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AD NUMBER

AD385638

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

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LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:
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FROM:
Controlling Office; Assistant Chief of
Staff for Force Development [Army]
Washington, DC 20310-0000

AUTHORITY

28 Jun 1979, DoDD 5200.10, 26 July 1962.;
Per OAG, D/A ltr 29 Apr 1980.

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(18) OACSFOR 1 (19) OT-RD-67X030

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



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IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (19 Jun 67) FOR OT

28 June 1967

SUBJECT: ~~Combat After Action Report~~ - Operation Sam Houston Conducted
by the 4th Infantry Division [47] ⑥

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

⑨ Combat after action rept. 1 Jan-5 Apr 67.

Forwarded as inclosure is a Combat After Action Report for Operation Sam Houston. Operation Sam Houston was conducted by the 4th Infantry Division during the period 1 January - 5 April 1967. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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INCLOSURES

⑪ 16 May 67

⑫ 123 p.

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
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SAM

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AFTER ACTION REPORT

4th INFANTRY DIVISION

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HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
Office of the Commanding General
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-CG

16 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report -- SAM HOUSTON

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached Combat Operations After Action Report -- SAM HOUSTON is submitted for the information of all concerned.

2. Operation SAM HOUSTON started on 1 January 1967, but did not really get going until the division crossed the NAM SATHAY River in mid February. Then, in the next five weeks, the division had nine major contacts and a small number of contacts with NVA squad or platoon sized elements. It is significant to note that in each major contact, enemy tactics were of the same pattern. He located the battalion fire bases and kept them under constant surveillance. When the rifle companies moved out on patrol, the enemy would keep track of their movements through the use of small reconnaissance parties or trail watchers. His favorite tactic involved a procedure of reporting movements back and, at a time and location of his choosing, attempting to engage a rifle company while it was moving. He would close quickly with the elements of the company before supporting fires could be effectively employed. He would simultaneously attempt to surround the entire company and fragment it into smaller platoon sized pieces using his favorite weapons, mortars and large numbers of snipers in the trees. His mortars were countered with artillery and air and his snipers by small arms, automatic weapons and particularly the M-79 grenade launcher.

b. In every instance of major contact, the enemy was hurt severely. By body count 733 enemy were killed in action, as compared to 155 friendly killed in action. Unfortunately, because of the dense, rugged terrain and the vicious close fighting, the terrain favored the enemy and US firepower could not be employed to its full advantage. However, the body count of enemy dead does not give a true picture. Nearly every major contact was broken by the NVA after dark and the US units did not have an opportunity to sweep the battle area until the next morning. The NVA, despite the defensive concentrations placed around the friendly perimeter, would take advantage of the darkness and police the battle area. Therefore, the true kill ratio cannot be determined.

3. Some of the lessons learned during Operation SAM HOUSTON, as set out in this report, are perhaps variations on an old theme, but all are applicable to the enemy situation and terrain of the Central Highlands. All are important enough to receive continuing attention and emphasis in this area of operations.

1 Incl
as

W. R. Peers
W. R. PEERS
Major General, USA
Commanding

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COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT -- SAM HOUSTON

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16 May 1967

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
ATTN: AVF-GC-TMG
APO US Forces 96350

TO: Commander
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO US Forces 96243

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF OPERATION: Operation SAM HOUSTON - Search and Destroy.
2. (U) DATES OF OPERATION: 010001 January 1967 to 052400 April 1967.
3. (U) LOCATION: SAM HOUSTON area of operation is shown at inclosure 1. (Reference: Map VIETNAM, Scale : 1/250,000; Series JOG (G) 1501, Sheets ND 48-8, 48-12, 49-5, 49-9 and map VIETNAM, Scale: 1/50,000; Series L 7014; sheets 6534 I & II; 6634 III & IV; 6437 I & II; 6537 I, II, III, & IV; 6434 I, II, III & IV; 6525 I & II; 6635 IV.)
4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: Principal commanders and senior staff officers participating in the operation are listed at inclosure 2.
6. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION: Inclosure 3.
7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES:
 - a. Non-organic and non-attached supporting forces.
 - (1) 7th Air Force.
 - (2) 52d Artillery Group.
 - (3) 52d Combat Aviation Battalion.

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- (4) 20th ARVN Psywar Battalion.
- (5) Det, 5th Air Commando Squadron.
- (6) Det, 245th Psyops Company, PLEIKU.
- (7) USAID, PLEIKU Province.
- (8) JUSPAO, PLEIKU Province.
- (9) GVN District Contact Teams.

b. Artillery Support.

(1) Direct fire support to the maneuver elements was provided by the attachment of the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (105T) to the 1st Brigade; 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery (105T) to the 2d Brigade; and the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery (105T) to the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. Reinforcing and general support fires were provided by the 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery (-), the organic 155/8-inch unit of Division Artillery. Units of the 52d Artillery Group were attached, OPCON, and general support-reinforcing 4th Infantry Division Artillery. USSF/CIDG were supported by positioning 175/8-inch batteries of the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery, OPCON to the division, within or adjacent to USSF/CIDG camps and at Oasis to provide fires to PLEI ME. Road security missions were supported, when possible, by self-propelled units which complemented the armored force normally assigned this type of mission. Two batteries of SP artillery from the 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery, and one battery (105T) from 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery, OPCON to the division, were in direct support of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry on highway 509. A provisional organization consisting of one battery (105SP) 3d Battalion, 6th Artillery, and one medium battery from 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery, was placed OPCON to 1st Battalion, 69th Armor on highway 19 East.

(2) 1st Brigade with attached artillery deployed from the TUY HOA area to the SAM HOUSTON AO. Battery A, 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, closed with supported task force, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, on 26 January 1967. 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery (-) with brigade headquarters and two infantry battalions entered the operation on 20 February. Battery A, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery, was transhipped from TUY HOA to QUI NHON and convoyed to the operational area, closing on 24 February 1967.

(3) Headquarters Division Artillery continued, as in previous operations, to manage artillery assets by positioning and allocating artillery, anti-aircraft automatic weapons, radar, searchlights, and metro station and giving planning guidance for employment of available artillery. During one phase of the operation Division Artillery operated a combined forward tactical artillery operations and fire support coordination center

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in conjunction with the division forward TAC CP. The close proximity of the many maneuver elements operating in the area of operations required that Division Artillery exercise close control of all artillery units operating in the AO. Further, Division Artillery planned and programmed fires for both organic and OPCON general support and reinforcing artillery, provided on the spot fire planning guidance to artillery units deployed from other locales to the division AO and supervised the operation of the artillery air advisory net for the portion of the AO controlled by 1st and 2d Brigades.

(4) Task organizing the artillery became somewhat more complex during other phases of the operation. There were instances where battalion sized task forces of one brigade were operating in the area of operation of another brigade. When this occurred it became necessary for the Division Artillery to assign tactical missions to units already favorably positioned, i.e., Battery A, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery, which was attached to 2d Brigade was placed OPCON 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, and assigned a mission of direct support. In another case it was necessary to form a provisional headquarters that could be placed in direct support of a separate task force. This was accomplished using the headquarters of the Division Artillery organic general support battalion. Division Artillery continued the practice of forming organic attached and OPCON artillery into mixed caliber battalion groups. (See inclosure 3, Task Organization).

(5) Mutually supporting fire support bases (FSB's) containing single and multiple batteries, proved to be highly successful. The bases were positioned to support one or more of the patrols operating in the area and permitted the massing of fire from one or more bases. Security for FSB's was normally provided by division and USSF/CIDG resources.

(6) The 175/8-inch FSB's at New PLEI DJERENG, Oasis, and DUC CO proved invaluable because from these bases long-range fires of the 175 were mutually supporting and were able to fire along the CAMBODIAN Border. These fires were paramount in the suppression of enemy anti-aircraft and mortar fire and in heavy harassment and interdiction programs along the border areas. Long range 175's also proved very effective when used as defensive fires 150-200 meters to the flanks of personnel protected in bunkers.

(7) Artillery metro coverage was improved during SAM HOUSTON by return of the division metro section which was formerly positioned in the TUY HOA area. Electronic and visual sections operated independently and each was positioned to provide local metro data to all units in the division AO.

(8) Counter-mortar radars, AN/MPQ-4, were used effectively throughout the operation. On several occasions radars were airlifted into forward fire support bases to provide coverage along the CAMBODIAN Border.

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Four radar sections were deployed as follows: One was utilized in the Division's Base Camp Defense system, two were employed by the direct support artillery battalions in forward areas, and one was retained under Division Artillery control to cover division and brigade T&C CP and New PLEI DJERENG USSF/CIDG camp.

(9) Ammunition expenditure for SAM HOUSTON:

(a) Forward area.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>AMOUNT</u>
4-42 Arty	105T	88,575
6-29 Arty	105T	39,083
2-9 Arty	105T	20,014
3-6 Arty	105SP	23,675
7-13 Arty	105T	4,328
5-16 Arty	155SP	24,971
	8" SP	7,619
6-14 Arty	8" SP	10,977
	175SP	7,672
1-92 Arty	155T	218
	TOTAL	227,132

(b) Base camp.

	105	1,896
	8"	702
	155	358
	4.2"	261
	81mm	298
	TOTAL	3,515

GRAND TOTAL 230,647

(10) Average artillery available for SAM HOUSTON.

105	66 TUBES
155	12 TUBES
8"	10 TUBES
175	6 TUBES

TOTAL 94 TUBES

(11) Searchlight missions.

H & I	9,456
On Call	3,940

TOTAL 13,396

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c. Air Support.

(1) Experience gained in previous operations concerning the utilization of close air support (CAS) was carried forward with success in Operation SAM HOUSTON.

(2) Units continued to use the tremendous firepower and close-in targeting available from the fighter aircraft. CAS immediate requests supported practically every contact of the operation. Preplanned strikes were utilized by both brigades to strike known and suspected targets day and night throughout the AO. The use of preplanned strikes on targets developed by visual reconnaissance, recondo patrols and other intelligence gathering sources constituted the majority of the sorties flown.

(3) The following table indicates the CAS requested, flown, type aircraft utilized and results of the strikes during Operation SAM HOUSTON.

Type Mission	MISSIONS		SORTIES		TYPE AIRCRAFT					DAMAGE ASSESSMENT				
	Req	Flown	Flown	A1E	B57	F4C	F100	Navy	AC47	Huts	Bunk-ers	AW/AA	Sec/Exp	Est KIA
FAC PP	705	515	1494	83	49	87	1271	4		140	251	9	16	61
FAC Immed	196	217	473	106	14	84	269			36	71	11	24	92
CSS PP	332	209	409		17	113	279							2
CSS Immed	38	29	57			5	52							1
SPOOKY	76	67	67						67					
TOTAL	1347	1037	2500	189	80	289	1871	4	67	176	322	20	43	153

(4) The damage assessment does not reflect the true value of the CAS used. This is especially true in the figures for enemy killed. Assessment of strike damage is often difficult to obtain because ground units sometimes do not enter the strike area until hours, or even days, after a strike, if at all. Strikes on the majority of targets must be assessed by aerial observers whose observation is limited because the heavy jungle frequently prevents them from seeing the ground.

(5) The B-52 bombers provided another source of devastating

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firepower to the division. A total of 31 of B-52 strikes were flown in response to division requests. (Inclosure 4). The raids were targeted on locations where intelligence indicated locations of enemy headquarters, base camps, units and fortified areas. The psychological impact of the strikes on the enemy was one of the most important side effects. Enemy prisoners of war have indicated that the B-52 bombers are a source of constant terror to them.

(6) The XM-27 Gravel Mine was utilized by the division for the first time during Operation SAM HOUSTON. This new self-sterilizing anti-personnel mine was sewn across the targets by A1E aircraft. The type targets selected were fire support bases recently abandoned by friendly units because experience had shown that enemy units entered these areas shortly after the departure of the US troops. A reconno patrol, inserted to observe one of the two FSB's on which the mines had been placed, reported hearing several explosions during a 24 hour period. It is believed that the explosions were the result of enemy troops stepping on the mines. The overall effectiveness of the mines needs further evaluation.

d. Army Aviation support.

(1) Army Aviation support for contingency and operational missions assigned the division during Operation SAM HOUSTON was provided by the organic 4th Aviation Battalion and the general support 52d Aviation Battalion.

(2) The 52d Aviation Battalion provided the majority of the divisional aviation support for the period 1 January through 24 February 1967. Elements of the 52d Aviation Battalion were principally utilized in airmobile combat assaults, command and control and resupply missions for the brigades and battalions committed in the forward areas of the division AO. Losses incurred by the battalion in support of division operations were two KIA, two WIA and one aircraft destroyed.

(3) The 4th Aviation Battalion phased into the theater during the period 11 January to 24 February 1967. The air crews of Company A, the principal lift unit of the battalion, began arriving in country on 11 January 1967 and the last crews closed on 14 January 1967. All assigned aircraft and maintenance personnel closed Dragon Mountain Base Camp on 5 February 1967. The supporting equipment closed the base camp on 23 February and the unit was declared fully operational 25 February 1967. Losses incurred by the battalion in support of division operations were two KIA, 15 WIA and two aircraft destroyed.

(4) Army aviation was employed by the division as follows:

(a) 4th Aviation Battalion.¹

¹See footnote next page.

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1. Sorties 43,539.
2. Hours flown 7,836.
3. Troops lifted 22,520.
4. Tons of cargo lifted 801.

(b) 52d Aviation Battalion.¹

1. Sorties 37,224.
2. Hours flown 12,087.
3. Troops lifted 53,868.
4. Tons of cargo lifted 9,466.

e. Engineer support.

(1) The 4th Engineer Battalion, supported by non-divisional engineer effort, provided support to the division in its conduct of search and destroy operations in western PLEIKU Province.

(2) The battalion conducted aerial and ground reconnaissance of the existing road net within the AO and over many proposed pioneer routes for the purpose of updating information of the roads and for the planning of new improvements.

(3) A significant engineer accomplishment within the AO was the clearing and opening of route 19W from DUC CO to the CAMBODIAN Border. This road was upgraded to two lane class 35 and one way class 55 dry-weather capability. The existing road bed was found to contain good rock base providing one lane class 35 all weather capability.

(4) In support of brigade operations, elements from the engineer battalion performed the missions of landing zone and fire support base clearance, route clearance, mine sweeping, perimeter defense construction and enemy fortification destruction.

(5) Other tasks included the maintenance of the road net, TAC CP, FSA facilities, helicopter pads, refueling points and sling out areas at the 3F complex.

¹The apparent discrepancy between the number of sorties and hours flown between the two battalions exists because the 4th Aviation Battalion aircraft during the reporting period were used for resupply, liaison and other short flights within the AO, requiring more landings and take-offs, which is the criteria for counting sorties. Additionally, each firing run by an armed helicopter is considered a sortie.

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(6) The 20th Engineer Battalion (-) with elements of three companies provided general support to the division by upgrading and maintaining LLOC's in the area (routes 19W, 14B and 509), constructing and maintaining C-130 airfields at New PLEI DJERENG (YA8546) and Oasis (ZAI027) and furnishing selected engineer equipment support as required.

f. Psyops support.

(1) Psychological operations were conducted in conjunction with tactical operations to cause disaffection and desertion of enemy soldiers, deny support to the VC and encourage the civilians to support the GVN.

(2) The attached teams from the 245th Psyops Company were utilized to assist brigade psychological operations personnel in the coordination of brigade programs, aircraft scheduling, leaflet and tape preparation and delivery. The teams also acted as liaison between the division and their parent unit to secure needed materials. The PLEIKU detachment of the company printed and supplied over 15 million special leaflets in addition to some 30 million standard leaflets. The average time for special leaflets was 36 hours from submission to delivery.

(3) Psywar teams from the 20th ARVN Psychological Warfare Battalion were utilized by the brigades and battalions to carry the psywar program from the GVN to the people. The teams assisted and supported US psyops personnel in developing materials and by representing the GVN to the people.

(4) Over 50 million leaflets, 100 hours of airborne loud-speaker time and 85 hours of ground loudspeaker time were utilized in the psyops effort.

g. Civic Action support.

(1) Civic actions were conducted to prevent interference with the division's operations, protect civilians from friendly and enemy fires, relieve suffering and extreme privation and assist the GVN in evacuation, resettlement and Revolutionary Development activities.

(2) Civil affairs teams from the 41st Civil Affairs Company were attached to each of the two brigades to support the brigade civic action program. A team attached at division level was responsible for coordination of the civic action of all units, complete statistics and other data on hamlets and requisition and distribution of supplies for the civic action program.

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(3) The majority of the civic actions conducted in the AO were of the high impact, short duration type and were executed to alleviate critical conditions in the villages in the vicinity of the 1st and 2d Brigade and 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry forward command posts. In the local programs, emphasis was placed on distribution of relief supplies, community sanitation, personal hygiene and medical treatment. Also, transportation from the remote location of the CP's to the markets in PLEIKU was provided the villagers in the area. Long term civic actions could not be considered by the brigades and the cavalry squadron because of the temporary nature of their locations.

(4) The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor because of the relative permanency of the battalion forward base was able to implement a long term civic action program in their portion of the AO. In addition to the short duration, high impact type civic actions, the battalion completed construction of a spillway, began construction of a dam for an irrigation system and fish pond, and conducted MEDCAP and VETCAP in six surrounding villages. Also during the period of the operation the battalion resettled one hamlet to include clearing the land and assisting the people of the hamlet drive their cattle to the new hamlet site.

8. (C) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength Prior to Operation SAM HOUSTON.

(1) Prior to Operation SAM HOUSTON, NVA forces avoided major contact with friendly forces while refitting and regrouping in CAMBODIA. At the same time, they dispatched reconnaissance elements into the KONTUM (PLEI TRAP) panhandle to observe and warn of impending FVMAF operations. It was anticipated that the enemy would attempt to reestablish the KONTUM panhandle as a base area and as a potential battlefield. It was further anticipated that the VC would continue to increase activities in the form of limited attacks against lucrative targets, minings and harassing fire along LLOC's, sabotage, and subversive activities in villages and hamlets throughout the AO.

(2) Summary of Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength prior to the beginning of Operation SAM HOUSTON:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
1st NVA Div	5585	Vic YA 5056
32d Regt	1500	Vic YA 5056
33d Regt ²	940	Vic YA 5056

²The 33d and 101C Regiments sustained heavy casualties during Operation PAUL REVERE IV, and several NVAC's claimed both units had been disbanded to provide replacements for other regiments.

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
66th Regt	1800	Unk
10th NVA Div	Unk	Unk
88th NVA Div	1600	Unk
95B Regt	1400	Vic YA 5056
101C Regt ²	500	Unk
24th NVA Regt	1600	Central KONTUM Province
200th Arty Bn	200	Unk
407th MF Bn	500	Central PLEIKU Province
H-15 LF Bn	375	Central PLEIKU Province

b. Enemy Activity during Operation SAM HOUSTON.

(1) Operation SAM HOUSTON began on 1 January 1967, but involved no significant contact with sizeable NVA forces until mid-February. During the period 1 January through 15 March 1967, small scale guerrilla activities increased throughout PLEIKU Province and consisted mostly of mining incidents along the major LLOC's in the western portion of the province. This same period was probably used by the NVA to refit and regroup NVA forces in CAMBODIA in preparation for the Spring and Summer Campaign 1967. During the latter part of January numerous enemy sightings were reported by friendly patrol elements operating in the panhandle area of southwest KONTUM Province. The discovery of recently occupied fortifications, huts and camping sites, and engagements with small NVA recon elements confirmed the belief that enemy forces were again moving into this panhandle area. The TET truce period, 7-11 February, revealed no overt activity. However, this time was used extensively by the NVA to continue to infiltrate units into southwestern KONTUM. The end of the truce brought a resurgence of VC activity, and two US battalions, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry were deployed west of the NAM SATHAY River in the KONTUM panhandle. Both battalions dispatched companies on search and destroy (S&D) operations, and almost immediately encountered strong enemy resistance. The same type activity was occurring east of the NAM SATHAY River where the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry had also just established a FSB.

(2) It was evident from the initial encounters that the NVA had altered their tactics from those employed during Operation PAUL REVERE IV. In PAUL REVERE IV, the NVA had normally fragmented his forces during daylight and avoided contact, then regrouped at night preparatory to an attack on a US night defensive position or FSB. The night attack would

²See footnote on previous page.

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inevitably be preceded by heavy mortar fire and culminate in a battalion size assault against the prepared US positions. These tactics did not prove successful for the NVA. In Operation SAM HOUSTON, we engaged essentially the same enemy but his reactions were different. A large majority of the contacts occurred during daylight with the NVA making extensive use of snipers in trees and engaging our isolated companies at times and places of his choosing. Our FSB's were subject to intensive mortar fire. However, the enemy did not commit large ground forces in assaulting these bases.

(3) In mid March, there were reliable indications that the NVA was infiltrating forces from CAMBODIA into the area west of highway 14B. Mortar attacks and contacts suddenly replaced minings as the most significant incidents in PLEIKU Province. On the night of 13 March and continuing into the next morning, the division TAC CP and the forward CP's of the 1st and 2d Brigades at 3T received an estimated 330 rounds of 82mm mortar fire plus 75mm RR and B-40 fire. On 16 March, Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was helilifted to YA758386 and was immediately engaged by an estimated NVA platoon. During a sweep of the area, seven infiltration passes were found. Five of these were numbered D300, one D301D and one 520. These numbers equate to the 95B, 101C and 33d NVA Regiments, thereby indicating that elements of the 95B NVA Regiment had infiltrated into South VIETNAM north of the CHU PONG Mountains. On 22 March, Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA battalion at YA686344. During late March, search and destroy operations in the panhandle revealed numerous abandoned base camps and fortified positions indicating that enemy activity was shifting to the southwest in PLEIKU Province in the vicinity of the IA DRANG valley. The majority of the NVA forces had probably sought refuge in CAMBODIA, with some elements infiltrating into western PLEIKU, and operating in conjunction with main force (MF) and local force (LF) VC units. US units then concentrated their attention on the western portion of the province, attempting to reduce the threats posed by VC/NVA units, and to disrupt the VC infrastructure.

(4) Below is the Enemy Composition, Disposition and Strength encountered during Operation SAM HOUSTON:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u> ³	<u>DISPOSITION</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
1st NVA Div	Unk	YA 5056	Reliable Source
32d Regt	1100	YA 6952	PW & Documents
66th Regt	1740	YA 6055	PW & Documents
88th Regt	Unk	YA 6058	PW & Documents
95B Regt	Unk	YA 6834	Documents
200th Arty Bn	Unk	YA 8335	PW
407th MF Bn	500	N PLEIKU	Agent

³Based on interrogation reports.

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c. During Operation SAM HOUSTON the following enemy techniques were used against friendly forces.

(1) Enemy use of Imitative Communications Deception.

(a) The first indication of imitative communications deception being used by the enemy in the area was during the attack on Camp Holloway on 7 January 1967. Just prior to and during the attack, several calls were made on that unit's internal telephone circuit during which the caller, speaking fluent English, determined the number of US personnel in certain bunkers. The caller then informed the Camp Holloway control tower that an attack was imminent. It was later found that the wires had been tapped near the perimeter fence.

(b) In Operation SAM HOUSTON one instance of ICD occurred when a voice speaking fair English attempted to answer a call transmitted from a friendly station. The station attempting to imitate the friendly unit was challenged, but could not authenticate. A homing device in a helicopter pointed to a location across the border in CAMBODIA.

(c) In another case during SAM HOUSTON, a voice without accent or trace of oriental pronunciation called two friendly units, and using the call sign of another friendly unit, asked for help at a road junction. The sender upon being challenged could not authenticate. A check revealed that no friendly units were within the area indicated by the sender.

(2) A new technique employed by the enemy during SAM HOUSTON was the use of handgrenades in an airburst role against heliborne operations. The technique used involved burying a propellant charge over which a layer of earth was placed. A wooden board was then placed on top of the earth fill and directly over the charge. A number of stick-type handgrenades were secured to this block of wood. A wire was attached to the grenade fuzes with one end anchored to a stake. When the propellant charge was command detonated, the grenades were thrown into the air and armed, resulting in an airburst effect at altitudes of from 40 to 70 feet. Included as inclosures 5 and 6 are a top and side view of the device and a diagram of the IZ illustrating the pattern in which the grenades were distributed.

d. Terrain.

(1) Relief and Drainage: The area of operations is situated on a moderately dissected plateau except for the northwest quarter where the terrain is rugged and mountainous. Several large hill masses and a few isolated volcanic cones rise above the plateau. The plateau is divided into two distinct areas. The northeastern half consists of rolling plains and the southwestern half of relatively level plains. The mountainous northwest quarter of the area, where the majority of activity occurred during the operation, is extremely rugged and contains many steep-walled valleys and ravines with only one road and a limited number of IZ's.

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Principal drainage is provided by the IA DRANG, SE SAN and NAM SATHAY Rivers. Drainage in the area is generally northeast to southwest.

(2) Vegetation: The area consists of open plains, open forest plains and dense forests. The southwestern quarter consists of open forest plains with closely spaced trees and scattered clear areas. Hill masses in this area are covered by dense forests and thick undergrowth. The rugged, mountainous terrain in the northwestern portion of the area is covered by a dense, broadleaf, ever-green forest. Trees range from 20 to 25 meters in height with some as high as 45 meters.

(3) Military Aspects of the Terrain.

(a) Observation and Field of Fire: Observation and fields of fire are good in open plains, but is severely reduced in the open forest plains. The hills and mountains restrict fields of fire for flat trajectory weapons, and the dense undergrowth will deflect small arms fire. Vegetation and terrain irregularities limit target acquisition and adjustment of fire for high angle fire weapons.

(b) Cover and Concealment: Cover from flat trajectory fire is good in most of the area because of the numerous valleys and the relatively steep stream embankments. The extremely rugged terrain in the northwest provides excellent cover from flat trajectory weapons. Overhead concealment is fair to poor in the relatively open eastern half of the area, and excellent in the northwest portion.

(c) Obstacles: The major obstacles are the SE SAN and NAM SATHAY Rivers which form barriers to east-west travel. These rivers are fordable during the dry season.

(d) Key Terrain Features: The CHU PRONG (ZA0049) and CHU KAN YAN (YA9348) mountains in the northwest portion of the area are two key terrain features overlooking route 509, the only surface link between PLEIKI City and PLEI DJERENG. In southwestern KONTUM Province the key terrain feature is the area in the vicinity of Hill 1282 which dominates the PLEI TRAP valley.

(e) Avenues of Approach: There are several avenues of approach into the area. They are: (1) from the north along route 14; (2) from the southwest along the many tributaries of the IA DRANG River; (3) from the west along route 509; and (4) from the north down the corridors between the mountain ranges. Excellent avenues of approach in the northwestern part of the area exist in the area of the NAM SATHAY River. This area also contains numerous good east-west trails leading from CAMBODIA into VIETNAM by way of the KONTUM panhandle. Many excellent east-west infiltration trails also exist in the area north of the CHU PONG Mountains leading from CAMBODIA into VIETNAM.

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e. Weather. The weather throughout the area of operations was good with only very small amounts of precipitation in the form of afternoon rainshowers. As a result of the good weather experienced during the dry season, maximum utilization of helicopters was possible.

f. The total number of mining incidents during Operation SAM HOUSTON was 53. Based upon a monthly period the maximum number of mining incidents were in March as the table below indicates:⁴

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</u>
January	5
February	17
March	25
April (to 5 April)	<u>6</u>
TOTAL	53

A further breakdown of mining incidents by type vehicle involved is as follows:

<u>TYPE VEHICLE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</u>
1/4 ton	2
3/4 ton	2
2 1/2 ton	7
5 ton	6
APC	11
Tank	23
VTR	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	53

g. The total number of mines located and either evacuated or destroyed during Operation SAM HOUSTON was 65. Based upon a monthly period the maximum number of mines discovered occurred in March as indicated below:⁵

⁴Inclosure 7 contains a list of all mining incidents to include: date-time-group, unit, location, type vehicle, casualties (friendly), damage. Tab A to Inclosure 7 further illustrates the location, date-time-group and type of vehicle involved in mining incidents within the AO.

⁵Inclosure 8 contains a list of all mines evacuated or destroyed by date-time-group, location, type of mine and additional charge. Tab A to Inclosure 8 further illustrates the location, date-time-group and number of mines that were evacuated or destroyed.

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<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MINES EVACUATED/DESTROYED</u>
January	1
February	26
March	30
April (to 5 April)	<u>9</u>
TOTAL	66

The total figure included 56 destroyed and 10 evacuated.

h. A total of 41 mortar attacks were experienced during Operation SAM HOUSTON which involved an enemy expenditure of 1641 (60 and 82mm) mortar rounds fired at friendly positions.⁶ The maximum number of attacks occurred in March.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>NUMBER OF INCIDENTS</u>
January	2
February	13
March	25
April (to 5 April)	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	41

i. The overall CA/Psyops evaluation of population attitude showed marked acceptance of both US and GVN officials and the programs initiated in their hamlets. Concurrently, there was a marked increase in the amount of information volunteered by local inhabitants and apparent willingness to openly assist military and government officials.

9. (C) MISSION: The 4th Infantry Division conducted operations in SAM HOUSTON⁷ area of operation to:

detect North Vietnamese Army (NVA) infiltration into Republic of VIETNAM (RVN).

detect NVA/VC troop concentrations.

provide security for engineer construction and logistical installations.

⁶Inclosure 9 contains a list of all mortar attacks occurring during Operation SAM HOUSTON by date-time-group, unit, location, number of rounds received, type ammunition used, and friendly casualties. Tab A to Inclosure 9 further illustrates the location, date-time-group and number of rounds and type ammunition involved.

⁷The name of the operation was changed from PAUL REVERE V to SAM HOUSTON by IFV msg #0235, subj: Change of Operation Names, DTG 180942Z January 1967, retroactive to 010001Z January 1967.

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provide security for Government of VIETNAM (GVN) resettlement operations within the area of operations.

provide security of highway 19 east of PLEIKU.

10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The 4th Infantry Division employed two brigades to provide surveillance and reconnaissance of the CAMBODIAN Border with extensive use of recondo patrols; conducted search and destroy operations west of the SE SAN and NAM SATHAY Rivers, and provided security for engineer construction of route 509B, landing zone and fire support base vicinity YA6953 and PLEI TRAP vicinity YA6555; and with one tank battalion task force and one cavalry squadron task force provided security of convoys and LLOC, engineer construction, logistical installations, EDAP ENANG resettlement areas and conducted search and destroy operations throughout the remainder of the SAM HOUSTON area of operation. In coordination with ARVN and CIDG units extensive search and destroy operations were conducted in the CHU PRONG area, in vicinity of DUC CO and New PLEI DJERENG, and in the area bounded by routes 14B, 509, 19W and 14. Heavy enemy contacts west of the SE SAN River required extensive search and destroy and pursuit operations by two brigades in the lower PLEI TRAP and NAM SATHAY valleys.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. General.

(1) Operation SAM HOUSTON was initiated by the 4th Infantry Division at 010001Z January 1967 by OPORD 1-67. The area of operation remained the same as that of PAUL REVERE IV. At the beginning of the period the major elements of the division were disposed as follows: 2d Brigade on the northwest near PLEI DJERENG; 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry west of PLEIKU along route 509 and 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry on route 19 east of PLEIKU.

(2) Operation SAM HOUSTON is viewed as occurring in five time phases.

(a) Phase One - 1 January to 14 February. Screening operations were conducted along the CAMBODIAN Border and search and destroy missions were carried out in an area of operation bounded generally by the SE SAN River and Highway 509 on the north, the PLEIKU defense sector and the division TAOR on the east, the 20 grid line on the south and the CAMBODIAN Border on the west. These operations were conducted by one brigade consisting of three infantry battalions. The cavalry squadron and the armor battalion conducted route security for highways 509, 14B and 19W within the AO. One infantry battalion task force was responsible for the security of highway 19E from PLEIKU to the MANG YANG pass. Midway through the phase the infantry battalion task force was committed in the AO and was replaced by the armor battalion. Aerial surveillance and

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recondo patrols were used extensively in the border screening mission. Roads in the area were upgraded by the engineers in preparation for future operations. The 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry returned to division control from the TUY HOA area. The first significant contact of Operation SAM HOUSTON occurred on 3 January 1967 when LZ 3T (YA850455) was hit by a 40 round mortar attack. During the latter part of the phase the division began to move across the SE SAN River.

(b) Phase Two - 15 February to 21 February. This is the period of the heaviest contact during Operation SAM HOUSTON. A build up of intelligence indicated that enemy forces were entering the area west of the NAM SATHAY River. The decision was made to commit two infantry battalions into FSB's secured by ground units into the area west of the NAM SATHAY River. Two companies moved out the day before and secured two designated landing zones. The following morning, the first of the battalions made a combat assault into the landing zone. They received sniper and mortar fire. The mortars were quickly silenced by counter battery artillery fire. The second battalion made its combat assault in the afternoon and came under intense small arms and automatic weapons fire during the landing. The battalion later made heavy contact on the ground as they moved out to sweep the area around the LZ. Three other heavy contacts were experienced by units of the division during this period each inflicting heavy casualties upon the enemy. Near the end of the phase the 1st Brigade, with the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry and the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery, returned to division control from the TUY HOA area.

(c) Phase Three - 22 February to 15 March. The area of operation was divided between the two brigades. The 1st Brigade with three infantry battalions assumed responsibility for the portion of the AO between the SE SAN and NAM SATHAY Rivers. The 2d Brigade with two infantry battalions assumed responsibility for that portion of the AO west of the NAM SATHAY River to the CAMBODIAN Border. There were numerous displacements during the period as units were shifted to block likely exfiltration routes and to expand the number of potential FSB's. Bulldozers were helilifted to the battalions to aid in the development of the fire bases. There was generally light contact throughout the period with four heavy contacts occurring, two at the beginning of the period, each involving a company sized patrol and two at the end of the period. One initially involved one battalion in which two additional battalions were later helilifted into blocking positions in an attempt to prevent the exfiltration of the enemy units in contact. The other action involved a company size patrol. In one three day period during the phase the enemy fired over 300 rounds of mortar ammunition into two FSB's and the CP complex at LZ 3T. One of the fire bases was hit with 12 separate mortar attacks in a 36 hours period receiving over 300 rounds.

(d) Phase Four - 16 March to 28 March. During this phase both brigades moved from the area west of the SE SAN River to an

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operational area bounded generally by the SE SAN River and 60 grid line on the north, the PLEIKU defense sector and the TAOR on the east, the 20 grid line on the south and the CAMBODIAN Border on the west. All elements were withdrawn by the end of the period utilizing helilift and road movement. There were three significant contacts during the period; one during a combat assault, one while on a search and destroy mission and one when a unit was moved into an area to extract a reconno patrol with which radio contact had been lost.

(e) Phase Five - 29 March to 5 April. This phase began with the removal of the bridge across the SE SAN River by the engineers and was characterized by extensive cordon and search operations of villages and hamlets within the AO, in an area northwest of PLEIKU and in areas adjacent to the division TAOR. The EDAP ENANG resettlement project was started by the GVN and supported by the division. The 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, the last of divisional units in the TUY HOA area, returned to division control.

b. The significant events that occurred during Operation SAM HOUSTON are listed chronologically at inclosure 10 with the following exceptions.

(1) Details of mining incidents and mortar attacks referenced in subparagraphs are at inclosures 7 and 9 respectively.

(2) Displacements of fire support bases and brigade and battalion command posts are shown at inclosure 11.

c. Significant contacts during SAM HOUSTON are shown at inclosure 12.

d. Chemical Operations.

(1) Chemical operations during Operation SAM HOUSTON consisted of defoliation and riot control agent (RCA) employment.

(2) Ground based defoliation began on 2 January 1967 and continued throughout the operation. The principal target areas were routes 509 and 509B and fire support bases. A total of 249 sorties were flown by UH-1H helicopters in support of the program (Inclosure 13).

(3) Aerial defoliation missions flown by Air Force C-123 aircraft from the 12th Air Commando Squadron began on 18 February 1967 and continued throughout Operation SAM HOUSTON. The missions were flown over target areas in KONTUM Province. A total of 25 sorties were flown in 11 missions (Inclosure 13).

(4) Two riot control agent drops were made in support of 2d Brigade operations. The target areas were suspected enemy positions and in both cases were followed by artillery concentrations. Negative results were reported from both drops. The mission data is listed below and graphically shown at inclosure 13.

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23 (a) 25 February 1967 - 30 drums (2560 lbs) of CS-1 (powder) dropped from two CH-47 helicopters on suspected NVA positions from YA569576 to YA568587.

(b) 28 February 1967 - 420 M7A3 grenades were dropped from a locally fabricated grenade dispenser on a suspected NVA unit vicinity of YA6460.

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Summary of enemy personnel and equipment losses.

(1) Personnel.

(a) KIA (BC)	733
<u>1.</u> NVA	725
<u>2.</u> VC	8
(b) Detainees	288
<u>1.</u> PW's	17
<u>a.</u> NVA	8
<u>b.</u> VC	9
<u>2.</u> Civil Defendants	92
<u>3.</u> Innocent Civilians	177
<u>4.</u> Returnees	2

(2) Weapons:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>1 BDE</u>	<u>2 BDE</u>	<u>1/10 Cav</u>	<u>1/69 Arm</u>	<u>Other⁸</u>	<u>Total</u>
Small Arms	18	161	2			181
Crew Served	11	41				52
60mm Mortar	3					39
82mm Mortar						09
AA Weapon						09
RL B-40	1	8				99

⁸Includes separate units OPCON to 4th Infantry Division during Operation SAM HOUSTON

⁹Included in crew served total

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(3) Ammunition:

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>1 BDE</u>	<u>2 BDE</u>	<u>1/10 Cav</u>	<u>1/69 Armor</u>	<u>Other⁸</u>	<u>Total</u>
Small Arms	6410	10565	291		124	17390
Crew Served	64	9154	51	12	314	9595
57mm	27	14		2	20	63
60mm	5	5				10
81/82mm	31	99	7			137

(4) Explosives:

TNT (lbs)	71	5.5	4	18.6		99.
Hand Grenades		337	3	1	91	432
Mines	12	22	13	13		60

(5) Structures and Fortifications Destroyed:

Structures	121	660	36	54	349	1220
Fortifications	775	1365	32	157	580	2909

(6) Foodstuffs:

Rice (tons)	4.3	5.5	28.3	11.3	2.9	52.3
Salt (lbs)		63.6	140		49.4	253

(7) Documents:

Documents (ins)	11	47	7	18	60	143
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(8) Body count and estimates of enemy losses during Operation SAM HOUSTON were affected by several pertinent factors.

(a) Terrain and Vegetation. The difficult terrain and dense vegetation in the area of operations assisted the enemy in his efforts to evacuate casualties from the immediate areas of major contacts and made the friendly effort to search for and locate enemy casualties more difficult. The absence of landing zones or clearings, suitable for helicopter extraction of casualties, required units to cut clearings in the jungle immediately following contacts with the enemy so that the seriously wounded could be evacuated. At the same time the enemy was able to remove his own casualties from the battle area.

(b) Proximity to CAMBODIA. The proximity of the CAMBODIAN

⁸See footnote on previous page.

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Border to the sites of most of the major contacts and B-52 strike areas made it possible for the enemy to transport most of his casualties to his CAMBODIAN safehaven for burial or medical treatment. Agent reports and prisoner reports described several movements of numerous enemy casualties into CAMBODIA following contacts.

(c) Enemy doctrine. The enemy consistently makes a determined, almost fanatical effort to recover his casualties from each contact. His preparations for such recovery and his demonstrated efforts and willingness to risk fresh casualties to police his dead and wounded have generally proven successful for him. Enemy battle orders for defense of landing zones and plans for attacks on FVMAF positions have invariably included emphasis on all NVA dead or wounded being evacuated.

(d) As a result of the factors described above it is concluded that the actual body count of enemy KIA during Operation SAM HOUSTON is not a complete count of enemy KIA and is far less than the actual enemy KIA during the operation. Unit after action critiques and reports have indicated that in almost every contact with the enemy, US personnel, who observed kills or hits on enemy personnel, found the enemy had evacuated these casualties when contact was broken.

(9) The following analysis illustrates the methods and data used for estimating enemy losses. Beginning with the actual body count, enemy losses are computed using the MACV Formula, After Action Reports and Agent Reports.

ENEMY UNITS	1	2	3	4	TOTAL LOSSES			
	ACTUAL BC	MACV COMPUTED ADDNL LOSSES (A)	AFTER ACTION REPORT ADDNL LOSSES (B)	JTAD ADDNL LOSSES (C)	COL 1	COL 1+2	COL 1+3	COL 1+4
7th & 8th Bn, 66th (Conf)	152	43	184	-	152	195	336	152
5th Bn, 88th (Prob)	110	31	53	-	110	141	163	110
2 Bns, 32d (Prob)	235	66	153	-	235	301	388	235
2 Bns, 95B (Prob)	160	45	94	-	160	205	254	160
U/1 VC Unit	-	-	-	75	-	-	-	75
Other	76	21	-	800	76	97	76	876
Total	733	206	484	875	733	929	1217	1608

(See next page for explanation of columns (A) (B) and (C).)

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(A) Based on the MACV formula for determining additional enemy losses by multiplying the number of KIA (BC) by .28.

(B) This figure is the difference between the reported enemy losses in after action reports, and the actual BC made on the ground after the battle. Reported enemy losses in after action reports are based on estimation of those seen being killed, estimation of those killed by artillery or air, estimation of those KIA removed from the battlefield, and an estimation of those possibly killed (determined by blood trails, etc.).

(C) Data collected by NVA agents across the CAMBODIAN-VIETNAMESE border, i.e., agent reports of enemy KIA returned to CAMBODIA from SAM HOUSTON AO for burial.

b. Summary of friendly personnel losses.

(1) Personnel:

UNIT	BATTLE				NON-BATTLE		TOTAL LOSSES	
	EN		TOTAL		DEATHS	INJURY		
	KIA	WIA	KIA	WIA				
1-8 INF	19	66	8	3	27	69	8	104
3-8 INF		2	1	18	1	20	1	22
6-29 ARTY	2	1		1	2	2	1	5
HHC, 2d Bds		9				9		9
2-3 INF	32	129		12	32	141	6	179
1-12 INF	18	107	1	44	19	151	18	188
1-22 INF	42	112	1	17	43	129	13	185
4-42 ARTY		22		8		30	6	36
2-35 INF	34	84	1	9	35	93	2	132
2-9 ARTY	2	8			2	8	1	11
D/65 ENGR		4				4		4
DIV ARTY (-)	2	12		3	2	15	3	20
DISCOM		4				4	3	7
1-10 CAV	2	5		1	2	6	2	10
1-69 ARMOR		3				3	8	11
4TH AVN BN	2	15			2	15	3	20
7TH ENGR BN		9	2		2	9	1	17
124TH SIG BN		7				7	2	9
HHC, 4TH DIV		1				1		1
33D INF PLAT		3		1		4		4
TOTAL	155	603	14	117	169	720	3	974

10D/1-10 Cav had 1 MIA that is not included in the totals for either 1-10 Cav or the division.

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(2) Equipment:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NR DAMAGED</u>	<u>NR DESTROYED</u>
Helicopter	25	5
Tanks	26	
Carrier, Armored Personnel	9	
Vehicle, Tank Recovery	2	
Truck, 1/4 ton	7	
Truck, 3/4 ton	4	1
Truck, 2 1/2 ton		3
Truck, 5 ton	4	
Truck, shop van	2	
Trailer, 1 1/2 ton	11	
Trailer, POL	1	
Road Grader	1	
Bucket Loader	1	
Machine Gun, M-60		2
Rifle, M-16		6
Pistol, Cal .45		1
Radio		7

c. Fire support results.

(1) Enemy killed and wounded and other destruction mission results, attributable to artillery fires, are difficult to assess. In the majority of contacts the success of the operation was based on the combined efforts of the artillery, air strikes and maneuver elements.

(2) H & I programs were highly successful, particularly along the CAMBODIAN Border. Reconnaissance by fire and other fire missions were successful in destroying and demoralizing the enemy throughout the area of operation. A particular effort by the artillery was the counter fire program fired when the division TAC CP and the 1st and 2d Brigade CP's at LZ 3T were mortared on 13 and 14 March. The fires greatly reduced the effectiveness of the enemy mortar attack. In addition to the counter-mortar fires by artillery units located in the immediate area, long range 175mm guns were fired from a battery located at DUC CO, medium range 8-inch howitzers were fired from PLEI DJERENG and one battery of 105mm howitzers (SP) fired maximum range from positions on highway 509.

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. General.

(1) The concept of logistic support for Operation SAM HOUSTON was to furnish required support as far forward as possible. To accomplish this, forward logistic bases were collocated with brigade trains. The forward logistics bases provided Class I, III and V supply

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support and necessary service support to include maintenance, medical, bath, laundry and GREEG. The above Logistics support in the forward area was provided by a forward support activity (FSA) organized from 1st Logistical Command, VIETNAM resources. 28

(2) Initially two forward logistics bases were established. One at LZ 3T (YA853455) and one at Oasis (ZAL20278) in consonance with the tactical disposition of each brigade. As combat operations shifted to the areas west of the NAM SATHAY River the forward base at Oasis was closed and both brigades were supported from the logistic base at LZ 3T.

(3) With the redistribution of tactical elements east of the SE SAN River, the logistic base at 3T displaced to LE THAN (YA898313) to support the 1st Brigade and a logistic base was established at Oasis to support the 2d Brigade.

(4) Resupply of forward logistic bases was accomplished primarily by LLOC. Resupply of units in inaccessible areas was accomplished by Army aircraft.

b. Material and Services.

(1) Supply: The majority of supplies consumed during Operation SAM HOUSTON were issued through the Forward Support Areas (FSA) operated by 1st Logistical Command. It is estimated, however, that approximately 5,000 tons of supplies were issued directly to units from rear base areas. Supplies issued from rear areas include fuel utilized by aircraft and vehicles in direct support of combat operations, Class V issued to units from ASP 341 at Camp Holloway and Class II & IV supplies issued to units by DSO at DMBC.

(a) The following Class V items were issued directly to units from ASP 341:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NO RDS</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
105mm	13,000	390
155mm	5,000	348
175mm	4,000	530
8-inch	<u>5,000</u>	<u>640</u>
TOTAL	27,000	1,908

(b) A summary of supplies issued through supporting FSA's is shown below:

<u>SUPPLY CLASS</u>	<u>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUE</u>	<u>TOTAL ISSUES</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
<u>Class I</u>			
"A" Rations	3,300 (rations)	313,500	945

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<u>SUPPLY CLASS</u>	<u>AVERAGE DAILY ISSUE</u>	<u>TOTAL ISSUES</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
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Class I

"B" Rations		1,900	6
MCI (in Rations)	<u>3,100</u>	<u>294,900</u>	<u>708</u>
TOTAL	6,400	610,300	1,659

Class III

JP4	10,100 (Gallons)	959,500	2,832
AVGAS	500	47,500	145
MOGAS	3,000	285,000	870
DIESEL	<u>3,800</u>	<u>361,000</u>	<u>1,304</u>
TOTAL	17,400	1,653,000	5,151

Class IV

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TOTALS ISSUES</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
Sand Bags	1,123,820	182
Concertina (Bundles)	25	21
"U" Shape Pickets	3,000	<u>15</u>
TOTAL		218

Class V: A total of 8,785 short tons of Class V was used during Operation SAM HOUSTON for a daily average of 103 short tons. Major items consumed are as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QTY (IN ROUNDS)</u>
40mm (Gren)	37,600
81mm	40,000
90mm	500
105mm	142,000
4.2 inch	48,000
155mm	15,000
175mm	4,000
8-inch	11,000
2.75 inch Rocket	6,000

(c) Water Points issues: Two water points were operated in forward areas and issued a total of 2,000,000 gallons of potable water for a daily average of 21,000 gallons.

(d) Recapitulation of supplies consumed:

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<u>ISSUED FROM</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
FS&	15,913
Rear Areas	<u>5,000</u>
TOTAL	20,913

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Daily issues averaged 220 short tons. This closely approximates the theater average for a two brigade force.

(e) In addition to tonnage of Class III and V used by division units, the US Air Force expended the following Class III and V in support of Operation SAN HOUSTON:

Class III

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>QTY (IN GAL)</u>
Fighters	2,382
B-52's	2,125

Class V

Delivered by Fighters:

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
Bombs	8,152	2,532
CEU	777	1,109
Napalm	3,396	1,033
Rockets	477	95

Delivered by Fighter & AC-47 (SPOOKY):

20mm	262,842 (Rds)	66
7.62mm	310,000	8

Delivered by B-52's:

Bombs	Unk	3,567
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(2) Services: A clothing direct exchange (DX) facility was established in the forward support area at LZ 3T. The purpose of the exchange point was to allow units to exchange unserviceable clothing once it had been sorted out for laundering. The DX point was collocated with the field laundry unit. Total exchanges effected during period 14 January to 22 March 1967, are shown below:

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QTY</u>
Trousers, Tropical	2200
Shirts, Tropical	1279
Boots, Jungle	880
Socks, Cushion Sole	1200
Towels	200
Undershirts, cotton	1800
Drawers, cotton	1900

This facility contributed to the welfare of the combat soldier by reducing replacement time for individual clothing. Above figures do not include issues made from base camp through normal supply channels but are useful in that they indicate a replacement trend ratio for the jungle covered terrain in the SAM HOUSTON AO.

c. Maintenance.

(1) Maintenance support for tactical units was provided by the 704th Maintenance Battalion with a combination of forward support elements and mobile contact teams backed up by the Headquarters and Main Support Company at Dragon Mountain Base Camp.

(2) Forward support elements were stationed in the brigade trains area while armored and cavalry units were supported by mobile contact teams.

(3) Aircraft maintenance support was provided from Dragon Mountain Base Camp.

(4) Job Orders processed during Operation SAM HOUSTON are shown below:

<u>TYPE JOB ORDER</u>	<u>QTY</u>
Mechanical	1067
Electronic	2076
Armament	4182
Aircraft	<u>241</u>
TOTAL	7566

d. Transportation.

(1) The primary means of resupply during Operation SAM HOUSTON was accomplished via LLOC. The MSR's utilized were as follows:

(a) Route 509 from PLEIKU to New PLEI DJERENG.

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(b) Route 19 West from PLEIKU to DUC CO.

(a) Route 14B.

(2) The following procedures were used in traffic movement and control:

(a) All traffic to include single vehicles, moving to forward areas were cleared through DTO.

(b) The Division Movement Control Center (DTO) organized convoys, coordinated for security during movement and established movement times. DTO representatives located in forward base areas coordinated convoy movement from the forward area to base camp. Traffic control posts were established on route entrances to the AO to prevent unauthorized and/or unscheduled traffic from traveling on the MSR's.

(c) Security and convoy control was provided utilizing two different methods based on availability of security forces.

1. Security for movement of convoys on the MSR's was accomplished by securing the road, (armor units establishing strong points along the route) and/or physical escort of convoys by armor units.

2. Military Police were utilized for escorting convoys where the road had been secured by strong points. The Military Police monitored the security forces net and thus would have been able to call for immediate assistance.

(3) The DTO section and Military Police had to be augmented with vehicles and personnel to give these elements the capability to effect proper traffic coordination, movement and control.

(4) During Operation SAM HOUSTON a reported 12,400 vehicles traveled on Division MSR's to resupply forward areas and to effect movement of units.

e. Medical.

(1) Medical clearing in forward areas was provided by the 4th Medical Battalion with the main clearing capability retained at Dragon Mountain Base Camp. The clearing section in support of 1st Brigade elements consisted of 19 EM and three officers (2 MC, 1 MSC). The clearing section in support of 2d Brigade consisted of 21 EM and three officers (1 MC, 1 DC, 1 MSC). Medical support included daily sick call, lab and dental service and emergency care.

(2) Medical evacuation from the battle area to the clearing station and from the clearing station to DMBC or 18th Surgical Hospital.

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at PLEIKU was exclusively by air ambulance. Helicopter ambulances were stationed in forward areas and back-up ambulance ships were located at PLEIKU. The unit furnishing ambulance support was the 498th Air Ambulance Company stationed at PLEIKU.

(3) A summary of medical services rendered by the forward clearing sections is given below:

(a) Total patients seen	3033
(b) Admitted to Forward Clearing Station	1734
(c) Evacuated to 18th Surgical Hospital	608
(d) Evacuated to Base Clearing Station	1086
(e) Returned to duty	40
(f) Total out patient (sick call)	1299

f. Problem Areas.

(1) Tank M48A3: The high deadline rate persisted throughout Operation SAM HOUSTON. The most frequent mechanical failures occurred in tank power trains and suspension systems. Primary faults in power trains were caused by engine and transmission failures attributable to the high mileage. This problem pointed up the need for an accelerated program to replace tanks with over 5000 miles. The prime cause for suspension component faults was mine damage.

(2) Heavy Duty Chain Saws: Chain Saws currently authorized for tactical units are inadequate for cutting thick hardwood trees in the AO, which at times exceed five feet in diameter. As a result, excessive delays were encountered in preparing LZ's for extraction of casualties. A request for issue of a heavy duty, two-man power saw, has been submitted on the basis of two per infantry battalion and two per combat engineer company.

(3) Radio AN/PRC 25: TOE authorizations for the AN/PRC 25 radio are inadequate, because of the limited range and reliability of the AN/PRC 6 and the need to equip long range patrols with the AN/PRC 25. This problem was partially alleviated when USARV approved an issue of 75 against a special request for 324 additional AN/PRC 25 radios. The AN/PRC 25 radio has proven to be a highly reliable radio. Consideration should be given for issue of this radio for use within platoons.

(4) Helicopter Ambulances: Extraction of casualties continued to be a problem during Operation SAM HOUSTON. The problem is that of extracting personnel from the jungle containing thick undergrowth and trees

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ranging in height up to 200 feet. CH-47 Helicopters are being used where the UH-1D Helicopter is not capable of hovering above the jungle canopy. Action taken to alleviate this problem was the submission of an equipment improvement recommendation on the UH-1D winch system and an endeavor by I Field Force, VIETNAM to assign incoming UH-1D aircraft equipped with more powerful "Dash 13" Engines to the highlands.

g. Communications.

(1) The 124th Signal Battalion at the start of the operation provided the division with normal communication support, and continued this support throughout Operation SAM HOUSTON until its termination.

(2) On 19 February, the Division Signal Office in support of the operation installed and operated a systems control (SYS CON) at the Division TAC CP. An AN/MRC-69 VHF radio system, MTC-7 switchboard, MGC-17 message center and an AN/GRC-46 radio teletype were all operated at 3T to support the TAC CP. The VHF radio system provided six hot line, four common-user and two teletype circuits between the division base camp and the TAC CP. Lateral trunk lines were layed, interconnecting Division TAC (Famous FWD), 1st Brigade FWD (Formal), and 2d Brigade FWD (Fortify) switchboards providing alternate routing capability to the base camp. The MGC-17 was used for terminating a teletype circuit from Famous communications center. The AN/GRC-46 operated in the Division Command Net #3 (AM) Radio Teletype. The above systems closed down operations on 28 March and returned to base camp.

(3) During the operation the signal battalion provided equipment and personnel to establish a multi-channel VHF system from division headquarters to 1st Battalion, 69th Armor and the same service to 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. This service was in addition to the normal radio service provided.

(4) Problem areas experienced during the operation were extreme dust and high temperatures which created persistent maintenance and overheating problems. Although the use of overhead cover and sandbags helped to reduce the heat inside of the signal vans, the installation of air conditioning would eliminate most problems caused by overheating.

h. Personnel.

(1) The following replacements were received during Operation SAM HOUSTON.

	<u>E9</u>	<u>E8</u>	<u>E7</u>	<u>E6</u>	<u>E5</u>	<u>E4</u>	<u>E3/1</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Jan	1	4	11	37	36	42	270	401
Feb	0	3	7	37	47	107	796	997
Mar	0	2	3	39	38	59	803	944
1-5 Apr	0	0	0	1	0	4	57	62
	<u>1</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>114</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>212</u>	<u>1926</u>	<u>2404</u>

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(2) Replacement priority units established during the operation were:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>APPROX PERIOD OF PRIORITY</u>
1st Bn, 69th Armor	1 Jan - 15 Feb
2d Bn, 8th Inf	15 Jan - 28 Feb
1st Bn, 12th Inf	1 Mar - 7 Mar
3d Bn, 12th Inf	1 Mar - 19 Mar
2d Bn, 35th Inf	1 Mar - 26 Mar
1st Bn, 8th Inf	19 Mar - 26 Mar

14. (C) SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES:

a. Scout Dog operations.

(1) During Operation SAM HOUSTON, the division was supported by one infantry platoon (scout dog). Scout dog teams were committed on 209 separate occasions in support of the operation.

(2) The effectiveness of the scout dog teams was impaired by the heat and dry weather condition, which quickly tired the dogs. The capability of the dogs was further restricted by the heavy jungle found in the SAM HOUSTON AO.

(3) The scout dog teams were more effectively employed than in previous operations, primarily because of commander's increased experience with scout dog capabilities.

(4) A recapitulation of alerts/actions of scout dog teams follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
7 Jan	Found tunnel system in a village.
17 Jan	Found a cave and two enemy huts.
22 Jan	Found a tunnel.
3 Feb	Alerted company to an abandoned enemy battalion size base camp.
16 Feb	Alerted to three enemy snipers hiding in trees. Results were three NVA KIA. Dog then alerted to a platoon size enemy force.
17 Feb	Alerted to enemy sniper in tree. Sniper escaped when fired upon.
3 Mar	Alerted to enemy presence 100 meters to the front. Company moved forward and killed six NVA who were in a rest area.
10 Mar	Alerted to the right flank of a patrol. A squad checked out the alert and found a hut 100 meters distance. Hut contained nine SRICOM light machine guns, one US Cal .30 light machine gun, one US Cal .50 machine gun, three anti-aircraft guns, two field phones and 50 boxes of ammunition.

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b. Tracker Team operations:

From 15 - 27 March a Combat Tracker Team was attached to the division. The team, consisting of 10 personnel and supported by two Labrador dogs, was specially trained in fieldcraft and reading the signs of the trail. It was employed to locate enemy personnel, equipment and bodies. The team is credited with finding five buried NVA bodies, several bunker complexes and miscellaneous equipment. The team was not with the division long enough to evaluate its capability or potential.

c. Man-packed Position Locator:

A man-packed position locator was evaluated. The locator operated on the principle of a pedometer correlated with a compass. The locator corrected itself when deviations from an established forward direction of travel were made, i.e., when the wearer moved in the direction of travel set on the machine, each step was added; when he moved in the opposite of the direction set on the machine, each step was subtracted; tangent movements were added or subtracted in proportion to relative forward movement. Instruction of machine operators and supervision of evaluation was accomplished by a technician from the Limited War Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland. The device was considered unsatisfactory inasmuch as both tested instruments failed to function after a few days operation.

d. XM148, 40mm grenade launcher:

The XM148, 40mm grenade launcher was field evaluated during Operation SAM HOUSTON. All combat battalions received TOE allocations of the weapon. Although evaluation had not been completed by the end of the operation, two known deficiencies of the weapons system were the difficulty in loading under combat condition and fragile sight assembly.

e. XM576, 40mm Multi-Shot Projectile:

This projectile was evaluated and found to be very satisfactory. It was reported that the projectile has sufficient velocity to penetrate the jungle foliage to ranges up to 50 meters. The pattern of the projectile was found to be about three feet at ten meters range. The projectile is recommended as a standard Class V munition.

f. Man-Pack Personnel Detector:

The man-packed personnel detector (MPD) was evaluated and found to be effective under ideal conditions. It was found that it would detect small groups of Montagnards at distances of up to 200 meters; however, there must be at least a 4-5 knot wind and the MPD must always work into the wind. It was found that airborne employment (helicopter-mounted) was effective. The major problem with the detector was that of maintaining it in operational condition; for this reason, preliminary evaluation indicated that the device is marginally satisfactory in its current configuration.

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g. Trace Metal Detection Kits:

Fifteen trace metal detection kits were employed in operations to detect suspected VC. As a result of the employment of these trace metal detection kits, 62 VC were identified. The kit was found to be relatively maintenance free. Operator training poses no problems.

h. CAR-15 Sub-Machine Gun:

The compact, easy to carry CAR-15 Sub-Machine Gun has proved very desirable for use by leaders in the jungle because of the freedom of movement it provides them. The 30 round magazine had proven effective for use on initial contact and 20 round magazines can be used thereafter. Reconno patrols have also found the weapon easier to handle in the jungle.

i. Light Marker, Distress:

This device has proven very effective for marking friendly positions for the conduct of air strikes in dense jungles and for marking landing zones for medical evacuation during the hours of darkness.

j. White Phosphorus grenades: Units have been very successful in using white phosphorus grenades to mark positions under thick jungle canopy during daylight. The hot smoke rises and pierces the canopy; colored smoke does not.

k. "AN/MRC-34 $\frac{1}{2}$ ": To gain a smaller VHF equipment configuration that could be easily helilifted into hard to reach locations in support of rapid reaction forces, the signal battalion fabricated an "AN/MRC-34 $\frac{1}{2}$ ". This was accomplished by dividing an AN/MRC-69 in half and mounting each half on a 3/4 ton truck and trailer.

l. No-Doz missions. No-Doz night tape loudspeaker missions, flown by Air Force C-47 aircraft, were initiated half-way through Operation SAM HOUSTON. The missions flown almost nightly over areas of known enemy troop concentrations were a part of the overall H&I program. The loudspeakers broadcast music, messages to surrender and simulated battle noises to the enemy. Initially the missions met with ground to air fire. Air strikes and artillery fires were placed on the locations from which ground to air fire was received and subsequent missions went unhampered. Complete information on the effectiveness of the missions is not available, but initial reaction appears to indicate the missions were effective.

m. Floating shingles. Psyops leaflets were affixed to numerous blocks of wood, waterproofed and floated down several nearby rivers in an effort to reach areas under VC control. Each leaflet stated in VIETNAMESE "For Peace and Prosperity, Support the Government of VIETNAM". The leaflet went further to instruct the finder to take the leaflet to the nearest FWMAF and collect a five piaster reward. No leaflets have been turned in as yet.

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n. Soil stabilization. Peneprime proved to be very effective in soil stabilization and reduced the dust problem on roads and helicopter pads. Peneprime is most effective when applied on a laterite cap and after the area has been sprinkled with water. Spreading of peneprime was accomplished by one asphalt distributor from a general support engineer battalion and by homemade "Jury rigs" available in many units. The gravity feed homemade unit is slow and inefficient but workable.

o. Use of dozers. D-4 dozers were helilifted into landing zones and forward fire support bases to clear away brush and small trees. The dozer's effectiveness was limited in clearing heavier jungle type vegetation. This deficiency was partially overcome by employing the dozers in pairs. To prepare for the helilift each dozer was rigged as two loads; the dozers, less blades, were lifted by CH-54 Crane; and the blades were lifted by CH-47 Chinooks.

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15. (C) LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Operations

Search Techniques And Security Of Movement

Item: Search techniques and security of movement.

Discussion: The most difficult tactical problem found in fighting the NVA in large areas of difficult terrain is "finding the enemy". That is, finding him without having tactical units shot up and pinned down by automatic weapons and snipers (also armed with automatic weapons) at close range. Our tremendous advantage in firepower permits us to accept combat on his terms if we observe a few basic fundamentals which minimize or preclude conditions where our supporting fires cannot be effectively utilized.

Observation: A tactical unit (company or platoon) moving over difficult, jungle covered terrain must have security elements covering the main body (front, flanks, and rear) at a distance from the main body commensurate with control. Not less than 100 meters is desirable if feasible. When entering areas where observation is greater than 50 meters, this distance should be increased proportionately. When moving over trails, point elements should precede the main body by not less than 200 meters. Normally a fire team should be designated as the point element for a rifle platoon or company. However, two men should precede the remainder of the point element by not less than 50 meters.

Movement by bounds is the most effective and secure method of moving over and searching difficult terrain. A rifle company or platoon establishes a hasty perimeter, then sends out fire team or squad size patrols in all directions to a distance of from 300 to 1,000 meters. Several different search patterns can be used including the cloverleaf, starburst and zig-zag. Plan must also provide for an adequate reaction force and must include provision for rapid reassembly of the command. After searching the initial area, the unit moves, still secured, to another location on its axis of advance and repeats the operation. The distance which patrols search from the unit base will depend on the time element, terrain, and the mission.

Mutual Support

Item: Mutual support between units in search and destroy operations is synonymous with reaction time.

Discussion: In the difficult terrain north of the SE SAN River and west of the NAM SATHAY River, mutual support was frequently provided by keeping infantry companies within from one to three hours (cross-country movement time) of each other. This technique was used for several reasons:

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- a. The enemy was known to be in the area in considerably greater strength (numerically) than we had available.
- b. The enemy had the capability of moving large forces (several regiments) from his sanctuary into our area of operation within a matter of hours.
- c. The enemy had good intelligence of our strength and movements.
- d. The terrain was extremely difficult and overland movement slow.
- e. Few landing zones were available and reinforcement by air was frequently impossible.
- f. NVA tactics were predictable. In almost every instance of major contact, the NVA attempted to ambush, surround, and destroy a platoon or a company size force with an NVA unit of battalion size or larger.

g. Predictable engagements with an enemy on his terms require a preponderance of firepower plus the capability to reinforce within a reasonable period of time if we are to be successful under such circumstances.

In areas where the terrain is more open and LZs are available or can be readily constructed, reaction time is related to airmobility rather than ground mobility. However, the same results are achieved. The requirement is to rapidly support or reinforce small units which gain heavy contact with the enemy. This reaction capability must be related to the enemy and the size of the units involved. For example, if a battalion is searching with platoon size units in an area where contact with enemy battalion size units is expected, reaction time must be reduced. If the searching units are of company size, reaction time may be greater than that required for a platoon.

Observation: In search operations against major (regiment and larger) NVA forces, the ability to support (reinforce) a rifle unit (company or platoon) with a like or larger unit is mandatory. Reaction time is a vital factor. Two rifle companies conducting search and destroy operations within mutual support distance may each be considered a reaction force. In terrain where reaction by air is feasible, the reaction force may be separate from the search and clear force by twenty or more miles - time, not distance, is the criterion.

Patrol Patterns

Item: Varying patrol patterns.

Discussion: The enemy is aware that our patrols never return by the same route. This allows him to move into an area after a patrol has passed without fear of detection. Moreover, he often utilizes patrols of three to five men to trail US units. Patrolling back and forth in zig-zag patterns, covering a specific area and then circling back, has proven effective. The clover leaf pattern is also good and provides good security.

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Observation: Vary patrol patterns and routes so as to occasionally re-search an area. This could result in the elimination of trailing parties or establishing contacts with infiltrated units.

Marking Locations

Item: Marking the location of friendly units.

Discussion: The heavy jungle of the Central Highlands makes locating friendly units from the air very difficult. Recent experience has shown that hand held flares and smoke grenades often fail to penetrate up through the overhead canopy.

Observation: The use of star clusters fired from M79 grenade launchers and strobe lights have proven the most successful methods of accurately identifying the location and limits of the perimeter of friendly units under the jungle canopy.

Landing Zones

Item: Securing Landing Zones.

Discussion: In areas where LZs are limited, it must be assumed that all are hot and mined. The NVA has made a concerted effort to keep all potential LZs under observation by small recon elements and has in some instances implaced command detonated mines in the LZ as anti-helicopter devices.

Observation: When time permits, the best method of securing a LZ is to move a rifle company overland to accomplish the task. The company should secure the LZ by establishing outpost or strong points well out from the LZ (200-500 meters). Timing is important, the remainder of the force to move into a secured LZ should initiate movement as soon as the LZ is declared secure. The NVA is aware of our technique of securing LZs for airmobile movement and may react prior to reinforcement of the securing unit if given adequate time. A second method of securing a LZ without air assault, is the use of a small reconnaissance patrol. The patrol is landed several thousand meters from the proposed LZ. It moves overland to arrive at the LZ a few hours before the first assault elements are scheduled to arrive. The area around the LZ is carefully reconnoitered to a distance of about 500 meters from the LZ. If no enemy are in the area, the patrol members station themselves 200-300 meters from the LZ on the approach and departure routes for the lift aircraft. The assault units move in rapidly without preparation of the LZ. If the patrol sights significant enemy troops in the area, they withdraw, the LZ is prepared by artillery air strikes and rifle troops assault the LZ.

Battalion Fire Bases

Item: Excessive impedimenta at battalion fire bases.

Discussion: In difficult jungle covered terrain, it frequently becomes

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necessary to occupy battalion fire bases for excessive periods (more than one week). The longer a unit remains in a base, the greater the tendency to get comfortable. Artillery and mortar ammunition on hand increases, excessive rations may be stocked, cooking units appear, various items of supply are readily available, extra radio vehicles are frequently airlifted into the base, and even administrative personnel with typewriters may appear. There are three good reasons which demand that impediments in fire bases be limited to essential requirements. First, we increase demands on limited airlift resources; second, we create an unnecessarily profitable target for enemy mortar attacks; and third, when the tactical situation requires an immediate move, we are too heavy to respond with the necessary degree of mobility.

Observation: It is essential that unnecessary impediments be eliminated from battalion fire bases. This can be effectively accomplished by establishing specific limits on the number of CH-47 and UH-1D sorties allocated for the movement of an infantry battalion and its supporting artillery battery. Although the number of UH-1D sorties required will vary with the strength of the rifle companies, the number of CH-47 sorties may be fixed for all units. For example, 17 sorties will move an artillery battery (105) with two radio vehicles and 1,400 rounds of ammunition. One radio vehicle and 1,200 rounds of ammunition is normally adequate. When a unit is evacuating a fire base it should plan to reduce its artillery ammunition and other supplies should be similarly reduced. The infantry battalion's requirements can be easily determined but must always take into consideration the weather, terrain, and enemy capabilities.

Security

Item: Sweeps around defense perimeters.

Discussion: The NVA effectively observes our fire bases, both by ground reconnaissance and by observation of helicopter flight patterns. Other enemy observation includes the direction of movement from the fire bases and frequently movement along trails and other axis. Therefore, it is necessary to daily sweep the area around fire bases. When units move out of a fire base, they should never depart in the direction they intend to follow. For example, a company going on a search operation to the north should leave the fire base to the south, east, or west and circle north when some distance from the fire base. The same principle applies to the rifle company on a search and destroy mission away from the battalion fire base.

Observation: Fire Support Bases should sweep their perimeters out to a distance of 1,000 meters, using varying patrol routes and times, to detect any possible build up of enemy forces in the vicinity. Companies in night locations in the jungle should sweep their perimeters at first light out to a minimum distance of 200 meters to check for enemy infiltration during the night.

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Landing Areas At Fire Support Bases

Item: Helicopter landing areas at fire support bases.

Discussion: When selecting landing zones at fire support bases, primary consideration should be given to the approaches and touch-down point for helicopters. Tents and other equipment should not be placed in the approach or take-off paths. The touch-down point should be well up wind from the lowest barrier and in an area as free from dust and debris as possible. In addition there should be no burning fires in the vicinity of the landing zones that would be affected by the rotor wash from the helicopter.

Observation: The approaches, touch-down points and take-off paths of landing zones at fire support bases should be as free as possible of any obstructions, equipment, dust and debris. Any fires in the vicinity of landing zones should be extinguished by covering with dirt before a helicopter approaches to avoid scattering of flames and sparks.

Night Observation Device/Ground Surveillance Radar

Item: Employment of night observation device (starlight scope) and ground surveillance radar.

Discussion: The starlight scope enables the observer to quickly spot a target, but does not provide accurate distance or direction measurement. The short and medium range ground surveillance radar sets give accurate direction and distance to a target, but are tiring to operate.

Observation: Operation of the starlight scope and radar together permits quick discovery and range sensing of a target. The target is spotted with the starlight scope, then the radar has only to search a narrow area to find it and give quick, accurate determination of distance or direction.

Fire Support And Maneuver

Item: Coordination of fire support and maneuver.

Discussion: It is reemphasized that immediate application of firepower, when significant contact is established, is the decisive factor. When contact is established with the enemy, the commander's immediate emphasis must be on methods of maximizing effective use of all supporting fires available, rather than initially attempting sophisticated fire and maneuver patterns. Tactical maneuver immediately after contact, frequently results in small units being separated and pinned down. Since enemy snipers concentrate on radio operators and leaders, communications may be lost between tactical elements and thus the application of firepower is restricted or even prohibited.

Observation: When firm contact is established with NVA forces in dense jungle terrain, supporting fires must immediately be employed against

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known and suspected enemy positions. After intensive artillery, mortar and air strikes, tactical elements maneuver to determine; the extent of the area occupied by the enemy position/force, effect of supporting fires, additional support required to prevent his withdrawal from the battlefield, and to destroy the remainder of the enemy force. 44

Ground Orientation And Firepower

Item: Ground orientation and the application of firepower.

Discussion: In areas of dense jungle vegetation, exact orientation on the ground is frequently difficult even for the most experienced personnel. Under such circumstances, when contact is made, there may be an unacceptable time delay before supporting fires can be brought to bear on the enemy. To prevent such occurrences when a tactical unit is moving through the jungle, periodically an artillery round should be registered along the unit's axis of movement. In order that the enemy may not follow such movement by observing the fires, it is necessary to place a few H&I rounds throughout the area. With this procedure, when contact is made, artillery fire can be rapidly walked into the enemy position utilizing the last observed or heard registration round.

Observation: Immediate application of firepower, when contact is established, is the decisive factor. Nothing can be left to chance. Ground orientation and artillery registration are prerequisites to the prompt application of firepower. Therefore, orientation should be insured by periodic and judicious registration of artillery.

Heavy Artillery Fires

Item: 175mm defensive fires.

Discussion: 175mm defensive concentrations less than 500 meters from the flanks of a position have proven successful. It is imperative that the unit have adequate overhead protection and that detailed coordination be effected with the firing unit to insure that the gun-target line does not intersect any portion of occupied positions.

Observation: 175mm defensive fires should be included in defensive concentration planning with particular attention given to minimum safety distance and the gun-target line. Fires within less than 500 meters from the flank of a position are feasible in an emergency.

Air Strikes

Item: Employment of pre-planned air strikes.

Discussion: On occasions aircraft have had to be turned back from a pre-planned strike zone. This occurred when friendly units moved into the target areas and secondary target areas were not designated.

Observation: Suitable secondary targets must be planned ahead of time and the FAC briefed in case primary targets cannot be struck.

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Recondo Patrols

#5
Item: Employment of Recondo Patrols.

Discussion: During Operation SAM HOUSTON, an average of seven recondo patrols per day were employed in the division AO. Their invaluable information included: monitoring enemy movement along trails, the location of enemy way stations and defensive positions, ambushing NVA patrols, locating possible landing zones, reconnaissance of B-52 strike areas, and verifying the absence of enemy activity.

Observation: The continued use of recondo patrols is essential in gaining a comprehensive intelligence picture of enemy forces operating within the division AO. The use of recondo patrols for tasks such as observing potential landing zones and the reconnaissance of B-52 strike areas permits economy of force and frees tactical units for other missions.

Individual Soldier's Load

Item: Reduction of the individual soldier's load.

Discussion: It is not uncommon to see a rifle company moving out on an operation with soldiers carrying from 40 to 60 pounds. Not only do they carry the essentials but things "nice to have". Every step in jungle warfare is dangerous and a man's survival frequently depends on his ability to react rapidly. Every pound that a man carries reduces that ability to react to some degree and proportionally increases the exertion of the individual to carry the load. Therefore, commanders must carefully consider each item carried and stipulate each individual's load in light of the unit's mission, the duration of the operation, means of resupply, feasibility of resupply, availability of water, the climate, terrain, and all other relevant factors.

Observation: The individual soldier's load must be tailored to the operation and limited to the essentials. It should include individual weapons (and/or crew served weapon), ammunition, water, food, extra socks, poncho (with liner if appropriate), mosquito repellent, head net, razor and toothbrush. These are the essentials; however, the essentials can be reduced by the use of halazone tablets and local water, jungle rations in lieu of "C" rations, helicopter drop of resupply and simply by the use of imagination and judgement on the part of commanders.

Casualty Evacuation US - NVA

Item: The evacuation of casualties.

Discussion: a. The NVA, either for religious or morale reasons, places great emphasis on retrieving all casualties and bodies from the battlefield. Practically every soldier carries a short rope with a hook on one end for the specific purpose of dragging bodies from the battlefield. If he can't evacuate his seriously wounded, it is believed that he may kill them rather than have such personnel captured.

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b. We have great capability for the evacuation of casualties. In most instances, our casualties are under a doctor's care in a matter of minutes. However, there are times when evacuation becomes a serious problem and must be approached with good judgment.

c. Paragraphs a and b above, present, at times, conflicting requirements. For example, if contact has been established and extends into the night. It may be assumed that our supporting fires have inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy. As long as our fires are continued, he cannot effectively evacuate the battlefield and will suffer additional casualties in his attempt. We, on the other hand, will have also sustained casualties. We cannot evacuate them, at times, without lifting our artillery fire or at least shifting it from part of the battlefield. This of course, also permits the enemy to evacuate casualties. In addition, it is an extremely hazardous operation for a helicopter to land or hover over an area in the jungle with the enemy near.

Observation: Only emergency cases, seriously wounded, should be evacuated from the jungle at night. Artillery fires may be briefly shifted for this purpose but the commander should use automatic weapons and M-79's to cover the battlefield.

(2) Intelligence

NVA Reconnaissance Of US Unit Movements

Item: NVA reconnaissance of US unit movements.

Discussion: Early in SAM HOUSTON, it became apparent that the NVA were using some new and rather skillful procedures in ground observation to keep track of the movement of US units. In general, it was noted that he used at least three methods, either individually or collectively. The first method involved the stationing of small recon parties of four or five men along key trails, ridge lines, streams, and other avenue of approach. When a US unit was observed, one or two members of the recon party would report back to their parent unit to alert it to the approach of US forces. The remaining two or three men would act as snipers to harass and delay the US unit, thus providing additional time for the deployment of the NVA unit. As the US unit moved on, other reconnaissance parties would report in and harass the movement. Such reconnaissance parties were habitually employed near a trail junction or fork so that word could be sent to the parent NVA unit as to the direction taken by the US unit. By this means, if the US unit took a different route, the NVA unit could shift to alternate positions. A second method involved trailing US units with two or three men at a distance of 1,000 to 1,500 meters and reporting the direction of movement by runner or radio. A third method was to use reconnaissance parties of 10-15 men moving parallel to the US unit and keeping track of its movement by dispatching one or two men to observe the movement from the flank and report. This type reconnaissance party normally reported information to its parent unit by radio.

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Observation: All US units moving on S&D operations must assume that their movements are being monitored by NVA reconnaissance elements. Hence, it is essential that all-around security be provided well to the front, flanks and the rear. Based on the first NVA method noted above, whenever a US unit encounters two or three individual snipers, it should adjust its formation, proceed with caution, and take other necessary precautions since the possibilities of early contact are very good. To eliminate elements trailing US formations, it is necessary to drop off a fire team to stay behind in an ambush position until the US unit has advanced 2-3,000 meters beyond. To guard against flanking NVA reconnaissance parties, it is necessary to have some flank security fairly close to the moving units to pick up enemy observers and to utilize larger reconnaissance parties deployed to the flanks at a considerable distance--one to three thousand meters. Another method is to have a unit of comparable size moving parallel and slightly behind the primary formation.

Enemy Tactics

Item: Enemy units hugging friendly fire support bases.

Discussion: All major enemy contactswest of the NAM SATHAY River during Operation SAM HOUSTON were made within 3,000 meters of a friendly fire support base. It is reasonable to assume that the enemy is aware of the 3,000 meter minimum safety limit from friendly troops for the placement of B-52 strikes. Thus the enemy stays within 3,000 meters of a fire support base when he is east of the CAMBODIAN Border to avoid the effects of these strikes.

Observation: The employment of artillery H&I fires in the area out to 3,000 meters from the fire support base help reduce the degree of safety provided the enemy by the enemy's "hugging tactics".

Enemy Snipers

Item: Enemy use of snipers.

Discussion: The enemy's tactics call for the extensive use of snipers. On contact, friendly units have been subjected to intensive and accurate sniper fire from trees. This fire is concentrated on leaders and radio telephone operators. Automatic weapons fired from trees in the jungle are highly effective against unprotected personnel and must be rapidly located and destroyed.

Observation: If distance permits, artillery using VT fuse is very effective against snipers in trees. However, in many instances the use of artillery is not practical, and tactical units must rely on the M-16 rifle and M-79 grenade launcher. These weapons are effective, and the saturation of surrounding trees with their fire will alleviate if not eliminate enemy fire from the trees. The enemy will replace snipers shot from trees so neutralization is a continuing process. Certain personnel (good marksmen) should be

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designated to continuously observe for enemy located in trees. Radio telephone operators should camouflage their radios and once under fire should immediately find good protective cover for himself and the radio.

Enemy Fire Support

Item: Enemy employment of indirect fire support weapons.

Discussion: During Operation SAM HOUSTON, the enemy normally employed his indirect fire weapons in a harassing role against fire support bases and forward command posts, rather than as fire support for a ground attack as he had previously. Mortars were employed, however, against friendly elements when contact was made on search and destroy missions away from the fire support bases.

Observations: Units occupying fire support bases must be dug-in and have overhead cover. Communications vehicles and artillery ammunition should likewise be protected by overhead cover. Units operating away from the fire support bases should stop not later than 1600 hours to permit all personnel to prepare defensive positions with overhead cover if practical.

(3) Logistics

Forward Support Areas

Item: Forward Support Areas.

Discussion: Forward Support Areas (FSA's) operated by the Logistical Command in support of forward brigades should not become heavy and extensive. When they do, they become prime mortar targets and are also difficult to move at the termination of an operation. The stockage level cannot be based solely on a fixed number of days of supply, but must be responsive to the needs of the tactical commander. In one instance during SAM HOUSTON, repeated requests were made to the local logistics commander to begin phasing down his stockage levels because of the impending redeployment of tactical forces away from the area, but despite these requests he was required to maintain a three day level. Consequently, when the tactical units moved out, they had to leave behind tactical troops to secure the area for a period of several days while the excess supplies were back-hauled away.

Observation: The level of stockage must rest with the tactical commander, not with the logistical commander two headquarters removed. Stockage must be phased down by attrition once a termination date is established.

Equipment For Casualty Evacuation

Item: Equipment required for the evacuation of casualties from the jungle.

Discussion: Casualty evacuation from the type jungle found west of the SE SAN River is a difficult and time consuming procedure. Present equipment

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is not adequate to perform the mission. LZs to accommodate dust-off ships cannot be rapidly cut out of the dense jungle. The UH-1D helicopters do not have the power in the light, hot air over the jungle to hover the length of time required to extract a casualty by winch. The CH-47 Chinooks can do the job, but present a large target to enemy fires. The Air Force Husky, the best helicopter for the mission, is not available. Coupled with the problem of securing adequate lift capability is the problem of securing a capsule in which to place the wounded to pull them up through the trees. Present equipment does not fully protect the casualty from further injury when he is being extracted.

Observation: To overcome the difficulties encountered in extracting casualties from the triple canopy jungle two new items of equipment or improvement on current items are required. One is a helicopter that presents the smallest possible target to enemy ground fires and is capable of hovering in this area for the period of time required to extract a casualty. The second item of equipment is a capsule in which a wounded individual can be placed that will protect him from further injury caused by extraction through dense foliage.

Mine Detectors

Item: Mobile, vehicular mounted mine detector.

Discussion: The enemy's extensive employment of mines on LLOCs in the division AO has resulted in almost daily mining incidents with a high rate of equipment loss. The mine detectors presently available require that the operator be dismounted. The length of the routes in the AO, and the necessity for clearing the routes daily result in either the routes not being thoroughly swept or convoys late in arriving at their destination; too often after the hours of darkness.

Observation: A need exists for mobile, vehicular mounted mine detectors to accomplish a more expeditious and more thorough sweep of the LLOCs in the division AO.

Chain Saws

Item: Heavy duty chain saws.

Discussion: The majority of the division's area of operation is covered with thick virgin rain forests. The trees in the AO are primarily hardwood, grow to heights of 100 to 200 feet, and are up to six feet in diameter. Clearing such timber for the construction of landing zones and fire support bases poses a basic problem. The chain saws presently available to infantry and engineer units are too light to cut this timber. In fact, it is very difficult to keep these saws operational. Demolitions can and are used to clear areas in the jungle, but the quantities required make this an impractical solution to the problem.

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Observation: A heavy duty, two man, chain saw is required to efficiently cut the large hardwood trees found in the division's area of operation. This saw in sufficient quantities should be made available to both infantry and engineer units.

Helilift Of Dozers

Item: D-4B dozers for clearing LZ's and FSB's.

Discussion: Many man hours are required to clear an adequate LZ or fire base in jungle covered terrain when only chain saws, axes and demolitions are available for the task. The D-4B dozer can be lifted into areas inaccessible by ground and accomplish or assist in accomplishing such missions in a fraction of the time required to do the job without this equipment.

Observation: That airliftable dozers of the D-4B type be included in the MTOE of units operating in the jungles of the Central Highlands. Lift aircraft must also be made available on a mission basis.

Recondo Patrol Equipment

Item: Special radio for recondo patrol operations.

Discussion: The AN/PRC-25 Radio is presently being used by the recondo patrols, but has proven only moderately satisfactory for this type of operation. Problem areas include weight, transmitting range and line-of-sight transmission limitation. The recondo patrol of necessity must travel with a minimum of equipment and the additional weight of the AN/PRC-25 is considered excessive for their operations. Normally a recondo patrol operates at extended distance from friendly stations and the short range of the AN/PRC-25 often necessitates aerial relay. In addition, the inability of the AN/PRC-25 to transmit over intervening hill masses is disadvantageous. Even when a team is within range of a friendly station, an intermediate hill mass may make communications impossible.

Observation: A need exists for a light weight radio that has the capability of long range transmission without limitation caused by jungle foliage on hill masses.

Combat Rations

Item: Light Weight Combat Rations.

Discussion: The weight and bulk of the issued "C" ration makes it impractical for a company on S&D operations to carry a desired three to five days supply of rations. To supply the necessary rations in the jungle daily helicopter resupply missions are required. This discloses the units position to the enemy, endangers the command, and precludes the possibility of gaining a degree of surprise.

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Observation: A high energy, light weight ration is needed to reduce the weight the troops must carry in the jungle and to decrease the frequency of helicopter resupply missions. Currently available light weight, dehydrated rations are not satisfactory because they require great amounts of water, which is often not available, and are time consuming to prepare.

40mm Grenade Launcher

Item: XM148

Discussion: In heavy contact with enemy units, personnel armed with the XM148 Grenade Launcher had difficulty loading, cocking, and firing the grenade launcher. As a result, only the M16 portion of the weapon was used and the unit lost much of the available fire power.

Observation: The M-79 Grenade Launcher is easier to load, cock and fire than the XM148. Personnel armed with the M-79 have no difficulty placing a heavy volume of fire on the target when under pressure of enemy contact. The M-79 is also lighter and less cumbersome than the XM148.

Convoy Control

Item: Traffic Control on MSR's.

Discussion: When road nets are limited, it is important that all tactical, logistical and administrative convoys make their movement plans known to the route's traffic manager. Scheduling priorities must be determined and traffic control points established at areas of possible congestion.

Observation: All units' early coordination with the traffic manager and adherence to instructions from the TCP's during convoy movements will enable maximum and expeditious use of the division's MSRs.

(4) Other

PSYCOPS

Item: Proper altitude for speaker broadcasts.

Discussion: Interrogation of CHIEU HOI and POWs plus observation by units in the field have led to the conclusion that beyond 1,000 - 1,500 feet, depending upon atmospheric conditions, broadcast messages from U-10 aircraft often become garbled beyond recognition.

Observation: Ground reception can be improved by either more powerful equipment or by lowering the operational altitude. If possible, ground observers should be used to report the clarity of reception to the aircraft.

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Interpreters

Item: Tri-lingual interpreters.

Discussion: Operations in the Central Highlands involve the unique problem of daily contact with both VIETNAMESE and MONTAGNARD civilians. Most interpreters supporting US Forces are VIETNAMESE-English qualified, but cannot communicate with the MONTAGNARD tribes which make up the bulk of the population in the Highlands. Some MONTAGNARDS speak VIETNAMESE but this poses a double translation problem which is seldom satisfactory.

Observation: Tri-lingual (English-VIETNAMESE-MONTAGNARD) interpreters are essential for battlefield interrogation of VMC as well as to assist in operations, such as cordon and search of villages. When interpreter capabilities are limited, vital information may be lost simply because the units cannot communicate with local inhabitants.

b. Recommendations.

- (1) That a vehicular mounted mine detector be developed and issued at the earliest practicable date.
- (2) That air transportable bulldozers be procured and made available for the development of forward fire bases inaccessible by road.
- (3) That two man heavy duty chain saws be procured and issued to both engineer and infantry units in VIETNAM.
- (4) That expedited action be taken to improve present capability of evacuating casualties.
- (5) That a small, light weight, AM radio with a planning range of 60 to 85 kilometers using voice transmission be procured and issued to units employing recondo patrols in their operations.
- (6) That consideration be given to employing in the psychological warfare effort screaming bombs for B-52 strikes, whistling artillery rounds, clandestine operations, such as use of agents to place posters in enemy rear areas and safe havens, and brightly colored balloons riding on the winds.
- (7) That tri-lingual (English-VIETNAMESE-MONTAGNARD) interpreters be trained in sufficient numbers to provide adequate support to units operating in the Central Highlands.
- (8) That the "lessons learned" contained in this report be made available to those individuals and agencies responsible for the training of personnel to be employed in the Republic of VIETNAM.

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16. (C) COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS:

Elements of the 4th Infantry Division have fought previously in the area of the NAM SATHAY-SE SAN River valleys; however, it is important for the reader to fully understand the nature of the terrain.

It is an area of almost continuous jungle with hardwood trees of several varieties up to six or seven feet in diameter and 200-250 feet in height. Where the sunlight can break through the overhead canopy, the jungle floor is covered with thick, dense undergrowth restricting observation to a few meters and making movement extremely difficult. The area represents some of the most difficult jungle terrain in all of Southeast Asia. It is intersected by valleys and mountains with elevations varying from about 500 feet to nearly 6000 feet, presenting additional difficulties to movement and maneuver. Moreover, although there was practically no rainfall during the period of the operation, there were wide variations in temperature. On several occasions, daylight temperatures exceeded 105° whereas nighttime temperatures sometimes dropped as low as 45°. Still further, the period of the operation was near the end of the dry season, and there was very little water available, except in the valley floors, which frequently necessitated that all personnel carry at least a two-day supply of water with them. In the aggregate, it was an area of difficult terrain covered with thick, dense jungle which had considerable effect upon the enemy's tactics as well as our own.

Another highly important point is that the NAM SATHAY-SE SAN areas border on CAMBODIA. There is no doubt here that major NVA elements of up to regimental and division size take advantage of the protective sanctuary of CAMBODIA. They bivouac in areas close to the border and take additional advantage of the difficult mountain and jungle terrain which affords them added concealment and protection. The area of operation is of little economic value in that it has practically no human habitation, and the only road into it is one constructed to support a 4th Infantry Division Forward Fire Support Base. Accordingly, there is little to be gained by the permanent stationing of Free World Military Forces in the area except to engage the NVA when he sallies forth in strength. The NVA, on the other hand, living in the area adjacent to the South VIETNAM-CAMBODIAN border, has the capability to send large numbers of scouting parties into the area and to become thoroughly familiar with every hill, valley, and trail. Hence, when we engage the enemy in this area, he tends to have the initial advantage with respect to knowledge of the terrain. Moreover, the closer the engagements approach the SVN-CAMBODIAN border, the greater opportunity he has to take advantage of its protective sanctuary. He can remain on the CAMBODIAN side of the border in relative safety until such time as an opportune situation presents itself and then move rapidly for a distance of five to six kilometers to engage our forces. His forces can remain in South VIETNAM with the full knowledge that whenever the tide of battle turns against them, they can break contact and again

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seek their sanctuary within CAMBODIA. It is interesting to note that of the 11 major engagements of OPERATION SAM HOUSTON, nine of them occurred within 5000 meters of the CAMBODIAN border.

All reports covering major contacts during the operation were reviewed by senior commanders and staff officers of the division and were discussed with a broad sampling of the personnel who participated in each battle. The principal conclusions which were drawn are as follows:

a. The majority of casualties sustained during SAM HOUSTON resulted from enemy mortar fire rather than small arms fire.

b. In several major encounters, a high percentage of our serious casualties were caused by small arms fire. This is attributed to the fact that contact was so close that neither side could effectively utilize supporting fires.

c. Basically, the tactics used by the enemy in SAM HOUSTON were the same as in PAUL REVERE IV. However, there were significant differences:

(1) During PAUL REVERE IV, most major (battalion size) enemy contacts were attacks on rifle positions (perimeters) and in one instance an attack against a battalion firebase. It is significant to note that these attacks usually occurred in the late afternoon or at dark. In most instances, our units were dug in or at least positions were partially prepared. In contrast, during SAM HOUSTON the majority of contacts were made by our rifle companies while conducting search and destroy operations. The enemy avoided ground attacks against units in prepared positions.

(2) The second variation in enemy tactics is closely related to the first. During both operations the NVA made effective and frequent use of mortar fire--mostly 82mm. During both operations mortar fires were directed against our prepared positions. Albeit, during PAUL REVERE IV, the enemy normally followed up the mortaring of our positions with a ground assault, whereas during SAM HOUSTON he only mortared the positions. In fact, he increased significantly the use of mortar fire on units moving through the jungle without the protection of prepared positions.

(3) The third variation employed by the NVA during SAM HOUSTON was not so much a difference in tactics as a difference in the degree of emphasis. During PAUL REVERE I, II, III, and IV, the NVA used snipers in trees to an increasing degree, from harassing to moderate. However, during SAM HOUSTON this tactic became almost habitual and frequently predominant.

(4) A fourth tactical variation was the enemy's attempt on four occasions to defend previously used LZ's by both mining and direct fire. This tactic is most significant because of the limited number of LZ's available in the difficult terrain.

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During Operation SAM HOUSTON, the combat elements of the brigades were under continual physical strain and mental pressure. The physical strain resulted from the exertion required for the day after day moving and searching through the dense and difficult jungle. Also, at the end of each day, the units on search and destroy operations had to dig in and provide individual shelters with at least one level of sandbags overhead as protection against enemy mortar attacks which were employed extensively. Although nobody objected to this procedure, it required an additional two to three hours hard labor each day. Commanders at all echelons had to use great care in their planning and operations to prevent the troops from getting over-tired and developing a lackadaisical attitude and to insure that they would not be in an exhausted condition when contact was established with the NVA. When the contacts did take place, they were generally sudden, short (one to six hours), and violent. The violence of the contacts combined with a certain feeling of claustrophobia from the dense foliage created a certain degree of tension with individuals and units. The degree varied with the nearness to the border, the enemy situation, and the leadership within the unit. Although strain and pressure were always present, they in no way altered the course of the operation. The important point to note is that they could have deleterious effects and must be monitored closely throughout and at all levels of command.

The performance of all personnel in this operation was uniformly excellent. It speaks well for their fine unit and individual replacement training. These men soon became combat veterans. It would be my judgment that the fighting men being sent to South VIETNAM today are the finest our country has ever produced. SAM HOUSTON also affirmed the fine caliber of leadership we have in our Army in both the noncommissioned and the commissioned officer corps. It was uniformly high at all levels, and the fine leadership of a large segment of our company grade officers portends well for the future of our Army and our Nation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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Nicholas R. Colucia
NICHOLAS R. COLUCIA
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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- 1 - CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf
- 1 - CO, 1st Bn, 35th Inf
- 1 - CO, 2d Bn, 35th Inf
- 2 - CO, 4th Avn Bn
- 2 - CO, 4th Engr Bn
- 2 - CO, 124th Sig Bn
- 1 - ACofS, G1
- 1 - ACofS, G2
- 1 - ACofS, G3
- 1 - ACofS, G4
- 1 - ACofS, G5
- 5 - TACP (ALO), 4th Inf Div
- 25 - CO, 29th Mil Hist Det

UNCLASSIFIED

FRAGO 4-1-67 30 JAN 67

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OPORD 1-67 1 JAN 67

FRAGO 4-1-67 27 JAN 67

FRAGO 7-1-67 11 FEB 67

FLEIKU
DEFENSE
TAOR

DRAGON MOUNTAIN
BASE CAMP

4TH INF DIV
TAOR

OPORD 1-67 1 JAN 67

TFLUAT

FRAGO 8-1-67 19 FEB 67

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INCLOSURE 1

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORTING OFFICER (U)

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Principal commanders and senior staff officers participating in this operation were:

4th Infantry Division Headquarters.

CG	MG	Collins, Arthur S. Jr.	1 Jan 67 to 2 Jan 67
	MG	Peers, William R.	3 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
ADC-A	BG	Walker, Glenn D.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
ADC-B	BG	Ryder, Charles W. Jr.	1 Mar 67 to 5 Apr 67
CofS	COL	McDowell, William D.	1 Jan 67 to 14 Jan 67
	COL	Hiller, Judson F.	15 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
Acting CofS	COL	Farley, Roy W.	1 Jan 67 to 7 Jan 67
	LTC	Morley, Leonard A.	13 Mar 67 to 30 Mar 67
Asst to ADC	LTC	Parr, Bertram L.	25 Jan 67 to 3 Mar 67
ACofS, G1	LTC	Lounsbury, Roy E.	1 Jan 67 to 28 Jan 67
	LTC	Morley, Leonard A.	29 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
Acting G1	MAJ	Wilson, Donald L.	13 Mar 67 to 30 Mar 67
ACofS, G2	LTC	Kitchen, Albert B. Jr.	1 Jan 67 to 14 Jan 67
	LTC	Crizer, Pat W.	15 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
ACofS, G3	LTC	Rosell, Thomas G.	1 Jan 67 to 12 Feb 67
	LTC	Lay, James R.	13 Feb 67 to 5 Apr 67
ACofS, G4	LTC	Richards, William G.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
ACofS, G5	LTC	Braim, Paul F.	1 Jan 67 to 25 Jan 67
	LTC	Allyn, John O.	26 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67

Special Staff, 4th Infantry Division.

AG	LTC	Robinson, Herbert A.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
Div Surg	LTC	Dycaico, Armin G.	" "
IG	LTC	Friedly, Howard W.	" "
SJA	LTC	Schug, Willis E. Jr.	" "
PM	LTC	Kulo, Edwin H.	1 Jan 67 to 6 Mar 67
PM	LTC	Cullen, Victor A.	7 Mar 67 to 5 Apr 67
Fin Off	LTC	Hess, Frank J.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
Chap	LTC	Hett, William R.	" "
Cml Off	MAJ	Henderson, William	" "
Info Off	MAJ	Zenk, Daniel R.	" "

1st Brigade Task Force, 4th Infantry Division.

CO	COL	Austin, John D.	12 Feb 67 to 22 Mar 67
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Inclosure 2

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1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

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CO	COL	Austin, John D.	1 Jan 67 to 11 Feb 67
	COL	Jackson, Charles A.	12 Feb 67 to 5 Apr 67
XO (Add'l dy)	LTC	Lennon, Lynwood	1 Jan 67 to 20 Jan 67
XO	LTC	Simmons, Charles	20 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
S-3	MAJ	Lycocock, Herbert L.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67

2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

CO	COL	Miller, Judson F.	1 Jan 67 to 14 Jan 67
	COL	Adamsen, James B.	15 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
XO	LTC	Wilcox, George L.	1 Jan 67 to 12 Feb 67
	LTC	Rosell, Thomas G.	13 Feb 67 to 3 Mar 67
	LTC	Parr, Bertram L.	4 Mar 67 to 5 Apr 67
S-2	MAJ	Williams, Grady W.	1 Jan 67 to 28 Feb 67
	CPT	Hill, David A.	1 Mar 67 to 5 Apr 67

3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

CO	COL	Shanahan, James G.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
XO	LTC	Ganpon, Timothy C.	3 Mar 67 to 5 Apr 67
S-3	MAJ	Moore, James E. Jr.	1 Jan 67 to 12 Feb 67
	MAJ	Houben, Emil	13 Feb 67 to 5 Apr 67

Division Artillery.

CO	COL	Cutrona, Joseph F.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
XO	LTC	Basich, Vincent W.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
S-3	LTC	Kuckhahn, Karl O.	1 Jan 67 to 14 Feb 67
	LTC	Citrak, Michael	15 Feb 67 to 5 Apr 67

DISCOM.

CO	COL	Boudman, Arthur B.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
XO	LTC	Fellows, Dean	1 Jan 67 to 4 Jan 67
	LTC	McMullin, Thomas L.	5 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
S-3	MAJ	Scofield, Charles F.	1 Jan 67 to 18 Feb 67
	MAJ	Wells, David T.	19 Feb 67 to 5 Apr 67

1st Battalion, 8th Infantry.

CO	LTC	Ise, Harold H.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
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2d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

CO LTC Duquemin, Gordon J. 1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67

3d Battalion, 8th Infantry.

CO LTC Lynch, Thomas P. 1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67

1st Battalion, 12th Infantry.

CO LTC Lay, James R. 1 Jan 67 to 12 Feb 67
LTC Wilcox, George L. 13 Feb 67 to 28 Feb 67
(Acting) MAJ Williams, Grady W. 1 Mar 67 to 2 Apr 67
LTC Wright, Corey J. 3 Apr 67 to 5 Apr 67

3d Battalion, 12th Infantry.

CO LTC Peters, David M. 1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67

1st Battalion, 22d Infantry.

CO LTC Morley, Leonard A. 1 Jan 67 to 25 Jan 67
LTC Braim, Paul F. 26 Jan 67 to 3 Mar 67
LTC Rosell, Thomas G. 4 Mar 67 to 5 Apr 67

1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.

CO LTC Miller, William H. 1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67

1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

CO LTC Kingston, Robert C. 1 Jan 67 to 17 Feb 67
LTC Moore, James E. Jr. 18 Feb 67 to 5 Apr 67

2d Battalion, 35th Infantry.

CO LTC Granger, Clinton E. Jr. 1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67

1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry.

CO LTC Nutting, Wallace H. 1 Jan 67 to 13 Feb 67
LTC Cole, Thomas F. 14 Feb 67 to 5 Apr 67

1st Battalion, 69th Armor.

CO LTC Clark, Clyde O. 1 Jan 67 to 5 Mar 67
LTC Williams, Paul S. Jr. 6 Mar 67 to 5 Apr 67

2d Battalion, 9th Artillery.

CO LTC Holbrook, Bruce 1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67

4th Battalion, 42d Artillery.

CO LTC Parr, Bertram L. 1 Jan 67 to 24 Jan 67
LTC Woods, Jack C. 25 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67

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5th Battalion, 16th Artillery.

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CO	LTC	Citrak, Michael	1 Jan 67 to 14 Feb 67
	LTC	Kuckhahn, Karl O.	15 Feb 67 to 5 Apr 67

6th Battalion, 29th Artillery.

CO	LTC	Lennon, Lynwood B.	1 Jan 67 to 28 Feb 67
	LTC	Nettles, Elritt N	1 Mar 67 to 5 Apr 67

4th Aviation Battalion.

CO	LTC	McDowell, William R.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
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4th Engineer Battalion.

CO	LTC	Schulz, Gerhard	1 Jan 67 to 28 Feb 67
	LTC	Delbridge, Norman G. Jr.	1 Mar 67 to 5 Apr 67

4th Medical Battalion.

CO	LTC	Peard, William G.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
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4th Supply and Transportation Battalion.

CO	LTC	Jacques, Jasper F.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
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124th Signal Battalion.

CO	LTC	Keefer, Loren R.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
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704th Maintenance Battalion.

CO	LTC	Kouchoukos, Paul C.	1 Jan 67 to 21 Feb 67
	LTC	Gilbanks, William R.	22 Feb 67 to 5 Apr 67

3d Supply and Transportation Battalion (Prov).

CO	MAJ	Housand, Andrew H.	1 Jan 67 to 17 Feb 67
	MAJ	Rutledge, Robert R.	18 Feb 67 to 5 Apr 67

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Infantry Division.

CO	CPT	Zwicker, Gary L.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
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4th Administration Company.

CO	CPT	Terrell, Edmund D.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
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4th Military Police Company.

CO	CPT	Sullivan, Gerald A.	1 Jan 67 to 5 Apr 67
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Inclosure 2

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TASK ORGANIZATION (C)

63

1. (C) Detached units.

a. 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division was under operational control of I Field Force, VIETNAM from 010001Z January 1967 until 190817H February 1967 and participated in Operation ADAMS in PHU YEN and PHU BON Provinces during that period.

b. 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division remained attached to the 25th Infantry Division.

c. 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry was attached to the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division from 010001Z January 1967 to 190730H February 1967 at which time the battalion became a separate task force under operational control of I Field Force, VIETNAM. The battalion remained OPCON to IFFV participating in Operation ADAMS in PHY YEN Province until 030001 April 1967.

d. No other major units were detached from the division.

2. (C) Attached units.

a. 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division was attached to the division by authority of General Order Number 704, Headquarters United States Army, VIETNAM, 16 February 1967 effective 13 February 1967.

b. 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.

c. Company C, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry.

d. Team 8, 41st Civil Affairs Company.

e. Team 9, 41st Civil Affairs Company.

f. 374th Radio Research Company.

g. 33d Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog).

h. 50th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog).

3. (C) Task Organization for Combat.

a. Control Headquarters was Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division.

b. Task organization for Operation SAM HOUSTON as set forth in OPORD 1-67, effective 010001Z January 1967.

2d Bde, 4th Div

HHC, 2d Bde
2-8 Inf
1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf

3d Bde, 25th Div

HHC, 3d Bde
1-14 Inf
1-35 Inf
2-35 Inf

Inclosure 3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4-42 Arty
D/5-16 Arty (OPCON)
Plat Co B, 4th Engr Bn
Det CA Tm #8 41 CA Co

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav (-)
C/3-4 Cav
Rifle Co 3/25 Inf
CA Det G5 Sect

Div Arty

HQB, Div Arty
6-14 Arty (OPCON)
5-16 Arty (-) GS

DISCOM

HHC & Band
4th Admin Co
704th Maint Bn
4th Med Bn
4th S&T Bn

2 Tk Co 69th Armor
2-9 Arty (atch) 64
C/5-16 Arty (OPCON)
B/3-6 Arty (OPCON)
D/65 Engr Bn
40th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Div
43d Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det
1-69 Armor (-)
4th Engr Bn (-)
4th Avn Bn (-)
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th Div TACP
4th MI Det (-)
41st CA Co (-)
124th Sig Bn
4th MP Co

c. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 1-1-67 effective
030100Z January 1967.

2d Bde, 4th Div

2-8 Inf
1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
4-42 Arty
D/5-16 Arty (OPCON)
A/6-14 Arty (OPCON)
237 RADAR (OPCON)
Plat Co B, 4th Engr Bn
Det CA Tm #8, 41st CA Co

TF 2-35 Inf

2-35 Inf (-)
Co, 1-69 Armor
C/2-9 Arty
B/3-6 Arty

Div Arty

HQB, Div Arty
6-14 Arty (OPCON)
5-16 Arty (-)

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav (-)
C/3-4 Cav (-)
Co, 2-35 Inf
Co, 1-69 Armor
Co, 2/4 Bde
3-6 Arty (-) DS
CA Det, 4th Div

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div
1-69 Armor (-)
4th Engr Bn (-)
4th Avn Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn
43d Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det
4th MI Det (-)
Tm #1, 41st CA Co (-)
4th Div TACP
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th MP Co

Inlosure 3

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CONFIDENTIAL

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d. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 3-1-67 effective 241400H January 1967.

65

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

HHC, 2d Bde
2-8 Inf
1-12 Inf (-)
4-42 Arty (-)

3d Bde, 25th Div

(OPCON 1st Cav Div (M))
HHC
1-14 Inf
1-35 Inf

Div Arty

D/5-16 Arty GSR 4-42 Arty
6-14 Arty (-) GS
A/6-14 GSR 4-42 Arty

DISCOM

No Change from
OPORD 1-67

Div Troops

1-22 Inf
C/4-42 Arty DS
2-35 Inf
B/1-69 Armor (-)
C/2-9 Arty DS
B/3-6 Arty (OPCON)
1-69 Armor (-)
C/1-12 Inf (-)
C/5-16 Arty DS
1-10 Cav (-)
C/2-35 Inf
C/3-4 Cav
Plat B/1-69 Armor
3-6 Arty (-) DS
4th Avn Bn (-)
4th Engr Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn
HHC 4th Inf Div
41st CA Co (-)
4th MI Det
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th KP Co
43d Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det

e. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 4-1-67 effective 290700H January 1967.

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

HHC, 2d Bde
2-8 Inf
1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
4-42 Arty
Plat, Co B, 4th Engr Bn
Det CA, Tm #8, 41 CA Co

TF 1-8 Inf

1-8 Inf
A/6-29 Arty

TF 2-35 Inf (-)

2-35 Inf (-)
1 Co, 1-69 Armor
C/2-9 Arty

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav
1 Co, 1-69 Armor
5-16 Arty (-) DS
C/3-6 Arty
C/5-16 Arty

Div Arty

6-14 Arty
D/5-16 Arty

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div
4th Engr Bn (-)
4th Avn Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn
33d Inf Plt (Sct Dog)

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TF 1-69 Armor (-)

1-69 Armor (-)
C/3-4 Cav (eff 281100H Jan 67)
1 Co, 2-35 Inf
3-6 Arty (-) DS

43d Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det
Plat, C/1-22 Inf
4th MI Det (-)
41st CA Co (-)
4th MP Co

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DISCOM

No change from OPORD 1-67

f. Task organization as provided in FRAGO 4-1-67 (para 4 above) was changed by Msg cite 289-67-C, 30 January 1967, subj: Change to FRAGO 4-1-67 (SAM HOUSTON) (U). The message changed the artillery organization and was effective upon receipt except where indicated otherwise.

B/7-13 Arty: Atchd 3-6 Arty eif 281200H January.

TF 1-8 Inf

A/6-29 Arty: Atch
C/5-16 Arty: Reinf A/6-29 Arty

2d Bde, 4th Div

4-42 Arty: Atch
A/6-14 Arty: Atch
D/5-16 Arty GSR
4-42 Arty

TF 1-69 Armor (-)

5-16 Arty (-) DS
B/3-6 Arty
B/7-13 Arty

TF 1-10 Cav

3-6 Arty (-): DS

TF 2-35 Inf

Not changed

g. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 5-1-67 effective 311000H January 1967.

2d Bde, 4th Div

HHC, 2d Bde
1-8 Inf
A/6-29 Arty
2-8 Inf
1-12 Inf (-)
1-22 Inf
4-42 Arty
Plat, Co B, 4th Engr Bn
Det, CA Tm #8, 41st CA Co

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav (-)
C/1-69 Armor
3-6 Arty (-) DS

Div Arty

HHC, Div Arty
6-14 Arty GS
D/5-16 Arty GSR 4-42 Arty
C/5-16 Arty reinf A/6-29 Arty

TF 2-35 Inf

2-35 Inf (-)
A/1-69 Armor
A/2-9 Arty

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div
43d Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det

Inclosure 3

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TF 1-69 Armor

1-69 Armor (-)
C/3-4 Cav (-)
B/2-35 Inf
5-16 Arty (-) DS
B/3-16 Arty OPCON 5-16 Arty
B/7-13 Arty OPCON 5-16 Arty

Plat, C/1-12 Inf
4th Engr Bn (-)
4th Avn Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th MP Co
4th Div TACP
4th MI Det (-)
41st CA Co (-)

DISCOM

No change from OPORD 1-67

h. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 6-1-67 effective
040300H February 1967.

2d Bde, 4th Div

No change from FRAGO 5-1-67

TF 2-35 Inf

2-35 Inf
A/2-9 Arty

Div Arty

HHC, Div Arty
6-14 Arty GS
A/6-14 Arty GSR 4-42 Arty
B/6-14 Arty GS
C/6-14 Arty GS
D/5-16 Arty GSR 4-42 Arty
D/5-16 Arty reinf A/6-29 Arty

TF 1-69 Armor

1-69 Armor (-)
C/3-4 Cav (-)
Inf Plat, 1-12 Inf
3-6 Arty (-) DS
B/3-6 Arty
B/7-13 Arty OPCON 3-6 Arty (-)

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div
43d Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det
4th Engr Bn (-)
4th Avn Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn
Inf Plat, 1-12 Inf
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th Div TACP
4th MI Det (-)
41st CA Co (-)
4th MP Co

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav (-)
A/1-69 Armor
C/1-69 Armor
1 Inf Plat, 1-12 Inf
3-6 Arty (-) DS
A/3-6 Arty
C/3-6 Arty

DISCOM

No change from OPORD 1-67

i. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 7-1-67 effective
111500H February 1967.

2d Bde, 4th Div

HHC, 2d Bde
1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf

Div Arty

HHC, Div Arty
6-14 Arty GS
A/6-14 Arty GSR 4-42 Arty

Inclosure 3

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4-42 Arty
Plat, Co B, 4th Engr Bn
Det, CA Tm #8, 41st CA Co
Tml Tm 2B/124 Sig Bn
2 Plat, 4th MP Co
3d Det, 374th RRC
Cl Sec C/4th Med Bn
Contact Tm, 704th Maint Bn
Bde Avn Sec
FAC Party

TF 1-8 Inf

1-8 Inf
A/6-29 Arty

TF 2-35 Inf

No change from FRAGO 6-1-67

TF 1-69 Armor

1-69 Armor (-)
C/3-4 Cav (-)
Inf Plat, 1-8 Inf
3-6 Arty (-) DS
 B/3-6 Arty
 B/7-13 Arty (OPCON)

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav (-)
Co, 1-69 Armor (OPCON)
Co, 1-69 Armor (OPCON)
Inf Plat, 1-8 Inf
3-6 Arty (-) DS
 A/3-6 Arty
 C/3-6 Arty

j. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 8-1-67, DTG 190400H
February 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Div

HHC, 1st Bde
2-8 Inf
2-35 Inf
6-29 Arty (Prov) DS
 A/4-42 Arty
 C/2-9 Arty
Co A, 4th Engr (-)
Co 1-8 Inf (OPCON)
Tm #9 41st CA Co
Tml Tm 1B/124th Sig Bn

68
B/6-14 Arty GS
C/6-14 Arty GS
C/5-16 Arty GS
D/5-16 Arty GSR 4-42 Arty

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div
4th Engr Bn (-)
4th Avn Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn (-)
43d Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det
Inf Plat, 1-8 Inf
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th Div TACP
4th MI Det (-)
41st CA Co (-)
4th MP Co (-)

DISCOM

HHC & Bend
4th Admin Co
704th Maint Bn (-)
4th Med Bn (-)
4th S & T Bn (-)

TF 1-69 Armor

1-69 Armor (-)
C/3-4 Cav (-)
Plat, 1-8 Inf
B/3-6 Arty DS
 B/7-13 Arty (atch 3-6 Arty)

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav (-)
Co, 1-69 Armor (OPCON)

inclosure 3

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

69

1st Plat, 4th MP Co
C1 Sec B/4th Med Bn
Contact Tm D/704th Maint Bn
Bde Avn Sec
F&C Party

Co, 1-69 Armor (OPCON)
Plat, 1-8 Inf
3-6 Arty (-) DS

Div Arty

2d Bde, 4th Div

HHC, 2d Bde
1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
4-42 Arty (Prov) DS
B/4-42 Arty
C/4-42 Arty
237th Radar (OPCON)
Plat, Co B, 4th Engr Bn
Tm #8, 41st CA Co
3d Det, 374th RRC
2d Plat, 4th MP Co
C1 Sec, C/4th Med Bn
Contact Tm, C/704th Maint Bn
F&C Party

HHC, Div Arty
6-14 Arty (-) GS (OPCON)
A/6-14 Arty GSR 4-42 Arty
(Prov)
5-16 Arty (-)
A/5-16 Arty GS
C/5-16 Arty GS
D/5-16 Arty GS
Plat/B/6-29 Arty
235th Radar (OPCON)
Plat, 1-8 Inf

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div
4th Engr Bn (-)
4th Avn Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn (-)
43d Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det
41st CA Co (-)
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog) (-)
4th Div T&CP
4th MI Det
4th MP Co (-)

TF 1-8 Inf

1-8 Inf (-)
5-16 Arty (Prov) DS
A/6-29 Arty
B/6-29 Arty

DISCOM

No change from FRAGO 8-1-67

TF 3-8 Inf

3-8 Inf
C/6-29 Arty DS

k. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 9-1-67 effective 211810Z February 1967.

DELETE: TF 1-8 Inf

1st Bde, 4th Div

ADD: 1-8 Inf (-)
A/6-29 Arty

TF 3-8 Inf

ADD: 5-16 Arty DS
B/6-29 Arty (OPCON)
C/6-29 Arty (OPCON)

l. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 10-1-67 effective 260600H February 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Div

HHC, 1st Bde

2d Bde, 4th Div

HHC, 2d Bde

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1-2 Inf
2-8 Inf
2-35 Inf
6-29 Arty (Prov) DS
A/6-29 Arty
A/4-42 Arty (OPCON)
C/2-9 Arty (OPCON)
Co A, 4th Engr Bn (-)
Flamethrower Plat, HHC 4th Engr Bn
Tm #9, 41st CA Co
Tml Tm 1B/124th Sig Bn
1st Plat, 4th MP Co
Cl Sec, B/4th Med Bn
Contact Tm D/704th Maint Bn
Bde Avn Sec
FAC Party

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav (-)
Co 1-69 Armor (OPCON)
Co 1-69 Armor (OPCON)
Plat 3-8 Inf
3-6 Arty (-) DS
B/7-13 Arty

Div Arty

6-14 Arty (-) DS
A/6-14 Arty
5-16 Arty (-) GS
C/5-16 Arty
D/5-16 Arty

DISCOM

No change from FRAGO 8-1-67

1-12 Inf
1-22 Inf
4-42 Arty (Prov) DS
B/4-42 Arty
C/4-42 Arty
1st Slt 29th Arty (OPCON)
Co B 4th Engr Bn (-)
Tm #8, 41st CA Co
3d Det, 374th RBC
2d Plat, 4th MP Co
Cl Sec, C/4th Med Bn
Contact Tm C/704th Maint Bn
FAC Party

TF 3-8 Inf

3-8 Inf (-)
5-16 Arty (Prov) DS
B/6-29 Arty (OPCON)
C/6-29 Arty (OPCON)

TF 1-69 Armor

1-69 Armor (-)
C/3-4 Cav (-)
Plat 3-8 Inf
3-6 Arty (Prov) DS
B/3-6 Arty
A/5-16 Arty (OPCON)

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div
4th Engr Bn (-)
4th Avn Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn (-)
43d Cml Det
29th Mil Hist Det
41st CA Co (-)
33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th MP Co (-)
4th HI Det
4th Div TAGP

m. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 12-1-67 effective 082300H March 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Div

HHC, 1st Bde
1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf (eff 9 Mar 67)
2-35 Inf

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav (-)
Co 1-69 Armor
C/3-4 Cav (-)
Plat, 2-8 Inf

Inclosure 3

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

6-29 Arty (Prov) DS

A/6-29 Arty

C/6-29 Arty

C/2-9 Arty (OPCON)

Co A, 4th Engr Bn (-)

Flamethrower Plat, HHC, 4th Engr Bn

Tml Tm, 1B/124th Sig Bn

1st Plat, 4th MP Co

Cl Sec, B/4th Med Bn

Contact Tm, B/704th Maint Bn

2d Bde, 4th Div

HHC, 2d Bde

1-12 Inf

1-22 Inf

4-42 Arty (Prov) DS

B/4-42

C/4-42

1st SLT 29th Arty (OPCON)

Co B, 4th Engr Bn (-)

3d Det, 374th RRC

2d Plat, 4th MP Co

Cl Sec, C/4th Med Bn

Contact Tm, C/704th Maint Bn

DISCOM

No change from FRAGO 8-1-67

3-6 Arty (-) DS

B/7-13 Arty

TF 2-8 Inf (eff 9 Mar 67)

2-8 Inf (-)

5-16 Arty (Prov) DS

B/6-29 Arty (OPCON)

A/4-42 Arty (OPCON)

TF 1-69 Armor

1-69 Armor (-)

Plat 2-8 Inf

3-16 Arty (Prov) DS

B/3-6 Arty

A/5-16 Arty (OPCON)

Div Arty

HHC, Div Arty

6-14 Arty GS

5-16 Arty GS

Plat, 2-8 Inf

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div

4th Engr Bn (-)

4th Avn Bn (-)

124th Sig Bn (-)

43d Cml Det

29th Mil Hist Det

33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)

4th MI Det

4th Div TACP

41st CA Co (-)

4th MP Co (-)

n. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 14-1-67 effective 172330H March 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

HHC, 1st Bde

2-8 Inf (-)

3-8 Inf

2-35 Inf

Plat A/1-69 Armor

6-29 Arty (-)

C/2-9 Arty (OPCON)

Co A, 4th Engr Bn

Tml Tm 1B/124th Sig Bn

1st Plat, 4th MP Co

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

HHC, 2d Bde

1-12 Inf

1-22 Inf

1-8 Inf

4-42 Arty (-)

A/6-29 Arty (OPCON)

Co B, 4th Engr Bn (-)

Tml Tm 1C/124th Sig Bn

2d Plat, 4th MP Co

Cl Sec, C/4th Med Bn

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Cl Sec B/4th Med Bn
Contact Tm, D/704th Maint Bn
FAC Party

Contact Tm, C/704th Maint Bn
FAC Party

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TF 1-69 Armor

1-69 Armor (-)
3-6 Arty (Prov) DS
B/3-6 Arty
A/5-16 Arty (OPCON)
Plat C/2-8 Inf

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav (-)
C/3-4 Cav
B/1-69 Armor
Plat C/2-8 Inf
3-6 Arty (-) DS
A/4-42 Arty (-) (OPCON)

Div Arty

6-14 Arty GS
5-16 Arty (-) GS
C/5-16 Arty GS Reinf 4-42 Arty
D/5-16 Arty GS Reinf 6-29 Arty
1-92 Arty GS (approx 1 April)
Plat C/2-8 Inf

Div Troops

No Change from FRAGC 12-1-67

DISCOM

No change from FRAGO 8-1-67

o. Task organization as changed by FRAGO 16-1-67 effective
281600H March 1967.

1st Bde, 4th Div

HHC, 1st Bde
1-12 Inf
1-8 Inf
3-8 Inf
6-29 Arty DS
B/4-42 Arty (OPCON)
C/4-42 Arty (OPCON)
237th Radar (OPCON)
Co, 2-8 Inf
C/3-4 Cav (-)
Co A, 4th Engr Bn (-) DS
Tml Tm B, 124th Sig Bn
1st Plat, 4th MP Co
FAC Party

2d Bde, 4th Div

HHC, 2d Bde
2-8 Inf (-)
1-22 Inf
Plat, B/1-69 Armor
4-42 Arty (-) DS
C/2-9 Arty (OPCON)
A/3-6 Arty (OPCON)
1 Slt, 29th Arty (OPCON)
Co B, 4th Engr Bn (-)
Sqd Co D, 4th Engr Bn (-)
(OPCON on order)
Tml Tm 1 C/124th Sig Bn
2d Plat, 4th MP Co
FAC Party

TF 1-69 Armor

1-69 Armor (-)
3-6 Arty (-) DS
B/3-6 Arty
A/5-16 Arty (OPCON)
Plat, C/2-8 Inf

TF 1-10 Cav

1-10 Cav (-)
C/3-6 Arty DS

Div Arty

6-14 Arty GS
5-16 Arty GS
D/5-16 Arty GSR 6-29 Arty

Div Troops

HHC, 4th Inf Div
4th Avn Bn (-)
4th Engr Bn (-)
124th Sig Bn (-)
43d Cml Det
29th AIR Hist Det

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CONFIDENTIAL

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1-92 Arty GS (1 April)
D/6-40 Arty GS (1 April)
235th Radar (OPCON)

33d Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
50th Inf Plat (Sct Dog)
4th MI Det
4th MP Co (-)
4th Div TACP
41st CA Co (-)

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Inclosure 3

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CONFIDENTIAL

100530 MAR
9 B-52's

090630 MAR
9 B-52's

CONFIDENTIAL

221640 FEB
6 B-52's

030700
MAR
9 B-52's

B-52 STRIKE AREAS
MAP 1:50,000 SERIES L7014 (FOR SHEET NRS, SEE PARA 3,
COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT-SAM HOUSTON).

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010600
MAR
9 B-52's

270600 JAN
6 B-52's

200547 FEB
3 B-52's

190547 FEB
3 B-52's

200545 FEB
6 B-52's

290435 MAR
6 B-52's

181800 FEB
6 B-52's
130200 MAR
6 B-52's

281330 MAR
6 B-52's

171345 FEB
6 B-52's

162015 FEB
6 B-52's

01
0630
APR
6 B-52's

17
1930
FEB
6 B-52's

162015 FEB
6 B-52's

020530
APR
6 B-52's

240810 FEB
6 B-52's

302100 JAN
5 B-52's

25
0300
FEB
6 B-52's

161000 FEB
3 B-52's

250630 JAN
6 B-52's

070530 FEB
6 B-52's

160445 FEB
3 B-52's

110830 MAR
6 B-52's

270415 FEB
6 B-52's

100530 MAR
9 B-52's

090630 MAR
9 B-52's

2


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221640 FEB
6 B-52's

050700
MAR
9 B-52's

B-52 STRIKE AREAS

MAP 1:50,000 SERIES L7014 (FOR SHEET NRS, SEE PARA 3,
COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT-SAM HOUSTON).



010600
MAR
9 B-52's

270600 JAN
6 B-52's

131800 FEB
6 B-52's
130700 MAR
6 B-52's

072545 MAR
6 B-52's

171345 FEB
6 B-52's

01
0630
APR
6 B-52's

17
1930
FEB
6 B-52's

281330 MAR
6 B-52's

112015 FEB
6 B-52's

040045 FEB
6 B-52's
182015 FEB
6 B-52's

102530
APR
6 B-52's

302000 JAN
9 B-52's

25
0500
FEB
6 B-52's

240200 FEB
6 B-52's

160000 FEB
3 B-52's

250630 JAN
6 B-52's


070530 FEB
6 B-52's

160445 FEB
3 B-52's


110830 MAR
6 B-52's


270415 FEB
6 B-52's

TOP VIEW



SIDE VIEW





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MINING INCIDENTS (C)

<u>DTG</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE VEH</u>	<u>CAS</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
041030 Jan	20 Eng Bn*	ZA 170153	5 Ton	Neg	Light
041215 Jan	B/1-10	YA 765213	APC	2 US WIA	Heavy
041300 Jan	20 Eng Bn*	ZA 195195	5 Ton	Neg	Heavy
091240 Jan	C/3-4	ZA 120512	APC	2 US WIA	Moderate
181628 Jan	HQ 1-69	YA 902387	Tank	Neg	Moderate
150800 Feb	A/2-8	YA 678535	½ Ton	2 US WIA	Heavy
150855 Feb	A/2-8	YA 885530	M106	Neg	Moderate
160855 Feb	1-10	YA 930281	2½ Ton	Neg	Moderate
160906 Feb	1-10	YA 927280	2½ Ton	Neg	Moderate
160920 Feb	1-10	YA 926279	2½ Ton	Neg	Moderate
161050 Feb	1-10	YA 904270	2½ Ton	Neg	Moderate
181050 Feb	A/1-69	YA 902364	Tank	Neg	Light
181143 Feb	C/1-69	YA 908386	Tank	Neg	Light
181145 Feb	C/1-69	YA 904383	Tank	Neg	Light
201200 Feb	2-8	YA 687532	APC	Neg	Moderate
201215 Feb	2-8	YA 687532	5 Ton	3 US WIA	Heavy
220008 Feb	A/1-69	YA 923270	Tank	Neg	Light
220015 Feb	A/1-69	YA 923270	Tank	Neg	Light
220015 Feb	A/1-69	YA 923270	Tank	Neg	Light
230831 Feb	A/1-69	YA 956288	Tank	Neg	Moderate
272050 Feb	C/1-69	YA 934443	Tank	Neg	Light
281035 Feb	1-10	YA 933444	Tank	Neg	Light
020734 Mar	C/1-69	YA 942435	Tank	Neg	Light
071115 Mar	2-8	YA 738504	APC	Neg	Light

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<u>DTG</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE VEH</u>	<u>C/S</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>	80
071115 Mar	2-8	YA 738504	5 Ton	Neg	Light	
081735 Mar	B/1-10	YA 935285	5 Ton	Neg	Light	
101238 Mar	C/3-4	YA 901424	Tank	Neg	Light	
111435 Mar	C/3-4	YA 903186	Tank	Neg	Light	
111650 Mar	1-10	YA 898407	VTR	Neg	Light	
120145 Mar	1-10	YA 898408	VTR	Neg	Light	
130930 Mar	1st Log Cmd*	ZA 147475	2½ Ton	Neg	Light	
141240 Mar	2-35	YA 848420	APC	Neg	Light	
141600 Mar	2-35	YA 687530	½ Ton	Neg	Light	
151443 Mar	C/3-4	YA 898407	Tank	Neg	Light	
151443 Mar	C/3-4	YA 898407	Tank	Neg	Light	
151820 Mar	2-8	YA 684531	APC	Neg	Light	
180745 Mar	B/1-69	YA 930282	Tank	Neg	Light	
201515 Mar	A/1-69	YA 713522	Tank	Neg	Light	
201405 Mar	2-35	YA 713522	2½ Ton	Neg	Light	
230730 Mar	C/3-4	YA 955441	Tank	Neg	Light	
230730 Mar	C/3-4	YA 935442	APC	Neg	Light	
230845 Mar	B/1-69	YA 999299	Tank	Neg	Light	
261122 Mar	HQ 2 Bde	YA 927280	2½ Ton	Neg	Light	
261715 Mar	B/1-10	YA 920269	Tank	Neg	Light	
281510 Mar	B/1-69	YA 933283	Tank	Neg	Light	
290815 Mar	6-29	YA 784470	3/4 Ton	2 US WIA	Heavy	
290830 Mar	C/6-29	YA 782470	3/4 Ton	Neg	Moderate	
010905 Apr	Recon 2-8	ZA 086252	APC	Neg	Moderate	
021044 Apr	HQ 4 Engi	YA 940287	Dozer Tank	Neg	Moderate	

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<u>DTG</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE VEH</u>	<u>CAS</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
021125 Apr	Recon 2-8	ZA 098270	APC	Neg	Light
040710 Apr	C/3-4	YA 899393	APC	Neg	Moderate
040735 Apr	C/3-4	YA 899395	Tank	Neg	Light
041320 Apr	HQ 3-8	YA 766219	5 Ton	Neg	Heavy

TOTAL INCIDENTS: 53

*NOTE: Units not OPCON to 4th Inf Div.

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
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150800 FEB 1/4 TON
141600 MAR 1/4 TON
201215 FEB 5 TON
201200 FEB APC
151820 MAR APC

201425 MAR 2 1/2
201515 MAR TANK

071115 MAR APC
071115 MAR 5 TON

13



290830 MAR 3/4
290815 MAR 3/4

150155 FEB TK

CONFIDENTIAL
MINING INCIDENTS
MAP 1:50,000 SERIES L7014
(FOR SHEET NRS SEE PARA 3, COMBAT
AFTER ACTION REPORT-SAM HOUSTON)

281035 FEB TK
230730 MAR APC
272050 FEB TK
230730 MAR TK
020734 MAR TK

141240 MAR APC

101238 MAR TK
120145 MAR VTR
111650 MAR VTR
151443 MAR TK
151443 MAR TK
040735 APR TK
040710 APR APC

181627 JAN TK
181143 FEB TK
181435 MAR TK
181145 FEB TK
181050 FEB TK

161050 FEB 2 1/2

230831 FEB TK
021044 APR DOZER TANK
081735 MAR 5 TON
201310 MAR TK
180745 MAR TK
160855 FEB 2 1/2
261122 MAR 2 1/2
160906 FEB 2 1/2
160920 FEB 2 1/2
220008 FEB TK
220015 FEB TK
220015 FEB TK
261715 MAR TK

041215 JAN APC
041320 APR 5 TON

TAB A to INCLOSURE 7
CONFIDENTIAL

TK
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S
IES L7014
PARA 3 (COMBAT
PORT- SAM HOUSTON)

091240 JAN APC

130930 MAR 2K

281035 FEB TK
230730 MAR APC
272050 FEB TK
230730 MAR TK
010734 MAR TK

08 MAR TK
145 MAR VTR
00 MAR VTR
043 MAR TK
043 MAR TK
0735 APR TK
0710 APR APC
027 JAN TK
0143 FEB TK
0435 MAR TK
01145 FEB TK
0060 FEB TK

230845 MAR TK

230831 FEB TK
021044 APR DOZER TANK
081735 MAR 5 TON
281310 MAR TK
180745 MAR TK
160855 FEB 2 1/2
261122 MAR 2 1/2
160906 FEB 2 1/2
160920 FEB 2 1/2
220008 FEB TK
220015 FEB TK
220015 FEB TK
261715 MAR TK

021125 APR APC

010905 APR APC

ENCLOSURE 7
NTIAL

10
20
041030 JAN 5 TON (2A170153)
041300 JAN 5 TON

2

CONFIDENTIAL

MINES EVACUATED OR DESTROYED (C)

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<u>DTG</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE MINE</u>	<u>DEST/EVAC</u>	<u>ADDNL CHARGE</u>
191345 Jan	YA 903387	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
110907 Feb	YA 943037	1 US Claymore	E	
110907 Feb	YA 943037	2 US A P	D	
151130 Feb	YA 685530	5 Chicom MIAI	D	1/2 lb TNT
161230 Feb	YA 603547	4 Chicom MIAI	E	
161230 Feb	YA 603547	1 Unk A P	E	
171130 Feb	YA 675495	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
181415 Feb	YA 904384	5 Chicom MIAI	D	
181415 Feb	YA 904384	1 Chicom MIAI	E	8-10 lbs C-3 or C-4
181215 Feb	YA 904388	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
201200 Feb	YA 687550	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
201201 Feb	YA 687551	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
221436 Feb	YA 938285	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
221750 Feb	YA 954274	1 Chicom MIAI	D	6 lb TNT
231345 Feb	YA 954299	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
021030 Mar	YA 942435	2 Chicom MIAI	D	
021030 Mar	YA 942435	1 Chicom MIAI	E	2.6 lb TNT
051545 Mar	YA 899394	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
051635 Mar	YA 900389	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
051720 Mar	YA 903387	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
051730 Mar	YA 903384	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
061505 Mar	YA 904380	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
071115 Mar	YA 738504	1 Chicom MIAI	D	
131845 Mar	ZA 114464	1 US M-15 A T	D	
141305 Mar	YA 683530	2 Unk A T	D	

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<u>DYG</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>TYPE MINE</u>	<u>DEST/EVAC</u>	<u>ADDNL CHARGE</u>	86
151410 Mar	YA 900444	1 Unk A T	D		
161620 Mar	YA 901427	1 Unk A T	D		
181245 Mar	YA 760408	4 VC Claymore	D		
181245 Mar	YA 760408	2 US Claymore	D		
181245 Mar	YA 760408	1 Grenade Mine	D		
181245 Mar	YA 760408	1 Grenade Mine	E	Satchel Charge	
210840 Mar	YA 902422	2 Chicom MIAI	D		
211015 Mar	YA 695534	1 Unk	D		
211115 Mar	YA 695533	2 Chicom MIAI	D		
220740 Mar	YA 902403	1 Chicom MIAI	D		
250745 Mar	YA 687531	1 Unk	D		
260730 Mar	YA 901431	1 Chicom MIAI	D		
021000 Apr	ZA 099270	2 Chicom MIAI	D	Unk size booster	
031000 Apr	YA 929282	1 Chicom MIAI	D		
040830 Apr	YA 899396	1 Chicom MIAI	D	Booby Trapped	
040845 Apr	YA 898403	1 Chicom MIAI	D		
040900 Apr	YA 898406	1 Chicom MIAI	D		
040945 Apr	YA 898406	1 Chicom MIAI	D		
040958 Apr	YA 901421	1 Chicom MIAI	D		
051225 Apr	ZA 089519	1 Chicom MIAI	E		

TOTAL MINES 66

Total Destroyed 56

Total Evacuated 10

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201201 FEB (6-D)
201200 FEB (6-D)

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MINES EVACUATED & DESTROYED
MAP 1:50,000 SERIES L7014
(FOR SHEET NRS, SEE PARA 3, COMBAT
AFTER ACTION REPORT- SAMHOUSTON)


250746 MAR (1-D)
251106 MAR (1-D)
251105 MAR (1-D)
181130 FEB (5-D)
141305 MAR (2-D)

97

161230 FEB (5-R)
(YA607530)

071106 MAR (1-D)

171130 FEB (1-D)



151410 MAR

260730 MAR

210840 MAR

161620 MAR

040958 APR

040845 APR (1)

040900 APR (2)

220740 MAR

040830 APR (1)

051545 MAR (1-D)

051635 MAR (1-D)

191316 JAN

181215 FEB

051506 APR

181415 FEB

181245 MAR (1-E)(1-D)

051720 MAR (1)

051730 MAR (1)

NOTE:
NOT DEPICTED ON OVERLAY
110907 FEB YA943037(1-2)(1-2)

LEGEND:
(E)-EVACUATED
(D)-DESTROYED

TAB A to INCLOSURE 8

CONFIDENTIAL

D

COMBAT
HOUSTON


051225 APR
(1-D)

131845 MAR (1-D)

- 151410 MAR (1-D)
- 021030 MAR (1-E)(1-D)
- 260730 MAR (1-D)
- 210840 MAR (8-D)
- 161620 MAR (1-D)
- 040958 APR (1-D)
- 040845 APR (1-D)
- 040900 APR (2-D)
- 220740 MAR (1-D)
- 040830 APR (1-D)
- 051545 MAR (1-D)
- 051635 MAR (1-D)
- 191315 JAN (1-D)
- 181215 FEB (1-D)
- 051605 MAR (1-D)
- 181415 FEB (1-E)(5-D)

2

- 051720 MAR (1-D)
- 051730 MAR (1-D)



- 231345 FEB (1-D)
- 031000 APR (1-D)
- 221346 FEB (1-D)
- 221760 FEB (1-D)

021000 APR (2-D)

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MORTAR ATTACKS (C)

<u>DTG</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>RDS</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAS</u>
032015 Jan	2-4 Fwd CP	YA 845453	40	82mm	12 WIA
061945 Jan	A/2-35	BR 209525*	12	82mm	Neg
141700 Feb	2-4 S-5 CP	AR 227380*	2	82mm	Neg
142230 Feb	2-4 Fwd CP	YA 850455	40	82mm	9 WIA
150707 Feb	C/1-12	YA 608543	22	82mm	Neg
150745 Feb	B/1-12	YA 610601	3	82mm	Neg
161350 Feb	C/2-8	YA 675495	70	60/82mm	Contact (see Incl 10.)
172250 Feb	1-12	YA 603547	50	60mm	Neg
181050 Feb	A/1-69	YA 902364.	4	60mm	Neg
201940 Feb	A/1-69	ZA 110271*	100	82mm	Neg
211730 Feb	B/2-8	YA 689593	60	82mm	Contact (see Incl 10)
220008 Feb	A/1-69	YA 923270	10	82mm	Neg
220155 Feb	B/2-8	YA 689593	40	82mm	1 KIA, 27 WIA
221850 Feb	1-22 FSB	YA 613602	15	82mm	Neg
232250 Feb	A/2-35	YA 660514	30	82mm	Neg
022145 Mar	1-12 FSB	YA 603547	50	82mm	2 KIA, 2 WIA
030131 Mar	1-12 FSB	YA 603547	40	82mm	Neg
031025 Mar	B/1-12	YA 590622	40	82mm	2 WIA
031310 Mar	A/1-12	YA 580616	15	82mm	Neg
040830 Mar	C/3-4	BR 172519*	3	82mm	Neg
091840 Mar	1-22 FSB	YA 613602	60	82mm	1 WIA
121405 Mar	1-22 FSB	YA 613602	62	82mm	14 WIA
120952 Mar	A/2-35	YA 658486	30	60mm	Neg
131917 Mar	2-35 FSB	YA 675536	45	60mm	Neg

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<u>DTG</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>RDS</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CAS</u>
130107 Mar	1-22 FSB	YA 613602	109	82mm	3 WIA
132300 Mar	LZ 3T	YA 850455	100	82mm	47 WIA
140105 Mar	1-22 FSB	YA 610600	32	82mm	Neg
140436 Mar	2-35 FSB	YA 676537	80	60/82mm	24 WIA
140715 Mar	C/3-8	YA 654472	6	60mm	Neg
140120 Mar	LZ 3T	YA 850455	230	82mm	1 KIA, 13 WIA
160340 Mar	A/3-8	YA 686476	10	82mm	Neg
160918 Mar	B/1-12	YA 758386	2	82mm	Neg
162100 Mar	1-12 FSB	YA 757386	60	82mm	10 WIA
201020 Mar	1-69	BR 075396*	6	60mm	Neg
211535 Mar	C/2-35	YA 680560	32	82mm	Contact (see Incl 10.)
211930 Mar	2-35 FSB	YA 675533	30	82mm	Neg
211845 Mar	A/2-35	YA 66576	6	82mm	Neg
212100 Mar	A/2-35	YA 665576	50	82mm	Neg
220610 Mar	A,C/2-35	YA 683567	30	82mm	Neg
240140 Mar	A/2-35	YA 676563	60	82mm	Neg
040410 Apr	1-12 FSB	YA 757386	10	82mm	Neg

TOTAL NUMBER ROUNDS RECEIVED: 1641

*Locations not shown on overlay.

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L031025 MAR (40)82
L0310 MAR (15)82

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221850 FEB (15)82
091840 MAR (60)82
121405 MAR (62)82
13407 MAR (09)82
150745 MAR (18)82
160105 MAR (22)82

211730 FEB (60)82
220155 FEB (40)82

MORTAR ATTACKS
MAP 1:50,000 SERIES
(FOR SHEET NOS, SEE PARA 3)
ACTION REPORT - SAM

24845 MAR (4)82
212105 MAR (60)82

220610 MAR (30)82
240140 MAR (60)82
211505 MAR (32)82

022145 MAR (50)82
030131 MAR (40)82
172200 FEB (60)82
150707 FEB (22)82

131917 MAR (45)60
140436 MAR (25)60/82
211930 MAR (30)82


232250 FEB (30)82

161350 FEB (70)60/82

120952 MAR (30)60

160340 MAR (10)82

140715 MAR (6)60



NOTE: LOCATIONS NOT SHOWN ON OVERLAY

DTG	LOCATION	NO RDS	TYPE
061945 JAN	BR 207625	(12)	82 MM
141700 FEB	AR 227360	(2)	82 MM
220008 FEB	YA 729284	(10)	82 MM
201940 FEB	ZA 110271	(100)	82 MM
040830 MAR	BR 172817	(3)	82 MM
201020 MAR	BR 076396	(6)	60 MM

NOTE: TOTAL RDS REFLECTED ON THE OVERLAY: 164 60/82 MM

160918 MAR (2)82
040410 APR (10)82
162100 MAR (60)82

TAB A TO INCLOS
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MORTAR ATTACKS
MAP 1:50,000 SERIES L7014
(FOR SHEET NRS, SEE PARA 3, (OMBAT AFTER
ACTION REPORT-SAM HOUSTON)

211730 FEB (60) 82
220185 FEB (60) 82

MAR (6) 82
25 (30) 82

220610 MAR (30) 82

20140 MAR (60) 82
211535 MAR (32) 82

31917 MAR (45) 60
40436 MAR (35) 60 82
211930 MAR (30) 82

FEB (30) 82

61330 FEB (70) (60) 82

MAR (30) 60

160340 MAR (10) 82

MAR (6) 60

142230 FEB (40) 82
132300 MAR (100) 82
140180 MAR (22) 82
1032015 JAN (40) 82

2


OVERLAY
TYPE
82 MM
82 MM
82 MM
82 MM
82 MM
60 MM

THE OVERLAY: 1641 60/82 MM

140715 MAR (2) 82
090410 APR (10) 82
163100 MAR (40) 82

TAB A TO INCLOSURE 9
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181050 FEB (4) 60



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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS (C)

c. Operations. The following is a chronological summary of combat operations conducted by division during Operation SAM HOUSTON. Significant contacts are illustrated at inclosure 11.

1 January. During the New Year truce, the division conducted local reconnaissance and prepared for future operations.

2 January. Division units continued patrolling activities and 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry began security operations along route 509, 19 west and 14B. 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry commenced movement to Hammond Airfield.

3 January. The 2d Brigade CP located at YA850455 was hit with approximately 40 82mm mortar rounds during a 15 minute period. Twelve soldiers were wounded, 22 vehicles were damaged and two individual weapons were destroyed. The 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division completed movement to Hammond Airfield and came under OPCON of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM).

4 January. A squad from Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received 10-15 rounds of mortar fire west of New PLEI DJERENG. One mining incident on route 19 west resulted in two US WIA.

5 January.

6 January. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry received 12 rounds of enemy mortar fire at BR299525. One hospital building (empty), 62 huts and 51 bunkers were destroyed by artillery and air strikes.

7 January. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry assisted a VIETNAMESE radio station under ground attack by providing supporting fires. The 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry captured six VCS and 7300 pounds of rice. The 1st Battalion, 69th Armor received five rounds of friendly artillery fire at YA794518 resulting in nine US WIA. The division base camp went on an alert status in conjunction with an enemy mortar attack on Camp Holloway. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was airlifted to AR796466 to aid in the defense of Camp Holloway.

8 January. Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry located 11 tons of rice at YA974335.

9 January. Three tons of rice were found at YA9735. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry received two mortar rounds at BR190570 resulting in three US WIA. A base camp patrol apprehended 27 detainees at AR806405.

10 January. Riot control agents (RCA) were used to contaminate caves at YA693536. The base camp reaction platoon working with Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry captured 15 detainees during a search of four villages (AR778430, AR773418, AR812534, and AR785443).

11 January.

12 January. The 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry located five tons of rice.

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13 January.

14 January.

15 January.

16 January. Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry discovered a VC/NVA hospital site consisting of 45 huts at YA685538.

17 January.

18 January.

19 January. One helicopter from the 4th Aviation Battalion received small arms fire at ZA172586, causing one US KIA, three US WIA and damage to the helicopter's hydraulic system.

20 January. Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received small arms fire at ZA100520. An enemy complex of eight foxholes and machine gun emplacements surrounded by punji stakes was destroyed near ZA154267. Company C, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor destroyed five bunkers at YA913358 and one bunker at YA914361.

21 January.

22 January.

23 January. A Civilian Irregular Defense Group Company operating with the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor located two rice caches totaling 2200 pounds.

24 January. Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry provided armed helicopter support to the PHU NHON area with action resulting in two VMC KIA. Other elements of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry located a 1000 pound rice cache at ZA003331.

25 January. A helicopter crashed at ZA025326 from mechanical failure resulting in two US WIA.

26 January. 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry moved from TUY HDA by air to the 4th Division area of operation on 26 January.

27 January. Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry destroyed seven huts and captured 2500 pounds of rice.

28 January.

29 January.

30 January.

31 January.

1 February. A 4th Aviation Battalion OH-23 aircraft received

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ground fire vicinity YA738248 and YA552230, wounding the observer in the shoulder.

2 February. Aero-rifle platoon, Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry conducting a search and clear operation located 400 pounds of rice vicinity ZA038452.

3 February. At 2250 hours, a report was received that Special Forces camp at DUC CO was having internal problems with contact erupting between US and ARVN Special Forces elements. One tank platoon deployed to a standby location approximately five kilometers east of DUC CO on Highway 19 west. A principal staff officer, this headquarters, and a senior officer from II Corps (ARVN) sent to DUC CO to take charge and restore order. Platoon size patrol 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with three NVA vicinity YA691530 resulting in the capture of one NVA and one AK-47. The same patrol located a base camp area, vicinity YA684523, containing approximately 50 huts and 30 bunkers. All were destroyed.

4 February. A patrol from Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry discovered and destroyed 20 bunkers vicinity YA683537. Base camp reaction platoon conducted search and clear operation in village at AR877364 and apprehended three VMCS and one informer. Six bunkers at YA565517 were destroyed by air strikes.

5 February. 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry discovered and destroyed a tunnel complex with barbed wire entanglements at YA899445. Air strikes in support of division operations destroyed 16 huts and 15 bunkers.

6 February. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry on a search and destroy mission destroyed 32 bunkers and two huts at YA718399. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry on a search and destroy mission located and destroyed 50 bunkers at YA951082 and 25 bunkers at YA964105. Also at the latter location they destroyed 200 pounds of rice, 50 pounds salt and six huts. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry patrol received sniper fire resulting in one US WIA. Base camp perimeter received small arms fire from 0125 to 0400 hours.

7 February. Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry destroyed 10 bunkers at YA960100. They also destroyed 10 bunkers with overhead cover and 200 rounds 7.62 machine gun ammunition vicinity YA906105, and five huts vicinity YA935076. Air strikes in support of division operations destroyed eight bunkers and three huts.

8 February. Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry destroyed 50 huts in vicinity of YA687544.

9 February. Division helicopter crashed vicinity of YA714384, no injuries, but damage unknown. 2d Brigade recondo made contact at YA587561 with an unknown size force; one US WIA. Reconnaissance Platoon, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry being landed at YA714384 sustained eight WIA's while jumping from helicopters. Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry located and destroyed 20 foxholes, 10 with overhead cover.

10 February. A 2d Brigade recondo patrol received small arms and

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automatic weapons fire at YA579524. Fire was returned; results were three NVA KIA; two US WIA.

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11 February. Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry destroyed 30 huts at YA925055.

12 February. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry and Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry OPCON to 2d Brigade moved across the NAM SATHAY River at YA642561.

13 February.

14 February. At 2230 hours 2d Brigade Forward CP at YA850455 received 70 mortar rounds resulting in nine WIA.

15 February. At 0630 hours Company C, 1st Battalion 12th Infantry made squad size sweeps out from the perimeter of their fire support base. The sweeps on the northern side of the perimeter met negative resistance, however, the sweep to the southeast and the sweep to the southwest met heavy automatic weapons fire approximately 100 meters from the perimeter. The two squads began withdrawing back toward the perimeter. One returned without difficulty, the other was pinned down in a ravine for an hour before it was able to move back inside the perimeter. Artillery and air strikes were called into the area. These had to be brought in closer as the enemy kept moving towards the perimeter in spite of heavy small arms and machine gun fire. During the morning 40-50 mortar rounds were received, but caused no damage. In the same period, several attacks were made on the perimeter from the south and southwest with the enemy advancing to within 30 meters of the bunkers occupied by Company C.

At 1330 hours, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry (-) began reinforcement with the two remaining rifle companies. As the aircraft approached the landing zone, they received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire. Eventually, eight ships were able to land approximately two squads of Company B, but all received hits as they lifted out of the landing zone. The two squads from Company B and a squad from Company C began a sweep to the south and southwest of the perimeter, and made heavy contact. By this time the rest of Company B had landed and moved out of the perimeter to link up with the composite platoon and continue the sweep. They too were hit by a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire. Company B soon had two platoons pinned down and cut off from the perimeter.

Company A and the battalion CP accompanied by the 81mm and 4.2 inch mortars completed their lift into the LZ by 1720 hours. Company A was immediately sent out to assist Company B. Company A formed a corridor and Company B began evacuating their dead and wounded back to the perimeter. The 81mm mortars provided close support for Company A with the 4.2 inch mortars providing blocking fires to the south and west. After much fierce fighting, heavy use of supporting fires and the cover of darkness; the two companies were able to break contact and move into the perimeter; closing by 2000 hours. Air and artillery were employed to prevent the enemy from sweeping the battle area.

A sweep of the area on the 16th discovered 113 NVA KIA (BC),

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four NVAC WIA, 30 AK-47's, six SKS rifles, eight B-40 rocket launchers, a large quantity of field gear.

US losses were 12 KIA and 32 WIA.

1st Battalion, 22d Infantry helilifted into new fire support base at YA613602 and received sniper fire resulting in one US WIA.

16 February. 4th Aviation Battalion UH-1D craft received damaging ground fire and was forced to land at 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry's fire support base. Base camp patrol fired upon by snipers; reaction platoon committed in support of patrol and apprehended nine detainees. Four mining incidents on route 19 west.

Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry. At 1245 hours, the 1st platoon made contact with an unknown size enemy force at YA672502. As the platoon returned fire and maneuvered, the enemy force, larger than initially estimated, attempted to outflank the platoon. The platoon leader reorganized his forces into a perimeter and called for artillery. Because of the noise and thick vegetation, he was unable to adjust the artillery by sound or sight, but was able to talk gunships in close to his perimeter for close support. The enemy fires were very intense with a preponderance of automatic weapons fire, many sniper positions and effective mortar rounds.

The company (-) from their night location moved aggressively through harassing sniper fire to reinforce the 1st platoon. Close in artillery and air fires were called. The company formed a corridor and withdrew to more advantageous ground to the rear.

Shortly, after the establishment of the new perimeter, the enemy, using the dense foliage for concealment, attempted to crawl close to the perimeter and throw grenades. They also employed B-40 rockets and at least four heavy machine guns.

At this time, approximately 1545 hours, the NVA appeared to become confused, misoriented, and lost much of their momentum. This was due in a large part to the extremely close air support and the heavy volume of small arms fire used against the massed attacks. The M-16 rifle and M79 cannister round proved highly effective at such close ranges.

The enemy casualties were 114 KIA (BC) and an additional 200 NVA were estimated as casualties.

Friendly casualties were 23 KIA and 21 WIA.

Approximately the same time at YA598615, Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was moving west with one squad out as point. The point made contact with an enemy force that was apparently moving east. The point squad deployed and soon became pinned down by a heavy volume of automatic weapons fire.

The undergrowth in this area was extremely dense. The enemy took advantage of this and deployed numerous accurate snipers in the trees and

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undergrowth very close to Company A's position.

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Company A organized a defensive perimeter and began using close artillery support and air strikes including CBU and naplam. A heavy volume of fire was placed on sniper's positions as soon as they were determined.

Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry moved toward Company A's perimeter and its point squad made contact about 250 meters out. The companies linked up and the enemy appeared to break contact. A sweep of the battle area resulted in further contact with a large number of snipers. Air and artillery were used. The enemy appeared to withdraw to the northwest. The results of this contact were 33 NVA KIA; two light machine guns, two SKS and six AK-47's captured. Friendly losses were 20 KIA and 21 WIA.

17 February. Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry patrolling south of the fire support base found one NVA WIA, 15 bunkers and blood trails indicating numerous casualties from engagement on the 15th. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, while placing defcons on their night position, received one friendly round resulting in one US KIA and three US WIA. 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry's fire support base received 60 rounds of mortar fire. Two OH-23 aircraft, while conducting visual reconnaissance of B-52 strike area at YA568588, were forced down by ground fire and burned. Attempt to helilift a rescue platoon to the scene was aborted because of darkness. The result was four US MIA.

18 February. Rescue task force was inserted at crash site of two UH-23's and found two KIA's in the burned aircraft and one WIA. One survivor had left the area to look for water and could not be located when task force was extracted. Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry on search and destroy mission found 15 NVA KIA, seven AK-47's, and one machine gun resulting from engagement on 16 February. There were three mining incidents on route 14B.

19 February. 1st Brigade Headquarters began movement from TUY HOA to New PLEI DJERENG YA850455. Division TAC CP moved to same vicinity and became operational. 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry recondo patrol made contact with three NVA resulting in three NVA KIA.

20 February. Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry on a search and destroy operation located an enemy weapons cache in a hut at YA684469 including three 60mm mortars, four French light machine guns, and ammunition. Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry located three NVA KIA from previous action while patrolling in vicinity of the battalion fire support base. Forward base of Company A, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor received 60-100 rounds of mortar fire but with negative damage or casualties. A UH-1D helicopter during a helilift of a platoon of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry had an accident on landing resulting in four US WIA. Two mining incidents on route 509 resulting in two US WIA.

21 February. 1st Brigade completed airlift from TUY HOA to New PLEI DJERENG requiring a total of 75 C-130 sorties.

The 2d Platoon, Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, conducting a routine sweep of the area east of the company night perimeter at YA691592,

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came upon a well used trail. Approximately the same time the 4th platoon sweeping the west side came upon the same trail. The 2d platoon was instructed to follow the trail to the east and the 4th platoon to the west. Two squads from 3d platoon were sent to reinforce the 2d platoon and two squads from the 1st platoon were sent to reinforce the 4th platoon.

The 2d platoon followed the trail and came to within 25 meters of what later proved to be the rear of an NVA heavy weapons company position. The platoon was fired upon from the front and from one flank. The platoon returned the fire with all organic weapons. The machine gunners moved forward and placed the enemy positions under heavy fire allowing the rest of the platoon to disengage and withdraw through the two squads of the 3d platoon which had set up a base of fire. Both platoons withdrew back to the company perimeter. Artillery defensive concentrations were fired close to the company perimeter.

The NVA surrounded the perimeter. Snipers in trees, supported by mortars and protected by small arms and automatic weapons, caused heavy casualties. With no prepared positions, the company was pinned down by the accurate sniper fire. However, enemy reconnaissance probes were repulsed and at least 15 enemy snipers were killed. M79 grenade launchers firing the shotgun round were very effective against the snipers.

Enemy losses were: 11 NVA KIA (BC), 32 NVA KIA (visual observation) and an estimated 30 more NVA either KIA or WIA due to ground action. Additionally, 75-100 NVA were probably killed or wounded by air and artillery.

US losses were: Seven KIA and 34 WIA.

22 February. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry received 30 mortar rounds inside the perimeter at 0210 hours resulting in one US KIA and 27 US WIA. One mining incident occurred on highway 19 West.

23 February. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry located an estimated battalion-size base camp vicinity YA680606 with 345 bunkers and 25 foxholes. The complex was destroyed. Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry on a search and destroy operation located an estimated battalion-size base camp at YA676487. Thirty bunkers, each having overhead cover and fighting positions, were discovered and destroyed. One mining incident occurred on highway 19 West.

24 February. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry on a search and destroy operation located 19 bunkers, 1000 pounds of rice and three NVA bodies in shallow graves at YA693598.

25 February. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry conducting a search and destroy operation in conjunction with a MIKE FORCE from C Detachment, USSF PLEIKU located an estimated company size base camp at YA 698595 containing two NVA bodies in shallow graves, 25 bunkers, and 40 pounds of rice.

Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry moved out from fire support base 501 located at YA602547 on a search and destroy mission toward

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hill 770, YA583535. At approximately 1030 hours, the point man fired on an NVA, thus springing an attempted ambush (L shaped formation). The company halted and, as the fire increased to their front, withdrew to the high ground to their rear and formed a defensive perimeter. The NVA began moving around Company A's left flank in an attempt to deny them the hill. At the same time the 3d platoon became involved in an intensive fire fight on the left. Enemy snipers were used extensively. Through the use of mortars and air strikes, the sniper fire on the right was practically eliminated. The intensive sniper fires persisted on the left. 100

Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, northwest of Company A, moved towards Company A and closed at 1500 hours.

Under heavy sniper fire, a landing zone was cut. After two vain attempts by a CH-47, two OH-23's were able to evacuate the wounded. One helicopter was disabled by striking its tail rotor on a tree.

The enemy personnel losses were 48 KIA (BC) and three WIA/CIA, all NVA.

Friendly losses were one KIA and 30 WIA.

26 February. Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted search of battle area and located three NVA KIA, three NVA WIA, 12 AK-47's, four SKS rifles, four light machine guns, one B-40 rocket launcher. Platoon from Company A, 1st Battalion 12th Infantry made contact with unknown size force; two US WIA. Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged and killed two NVA. One mining incident resulting in four US WIA.

27 February. Reconno patrol, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with 12 NVA and exchanged fire resulting in two NVA KIA; the reconno patrol was extracted. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received one KIA and two WIA when a friendly 105mm artillery round landed short. One mining incident occurred on route 509.

28 February. One short artillery round firing in support of Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry resulted in two WIA. One 81mm mortar round fell short while firing a defcon for the Reconnaissance Platoon, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry wounding one individual. One mining incident on route 509.

1 March. Artillery firing in support of Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry had one round explode pre-maturely in a tree resulting in one US KIA.

2 March. 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry's fire support base received 50 mortar rounds resulting in two US KIA and two US WIA. 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry had six WIA as a result of a tree burst fired by friendly artillery vicinity Z110275. An Armor/Infantry team from 1st Battalion, 69th Armor located and destroyed 12 bunkers and eight huts.

Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry moved in a column formation, and came under heavy sniper fire. The company was pinned down by the

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fires coming from a heavily wooded hill. Use of artillery and air support allowed the company to maneuver the battalion reconnaissance platoon wide to the left while the company laid down a heavy volume of fire on the enemy position. The attack was successful and the enemy withdrew to the west.

Enemy losses were two NVA KIA, but several large blood trails indicated more were killed or seriously wounded. Documents indicated the unit was the 19th Mortar Company of the 32d Regiment.

Friendly losses were two WIA

3 March. 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry recondo patrol found nine NVA bodies approximately three weeks old at YA675505. 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery located at 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry's fire support base had a premature detonation on a round 40 feet from the muzzle of an 8 inch gun resulting in one KIA and five WIA. Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry killed one NVA during a combat assault into a landing zone at YA761549. 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry's fire support base received approximately 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force at YA590622. During the night sniper fire and 15 rounds of mortar fire resulted in two US WIA. Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry attacked a suspected enemy mortar location. They were engaged by the enemy with small arms fire and received 15 rounds of mortar fire. The enemy broke contact and withdrew; results were 10 NVA KIA, one US KIA, and nine US WIA.

4 March.

5 March. Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry engaged 12 NVA resulting in two NVA KIA.

6 March.

7 March. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry located 500 pounds of rice at YA766583. Two mining incidents occurred on highway 509B.

8 March. During a helilift of 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry a UH-1D crashed due to mechanical failure injuring five US and destroying the aircraft. One mining incident occurred on route 19 West.

9 March. 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received 60 82mm mortar rounds at their fire support base resulting in one WIA.

10 March. Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found enemy weapons and equipment cache at YA603655. It contained nine French, one German 7.9mm, and one US cal.50 machine guns, two EE-8 telephones, three cases of documents and books, and ammunition of various calibers. Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found and destroyed a bunker complex consisting of 40 bunkers at YA603655. Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found 1500 pounds of rice in a hut. A platoon from 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found a large bunker and living complex at YA598589; 160 bunkers and 205 huts were destroyed. One mining incident on route 14B.

11 March. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry located a

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company size defensive position with 25 bunkers. Engineers in support of 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry removed a mine field at YA903386. One individual stepped on a mine resulting in one KIA and one WIA. Two mining incidents occurred on route 14B. 102

12 March, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received 52 rounds of 82mm mortar fire in four separate attacks resulted in 14 US WIA. One mining incident occurred on route 14B.

At 0910 hours, Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry was moving southwest to make a reconnaissance of a B-52 strike area from a night location at YA663489 when they contacted two NVA on a parallel trail which were engaged and killed. Soon thereafter the company received heavy automatic weapons fire from bunkers very close to their front. Attempts to maneuver soon resulted in the company being pinned down. Each platoon had been allowed to approach and move inside a bunker complex before the enemy opened fire.

Company C was lifted to YA655476 and began moving to the northwest to set up a blocking position southwest of Company A.

Company B was lifted to a landing zone at YA648501 by 1530 hours. They moved towards Company A. About 1800 hours, the company came under intense fire from close range. The enemy had allowed the company to move to within 10 meters before opening fire. The company commander maneuvered his platoons on line and gained fire superiority. By this time the company was 150 meters from Company A. Company B formed a perimeter. During this time the enemy, employed a preplanned mortar barrage hitting the right flank platoon of the company. Company B was directed to fall back, evacuate its casualties, and set up a new perimeter.

Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry had moved up to within 300 meters of Company A by 2200 hours when Company C came under intense automatic weapons fire. Further attempts to link resulted in finding an isolated squad of Company A. The confusion and darkness caused the company to establish a perimeter and wait for morning.

The NVA withdrew during the night.

The next day sweep was made by all three companies of the battle area. Three bunker complexes were discovered having several connecting trails.

Enemy casualties were 55 KIA (BC) and estimated 200 casualties total.

Friendly casualties were: Co A - six KIA, 13 WIA; Co B - seven KIA, 26 WIA; Co C - five WIA; HHC - one KIA, one WIA; 52d Aviation Battalion - one WIA.

13 March, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry conducted a combat assault at 0645 hours and set up blocking positions at YA649508, north of 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry's contact on 12 March. At 1130 hours, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry was helilifted into blocking positions at YA730505, southwest of the area of 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry's contact. Search of battle area by the 2d

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Battalion, 35th Infantry resulted in finding 27 NVA KIA. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry's fire support base, located at YA676535, received 60 mortar rounds; negative casualties. 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry's fire support base received 121 rounds of 82mm mortar fire during six separate daylight attacks; results 3 US WIA.

14 March. 3T complex received an estimated 310 rounds of 82mm mortar in an attack that lasted from 132300 hours until 140200 hours. An undetermined number of B-40 rocket rounds and 75mm recoilless rifle rounds were received. From 0655 to 0700 hours 3T again received an estimated 30 rounds of 82mm mortar; results of both attacks were one KIA and 47 WIA. A sweep of the perimeter resulted in finding 75mm recoilless shell casings and two NVA KIA with C-4 tied around their waists. Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received 80 rounds of 82mm mortar fire in two separate attacks resulting in 24 WIA. 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry fire support base received three separate mortar attacks totaling 26 rounds of 82mm mortar. Two mining incidents on 509B resulting in two US KIA and one US WIA.

On the morning of 13 March Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was sent out of the fire base with the mission to locate the enemy mortar position.

At night fall the company halted. During the night, mortars were heard leaving tubes to the northeast. The next morning the company began moving toward the northeast. The company became heavily engaged and two platoons were pinned down after attempts to maneuver. After heavy fighting and with much difficulty the company was able to form a perimeter and call in artillery, air and mortar fires. The enemy broke contact late in the afternoon and withdrew.

Enemy casualties were 29 NVA KIA (BC), and an estimated 25 NVA KIA were removed from the battle area by the enemy before the area could be searched.

Friendly casualties were 16 KIA and 30 WIA.

15 March. Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry located 11 NVA KIA within a bunker complex at YA674504. Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry located 12 NVA KIA at YA674504, in the vicinity of their 12 March contact. Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located 25 NVA KIA at YA600585. Company C located five NVA KIA and one NVA WIA at YA600583 resulting from Company A's 12 March contact. Two mining incidents occurred on route 509 and two more on route 509B.

16 March. Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received 10 rounds of 82mm mortars. 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a combat assault in a landing zone at YA758368. The landing zone was occupied by an estimated NVA platoon which engaged the first elements with small arms, automatic weapons and command detonated mines. This action resulted in five US KIA, 13 WIA, one UH-1D destroyed and seven damaged. Ten NVA were KIA. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with an NVA squad resulting in seven NVA KIA; two US KIA and five WIA.

17 March. Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact

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with an estimated NVA platoon at YA769391 resulting in four NVA KIA, one US KIA and seven WIA. Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size NVA force resulting in 10 NVA KIA, one US KIA and six WIA. An ambush patrol, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry killed two NVA at YA613602. 104

18 March. Patrol from 1st Battalion, 69th Armor located three 750 pounds bombs and seven 90mm projectiles at BR063345. All were destroyed in place. One mining incident occurred on route 19 west.

19 March.

20 March. Patrol from 1st Battalion, 69th Armor received an estimated 10 rounds of 60mm mortar fire vicinity of BR075409. Two mining incidents occurred on route 509B.

21 March. Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made heavy contact at 1540 hours with an estimated NVA company at YA680560. They were receiving small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fires. Contact was broken at 1739 hours. Results: 22 US KIA, 53 US WIA. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry moved north from battalion fire support base and linked up with Company C at 1950 hours. 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry's fire support base received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire at 1930 to 1940 hours.

22 March. Company A and C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry received an estimated 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. Search of the battle area by Company C revealed 16 NVA KIA.

A reconno patrol, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry lost radio contact for an extended period. Company A and B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry were sent to search for them. At 0730 hours, Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry moving in two columns came under automatic weapons fire around the flanks bringing the entire company into contact. A direct hit from a mortar round or a B-40 rocket round killed the company commander and artillery forward observer. With the resulting break in communications, effective, close-in artillery fires were not available. The company fought most of the engagement at close range from two separate perimeters.

Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry moved toward the sound of the battle on a company line. The company became heavily engaged. The company was temporarily split but soon reconsolidated.

The enemy eventually broke contact and withdrew to the southwest.

Enemy personnel losses were 136 NVA KIA (BC).

US losses were 27 KIA and 48 WIA.

23 March. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with two NVA resulting in two NVA KIA. Companies A and B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry encountered two NVA attempting to police the battle field. Result: two NVA KIA. Two mining incidents occurred on route 509. One mining incident occurred on route 19 West.

24 March. Companies A and B, 2d Battalion 35th Infantry continu-

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105 ing to sweep battle area located 21 NVA KIA. Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry located 10 NVA bodies estimated three days old in shallow graves. Company A observed 60mm mortar rounds landing 200 meters from their night location; later five 60mm mortar rounds landed outside their perimeter.

25 March.

26 March. Three mining incidents occurred on route 19 West resulting in two WIA.

27 March.

28 March. One mining incident occurred on route 19 West.

29 March. Two mining incidents occurred on route 509B.

30 March. 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry took 34 detainees during a cordon and search of a village in AO northwest of PLEIKU.

31 March. 2d Brigade reconce patrol made contact with eight VMC at ZAL36207 and resulted in six VMC KIA, one light machine gun captured.

1 April. 4th Aviation Battalion UH-1C received ground fire forcing the helicopter down. Two crewmen were WIA and the aircraft was destroyed.

2 April. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received automatic weapons fire vicinity ZA088524 resulting in one US WIA. It also located two tons of rice and 60 pounds of salt at ZA098528. One mining incident occurred on route 19 West.

3 April. Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry found 300 pounds of rice in the vicinity of ZA095181. During the process of destroying the rice two US were WIA by punji sticks. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received 30-40 rounds of small arms fire resulting in one US WIA. Artillery placed on suspected enemy location resulting in one NVA KIA. 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry returned to operational control of the 4th Infantry Division at 030001.

4 April. One mining incident occurred on route 14B. One mining incident on route 19 West.

5 April. Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received friendly 81mm mortar rounds resulting in 12 US WIA. The rounds were fired by their mortar platoon. The accident was the result of a deflection error. Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry located 500 pounds of rice vicinity ZA107562.

Operation SAM HOUSTON terminated 052400 hours.

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 FIRE SUPPORT BASES AND FORWARD CP AREAS
 MAP 1:50,000 SERIES L7014
 (FOR SHEET NOS, SEE PARA 3, COMBAT AFTER ACTION
 REPORT- SAM HOUSTON)

2/8 10-13 MAR

1/8 11-13 MAR

1/8 22 FEB-4 MAR
 1/12 8-16 MAR

1/8 4-11 MAR

1/22 15 FEB-18 MAR

2/35 3-9 MAR


1/12 15 FEB-8 MAR

2/35 27 FEB-3 MAR

2/8 20 JAN-9 MAR
 2/35 9-28 MAR

2/8 3-20 JAN
 2/35 17-27 FEB
 1/8 13-18 MAR
 3/8 18-29 MAR

1/12 30 JAN-2 FEB
 1/8 21-22 FEB



1/22 10-15 JAN

1/12 2-15 FEB 1/12 16 MAR-5 APR

1/69 15-23 JAN
 1/22 18-29 MAR

1/69 22-27 JAN

15° BDE 3

1/8 4-11 MAR

2 15 FEB-18 MAR

2/35 3-9 MAR


FEB-8 MAR

2/35 27 FEB-3 MAR

2/8 20 JAN-9 MAR
2/35 9-28 MAR

2/8 3-20 JAN
2/35 17-27 FEB
1/8 13-18 MAR
3/8 18-29 MAR

1/12 30 JAN-2 FEB
1/8 21-22 FEB



1/22 10-15 JAN

1/12 7-15 FEB 1/12 16 MAR-5 APR

1/69 15-23 JAN
1/22 18-29 MAR

2

1/69 22-27 JAN

1st BDE 3 MAR-5 APR
3/8 29 MAR-5 APR
1/69 27-29 JAN

1/8 21 MAR-4 APR

2/35 16-17 FEB
1/8 31 JAN-16 FEB

1/8 18-21 MAR


2/35 13-16 FEB
1/8 4-5 APR
YA 868135

2/35 4-13 FEB
YA 941013

95
25 YA

INCLOSURE 11-1
CONFIDENTIAL

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1/22 29 MAR - 5 APR

3/25 BC, 1-2 JAN

CONFIDENTIAL
 FIRE SUPPORT BASES & FORWARD
 MAP 1:50,000 SERIES L7014
 (FOR SHEET NRS, SEE PARA 3, COMB
 REPORT - SAM HOUSTON)

1/22, 25-30 JAN

1/10 29 JAN - 5 APR



DMBC

1/10 2-17 JAN
1/22 16-17 JAN

1/8 23-30 JAN
1/10 18-25 JAN

1/22 24-25 JAN
2 BDE 26 MAR - 5 APR
2/8, 29 MAR - 5 APR

1/10, 26-28 JAN
1/22, 17-23 JAN
1/8, 21-26 JAN
2/15, 29 JAN - 3 FEB

INCLOSURE 11-2
CONFIDENTIAL

MAR-5 APR


2/85 2-8 JAN
(BR 120549)

1/69 29 JAN-5 APR

3/25 BC, 1-2 JAN

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FIRE SUPPORT BASES & FORWARD CP AREAS
MAP 1:50,000 SERIES L7014
(FOR SHEET NRS, SEE PARA 3, COMBAT AFTER ACTION
REPORT - SAM HOUSTON)




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INCLOSURE 11-2
CONFIDENTIAL

70
60

CONFIDENTIAL
SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS - OPERATION SAM HOUSTON
MAP 150,000 SERIES L7014
(FOR SHEET NRS SEE PARA 3, COMBAT
AFTER ACTION REPORT - SAM HOUSTON

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INCLOSURE 12

111

B/1-22
2-3 MAR
AC/1/22
16-FEB
x 1/22
A/1/22
14 MAR

F/12 15 FEB
A, B, C, 11-12
A/1-12
25 FEB

B/2-8
21 FEB
C/2-35
21 MAR
A/2-35

2/8 X
20 JAN
CF/2-8

W/2-8
A/2-8
K/2-8
16 FEB

A, B, C / 2-35
12 MAR

B/1-12
16 MAR


A, B / 1-8 22 MAR

x CPFSB
1/8 21 MAR

x 3J

2

ENCLOSURE 12



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AIR AND GROUND DEFOLIATION DATA (C)

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1. (C) The following aerial defoliation missions were flown:
 - a. 18 Feb 67 - one C-123 sprayed approximately 1000 gal of defoliant from YA6754 to YA7351.
 - b. 26 Feb 67 - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA6670 to YA6453.
 - c. 2 Mar 67 - three C-123's sprayed approximately 3000 gallons of defoliant from YA6655 to YA7351.
 - d. 4 Mar 67 - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA7186 to YA6670.
 - e. 12 Mar 67 - three C-123's sprayed approximately 3000 gallons of defoliant from YA6370 to YA6354.
 - f. 16 Mar 67 - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA7769 to YA7652.
 - g. 24 Mar 67 - three C-123's sprayed approximately 3000 gallons of defoliant from YA8762 to YA7661.
 - h. 27 Mar 67 - three C-123's sprayed approximately 3000 gallons of defoliant from YA6368 to YA5757 to YA5953.
 - i. 1 Apr 67 - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA6670 to YA6454.
 - j. 3 Apr 67 - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA7620 to YA7552.
 - k. 5 Apr 67 - two C-123's sprayed approximately 2000 gallons of defoliant from YA6563 to YA 7352.
2. (U) Ground based defoliation was conducted using a power driven decontaminating apparatus along Highway 509B Extension from 2-14 Jan 67. Minimal results were obtained, killing underbrush and leaves on small trees within 20-30 feet on each side of the road.
3. (C) Commencing 21 January 1967, ground based defoliation has been accomplished from a spray system mounted in a UH-1D Helicopters. The following are the targets and the results achieved on each.
 - a. Route 509B (Extension) - YA740503 to YA655555 - 1225 gal ORANGE - 810 gal WHITE - Results were:
 - (1) YA740503 - YA677547 - approximately 80% leaf kill 30-50 meters each side of the road.

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(2) YA677547 - 45% leaf kill 100-150 meters from perimeter.

(3) YA677547 - YA655555 - Approximately 45% leaf kill 20-30 meters each side of the road.

(4) Visibility increased 75% in all sprayed areas. The road is now clearly discernable.

(5) Further results cannot be stated due to commencement of aerial defoliation missions being flown over the same area on 18 Feb 67.

b. Route 509B - YA802454 to YA740503 - 110 gal ORANGE - 60 gal WHITE - Results: Approximately 30% leaf kill 20-30 meters each side of the road.

c. Route 509 - YA870455 to YA945433 - 50 gal ORANGE - 190 gal WHITE - Results: Negligible except at bridge site vic YA912450 (25% leaf kill), project incomplete at end of period.

d. Route 509 - ZA0242 to ZA0443 - 180 gal WHITE - Results: Negligible at this time. Project incomplete at end of period.

e. Fire Support Base - YA6160 - 38 gal WHITE - Results: Approximately 20-30% leaf kill. Project incomplete at end of period.

f. Fire Support Base - YA757386 - 76 gal WHITE - Results: Approximately 20-30% leaf kill. Project incomplete at end of period.

g. Fire Support Base - YA760500 - 38 gal WHITE - results: Approximately 20-30% leaf kill. Project incomplete at end of period.

h. Fire Support Base - YA732504 - 38 gal WHITE - Results: Approximately 20-30% leaf kill. Project incomplete at end of period.

i. LZ 3T - YA8545 - 70 gal ORANGE - Results: Approximately 85% leaf kill in all areas sprayed.

NOTE: (C) Defoliants mentioned above:

(1) WHITE attacks only certain species of broadleaf plants.

(2) ORANGE attacks both broadleaf and grasses.

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1/5-


TO
YA 7186
2

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CHEMICAL OPNS OVERLAY - OP SAM HOV
MAP SCALE 1:50,000
MAP SERIES L 7014
MAP SHEETS 6437 II, 6537 III, 6536 I, 6536




- 2 TRAIL DUST MISSIONS (NO. OF SORTIES)
- - - GROUND BASED DEFOLIATION
- ▨ CS DROPS
- FIRE BASE PERIMETERS DEFOLIATED




CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CHEMICAL OPNS OVERLAY - DP SAH HOUSTON
MAP SCALE 1:50,000
MAP SERIES L 7014
MAP SHEETS 6437 II, 6537 III, 6536 I, 6536 II



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INCLOSURE 13

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List of Abbreviations Used in Text

AO	Area of Operations
ARVN	Army Republic of VIETNAM
CA	Civic Actions
CAS	Close Air Support
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CP	Command Post
GSS	Combat Sky Spot
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DMBC	Dragon Mountain Base Camp
DS	Direct Support
BAC	Forward Air Controller
FSA	Forward Support Area
FSB	Fire Support Base
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GRREG	Graves Registration
GS	General Support
GVN	Government of VIETNAM
H & I	Harassment and Interdiction
IGD	Imitative Communications Deception
IFWV	I Field Force, VIETNAM
JUSPAO	Joint US Public Affairs Agency
KIA	Killed in Action
LF	Local Force
LLOC	Land Lines of Communication
LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol

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MEDCAP	Medical-Civic Action Program
MF	Main Force
MIA	Missing in Action
MSR	Main Supply Route
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVAC	North Vietnamese Army Captive
OPCON	Operational Control
PP	Pre-Planned
RCA	Riot Control Agent
RR	Recoilless Rifle
RVN	Republic of VIETNAM
S & D	Search and Destroy
SP	Self Propelled
TAC	Tactical
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSF	United States Special Forces
VC	Viet Cong
VCC	Viet Cong Captive
VEFCAP	Veterinary Civic Action Program
VMC	Viet Montagnard Cong
VMCC	Viet Montagnard Cong Captive
VR	Visual Reconnaissance
VTR	Vehicle, Tank Recovery
WIA	Wounded in Action

Inclosure 14

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