the American Friends Service Committee, and by the Australian Wilfred Burchett. The PWs had been asked questions about what they had read. The interrogators also had organized discussion sessions. The PWs had listened to records and the radio. Included had been comments by Senator Fulbright and Stokely Carmichael. The North Vietnamese never used racial prejudice to create tension among the PWs or to extract information. They did, however, mention racial strife in the US during indoctrination sessions, and the Sunday Radio Hanoi broadcasts had been beamed to US black soldiers in RVN. Interrogators used both the friendly and despair approaches, and had played on mental depression. Personal information obtained about a PW was not known to have been used to disgrace him, nor were threats of punishment of other PWs used to coerce a PW to cooperate. "Confessions" by other PWs, however, were used extensively to entice a PW to cooperate in writing a statement. The North Vietnamese threatened trials and executions but no such threats were known to have been carried out. The Vietnamese continually stated that the US Government would bear the full responsibility for bomb damage. This led the PWs to believe that they would be tried and convicted as war criminals, and that the US would pay a fine or ransom for their release at the end of the war. 60

PW Camp Conditions

(S) Most rooms were furnished with a bed made of boards, a "honeybucket," and a 25-watt light bulb which burned constantly. There might or might not be a window or peephole in the

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door to facilitate checking inside the cells by the guards. The PWs were issued two blankets, two long sleeve shirts, two trousers, two black undershorts and T-shirts, one pair sandals (Ho Chi Minh type), one pair socks, washcloth, toothbrush, toothpaste and mosquito netting. Food at the "Hanoi Hilton" was adequate, but not elaborate. The PWs were given better food and treatment prior to release. PWs were very careful about preventing sickness. Clothes and body were washed at every opportunity, and all edible food was consumed. Despite their attempts, most PWs suffered from ringworm, parasites, diarrhea, malnutrition, and heat rash. However, the Vietnamese did not want the PWs to become sick and were concerned about fundamental preventive medicine. (LT Frishman had received three vitamin shots but no inoculations.)⁶¹

Isolation

(S) This had been the greatest obstacle to be faced as other returnees had indicated. Boredom, monotony and anxiety had to be combatted. One of the 1969 returnees, who spent over a year in isolation, recounted one method used by himself and others to combat the effects of isolation. They divided the day into separate events and did each event entirely by itself. For example, the morning cigarette was one event. More explicitly, one did not daydream while smoking--daydreaming was a separate event. Every daily action, even the most minute, such as using the latrine, was made a single event, and, if possible, was done each day at the same time. He also kept his mind active by memorizing dates, names, numbers, etc.

PW Organisation and Communication

(S) The existence of a PW organisation and communications system was confirmed, although the camp officials did not recognize its organisation. All PWs knew who the Senior Ranking Officers (SRO) were, and each complex and cell had an SRO. Examples of SRO policy were:

No escape without outside help. Resist to the point of permanent physical injury or loss of control. Do not ask for money to be sent from relatives even though requested to do so. Unit before self. Pray. Don't let the "SOBs" get you down.

No indication of a PW communication system between camps was evidenced except for the transfer of prisoners from one camp to another. However, in the camps, even though the authorities tried very hard to segregate the men, various means of communication were used.

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Letters Home

(S) PWs were occasionally allowed to write a letter to their wives or parents, however, the procedure was laborious. A first draft was presented to the chief interrogator for approval, and weeks later the draft was returned with deletions and recommended corrections. Again, a draft was prepared and the same procedure followed. Eventually, the PW was allowed to write the final draft. The interrogator did not dictate the contents of the letters but did provide guidelines and restrictions in length. Long delays were experienced between sending and receiving letters. The last letter Frishman received was dated June 1968, and he received it at Tet 1969. The most recent letter known by the PWs released in August 1969 to have been received by a PW had been dated November 1968.

P9 PWs knew that letters which contained reference to good treatment had a better chance of getting through so the PWs included such praise. Packages which had gotten through to the PWs had had some items removed. 63

PWs Assert their Pride

(S) PWs attempted to resist to the best of their ability. Pride was asserted by building and maintaining a chain of command and by communicating with each other. In spite of occasional disagreements among PWs, and in spite of occasional efforts by authorities to get PWs working against each other, the PWs worked very hard to help each other and particularly to help those PWs in isolation. Opposition to the authorities was expressed by means of obscene gestures made in propaganda photographs. Because the guards placed so much emphasis on the PWs bowing whenever a guard approached, the PWs bowed at trees, buildings, dogs, pigs, chickens, and other things in the yard. A courageous example of resistance was the refusal of LCDR John McCain, son of CINCPAC, to accept amnesty, which he alone was offered, if he would sign a statement. 64

(S) Recreation in the camp consisted of catching and killing rats in the cells. There was considerable competition between individuals to amass the greatest number of possible, probable, and confirmed kills. Despite these infrequent diversions, isolation from other PWs, except roommates when a PW had a roommate, prevailed. 65

Security and Escape

(S) Camp security regulations were the same for all camps but physical measures varied from maximum security conditions at "Heartbreak/Hanoi Hilton" to fairly relaxed ones at other camps. The "Country Club" was cited as being particularly easy to escape from. However, it was evident that the local population reacted violently toward the PWs. Further, the Vietnamese policy was that an escapee and his supporters would be severely punished. Evasion in Hanoi was next to impossible. Outside help, a Hanoi city map, a compass and civilian clothing were considered essentials for escape. For these reasons, SRO policy was that no escapes be attempted without outside help, including contacts, safe houses, compass, map, and survival food. 66

NVN PW Camp Staff Organization

(S) One of the returned PWs provided an explanation of the NVN camp organization. The highest ranking officials in the PW organization were known as staff officers. The organization

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in the "Country Club" was divided between the camp military administration and the PW administration. The military administration was headed by the camp commander. Below the camp commander were the guards, turnkeys, cooks and other camp support personnel. The PWs nicknamed the head man of the "Country Club" PW administration "Frenchy". The remainder of the administration group consisted of all the interrogators and indoctrinators. All the guards answered to "Frenchy" if the PWs were mistreated. Bad treatment from the guards increased when "Frenchy" was absent from the camp.⁶⁷

Summary

(C) The comments on conditions in NVN prison camps, cited above, were per se constrained by the limits of the incomplete information which has been brought out or smuggled out to date. The most important advice that returning PWs had for men who might face similar ordeals was to plan in advance. After earlier releases of prisoners by Hanoi, a memorandum analyzed the treatment which the prisoners had received. Coercive methods, efforts to affect conversion and manipulation were seen as the primary means used by NVN authorities. Coercion and manipulation were most frequently used with the latter being primary. Manipulation took a number of forms, ranging from total control of the prisoners environment, which is to say, absolute control of such fundamental necessities as eating, drinking, eliminating, washing, sleeping and so on... not the least of these manipulative techniques was the attempt, at least initially and sustained for several months or much longer, to isolate each prisoner from the other. That the prisoners themselves were able to confound this technique by establishing a primitive but effective form of communication degraded much of the intended effect of this technique. On those occasions where intellectual stimulus could not be provided by persons having the same precapture values as the prisoner (i.e., other US prisoners) the Communists moved to supply such a need; not, of course, by permitting fraternization between the prisoners themselves, but the provision of selected reading and listening matter, this last being supplied by a remote controlled loudspeaker in each cell, and by interviews (not interrogations) with English speaking indoctrinators and persuaders on the camp staff. A shift occurred from the attempt to get military information which characterized interrogations in WWI and WWII towards the calculated manipulation of prisoners for a series of propaganda advantages which from the captor's point of view were far more profitable than small pieces of military information. A prisoner who was accused of "war crimes" wasn't interrogated. He was indoctrinated with the purposes being to convince him that he had committed a crime and to have him write and sign a statement to that effect.⁶⁸ However, the fact that statements were made by the PWs was not proof the North Vietnamese indoctrination succeeded since signs indicated that statements were made only after prolonged and intensive mental and physical pressure.

Statements Before and After Release

(FOUO) LT Robert Frishman, one of the PWs released in August was forced to write a statement before he was released asserting that he was repentant and asking the North Vietnamese people for "forgiveness" and Ho Chi Minh for "amnesty".⁶⁹ Also, LT Frishman was interviewed by an Italian newswoman probably in February or March. The interview appeared in Europeo on 17 Apr and in Look on 15 Jul. A second prisoner, MAJ Roger Dean Ingvelson (USAF), was also interviewed at the same time. The author portrayed a compassionate picture of LT Frishman. The ordeal which he was undergoing appeared between the lines of the interview even though he said that he was well treated and fed. In the interview the prisoner's

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major complaint was that he had no one to talk to. 70 The following is a selection from the article:

(U) Lieutenant, how do they treat you?

Good! Real good. They make me get up at five in the morning --a little early maybe, since I don't have anything to do all day, and then they let me have a nice cold shower. The first meal is at ten, a little late if you get up at five, but it is better that way because then I have more appetite. The meal is great. I have soup, meat loaf, vegetables and French bread and coffee. They give me plenty of food, and it is good. They couldn't treat me better. In the evening, they give me supper at five.

What do you do the rest of the day Lieutenant, besides cleaning your cell?

Nothing, ma'am. We aren't permitted to work. And I tell you, ma'am: though they treat us so well, so very well, sometimes I'd give a lot to do some work. Instead, we're only permitted to sweep the leaves outside once in a while. And it's hard, you know, to do nothing, all day, hour after hour, week after week, month after month. God, if I only had a book. But staying there is that nothingness, all you can do is think. And you think of the day they caught you, and you think of your childhood and of your father and your wife. But thinking isn't enough for a man, is it? Well, sometimes they give us a North Vietnamese paper in English. And then they read the news to us over the loudspeaker. 71

(S) The interview occurred in the controlled environment of the "Country Club". A North Vietnamese officer was present throughout the interview. After his release, LT Frishman revealed his true feelings at a news conference. For the first time, the US and world publics received a realistic account of what life was like for US PWs in NVN:

Frishman: Pn. Lieutenant Robert Frishman, one of the released prisoners of war from North Vietnam. Hanoi says the best proof of their treatment to American prisoners will come from those they have released.

I am here today to tell of the type treatment that I and other American prisoners of war have received. I feel a deep obligation to the other prisoners of war still in Vietnam to express myself straight forward and tell the truth. What I say will be refuted by the North Vietnamese.

If they don't have statements of humane treatment, they have ways of getting them. They threaten that if I embarrass them in any way they have ways of getting even with me, and told me not to forget that they have hundreds of my buddies still

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in their hands. If they are going to use me and other prisoners of war as propaganda to try and show the world that they have given us "humane and lenient treatment", when they haven't then I feel it's time that the facts are brought out into the open. I would like to relate some of my experiences and those of others, and leave you to your own opinion.

I had two meals a day--pumpkin soup with pig fat in it and bread. It may not sound good but you can live on it. Sometimes we would sweep the leaves and occasionally sit in the sun. They would give me some magazines and books to read, which, of course, were slanted along the North Vietnamese party line propaganda. But for the most part, I would have to use American ingenuity to keep my mind busy and fight the isolation.

What about medical treatment?

The doctors at Bethesda tell me that if you have to remove an elbow, the way they did seems to be professional. I still have a right arm and I'm thankful for that. However, they failed to remove the fragments of the SAM missile in my arm. It took six months just for my incision to heal over. I would wake up and find my arm stuck to the blankets by the dried scab. When I took the blanket off, the scab would come off and the wound would drain again. During the operation, they put serum in my left leg with a needle, and left string behind them which resulted in a seeping sore which drained until my return to this country. A few minutes at Bethesda, the doctors removed the foreign object, sutured it up and now it is healing.

I believe the North Vietnamese are capable of giving good medical care, but they are basically willing only in doing what is necessary to keep us alive. My case is not unique, LCDR (John) McCain received basic treatment to keep alive but will require further treatment before they are in good shape again. I hope they get home in time for our doctors to effect a recovery.

While I probably will never have a whole arm again, I am told that after an operation and physical rehabilitation of my atrophied muscles, I will have a good chance of regaining at least partial use of my right arm, and I might even be able to fly again. Even in spite of the time which has elapsed, I'm sure our doctors can do

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things that the North Vietnamese doctors weren't willing to do.

The North Vietnamese told that John McCain was the worst wounded pilot. He has many broken bones but he can walk with a very pronounced limp and a stiff arm. He has been in solitary confinement since April of '68. It's hard enough just being in solitary but when you're wounded like John is, it is even worse because you don't have anyone to help you wash yourself, your clothes, or keep your room clean. Why do they keep John in solitary.

Is sitting on a stool in a hot stuffy room with no sleep and mosquito's biting you until they make their lousy statements humane? I know what it's like.

In two days your feet swell up and creased up your legs until they're numb. Weather and your physical well being are determining factors on how long you can hold out. Some have gone for 150 hours. Other have passed out from heat exhaustion in 48.

The North Vietnamese tried to get LCDR Stratton to appear before a press delegation and say that he had received humane and lenient treatment. He refused because his treatment hadn't been humane. He'd been tied up with ropes to such a degree that he still has large scars on his arms from rope burns which became infected. He was deprived of sleep, beaten, had his finger nails removed and put in solitary, but the North Vietnamese insisted that he make the false humane treatment statements and threw him into a dark cell alone for 38 days to think about it.

Facing future torture, Stratton did what I consider a very patriotic act. He got up before the press and intentionally walked around glassy-eyed, bowing as we are forced to do in camp giving the impression that he is brainwashed hoping that the Americans would get the message. They did and the rebound hit Hanoi right between the eyes. Since then they have forced Stratton to make appearances, statements saying that he wasn't tortured or brainwashed. He goes to those delegations but it makes him sick every time he does. He tells the North Vietnamese not to believe for one minute that he's cooperating with them. He then rolls up his sleeves and shows them the cigarette burns and rope scar and says this is the reason. While I'm in your hands I'll be obedient, but the first chance I get I'm going to blow the whistle and tell the truth.

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I feel like I'm Stratton's chance to get the facts out. Actually, I've seen Stratton and he's in fair shape despite the torture. He's a real example for me to follow. Stratton knows that I have been released. He told me not to worry about telling the truth about him. He said that if he gets tortured some more at least he'll know why he's getting it and he will feel that it will be worth the sacrifice.

I'm using Stratton as a specific example of North Vietnamese torture. If they still insist that he hasn't been tortured, then the North Vietnamese should send him to Paris or some where, where he will be free to talk and free from fear or future reprisal by the North Vietnamese if he tells the truth.

You may ask why do we resist. I'll tell you why. It's because of pride. Not only your own self pride that you have resisted, but because the enemy has had to lower itself to such inhumane levels of conduct that you know that you are still resisting them even while you are in their hands.

I feel possible that the higher ups in North Vietnam don't know the truth about our treatment. They only see the results of the phony statements and confessions forced out of us by their subordinates' labor. I noticed that when the really big men, I mean the generals come into camp, things have gotten better. There were times that my physical treatment was good, especially that last month before my release. But you are still always under the mental strains of abuse and future reprisals.

My intentions are not to scare wives and families but Hanoi has given false impressions that all is win and roses and it isn't so. All I'm interested in is for Hanoi to live up to their claims of humane and lenient treatment of prisoners of war.

I don't think solitary confinement, forced statements, living in a cave for three years, being put in straps, not being allowed to sleep or eat, removal of finger nails, and not allowing an exchange of mail to prisoners of war are humane.

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Why don't they send out a list of their prisoners of war? Why do they try to keep us from even seeing each other? Certain prisoners of war have received publicity. Others are kept silent. Why aren't their names officially released? If they don't have any secondary alternatives or motives in mind, then release the names of the prisoners of war so their families will know their loved ones' status. I feel as if I am speaking not only for myself, but my buddies back in camp to whom I promised I would tell the truth. I feel it is time people are aware of the facts.⁷²

US PWs in RVN

General

(U) US PWs captured in RVN were imprisoned in PW camps in the jungles of RVN and probably in Cambodia and Laos. US forces found it extremely difficult to discover the exact locations of these camps. Neither the NFLSVN nor the PRG had signed the 1949 Geneva Convention, however, the Viet Cong said that they treated prisoners "humanely".⁷³ COSVN policy was to make every effort to capture prisoners and to keep them alive, however, some PWs had been killed. As in Hanoi's PW camps, interrogation and indoctrination seemed directed primarily towards the end of producing propaganda statements by the PWs opposing the war. If anything, the PWs held in the jungles of RVN were even more vulnerable than the PWs in Hanoi to contracting disease.

VC PW Policy

(C) Documents captured over a period of several years revealed that the official VC policy toward PWs was one of leniency and humanitarianism for political expediency. One source stated that the VC cadre were given highest priority treatment for wounds, but that in instances where VC cadre and US PWs required treatment at the same time, the US PW was given attention first, unless the VC was more seriously wounded.⁷⁴ However, it was also clear that there was a gap of some magnitude between the overall PW policy and its application.⁷⁵ As an example of the policy, after the 1968 attacks and the increase in the number of PWs, the VC in My Tho Province reissued a basic directive on PW policy which emphasized that a lenient and humane policy could split the enemy's ranks and that PWs, particularly US, could be politically exploited. One former VC platoon leader had been taught in 1966 that:

We are not to mistreat any prisoners taken on the battlefield. Captives are taken to the base camp for interrogation and political means are employed to make them understand the Party policy. If captives were killed or mistreated, political and military information could not be obtained from them. The PW policy was disseminated by the Central Party HQ and was to be strictly observed by every echelon in order to achieve successful results.⁷⁶

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However, instances occurred where subordinate units didn't follow the policy. For instance, on 24 Dec, the bodies of two US servicemen were recovered. Information from the local populace indicated that they had been captured by VC forces on 13 Aug 66, had been put on public display in several villages and had then been shot to death. The bodies of three RVN soldiers also apparently executed were found in the same grave.⁷⁷ There were numerous VC directives berating subordinate units for not adhering to the PW policy and ordering the military proselyting sections to set up special classes to correct this situation. Several documents attested to the fact that in many areas the policy was ignored most of the time. The Party constantly urged the cadres to emphasize in their classes that killing, beating, and torturing PWs, or mutilating the dead was harmful to the revolution. The cadres were told to make the point that important PWs could be used as hostages, thus assuring the safety of captured VC, and that their release could win propaganda victories of international impact.⁷⁸ A document, dated 4 Jan 69, and possibly relating to a 1968 battle, described first aid which had been given to wounded personnel and fair treatment to those who had been seriously wounded in order to promote a humanitarian image of the VC/NVA.⁷⁹

(C) Combat units were reminded constantly to increase the number of PWs, especially Americans. Quotas of PWs were set for units and medals were offered for their capture. They were instructed to issue ropes to each soldier for binding PWs, to teach the troops English phrases such as "Hands Up", and to teach such techniques as removing the shoes of US PWs to hinder their escape attempts. Further, the soldiers were told not to take the personal property of PWs but to collect it and make out a receipt and pass it along with the PW. The Party experienced great difficulty in getting individual soldiers to carry out this policy. Once captured, the PW was handed over to the village, district, or province authorities. If it had not already been done, the PW was placed in one of what appeared to be two categories. The first was based on the type of unit to which the captive had belonged and his rank. The less elite his unit, the more likely the PW would be kept at a lower VC echelon, given shorter indoctrination, and the more likely he would be considered as a potential recruit for the VC. Generally, the lower the rank the less time the PW would be held. The same was true for all FWMAF, intelligence and psychological operations personnel, and other specialist groups. In addition, enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, and officers were usually separated immediately to break the influence of the higher ranking men over their juniors. The second category was based on the individual's actions. Those who surrendered in the early stages of the battle and exhibited little personal loyalty to the GVN received special treatment. Such PWs were not bound, but they were forced to attend indoctrination sessions. The legitimate PW, in theory, was to have received humane but firm treatment. If he proved to be obstinate, certain punishments were suggested, such as standing in the sun or being put in isolation. In some documents death was mentioned. Care was taken, however, to ensure that the victims died with their hands untied so that rope marks would not show on the corpse. However, in general, the accounts from the small number of PWs who escaped or were released indicated that the men whom they had known who had died, had done so from serious wounds or from malnutrition and disease.

(C) Almost all important PWs were transferred to the province or region level. While en route, the PW was usually bound, barefoot, and blindfolded and taken on a route which the prisoner could not remember. In camp the prisoners were usually unfettered during the day, however in some instances at night their legs were placed in stocks. The prison camp was usually small consisting of five or fewer thatched huts or semiburied bunkers containing from 15 to 70 inmates. Caves and tunnels were also used. Some camps were reported to have contained 400 or more prisoners. On the other hand, some camps remained empty for long

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periods of time. It was common for PWs to be transferred to several camps. If Allied troops were in the area or if there was any chance that the camps had been discovered, the VC usually moved the PWs. Usually some work was performed, certain holidays were allowed, and some medical facilities existed.

(C) New prisoners were usually given a booklet about PW regulations or it was read to them. According to directives, this was considered especially important in the case of Americans who had been led by their commanders to expect inhumane treatment. All military equipment and documents were confiscated. FWMAF prisoners who died were often buried secretly and their possessions sent to the rear. This procedure appeared to be followed, because the VC thought it would be advantageous to keep these dead men "alive" for retaliatory "executions". The VC bombarded the PWs with a steady stream of indoctrination. The typical indoctrination had the PW memorize a lesson and then repeat it in written tests. In addition, the VC used self-criticism sessions and had the PW write a personal history statement. The FWMAF prisoners posed a problem since they usually could only be released at the regional or central level and then only in connection with some international propaganda coup. The Fleet Intelligence Center SERE Newsletter stated that "The more obstinate FWMAF PWs were quietly executed." 80

(C) A few PWs, including an occasional American, were transferred to security sections whose detention camps were generally occupied by VC deserters, GVN officials, and spies. The treatment tended to be harsher, the executions more frequent, and the physical restraints more brutal, such as the use of blinders and leg irons. Still, the ultimate goal in these camps was supposed to be "rehabilitation" and eventual release. Regarding the release of PWs, a My Tho Province directive on PW policy stated that PWs had to be bound closely to the revolution so that they would be looked upon with suspicion by the other side. The document also stated that before each release, the PW would be provoked to write some kind of pledge in favor of the NFLSVN and make comments about VC policies and the treatment and attitudes of the Liberation Troops. Each release scene was to be photographed.

(C) There were several instances, especially around Tet 1968, where groups of prisoners, such as Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) members, informants, and other "bad elements" were marked for immediate execution. In isolated cases, even FWMAF prisoners were put on these lists, although this may not have been done with high level party approval. VC policy concerning disposition of PWs when imminent danger arose was not clear. There were some documents saying to kill and others saying not to kill under such circumstances. The continued release of PWs, including FWMAF personnel, and the continued appearance of PW personnel, indicated that the fundamental policy of leniency and humanity for political expediency was the preferred course by the VC leaders. 81

(FOUO) At one point in 1969, the VC apparently threatened "certain and inescapable revenge" for the alleged murder of VC prisoners and linked this with a statement that the VC held US PWs. The threat was carried by the Associated Press which claimed that it had been broadcast over Liberation Radio and had been monitored in Hong Kong. 82 However, at year's end, indications were that the VC were adhering strongly to their policy of attempting to capture and keep prisoners alive in order to use them for propaganda and bargaining purposes.

Enemy Proselyting.

(C) Proselyting was evidently divided into three phases: interrogation, education, and

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final preparation for release. During all three phases, efforts were aimed at promoting prisoner cooperation and sincerity. The interrogation phase was composed of two periods; a period of indirect interrogation while accomplishing ideological indoctrination, and a period of direct interrogation. During the first period, which generally lasted two weeks, PWs were "enlightened." Documents, some in English, were distributed to the prisoners to ensure they understood the goals and policies of the NFLSVN. Interrogators asked and answered questions about the indoctrination literature until satisfied that the prisoners understood and appreciated the NFLSVN. The prisoners were encouraged to ask questions and express their personal views. When the interrogator thought the PWs were sincere and cooperative, the second period of interrogation began. During this period, interrogation was overt. Prisoners were asked to fill out biographical data sheets. These sheets and questions of a tactical nature were also compiled and printed in English. After successful completion of the interrogation phase, the PWs were encouraged to write declarations of good will, confessions, and open letters to other GIs. Until their release, the prisoners were encouraged to make statements showing repentance for their role as "US aggressors" and appreciation and praise for the NFLSVN.

(C) The education phase of proselyting stressed student participation. Prepared lessons were usually studied for two days and discussed for one day to ensure understanding. Early lessons documented the "US invasion" of Vietnam. GVN "puppet" governments, established with "US imperialistic support," were vehemently criticized. VC victories were dramatically retold to emphasize the "obvious" defeat of the "foreign aggressors." It was stated that this defeat of foreign invasion "would allow" the Vietnamese to solve their own problems and chart the country's destiny. Other lessons included such subjects as the natural resources of Vietnam, the history of the heroic people, and the record of Vietnam's struggle with foreign invaders.

(C) Prior to release, special classes were conducted to ensure that PWs understood completely the clemency and humanitarian policy of the Front towards war prisoners. The prisoners were again asked to make a written declaration attesting to the lenient treatment they received and expressing repentance for their crimes. Prisoners were told to convince their families and friends that the US "must" cease its "imperialistic occupation" of RVN and allow the Vietnamese to determine their own destiny. 83

PW Comfort Standards.

(C) When food was available, the US PW usually received more than his captors. In fact, the comment of some men who had been held by the VC was, "there was plenty of rice and other foul smelling chow, but I just couldn't eat it." Others commented that they had eaten everything possible because they had known that every bit of nourishment was essential for survival. The daily food money was usually nominal and used strictly for bud geting. It was automatically deducted for rice supplements such as pork fat and fish sauce:

US PW Received:

35 to 40 liters rice/month*
VN\$8/day for food
Cigarettes, soap, etc. (80% of normal VC ration)
Medicines (80% of quantity normally programmed for VC)

VC Normally Received:

35 to 40 liters rice/month
VN\$8/day for food**

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*Initially he received 1 1/2 times normal VC rations.

**Interrogations indicated VC daily food allowance was from zero to VN\$35.

On occasion, however, the per diem rate was paid and allowed to accumulate, and the prisoners were allowed to buy extras, particularly cigarettes. Evidently, rationing of soap, cigarettes, sugar, and salt was stressed. In many instances, when "smokes", for example, were unavailable or unwanted, prisoners were allowed to accumulate these rations for special events (a birthday party, Thanksgiving, Christmas). Prisoners received a clothing issue periodically. The initial issue included black pajamas, sandals, a towel, and mosquito netting. Subsequent issues, apparently programmed every 90 days, included black shorts and replacement of wornout items. The US prisoner could expect to receive all available medicine and medical attention; VC policy stressed medical care. VC directives established a medical program designed to prevent deterioration of health, cure ailments, and ensure prisoner survival. ⁸⁴

Rach Gia PW Camp.

(S) According to one Hoi Chanh, there were two large prison camps in IV CTZ for holding US PWs from approximately 1962 until the time of his return to the GVN. ⁸⁵ One was called the Ca Mau Prison Camp and the other was the Rach Gia Prison Camp. The Rach Gia PW Camp was located near Hau Thu Bay Canal, Dong Thai Village, Kien An District, Kien Giang Province. The source did not observe either of the two prison camps and his knowledge was limited to the Rach Gia Prison Camp. He was acquainted with two camp officials. One was an interrogator whom the source knew from 1961 to January 1965. The other was the camp commander--and the interrogator's father--whom the source knew from June 59 until Feb 69. The Hoi Chanh met each of these two individuals many times during the years in which he knew them. During these encounters, usually during the conduct of party business, they each discussed their respective jobs.

(C) The Rach Gia Prison Camp was commanded by LTC Hai Thanh. Thanh's rank was equivalent to that of Province Committee Chief. His immediate superior was the Chief of the Western Nambo Region (MR-3) Security Section, who also doubled as the commander of the region. The source did not know the strength or designation of the troops detailed to guard the camp. The guards he observed wore black pajamas and carried SKS or AK weapons. The prisoners (total number unknown) were exclusively American and, according to the source, they came from all four CTZs. He guessed that the camp had first become operational in 1962 as the pace of the US involvement in the war increased.

(C) Upon arrival at the camp, all the US prisoners were chained and dressed only in black short pants. The period of time spent in chains varied with individuals but was usually two to four weeks. Once they became "accustomed to the camp discipline" however, they were allowed to wander about camp with freedom of action. At times, they were permitted to leave the camp under guard in order to fish, gather wood, etc.

(C) The source claimed that the Americans were better treated than the VC or ARVN prisoners. A VC prisoner himself at one time, he explained that he knew from personal experience that the VC and ARVN were badly treated --poor food and generally poor living conditions. However, he thought that the VC did not risk antagonizing world opinion by treating the US PWs in the same way. He could not provide any concrete examples of preferential treatment given to Americans, yet, he insisted that the VC and ARVN earned money to support

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the Americans. The VC/ARVN worked hard to catch fish, grow crops, etc., so that they could be sold for profit; however, he claimed that he never received any funds from these sources while [redacted] A9

[redacted] He concluded, therefore, that the money must have been spent on the Americans. He did not know whether or not the prisoners were segregated either by race or rank. Although he was familiar with the problem of black and white race relations, he did not know whether this issue was exploited in the PW camp. The source also did not know of any cases of severe punishments inflicted on US prisoners, but he believed that PWs who caused trouble were beaten. He doubted whether a prisoner who had been severely beaten would ever be allowed to go free. Instead, he thought that they would probably be retained or killed because the VC would not want the world to know of the incident. He knew of no escapes from the PW camp. He said that escapes were impossible because of the camp's isolated location in the jungle and because the local inhabitants would probably return any escapees to the VC. The source heard that even ARVN prisoners who had eluded their guards had been eventually turned in by villagers from the nearby area. The interrogator, whom the source knew, allegedly related the story of an American who had once offered him \$VN 4,000 piasters if he would help him escape. The source's friend had refused and had told the camp security guards about this incident; the American had been immediately "locked-up".

(C) Interrogation of US PWs was a regular activity at the camp. The source's friend interrogated frequently and found "no trouble" in obtaining information from the Americans. The source did not know the nature of the information sought or the interrogation techniques employed, but he asserted that an NVA interpreter was employed. He was told that, in the event of PW releases, prisoners would be released in the CTZ where they had been captured, or at least in a different location than the prison camp, in order to keep its location a secret. He was unable to provide information on the identities of any US prisoners who might have been in the camp and had no further information on the prison camp itself, its inmates, its guards or its operations. 86

Ca Mau Province PW System.

(C) Prison camps run by VC military proselyting sections theoretically were committed to a policy of reforming rather than punishing prisoners. (This section refers primarily to VC handling of RVN prisoners.) A group of captured documents explained the operation of a detention facility operated by the VC in Ca Mau Province (RVN An Xuyen Province) and gave an indication as to the sophistication of the VC handling of PWs. The following policy statements appeared in two of the documents:

Our policy toward detainees is punishment in conjunction with re-education. Therefore, the characteristics of our handling of detainees are designed to reform their thoughts.

We detain the enemy in prisons not to revenge ourselves on the enemy as the imperialists usually do in their detention camps. The camps are only the places where we indoctrinate the prisoners with our just cause. 87

(C) As was the case with camps run by the military proselyting sections, policies had not always been adhered to by the camp security sections, even according to the reports of the

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Ca Mau Province security section. A Ca Mau Province recapitulation report for September 68, noting operational weaknesses, had stated that in various areas the handling of detainees had not complied with policy. In fact, there had been instances in which PWs had been mistreated. It also noted that due to slowness or callousness of some cadres, a large number of innocent people, suspects, and unsentenced criminals were detained without action being taken. Reconnaissance agents often failed to collect documentary evidence, which hindered interrogations and caused the postponement of trials, "...and worse yet, a number of V's (districts) have sent no detainees to us (province) for nearly two years." Some facilities even refused to accept detainees whose records were incomplete or missing, causing some villages to despair of the whole business. There were also instances of indoctrinations where detainees were mistreated. Out of sheer laziness, some indoctrination was administered en masse rather than on an individual basis.

(C) At province level, the security section had a prison staff subsection. In addition to a subsection chief and two assistant subsection chiefs, there was an administration office, an interrogation element, a detention camp element, and the armed security forces. The office element dealt with paper work and liaison with other sections. One cadre from the interrogation element was assigned for every 15 to 20 prisoners. A team of three interrogators was assigned to verify statements made by prisoners. The detention camp element consisted of a board of supervisors and an administration and indoctrination cell. Each cadre in this cell was responsible for 20 prisoners. For every 30 prisoners there was an armed security squad of 10 soldiers. If the size of the camp warranted it, the squads were combined into a platoon. The armed security forces also were responsible for the other sections of the province.

(C) While there was no subsection at district level, there was a prison staff element consisting of an administration cell, an interrogation cell, and a detention camp element. The size of the administration cell varied with the work load. The interrogation cell included a number of reconnaissance agents to verify prisoner statements. The ratio of interrogators authorized was one for every 15 to 20 detainees. The detention camp element consisted of a board of supervisors or control elements, an administration and indoctrination cell, and an armed security unit. (One document stated that the board of supervisors should consist of a chief--who did not belong to any other element--the cell leader in charge of interrogation, the cell leader in charge of administration and indoctrination, an adjutant, and the security guard commander.) There was supposed to be one administration and indoctrination cadre for every 20 detainees, and one security guard squad for every 30 detainees. On the average, each district had three interrogation cadres, three evidence gathering reconnaissance cadres, and three administration and indoctrination cadres except Duyen Hai and Chau Thanh Districts, which had only two. Every district except one had self-production organizations operated by the detainees.

(C) The province capital had one armed security cell of three to four guards whose mission it was to guard and escort prisoners taken in the city area. In addition there were two interrogators, one near the city to obtain tactical information and the other for operation in any temporary mid-way facility. A final element in the organization of a detention camp was the use of secret undercover agents, usually three to four per facility. They were infiltrated into the detention camps whenever dangerous or "stubborn ring leaders" were detained there. Apparently these agents were recruited from among the prison population.

(C) The province had established certain procedures for handling its detainees. When a

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person was arrested, documents were prepared itemizing the alleged crime, evidence, and his personal effects. As the detainee was passed to higher echelons, the documents and evidence accompanied him. When the prisoner was delivered to a new camp, two receipts were used; one for the deliverer to take back to his agency, and one for the receiver to add to the prisoners's documents. In the event of missing items, a record was to be made, a copy of which was then sent back to the evacuating agency. District level camps were to send prisoners who were sentenced to two or more years imprisonment to the province level. This was done to reduce the load on the district camps. Jailers were told to submit monthly, quarterly, semiannual, and yearly reports on the number of prisoners present, their classification, and their status; PWs covered ranged from uninterrogated and uninvestigated individuals to those sentenced or executed. When a PW first arrived at the camp, an administration and indoctrination cadre man was supposed to establish a record on him, using not only the documents accompanying the prisoner but also from observation and interrogation of the prisoner. After coordinating his findings with those of the interrogators, the administration and indoctrination cadre classified the prisoner. Although there were indications such was not always the case, classification was to be performed rapidly so the various categories of prisoners could be separated, and "...so that we (VC) can have a quick and correct solution for each case in the event of an enemy attack against the camp."

(C) There were five categories of detainees. Type 1 were PWs under sentence of death who were being detained either for further interrogation or public trial. Type 2 "deserved" sentencing. Type 3 included those known to have worked for the enemy but were not worth arresting. Type 4 was for suspects, and Type 5 designated those who were probably innocent. In the case of Types 3, 4, and 5, provinces urged all sections to stress expeditious acquittal, house arrest, or thought reform. Types 1 and 2 were to be detained separately and further broken down between those who had more than two years to serve and those who had less. Ideally, the province hoped defendants and convicted prisoners could be detained separately and that types 3, 4, and 5 would be separated from 1 and 2. Whether the camps were built away from or near each other depended on the base area. However, cadres were urged not to concentrate them in the same area. Each camp was to accommodate no more than 30 prisoners, and was to be guarded by a squad of 10 armed security personnel. Prisoners under death sentence and key enemy personnel were to be detained in separate camps deep within the base areas. Even if these latter camps did not total 30 persons, a full squad was usually placed on guard. Finally, female quarters were always to be separate.

(C) Periods of interrogation, which were linked closely with classification, were also standardized. The interrogations of criminal elements were to be completed within one month of their arrival in camp. Political cases were allotted a maximum of three months. Interrogators were urged to utilize the documents accompanying the prisoner, who as a rule, was ignorant of their content. Torture and implied threats were listed as being against Party policy. Indoctrination cadres were also urged to make use of background documents, personal letters of the prisoners, and observations of their actions in camp. The cadres also were encouraged to indoctrinate on an individual basis as much as possible. According to one document, "the prison staff is considered to be a technical element of the security branch. Investigation and interrogation constitute the main mission." The initial aim was to exploit the prisoners for all information which would aid the general offensive and smash the "enemy's" spy apparatus. The long term goal, if possible, was to convert the prisoner and make him loyal to the revolution. Even after the prisoner was released, however, the village security section was to observe and continue to indoctrinate the releasee. 88

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Viet Cong PW Camp Photos

The structures pictured on the following pages housed South Vietnamese and, reportedly, US PWs. This PW Camp was located on the southern tip of South Vietnam in IV CTZ. It was well-hidden in dense jungle vegetation and all buildings were constructed of readily available natural material. A strike force, acting on intelligence provided by an escapee from the camp, was inserted into the area by helo on 8 Dec 68. The PW Camp was located within three minutes, however it had been abandoned 24 hours earlier. (Photos and comments come from the SERE Newsletter of April 1969.)



Photo 1. PW cage for approximately 10 people. There were 10 separate sleeping slots partitioned off, but it could have housed more.

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


Photo 2. This cage was located in the northern part of the PW area. It may have held the 3 US PWs reported to be in the camp. The structure was strongly constructed and had 3 sleeping mats.

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


Photo 4. Details of construction of cage which may have held US PWs.

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Photo 5. End of larger PW cage shown in Photo 1. Structure was located about 10 meters south of the suspected US PW cage. The plastic hose was used as a urine tube.

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Photo 6. This building was on the trail leading out of the PW camp. It may have temporarily housed PWs before the cages were built; however, there were no signs of shackles having been fastened to the building.

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They have sort of an unusual relationship which they try to build between the POW and the captor. They deal mainly with the psychological rather than the physical. As such they try to make the POW a part of the daily life and yet keep him separate. I did work with the guards. There are some of the guards that have been with me since 1964. Others have gone out; have not returned - they have gone out on operations or joined units for operations and have not returned. Some I have seen over and over again. Some have been with me constantly. I did get to know most of the guards and the cadres in the area since I have been with them for an extended period of time.

Sir, during the time you were in captivity, was it spent mostly in the Fourth Corps Tactical Zone?

We moved from an area south of Ca Mau which is an area I was initially in. We moved from there in 1964 after our camp was bombed out. Correction on that - we moved in January of 1965 to an area just north of Toi Binh and we have been in the area north of Toi Binh since 1965.

Sir, let's get to you personally now. How does a man keep his morale up for 5 years as a captive of the VC? I imagine you went through some pretty emotional times.

This is a matter of deciding to do something and carrying through with it. It's psychological but you must prepare yourself. You must choose a goal and work towards that goal. While I had other POW's with me I was the senior ranking officer, the senior POW in camp, and as such I had guidelines set for me. I had no choice - I wanted no choice. My responsibility there was clear. During that period of time I had no difficulty with my morale because my main mission, my main responsibility at that time was the welfare of the people who were subordinate to me. After the three other POW's were released in October of 1967 and I was isolated, there were periods of time under psychological pressure, political indoctrination and such that I became mentally depressed; frustrations and anxiety being the main problems building over

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an extended period of time and it was a matter of finding an outlet primarily for the frustrations and at the same time establishing a goal that you could work for; mine being escape in any form - to get away from the environment in which I found myself. 89

(C) The first escape of a US PW during 1969 came 27 Mar when SP4 Thomas Van Putten, USA escaped from a VC prison camp. Van Putten had been serving with the 326th Engr Co until his capture on 10 Feb 69. Though he escaped on 27 Mar, he was not picked up until 17 Apr. 90 When recovered, Van Putten was apparently suffering from severe malnutrition. Before being captured, Specialist Van Putten had weighed about 185 pounds. After his escape, he weighed 121 pounds. He was six feet one inch tall. 91

(C) The second escape of 1969 occurred during the night of 26-27 May when SSG Kenneth R. Gregory freed himself from VC captivity. Gregory related that on 26 May, the VC held a "release rehearsal" and that the VC had furnished him with a certificate of release. However, this was only a rehearsal, and Gregory believed that he was to be released on 27 May, provided he would agree to demands that he distribute propaganda material after his release. Gregory did not desire to be released under those demands. During the night he managed to extricate his left leg from a chain that had been placed around his leg and secured to a log in his bunker; he then slipped away. On 30 May, he was observed and picked up by a US helicopter. 92

Recovery Operations

(C) The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) was the focal point for action and information concerning enemy-held and missing FWMAF personnel. The mission of the center was to return all individuals who had been captured to friendly control. The JPRC was also the agency charged with the responsibility for paying rewards to indigenous personnel who returned or assisted in the return of US personnel to friendly control. 93

49

(S) 1969 Operations. On 10 Jul 69 a Hoi Chanh named [redacted] led a PW recovery operation into a VC hospital in Quang Tin Province. He led the forces into the area where he had seen a PW on or about 1 Jul.

49

(U) A reconnaissance element of the 5th Regt, 2nd ARVN Inf Div, an RF Co, and other units were air assaulted by Army helicopters into the area. During the operation, six NVA soldiers were killed, two detained, and three weapons captured. Because of the difficult nature of the terrain, an ARVN soldier was lowered by rope into the jungle from a hovering helicopter to reach the PW, SP4 Larry D. Aiken, and a US trooper, PFC Robert Bohler, rappelled down another rope to assist. SP4 Aiken was found lying face down outside the hut where [redacted] had reported seeing him. He was found unconscious and suffering from a fresh head wound (not a gunshot wound). They then carried him 300 yds down a stream bed to a waiting helicopter.

(U) Aiken was admitted to the 91st Evacuation Hospital in Chu Lai where he remained in a coma until his death on 25 Jul. Hospital officials concluded that he died of an open skull fracture and brain damage inflicted by his captors prior to his rescue. 94

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US PWs Released by the VC/NVA in RVN

(C) The first PWs released by the VC/NVA during 1969 occurred on 1 Jan. This release took place on the battlefield in RVN (See 1968 MACV Command History, pages 845-847 for a complete discussion), and involved three US Army Enlisted men, SP4 James W. Brigham, SP4 Thomas N. Jones, and PFC Donald G. Smith. ⁹⁵

(C) One of these men released by the VC/NVA on 1 Jan, James Brigham, died on 17 Jan. Prior to his death, he was interviewed and questioned about his treatment by the VC. Among other things, he explained that he had been asked if he would permit a VC doctor to operate on a head wound that he had received just prior to his capture. He stated that the VC had explained that he would die unless this operation were performed--"immediately." He had been treated well prior to that time and had even been allowed to rest often while en route to the camp. He had granted permission for the operation and was taken to a hospital which he said was very clean. A doctor operated on him, and he was allowed to remain in the area long enough to "recover." During his recovery, he was subjected to infrequent lectures by a person who Brigham believed to be the camp commanding officer; this individual told him (and other prisoners) of the unjustness of the war and how the VC believed in equality for all. He was told that the VC knew how black Americans were treated in the US, and therefore, the VC tried to give black PWs special consideration. Brigham stated that at no time had he witnessed any of the prisoners being given extra favors except those that had required medical treatment. The injured had been well cared for and dressings were changed regularly. ⁹⁶

(C) SP4 Brigham's death on 17 Jan prompted a barrage of Communist propaganda which accused the US of murder. The Liberation Press Agency carried an article on 21 Jan explaining that the US representatives present at the 1 Jan release had acknowledged that the PWs were "in quite satisfactory" health at the time of their release. The article went on to say: "It is clear... that the US authorities have planned the murder of Brigham, fearing that his opinion might influence the movement of the American people, particularly the black people in the US who are opposing the unjust aggressive war conducted by the US Government in South Vietnam." ⁹⁷ A source commented that the NVA reportedly told the US PWs that they would never again release any PWs in RVN because when they had released the three on 1 Jan, the Negro PW had been beaten by a white officer as the helicopter left the site. The NVA were urging the PWs to demand when they were released a release site where they would not be beaten. ⁹⁸ The article did not mention Brigham's medical treatment by the VC, an obvious reversal of previous Communist propaganda treatment of the PW release. A newspaper published on 1 Jan by the NFLSVN Central Committee included a photo of two of the three PWs released, and SP4 Brigham was quoted as saying "The NFLSVN's PW policy is extremely humane. That is why I was saved from death by the NFLSVN's surgeons who healed my head wound." ⁹⁹

(U) In another instance, Liberation Radio made the following comments about the PW release:

Now... US POW's have been returned to an honest life. All three POW's, Brigham, Jones, and Smith, who were only 21 years old, stood under the Front's flag, respectfully bowing to those attending the ceremony. Brigham had been wounded in the head, but was saved

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The 1 January 1969 Release Ceremony. Note the VC flag in the background. Also note the photographer. The ceremony was filmed by the VC/NVA and covered by the U. S. press.

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SP4 James W. Brigham after his release

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through the devoted care of Liberation Doctors. Time and again, he recalled this noble action, grateful to his savior. 100

(U) In response to queries prompted by VC propaganda statements, the following official statement was released concerning SP4 Brigham's death:

SP4 James W. Brigham, Jr., was admitted to Walter Reed General Hospital January 4 with partial blindness and persistent draining wound from the head. Examination revealed that visual impairment was due to a loss of part of the brain and the persistent purulent drainage from an open wound. The drainage was due to contaminated infected brain tissue. After diagnostic studies to reveal the extent of drainage, Brigham was operated on Thursday (sic), January 9th. A metal fragment and dead infected tissue were removed. The wound was found to contain hair deep within. In spite of antiseptic therapy, the inflammation did not subside and a second debridement was necessary. Specialist Brigham's response was slow following his second operation. On Monday, January 13, he was taken with convulsive seizures. The seizures were controlled with difficulty with medication and he lapsed into unconsciousness and died on Friday, January 17th. The postmortem examination revealed the cause of death to be widespread infected brain tissue second to inefficient debridement of the wound after initial injury while the patient was still in captivity. 101

(C) Meanwhile, following the PW release of 1 Jan, the Independent Bloc of the GVN's Lower House issued a proclamation concerning such releases:

Considering that... the Communists have directly contacted representatives of the US in order to release a number of PW's and take advantage of that humane action for distorted propaganda purposes.

...

Considering that the US ally, which has willy-nilly let itself become entrapped by the Communists, has publicly declared that it is ready to go anywhere to any place fixed by

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the Communists in order to receive the U.S. POW's and at the same time, it sets up many member delegations in order to contact the Communist representatives.

...

Because of the above facts, the Independence Bloc of the Lower House of RVN solemnly proclaims:

1. (We) do not oppose the humanitarian exchange of POW's on the battlefield. Both belligerent parties may agree to a truce for the period necessary for the exchange, but they may not introduce any conditions concerning procedures or political matters.
2. The RVN, when authorizing the US to exchange POW's with the Communists, must determine a number of well defined localities, and it must not let the Communists take the liberty of selecting them nor allow the US delegation to go anywhere to meet them.
3. The persons in charge of the POW exchange on the Allied side must be designated by the field commander and they will have the sole duty of remitting or receiving the POW's. They will not be authorized to discuss any other questions nor to sign any document, except the receipt for the POW's.
4. (We) appeal to the responsible circles and the people of the Allied nations to draw lessons from this experience in order to heighten their vigilance in view of the objectives of the Communists who continuously take advantage of every opportunity, including those in the purely humanitarian field, to realize their dark objectives.

Done in Saigon, January 9, 1969

The Independence Bloc of the
Lower House 102

(C) Six other PWs were released by the VC in 1969. PFC Jesse B. Harris, MIA since 8 Jun 69, returned to US control on 200815Z Oct 69 in Quang Tin Province about 12 miles west.

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southwest of Tam Ky. ¹⁰³ PFC James H. Strickland, captured on 8 Jan 68, PFC Coy R. Tinsley, captured on 10 Mar 68, and SP4 Willie A. Watkins, captured on 9 Jan 68, were returned to US control on 5 Nov, west of Tam Ky. ¹⁰⁴ WO Michael Peterson, captured on 7 Nov after evading since his helicopter had come to the aid of a downed helicopter and been shot down itself on 2 Nov near Bu Prang, and SGT Verron C. Shepard, captured on 6 Nov after evading since his helicopter had been shot down on 2 Nov in the Bu Prang area, were returned to Allied control on 10 Dec. ¹⁰⁵

(C) Unlike the 1 Jan release, which was conducted by means of a meeting between VC and US representatives, all six of these men had been released, escorted over a considerable distance to a point close to friendly units and then left to make contact on their own. Strickland, Tinsley, and Watkins were shot at by friendly units before contact had been successfully made. A Hoi Chanh who had returned prior to the 1 Jan release, when asked what he thought the VC aims had been in releasing the first three PW in 1969, had asserted in short that the prisoner release had been a politically motivated move on the part of the NFLSVN to force the Allies to recognize the existence of the Front and to improve the status of the Front at the Paris Peace Talks. The VC would have made propaganda use of the release and of the ceremony itself. ¹⁰⁶ A 27 Oct Liberation Radio broadcast helped explain the shift in VC release policy. The broadcast referred to the case of SP4 Brigham and alleged that although he had been in good health when he had been released, the US had used the pretext of further medical examination to kill him. The broadcast further alleged that the US falsely had claimed that SGT Gregory had escaped although he had been "released." The broadcast also said that the Central Committee had reminded the US commanders in Saigon that they must be responsible for their soldiers and that they had to ensure safety and create conditions for the released PWs to return to their families soon. The Saigon Embassy noted that the statement making US commanders responsible for ensuring safety of PWs contrasted with the statement prior to the release of the three PWs on 1 Jan when such responsibility had been claimed for the NFLSVN. The Embassy also noted that the three PWs who were reported released were reported missing in the same general area where Harris was released without fanfare a week earlier. The Embassy thought the Communists might simply release PWs without making the effort to achieve a degree of US recognition for the NFLSVN or to exacerbate US/GVN relations, but only after having absolved themselves of responsibility for any possible harm that might come to the PWs. ¹⁰⁷

Reason for VC PW Releases.

(C) Propaganda gains were undoubtedly the primary reason for the release of US PWs by the VC. PWs were pressured into preparing statements or were dictated statements, which they signed prior to release. The statements generally thanked the VC for humane treatment and stated that the war in Vietnam was unjust. Elaborate ceremonies were held prior to the release where these statements were read and sometimes recorded. Sometimes the ceremonies were photographed and in addition the PWs were given propaganda statements to carry with them on their return. Some of the PWs were given handkerchiefs with the phrases "Withdraw All US troops from South Vietnam" and "Peace for Vietnam" embroidered on them. The VC/NVA also probably hoped to appeal to opponents of the war in the US. At a release ceremony in a village, an NVA officer made a speech telling the villagers that the release of the prisoners demonstrated the VC/NVA solidarity with the American people in their desire for peace. Prior to the prerelease period, the PWs had also been used for propaganda purposes. The PWs had been pressured to make statements and propaganda photographs and films had

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been taken. Also, although none of the released PWs had been forced to address local inhabitants, there was a report that some PWs had been forced to do so and to speak against the RVN and US governments. 108

(C) One PW thought that in choosing PWs for release, the VC considered physical condition, time in captivity, propaganda value, and willingness to work. Another PW said that the camp interpreter had told him that the camp doctor had decided that he would be released because his resistance was low due to a wound and malaria and that the staff had felt that he would not survive more than three or four months if he remained in captivity. The same PW commented that the VC/NVA released prisoners based on how well they cooperated with the VC/NVA. He based this reasoning on the fact that the camp commander told the PWs remaining in the camp that if they stayed healthy, abided by all camp rules, and tried to make progress like the three who were being released, that they, too, would return home someday. One of the returned PWs was told by a guard that two other PWs, who were captured near Bu Prang at the same time as the released PWs, were taken to Hanoi. A debriefer hypothesized that the two were sent to Hanoi because they may have refused to sign statements of "guilt", confessions, or "letters of repentance." However, other factors may have been involved. 109

Experiences in VC PW Camps

(C) The following experiences of Harris, Strickland, Tinsley, Watkins, Peterson and Shepard shed considerable light on ordeals of US PWs in RVN:

1. Most US servicemen had been captured by the VC either while wounded or in a situation where contact or coordination with their parent unit had been lost and when the individual had become disoriented and confused. Of the PWs who had escaped or been captured in 1968 and 1969, only one had been captured when the VC had set a trap specifically for him. 110

2. The prison camp authorities emphasized that they were members of the "Peoples Liberation Army" or "NFLSVN." At one camp, the interrogator, the guards and the camp commander impressed on the prisoners that the VC/NVA group was a part of the PRG of the South Vietnamese Front for Liberation of Duc Lap-Bu Prang. The captors demanded obedience of the PWs; for instance, they had to bow to receive food, bow to leave, etc. 111

3. One PW said that the guard and camp staff seemed to be interested in the PWs health and welfare because they were responsible for this to higher headquarters. The PWs seemed to be treated as well as the VC were able to treat them once they reached the PW camps. The VC wanted to keep them alive. However, it was not clear what treatment was received by PWs who tried hard to resist the VC. The VC gave the PWs what they had available. If the VC were short, the PWs suffered too. One "main man" of a camp told a PW that the reason that they could not change his bandages more often was that they just did not have enough. The PWs actually seen dying by released PWs either had died of serious wounds received prior to capture, or of general weakening and malnutrition which had made them vulnerable to disease. 112

4. The recently released PWs did not report any attempt by US PWs to organize any of the camp militarily, although Major Rowe had organized his PW camp when other US PWs were present. The prisoners were threatened with serious reprisals if any semblance of organization was detected by the VC/NVA guards. No prisoner assumed leadership or command of the other prisoners. It must be remembered that the released PWs represented only a small part

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of the experiences of US PWs in RVN. 113

5. Sessions which began as interrogation sessions often became indoctrination sessions. An interrogator informed one of the PWs that he was a "criminal" because he had committed criminal acts against the Vietnamese people. A summary of the debriefing of one of the PWs stated that the general themes of the propaganda sessions were the various peace demonstrations that had been taking place in the US and RVN. The indoctrinator distinguished between "progressive" and "aggressive" Americans with the former opposing the war and the latter favoring it. The indoctrination officer mentioned some of the war critics in the US Senate. One indoctrinator mentioned that US soldiers had participated in demonstrations in uniform. Although the VC/NVA did not attempt to use racial tensions in the US to divide black and white PWs, indoctrinators did discuss the issue. One PW reported that the NVA indoctrination officer discussed at length the current racial conflict in the US and how it affected the black soldier in RVN. The PW was impressed by the NVA officer's knowledge of the racial issue. He suggested that the NVA officer was more knowledgeable than he on racial problems, but the PW could not explain why he felt that way. Another PW asserted that he became angry when the indoctrinator asked questions concerning the racial problems in the US and told the interrogator that he, the PW, did not think that there was a racial problem in the US. Another point raised in an indoctrination session was the events at Song My (My Lai). An indoctrinator mentioned as an example of "crimes" committed by Americans that hundreds of women and children had been killed at Song My. Another ploy used in indoctrination was to fabricate or exaggerate VC/NVA military successes and to fabricate US-RVNAF defeats. One PW seemed still to have been affected by mention of a particular NVA indoctrination officer after his return. Interviewing agents expressed the view that the PW was in an "exceptional fluid mental state during interviewing". They stated that the conversations between the PW and the indoctrinator seemed to have affected the PWs "current mental state" and that he sweated, twitched in bed and reacted in a very nervous manner when discussing the NVA indoctrination officer. 114

6. One PW had been offered the opportunity to write home but had refused because he believed the letter would not be mailed. The same PW said that at one of the PW camps the PWs were not encouraged to write, but were allowed when they requested to do so. There were no restrictions on what could be written and no promises were required in order to write a letter. One PW, a doctor, wrote a letter each month. However, the released PW doubted that the doctor's letters ever got out of the camp, because he saw the interrogator/interpreter wadding one of the doctor's letters up and putting it in his pocket after having read it. 115

7. A number of the PWs who were released had been too seriously wounded for escape to have been feasible. Otherwise, theoretically, the best time for escape remained as soon after the time of capture as possible. Also, movement from camp to camp sometimes offered opportunities to escape. Fear, weakness from malnutrition, wounds, fear of failure, and promise of repatriation were the most common reasons for the PWs failure to escape. One PW was warned when he arrived at the PW camp that an attempted escape would result in death. One of the returned PWs stated that one PW had unsuccessfully attempted to escape. He had been returned to the camp after having been wounded in the leg and after having been beaten by the Montagnard villagers who lived near the camp. The released PW said that the PWs talked of escape, but that although their health had been good, they never put a plan into action, because they believed that they could not withstand the rigors of escape and evasion. All thought that if they had escaped initially after capture, their chances of survival would have been greater. After the unsuccessful attempt, the PWs believed that the physical barriers of

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the camp plus the unfriendly villagers who surrounded the camp were almost insurmountable odds. 116

8. Two ARVN PWs were referred to by US PWs as "hard cores" because they were uncooperative with VC/NVA camp personnel and refused to obey camp rules. These PWs were kept in a hole in the ground and were treated worse than the other ARVN PWs. Their bunker was more strongly constructed. The two ARVN PWs eventually escaped successfully. Other ARVN PWs seemed to be treated roughly similarly to US PWs, although the ARVN PWs seemed to be used by their captors to do more work than the US PWs. Reports on the treatment of ARVN PWs were fragmentary and little precise information was available. 117

9. In addition to providing information about the conditions of their captivity, released PWs provided names of PWs whom they had seen and who were still alive, carried out messages from these PWs to their families, provided information about their physical conditions, and also provided information about PWs who had died in captivity. 118

10. One other piece of information brought out by released PWs seemed to indicate that at least one and perhaps a small number of Americans were actively aiding the VC/NVA. This information jibed with similar information obtained from other sources. 119

11. Released PWs reported various statements made by VC/NVA PW camp officials concerning the overall goals of the VC/NVA. One of the camp directors told a PW that if Allied and US forces were withdrawn, or, if a coalition government was formed in RVN release of PWs would be a minor problem. A PW camp commander asked the PWs to write a motion to the USG indicating that they were against the war in Vietnam. The motion appealed to the US to stop the bombing of North Vietnam, withdraw all US troops from RVN, and allow a coalition government to be established between the NFLSVN and the Saigon Government. The camp commander furnished other unrecalled information that was to be incorporated into the document. The PWs signed the document because they feared being harmed by the VC/NVA if they refused, and because they thought that it would indicate to the US Army that they were still alive. The PWs knew that the statement did not represent their true feelings, but they thought that it would not harm anyone. 120

12. Two PWs commented after their return that they were treated well and were not brainwashed. One of the PWs said that he couldn't take arms against the VC/NVA again because of the way he was treated. The other PW, who was wounded when captured, commented that his captors saved his life. 121

US PWs Released in Cambodia

(C) Four US servicemen, MAJ Querin E. Herlik, SP5 Robert J. Pryor, SP5 John Fisher, and CW2 Laird Pearson Osburn were released by the Cambodian government in March 1969. The four men were captured on 12 Feb 69 when their plane was disabled by ground fire over Tay Ninh Province, and they were forced to make an emergency landing. It was not until after their arrival in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, that they learned that their plane had landed in Svay Rieng Province, Cambodia. Upon impact, the men reported that they were taken under fire by VC/NVA forces who converged on them from all directions; it was estimated that there were between 250 and 300 troops in the area. After capture by the VC/NVA, the men were turned over to the Cambodian government. Osburn was captured separately, but Major Herlik instructed Fisher and Pryor what to say concerning their mission in RVN. During their captivity,

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the only mistreatment inflicted on the four occurred when they did not respond to directions; they reported no other acts of mistreatment throughout the period of captivity. During interrogations, threats were not used, and as a general rule, the men were treated well. 122

PW RELEASE/EXCHANGE PLANNING

(C) In order to develop a joint US/GVN position on PWs a Combined Military Working Group meeting was held on 4 Feb. The combined position paper produced by this group provided the basis for talks between President Thieu and Ambassador Bunker on PW matters. Subsequent guidance from SECDEF and CINCPAC brought about certain modifications to the PW position paper. The result, Change 1 to Annex L, COMUSMACV OPLAN 69-69 was approved and distributed on 26 Feb. The most significant part of the change was the designation of Cam Ranh Bay, and specifically the 12th USAF Hospital, as the central processing location for all US returnees for a large scale repatriation of PWs. The following guidance was provided concerning the processing of returned PWs:

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF A CENTRAL PROCESSING LOCATION

GENERAL

Prompt repatriation of prisoners of war (PW) is one of the main US objectives during the current Paris negotiations. For humanitarian reasons, once agreement is reached, such repatriation should be initiated as soon as feasible and concluded as expeditiously as conditions allow. Similarly, in the interest of the US returnees' welfare, efforts should be directed toward the goal of assuring uniformity of treatment of returned personnel.

Consistent with the following considerations the most recent policy guidance provided in a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 18 January 1969 states:

"With proper regard for the returnees' needs immediately following their initial release and return to the Unified Commander's control, they will be evacuated regardless of Service affiliation from this release point by the most expeditious mode of transport consistent with medical considerations to a single central processing location in Vietnam or elsewhere in WEST-PAC if circumstances require."

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In amplification of this guidance CINCPAC specified that with regard to Southeast Asia, the central processing location will be situated in South Vietnam and established as a unified facility. Additionally the processing facility will be a responsibility of COMUSMACV and operated under basic rules applicable to all MACV Service Components.

Cam Ranh Bay has been designated in Annex L (Prisoners of War) to COMUSMACV Operation Plan 69-69 as the central location for processing large groups of returned US prisoners of war. Upon commencement of processing at this location a unified facility will be activated under the direct operational control of COMUSMACV. Since medical care will take precedence and aeromedical evacuation channels will be utilized through the return to CONUS, the 12th USAF Hospital with its 26th Casualty Staging unit will be the specified activity for care, processing, billeting and messing of US returnees. The 12th USAF Hospital will be augmented as necessary by Army, Navy and Marine Corps personnel to insure efficient processing and satisfy the requirement that inherent Service functions and responsibilities are carried out in accordance with existing policy guidance.

ORGANIZATION

In establishing a unified facility at Cam Ranh Bay existing activities/organizations will be utilized whenever possible. (See Figure X-1 for a chart of the planned organization for the central PW processing facility.)

OPERATION

The overriding consideration in the reception and processing of returned US prisoners of war is proper medical care. Upon initial receipt at the repatriation site each returnee will be given a preliminary examination to identify those persons requiring emergency medical treatment. Those so identified will be evacuated to the nearest hospital or hospital ship. The remaining personnel will be aeromedical evacuated to the central processing site at Cam Ranh Bay. While enroute they will be advised of the general procedures

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
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CENTRAL PROCESSING FACILITY ORGANIZATION




* EXISTING ACTIVITIES/ORGANIZATIONS TO BE UTILIZED UPON ACTIVATION OF THE UNIFIED FACILITY. AUGMENTATION WILL BE AS REQUIRED TO PERMIT OPTIMUM CARE AND PERMIT THE CARRYING OUT OF SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES.

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FIGURE X-3

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PRISONER OF WAR PROCESSING FLOW CHART



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FIGURE X-4

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they will be following until arrival in CONUS. They will be given initial public affairs guidance should contact with news media be unavoidable at Cam Ranh.

The flow chart. . . (See Figure X-4). . . identifies in broad terms processing steps from initial receipt to aeromedical evacuation to CONUS. Quantifying time to be utilized for various processing actions is sensitive to many variables. The following list is provided as a gross average estimate, recognizing each case might be different. It has been assumed the returnee arrives on one day, remains overnight, the following day plus the next night, departing the second morning on an aeromedical evacuation flight:

<u>HOURS</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
2	Initial medical exam and personal hygiene
6	Subsistence
16	Sleeping
6	Tests, lab work, dental, miscellaneous treatment
2	Intelligence debrief
4	Personal affairs, briefing, personal needs
4	Rest and relaxation 123

ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (VC/NVA)

(U) This section discusses primarily the status of enemy military personnel: VC and NVA, who were captured by RVNAF and US/FWMAF and detained under RVNAF custody in ARVN Prisoner of War Camps (PWC). The abbreviation PW in the text refers, in all cases, to the prisoner of war personnel, and should in no way be interpreted to apply to civilian prisoners (political or otherwise) or to military prisoners (RVNAF disciplinary cases) who were detained in confinement facilities or prisons other than the PWC. This section also includes two special topics: first, the problem of returning NVN "innocent civilians" rescued by US Forces, and second, the attempts of the GVN to release sick and wounded PW to the custody of GNVN authorities.

Procedures for Processing and Classifying from Capture to Detention or Release

(U) Procedures for handling captured personnel continued to follow the same process as had been established in 1968 (See MACV History 1968, pp. 851-852). Briefly summarized, captured personnel were initially detained at the division or separate brigade collecting points until intelligence sources could classify the individual through routine interrogation. Those classified as "civil defendants" were released to the custody of the provincial National Police in the province in which captured. If status was determined to be "innocent civilians", the individuals were returned to the village or hamlet of residence; otherwise they remained under

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jurisdiction of civil courts and placed in civilian prisons. Personnel falling into the various PW categories were subsequently evacuated to an ARVN PW camp in the CTZ where captured for internment. Prisoners requiring medical attention were placed in an appropriate medical facility and given a definite classification before internment or release from the facility where hospitalization had taken place. Capture documentation accompanied the detained person from time of capture until internment in a PW Camp or when otherwise released.

Categories of Prisoners in PW Camps (See Figure X-5 for Camp Locations)

(C) Danang and Pleiku PW camps interned those PWs captured in their respective CTZs. The Qui Nhon camp housed those PWs captured in II CTZ not initially interned at the Pleiku PW camp. This facility was also the central camp for internment of female PWs. Approximately 92 percent of all female PWs were in the Qui Nhon camp by the end of 1969 and comprised approximately 77 percent of the total PWs held there.

(C) The Bien Hoa camp interned those PWs captured in III CTZ, as well as most of the paraplegic, amputee victims, and "youth" (17 years of age or younger) in the RVNAF PW system. Considerable emphasis was placed on education, instruction, vocational training, and rehabilitation programs for the PW at Bien Hoa.

(C) The Can Tho camp interned PWs captured in IV CTZ. Central PW Camp, Phu Quoc Island, interned those PWs captured and initially processed through any one of the other five camps. The PWs at Phu Quoc were generally the hard core VC and NVA.

Enemy Captured in PW Camps

(C) The GNVN had never officially admitted to the presence of NVA in the fighting area of RVN. The enemy order of battle, however, and the captured NVA in ARVN PW camps, if unofficial for Hanoi, were fact for the friendly forces, e.g. the number of NVA, captured and interned in PW camps each year was as shown below:

	<u>Prior to 1966</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969*</u>	<u>Total**</u>
NVA	167	694	1,104	2,946	1,988	7,205
REGPE	83	105	129	193	55	
VC	203	2,591	7,004	9,655	6,264	24,871
UNK	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	453	3,390	8,261	12,797	8,307*	32,076**

* Reflects the total number of PWs interned in camps reported on an official RVNAF roster thru 5 Jan 70.


** Reflects the total number of PWs interned in PW camps as of 31 Dec. Not included are those PWs, who were interned in late 1969 but not reported (413), and those captured prior to 31 Dec, but still in processing channels.

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LOCATIONS OF PRISONER OF WAR CAMPS (VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAM INTERNEES)



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FIGURE X-5

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(C) The number of PWs interned in PW camps each year by capturing force is shown below: 124

<u>Capturing Force</u>	<u>Prior to 1966</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969 *</u>	<u>Total *</u>
RVNAF	301	1,966	3,039	7,291	5,142	17,300
US	145	1,199	4,554	4,993	2,993	13,251
ROK	7	215	660	47	126	1,435
Aust	0	10	8	37	29	79
Thai	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>11</u>
TOTAL	453	3,390	8,261	12,797	8,307	32,076

*(Preceding footnotes apply)

RVNAF PW Camps, Capacity and Population

(U) At the end of 1968, RVNAF had the capability to house a maximum of 32,500 PWs under emergency conditions and 21,000 under normal conditions. The capacity of each PW camp was as follows:

	<u>Normal Capacity</u>	<u>Emergency Capacity</u>
Danang (I Corps)	2,000	2,500
Pleiku (II Corps)	2,000	2,500
Qui Nhon (II Corps)	1,000	1,500
* Bien Hoa (III Corps)	2,000 (3,000)*	2,500 (3,750)*
Can Tho (IV Corps)	2,000	2,500
Phu Quoc (Central PW Camp)	<u>12,000</u>	<u>21,000</u>
TOTAL	21,000 (22,000)*	32,500 (33,750)*

*Note: There was another compound at Bien Hoa with a 1,000 normal capacity and 1,250 emergency capacity which was used but not included in the RVNAF (ARVN) reports to MACV. The compound housed PWs considered to be potential Hoi Chanh.

(C) In January, there was a total of 22,079 PWs in all camps. By far, the greatest population (15,042) was in the Central PW Camp on Phu Quoc Island. Construction was underway at Phu Quoc, which was programmed to increase its normal capacity to 20,000 by the end of 1969. By the end of March, the capacity had risen to 14,000 when Enclosure 7 was completed. By October, construction of Enclosure 8 had been completed which raised the normal capacity to 16,000 and the emergency capacity to 28,500. However by that time there was a total of

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SUMMARY OF TOTAL PRISONERS OF WAR IN CAMPS

	<u>JAN</u>	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUN</u>	<u>JUL</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>
DANANG	756	838	1,026	1,222	1,251	1,241	1,407	1,128	1,208	1,270	1,143	1,112
PLEIKU	960	1,012	1,014	1,015	1,126	1,148	1,123	1,000	1,105	1,317	1,315	1,298
QUI NHON	1,095 *(746)	1,118 (749)	1,196 (739)	1,154 (743)	1,143 (775)	1,055 (799)	1,067 (820)	1,142 (823)	1,154 (824)	1,196 (897)	1,185 (896)	1,214 (935)
BIEN HOA	2,618 ***(1,143)	2,477 (1,171)	2,965 (1,222)	2,944 (1,232)	3,164 (1,265)	3,179 (1,389)	3,395 (1,474)	3,946 (1,584)	3,940 (1,610)	4,139 (1,776)	4,367 (1,780)	4,545 (1,797)
CAN THO	1,608	1,330	1,416	2,469	2,614	2,500	2,832	2,351	2,681	2,729	2,282	2,337
PHU QUOC	15,042	16,346	16,325	16,354	16,865	17,839	19,075	19,928	19,930	20,462	21,203	21,717
***TOTAL	22,079	23,185	23,943	25,158	26,163	26,962	28,899	29,495	30,018	31,113	31,495	32,223

*Figure in parenthesis represents number of females included in total.

**Figure in parenthesis represents number of yr olds included in total (17 years of age or younger regardless of sex).

***Difference between total assigned to camps and total captured in camps is due to differences in RVNAF reporting. For example: Total assigned to camps does not include deaths, escapes, repatriations, releases or reclassifications; whereas statistics on PW inputs into the various camps includes those who have become losses to, reason of death, escape, release or repatriation.

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20,462 PWs in Phu Quoc Central Camp (CPWC).

(C) During the year, the population in all PW camps steadily increased (See Table X-2). Danang and Pleiku camps consistently housed a PW population below their normal capacity, while at Bien Hoa the number of PWs exceeded the normal capacity (starting in May) and increased beyond the emergency capacity from August onward. The number of PWs in the Can Tho camp remained below its normal capacity until May 1969, but thereafter (with exception of 2,351 internees in August) the population increased only slightly during the year, exceeded the normal capacity by 196 PWs at the highest point and always stayed well below the emergency capacity. At the end of 1969, there was a total of 32,223 PWs in all camps (See Footnote*** Table 2) compared to a normal capacity of 22,000 (26,000) and an emergency capacity of 40,000 (41,250). (Note: Figures in parentheses include the additional compound at Bien Hoa, not reported by RVNAF).

(C) PW population in each camp by force served is shown below:

<u>PW Camp</u>	<u>NVN</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>Regroupee*</u>	<u>Total</u>
Danang	138	966	8	1,112
Pleiku	196	1,090	12	1,298
Qui Nhon	71	1,136	7	1,214
Bien Hoa	982	3,521	42	4,545
Can Tho	7	2,328	2	2,337
Phu Quoc	<u>5,338</u>	<u>15,903</u>	<u>476</u>	<u>21,717</u>
TOTAL	6,732	24,944	547	32,223

*Personnel who chose to go to NVN in 1954 and subsequently returned to RVN as NVA soldiers.

Chieu Hoi Program Extended to PWs

(C) On 5 Feb, the MOD informed the JCS/RVNAF of the GVN decision to reopen the Chieu Hoi Program to both NVA and VC PWs. On 11 Feb, the Provost Marshal General (PMG) ordered PW camp commanders to segregate NVA and Regroupee PWs from the VC PWs. This action was completed by 19 Feb without incident. The PMG further instructed PW Camp Commanders to screen and segregate prospective Chieu Hoi candidates from other PWs in order to avoid any contact between them and hard core PWs. On 20 Feb, a JCS letter directed agencies to recommend deserving PWs for a change in status to Hoi Chanh under the Chieu Hoi Program.

(C) On 31 Mar, a total of 1,538 PWs were selected as being good risks; 1,153 of these PWs submitted a request indicating their desire to change their status from PW to Hoi Chanh. Out

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of this total, 1,060 were 17 years of age or younger. Requests were sent to JGS for review prior to submitting to the MOD for decision. Results of JGS review or MOD action were not reported. 125

(C) On 1 Apr, MOD advised the JGS that, on 20 Feb, the GVN cabinet had decided that it was not necessary to allow NVA PWs in the Chieu Hoi program, but rather, they could be approved for release or parole pursuant to Article 21 of the Geneva Convention (GPW). 126

(C) With regard to releasing PWs, it should be noted that the GVN did not necessarily make a clear distinction between granting a prisoner Hoi Chanh status or releasing him outright. Often the determining criterion was whether the prisoner resided in secure or VC-held territory. If a prisoner resided in a secure area, he would be released outright. On the other hand, if the prisoner's home and family were located in a VC-controlled area, he would be granted Hoi Chanh status and would reside in a Chieu Hoi center until he learned certain minimal vocational skills so that his adjustment to civilian life would be eased. The likelihood of his rejoining VC forces would then be minimized. 127

(C) Actual implementation of this plan did not materialize to any significant degree. Only one PW was actually released from a PW camp as a result of the Chieu Hoi Program. This occurred in September without publicity. From time to time however, a few PWs considered potential Hoi Chanh were transferred from PW camps to the Bien Hoa PW camp and placed in a compound segregated from other internees. The total population of PWs in Bien Hoa camp included those "potential Hoi Chanh." 128

(C) On 22 Nov, a board of nine members from various GVN agencies met and interviewed 519 PWs selected by various camp commanders as possible Chieu Hoi candidates. The board recommended that 294 PWs be given Chieu Hoi status, 173 be reclassified, and 12 be released. End of year reports did not disclose if this recommendation had been approved. 129

Tet Amnesty (Mitigation of Sentence)

(U) In January, there was a report in the Washington Post that the GVN was considering the release of some 30,000 civilian defendants during the 1969 Tet season. The possible origin of this report, according to AMEMB officials, could have been a letter released by two GVN congressmen to President Thieu and Prime Minister Huong in which they requested a Tet amnesty or mitigation of sentence for prisoners, including political prisoners. 130

(C) United States officials doubted that the GVN had ever considered releasing 30,000 civilian defendants at Tet because the prisoner and detainee population in RVN at that time was about 44,000 and the release of two-thirds of them would create a major security threat for the GVN. It was known, however, that the GVN was planning a traditional prisoner release during Tet. The Minister of Interior had recommended 389 persons convicted of political offenses for release and the Minister of Defense had planned to free 10 PWs. The GVN's criteria for release of political prisoners was that the prisoner not be a Communist Party member, that his prison behavior was good, and that he had served two-thirds of his sentence. Ten VC PWs were released, but no further report was received regarding release of political prisoners. 131

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Prisoner Releases

(U) On 7 Jan, the GVN released 10 low-ranking VC PWs from the Bien Hoa Camp in what was termed a "humanitarian gesture." The releases were similar to the release of 140 VC PWs on 3 Nov 68 (See 1968 MACV Command History), although there were no elaborate ceremonies marking the release. The MOD said that the release was one of many planned in a massive psychological effort to get the VC to rally to the GVN. 132

(C) In the following months there were more releases, but not on a massive scale. Freeing of PWs varied from two in a month to as high as 89 in October. 133 By the end of December there had been a total of 191 released during 1969. All of the PW releases were generally based upon provisions of Art. 21 Geneva Convention, including the youth, aged, and pregnant women.

Rescue and Repatriation of NVN Fishermen

(U) On 29 Jul, five North Vietnamese fishermen were rescued from a 25-foot sinking boat in heavy seas in international waters, 25 miles northeast of Dong Hoi, by US Navy personnel from the destroyer USS Renshaw (DD-499). Following directions from tracker aircraft from the Early Warning Sq 111, the Renshaw headed for the scene of rescue. Five members of the fishing boat were found floating in a raft dropped by a USAF air-sea rescue helicopter. They climbed aboard the USS Renshaw via cargo nets lowered by the destroyer's crew. After being pronounced in good health by the ship's corpsman, they were given food and dry clothing and were taken to Danang. On 30 Jul, USN personnel from the destroyer USS Meredith (DD-890) rescued five more NVN fishermen from three rafts, adrift in international waters, approximately 70 miles north of Dong Hoi.

(S) All 10 NVN were identified as innocent civilians and were cared for in Danang by the US until arrangements could be concluded with the North Vietnamese for their safe return. On 31 Jul, the US informed the GNVN that the men were in US hands in RVN and proposed sending the fishermen to Vientiane, Laos, from where they could proceed to Hanoi on aircraft operated on behalf of the ICC. This method of repatriation was considered more expeditious than repatriation by sea. Experience with Operation TIGHT JAW in 1968, which had culminated in a return of NVN civilian seamen by sea (although concluded without incident), proved that method more cumbersome and potentially hazardous. North Vietnam rejected the proposal of returning the fishermen by ICC aircraft and did not offer any proposal of their own or express further interest on the possible return of these men.

(S) On 12 Sep, MACV was requested by the Saigon Embassy to prepare a plan for the return of the fishermen. In a memorandum to the Mission Coordinator, AMEMB Saigon, COMUSMACV proposed the following plan:

1. COMNAVSUPACT Danang purchase a junk suitable to carry 10 fishermen to NVN (the staff liaison officer with COMNAVSUPACT had determined that the fishermen had the ability to handle such a craft). Estimated cost of the junk was \$3,500.

2. III MAF/NAVSUPACT Danang transport fishermen and junk from Danang by truck

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(lowboy), to the vicinity of the DMZ and cited the village of Ha Loi Trung (YD 2876) or the fuel facility at Cua Viet (YD 3568) as possible launch sites.

3. Launch small craft with fishermen when weather permitted. If considered safe, direct them to sail north along the coast for at least 10 nautical miles, after which they could land at any time they wished. If sailing close to the DMZ was considered unsafe, the Northern Barrier Ship (MSO) could escort the junk out to 12-14 miles from shore and then direct it north-west towards NVN.

(C) The advantages of the proposed plan were:

1. Lower cost in that no large naval shipping would be required. (See MACV History 1968, pp 856-857, for Operation TIGHT JAW.)
2. Actual time/date of transfer could be chosen to provide the best possible weather and surf conditions.
3. Negotiations with NVN Government were avoided.

(C) The disadvantages of the proposed plan were:

1. Possibility of a longer trip (10-30 km) for the fishermen.
2. Difficulty of observing their safe arrival in NVN.

On 3 Oct, an AMEMB Saigon message to SECSTATE supported the MACV proposal and considered that the advantages of the plan outweighed the disadvantages, primarily since there appeared no doubt that the fishermen were sufficiently capable to assure their safe return. SECSTATE agreed and requested that State be informed of an estimated date for return of the men.

(S) In coordination between COMUSMACV and CG, III MAF, a tentative date/time was set for 0800 hours, 20 Oct. Cua Viet was selected as the point of embarkation. In the event weather or seas were prohibitive, embarkation would be delayed by successive 24-hour periods until transfer was complete. On 8 Oct, COMNAVSUPPACT proposed to COMUSMACV:

1. Procure boat in Quang Ngai City, since boats had moved south for the monsoon/typhoon season.
2. Tow junk and transport fishermen by sea to Cua Viet rather than by truck, because of the security considerations and condition of LOC.
3. Provide Northern Barrier Ship to escort craft out to 12-14 miles from shore.

On 14 Oct, COMUSMACV concurred, with the following changes (changes were required in order to agree with an AMEMB Paris information letter to DRV Delegation):

1. Designate point of release on seaward extension of southern boundary of DMZ, 12 nautical miles from land at coordinates YD 500770.

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2. Provide craft with radar reflector and high visibility signal panel.
3. Direct fishermen to head northwest towards NVN and to make landing prior to sunset.

(S) On 15 Oct, CINCPAC advised all concerned that the State Department would announce the plan to release the fisherman at a press briefing in Washington on 18 Oct (Saigon time).

(S) On 17 Oct, MACV was informed by AMEMB Saigon FONECON that the ICRC had been requested to verify present health and continued desires of the fishermen to return to NVN and that an ICRC representative was to observe the departure of fishermen from RVN waters. The ICRC representative, Mr. Hauser, was already in Danang and the ICRC physician, Dr. Rhymer, departed the next day to arrive at Dong Ha for further transportation to Cua Viet. On 19 Oct, AMCONSUL Danang advised the AMEMB Saigon that the fishermen had been interviewed by ICRC representative Hauser and examined by Dr. Rhymer on 18 Oct. All were found in good health and all signed statements that they desired to return to the north.

(U) Excerpts from the State's press briefing of 17 Oct follow:

It has been decided in consultation with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to provide 10 North Vietnamese fishermen, rescued in international waters by United States Naval craft last July, with a junk and to release them in the vicinity of the DMZ on the morning of October 20.

All of these men desire to return to North Vietnam. They have been interviewed by a delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who also determined that they were in good health.

They will be escorted to a distance of 12 to 14 miles from shore, and advised to sail from there, northwest, toward the territory of North Vietnam.

Anticipated release time 8:00 A.M. local. And if there is bad weather, they will be released at the same time on the first day thereafter that weather permits. . . . the announcement we are announcing today was made in Paris through an exchange of letters between the United States and North Vietnamese delegations at the Paris talks.

It was not until the last few days before the above press briefing that NVN accepted or even acknowledged final arrangements.

(S) Meanwhile COMNAVSUPPACT Danang had selected four of the NVN fishermen as crew for the junk and had instructed them in the operation and handling of the craft on 13, 14, and 15 Oct. The junk was equipped with radar reflector; two magnets, high reflector, signal panels; and rigged for and provided with sail. Cooking utensils and provisions with a minimum of three days food supply, 55-gal drum of diesel fuel, 20 gals of lubricating oil, and 20 gals of fresh

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water also were provided. The junk and personnel were staged at NSAD, Cua Viet. Transportation to Cua Viet had been arranged for by ICRC representatives. The Northern Barrier Ship would be visited by OIC NSAD to coordinate radar tracking procedures, and weather permitting would release the fishermen at 0800 hrs, 20 Oct.

(S) On 19 Oct, weather was reported favorable for the next 48 hours. COMNAVSUPACT, Danang issued the following instruction to the OIC, Cua Viet:

Release NVN fishermen YD 500770 at 200800H. Report ALCON time of release, and loss of radar contact, with grid position of NVN fisherman craft.

(S) On the morning of 20 Oct, the junk with 10 NVN fishermen embarked from NSAD Cua Viet at 0611 hours under escort of LCMB-607 with the OIC NSAD and ICRC representative aboard. Twenty minutes later, they rendezvoused with the USS Loyalty (MSO 457). The junk and USS Loyalty arrived vicinity YD 500770 at precisely 0800 hours, 20 Oct, and released the NVN fishermen. When last seen, the junk was on a course of 325° at a speed of 7 knots. The USS Loyalty continued tracking by radar until 1128 hours when at position YE 196086 contact was lost; craft was on course 310° at a speed of 6 knots. 134

Repatriation of Sick and Wounded

(C) During 1969 considerable interest developed in the growing population in ARVN PW camps and steps that could be taken to release NVA prisoners to NVN. Prisoners were identified, particularly those sick and wounded, who desired to be repatriated. However there was no agreed upon plan between the GVN and the NVN on the procedures for repatriation.

(C) In fact since November 1967, the GVN, with US support had been trying to repatriate 40 sick and wounded NVA PWs and 24 civilians. The PWs had qualified for repatriation under Articles 109 and 110 of the Geneva Convention, had been examined by ICRC doctors, and had expressed a willingness to ICRC representatives to be repatriated to NVN. Offers of repatriation had been made through the ICRC to NVN officials in 1968 but as of the end of the year, the 54 persons were still in GVN custody. 135

(C) On 18 Feb, an ICRC representative informed the AMEMB, Geneva that, in response to a recent GVN request for ICRC assistance in repatriating the NVA prisoners, ICRC was considering renewing attempts to return some or all of the 24 NVN civilians and 40 NVN sick and wounded PWs held by the GVN. The ICRC plan was to have one of their representatives meet with the NVN Embassy in Phnom Penh or Vientiane and arrange for the prisoners to be returned by boat to the coast of NVN. The ICRC would purchase the boat and ask the USN to transport the boat and prisoners to a location off the NVN coast. The ICRC also hoped to escort the prisoners ashore and return with their boat to the accompanying USN ship. 136 This plan had a format similar to the 1968 releases with the exceptions of the boat buyer and accompanying the prisoners ashore (See 1968 MACV Command History for details on previous releases).

(C) After further planning and discussion, ICRC decided to approach Hanoi either directly or through NVN representatives in Paris rather than through the NVN Embassies in Cambodia

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or Laos. The reason for this change was that ICRC believed a direct approach would be more successful than one through diplomatic channels. Also, the ICRC representatives in Cambodia and Laos were unwilling to approach the NVN embassies. These representatives also doubted that the North Vietnamese would accept the plan in light of Hanoi's hostility toward the ICRC.¹³⁷ Nothing came of these plans.

(C) Meanwhile during the first quarter of 1969, ICRC and GVN medical personnel completed a survey of all sick and wounded PWs in the six PW camps with the following results: 778 PWs were eligible for release or repatriation due to sickness and/or wounds. Of this number 26 desired to be repatriated to NVN, 198 desired to be released in RVN, and 554 desired to remain in the PW camps.¹³⁸ There was no change reported in this status until August, when MACPM received a list containing the names of 1,460 sick and wounded PWs under consideration for release. Out of this total, 816 had been affirmed by Joint ARVN/ICRC medical teams as eligible for release or repatriation. The majority of those PWs preferred to remain in camp, however, rather than be released or repatriated. The desires of these PWs were reported as follows:

	Desire to go to NVN	Desire to re- main in RVN	Desire to re- main in Camp	Total
VC	1	196	296	493
NVA	31	6	270	307
Regroupee	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>16</u>
Total	33	204	579	816

(C) On 28 Aug, 38 of the sick and aged PWs were released for return to their native provinces. These were all VC PWs and not NVA. Procedures with Hanoi for repatriation of the sick and wounded NVA to NVN were still unresolved.

(C) In this same month, the subject of GVN furnishing PW lists to the ICRC became a matter of SECSTATE concern. It was important to the US international position that provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention, relative to the treatment of PWs, be satisfied both by US and GVN agencies. The GVN was somewhat reluctant to furnish details about enemy PWs to the ICRC, apparently under the erroneous impression that to do so would give some advantage to the enemy.¹³⁹ Thus, any submission of PW lists by the GVN to the ICRC was spasmodic and lacking detail. The failure of GVN to keep ICRC up to date on enemy prisoners prompted the AMEMB Saigon to urge the GVN Foreign Minister to apprise the MOD of the importance of early action to furnish PW lists, hopefully by September. In October, the ICRC representative in Saigon received a letter from the GVN Ministry of Defense which explained the delay on the basis of the need to "rectify PW lists" and that such would be made available in "two or three weeks." In November, the GVN resumed transmittal of PW lists to the ICRC and was complying fully with the Geneva Convention in this regard.¹⁴⁰

(U) Following this the GVN announced its readiness to arrange procedures with Hanoi, or by any other means, for return of 62 sick and wounded PWs to the Hanoi administration. The overture was made at the 42d plenary session of Paris meetings on 13 Nov. The GVN commu-

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nique from the RVN delegation stated: 141

For humanitarian reasons and in respect of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war of August 12, 1949, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam decides to return to the Hanoi administration sixty-two (62) prisoners of war belonging to the armed forces of North Vietnam and captured on the battlefields of South Vietnam.

These 62 prisoners of war are sick and wounded soldiers who, after receiving medical treatment, are now in condition to be sent home. The afore-said individuals have also expressed the desire to return to their homes in the north.

In view to determine the proper procedures concerning the return of these prisoners of war, procedures which would be most convenient to both sides and best suitable to the individuals concerned, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam is ready for all contacts with the Hanoi administration through the two delegations of the Republic of Vietnam and of North Vietnam at these meetings or through any other means.

The delegation of the Republic of Vietnam is prepared to supply the list of the above mentioned 62 prisoners of war.

(U) Hanoi declined the offer. On 8 Dec, RVN officials asked the ICRC to require Hanoi to accept the 62 PWs. The move was made in a memorandum submitted to the ICRC by Ambassador Le Van Loi, Chief of the RVN permanent mission to the international organization in Geneva. 142

(C) Following is a translation of the 8 Dec note which the Permanent Representative, Geneva, of RVN delivered to ICPC Geneva:

The permanent mission Republic of Vietnam to International Organization Geneva presents compliments to ICRC and by order of its government, has honor to inform the following:

By note dated Nov 25, 1969, Ministry Foreign Affairs Vietnam approached ICRC delegation Saigon in order to make use its authority and influence to ask Hanoi authorities to accept return to North Vietnam of 62 war prisoners of Hanoi Armed Forces who had infiltrated into South Vietnam and for whom Republic Vietnam's government authorizes return to North Vietnam taking into consideration their infirmity, illnesses and their wishes to return home.

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Previously, at 43rd meeting in Paris on Nov 20, 1969, the Republic of Vietnam's Delegation Chief, Ambassador Pham-Dang-Lam offered to Hanoi Delegation same proposal giving him nominal roll 62 prisoners indicating their administrative and regimental numbers, and their health status. Ambassador Pham-Dang-Lam made clear that Vietnam Government is ready to hand over these prisoners to Hanoi Administration, without any conditions.

The Hanoi delegation has categorically refused the generous proposal of the Vietnam delegation... It is observed that in accordance with article 109 of 1949 Geneva Convention the conflicting parties will be required to repatriate sick and wounded prisoners.

If the Republic Vietnam is required to send back these prisoners to their country of origin, the Hanoi authorities are also morally, humanely and also legally bound to accept them.

The permanent mission of Vietnam would be grateful to ICRC to make use its moral influence and authority as depositary and guarantor of the 1949 Geneva Convention to convince the Hanoi authorities to receive in North Vietnam the above mentioned 62 prisoners, who became invalid and injured for having simply executed orders from the communist authorities to attack South Vietnam.

The ICRC action in response to the above appeal was to try to arrange repatriation to NVN through personal contacts between ICRC delegates and diplomatic representatives of DRV in Phnom Penh or Vientiane. 143 As a result the RVN Embassy, Vientiane, contacted the President of Lao Red Cross and requested his assistance in repatriation of 24 of the sick and wounded PWs via an ICC Saigon/Hanoi Flight. The problem was to obtain some assurance from DRV that the men would be accepted on arrival at Hanoi. The plan was for either the ICRC representative Vientiane or the President of Lao Red Cross to approach the DRV Embassy in Laos to ask if Hanoi would be prepared to receive them. Although the question of prisoners falls within jurisdiction of ICRC rather than that of a national level, it was believed some success might be achieved through the initiative of the President of the Lao Red Cross.

(C) During a DRV press briefing, 4 Dec, at the Paris talks on Vietnam, there was for the first time a response from the DRV representative regarding the release of PWs... an ambiguous and evasive one. When questioned as to what reception the prisoners would receive if they were in fact released at the 17th parallel, the reply was simply "patriots are always well received by the people." The representative went on to say:

Like the French people under Nazi occupation, whether they were from the south or the north, from east or west, a Frenchman had the right and duty to

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defend his motherland and to fight against the aggressors. As the Vietnamese patriots who have been arrested by the US and the puppet Saigon administration, they must give them back their freedom... If these captured persons desire to go to the north, the US and the puppet Saigon administration must take them to the 17th parallel or near the coast of this parallel to give them back their freedom. Whether southern or northern, if arrested patriots wanted to live in the south, they must be allowed to live there.

The above could be considered as the first time the other side had advanced a "formula". The problem was that response failed to make clear that the NVN administration would accept responsibility to meet and receive the sick and wounded if released.

At the 47th Plenary Session of Paris Talks, 18 Dec, the GVN opening statement by Ambassador Lam included the following:

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam only needs to know clearly the procedures which are most convenient and in the best interest of these prisoners of war. The release can only take place when the North Vietnamese communist administration has given indication that it will accept the responsibility to receive and take care of the above mentioned disabled and sick prisoners of war. Up to now, the statements made by the representative of the Hanoi Administration.....are not clear and are insufficient to enable the government of the Republic of Vietnam to discharge its responsibility towards these disabled and sick North Vietnamese Prisoners of war who have expressed the desire to return to their homes, in conformity with the 1949 Geneva Convention. The Government of the RVN has no right to abandon these disabled and sick prisoners of war into the wilds of the jungle or on the open sea, just as the North Vietnamese Communist administration has no right to evade its duty to receive them and return these prisoners to their families.

Since these disabled and sick prisoners of war are eager and anxious to be reunited with their families as soon as possible, the government of the Republic of Vietnam intends to have them transported by sea to any port or any point of the coast of North Vietnam suggested by the Hanoi administration, during the truce period declared by the government of the RVN on the fourth-coming occasion of Christmas.

In order to transport these disabled and sick prisoners of war, the Government of the Republic of

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Vietnam would welcome the participation of the ICRC
or any other international humanitarian organization
to escort these prisoners of war to the place of release.

The year ended with no release of the sick and wounded NVA PWs, as there was no further
response from the Communist side, nor had the ICRC reported any success. 144

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