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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (15 Dec 67) FOR OT RD-670698

20 December 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,  
4th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

D D C  
JAN 10 1968

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11th Infantry Brigade (Sep)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC

20 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)  
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (U) (WAZJ-FF)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) The attached Operational Report -- Lessons Learned for the quarter ending 31 July 1967 summarizes the activities of the 4th Infantry Division from 1 May to 31 July, except those covered in the Combat After Action Report, HANCOCK I, which is being forwarded with this report.

2. (C) During this period the division's organic and OPCON units have operated in a 5000 square mile area that stretched from BAN ME THUOT in BARLAC Province to DAK SEANG in the rugged mountains north of KONTUM. The major effort by 4th Division units was directed toward preventing the enemy's incursion of the RVN-CAMBODIAN Border in western PLEIKU Province. This area was the scene of several significant contacts. On 1 May, a mechanized infantry company from the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, supported by tanks from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, engaged an NVA battalion at close quarters within the enemy's bunker complex 10 kilometers north of PLEI ME. This action left 133 NVA dead at the cost of one American life. From 18-26 May, the three battalions of the division's 1st Brigade, operating west of Highway 14B, had a period of almost continuous engagement with two well-armed, well-trained NVA regiments. After the five contacts with never less than an enemy battalion, and frequently with a larger force, the soldiers of the 1st Brigade counted 367 NVA bodies as the enemy withdrew back into CAMBODIA to revise his monsoon offensive plans. Then on 12 July, two companies of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged an NVA battalion four kilometers from the RVN-CAMBODIAN Border, just north of the IA DRANG River Valley. In this contact, 142 NVA were killed. At the close of the quarter, on the afternoon of 23 July, two rifle companies from the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, supported by eight artillery batteries and TAC air, engaged two NVA battalions on the open ground south of DUC CO. The tremendous volume of supporting fires, combined with the infantry units' perimeter fires, accounted for a total of 184 NVA killed and 10 captured.

3. (C) As a result of the contacts in May, COMUSMACV deployed the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) to the Central Highlands, beginning 27 May, to assume the mission of Strategic Reserve Force for this vital area during the pending monsoon season. On 17 June, with approval of COMUSMACV and I FFORCEV, the brigade initiated Operation GREELEY in KONTUM Province in response to indications of a major enemy monsoon campaign north of KONTUM City. The operation is being conducted under 4th Infantry Division control and continues.

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for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (U) (WJZ-FF)

The brigade was joined by the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, for a 32-day operation in a portion of the area of operations during parts of June and July.

4. (C) Operation HANCOCK I, which began on 26 April, was concluded on 22 May. The ~~after~~ action report is inclosed. The operation demonstrated the techniques and the ultimate benefits of establishing a close working relationship between a US unit, local forces, and ARVN units participating in a combined operation.

5. (C) Although the past three months' operations have been more extensive in area covered than that of any previous reporting period, contact was with the same enemy and produced no discernible major changes in his tactics from the last period or Operation SAM HOUSTON. Nevertheless, we are constantly alert for variations of the enemy's basic tactics and continually are developing new ways to improve our advantages while refining the techniques which past lessons have produced. These improvements and refinements to our operations are contained in SECTION 2, Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned).

Incl  
as

*W. R. Peers*  
W. R. PEERS  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

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OPERATIONAL REPORT -- LESSONS LEARNED

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HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96262

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SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)  
for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (U) (WAJZ-FF)

TO: See Distribution

SECTION 1 (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General.

a. During the period covered by this report, the division continued Operation FRANCIS MARION, terminated Operation HANCOCK and initiated Operation GREELEY.

b. Organizational Structure.

(1) Task organizations for Operations FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY are shown at inclosure 1.

(2) The attached 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, was OPCON to TF Oregon throughout the entire period and is not included in this report.

(3) The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, attached to the 25th Infantry Division and operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone, is not included in this report.

(4) The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) became OPCON to the division on 27 May. The brigade's report is being submitted separately at a later date.

c. Commanders as of the end of the reporting period are listed at inclosure 2.

d. Mission.

(1) The general mission of the division at the end of the reporting period was to conduct surveillance and offensive operations and to provide maximum support to the Government of VIETNAM'S EDAP ENANG Resettlement Program.

(2) The specific missions of the 4th Infantry Division are to:

(a) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN Border and destroy enemy (NVA/VC) units within the assigned area of operations.

(b) Block enemy infiltration routes from CAMBODIA/LAOS across the highlands into the coastal provinces.

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- (c) Conduct spoiling attacks and ambush operations.
- (d) Destroy enemy base areas and supply installations.
- (e) Clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility.
- (f) Support the Revolutionary Development Program and the Government of VIETNAM's Refugee Resettlement Program.
- (g) Open, secure and maintain land lines of communication.
- (h) Be prepared to deploy forces for the relief/reinforcement of civilian Irregular Defense Group, Regional and Popular forces and of critical signal sites, sector and subsector headquarters within II Corps Tactical Zone.
- (i) Provide to I Field Force, VIETNAM, a battalion-size reserve on order.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. General. Enemy activities in PLEIKU Province during the period consisted of offensive operations against small unit targets of opportunity by the 32nd, 66th and 88th NVA Regiments; while the 95B Regiment engaged in battlefield preparation in the IA DRANG Valley. The enemy tried to avoid contact with large US/ARVN/FWMAF forces while defending their positions in the vicinity of the CAMBODIAN border west of Route 14B, however, they failed in this attempt and suffered significant losses in battles with units of the 4th Infantry Division. Mining activities along major LLOC's in the FRANCIS MARION AO and mortar attacks decreased slightly (there were 59 mines hit, 93 mines detected, and 59 mortar attacks; as compared to 65 mines hit, 87 mines detected and 71 mortar attacks during the previous period). There was a large increase of contacts and mortar attacks in the area northwest of KONTUM as the enemy made preparations for a monsoon campaign.

(1) The division had a total of 221 contacts with enemy forces during the reporting period. Of these contacts, 36 involved enemy units of platoon size or larger.

(2) During May, the 95B NVA Regiment was identified in a contact northwest of PLEI ME. Also during May, the 32d and 66th NVA Regiments were identified in contacts northwest of DUC CO and several brief encounters with platoon-size elements of the 88th Regiment south of DUC CO indicated that that unit was conducting extensive reconnaissance into the IA DRANG Valley. During June, the 24th NVA Regiment was engaged south of DAK TO, and in July, the 66th and 32d Regiments were engaged south of DUC CO.

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(3) A PW from the 66th Regiment stated his regiment had the mission of attacking DUC CO in June. This attack was to take place prior to an attack on PLEI ME. The deployment of US forces between PLEI DJERENG and DUC CO interrupted enemy preparations for possible attacks on the camps. However, the enemy reacted by conducting major attacks against deployed forces in the vicinity of YA7131 and YA7334 with elements of at least two regiments, which produced nine days of heavy, almost continuous contact during 18-26 May and forced the enemy to withdraw into CAMBODIA.

(4) Reconno patrols, red haze operations and visual reconnaissance during May and early June indicated enemy activity in the CHU PONG Mountains/LA DRANG Valley in the south of the FRANCIS MARION AO and in the SE SAN River/PLEI TRAP area in the north.

(5) During late May, decreased activity, lack of significant contact and special reports indicated the major elements of B-3<sup>1</sup> Front had withdrawn into their CAMBODIAN base areas. During July, the enemy showed signs of launching a major campaign as elements of the 66th NVA Regiment and 32nd Regiment were engaged by US units. In both instances the enemy suffered heavy casualties and withdrew to base areas in CAMBODIA. Also during this time, the enemy was apparently employing newly-arrived replacements to the terrain and situation in western FLEIKU.

(6) In KONTUM, particularly in the vicinity of DAK TO, DAK SEANG DAK PEK, there was a significant increase in enemy activity. Evidence indicated the possible presence of the newly-arrived 174th Regiment and the DOC LAP Regiment, which may be identified with the 101C Regiment and the K101D Battalion. A contact with the 6th Battalion, 24th Regiment confirmed its presence in the area south of DAK TO, and markings on captured equipment identified the 4th Battalion, 24th Regiment as the unit which attacked DIEN BINH.

(7) The enemy's use of mortar attacks as a casualty producing and economy of force tactic continued during the period. The heaviest mortar attack was on 20 May, when Companies A, B and C, of the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received 214 rounds of 82mm mortar fire in a night location at YA717318.

(8) On 17 June, DAK TO received 120mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire. This was the first time these weapons had been employed in II CTZ. Possession of these weapons poses an increased threat to friendly units in the Central Highlands due to the proximity of CAMBODIA and supply routes from North VIETNAM which can be used to supply the B-3 Front with these weapons.

<sup>1</sup>The B-3 Front is the tactical headquarters which controls all NVA units and operations in the TAY NGUYEN area (roughly the 4th Infantry Division AO). A Front is a flexible command which can control a force of any size up to three or more divisions. It compares in many ways to a US Army Corps.

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b. Estimated Enemy Composition, Disposition, and Strength, as of 31 July, 1967.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ESTIMATED STRENGTH</u>	<u>LAST REPORTED LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
B-3 Front	500	YA657368	21 May 67	PW
1st NVA Div	5,743	YA657366	21 May 67	PW
32d Regt	1,050	YA7708	30 Jul 67	PW
66th Regt	1,577	YA657368	26 May 67	Document
88th Regt	1,600	YA9111	3 Jun 67	PW
95B Regt	1,328	AR9514	24 Jul 67	PW
U/1 Bn 101C	500	YB8216	14 Jul 67	PW
24th Regt	1,776	AS847313	5 Jul 67	PW
33rd Regt (-)	860	AQ851409	20 May 67	Document
174th Regt	2,000	Western KONTUM	25 Jul 67	HOI CHANH
200th Arby Bn	200	YA650910	20 Dec 66	RET
407th Sapper Bn	500	AR7648	10 Jun 67	PW
304th VC Bn	400	ZB2219	6 Jun 67	Agent
H-15 VC Bn	375	AR9563	4 May 67	Agent
E-301 VC Bn	470	BF213835	26 May 67	Agent

c. Counterintelligence.

(1) The activities of the VC infrastructure in the area northwest of PLEIKU City remained relatively dormant, probably as a result of extensive division efforts in the area in March and April, which resulted in the apprehension of numerous VC.

(2) It was in the area west of PLEIKU City that the VC concentrated their efforts in response to a massive US/GVN relocation effort. The EDAP ENANG Resettlement Program moved 47 villages and hamlets from their scattered and insecure locations to a secure resettlement area along Route 19 West. The loss of these villages as a source of food and labor represented a serious threat to the infrastructure and the VC reacted accordingly. In an effort to break up the project, the VC launched an extensive propaganda effort and attempted to frighten the people away with threats of attacks. Their initial efforts were unsuccessful and EDAP ENANG survived its most critical period.

(3) The most significant fact during this period was not the amount of VC activities, but the number of times civilians voluntarily reported the VC presence to US forces. While there is no doubt that the VC can, at any time, control a small village there appeared to be definite signs that in some areas they are losing or have lost the sympathy of the people. This does not mean that the Government of VIETNAM has gained the complete sympathy of the people, but it does mean that the opportunity is present for the GVN to make extensive gains, if they initiate strong and extensive revolutionary programs in this area.

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d. Significant Enemy Tactics and Techniques.

(1) General. During the period, enemy activities included intensive VC guerrilla activities. These small scale activities consisted of tax collections, ground-to-air and sniper fire, the mining of roads, kidnappings, and terrorism. The incidence of mining activities throughout the reporting period indicated a coordinated effort on the part of NVA units and VC elements in the FRANCIS MARION AO. Reports of mixed NVA and VC/VMC elements in the PLEIKU - EDAP ENANG area further indicated increased NVA/VC/VMC cooperation in PLEIKU Province.

(2) Significant changes in enemy tactics.

(a) Enemy use of mortars. The enemy continued to use mortar attacks as a casualty-producing and economy of force tactic. Mortars continued to be the primary weapon in his attacks, and his infantry was employed to defend the mortars instead of assaulting prepared US positions. The enemy poses a significant threat with the possession of 120mm mortar and 122mm rockets with their increased range and greater casualty producing effects.

(b) Hugging tactics. The enemy continued to emphasize "hugging tactics" to reduce his casualties from friendly supporting fires. Contacts with NVA units were characterized by the enemy's efforts to either initiate the attack against US units from very close range or, when contact was initiated by US forces, to either break contact or to intermingle with the US position and employ large numbers of snipers overhead in trees.

(c) Use of route watchers. The enemy continued to employ route watchers during this period. Indications pointed to an extensive reconnaissance effort against friendly forward fire bases and night defensive positions by positioning route watcher parties on trails or routes leading from the US positions. Early warning of the direction of travel of US units from these positions provided the enemy with the information necessary for establishment of defensive positions along the US route. Several contacts initiated by the enemy against US units on the move showed that, just before contact, the enemy occupied hastily-prepared positions on the ground and at the same time, stationed a large number of his personnel in trees.

(3) Enemy use of chemical agents. On 23 June, DUC CO received three CHICOM tear gas grenades during a mortar and recoilless rifle attack. The agent dissipated quickly.

(4) Enemy propaganda.

(a) There were no indications of new or increased enemy propaganda efforts directed against US personnel. Those items of

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printed propaganda that were recovered were reprints of leaflets discovered during previous reporting periods. The number of propaganda incidents directed against US personnel decreased from the last three-month period.

(b) The enemy's main propaganda efforts were directed at the EDAP ENANG resettlement complex and other smaller village relocation and consolidation projects. These efforts, taking into account the general illiteracy of the population, were primarily verbal. The main themes were that their present location was unsafe and would be attacked. The people, therefore, should return to their real homes.

(c) Political Indoctrination: Propaganda and political indoctrination techniques followed the same pattern as they have in the past. Political officers are to be found at every enemy organizational level. Their predominant theme is that they are fighting to liberate South VIETNAM from foreign aggression and to unite North and South VIETNAM. Many of the troops have been told that this will be accomplished before the end of 1967. The CHEIU HOI program is also the subject of continuous propagandizing. While the policy varies from unit to unit, troops that possess CHEIU HOI passes are frequently subjected to punishment. Others are told that they will be tortured and killed if they rally to the government of RVN or surrender to US units.

(5) Recapitulation of enemy battle losses:

	<u>FRANCIS MARION</u>	<u>FRANCIS MARION</u>	<u>GREELEY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
	(6 Apr-30 Apr 1967)	(1 May - 31 Jul 1967)	(15 May-31 Jul 67)	

(a) Personnel.

KIA (DC)	54	1,005	189	1,258
NVAC	2	24	7	33
VCC	7	62	0	69
Detainees	<u>172</u>	<u>494</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>676</u>
TOTAL	235	1,585	206	2,036

(b) Weapons:

Small Arms	38	201	87	326
Crew Served	<u>2</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>67</u>
TOTAL	40	250	103	393

(c) Ammunition.

Small arms (rds)	3,240	23,988	7,831	35,059
Crew served (rds)	30	425	3,753	4,208
81/82mm Mortar (rds)	9	1,240	51	1,300
60mm Mortar (rds)	9	156	42	207
Grenades		344	164	603
Mines		93	15	127

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(d) Selected Items of captured equipment.

Explosives (lbs)	87.0	807.2	10.5	904.7
Documents (inches)	26.2	60.1	19.6	105.9
Rice (tons)	2.1	22.0	3.0	27.1
Salt (lbs)	10.0	163.0	0.0	173.0

(e) Material Destroyed.

Structures	141	334	99	574
Fortifications	1,062	1,963	36	3,061

e. Significant Sources and Collection Techniques. In the course of an average month, the G-2 Section received reports from numerous higher, lower and adjacent headquarters. These reports came from sources such as: VR, imagery, agent reports, captured documents, POW interrogations and from such furnished intelligence, produced ~~Insam~~, Perintreps, and Intel Bulletins. During an operation, however, the majority of information of immediate tactical value came from the division's own collection agencies and in particular from the interrogation sections of the 4th Military Intelligence Detachment operating at division and brigade level.

f. Enemy Capabilities, Vulnerabilities and Probable Courses of Action.

(1) Enemy capabilities are:

(a) Attack single or multiple targets simultaneously with a force of up to multi-regimental size, supported by local VC elements in the western portion of the FRANCIS MARION AO, and with a regimental-size force supported by local VC elements in the GREELEY AC.

(b) Reinforce the units committed on Operation FRANCIS MARION with the 24th NVA Regiment and possibly the DOC LAP and 174th Regiments in KONTUM Province; with elements of the 5th NVA Division in PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces; with the 33d NVA Regiment (-) in DARLAC Province; or with other as yet unidentified units inside CAMBODIA. Reinforce the units committed in Operation GREELEY with elements of the B-3 Front in PLEIKU Province; with elements of the 2d NVA Division in QUANG NGAI Province; or with other as yet unidentified units inside LAOS.

(c) Withdraw NVA forces into CAMBODIA or LAOS, thereby avoiding contact.

(2) Enemy vulnerabilities:

(a) The enemy's logistical system (NVA/VC/VMC) is

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vulnerable to disruption through friendly operations. Enemy units operating within RVN rely upon resupply from base areas in CAMBODIA or from prepositioned supply bases/caches in RVN.

1. Insertion of US Forces between enemy locations in RVN and the CAMBODIAN Border can interdict logistical support from CAMBODIA, as demonstrated in previous operations.

2. Sustained efforts to search out supply caches in the area of operations have uncovered numerous caches.

(b) The enemy's need for extensive combat preparations and his inflexibility in execution of plans makes him vulnerable to pre-emption by spoiling attacks. Locating enemy forces prior to the initiation of their major offensives offers the opportunity to destroy the forces and disrupt major enemy plans for multi-unit operations in an area.

(c) Enemy forces, when massed, are especially vulnerable to air strikes, artillery fires, and vertical envelopment by heliborne forces. This vulnerability increases as an enemy force penetrates deeper into RVN from CAMBODIA. However, it must be borne in mind that planned, major NVA contacts initiated by the enemy at relatively extended distances from CAMBODIA can reasonably be expected to include NVA preparations for ambushing US ground or heliborne reaction forces.

(d) VC dependence on support by the indigenous population requires the establishment of a VC infrastructure which must remain in place to be effective. Individual members of this infrastructure are vulnerable to detection and apprehension. Sustained friendly operations in an area produces a sense of physical security and trust among local inhabitants, and when augmented by intensive village sweep operations, such operations have achieved noticeable success in disrupting the VC infrastructure and detecting and apprehending VC cadre and officials.

(e) The enemy is vulnerable to the use of chemical defoliants and crop destruction agents. The enemy's need for concealed base areas, coupled with the need to produce his own rice to augment foodstuffs procured from the local populace, renders him particularly vulnerable to these weapons.

(f) Enemy personnel have several psychological vulnerabilities which can either be exploited as separate targets or used in combination against specific enemy units.

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1. The enemy's limited medical facilities, equipment and supply of drugs and medicines render the NVA susceptible to malaria and pulmonary diseases, especially during the southwest monsoon period.

2. Several intelligence sources have indicated that dissension exists between NVA unit commanders and unit political officers, and between NVA cadre and VC/VMC cadre in mixed NVA/VC units. If such dissension does not already exist, it can be created by persistent psychological attacks.

3. Intangible vulnerabilities that can be exploited to our advantage include: Fear of being killed or wounded, fear of improper burial or no burial at all, and fear of having to fight a long protracted war.

(3) Probable courses of action:

(a) The NVA achieved some measure of success in committing battalion-size forces against company-size or smaller US units, and will undoubtedly use this same tactic in future operations.

(b) In all probability, the NVA will continue to attack US units operating in proximity to the CAMBODIAN Border and south of the Oasis Base Camp. The most probable areas of enemy operations are in the vicinity of: The IA DRANG River; the area west of Route 14D; the PLEI ME, DUC CO, DAK TO, and DAK SEANG Special Forces Camps; the EDAP ENANG Resettlement Area; the LETRUNG and THANH AN District Headquarters; and the US/ARVN unit positions in this general area.

g. Recommended New Techniques and Changes in Doctrine and/or Organization.

(1) ARVN Intelligence Teams used in support of US sweeps, and cordon and search of villages: It is important that these intelligence teams be assigned permanently to the supported US unit. Permanent assignment permits supported personnel to train ARVN Intelligence Teams in US methods of operation. It also permits the assigned intelligence team to become familiar with the local tactical situation. Constant shifting and interchange of intelligence teams create a burden on the supported unit for transporting them to and from their sectors and districts. Permanent assignment would enhance intelligence operations.

(2) IPW: In order to provide rapid dissemination of information of immediate tactical value, the interrogation procedure has been divided into two phases. For the first phase, new EEI have been prepared which are designed to elicit immediate information for tactical

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commanders. Information thus derived is dispatched informally and by the most expeditious means to the DTOC and then to commanders in the field. The second phase, for which new EEI have also been prepared, is aimed at obtaining information of more long-term value. Although the actual interrogation is continuous, the second phase is further divided into two parts. The first is intended to determine and obtain information specific to the unit of the POW or detainee, such as its strength, location of base areas, organization, equipment and morale. The second part aims at enemy forces in general and seeks to obtain information with value for broad application, such as weapons capabilities and training methods, etc. This method is expected to provide rapid dissemination of information and a more thorough exploitation of the POW's/detainee's knowledge.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

a. Plans developed/executed during the quarter.

(1) OPORD 16-67 (3d Bde TF, 25th Inf Div Participation in Operation OREGON (U)) 20 May 1967. Clarifies the task organization and command relationship of 3d Bde TF, 25th Inf Div and its' component elements.

(2) OPLAN 17-67, 5 May 1967. Provides guidance for the receipt of an additional brigade in support of division operations in the FRANCIS MARION area of operations.

(3) OPLAN 18-67 (AVENGER), 14 May 1967. Plans for the relief/reinforcement of CIDG camps and BVN district headquarters in the FRANCIS MARION AO with an armored or airmobile task force.

(4) OPLAN 19-67 (CRAIG), 16 May 1967. Plans for airlifting a battalion task force to NHA TRANG to conduct search and destroy operations under I FFORCEV OPCON in cooperation and coordination with two ROK infantry battalions in vicinity of HAN BA Mountain (BR8972) for approximately 30 days.

(5) OPLAN 20-67 (MOULTRIE), 16 May 1967. Plans for airlifting a battalion task force to PHAN RANG to conduct search and destroy operations under I FFORCEV OPCON in cooperation and coordination with two ROK infantry battalions in vicinity of HAO CHU HI Mountain for approximately 30 days.

(6) OPLAN 21-67 (SCHUYLER), 17 May 1967. Plans for airlifting a battalion task force to DAO LOC to conduct search and destroy operations under I FFORCEV OPCON in cooperation and coordination with two ROK infantry battalions in vicinity of DAO LOC- DI LINH for approximately 30 days.

(7) OPORD 22-67 (FAMOUS FRIEND), 20 May 1967. Outlines plans

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for cordon and search operations to destroy VC infrastructure in the villages and hamlets in the vicinity of Camp Enari. CA/PSYOP activities to be conducted concurrently in conjunction with all cordon and search operations in the division TAOR.

(8) OPLAN 23-67 (DECATUR), 21 May 1967. Provides for the relief/reinforcement of CIDG camps, RF/PF outposts, critical signal sites and district/sub-district headquarters in the II Corps Tactical Zone by a force varying in size from a rifle company to the division (-).

(9) OFORD 24-67 (GREELEY), 4 Jun 67. The 173d Abn Bde, under OPCON of 4th Inf Div deployed to the vicinity of DAK TO to conduct search and destroy operations to locate and destroy elements of the 24th NVA Regiment and to conduct surveillance of the CAMBODIAN Border to counter major infiltration into the AO. The brigade prepared to relieve/reinforce USSF/CIDG camps, Province/District Headquarters, and RF/PF outposts within the GREELEY AO.

(10) OFORD 25-67 (STILLWELL), 17 June 1967. The division conducted search and destroy operations with a battalion task force east of Highway 14 and north and south of Highway 19 east of PLEIKU to eliminate VC and VC supply caches in the area.

(11) OFORD 26-67 (HIGH NOON), 28 June 1967. Provided for the security of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their official party while enroute to and from, and during their visit to the PLEIKU area and the division AO.

(12) OFORD 27-67 (BUSHMASTER), 19 July 1967. Established a night ambush program to complicate and harass the movement of VC/NVA forces in areas where heretofore they have been able to move with relative immunity. The program encompasses all portions of the division AO and TAOR.

b. Operations.

(1) The 4th Infantry Division continued Operation FRANCIS MARION. A chronological summary of significant activities from 1 May to 31 July is at inclosure 3.

(2) On 17 June, the division initiated operation GREELEY in an area of operations northwest of KONTUM. The 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), under the operational control of the division, was the primary unit participating and was continuing the operation at the end of the reporting period. The 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division deployed to the vicinity of KONTUM on 24 June and conducted search and destroy operations for approximately 30 days northeast of KONTUM. The 1st Airborne Task Force (ARVN), two battalions of the 42d ARVN Regiment, CIDG and Mike Force units participated in the

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operation, either in an assigned portion of the AO, or working directly with the 173d Airborne Brigade. A chronological summary of significant activities from 17 June to 31 July is at inclosure 4.

(3) Operation HANCOCK I, initiated during the previous quarter, terminated on 22 May. A detailed record of the operation is contained in Combat Operations After Action Report, HANCOCK I, Headquarters, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

c. Training.

(1) The 4th Division Replacement Training Program was revised to incorporate combat lessons learned in recent operations. Additional instructional units on the characteristics and employment of the M18A1 Claymore and the M-26 Grenade were added to the program. The procurement of two UH1B helicopter "hulls" added realism and enhanced the ground training phase of airmobile instruction. The Replacement Training Detachment trained a total of 5,230 replacements during the quarter.

(2) The 4th Division Combat NCO Leadership School provided instruction to 198 students; 175 of them successfully completed the course.

(3) Thirty-two students successfully completed the division Recondo Preparatory Course.

(4) Division personnel received the following new equipment training:

<u>NEW EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL TRAINED</u>
An/VSC-2 (RTT Operator Training)	84
An/GRC-106 (Radio Operator Training)	14
An/PRT 4 and PRR-9 (Squad Radio Operator Training)	78
An/PRT 4 and PRR-9 (Maintenance Training)	15
An/ARC-131 (Radio Maintenance Training)	8

(5) Other training conducted by the division during the reporting period included sniper training of five days duration for 93 personnel, and "Hawkeye" (Recondo hunter/killer teams) training of five additional days for 24 US and 30 Montagnard personnel (Hawkeyes). Experienced personnel from the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery trained CIDG artillery gun crews at PLEI ME. In addition, 36 members of combat support and combat service support units in the PLEIKU area attended a four-day course of instruction on ambush and patrolling.

(6) Projected new and revised training programs/courses of instruction are:

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(a) Increased instruction on mines and booby traps to include participation in a confidence course for all replacement trainees and selected combat and combat support units.

(b) A class on sniper and "Hawkeye" instruction to be conducted in September.

(c) Replacement and unit training programs for personnel of eight infantry company packets scheduled to arrive in August.

(d) An extensive unit training program for maneuver battalions to be conducted for approximately seven days each quarter, while operating from a fire support base in a relatively secure area. This program is in addition to the recurring training conducted at fire bases and while rotating through base camp.

(e) Development of a combat refresher training program for ARVN, and RF/PF units in the II Corps Area. Experienced division personnel will act as mobile cadre and form inspection teams to assist and advise ARVN training personnel. In addition, selected ARVN and RF/PF NCO's who have a degree of English comprehension will be given the opportunity to attend the division's NCO academy.

d. G3 Air Operations.

(1) 7th Air Force provided close air support for 4th Infantry Division operations during the quarter. In addition to 4th Infantry Division units in FRANCIS MARION AO, air support was flown for 173d Airborne Brigade and 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, in the GREELEY AO, and for Mike Forces in Operations WINFIELD SCOTT and GOETHALS, as well as for Special Forces Camps throughout the division AO.

(a) Operation FRANCIS MARION (1 May 67 - 30 Jul 67)

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>REQUESTED</u>	<u>FLOWN</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
FAC	1106	600	1733
FAC IMMED	197	174	442
CSS	589	404	882
CSS IMMED	108	60	86
SPOOKY	52	52	52
TOTAL	2054	1290	3195

(b) Operation GREELEY (17 Jun 67 - 30 July 67)

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>REQUESTED</u>	<u>FLOWN</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>
FAC	131	65	177
FAC IMMED	134	125	271
CSS	97	74	197
CSS IMMED	70	62	98
SPOOKY	12	10	10
TOTAL	444	336	753

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(3) Weather: Adverse weather conditions had a significant effect on air operations. Low ceilings and poor visibility virtually eliminated FAC missions prior to 1200 hours. Approximately 30% of the time, weather conditions were such as to prohibit FAC missions throughout the day.

(4) FAC/CSS Back-up: To counter-act the adverse weather conditions, the division initiated the use of FAC/CSS back-up requests for pre-planned air strikes. Pre-planned air requests were submitted with ordnance and targets compatible for CSS strikes. First priority was to employ the fighter aircraft with FACs. Strike aircraft contacted the FAC for final determination of weather conditions, and if they were not to be utilized as FAC missions, they were returned to the ground control radar for employment as CSS. This procedure allowed maximum flexibility in the employment of air strikes during marginal weather conditions.

(5) B-52 Strikes: B-52 air strikes continued to be a source of tremendous firepower. During the past quarter, 29 and 17 B-52 strikes were flown in support of Operations FRANCIS MARION and GREELEY respectively. The enemy fears the B-52 strike more than other sources of firepower because of its sudden and total destruction. One of the first NVA CHIEU HOI respondents turned himself in to US elements because of a B-52 strike on his regimental headquarters.

(6) Test Ordnance: During the past quarter, the division tested BLU 26B and Ring Trop interdiction devices for higher headquarters.

(a) Ring Trop: This air dropped, self-sterilizing, anti-personnel interdiction device was seeded in the division AO between 30 June - 5 July. Evaluation of Ring Trop was still being conducted at the end of the reporting period.

(b) BLU 26B: This ordnance, tested on a B-52 strike, was extremely effective against personnel in the open; however, duds produced a definite hazard for friendly personnel moving through the strike area.

e. Chemical.

(1) Chemical operations during the period consisted of defoliation, Riot Control Agent (RCA) Employment, Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) employment and the installation and maintenance of flame devices.

(2) Defoliation: Emphasis placed on defoliation during this period resulted in the production and submission of a crop destruction request for PLEIKU Province (IA DRANG-IA PUNCH Valley) which is still pending and in the approval of a PLEIKU Province ground defoliation request. Approval of the DARIAC defoliation request is still pending. Coordination on this request was accomplished with ARVN Sector S-3's and their advisors.

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(a) Aerial defoliation by C-123 aircraft continued in the division AO. Twenty-five missions totaling 64 sorties were flown in PLEIKU and KONTUM Province project areas. A total of 127 sorties have been flown in the project area since the initiation of the project on 18 February 67. (See Inclosure 5)

(b) Ground-based defoliation operations in the division AO continued throughout the period. A total of 59 UH-1D sorties, 25 CH-47 sorties and numerous Power Driven Deccontaminating Apparatus (PDDA) defoliation missions were carried out on many varied targets. (See Inclosure 5)

(c) A total of 5,008 gallons of defoliant were used for ground-based defoliation missions (4,778 gallons ORANGE and 270 gallons WHITE).

(d) During the period a different method of killing grasses was used. This method consisted of saturating the grass area with pure diesel fuel. The Power Driven Decontamination Apparatus (PDDA) and the CH-47 spray rig were used as dispensers to spray 35,600 gallons of diesel. The diesel fuel proved to be a satisfactory agent, although it was not as effective as the standard defoliant agents. Use of the PDDA as a dispenser of diesel fuel was discontinued because of the fire hazard.

(3) Riot Control Agent (RCA).

(a) A UH-1D mounted CS grenade dispenser was tested satisfactorily on 13 June. 867 grenades were dropped in two sorties to determine if the wet weather interfered with the functioning of the dispenser or the CS.

(b) Six RCA drum drops and four RCA grenade drops were made in support of division operations. In all cases, the RCA drops were followed by artillery concentrations or by rockets and AW fire from the escort gunships.

(c) The RCA was used in support of the 173d Airborne Brigade to harass and channelize the enemy at BR1234-BR1345.

1. 20 June - 60 drums (4800 lbs) of CS powder were dropped from Ch-47's.

2. 21 June - 60 drums (4800 lbs) of CS powder were dropped from CH-47's.

3. 23 June - 512 RCA grenades were dropped from a UH-1D mounted locally-designed RCA grenade dispenser.

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(d) On 29 July, 1012 RCA grenades were dropped in two sorties at ZA005965 in support of the 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

(e) On 21 - 22 June, an RCA contamination team was airlifted to BR099430 and contaminated 14 caves with CS-1 powder for the 173d Airborne Brigade.

(4) Personnel Detector employment.

(a) At the end of May, the division received five Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD), and nine Modified Manpack Personnel Detectors (MMPD), from the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) for test purposes.

(b) Maintenance and operator training for Chemical Section/ Detachment and supporting aviation personnel was accomplished at the 98th LEM Company, -QUI NHON.

(c) Testing of the personnel detector began the first week of June. On the average, three Airborne Personnel Detectors (APD's) were employed on daily detection missions after the tests began. The results of these tests were generally satisfactory (See Inclosure 6). The MMPD's had limited use because of a shortage of light observation helicopters. The five APD's were consolidated at division level and missions were assigned by the division G-2. The nine MMPD's were issued as follows: Five to the eight Scout Platoon, Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, and two to the Aviation Sections of the 1st and 2d Brigades.

(d) On 19 July, one Airborne Personnel Detector was destroyed when the helicopter carrying it was shot down by enemy ground-to-air fire.

(5) Installation and Maintenance of flame devices.

(a) By the end of the last reporting period, 123 operational 55 gallon flame devices had been emplaced around the perimeter of Camp Enari. An additional 59 flame devices were installed during this period, raising the total flame mines around the perimeter to 182.

(b) Eight flame mines required replacement. Five were set off by electrical storms and three were damaged when the new tank trail was cut near the North gate.

(c) On 23 July, two 15-drum napalm drops were conducted to burn off LZ's for the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.

f. Psywar.

(1) An overall CA/Psyops evaluation of the indigenous population attitude shows an acceptance of both GVN and US officials and the

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program initiated in the hamlets. There has been a marked increase in the amount of information volunteered by inhabitants, and the willingness to assist military and Government officials is more apparent.

(2) During the period, over 38 million leaflets, 285 hours of airborne loudspeaker time, 75 hours of ground loudspeaker time, and 48 hours of audio/visual time were used. The themes emphasized the strength of Government of VIETNAM and American forces and were designed to impress the enemy with the hopelessness of fighting the FVMAF. Other themes included the CHIEU HOI Program, the encouragement of civilians to provide information concerning NVA/VC activities, and denial of support to the NVA/VC. Loudspeaker missions were used also to warn the civilian population of danger.

(3) Several new items of equipment and several new programs were instituted. An audio/visual team from the 245th Psyop Co was attached to the division. This unit provided the division with the capability of showing movies to the villagers and playing tapes of local and national news. There was a lack of MONTAGNARD language radio broadcasts in the PLEIKU area because Radio DAN ME THOUT had been experiencing technical difficulties. To offset this difficulty, tapes of these broadcasts were shipped through JUSPAO channels to the division for broadcast over audio/loudspeaker equipment. The tapes, in JARAI and DAHNAH, were well received and were very effective. Several PP-1T Powerpages, (a small battery powered, 25-watt amplifier) were received, they were used very effectively in cordon and search operations and in connection with CA programs to announce the arrival of the CA teams and their proposed activities. A new variation of the water-borne psyops program was tried. Instead of pasting leaflets on shingles and dropping them in the river, an assortment of leaflets were put in nearly 1000 waterproof, plastic bags and dropped in the SE SAN and DAK PIHAC (VC Valley) Rivers. Themes included were: Where to Rally; Weapons Reward; Advantage of CHIEU HOI Program; Family Separation; and Where Will You Be Buried. Another new technique used was to place a package of cigarettes and several leaflets in plastic bags and drop them on known enemy locations. Approximately 300 such plastic bags were dropped. The G-2B aircraft arrived in country during this period. The airborne loudspeaker system aboard these aircraft is more than twice as powerful as the system on the old U-10 aircraft. This should eliminate the problem of being unable to hear the message and understand it as has been indicated by many HOI CHANHS and POWs.

(4) Problem Areas: The lack of Psyops teams as hampered the conduct of Psyops activities of the brigades and battalions. ARVN Psyops teams from the 29th POLWAR Battalion in PLEIKU were withdrawn for missions elsewhere on 29 April and have not returned.

g. Army Aviation Operations.

(1) Plans:

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(a) Plans continue to be updated for the improvement of Hensel Army Airfield. They include a remodeling of the POL and aircraft re-armament areas. Plans also call for the construction of three fixed-wing aircraft revetments and extending the airfield's runway to a length of 3500 feet.

(b) Staff planning was principally directed toward coordinating the use of 52d Aviation Battalion's assets that were allocated daily for division support missions.

(2) Training and Operations

(a) Training. All aviators who were programmed to fly the new UH-1H model aircraft were given "H model" checkouts prior to the arrival of the aircraft.

(b) Operations

1. Missions flown included combat assault, command and control, resupply, armed helicopter escort, casualty evacuation, liaison, reconnaissance, and Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) missions.

2. Totals for the quarter were:

	<u>Company A</u>	<u>Company B</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Hours Flown:	5,466	2,006	7,472
No. of Passengers:	30,270	2,517	32,781
Tons of Cargo:	1,200	5	1,205
No. of Sorties:	19,791	12,914	32,705

(3) Airfield Improvements. Completed projects include the construction of an airfield operations and passenger terminal building at the east end of the runway. The airfield tower was moved across the airfield to a position of better visibility adjacent to the runway. A 200 foot by 250 foot steel CH-47 landing pad and a 800 foot by 300 foot steel, fixed wing ramp were both laid. The reinforcement of all sandbag revetments with M8A1 steel matting was accomplished.

4. (C) Logistics

a. A detailed report of the logistical support of tactical operations during Operation HANCOCK I is contained in Combat Operations After Action Report, HANCOCK I.

b. Division CMMI's continued. Four battalions and two separate companies were inspected during the quarter.

c. Air drops of supplies were conducted on 31 May and 5 July, and served also as training exercises in logistic resupply.

d. 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division completed its relocation to Camp Enari on 15 May.

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e. Action was completed on 104 Reports of Survey. Thirty-two Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were approved. Three hundred and fifty nine combat loss reports were processed.

f. Planning action was initiated for receiving the Reorganization Infantry Packets and the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry.

g. Base Camp improvements in logistical support facilities accomplished during the period were as follows:

(1) Construction of six warehouses for storage of equipment and Class I supplies and for provision of adequate maintenance facilities.

(2) Establishment of an additional water point with a 500 GPH capacity.

(3) Completion of work on the ice plant.

(4) Completion of six deep wells to supply fresh water to the base camp.

h. Road conditions.

(1) Route 509 remained operational until the end of May. The road was then closed, and currently remains so without maintenance.

(2) Roads and bridges on Route 14 between PLEIKU and DAK TO were upgraded to class 55.

(3) All other roads essential to current operations are usable.

(4) Plans have been made to upgrade Route 14 between PLEIKU and BAN BLECH to Class 31 fair weather. No starting time has been established.

i. Transportation Service.

(1) Aerial support for the division was extensive. Nine special missions of fixed wing aircraft were flown in support of tactical units. The C7-A Division Aerial Courier lifted 2,043 passengers and 79.325 S/T's of cargo.

(2) The hold baggage section at Camp Enari processed the baggage of 1,355 personnel.

j. Maintenance support:

(1) Maintenance support continued to be accomplished through three Forward Support Companies, one main Support Company and an Aircraft Maintenance Company.

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(2) Job orders received and processed during the reporting period were:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>PROCESSED</u>
Track Vehicle	101	109
Wheel Vehicle	558	591
Small Arms	3,067	3,058
Artillery	76	77
Instruments	626	625
Signal (Radios)	1,782	1,797
Signal (Wire-Phone)	1,599	1,606
Generators	449	523
Aircraft	270	267
Total	8,258	8,653

k. Medical Service: Medical support continued during the reporting period. A summary of medical services is shown below:

	<u>HQ and A</u>	<u>B Co</u>	<u>C Co</u>	<u>B Co</u>	<u>C Co</u>
	<u>Company</u>	<u>Rear</u>	<u>Rear</u>	<u>Fwd</u>	<u>Fwd</u>
No. of Patients Seen	5,848	944	3,406	3,831	2,303
No. of Patients Admitted	1,927	23	60	1,193	889
No. of Patients Returned to duty	977	--	60	--	--
No. of Patients Evacuated (AMB)	941	23	946	230	685
No. of Patients Evacuated (Air AMB)	9	--	--	963	167

1. Operation GREELEY

(1) Operation GREELEY began on 18 June 1967 with the deployment of the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) to DAK TO. A 1st Log Command FSA was requested to support the operation. A logistic set-up to include laundry, bath, and graves registration was fully operational by 20 June 1967. Initially, a 3-day level of supply was established with ALOC being the primary means of resupply. By 25 June, the level was raised to five days and LLOC became the primary means of resupply. Weather and aircraft availability were the influencing factors in this decision. By 2 July, road conditions between PLEIKU and DAK TO had improved to the extent that daily resupply with no required lock-in of vehicles at DAK TO was assured. This factor coupled with the current and expected tactical situation allowed the level of supplies to be reduced to three days.

(2) Thus far, the following major supplies and services have been provided by the FSA:

(a) SUPPLIES:

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Class I (Rations)	A: 188,845
	C: 69,959
	SP: 1,971
Class III (Gallons)	JP4: 588,200
	AVGAS: 43,700
	MCGAS: 111,200
	DIESEL: 74,200
Class V (S/T)	2,335.47

(b) SERVICES:

Laundry (lbs)	72,600
Showers (Ind)	23,100

(3) With the addition of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division into the AO, a second FSA was requested, and subsequently was established at KONTUM on 25 June. A three-day level of supply was established and, except for specific items of ammunition, maintained until 10 July. The level of supply was reduced to 2 days on 10 July. Because of an anticipated move into a new AO, the move was cancelled. However, in anticipation of the units' return to their parent organization's AO, further phase-down of the level began on 20 July. The FSA closed on 25 July and departed KONTUM on 26 July. By phasing down the operation, there was no requirement for the departing tactical element to leave a security force behind. This problem had been experienced in past operations.

(4) During the period of the FSA's operation, the following supplies and services were provided:

(a) SUPPLIES:

Class I (Rations)	A: 168,125
	C: 56,068
	SP: 1,204
Class II (Gallons)	JP4: 546,000
	AVGAS: 17,290
	MCGAS: 84,700
	DIESEL: 66,655
Class V (S/T)	1,766.37

(b) SERVICES:

Laundry (lbs)	29,180
Showers (Ind)	14,135

(5) The US Air Force expended the following Class III and V in support of Operation GREELEY during the reporting period:

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Class III

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>QTY (GALS)</u>
Fighters	7,300,000
B-52's	36,900,000

Class V

Delivered by Fighters:

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
Bombs	2,838	6,341.00
CBU	158	21.20
Napalm	426	132.15
Rockets	50	10.40
Delivered by Fighters & AC-47 (SPOOKY)		
20mm	60,000	19.80
7.62mm	30,000	.75
Delivered by B-52's		
Bombs	UNK	2,526.55

(6) Transportation:

(a) From 24 June, when LLOC became the primary means of resupply to DAK TO, to the end of the reporting period, 11,132 vehicles have moved on Route 14 north from PLEIKU to KONTUM or DAK TO. This figure includes 4th Engineer dump trucks used to haul sand from KONTUM to Camp Enari for internal development.

(b) To support the relocation of the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division from KONTUM to LZ ENGLISH, the 4th Infantry Division requested air and land vehicle support. Seventy-eight C-130 sorties were required to move the combat elements by air, and 91 vehicles were required to move the brigade trains by land.

m. Operation FRANCIS MARION.

At the beginning of the quarter, the Division Support Command was operating an FSE at Jackson Hole in support of the 1st Brigade. Initially, the 1st Logistical Command operated an FSA in the FRANCIS MARION AO, with the two FSA's in the GREELEY AO being added later. To relieve the logistical effort required to support three widely separated FSA's, the FSA at Oasis, supporting the 2d Brigade, was phased out and an FSE was established. This turnover occurred between 1-6 July. At the close of the period, the division operated two FSE's in the FRANCIS MARION AO. 1st Logistical command continued to assist in transporting Class I because of division limitations in refrigerator vans. They also continued to provide laundry, bath and GRREG services. A study was begun by Division Support Command to evaluate their own capability to support two FSE's on a continuous basis.



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(2) The normal level of supplies maintained at the brigade FSE's was 3 days. However, major artillery ammunition levels and JP4 levels were varied periodically to best suit the tactical situation.

(3) During the period of the FSE/FSA operation, the following supplies and services were provided:

(a) SUPPLIES:

Class I (Rations)	A:	523,874
	C:	198,534
	SP:	5,811
Class II (Gallons)	JP4:	1,548,000
	AVGAS:	52,000
	MOGAS:	630,000
	DIESEL:	538,000
Class V (S/T)		11,029

(b) SERVICES

Showers (Ind) 117,583

(4) The US Air Force expended the following Class III and V in support of Operation FRANCIS MARION during the reporting period:

Class III

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>QTY (GALS)</u>
Fighters	28,760,000
B-52's	90,500,000

Class V

Delivered by Fighters:

<u>ORGANANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
Bombs	10,125	2,803.1
CDU	617	130.8
Napalm	2,128	712.05
Rockets	649	93.8
Delivered by Fighter and AC-47 (SPOOKY):		
20mm	153,600	46.3
7.62mm	200,000	4.5
Delivered by B-52's		
Bombs	UNK	5,949.5

(5) Transportation: During the quarter, 10,113 vehicles moved from CP 31 on Highway 19W to brigade base camps and DUC CO.

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5. (U) Military Civic Action Program (MILCAP).

a. The Good Neighbor Program continued to be the focal point of the division's Civic Actions.

b. Long-range nation building projects complementing the GVN Revolutionary Development Program were initiated under the Good Neighbor Program in the sixty-nine hamlets located within the division TAOR. Visitation by unit CA teams continued to be made five times a week to each of these hamlets. Newly initiated programs or those of a continuing nature conducted within the TAOR include dietary supplements, fish ponds, a pig farm, installation of pig troughs, furnishing of edible garbage for pigs and Youth Health Program of daily vitamins and milk. Self-help projects such as the construction of spillways, drainage culverts, recreational facilities and a market place have continued to be undertaken in response to the growing desire and awareness of villagers for added physical and material well-being. A reduction in construction because of the monsoon season was offset by an increased emphasis on MEDCAPS and on first-aid and personal hygiene classes.

c. The success of the division's Good Neighbor Program was reflected in increased participation by the villagers and GVN officials. Rapid and successful completion of the Good Neighbor Council House, spillways, two dispensaries and a five-acre fish pond/lake were representative of the growing community bond between the hamlets, the GVN and the Revolutionary Development Program as supported by the division.

d. The Good Neighbor Program was active in the forward areas of the division. The hamlets located around battalion fire bases, brigade CPs, and along Highways 14B and 19 began to enjoy new standards of health and well-being similar to the hamlets within the TAOR. Battalion fire base programs continued to emphasize short-range, high-impact projects permitted by the tactical situation and overall security of the particular area.

e. EDAP ENANG Resettlement Program.

(1) The ARVN continued to support the EDAP ENANG Resettlement Program by employing one ranger battalion, an RF company and several PF platoons as a security force, along with a staff organization. The division continued to support this GVN and ARVN program consistent with the tactical situation.

(2) The 1st and 2d Brigades assisted in the resettlement program by moving 47 hamlets, with a population of 7,046 MONTAGNARDS, from areas south of THANH AN District Headquarters and west of Highway 14B. Additional division support included use of several 2½ ton trucks daily, 583 acres of farmland cleared, 837 acres cleared for residential area, and 10 truckloads of sand distributed for selfhelp construction within the EDAP ENANG area. The division veterinary program was extended to include EDAP ENANG on 4 July. Also, the division has supported ARVN operations with additional security and transportation where such operations facilitated returning EDAP ENANG villagers to

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old village sites to harvest agricultural crops and thereby increase the recognition of GVN support to the MONTAGNARD people.

f. Efforts not otherwise mentioned above.

(1) Audio/visual teams continued night visits to hamlets in the TAOR and at EDAP ENANG, successfully utilizing radio tapes, movies, and 35mm slides to explain Revolutionary Development activities, and to entertain the people.

(2) The division continued its policy of providing packages of food and sundry items to persons detained and then released as innocent civilians. In addition, toilet articles and medical treatment were provided to the PW compound.

(3) Under the division veterinary program, a total of 692 cattle were examined or treated.

(4) Twenty hamlet health workers completed training at LE TRUNG District in June. A total of forty workers have completed training since the program was initiated. A new training class of twenty villagers was begun. The graduates of the Health Workers Training Program have added substantially to the physical well-being of their hamlets.

(5) One hour of instruction per replacement training cycle has been presented to division replacement personnel to familiarize them with the division's Civic Actions and Psyops missions and the role of the individual soldier in these programs.

g. Projected Plans. Two major area civic action programs reached the final planning stages. In coordination with PHU NHON Sub-Sector, a phased civic action program will commence in August in the triangular area bounded by road junction of Route 6C and 14, Route 6C on the west, Highway 14 on the east and the 00 grid line which runs through the village of PHU NHON on the south. Later in the 3d Quarter CY 67, a phased civic action program will commence in the rectangular area bounded by Route 509 on the north, Route 14B on the west, Highway 19W on the south, and the boundary of the division TAOR on the east. Both plans include extensive psychological operation.

6. (C) Personnel.

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and at the close of the reporting period were as follows:

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(1) Beginning of period	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized:	763	164	10,876	11,803
Organic				
Attached	<u>248</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>4,341</u>	<u>4,612</u>
Total	1,011	187	15,217	16,415
Assigned:	809	147	12,079	13,035
Organic				
Attached	<u>247</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>4,404</u>	<u>4,673</u>
Total	1,056	169	16,483	17,708
(2) Close of period				
Authorized:	762	164	10,827	11,753
Organic				
Attached	<u>248</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>4,308</u>	<u>4,577</u>
Total	1,010	185	15,135	16,330
Assigned:	776	133	12,089	12,998
Organic				
Attached	<u>223</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>4,409</u>	<u>4,650</u>
Total	999	151	16,498	17,648

b. Replacements. A total of 456 officers and 6,104 enlisted replacements were received during the period. During the same period, some 4,933 personnel rotated to CONUS.

c. Morale and Personnel Services:

(1) Morale throughout the division and attached elements remains excellent.

(2) Decorations awarded.

Distinguished Service Cross	2
Silver Star	105
Distinguished Flying Cross	21
Legion of Merit	23
Soldier's Medal	8
Bronze Star W/V Device	346
Bronze Star For Meritorious Service	358
Air Medal	1392
ACM W/V Device	170
ACM	401
Purple Heart	1427

(3) Combat Badges awarded.

Combat Infantry Badge	1636
Combat Medical Badge	123
Aircraft Crewman Badge	55

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d. Promotions. A total of 3,224 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

e. Reenlistments. A total of 157 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was:

(1) First term RA reenlistments	20
(2) Career RA reenlistments	114
(3) AUS reenlistments	17
(4) RA extensions	4
(5) AUS extensions	2

f. Postal:

(1) Money Order Sales	\$3,451,728.92
(2) Postal and Parcel Post Fees	\$ 70,681.20
(3) Incoming Mail.	6,973 sacks
Daily average	77 sacks
(4) Outgoing Mail	5,078 sacks
Daily Average	56 sacks
(5) Number of incoming mail days	90
(6) Number of outgoing mail days	90

g. Special Services.

(1) Two USO shows played to an estimated attendance of 1500.

(2) R & R quotas received were 4,608 out-of-country and 944 in-country quotas.

(3) A total of 88 movies and TV films were circulated throughout the division.

h. Chaplain activities.

<u>DENOMINATION</u>	<u>NUMBER OF SERVICES</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Roman Catholic	615	19,264
Protestant	661	19,423
Jewish	3	51
Memorial (Non-Denomination)	36	2,973
TOTAL	1,315	41,711

i. Maintenance of discipline, law and order.

(1) A total of 408 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's office during the reporting period.

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(2) Military Justice:

(a) General Courts Martial	5
(b) Special Courts Martial	41
(c) Summary Courts Martial	45

7. (C) Artillery.

a. General. During the reporting period, the 4th Infantry Division Artillery participated in Operations FRANCIS MARION, GREELEY and HANCOCK I and was responsible for the defense of Camp Enari.

b. Intelligence.

(1) Base Camp and TAOR defense.

(a) The defense of the base camp perimeter and the division TAOR has been divided into five sectors. The responsibility of these five sectors has been given to the three infantry brigades, Division Artillery, and Division Support Command, each of which controls the activities in its sector from a constantly manned Tactical Operation Center (TOC). The Installation Coordination Center (ICC), staffed and operated by Division Artillery, coordinates and controls the planning and operation of defensive activities in the five sectors of base camp perimeter and the TAOR.

(b) The base camp perimeter consists of seven rows of barrier wire in various configurations from triple concertina to single apron barbed wire. Fifty-five gallon drums of napalm (flame mines) have been buried between the second and third rows of barrier wire and between the bunker line and the first strand of barrier wire, claymore mines have been imbedded in concrete. Both the flame mines and claymore mines are detonated from within the bunkers. Facing the perimeter are 102 triplelayer sandbag bunkers and 30 twenty-five foot towers. Sixteen of the towers are equipped with 17", battery-powered, incandescent searchlights with seven additional searchlights scheduled to be mounted in the near future. During the hours of darkness, three men man each of the bunkers and towers with one man alert during a normal watch. During the day, only the towers are manned by one individual armed with an M60 machinegun. The bunkers and towers all have wire communications with the sub-sector command bunker, while the sub-sector command bunkers have both wire and radio communications with the sector command bunker and the sector TOC. Each of the five sectors has a reaction platoon which can be alerted and committed within 30 minutes.

(c) The division's TAOR encompasses the land and villages within a circumferential line 10,000 meters out from the base camp perimeter. This area is patrolled constantly by one, two or three-day patrols moving on varying routes and schedules and establishing night ambushes. The five sector TOC's are responsible for submitting the route plans of their patrols to ICC for approval. They control the movement of their patrols and commitment.

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of the sector's reaction platoon to relieve/reinforce a patrol when necessary.

(d) Each of the five sectors conducts an intensive civic action program within their assigned portion of the TAOR. In total, this is the 4th Infantry Division's Good Neighbor Program. The sector headquarters monitors the activities of these CA teams while they are away from base camp. The good rapport that has been established between these teams and the villages they visit assists in the base camp defense by gathering intelligence of enemy activity. This intelligence is volunteered by the villagers that have become to know and trust the CA teams.

(e) As an additional defensive measure, visual reconnaissance of the TAOR is flown daily, weather permitting, by one observation aircraft in the morning and by two aircraft in the evening prior to darkness. A TPS-25 radar is used to scan the base camp TAOR and artillery fire is placed on any contacts which meet the rules of engagement.

(2) Metro.

(a) Two electronic meteorological sections were employed in the TAOR during the reporting period, one from 6th Battalion, 14 Artillery (52d Artillery Group) and one from Division Artillery.

(b) The Division Artillery metro section operated for a total of 829 hours and was down for 27 hours for parts. A total of 279 "flights" were made during the period.

(3) Radar.

(a) Base camp. There is one MPQ-10 counter mortar radar and one TPS-25 radar located in Camp Enari. The MPQ-10 operated 741 hours and was down 301 hours for maintenance and awaiting parts. The TPS-25 operated 1210.6 hours with 2.6 hours of down time. The MPQ-10 had no sightings; the TPS-25 located 278 contacts during the period.

(b) Area of Operations. There are three additional counter mortar radars employed with the 4th Infantry Division. They are the AN/MPQ-4A type located at DUC CO, operated by the 237th Radar Detachment; another at Combined Arms Hill, operated by the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery; and the third located at the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry's fire support base, operated by the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery.

(4) Searchlights.

(a) During the period, more of the zenon searchlights were positioned in the battalion fire support bases and TAC CP's. These lights continue to be effective for immediate illumination of the fire base

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perimeter. As enemy activity decreased around a fire base, the lights were shifted to other locations. A significant feature of the searchlight is its infrared capability which permits undetected observation of movement on the perimeter.

(b) Searchlights were also used in support of roadblock and checkpoint operations and proved to be very valuable during the hours of darkness. The surprise effect and the capability of the searchlight to illuminate a larger area assisted the military police in identifying and controlling indigenous traffic.

c. Operations, Training and Safety.

(1) Operations.

(a) Operation FRANCIS MARION

1. Concept of Operations. The concept of artillery employment was to provide direct support artillery to the maneuver elements; to utilize medium and heavy artillery in reinforcing and general support missions; and to provide artillery support for USSF/CIDG Camps at PLEI ME, DUC CO and New PLEI DJERENG.

2. Execution.

a. To provide direct support to the maneuver elements the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery was placed in direct support of the 1st Brigade and the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery was placed in direct support of the 2d Brigade. Road security missions were supported, when possible, by placing self-propelled units in support, thereby complementing the armored force normally assigned that type mission. With the concurrence of the 52d Artillery Group Commander, two batteries of the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery provided direct support artillery to the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor on Highway 19E and one battery of the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery was placed in direct support of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry along Highway 19W. This battery also supported "Road Runner" operations to the south. The 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery and the remainder of the 52d Artillery Group units provided general support reinforcing fires for the division.

b. At times it was necessary to split a 155 howitzer battery in order to provide wider medium artillery support. This concept was used with both Batteries B and C, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery. During one phase of the operation, elements of both batteries were combined to form a fourth 155 howitzer firing battery in the operational areas.

c. USSF/CIDG Camps were supported by positioning 175/8" batteries of the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery within or adjacent to USSF/CIDG Camps and at the Oasis.

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d. Mutually supporting fire support bases containing single and multiple batteries were used regularly and continued to be highly successful. The bases were positioned to support one or more of the task forces operating in the area and permitted massing of fires from one or more bases.

e. Increased control has been exercised by the Division Artillery operations section over artillery ammunition expenditures by providing guidance for expenditures to both direct support and general support reinforcing artillery. During periods of contact, expenditure of all calibers was increased. When contact diminished, expenditures were proportionally reduced. The same held true with H&I programs.

f. Division Artillery has assumed responsibility for the planning, coordination and dissemination of the preplanned artillery programs and H&I programs. Preplanned fires from the direct support battalions were integrated into the artillery program and then transmitted to the firing units from division artillery.

g. Battery D, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery and 2d Platoon, Battery B, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery were attached to the division and placed OPCON to Division Artillery. These units provided automatic weapons support for the division. During daylight hours, the 40mm M-42 dusters and 50 caliber M-55 quad 50's were used for convoy and road security and during the hours of darkness they were positioned on the perimeters of the base camps and fire support bases. The M-55 quad 50's were also used in conjunction with searchlights to provide an effective close-in H&I program for the fire support bases. The M-42's and M-55's were split among the units so that Camp Enari had three M-42's and two M-55's, 1st Brigade had seven M-42's and three M-55's, 2d Brigade had six M-42's and three M-55's and 1st Battalion, 69th Armor had four M-42's. In addition, four M-42's were OPCON 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery for security with the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), in Operation GREELEY.

(b) Operation HANCOCK I. See Combat After Action Report HANCOCK I.

(c) Operation GREELEY.

1. Concept of Operations. The concept of artillery employment was to provide direct support artillery to the maneuver elements; to utilize medium and heavy artillery in reinforcing and general support missions; to provide the coordination of artillery fires between the US maneuver elements, the ARVN maneuver elements and the sector control; and to provide route security for road movements.

2. Execution.

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a. The direct support artillery was provided to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) by its organic 3d Battalion, 319 Artillery (105-Towed). The direct support artillery for the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division was provided by the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery, a 105-Towed battalion composed of three firing batteries and an aerial rocket artillery battery (-). Medium artillery was provided by attaching Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery (155-Towed) to 173d Airborne Brigade and by attaching Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery to 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division's 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery. The heavy artillery support was provided initially by Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (3" Self-Propelled) from 25-28 June and then by Battery C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery and Battery C, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery (8"/174mm Self-Propelled) from 52d Artillery Group. Route security was provided by Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery (105 Self-Propelled) of 52d Artillery Group. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery was positioned between KONTUM and DAK TO and provided coverage of the road for convoy movements.

b. A division forward TAC CP for the GREELEY AO provided a fire support coordination center for Operation GREELEY. The TAC CP assumed the mission of coordinating and obtaining clearance for the fires of the GS artillery in the area. The TAC CP also acted as coordinating headquarters for requests for artillery support from the participating units.

c. The following units from 52d Artillery Group were given the missions indicated in Operations GREELEY:

1. Battery A, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery, 155 towed, attached to 173d Airborne Brigade.
2. Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery 155 towed, attached to 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.
3. Battery C, 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery 8"/175mm Self-Propelled GS; reinforce 3d Battalion, 319th Artillery.
4. Battery C, 6th Battalion, 32d Artillery 8"/175mm Self-Propelled GS; reinforce 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery.
5. Battery B, 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery 105 Self-Propelled GS (Route Security).

d. On 26 July, the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division terminated their portion of Operation GREELEY. At that time, Battery B, 1st Battalion, 92d Artillery was released from attachment and returned to the FRANCIS MARION AO. The FSCE function of the forward TAC CP was also terminated on 26 July.

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(2) Training: Scheduled training as required by 4th Infantry Division Regulation Number 350-2 was conducted. Division Artillery has expanded the training program to a minimum of 15 hours per week to include MOS refresher training, safety during firing and rules of engagement. To further improve performance of the gun crews the Division Artillery Instruction-Safety Team visited and inspected each battery monthly. The Division Artillery also provided training for the engineer mortar crews and fire direction personnel. Support was also provided to the division NCO School, the Replacement Training Detachment artillery adjustment classes, and the division special schools. The battalion and battery training programs concentrated on deficiencies discovered during Instruction Safety Team visits. Lessons learned during operations, to include reviews of firing accidents, were emphasized during team visits. The 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery provided personnel to train CIDG artillery crews at PLEI ME.

(3) Safety:

(a) During the period the organic and non-organic units of the division artillery had several accidents. The basic causes for these accidents were:

1. Supervisory personnel failing to make required checks.
2. Friendly units not located on firing charts.
3. Friendly units reporting incorrect locations.
4. Observers making bold shifts when firing close in to friendly forces.

(b) All of the above accidents were violations of established safety procedures. Means were available to secure accurate locations through use of artillery assets and all artillery observers and liaison officers instructed covering use of the means.

(c) The Division Artillery and its organic and non-organic units continued to emphasize the importance of firing safety by all elements of the fire delivery team. The methods used to prevent and reduce accidents were:

1. Instructional-Safety Team checks of each unit monthly. During these visits the team reviewed the causes of recent accidents and the measures to be used to prevent recurrence. The team further checked to insure that the current guidance, policy and safety directives had been implemented and that personnel had been instructed on required duties.

2. Continued emphasis was placed on the performance of supervisory personnel and on insuring that essential checks had been performed

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prior to and during firing.

3. Smoke or illumination was prescribed as the first round of any mission.

4. When artillery fire was placed within 500 meters of friendly forces, the creeping method of adjustment was used.

5. All friendly locations were plotted on all firing charts.

6. Close-in fire support was approved by the maneuver force commander, only after he had been advised fully by either the artillery forward observer or liaison officer concerning the risks involved.

(d) Ammunition expenditures:

1. By caliber, 1 May to 31 July:

$\frac{105}{136,488}$	$\frac{155}{76,015}$	$\frac{8''}{23,371}$	$\frac{175}{12,979}$
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2. By unit:

FRANCIS MARION, 1 May to 31 July    GREELY, 20 June to 31 July

4/42 105T	52,855	3/319 105T	24,168
6/29 105T	64,326	1/21 105T	22,760
3/319 105T	9,572	3/6 105T	135
3/6 105SP	21,152	1/92 155T	10,327
5/16 155SP	51,116	5/16 8"SP	18
5/16 8"SP	8,844	6/14 8"SP	1,948
1/92 155T	16,479	6/14 175SP	2,523
6/14 8"SP	11,810	6/32 8"SP	414
6/14 175SP	8,715	6/32 175SP	598
6/32 8"SP	414		
6/32 175SP	598		
3/18 8"SP	496		
3/18 175SP	681		

HANCOCK I, 1 May to 22 May

6/29 105T	2,444
5/16 155SP	1,889

d. Army Aviation:

(1) Disposition of aircraft:

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(a) OH-23G.

Division Artillery: 7. 1. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 4th Infantry

2. On loan from 4th Aviation Battalion: 1.

(b) UH-1C: Attached to 4th Aviation Battalion: 2.

(2) Operations:

(a) May: 1155 combat support missions were flown and 1520 passengers were transported, requiring 1540 sorties. A total of 568 hours were logged on the aircraft and the aircraft availability was 80%.

(b) June: 954 combat support missions were flown and 829 passengers were transported, requiring 1273 sorties. A total of 478 hours were logged on the aircraft and the aircraft availability was 64%.

(c) July: 859 combat support missions were flown and 83- passengers were transported, requiring 1146 sorties. A total of 490 hours were logged on the aircraft and the aircraft availability was 60%.

(d) The quarterly totals are as follows:

1. Missions Flown - 2,968.

2. Passengers Transported - 3,179.

3. Sorties Required - 3,959.

4. Hours Logged on Aircraft - 1,056.

5. Average Aircraft Availability - 68%.

e. Logistics:

(1) Basic loads of artillery ammunition.

(a) For Operation FRANCIS MARION, the basic loads of artillery ammunition were the same as those developed from the experience gained during previous operations.

(b) The base camp defense ammunition stockage level remained unchanged during the period.

(2) FSE stockage levels of artillery ammunition.

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(a) DISCOM continued operation of the FSE at LE THANH for Class I, II & III and IV supplies. Class V supplies were maintained in a battalion trains area of the FSE. The stockage level of Class V items varied with the amount of firing, but for the majority of the period, the following stockage levels prevailed:

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>TYPE OF AMMO</u>	<u>FSE (3-day Stockage Level)</u>
105MM Howitzer	HE	3,000(Usage factor: 1,000rds/bn/day)
	ILL	300(Flat rate)
	WP	300(Flat rate)
	SMK	300(Flat rate)
155MM Howitzer (2 Btrys)	HE	1,500(Usage factor: 250 rds/btry/day)
	ILL	100(Flat rate)
	WP	100(Flat rate)
	SMK	100(Flat rate)
8 Inch Howitzer (1 Btry)	HE	480(Flat rate)

(b) On 1 July, the FSA at Oasis was closed and an FSE established by DISCOM using the same procedures as at LE THANH. Class V stockage levels at Oasis were the same as at LE THANH, less the 8-inch ammunition.

(3) Available supply rate of artillery ammunition.

(a) The following ASRs were in effect during the reporting period (105MM Howitzer only):

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>HE</u>
301800 Apr - 121800 May	30 rds/wpn/day
121800 May - 241800 May	30 rds/wpn/day
241800 May - 091800 Jun	30 rds/wpn/day
091800 Jun - 241800 Jun	30 rds/wpn/day
241800 Jun - 091800 Jul	30 rds/wpn/day

(4) The average percentage of howitzers deadlined was:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>M101A1</u>	<u>M109</u>	<u>M110</u>
May	1%	5%	3%
Jun	0	4%	1%
Jul	0	5%	3%

(5) The average percentage of vehicles deadlined was 5% each month.

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8. (C) Engineer

a. General: During the period, the 4th Engineer Battalion's effort was directed toward support of tactical operations and base development at Camp Enari. Company C and one bridge platoon of Company E, 4th Engineer Battalion remained attached to 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone. Company D and elements of the bridge company, 65th Engineer Battalion, were attached to the 4th Engineer Battalion to support the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

b. Intelligence

(1) Enemy forces utilized mines on MSR's and the unimproved roads used primarily by mechanized units. Mining was unimaginative generally in that most mines were the conventional CHICOM MLAL metallic mines with a booster charge of 6-8 pounds of CHICOM TNT. Mines habitually were placed in areas from 4 to 5 km in length along the same roads and trails. With few exceptions, the detected mines were not booby trapped and few were found to be prepared for command detonation. In some instances, mines were emplaced with safety pins still installed. In spite of the lack of ingenuity used by the enemy, mines took their toll of vehicles. The great distances that had to be swept daily precluded a thorough sweep of every turnout and a completed sweep of shoulders. Most of the vehicles striking mines did so in these locations or during tactical operations requiring the rapid movement of tracked vehicles over unimproved roads when time precluded a deliberate mine sweep of the route. Most of the mine incidents resulted in the damage or destruction of vehicles, but few casualties.

(2) Enemy forces destroyed several bridges during the hours of darkness. In each incident, the bridges were located in an area where the gap or a bypass could be spanned by an AVLB.

c. Operations

(1) Engineer combat support.

(a) OPERATION FRANCIS MARION (6 April to date) - the 4th Engineer Battalion supported the operation with one company (-) in direct support of each of the brigades.

1. Company A, attached to 1st Brigade, conducted daily minesweeps in conjunction with Company A, 20th Engineer Combat Battalion to clear approximately 35 kilometers of road, plus other sweeps conducted on an as-required basis. Thirty-one mines were detected by Company A and destroyed or removed using grappling hooks. Company A's efforts were also directed toward clearing battalion FSBs to facilitate the relocation of infantry battalions eight times during the period. Company A also supported the brigade by construction and maintenance of roads and drainage facilities, building protective berms around storage areas and helicopter pads, and building artillery firing positions within the base camp. In addition, Company A cleared fields of fire around the brigade base camp, provided dust control by applying 320 barrels of peneprime on the helicopter pads, and

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maintained a sanitary fill outside the base camp. Within the 1st Brigade AO, Company A provided engineer support for clearance of fields of fire, construction of helicopter berms, and miscellaneous projects at the DUC CO and PLEI DJERENG CIDG Camps. On two occasions a D6B bulldozer was airlifted by a CH-54 helicopter to a hilltop where it was employed to assist engineer troops in clearing outposts. On 23 July Company A began clearing the land 220 meters out on both sides of Route 19W from the intersection of Route 14B east to a distance of approximately seven kilometers. A small hill along this route was also cleared and the top leveled to provide a site for an observation tower with infantry and armor positions below.

2. Company B, attached to the 2d Brigade, supported the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry with a platoon (-) each. The line squads of the platoons were attached to the companies during their operations outside the FSB and assisted the companies by clearing landing zones with chain saws and explosives for resupply and MED EVAC. Additionally, squads destroyed enemy bunker and tunnel complexes and performed mine sweeps. The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (M) was supported by elements of Company B on a mission basis. Company B established a water point within the perimeter of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry FSB using a 600 GPH skidmounted unit and thus eliminated the requirement for six helicopter lifts of water per day. Within the 2d Brigade Base Camp, Company B constructed roads, a 250X700 foot helicopter loading pad, and protective berms and roads in the Class V storage areas.

(b) TASK FORCE CHARGER. Company D upgraded 25 km of Highway 6C from Highway 14 to the CIDG Camp at PLEI ME during the period 8 to 18 May. The route was initially cleared of mines; thereafter one platoon, furnishing its own security, cleared the route daily. The organic APC's and tank dozers were provided to augment the security element, and at night an additional engineer platoon was lifted to the bivouac site to reinforce the work force.

(c) OPERATION GREELEY. In late May Operation GREELEY began with the 173d Ariborne Brigade moving north to DAK TO from its base camp at CATECKA. To open the overland route to DAK TO, Companies D and E worked together on the night of 17 June to construct 120 feet of M4TB floating bridge across the DAK TA KAN River, south of DAK TO. During this operation, pre-inflated floats were carried forward by bridge trucks to a point near the bridge site. The floats were then lifted by CH-47 helicopters to the bridge site and placed in the river ready for assembly. In spite of the fact that the assembly crew worked under blackout conditions and was twice interrupted by mortar attacks, the bridge was completed in 12 hours and was ready for traffic by morning.

(2) Base development.

(a) Base Camp development was accelerated because of the impending monsoon season. Special emphasis was placed on improving drainage, upgrading roads, and providing woodframe troop billets with concrete floors. A sketch map of the base camp is at inclosure 7.

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(b) By operating mixers in a central location and operating 13 hours per day, an average of four building foundations were poured each day. Standardization of building plans, prefabrication of materials and the use of self-help unit labor, were instrumental in achieving the goal of 597 completed buildings by the advent of the monsoon season. In certain of the more specialized buildings, engineer troops were used rather than self-help labor.

(c) The lack of approval of the updated base development plan, submitted on 1 June, restricted efficient scheduling of the construction effort and caused piecemeal utilization of the engineer troops.

(d) Because a good source of sand was not available in the vicinity of Camp Enari it was necessary to send a convoy 60 kilometers to KONTUM on a daily basis. Rock was another critical material. The only sources were quarries operated by the supporting engineer group and located 15 kilometers or more from base camp. A fairly good source of laterite was discovered just outside the base camp and was used for road improvement.

(e) Particular drainage problems were motor pools, supply yards and parking areas. Many of these were improved by covering with M8A1 steel matting after grading.

(f) In airfield construction, 410,000 square feet of matting was placed on the Hensel Army Airfield runways, turn arounds and parking areas to provide an all-weather capability. An additional 48,000 square feet were emplaced for a Chinook pad, and 4,000 feet of revetment with M8A1 sections as retaining sides were placed at the airfield for helicopter protection.

(g) Both building and road improvement operations were restricted during the latter month of the quarter by heavy rains.

d. Logistics.

(1) Logistical operations continued space of the battalion effort. Over three million gallons of potable and non-potable water were supplied to the base camp.

(2) The battalion continued to supply barrier and fortification materials to divisional units. This added function, together with the necessity to receive and issue approximately 7,000 bundles of M8A1 steel matting during the period, hampered the battalion S-4 section in the performance of its normal mission.

9. (C) Signal.

a. Operations and Training Activities

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(1) Operations

(a) VHF Radio Operations - Previously established VHF systems and new systems established during the reporting period follows:

1. One existing 12-channel system from Camp Enari to 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was terminated on 14 May when the unit changed locations.

2. A second 12-channel system from Camp Enari to 1st Brigade Forward location was activated on 8 May.

3. One 12-channel system from Camp Enari to the 173d Airborne Brigade in the vicinity of CATEKA was activated on 28 May and deactivated on 24 June.

4. One 12-channel system between the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry was activated on 28 May and terminated on 24 June.

5. One 12-channel system between the 173d Airborne Brigade and one of its subordinate battalions was activated on 1 June and terminated on 10 June. This system was reactivated on 12 June and again terminated on 14 June.

6. One 12-channel system between the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor and one of its subordinate units was activated on 12 June and terminated on 24 June.

7. One 12-channel system from Camp Enari to the 173d Airborne Brigade, after relocation in the vicinity of DAK TC, was activated on 17 June. This system required two VHF radio relay sites.

8. One 12 channel system from Camp Enari to the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry was activated on 30 June and terminated on 14 July.

9. One 12-channel system from Camp Enari to the Division Forward Tactical Command Post in the vicinity of KONTUM, was activated on 24 June and terminated on 27 July.

10. One 4-channel system (AN/MRC-112) was installed from PLFIKU to KONTUM for alternate routing to the Division Forward Tactical Command Post, and on 26 June this system was extended between DAK TC and KONTUM in support of the 173d Airborne Brigade.

(b) AM Radio Operation.

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1. The Division Administration and Logistic Net #4 was terminated on 23 July.

2. Armed Forces Radio continued retransmission operations with its assigned 50-watt transmitter. A second transmitter capable of 450 watts output was activated. This additional power resulted in increased operating range.

3. A radio net utilizing the newly acquired radio sets AN/VSC-2 (AN/106 single side-band with teletype capabilities) was established with stations at Camp Enari, KONFUM, and DAK TO in support of division operations. This system proved quite satisfactory with the exception of the radio set not being equipped with a transmitter distributor capable of 60 wpm operation. The present configuration, although it is very compact and efficient for its intended use, limits the speed of transmission of teletype traffic to the typing speed of the radio operator.

(c) Operation HANCOCK.

1. The 124th Signal Battalion supported the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry Task Force operating in the vicinity of BAN BLECH Special forces Camp. A single-hop VHF radio relay system was installed between Camp Enari's Signal Hill radio terminal facility and the task force combat trains located at BAN BLECH. This system provided common-user and sole-user telephone circuits. A radio teletype team was attached to the task force to enable entrance into the division's secure radio-teletype command net.

2. VHF radio planning technique. This VHF system provided exceptionally high quality, reliable, telephone circuits for both operational and logistical traffic without the use of retransmission stations. What is noteworthy is that a new technique was used in the initial planning stage to predetermine whether or not a reliable direct radio relay link was possible. This technique, called profile computing, accurately predicted the quality of communications before the radio equipment left for the distant site. According to Army planning guidance, VHF radio relay provides line-of-sight communications over a distance no greater than 25 to 30 miles. The BAN BLECH-Signal Hill link extended 77 Km (about 50 miles) with three prominent land features interrupting the line-of-sight path (see inclosure 8). The radio quality prediction was made simply by using a pocket-size slide rule designed by and produced for the French Army Signal Corps. Once an accurate profile was constructed from standard Army maps, the slide rule operation took ten minutes. The results proved accurate.

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(d) Communications Center Operations.

1. During the reporting period nine teletype circuits were terminated in the communications center, leaving seven circuits operational at this time. The following circuits are still operational.

- a. Two circuits, Famous to Typhoon
- b. One circuit, Famous to Lava Forward
- c. One circuit, Famous to Parachute Forward
- d. One circuit, Famous to Formal Forward
- e. One circuit, Famous to Fortify Forward
- f. One circuit, Famous to Fleiku

2. An average of 1,564 messages were processed per week:

	<u>Sent</u>	<u>Received</u>
Flash	7	20
Immediate	116	440
Priority	243	513
Routine	17	190
	<u>383</u>	<u>1,163</u>

(e) Wire Operations:

1. The installation of the base camp's underground cable system was the primary project and the status of this project is shown below.

- a. Cable laid - 77% completed
- b. Trenches complete - 60% completed
- c. Cable junctions installed - 20% completed
- d. Famous MDF - 70% completed
- e. DTOC MDF wiring - 10% completed
- f. Favor MDF - 10% completed
- g. Unit terminations - 0% completed.
- h. Perimeter cable - 5% completed
- i. The primary problems affecting the project included the cable trencher being deadlined for approximately three weeks and the cable trencher's inability to be utilized on sloping ground.

(f) Photo Lab Operations

1. The division photographic laboratory was constructed. The building, plumbing and AC wiring were self-help projects.

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A gravity-flow water system was also installed. The initial equipment installed in the new facility came from the TOE AN/TIC-7 photo van.

2. Print washer and Dryer - a new print washer and dryer was installed on 27 June and the quality of prints prepared by the photo lab was greatly improved. The quantity of prints that can now be produced increased almost 400% over the old system.

(2) Training

(a) On-the-job type training was greatly emphasized during the reporting period because of the arrival of replacements in the unit.

(b) Instruction on the AN/VSC-2 was conducted during period 3-5 June by SFC Costello of the USA Signal School, Fort Monmouth.

(c) Instruction on the AN/GRC-106 was conducted during period 10-14 July by Mr. Schmeer of General Dynamics Corporation.

10. (U) Informational Activities.

a. During the reporting period, nine of the 13 issues of the division newspaper, the IVY LEAF, were printed by DONG NAM, a publishing house, 49-59 THAI-LAP-THANH Street, SAIGON. The last four issues of the IVY LEAF were printed at the Stars and Stripes Printing Plant, TOKYO, Japan. This change in printers has reduced the cost of each issue's printing by approximately \$100.00. Five-thousand copies of the six-page paper were printed with a distribution ratio of one copy per every three men assigned to the division.

b. The Division Information Office had 341 news feature stories and 342 photographs cleared by MACV-IO and released to the various media in CONUS; and 6,012 Hometown News Releases and 33 pictorial releases were sent to the Hometown News Center.

c. During the period 145 correspondents representing the civilian news media visited the division. Of these, 44 conducted formal interviews with the Commanding General or a member of the division's General Staff.

d. The Information Office produced a daily 10-minute radio program and a 15-20 minute weekly television show that featured the activities of the 4th Infantry Division. These programs were presented on AFRTS radio and television (PLEIKU) with transmitter located on Dragon Mountain.

e. A membership drive was initiated on 1 May by the Information Office for members of the division to join the division chapter, 4th Division Association. By 30 June, nearly 1,000 members had signed up. The television section filmed a 15-minute, colored motion picture of the 4th Infantry Division in action to be shown at the National 4th Division Association's reunion in Charlotte, North Carolina this summer.

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SECTION 2 (C) COLLEADER'S OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I: Observations (Lessons Learned).

1. (C) Operations.

Operations Near the RVN-CAMBODIAN Border

Item: Unit formations and distances when in close proximity to RVN-CAMBODIAN Border.

Discussion: When units are operating close to the RVN-CAMBODIAN Border, all unit commanders should be aware continually that the enemy has the capability of moving large forces (multi-regiment size) from his CAMBODIAN sanctuary in a short period of time. Overnight the enemy can position and support a large force to initiate an attack on a smaller US unit operating within ten kilometers of the border. When conducting operations in this area, a platoon-size element should not be separated from the remainder of the company at a distance where it could be surrounded and cut off. In this high risk area, this distance may be only a few meters - across a draw or over a hill rise. Once a company gains contact with an NVA element, the battalion should be prepared to reinforce immediately. Time, not distance, is the vital factor. In the open ground north of the LA DRUNG River where the availability of LZ's and open ground allows rapid reinforcement by air or overland, a wider disposition of units can be supported effectively. However, in the rugged mountainous region between DUC CO and PLEI DJERENG and west of the NAM SATHLY River, where dense, highland jungle foliage predominates and available landing zones are sparse, the reinforcement of a unit in contact invariably has to be over land. The dense foliage and terrain limits progress to a few hundred meters an hour.

Observation: Unit commanders operating in the proximity of the RVN-CAMBODIAN Border must be aware of the enemy's capability of greater offensive power and relatively more rapid displacement of his forces than in other areas. Company formations must not place a platoon in a position to be surrounded and cut off from the remainder of the company. The battalion must constantly be prepared to reinforce a company and must have an accurate estimate of the reinforcement time required, based on foliage, terrain, and the availability of LZ's.

Unit Rotations

Item: The effect of a large rotation of personnel within a unit.

Discussion: The period immediately preceding and following the anniversary date of a unit's deployment to VIETNAM is one that presents serious problems, since the unit may be understrength and composed of a majority of new personnel. The new personnel completely change the character of the experienced

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battalion. During a recent action involving a battalion that was just going through the DEROS of large number of its personnel, the field strength of its line companies was less than 70% of the aspired 130 men. In addition, there had been an almost complete turn-over of small unit leaders, commissioned as well as non-commissioned officers, and as a result, the tactical experience of the battalion was greatly reduced. The two companies that made contact proved to be less than prepared for decisive combat.

Observation: As the anniversary date of a brigade and its battalions approaches, it must be recognized that for a period of time, the tactical experience level of staff and unit leaders will be reduced severely as the unit assimilates new personnel. Accordingly, troop deployments and plans should give cognizance to a unit's decreased strength during rotations, as well as to the lack of tactical experience during the period immediately following the rotation of a large percentage of its veterans.

#### Daylight Defense of Company Patrol Base

Item: Employment of claymore mines around a company patrol base.

Discussion: When a company is conducting patrolling activities the usual situation is that one platoon will remain in the company patrol base for security as the other three platoons conduct their sweeps or patrols. In a recent action, a company patrol base was attacked by an estimated two NVA battalions at about 1200 hours. The claymore mines that were still in position from the previous night were instantly available and were employed by the platoon defending the perimeter in repelling the initial NVA ground attack. This gave the perimeter the time needed for a reinforcing rifle company to link-up.

Observation: When a company patrol base is to remain in place during the day the claymore mines should remain in position and maximum use be made of them by the platoon defending the perimeter. The claymores should be repositioned just prior to darkness.

#### Marking Friendly Positions

Item: Marking positions of friendly units for supporting fires.

Discussion: Since the division began operations in the Central Highlands, it has experienced continuous difficulties in adequately marking unit positions for air and artillery support. The smoke from a smoke grenade or the projectile from a handheld flare will not penetrate the thick jungle canopy. Further, during a recent contact, the use of smoke grenades to mark a unit position proved costly. In this case, the area was relatively open and in contrast to the dense jungle terrain in which contact with the enemy usually occurs; however, when the unit used smoke grenades to mark the limits of their position for an air strike, they immediately began receiving accurate enemy mortar fires. The enemy used the marking smoke grenades as a reference point

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for adjusting mortar and rocket fires.

Observation: A satisfactory method of accurately marking the position of a unit in contact is needed critically. Past experience has shown that the 40mm, white star cluster round, fired by the M79 grenade launcher, is an excellent method. The limited amount of this experimental ammunition that the division received in the past was extremely effective in penetrating the double-canopied jungle area, thus giving the FAC or artillery liaison officer an exact reference point from which to adjust TAC airstrikes and artillery fires. The white star cluster rounds also eliminate the problem created by smoke grenades which furnish the enemy a continuing reference point for his mortar and rocket fires. The division has been unable to obtain any 40mm star cluster rounds since March; however, every effort is being made to obtain this critical item.

#### Familiarization with NVA Weapons

Item: Utilizing NVA weapons captured during a contact.

Discussion: Engagements with NVA forces are invariably at very close range. Frequently enemy weapons are captured while the exchange of fires is continuing. When a situation develops that a US soldier's individual weapon is damaged or malfunctions it may be that a captured enemy weapon is available. If the US soldier is familiar with the NVA weapon he can effectively defend himself with it.

Observation: Prior familiarization with the small arms and automatic weapons organic to enemy units would enable US infantrymen to effectively use the enemy weapons should the need arise.

#### NVA Reserve Forces

Item: Location and destruction of NVA reserve forces.

Discussion: During a recent NVA attack on a company patrol base visual reconnaissance aircraft discerned considerable movement 1500-2000 meters behind the attacking NVA. Artillery and air strikes were placed in the suspected area. A sweep of the area after contact had been broken revealed large numbers of NVA dead.

Observation: The possibility exists that reserve units of an NVA attacking force will be 1500-2000 meters behind the attacking elements. This general area should be considered and reconned as a target for artillery and air strikes to inflict greater casualties on the enemy and prevent his reinforcing attacking units.

#### Actions Following an Enemy Contact

Item: Pursuit, sweep of the battlefield, and evacuation of the wounded.

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Discussion: There is a built-in conflict as to the action which should be taken immediately upon the termination of a contact with the enemy near the border. The ideal situation would be to have an LZ in the immediate proximity of the contact area through which reinforcements could be inserted to initiate an aggressive exploitation of the contact, or, should the enemy be in a disorganized state, to rapidly effect pursuit. Simultaneously, the US unit in contact should evacuate its wounded and KIA's, and then initiate an immediate sweep of the battlefield. The nature of the terrain in the border area however, is such that LZ's are not readily available in the vast majority of cases and must be cut out of the dense jungle foliage. The normal contact is usually violent and of short duration - four to six hours - invariably involving a US infantry company opposing an NVA battalion size or larger force. The NVA employ mortars extensively during a contact, causing a disproportionate number of wounded as compared to KIA. Upon breaking contact, and in the absence of an LZ, the US unit must direct its attention first to cutting an LZ out of the jungle foliage to evacuate the wounded. The normal time required to cut such an LZ is about 15 hours, but may often extend to 24 hours and, on occasion, to exceed 36 hours. During this period, the enemy is making a maximum effort to evacuate his wounded, documents, weapons and other items of equipment from the battle area. In many cases, he is able to physically remove his dead before a sweep of the battlefield can be accomplished.

Observation: There can be no set rule for the action to be taken immediately upon contact. Each situation must be analyzed carefully to determine the sequence of the actions to be taken. If at all possible, reinforcements should be inserted to conduct pursuit of the enemy and to otherwise exploit the contact. Moreover, immediate action must be taken either by the US unit in the contact or by the reinforcing unit, as the case may be, to effect an immediate sweep of the battlefield. Obviously, the seriously wounded must be evacuated from the battlefield by the fastest method in order to prevent further loss of lives. To accomplish all of these things in the proper order or simultaneously requires the careful judgement of the commander on the ground as well as his senior commander at battalion or brigade level.

Convoy Security

Item: Mobile strongpoint security for convoy routes.

Discussion: The division is required to provide convoy security throughout the area of operations and 55 kilometers of Highway 19L from PLEIKU to the HUNG YANG Pass, and comparable stretches of road (the LLOC's) west and north of PLEIKU. The age and high mileage on the combat vehicles in the armored cavalry squadron, and especially the armor battalion, made it necessary to reduce escorting of convoys to a minimum, and instead, employ mobile strongpoints for the security of convoy routes. This practice has provided continuous surveillance of bridges, critical terrain features and likely ambush areas but with much less mileage being accumulated on the tanks and APC's. All convoys have continuous coverage and the number of convoys or their size is not limited by the availability of escort combat vehicles.

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Observation: The mobile strongpoint method of convoy route security has eased the problem of excessive mileage and the resulting maintenance problems. Even if each convoy was provided escort, bridges and other critical sites along its route would still require a constant security force. The strongpoint system has proven successful in that no convoy has been ambushed since the system was adopted in December 1966.

#### Engineer Work Party Security

Item: Engineer work party security in forward areas.

Discussions: The mission of engineer support units often requires the movement of engineer troops into forward, unsecured areas. Examples include landing zone clearing, mine clearing operations, rock quarry and sand pit operations and movement to and from the work area. When the work site is relatively close to the engineer base, organic security is sometimes sufficient; however, in most cases, it is essential that the security of the work parties be planned and coordinated from the inception of a project through its completion. Planning for the security of these work parties must consider the nature of the operation; e.g., a landing zone clearing team could be secured by dismounted infantry, while armor is better suited for road maintenance and lateral clearing operations.

Observation: The security of engineer parties and the particular type of security (mounted or dismounted) best suited for the operation should be included in all phases of planning for engineer missions.

#### Movement of Fire Support Bases (FSB)

Item: Movement of FSB's during monsoon season.

Discussion: A unit must be ready to move its FSB at any time regardless of weather. However, during the monsoon season, a greater than normal amount of supplies and equipment tends to accumulate in the forward FSBs. This is because regular aerial resupply missions are often impeded by the bad weather. This tendency was demonstrated clearly during a recent battalion size move where more than one and one-half times the normal number of CH-47 sorties were required to accomplish the move.

Observation: Units should be alert for an excessive build-up of items in their FSB's. Only essential items should be kept on hand. When a unit is notified that its FSB is to be moved, all possible measures should be taken to reduce stockage levels and to reduce the number of items being brought into the FSB.

#### Hand Grenades

Item: Use of hand grenades by tank crewmen.

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Discussion: The enemy often engages a tank with rockets and automatic weapons from well-concealed ambush positions that are so close to the tank they are below the maximum depression of the tank's weapons. The immediate and liberal use of hand grenades by the tank crewmen when encountering the enemy in this situation has been very effective.

Observation: The amount of hand grenades carried in a tank should be sufficient to saturate the area around the tank when contact is made. The grenades should be positioned in the vehicle so that they are available at the driver, loader and tank commander positions.

#### Tank Mounted 50 cal. Machine Gun

Item: Mounting modifications for the 50 cal. machine gun on the M48A3 tank.

Discussion: The 50 cal. machine gun is normally mounted inside the tank commander's cupola on M48A3 tank. In this configuration the machine gun has several limiting factors. The ammunition trays hold only 50 rounds and reloading is very slow and difficult. When firing, the links from the spent rounds frequently jam in the link chute causing the weapon to malfunction. In addition the charger cable breaks easily.

Observation: When a 50 cal. machine gun mount from an APC is modified and welded on the top of the commander's cupola, the weapon's effectiveness is increased several fold. The reloading and link ejection problems are eliminated since the ammunition can be fed directly from ammunition boxes and the weapon does not require a link chute. The delicate charger cable is replaced by the original charger handle.

#### Cordon and Search Operations

Item: Effectiveness of cordon and search operations.

Discussion: Village cordon and search operations are an effective method of temporarily destroying or neutralizing local VC infrastructure. As soon as the tactical units leave the area however, the VC will begin to rebuild their organization, unless GVN Revolutionary Development teams or similar type government organizations move in to permanently secure the area and prevent the VC from re-entrenching themselves.

Observation: Revolutionary Development efforts must follow immediately behind tactical cordon and search operations if the full value of the tactical efforts are to be realized.

#### 2½ Ton Shop Van Truck

Item: Discounting the shelter from a 2½ ton shop van truck.

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Discussion: The utilization of the shelter from the 2½ ton shop van for an air transportable, battalion TOC has merit since present operations leave the shop vans unused. However, recent incidents indicate that the shelter is not constructed for repeated movement by CH-47. The lifting hooks are weakened and break after several moves.

Observation: Conex containers are more adaptable for this purpose since they are considerably sturdier than the van shelter. Two conex containers provide approximately the same usable work space as the van. In addition, conexes can be loaded with equipment without breaking the lifting hooks.

2. (C) Intelligence.

Intelligence

Item: Use of intelligence indicators.

Discussion: With our present technology, sources of information are many and varied. Often the personnel processing information at battalion, brigade and higher levels become enamored with a particular information source and credit that source with more validity than it deserves. This is particularly true of sophisticated information-gathering devices with which the intelligence analysts may not be too familiar, e.g., the Airborne Personnel Detector. This practice may result in the unwarranted deployment of troops or expenditure of air and artillery fires.

Observation: Units must use all the intelligence indicators at their disposal to develop the best possible intelligence picture. Examples of these indicators are aerial photographs, visual reconnaissance, agent reports, recondo patrols, and readout from infra-red flights and Airborne Personnel Detector missions. If only a single indicator is used, the likelihood of wasting resources is increased. Multiple sources must be used and evaluated at every opportunity.

LRRP's and Hawkeyes

Item: Intelligence derived from LRRP's and Hawkeye Team Operations.

Discussion: LRRP's and Hawkeye teams are an invaluable source of intelligence information because of their ability to observe enemy activity and remain undetected. The teams identify enemy troop movements, lines of communication, fortifications and logistical bases. Their special training makes the information they report highly reliable. They also are employed to verify incomplete information from other intelligence sources.

Observation: The information provided by the division's LRRP and Hawkeye teams has provided leads as to where and when to employ the maneuver battalions. The economy of force these teams provide is a major factor in the division's con-

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tinued success against an evasive enemy.

VIETNAMESE and MONTAGNARD Interpreters

Item: Shortage of ARVN VIETNAMESE and MONTAGNARD Interpreters.

Discussion: A present shortage of interpreters assigned to the division hinders both combat and administrative operations, delays intelligence exploitation of detainees, and impedes the civil affairs program. To help alleviate the problem in the long run, the assignment of ten US Army VIETNAMESE linguists has been authorized when they become available. In the interim period and even after the US linguists are assigned, the division will still depend on ARVN interpreters. These interpreters are in short supply because ARVN needs personnel with proficiency in English for its own use. In our area of responsibility, an additional problem exists which is not experienced by most US units in VIETNAM. The division must deal extensively with three or more MONTAGNARD tribes whose dialects are mutually unintelligible. ARVN has not been able to provide sufficient interpreters for two reasons. First, ARVN itself has extensive need for MONTAGNARD - VIETNAMESE interpreters. Secondly, and more important, the MONTAGNARDS in ARVN have little or no opportunity to learn English. As an interim measure, interpreter teams pair a VIETNAMESE-speaking MONTAGNARD with an English-speaking VIETNAMESE to communicate through a double translation process. This is not satisfactory, since it is so time-consuming, and much information is lost or distorted in the translations. However, as a temporary solution, double translation is acceptable. The division also hires English-speaking MONTAGNARD civilians, most of whom speak VIETNAMESE. While this is a workable solution, it is expensive, and the personnel so hired frequently prove to be unreliable. The ability to use these civilians in combat operations is also limited.

Observation: The GVN should be asked to provide sufficient VIETNAMESE-speaking MONTAGNARD soldiers to meet the division's combat and administrative requirements. A training program should be initiated to impart to these interpreters a proficiency in English. While their training is in progress, hiring of civilian interpreters should be continued.

Civil Affairs

Item: Civic Action teams and the development of intelligence.

Discussion: Civic action teams by demonstrating a sincere effort to help the local population, have on several occasions been given timely intelligence reports concerning VC and NVA activities. Because of the rapport developed between civic action teams and local villagers, intelligence information was offered voluntarily by the villagers concerning mining of roads, VC/NVA activities proximate to the areas which are of potential danger to team personnel and the turning over of enemy psyops leaflets.

Observation: Increased civic action pacification efforts, when accompanied by a sincere desire to aid the VIETNAMESE people, will increase the volun-

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tary channeling of enemy intelligence toward U.S. personnel.

#### Cordon and Search Operations

Item: Use of intelligence personnel on cordon and search operations.

Discussion: Tactical elements engaging in such operations generally do not have the organic capability to screen and interrogate all civilians. As a result they must forward these people to brigade or division collection and interrogation points. This practice has three distinct disadvantages; it severely taxes unit transportation resources; it creates an excessive cage population; and it causes a difficult civil affairs problem with the many innocent civilians who have been uprooted needlessly and treated with suspicion. The VC can easily exploit these incidents to their own advantage. CI/IPW personnel with indigenous intelligence teams have the background knowledge and screening ability to eliminate most of the innocent civilians on the spot and thus insure that only those people of intelligence value are forwarded to the collection points.

Observation: Deployment of intelligence personnel with tactical units involved in village search type operations is an effective method of providing initial screening and interrogation of civilian personnel.

### 3. (C) Logistics.

#### Logistical Support

Item: The problems and responsibility for logistical and maintenance support of detached armored/cavalry units.

Discussion: When reinforcing an infantry battalion with a cavalry troop or a company of armor, the squadron or battalion is able to provide and make available repair parts, ammunition and recovery capability peculiar to armor units, providing the battalion is advised of the requirement by the controlling infantry headquarters. However, detachment of armored/cavalry platoons for prolonged periods creates certain maintenance and logistical problems. Second echelon maintenance support is located at troop/company level and the personnel and equipment of the maintenance section cannot be subdivided effectively to provide support for isolated platoons. Similarly, Class III and Class V logistical support from the squadron/battalion support platoon can be allocated to provide support to a detached troop/company, but this support is not capable of a further break down to detached platoons.

Observation: During cross reinforcement of armor/cavalry and infantry units, the responsibility of logistical support should be defined clearly by SOP or other means. The gaining unit must be responsible for coordination and execution of logistical resupply since the losing headquarters usually is unaware of the requirements of its detached unit and consequently cannot anticipate its future needs.

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#### Bulldozer Operator Protection

Item: Operator protection on the D6B bulldozer while land clearing.

Discussion: On a land clearing operation in which the D6B bulldozer was airlifted into a restricted site, it was found that the operator was in danger both from above and below. Not only was there the danger from falling trees, but also when backing there was a tendency for limbs to come up under the dozer and hit the seat. These limbs frequently hit below the fuel tank and broke the fuel line.

Observation: A guard plate bolted to the rear of the dozer can protect both the operator and the fuel line.

#### D6B Bulldozer Airlift

Item: Preparing the D6B Bulldozer for airlift operations.

Discussion: The weight of the D6B requires that the track, blade and power control unit (PCU) be disassembled to reduce the weight to 13,500 pounds, if it is to be lifted by a CH-54 helicopter. Often, because of the altitudes and resulting air density found in the Central Highlands, the weight must be lightened still more by removing and transporting separately the seat, lights, stack and aircleaner. Any protruding parts and components must be secured. When airlifting the tracks, bars should be fabricated and used as spacers for the tracks so they do not twist.

Observation: There is a need for a bulldozer-type tractor capable of being airlifted in one sortie by a CH-47 "Chinook" helicopter. This with additional attachments such as a side mounted chain saw must be capable of performing the arduous task of cutting and clearing landing zones in the Central Highlands.

#### Sandbags

Item: Durability and size of sandbags.

Discussion: Present sandbags, manufactured from burlap or similar material, deteriorate in three to four months time and thus require the constant rebuilding and repair of bunkers and parapets. Modification of the dimensions of the sandbags should be considered. The most effective size for sandbags is 12" by 26". This size permits proper interlocking of bags in the same manner as a brick wall. If the sandbags are not twice as long as they are wide they are difficult to incorporate into solid, interlocked construction.

Observation: Sandbags should be manufactured from a more durable material, e.g., nylon, to conserve man hours required for repair of sandbag bunkers. In addition, sandbags should be twice as long as their width to provide for a more solid construction.

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4. (C) Artillery.

Landing Zone Preparation

Item: Landing zone preparation and coordination.

Discussion: One individual, normally the battalion's artillery liaison officer, should be designated to control all artillery fires and notify the flight leader when the landing zone is clear of artillery fire. To insure that the landing zone is clear, the following measures should be taken:

(1) Each 105mm and 155mm battery should fire one round of smoke in the last volley.

(2) Each supporting artillery unit should notify the artillery liaison officer when the last volley is fired and announce, "SPLASH", when it should be over the LZ.

(3) Once the artillery liaison officer has received all "SPLASHES" and observed the last round, he should notify the flight leader that the LZ is clear.

(4) A prearranged colored smoke round should be on-call to notify the flight leader that the LZ is clear should radio communication fail.

Observation: During all landing zone preparations, there must be close coordination and planning with aircraft flight leaders and ground commanders to preclude firing artillery through the flight path of approaching aircraft or firing artillery as aircraft approach the landing zone.

Effective Use of Firepower

Item: Effective use of supporting fires.

Discussion: Of the recent contacts, the most successful have been those that utilized artillery and tactical air fire support simultaneously. However, air support should not be used at the expense of reducing direct support and reinforcing artillery. Rather, tactical air is a supplement to the ground support provided the maneuver element. The calling of a "Check Fire" to bring in tactical air is dangerous and should be limited to the immediate area/axis of the airstrike.

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Observation: Units in contact should not sacrifice artillery fire for the sake of an airstrike. Both means of support should be employed to complement one another. If an airstrike is to be placed on a particular target, artillery fires may be shifted from the immediate area of the strike for its duration, but not cut off entirely. In the same manner, if artillery is being fired in support of a particular contact, tactical air should be used to block likely routes of withdrawal or to strike areas where the enemy may be assembling his reinforcements.

#### Adjustment of Supporting Fires

Item: Control and adjustment of supporting fires.

Discussion: A company commander on the ground does not have the knowledge of the overall situation nor the advantage the battalion commander has overhead to control the blocking fires and TAC air strikes. The most effective control of blocking fires on the avenues of approach or withdraw and suspected areas of enemy reserves can be accomplished from the battalion commander's position in the air overhead. However, the control and adjustment of close in, direct supporting fires - out 200-400 meters from the perimeter - must be left to the company commander and his artillery FO.

Observation: The control of reinforcing and blocking fires is most effective when the battalion commander controls it from his C & C ship overhead.

#### Coordination of Artillery Fires

Item: Coordination with ARVN units on firing clearance.

Discussion: The Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) of a unit operating in an ARVN sector must be briefed carefully and specifically on the procedures for clearing and coordinating artillery fires in the sector. Often a target cleared for fire by the sector will actually have friendly elements located near the target. In order to insure that the utmost in safety precautions are observed, targets for artillery fire should be cleared by the ARVN sector, the ARVN military headquarters for the area and the tactical unit operating in the area.

Observation: When operating in the ARVN sector particular attention must be given to procedures for the coordination and clearance of targets for artillery fires so as to preclude accidentally firing on friendly elements.

#### Positions of Friendly Villages

Item: Current village overlays.

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Discussion: The Fire Support Coordinator at each level of command is responsible for maintaining current and accurate data on the locations of villages so that artillery fire can be kept away from occupied villages. It is essential that every effort be made to obtain this data and keep it current since the maps are of 1965 vintage and villages sometimes move or new villages appear. Village data must be forwarded to a central collection agency where it can be consolidated, and a current village overlay must be distributed to the artillery units to preclude firing into or near friendly villages. In this division, all such data is collected and maintained by the G2 and is available to all division commands and staffs. For purposes of fire coordination, the Fire Support Coordinator publishes overlays showing the locations of all known inhabited villages.

Observation: To achieve utmost safety, it is essential that all artillery units are kept abreast of the current locations of villages in their vicinity.

#### Countermortar Program

Item: Countermortar and Defensive fire programs.

Discussion: Programs for countermortar fires, defensive fires, blocking fires and fires to cover avenues of withdrawal must be developed for base camps, fire bases and friendly locations. The programs should designate the type or the plan, the number of rounds to be fired on each target during the phase and the type fuze most desirable for the target location. Concentrations should then be assigned to all artillery units obtaining maximum area coverage in the initial phases of the program. These concentrations should be cleared daily prior to dusk and the units to fire should be notified of the concentrations which are not clear to fire that night. This procedure will facilitate obtaining maximum fire as soon as possible by calling for the specific program. Once a suspected mortar position or enemy location is determined the fires can be quickly shifted to that location.

Observation: During mortar or ground attacks on friendly locations all artillery and mortars within supporting range must react quickly. The practice of calling upon reinforcing and GS artillery to fire upon point or area targets individually once the attack has started substantially increases the response time of those medium and heavy artillery units.

#### Countermortar Program

Item: Countermortar radar targets.

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Discussion: An after-action check of suspected enemy mortar positions detected by the countermortar radar during mortar attacks on friendly locations, revealed that the targets obtained by the radar are sometimes as far as 500 meters away from the actual locations.

Observation: When the countermortar radar detects a suspected enemy mortar position during a mortar attack, the artillery fires should be shifted to that location. In addition to firing several volleys on the target, firing units should cover the surrounding area within a 500 meter radius by fire. The avenues of approach and withdrawal should also be covered by fire after coverage of the primary target area.

#### Firing Data Requirement

Item: Requirement for firing data for projectile, smoke, colored, HE, M-116 & M-116B1.

Discussion: Because of visibility restrictions and safety problems relative to the fluid situation in VIETNAM, current safety procedures for the conduct of observed artillery fire in the division require the use of colored smoke as the first round in a fire mission. If the smoke round impacts in a safe location a change to HE is authorized. It is essential that the HE round impact in the same spot as the colored smoke, especially during contact missions. M-116 projectile is described in paragraph 3, Pg VI, FT 155-AH-2 as having a weight of 86.4 pounds as compared to the standard M107 HE projectile weight of 95 pounds, for which the firing tables are prepared. At all ranges the direction of the special correction from the firing table (table F, FT 155-AH-2) is such that it would indicate that the colored smoke round will travel farther than a HE round at the same quadrant.

Observation: After repeated firings of both HE and colored smoke projectiles at the same quadrant and using point detonating fuze action, the following has been observed:

(1) At relatively short ranges, 2,000-7,000 meters, the lighter projectile M-116 tends to travel farther than the heavier HE round. The higher muzzle velocity attained by the smoke projectile more than offsets the range limiting factors of reduced cross-sectional density and corresponding increase in drag on the projectile at short ranges.

(2) As the range increases the lighter round seems to follow a less rigid trajectory due to the steadily increasing effects of drag and at some undetermined point, approximately 9,000-10,000 meters, the round appears to become less efficient than the HE and falls short. As the range increases this difference in points of impact appears to increase.

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(3) Regardless of range and direction of the required correction all rounds have been observed to impact within four range probable errors.

(4) Controlled tests should be authorized and conducted to compile and publish data upon which to base corrections.

5. (C) Aviation.

Pathfinder Support

Item: Pathfinder support in the pick-up zone (PZ).

Discussion: A pathfinder team in the PZ can both control aircraft and expedite the loading of troops and equipment. A pathfinder team should link up with the lift force at least thirty minutes before PZ time. The pathfinder leader, after a complete briefing by the flight commander, will have the latest information on aircraft formations, loads and loading order. The pathfinder team will then arrange the loads and control incoming aircraft over the pathfinder ground-to-air frequency. By working in coordination with personnel from the supported unit, an uninterrupted flow of personnel and equipment between the PZ and LZ can be maintained.

Observation: Unless closely controlled throughout the combat assault operations, delays may develop in the pick-up zone which could be critical to the tactical situation at the landing zone.

Gunship Support

Item: Utilization of gunships supporting a unit in contact.

Discussion: Frequently gunships are called to an area of contact. Upon arrival on station they are then required to orbit and ultimately are never used because of the presence of other fire support means. The resolution of this problem lies in the commander's integration of the gunship support with the artillery and tactical air support available.

Observation: One solution would be to give the gunships a separate mission and area of operation within the zone of contact; such as covering escape routes from artillery or tac air concentrations. Another approach would be to assign enough gunships to the operation so there would be no "dead time" when one team had to depart for refueling and re-arming. Gunships, because they work at tree top level, are particularly useful in identifying the direction and extent of enemy movement and in conducting a visual reconnaissance by fire for friendly units moving to contact.

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Gunship Support

Item: Gunship coverage on recondo patrol insertions.

Discussions: As the troop-carrying aircraft turns on a final approach to the landing zone, the gunship team follows in a staggered-trail formation common to most gunship escort missions. As the lead slick begins descending into the LZ, the lead gun should have closed to his quartering rear. As the slick levels for touch-down, the lead gunship makes his "break around" the slick, turning inside, and covering the outer edges of the LZ to the front of the slick. This maneuver gives the inside door gunner constant coverage of the slick in the LZ and may draw fire away from the slick in the event the enemy is occupying the LZ.

Observation: It is imperative that the gunship team covering a recondo patrol insertion give maximum coverage to the troop-carrying aircraft just before touch-down when it is most vulnerable to enemy fire.

Gunship Support

Item: Gunship escort for APD aircraft.

Discussion: Gunships serve three purposes when working with APD aircraft. First, they assist in keeping the pilot of the APD oriented with respect to his geographical location. Second, their presence may act as a deterrent to enemy ground elements considering anti-aircraft measures. Third, the gunships on station can more accurately determine the source of enemy fire and can be used to place immediate fire on known or suspected targets.

Observation: A minimum of a light gunship team should escort the APD aircraft with the gunships at a higher altitude than the APD aircraft.

UH-1H Model Helicopter

Item: Operations in the Central Highlands with the UH-1H model helicopter.

Discussion: The 4th Aviation Battalion, 4th Infantry Division operated in the PLEIKU area initially with UH-1D aircraft. Since July, the battalion has been using the UH-1H helicopter with a significant increase in the lift capability available to the division. The UH-1H has a more powerful engine, the Lycoming T53-L-13, which has approximately 20% more useable horsepower than the L-11 engine in the UH-1D. To the user, that percentage translates into an increased payload of from 1000 to 1200 pounds. Additionally, whereas the UH-1D could lift a maximum of five personnel, the UH-1H can lift seven combat-equipped troops, or eight personnel without combat gear. A significant advantage is that in a

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critical situation when more engine power is needed as soon as possible, the L-13 engine in the UH-1H has a much shorter response time than does the L-11 engine in the UH-1D. The maximum allowable gross weight of the UH-1H is the same as for the UH-1D. Under the high ambient air conditions (high temperatures coupled with high altitudes) which prevail in the Central Highlands, the UH-1H is capable of operating safely and effectively at its design gross weight. The UH-1D with the L-11 engine does not have that capability.

Observation: The UH-1H gives the commander the capability of moving more personnel and more supplies in a specified period of time with fewer aircraft than if UH-1D aircraft were used. Therefore, more tactical missions can be accomplished simultaneously with a given number of UH-1H aircraft. The overall result is an increase in the commander's capability to respond to changes in the tactical situation.

6. (C) Chemical.

Airborne Personnel Detector (APD)

Item: SOP's and tactics for the employment of airborne personnel detector.

Discussion: A helicopter flying an APD mission must fly at top speed, at tree top level, to pick up a "scent" since once the "scent" given off by the enemy clears the top of the jungle canopy by ten to twenty feet it is caught by the wind and disseminates making a point location impossible. The APD helicopter must also fly perpendicular to the wind and make 500 to 900 meter wide tracks always turning into the wind to ensure the aircraft's exhaust does not interfere with the APD. Recognizing these two basic requirements the APD aircraft have developed tactics and techniques for their missions. Initially the pilots of an APD aircraft should be completely briefed by appropriate intelligence or command personnel from the supported unit who know the exact disposition of friendly units, can obtain immediate clearance to fire and who can call for supporting fires. Additional SOP's presently used by this unit are as follows:

(1) Each APD mission should be initiated by a high altitude reconnaissance of the area to establish prominent terrain features and plan a search pattern.

(2) Over level terrain an "accordion-type" pattern is best, with each run perpendicular to the wind direction and the direction of search gradually moving upwind.

(3) In mountainous terrain a predictable search pattern should be avoided.

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(4) The AFD should not be employed over known concentrations of enemy personnel.

(5) The pilot should not overfly the same track twice or continue to search a location once it is identified as "hot".

Observation: The AFD has proven itself many times of being capable of determining the location of unobserved ground personnel. Its success however, is dependent upon the search tactics employed, defensive measures taken and the ground commander's response to intelligence gained.

#### The Use of Riot Control Agents

Item: Use of aerially delivered CS-1.

Discussion: Limited use of air-delivered CS-1 was made during this period; however, there have been other occasions when Riot Control Agent CS-1 could have been used effectively to create confusion among enemy troops. When a US unit is in contact, most of the supporting fires are placed in close proximity to the friendly unit. However, a large proportion of the fires are placed on suspected positions, possible assembly areas, and probable withdrawal routes considerable distances from the actual contact in an attempt to isolate the battle area until friendly reinforcement can be effected. The Agent CS-1 can be delivered on these latter targets with great effectiveness and with no chance of interfering with friendly activities. During a contact, all troops, both friendly and enemy, are in a highly excited state. Under these conditions the physiological effects of CS-1 and the natural fear of the unknown can combine to have a major impact on enemy troop discipline and morale.

Observation: The Riot Control Agent CS-1 delivered by tactical air (CBU-19) or by HU-1D helicopter (grenade drop) should be utilized to supplement other supporting fires during contacts.

#### Grass Killing Operations

Item: Field expedient grass-killing agent.

Discussion: A temporary shortage of herbicide developed and, in order to meet the continuing requirement to keep the grass down around the base camp perimeter, pure diesel fuel was applied as a grass-killing agent.

Observation: Pure diesel fuel killed grasses in 2-5 days depending on weather conditions. Sunny weather required less time. It was necessary to wet the grasses much more heavily than when diesel/herbicide mixes were used.

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7. (U) Civil Affairs.

Civil Affairs

Item: US assistance to indigenous personnel.

Discussion: US assistance to indigenous personnel through building projects, food distribution and medical assistance represents a sincere effort on the part of US personnel to help these people and is an effective counter to VC propaganda about US exploitation of the VIETNAMESE. It also has an inherent danger. Distribution of excessive amounts of food and medical supplies provide the VC with a source of supplies they themselves need. It also makes the villagers the subject of even more VC harassment as the VC move into villages that have excessive supplies.

Observation: The distribution of food and medical supplies must be monitored closely to prevent excessive distribution that could assist the VC.

8. (C) Signal.

SOI/SSI

Item: Prevention of a compromise of the division SOI.


Discussion: In order to deny the enemy as much information as possible, certain SOI items such as Fm frequencies and call signs are changed monthly. As a further safeguard the SSI states that the complete SOI/SSI will not be taken forward of a battalion or a separate unit command post. During a recent heavy contact, a company SOI was captured by the enemy. Division Fm frequencies and call signs were listed in this captured SOI. A new SOI item for division Fm frequencies and call signs had to be published only four days after the compromised SOI item was in effect.

Observation: Only an extract of required information should be taken forward of a battalion or a separate unit command post. If the extract is lost or compromised, then the entire SOI item need not be changed.

Part II: Recommendations.

Appropriate recommendations are contained in the lessons learned.

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W. R. PEERS  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

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AVFA-GC-OT (20 Aug 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 July 1967 (U) (4th Infantry Division)

HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM, APO 96350 22 Sep 67

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96375  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D. C. 20310

(C) This headquarters has reviewed the 4th Infantry Division Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1967 and pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference paragraph 2g(page 9): Non-concur. ARVN intelligence teams should not be permanently assigned to US units unless they are province teams. It would be more appropriate to attach sector and district intelligence teams to US units when the US elements are operating in a specific province district. Because of the rapid deployment of US elements to different districts, district teams would not be familiar with the local tactical situation if they were moved with the US units.

b. Reference paragraph 3f(pages 16 and 17)-Psy War:

(1) Sub-paragraph(3): Concur. The new variation of the waterborne PSYOP program being tried by the divisions has merit. Its effectiveness has not yet been fully evaluated.

(2) Sub-paragraph(4): The ARVN 20th Polwar Bn will be urged through DSA II Corps to resume its support in the 4th Infantry Division AO.

c. Reference Section 2: Commander's Observations and Recommendations:

(1) Paragraph 2(page 51): (Vietnamese-Montagnard Interpreters) DSA II Corps has a program that is in the planning stages for providing Vietnamese speaking Montagnard soldiers for use throughout the II CTZ. The program eventually will give the interpreter section of the division a Montagnard dialect interpreter capability in the Pleiku-Kontum area.

(2) Paragraph 4(page 57): (Firing Data Requirement) Concur. Firing test should be conducted under controlled conditions. Control conditions do not exist in Vietnam. Recommend this test firing be conducted by the USAMCOM. Data obtained could be the basis for publishing changes to the Tabular Firing Tables.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
nc

s/B.L. Chenault  
t/L.M. ROSCOE  
ILT, AGC  
Asst AG

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Declassified after 12 years  
DOD DIR 5200.10*

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AVHGC-DST (20 Aug 67) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 8 NOV 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division (AJZF) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning marking friendly positions, pages 45 and 46: Concur. The 40mm White Star Cluster round is an experimental item. The distribution of this round in-country has been determined. At the present time, a basis of issue has been established and rounds have been shipped. Detailed information on BOI has been dispatched to all interested units.

b. Reference item concerning Vietnamese and Montagnard Interpreters, page 51, 1st item. The shortage of ARVN Vietnamese and Montagnard interpreters in this command is fully recognized by all headquarters concerned. The problem of ARVN Vietnamese interpreters has been given greater command emphasis and each US Division in-country is now authorized 116. It is estimated that by the end of 1967, all combat units in Vietnam will have their authorized number assigned. The Montagnard - English or Montagnard - Vietnamese interpreter is a different situation since ARVN does not want Montagnard soldiers to attend the MACV/ARVN school. Some units in the II CTZ are getting Montagnard interpreter support through the 5th SFG (Abn). Until the ARVN - Montagnard situation is solved, or the Deputy Senior Advisor, II Corps, program is put in effect, the best solution to the problem is to continue the practice of hiring civilians to do the interpreting.

c. Reference item concerning firing data requirement, page 57, and 1st indorsement, paragraph c(2): Nonconcur. Although there is a weight difference between the smoke and HE projectile, fall of shot can be predicted. Based on the observations by 4th Infantry Division personnel, if all rounds tested at short and long range impacted within four probable errors, there appears to be little requirement for test firing by USAMC or publishing changes to the Tabular Firing Tables.

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AVHGC-DST (20 Aug 67) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
nc

*C. S. Nakatsukasa*  
C. S. NAKATSUKASA  
Capt. *U.S. Army*  
Assistant Adjutant General

cc:  
HQ, 4th Inf Div  
HQ, I FFV

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
GPOP-DT(20 Aug 67) 3d Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Rept for the Quarterly Period  
Ending 31 Jul 67 from HQ, 4th Inf Div  
(UIC: WAJZFA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 6 DEC1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



HEAVRIN SNYDER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

1 Incl  
nc

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ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. (C) Operation FRANCIS MARION

a. Task organization at beginning of period.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

HHC, 1st Bde  
3-12 Inf  
1-22 Inf  
6-29 Arty (-) DS  
C/4-42 Arty (OPCON)  
Plat (+) D/4-60 Arty (AW)  
(SP) (OPCCN)  
A/4th Engr Bn (-) DS  
ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn  
1st Plat, 4th MP Co  
TACP

TF 3-8 Inf

3-8 Inf  
C/6-29 Arty Btry Gp  
C/6-29 Arty (105)  
A/5-16 Arty (155)  
Det, D/4-60 Arty  
Plat, 1-10 Cav  
Plat, B/4th Engr Bn

Div Arty

HHB, Div Arty  
5-16 Arty (-)  
6-14 Arty GS  
235th Radar  
1-92 Arty GSR

DISCOM

4th S&T Bn  
4th Med Bn  
704th Maint Bn

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

HHC, 2d Bde  
1-8 Inf  
2-8 Inf  
1-12 Inf  
4-42 Arty (-) DS  
A/6-29 Arty (OPCON)  
Plat (-), D/4-60 Arty (AW)  
(SP) (OPCON)  
B/4th Engr Bn (-) DS  
ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn  
2d Plat, 4th MP Co  
TACP

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav  
A/3-6 Arty DS

TF 1-69 Armor

1-69 Armor (-)  
3-6 Arty (-) DS  
Det, D/4-60 Arty (-) (AW)

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div  
D/4-60 Arty (-)  
4th Avn Bn  
4th Engr Bn (-)  
124th Sig Bn (-)  
43rd Cml Det  
29th Mil Hist Det  
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)  
50th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)  
4th MI Det  
4th MP Co. (-)  
4th Admin Co  
4th Div TACP  
Inf Plat

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b. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 7-2-67 effective 070700 H  
May 67.

- (1) 1-10 Cav (-) OPCON 1st Bde.
- (2) Trp D, 1-10 Cav support Div on mission basis.
- (3) Div LRRP Plat remain OPCON to Div.
- (4) A/3-6 Arty GS; reinf 6-29 Arty.

c. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 9-2-67 DTG 111310Z May 67.

- (1) 1-8 Inf (-) changed OPCON from 2d Bde to 1st Bde.

d. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 10-2-67 DTG 211430Z May 67.

- (1) TF 3-8 Inf returned to 1st Bde control and TF dissolved.
- (2) 1-22 Inf changed OPCON from 1st Bde to 2d Bde.

e. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 11-2-67 effective 300001 H  
May 67.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

HHC, 1st Bde  
1-8 Inf  
3-8 Inf  
3-12 Inf  
1-10 Cav (-)  
6-29 Arty DS  
Plat, D/4-60 Arty (OPCON)  
1 Sec, E/41 Arty (OPCON)  
1 Slt, B/29 Arty (OPCON)  
Co A, 4th Engr Bn (-) DS  
ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn  
2d Plat, 4th MP Co DS  
TACP

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

HHC, 2d Bde  
1-12 Inf  
1-22 Inf  
2-8 Inf (Mech)  
4-42 Arty DS  
237th Radar (OPCON)  
1 Slt, 29th Arty (OPCON)  
Plat D/4-60 Arty (OPCON)  
Co B, 4th Engr Bn (-) DS  
ASC Plat, B/124th Sig Bn  
2d Plat, 4th MP Co DS

173rd Abn Bde (Sep)

HHC, 173rd Bde  
1-503 Abn Inf  
2-503 Abn Inf  
4-503 Abn Inf  
3-319 Arty  
D/16 Armor  
E/17 Cav  
173rd Cbt Spt Bn  
173rd Engr Co  
723d Sig Plat  
39th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)  
Co B, 173rd Med Bn

TF 1-69 Armor

1-69 Armor (-)  
3-6 Arty (-)

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div  
D/4-60 Arty (-)  
4th Avn Bn  
4th Engr Bn (-)  
124th Sig Bn (-)  
43d Cml Det  
29th Mil Hist Det  
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)  
50th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)

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TACP

Div Arty

HQB, Div Arty  
5-16 Arty (-)

4th MI Det  
4th MP Co (-)  
4th Admin Co  
4th Div TACP

DISCOM

No Change

f. Task organization was changed upon initiation of Operation GREELEY on 17 June 1967 and Operation STILLWELL on 20 June 1967.

(1) 173d Abn Bde (-) with 1-503 Abn Inf and 2-503 Abn Inf and attachments were airlifted to GREELEY AO on 17, 18 June 1967.

(2) 4-503 Abn Bn TF initiated Operation STILLWELL, a sub-operation of FRANCIS MARION, in the area east of PLEIKU on 20 June 1967.

(3) 4-503 Abn Bn TF was withdrawn from Operation STILLWELL and moved to GREELEY AO on 23 June 1967.

(4) Task organization on 23 June 1967 was the same as FRAGO 11-2-67, less the 173d Abn Bde.

g. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 1-25-67 (STILLWELL) effective 30 June 1967.

4th Inf Div (-) same as FRAGO 11-2-67, less GREELEY forces and a battalion task force to STILLWELL AO as follows:

TF 1-8 Inf

1-8 Inf  
A/6-29 Arty DS  
C/1-69 Armor (-) OPCON  
Scout Sect/Recon Plat/1-69 Armor GPCON  
2 tubes D/5-16 Arty GSR

h. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 16-2-67, DTG 061031Z Jul 67.

Operation STILLWELL terminated and TF 1-8 Inf dissolved and returned OPCON 1st Bde on 15 July 1967.

2. (C) Operation GREELEY.

a. Task organization for Operation GREELEY as set forth in OPORD 24-67 effective 17 Jun 67.

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173d Abn Bde

HHC, 173d Abn Bde  
1-503 Abn Inf  
2-503 Abn Inf  
E/17 Cav  
Plat D/16 Armor  
B/1-92 Arty (155) (T)  
A/3-319 Arty (105) (T)  
C/3-319 Arty (105) (T)  
173d Engr Co (-)  
723d Sig Plat (-)  
B/173d Med Bn (-)  
39th Inf Plat (Sct Dog) (-)  
Sect, IPW  
Sqd, MP Co

b. 4-503 Abn Inf with B/3-319 Arty was committed to Operation GREELEY by VCG on 22 Jun 67.

c. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 1-24-67, DTG 240740Z Jun 67.

173d Abn Bde

Add 2-12 Cav  
C/1-77 Arty

3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div

HHC, 3d Bde, 1st ACD  
1-12 Cav  
5-7 Cav  
1-21 Arty  
B/2-19 Arty  
C/1-21 Arty  
B/2-20 ARA GS  
D/5-16 Arty reinf 1-21 Arty

d. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 2-24-67, effective 25 July 1967.

3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div released from OPGON 4th Inf Div and returned to parent organization. (Included 1-12 Cav, 2-12 Cav, 5-7 Cav and atchd arty.)

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